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Filtering by: Creator Daniel Fershtman Keyword Mechanism Design

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Essays in Dynamic Delegation and Matching

Description:

This dissertation is a collection of three essays that study (dynamic) incentive provision in multi-agent settings with asymmetric information: delegation of projects in organizations, dynamic matching on a platform, and arbitration between partners in a dispute.', "The first chapter studies dynamic delegation of heterogeneous projects to agents with diverse capabilities....

Keyword:

Arbitration, Dynamic Delegation, Partnerships, Mechanism Design, Information Economics, and Dynamic Matching

Subject:

Economics

Creator:

Daniel Fershtman

Owner:

Scholarly Digital Publishing

Date Uploaded:

10/08/2019

Date Modified:

10/08/2019

Date Created:

2018-01-01

Resource Type:

Dissertation