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Filtering by: Creator Pavan, Alessandro Creator Gomes, Renato

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Many-to-many matching and price discrimination

Description:

We study centralized many-to-many matching in markets where agents have private information about (vertical) characteristics that determine match values. Our analysis reveals how matching patterns reflect cross-subsidization between sides. Agents are endogenously partitioned into consumers and inputs. At the optimum, the costs of procuring agents-inputs are compensated by the gains...

Keyword:

cross-subsidization and economics

Creator:

Gomes, Renato and Pavan, Alessandro

Depositor:

Chris Diaz

Owner:

Scholarly Digital Publishing

Publisher:

Wiley

Date Uploaded:

01/06/2017

Date Modified:

12/01/2017

Date Created:

2016-09-12

Resource Type:

Article