This dissertation is on daily policing dynamics in China, centering around one core question: why coercive institutions can be extremely efficient for some issues but nearly dysfunctional for others in authoritarian regimes. The police may enforce the law relentlessly in some cases, even if there is no clear harm, but they may also be dismissive of conspicuous crime. What factors shape frontline policing work? How do these factors affect current Chinese policing routines? What do the police focus on and what do they neglect, and why? I argue that political pressure and individual incentives jointly shape daily policing in China, resulting in a typology of four kinds of policing: zealous, lazy, deceptive, and selective. Under high political pressure and high individual incentives, Chinese policing is often zealous, and in some cases, overzealous and heavily enforced. At the other extreme, when both pressure and incentives are weak, enforcement is low to non-existent. In situations where high political pressure combines with low individual incentives, police enforcement tends to be superficial or deceptive, meaning that frontline police do enough to make their key measurements look good, or they manipulate the key measurements, but may not fully police the underlying issues. When an issue is characterized by low political pressure but high individual incentives, policing enforcement tends to be selective, primarily focusing on easy cases where the career benefits are clearest. I focus on three aspects of daily policing to test my theory: criminal investigation, public order management and daily function of police stations.

Creator

• Liu, Yuchen

DOI

• https://doi.org/10.21985/n2-ygdt-gg37

Subject

• Political science

Language

• en

Alternate Identifier

• etdadmin_upload_731438
• http://dissertations.umi.com/northwestern:15041

Date created

• 2020-01-01

Resource type

• Dissertation

Rights statement

• In Copyright