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Defining China: Beijing, Taipei, and the United Nations' "China Seat," 1949-1992

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Abstract

After the Second World War, two states claimed to represent the same nation: “China.” This work examines how the Kuomintang (KMT) and the Communist Party of China (CPC) competed to represent China and the international consequences of that competition. The CPC’s victory in the Chinese Civil War (1946-1949) led to their founding the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in Beijing in 1949, while the KMT reestablished the Republic of China (ROC) in Taipei, Taiwan. Consequently, “China” was a contested concept as both the KMT and the CPC developed distinct models of “China” to support their legitimacy, and the UN was a key venue for demonstrating international legitimacy. In this work, I investigate the CPC’s and the KMT’s vying interpretations of China from 1949 to 1992 by assaying both parties’ interpretations through local newspapers published in China and Taiwan, party-mouthpiece publications, periodicals meant for foreign audiences, and UN documents.

The UN encourages, unintentionally, state adherence to established narratives of the nation. Before 1971, the KMT presented its state as the inheritor of Chinese traditions and culture. The CPC presented its state as one that freed the Chinese nation from the shackles of the past. After the UN passed Resolution 2758, however, both parties’ models of China shifted. The CPC became more dedicated to presenting the glory of the Chinese nation’s past, while the KMT became less beholden to the fiction they represented a nation whose roots stretched back unbroken through antiquity. The only way to understand how the change in UN representation affected each state is to examine both parties’ post-1971 claims to represent China. By going to the ROC’s 1992 democratic reforms, I analyze both parties’ definitions of China with and without access to the world body to show how UN membership, or lack thereof, shaped their

constructions of China and how those constructions, in turn, shaped their domestic and foreign policies. Going beyond 1971 also illustrates shifting Chinese attitudes towards the UN and theories of diplomacy in both states. “Defining China” enhances literature on Chinese foreign relations, Cold War international relations, and nationalism.

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Dedication

To Margaret Wang, 521

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Introduction

“China” was a contested concept throughout the latter half of the twentieth century. On 1 October 1949 Mao Zedong announced the establishment of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) from atop Tiananmen. Mao was Chairman of the Communist Party of China (CPC) which had recently claimed victory in the Chinese Civil War, 1946-1949. Chiang Kai-shek led the remnants of his defeated Kuomintang (KMT) to Taiwan where they reestablished the Republic of China (ROC). Chiang and his government in exile vowed to return to the mainland and free the nation from the communist usurpers even as Mao and his government swore they would liberate Taiwan and finish their revolution by eradicating the remnants of the Nationalist bourgeoisie.

This was not the first time a defeated regime, or its supporters, had used Taiwan as a redoubt. In 1661, Ming-loyalist Zheng Chenggong 鄭成功 (1624-1662) took control of Taiwan from the Dutch. Zheng’s goal was to return to the mainland, wrest control from the Manchu-ethnic Qing dynasty, and reestablish the Han-ethnic Ming. The Han were, and remain, the largest ethnic group in the region now known as China. After Zheng died in 1662, his heirs ruled an autonomous, maritime state from their base in Taiwan. The Zheng state’s autonomy and antipathy toward the Manchus made it a threat to the new Qing dynasty and in 1683 the Kangxi emperor (1661-1722) dispatched General Shi Lang 施琅 (1621-1696), one of Zheng’s former officers, to end the independence of the Zheng realm and exercise Qing rule. After Shi succeeded, Kangxi and his ministers had no interest in maintaining sovereignty over Taiwan. Shi had to convince the Court the island should remain part of the empire, which Kangxi and his

advisors accepted begrudgingly.¹ Three centuries later, Chiang's regime on Taiwan echoed Zheng's resistance to the Qing, except that in this twentieth-century iteration the resister was a nationalist regime opposed to China's new communist rulers. Mao, assuming the place of the Kangxi emperor, lacked a Shi Lang to oust the hostile government on Taiwan, but Mao and the CPC needed no convincing the island should remain their sovereign territory. Another difference between the Qing-Zheng competition in the seventeenth century and the KMT-CPC competition in the twentieth was that they took place in radically different international systems.

