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Work3

Resource type

Dissertation3

Creator

Daniel Fershtman1
Mishara-Blomberger, Jonas1
Theisen, Alexander Scott1

Keyword

Mechanism Design[remove]3
Arbitration1
Dynamic Delegation1
Dynamic Matching1
Full Surplus Extraction1
more Keywords »

Subject

Economics[remove]3
Economic theory1
Political science1

Language

en2

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Studies in Persuasion and Enforcement in Political Economy

Description:

This dissertation presents research on the game theory of political power, both between and within nations. It first revisits a classical distinction between three different types of power or influence: information, rewards and threats. By presenting a binary-action Principal-Agent problem which incorporates the essential ingredients of all three types of...

Keyword:

Game Theory, Mechanism Design, and Political Economy

Subject:

Economics, Political science, and Economic theory

Creator:

Theisen, Alexander Scott

Owner:

Scholarly Digital Publishing

Language:

en

Date Uploaded:

01/21/2021

Date Created:

2020-01-01

Resource Type:

Dissertation

Alternate Identifier:

etdadmin_upload_742509 and http://dissertations.umi.com/northwestern:15094
Essays on Selling Information and Surplus

Description:

In the first chapter I introduce the ideas that link selling information to surplus extraction. In my environment the seller may be uncertain about how much the buyer both has already learned before contracting with the seller (belief types) and is able to learn after contracting with the seller (information...

Keyword:

Screening, Selling Information, Mechanism Design, and Full Surplus Extraction

Subject:

Economics

Creator:

Mishara-Blomberger, Jonas

Owner:

Scholarly Digital Publishing

Language:

en

Date Uploaded:

02/12/2020

Date Created:

2019-01-01

Resource Type:

Dissertation

Alternate Identifier:

etdadmin_upload_662459 and http://dissertations.umi.com/northwestern:14641
Essays in Dynamic Delegation and Matching

Description:

This dissertation is a collection of three essays that study (dynamic) incentive provision in multi-agent settings with asymmetric information: delegation of projects in organizations, dynamic matching on a platform, and arbitration between partners in a dispute.', "The first chapter studies dynamic delegation of heterogeneous projects to agents with diverse capabilities....

Keyword:

Arbitration, Dynamic Delegation, Partnerships, Mechanism Design, Information Economics, and Dynamic Matching

Subject:

Economics

Creator:

Daniel Fershtman

Owner:

Scholarly Digital Publishing

Date Uploaded:

10/08/2019

Date Modified:

10/08/2019

Date Created:

2018-01-01

Resource Type:

Dissertation

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