Plato's Grounds for Philosophy: The Virtues of Dialectic in the Later Dialogues

Tushar Irani

doi:https://doi.org/10.21985/N2WB35

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Plato's Grounds for Philosophy: The Virtues of Dialectic in the Later Dialogues

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This dissertation consists of three self-standing essays, each of which focuses on a dialogue from Plato's later period. Together, they touch on some of his well-known views in metaphysics and moral psychology, from his theory of forms to his theory of the tripartite soul. But the topic that unifies these essays is philosophical method rather than philosophical theory. In each case, I argue that methodological concerns regarding the point and possibility of philosophy came to dominate Plato's attention in later dialogues following the Republic, and that the views he develops in these works are best understood in terms of his interest in advancing the practice of dialectic. The bulk of the dissertation is motivated by a claim I argue for in Chapter 1: that Plato is more interested in identifying the conditions that enable dialectic in the Theaetetus than he is in solving the question of knowledge. Plato famously refrains from defining knowledge in this work. Instead, he shows us what makes dialectic impracticable: a Heraclitean view of the world according to which all things are in flux, and a Protagorean epistemology devoid of rational activity, according to which all truth is relative and things are just the way they appear to be. We're left with unanswered questions by the dialogue's end. First, what kind of stability in the world and what kind of activity are required for dialectic? Second, why is pursuing dialectic even worthwhile? The remaining essays in the dissertation seek to answer these questions by turning to Plato's more positive views in the Sophist and Phaedrus. In Chapter 2, I examine his arguments in the Sophist against the so-called "Friends of the Forms" to show how the claims he makes in this work for the interrelatedness of the forms are similarly concerned with the point and possibility of philosophy. In Chapter 3, I show how the Phaedrus grapples with the same concerns, but from the standpoint of moral psychology, where Plato's conception of eros serves to inform his understanding of dialectic as an "ensouled" activity that ensures our flourishing. The purpose of dialectical activity on this reading is ultimately found in its ethical significance in making us better. Fostering such character involves considerable work, yet it is a running theme throughout Plato's dialogues that to live in a society that valued such activity above all would be our greatest good fortune.

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