The CPC and KMT both sought international acknowledgement of their right to represent the Chinese nation. Each party vied for recognition in the United Nations, the post-war world's premier intergovernmental organization. During the Second World War, the Allied nations began forming a new organization to replace the defunct League of Nations.² In 1945, at the end of the war, the Allies formally established the UN and it quickly transformed the international system by providing all states a forum to express their views and pursue their strategic interests. While the CPC had effectively won the Chinese Civil War in 1949, the KMT's ROC remained China in the UN. Therefore, the CPC and KMT competition to represent China continued in the new organization as each sought international recognition of their sovereignty over the Chinese nation. The UN held particular significance for the leaders in Beijing and Taipei because China was not only a founding member of the world body, it also held a permanent seat on the Security Council. The UN Charter gave permanent members of the Security Council veto power, which was a powerful tool in international affairs. Consequently, both the CPC and the KMT sought to

¹ Tonio Andrade, *How Taiwan Became Chinese: Dutch, Spanish, and Han Colonization in the Seventeenth Century*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008).

² For more on the League of Nations see: Thomas W. Burkman, *Japan and the League of Nations: Empire and World Order, 1914-1938*, (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2008); Susan Pederson, *The Guardians: The League of Nations and the Crisis of Empire*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015).

control the “China seat” in the UN and the symbolic and real power it provided in the international arena.

The competition between Beijing and Taipei became known as the “China Question,” and delegates to the UN debated which state had the right to represent China in every session of the UN until 1971. These debates helped shape the post-war international system. Essentially, China’s contested status in the UN resulted in the world body more clearly delineating the relation between state sovereignty and membership, a question of significance throughout the world. As colonies won their independence from their former imperial hegemons, such as the United States, United Kingdom, or France, they sought UN membership. The UN provided international recognition of state sovereignty as well as an essential platform for international statecraft. As UN representatives argued for and against Beijing or Taipei representing China, their claims influenced new states seeking to join the world body. New UN delegates then influenced the ongoing debate over which party represented China.

The UN was not a marginal site of contest after the Second World War, but one where debates on sovereignty and legitimacy established the foundations for international order in the post-war era. Legitimacy in international relations is the acceptance of an institution’s or a state’s authority to engage with other states. In Ian Hurd’s terms “sovereignty, understood as the exercise of legitimate authority in international relations, is not located exclusively in states. Sovereignty exists wherever processes of legitimation create powerful institutions of authority in world politics. Sovereignty can be found in some international institutions, including the Security Council” and other UN organs, including the General Assembly.³ China serves as an important

³ Ian Hurd, *After Anarchy: Legitimacy and Power in the United Nations Security Council*, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008), 185.

example of the UN's legitimizing role as the debates over PRC versus ROC authority influenced decolonization as it took place throughout the post-war world. The creation of new states from former colonies was directly influenced by the debates over sovereignty in the UN. Within the debates over sovereignty in the world body, the competition between Beijing and Taipei to represent China was the longest running and received significant attention. The ROC represented China in both the Security Council and General Assembly even after most Chinese territory remained outside of KMT control.

That the KMT was able to represent China on the world stage, despite their inability to assert control over more than a tiny fraction of the Chinese nation, disaggregates the nation from the state. Indeed, the UN itself is a site where states and nations are divorced. As China demonstrated, being the representative of a state in the world body did not necessarily connote control over the nation. China's contested status in the UN laid the foundations for what a legitimate political authority was, as nascent states sought international recognition of their right to rule territories and peoples.

Both Beijing's and Taipei's defense of their right to represent the Chinese nation separated the nation from the state. The CPC-KMT competition demonstrates that the term nation-state is an amalgamation of two discreet constructions, the nation and the state. While both the CPC and KMT claimed, respectively, that the PRC and ROC represented China, the "China" each portrayed was not the same. The CPC depicted China as a revolutionary nation and celebrated the triumph of communist modernism over traditional culture. The KMT also portrayed China as a revolutionary nation, but revolution was represented as a part of traditional culture that the Father of the Nation, Sun Yat-sen, had upheld in making a modern state. The struggle between the CPC and KMT to represent China separated the state from the nation as

each party depicted their state as the legitimate authority for the Chinese people and territory, and their constructions of Chinese nationality were more dependent on territoriality than ethnicity. The PRC and ROC claims to represent the same geography and people, along with allies who supported those claims, demonstrates how nations and states are neither coterminous nor natural. While oftentimes political entities share ethnic and territorial boundaries that made the term nation-state appear axiomatic, politicians, scholars and others who use the term naturalize the artificial constructs of both nation and state.

