Global Insurgents and the Winning Paradox

Humpal, Jesse

doi:https://doi.org/10.21985/n2-7bvy-qc19

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Global Insurgents and the Winning Paradox

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How do ever-changing international systems and rapidly emerging technology shape counter-systemic revolutionary insurgent (CSRI) behavior and outcomes? The purpose of this publication is to identify causes and develop a conceptual typology of CSRI survival and behavior in a Post-9/11 era. I argue three global shocks acted as junctures for new geopolitical responses to revolutionary groups. These shocks occurred in 1945, 1991, and 2001 and subsequently changed the way counter-systemic organizations behave and survive. Each of these shocks marks a year when international rhetoric changed, world balance of power shifted or transitioned, and funding and technology (survivability and autonomy) available for these organizations shifted. In order to survive, groups in all eras needed a resource, be it money or personnel. In the bipolar era of the Cold War, these resources most often came from an external state patron. Immediately following the Cold War (1991–2001), without easy access to either an external patron or modern connective technology, groups found themselves without many options for positive outcomes. Accordingly, this era yields the poorest survival odds for insurgency groups. Post-2001 groups, however, could recruit and raise money independently from external patronage thanks to social media, dark money, and other survival-enhancing technologies. In spite of these newly available advancements, counter-systemic groups also—for a variety of reasons—found patron availability again and increasingly took advantage of the state sponsor. Those who enjoyed both, a state patron and connective technology, displayed drastically different behavior and outcome options than either the bipolar-era groups with patrons or modern-era patronless ones.

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