This dissertation consists of three essays that deal with problems of information acquisition and aggregation and the incentives to acquire such information. The first of the essays is titled The Timing of Complementary Innovations and studies the problem of an agent that acquires information about the viability of a project while working on the complementary parts of the project. The second essay is titled Liability Design with Information Acquisition. The paper asks how to guarantee that agents acquire sufficient information about the risks that their actions might impose on others before acting using incentives that only when some damage occurs. The third essay, titled Market-Based Mechanisms, looks at the general problem of designing mechanisms that use as an input the aggregate action of a large number of players.

Creator

• Poggi, Francisco

DOI

• https://doi.org/10.21985/n2-b93b-9g89

Subject

• Economic theory

Language

• en

Alternate Identifier

• http://dissertations.umi.com/northwestern:15600
• etdadmin_upload_822162

Keyword

• Information Acquisition
• Innovation
• Microeconomics

Date created

• 2021-01-01

Resource type

• Dissertation

Rights statement

• In Copyright