The CPC's and KMT's efforts to represent China were shaped by Cold War realpolitik as they adopted rhetoric and policies to align themselves with and against either the United States or Soviet Union and their allies. When CPC officials defined China as a revolutionary nation, they challenged the international system which they claimed favored reactionary regimes, a position aligned with Soviet rhetoric. For the CPC, "China" had ended the century of humiliation by casting off the shackles of history and traditional culture to become not only "modern," but revolutionary. KMT officials cast China as a nation of culture and tradition while celebrating the international arena that had been established by the United States and benefited ROC legitimacy. For the KMT, "China" had regained world prominence by adopting new scientific and political methods while honoring its past through adherence to Confucian values and Sun Yat-sen's principles. The two parties' interpretations of China influenced their approaches to both domestic policy and international relations.

The CPC's and KMT's conflicting definition of China were married to the global Cold War narrative, but those depictions were not merely efforts to align with that international competition. The CPC's post-war effort to industrialize the economy led to the revolutionary and disastrous Great Leap Forward 大躍進, that instigated one of the most severe famines in history.

Mao launched the Great Leap despite warnings from Soviet representatives that this type of reform had proved disastrous when the USSR had done it in the 1930s. The KMT, on the other hand, pursued gradual economic reform through a “use agriculture to nurture industry” 以農養工 program that resulted in the ROC’s industrial sector surpassing agriculture in 1963.⁴ The KMT received U.S. support throughout this period and did not go against American advice, such as making the economy more amenable to investment by U.S. businesses.⁵ Significantly, Beijing chose a radical approach to reform its economy against the advice of its superpower ally, whereas Taipei chose a gradual approach with the backing of its superpower benefactor. This demonstrated how the CPC’s and KMT’s differing images of China were more than ideological positions; they directly influenced how each party conceived of and sought to govern the Chinese nation. While the competition between Beijing and Taipei cannot be divorced from the nascent Cold War, that conflict alone does not explain how the competition lasted as long as it did nor why it concluded in favor of the CPC.

Taipei’s and Beijing’s contested interpretations of the historical bequest and present iteration of China had consequences for the international system. In 1955 T.F. Tsiang 蔣廷黻, the ROC representative to the UN, cast the ROC’s sole veto during its tenure as China in the UN. Tsiang vetoed the admission of the People’s Republic of Mongolia to the organization. The ROC veto was highly controversial and opposed by many in the UN, including U.S. officials in private, but KMT officials considered Mongolia part of China’s territory and so acted in accordance with international norms to defend ROC national interests. PRC representatives

⁴ 黃安余, “論臺灣 ‘以農養工’ 政策的實施,” 臺灣農業探索, no. 2 (April 2012): 1-5.

⁵ Lee Wei-Chen and Chang I-Min, “US AID and Taiwan,” *Asian Review of World Histories*, no. 2 (Jan. 2014): 47-80.

denounced the ROC's veto and proclaimed support for Mongolian independence, though privately they too considered Mongolia part of the Chinese nation.⁶ KMT protestations that Mongolia was a part of China did not accord with Ulaanbaatar's decades of self-rule, which at one point included ROC recognition of its independence. This episode reveals how KMT officials, holding the UN China seat, used the international system to defend ROC national interests, specifically maintaining the territorial integrity of the Chinese nation as they perceived it; despite their "loss" of Mongolia years before and, arguably, China as well. The ROC government had no need to call for a reinterpretation of existing norms to act internationally. In contrast, PRC officials used the ROC veto to champion the independence of new nations. The CPC portrayed the veto as evidence the system was corrupt, demonstrated not only by its exclusion from the world body but by KMT representatives' denial of another state's entry into the UN. Consequently, Beijing's refusal to adhere to the international system was presented as a moral objection. Even though PRC national interests were similar to the ROC's in this case, CPC officials used this episode to call for change rather than keeping Mongolia within China's borders. The CPC's official stance on Mongolian sovereignty also aligned with Soviet rhetoric. The ROC's defense of the Chinese nation's territorial integrity allowed PRC representatives to appear supportive of Ulaanbaatar's independence without jeopardizing their concept of China. Their claims were symbolic, ROC representatives' were substantive.

The CPC and KMT created contrasting images of China that significantly influenced how they presented the past to their citizens and to the people of other states. In May 1966 Mao Zedong launched the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution文化大革命. Mao began this

⁶ "Information Memorandum, 'About the Claims of the Chinese Leaders With Regard to the Mongolian People's Republic,'" January 30, 1964, obtained and translated for Cold War International History Project by Sergey Radchenko, accessed 27 Apr. 2013, <http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/113098>.

tumultuous period in PRC history in order to reestablish his control of the CPC and set the nation's agenda. Mao invoked radical change to reassert his primacy within the party, but his invocation was tied to CPC representations of China as a revolutionary state. The Cultural Revolution resulted in the PRC entering its most internationally isolated period as it recalled all of its ambassadors except Egypt's, even as it appealed to radicals and revolutionaries throughout the world.⁷ Chiang Kai-shek's response to the Cultural Revolution roiling the Mainland was to begin the Chinese Cultural Renaissance Movement 中華文化復興運動 in November 1966, on the hundred-and-first anniversary of Sun Yat-sen's birth. Chiang's Cultural Renaissance was an attempt to reinvigorate Chinese culture in Taiwanese society based on Confucianism and Sun Yat-sen's Three Principles' of the People 三民主義: nationalism, democracy, and people's livelihood. The Cultural Renaissance was a political movement and among its goals was promoting the ROC as the bastion of traditional Chinese culture, where Confucian principles and Chinese history were honored, to international audiences. The KMT's Cultural Renaissance was a direct response to the CPC's radical assault on Chinese tradition on the mainland, but it also fit the international image Taipei had projected of China as a nation of traditions. Thus, both parties' constructions of China significantly influenced their domestic policies, as Mao called for continuous revolution and Chiang appealed to an ancient past.

Historiography

International Relations

⁷ Jeremi Suri, "The Rise and Fall of an International Counterculture, 1960-1975," *American Historical Review* 114, no. 1 (Feb., 2009): 60.

Scholarship on China's place in the UN has been limited. Studies that directly address the UN generally pay little attention to China's role in the world body.⁸ Works that examine Sino-American relations tilt towards climactic events rather than the long-running competition for the UN China seat.⁹ Indeed, assessments focused on diplomacy between the United States and China tend to address the UN's role in American foreign relations or international relations only in passing.¹⁰ Chen Jian in *Mao's China and the Cold War* asserts "the simple fact that the PRC... gained its position at the UN in October 1971 proves the enormous strategic value of the Sino-American rapprochement to Beijing."¹¹ Chen's comment demonstrates a tendency among Sino-American relations focused scholars to treat the UN as an organization that merely reflected U.S. interests, rather than as an important site for mediating questions of state sovereignty and international legitimacy. Implicit in this body of work is the assumption that rapprochement with the United States was more significant for the CPC than membership in the UN.

The U.S. role in the debates over whether the PRC or ROC was the legitimate representative of China in the UN was not insignificant. But that does not explain why key U.S. allies were willing to go against U.S. interests. For example, Britain recognized the PRC in 1950, even though Beijing refused to exchange ambassadors with London until 1972. Britain, though,

⁸ Hurd, *After Anarchy*; Mark Mazower, *No Enchanted Palace: The End of Empires and the Ideological Origins of the United Nations*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009); Mark Mazower, *Governing the World: The History of an Idea, 1815 to Present*, (New York: Penguin Books, 2012).

⁹ Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, *Patterns in the Dust: Chinese-American Relations and the Recognition Controversy, 1949-1950*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983); Gordon H. Chang, *Friends and Enemies: The United States, China, and the Soviet Union, 1948-1972*, (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1990); Shu Guang Zhang, *Deterrence and Strategic Culture: Chinese-American Confrontations, 1949-1958*, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1992); Robert Accinelli, *Crisis and Commitment: United States Policy toward Taiwan, 1950-1955*, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996); 宫力, "中美建立的歷史考察," in 《中國外交新論》, eds. 劉山 and 薛君度, 292-308, (北京世界智識出版社, 1998); Simei Qing, *From Allies to Enemies: Visions of Modernity, Identity, and U.S.-China Diplomacy, 1945-1960*, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007).

¹⁰ There are exceptions, for example see: 牛大勇, "肯尼迪政府與 1961 年聯合國的中國代表權之爭," 《中共黨史研究》, no. 4, (2000): 78-84.

¹¹ Chen Jian, *Mao's China and the Cold War*, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001), 239.

continued to support, even if grudgingly, Washington's and Taipei's representatives in the UN. Consequently, this body of literature does not address how UN representation influenced Taipei's and Beijing's ongoing struggle for international legitimacy. The UN's classification of the Korean War as a UN police action while Soviet representatives boycotted the world body to protest the PRC's exclusion is well known. But, as noted above, delegates questioned which government represented China and should, therefore, occupy the China seat at the UN, in every session of the world body from 1949 to 1971. The UN debates over which party was sovereign over China helped codify the international system that had begun taking shape with the League of Nations.

Analyses focused on ROC and PRC international relations do pay attention to Chinese representation in the world body. Works that examine Beijing's diplomatic maneuvering detail the significance leaders in Beijing attached to UN membership, especially once the PRC possessed the UN China seat in 1971.¹² Works that directly consider China's representation in the UN have a central theme about the considerable importance of the one-China policy. Both the KMT and CPC supported the one-China policy which maintained there was only one Chinese nation, they disagreed on whether that nation was represented by the ROC or the PRC. Nancy Tucker's 2009 *Strait Talk* emphasizes the significance of Henry Kissinger's visit to China in undermining U.S. efforts to keep the PRC out of the UN because it signaled a softening of Washington's position on the PRC, but she also argues that Taipei's adherence to the one-China

¹² 宮力, "中華人民共和國進入聯合國始末," in, 《神秘之門: 共和國外交實錄》, ed. 曹英, (北京團結出版社 1993): 179-186; Ma Jisen, *The Cultural Revolution in the Foreign Ministry*, (Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 2004); Ann Kent, *Beyond Compliance: China, International Organizations, and Global Security*, (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2007).

policy ultimately resulted in the ROC losing all representation in the world body.¹³ While the one-China policy resulted in the ROC's inability to maintain any influence in the world body, by 1971 it was PRC officials' adherence to the policy that was the determinative factor. By September 1971 KMT officials had relented and chose to accept a U.S. proposal that would have provided dual representation for both Beijing and Taipei in the General Assembly as the ROC's position in the world body became more tenuous ahead of the UN's twenty-sixth session.¹⁴ The idea that the KMT controlled China after 1949 was fantasy, but Taipei's access to the UN China seat allowed them to represent the Chinese nation internationally and perpetuated their dreams of a return to the mainland. Yet by decolonization had resulted in more states entering the world body who had no desire to maintain the ROC's symbolic control of China. The CPC had won significant international support by adroitly positioning the PRC as a champion for former colonies and an alternative to the superpowers. The KMT did abandon the one-China policy when it was apparent to much of the world that the PRC would enter the UN before long, but their wait was too protracted. Consequently, the ROC and its allies negotiated from a position of weakness when they finally acted to allow Beijing into the world body while keeping a position for Taipei. Most of these analyses end with the ROC's replacement by the PRC in 1971, thus they do not address how this reversal of international legitimation influenced the ongoing competition between the CPC and KMT to represent China. By extending the period of study beyond 1971, to the ROC's dissolution of the National Assembly and restructuring of the

¹³ Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, *Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009), 46-52.

¹⁴ Pu Jun Lin, "Sino-U.S. Relations in an Era of Rapprochement: The Important Breakthrough of Chinese Representation in the United Nations," M.A. thesis, California State University, Fresno, 1989. 金朝暉, "中國政府解決聯合國代表權問題研究 1949—1971" Ph.D. diss., 浙江大學, 2006; Tsai Bing-Xiu 蔡秉修, "中華民國退出聯合國歷程之研究 (1949—1971)" M.A. thesis, 國立中央大學, 2008.

Legislative Yuan in 1992, this project will capture the ways that the governments in Taipei and Beijing both operated with and without access to the world body, therefore this work illuminates how access to and exclusion from the UN's international legitimacy influenced both parties' actions, including their constructions of China.

Many works on international relations also treat the conclusion of the UN's Chinese representation issue in the PRC's favor as inevitable. Whether attributed to Beijing's adroit international maneuvering or Washington's abandonment of Taipei in pursuit of Sino-American rapprochement, few scholars question why the international community allowed the ROC to continue representing China in the UN for twenty-two years after the PRC's founding—outside of assuming U.S. hegemony. Whether states' chose to pursue relations with the PRC in pursuit of that old shibboleth of a "China market" or regarded the KMT government's claims to represent all of the Chinese nation as unrealistic or supported CPC or KMT claims based on ideology, why did each party adhere to a one-China policy the international community accepted and resolved in favor of the government in Beijing over the one in Taipei? Moreover, how was it concluded so completely? The salience of this question is heightened by ROC economic growth and integration in international markets in the 1970s. Taipei's claim to represent the Chinese nation were fairly problematic in light of its control of only Taiwan, the Pescadores, and some small off-shore islands, but Taipei's territorial claims were largely unchanged from 1949.

Unaddressed, also, is why the KMT would have maintained the illusion of one China long after a return to the mainland was no longer tenable, their inaction resulted in a failure to secure a place for the ROC in the international community even as it was clear the CPC's control over the majority of the Chinese nation was complete. Taipei's inability to deal with the reality of their situation when they still had the power to act in the UN led to its current ambiguous status in the

international community. I explore how Taiwan ended in its current position on the international stage: interconnected economically, isolated diplomatically.

Nationalism and Territoriality

Modern leaders of China were heavily influenced by the pursuit for and development of nationalism in late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century China. Mao and Chiang, among other early CPC and KMT leaders, were alive when Lu Xun, the father of modern Chinese literature, wrote “The True Story of Ah Q” in 1921-1922 critiquing the failure of ordinary Chinese to grasp the significance of the Xinhai Revolution of 1911.¹⁵ The Father of the Nation Sun Yat-sen argued as late as 1924 in the first of his Three Principles that “Chinese people are like a sheet of loose sand” because they lacked a concept of nationalism.¹⁶ Consequently, Chinese scholars and politicians devoted significant attention to educating the people on the importance of China as a nation even as they set out to define what the Chinese nation was.

Members of the CPC and KMT were dedicated to inculcating nationalism in China, though their concepts of that nation were not the same. Nationalism, as Eric Hobsbawm observed in 1990, is an oft used and infrequently defined term. The problem resides in the fact that “the word ‘nation’ today is used so widely and imprecisely that the use of the vocabulary of nationalism today may mean very little indeed.”¹⁷ Nationalism’s plastic meaning is well demonstrated by twentieth-century Chinese history. Chiang Kai-shek acknowledged five different ethnic groups in China—Han, Mongol, Uyghur, Tibetan, and Manchu—but he argued

¹⁵ Lu Xun, “The True Story of Ah-Q,” in *Selected Stories of Lu Hsun* (Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1960, 1972) accessed 19 July 2020, <https://www.marxists.org/archive/lu-xun/1921/12/ah-q/index.htm>, Marxists Internet Archive.

¹⁶ 孫中山, “民族主義, 第一講,” in 《三民主義》, 27 Jan. 1924. Accessed 19 July 2020, <https://zh.wikisource.org/wiki/三民主義/民族主義第一講>, Wikisource.

¹⁷ E. J. Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 9.

they were all one people with a common ancestry reaching back to the mythical Yellow Emperor 皇帝 (2698-2598 BCE) and the Shang dynasty (1600-1046 BCE) thus all part of the Chinese nation. The CPC, on the other hand, was influenced by Joseph Stalin's concept of nationalism. When the CPC formed the PRC, though, Beijing eschewed the Soviet model of an ethnic federation for the construction of its new nation-state. Instead, they created the PRC as a single polity with regional autonomy for some groups within a greater Chinese nation.¹⁸ The CPC's inclusion of all ethnicities within a greater China meant that, unlike the Soviet Union, there were no separate governments to challenge Beijing's authority. For both the KMT and CPC ethnicity was not considered an essential marker to be within the Chinese nation. The nation, for this work, will use Benedict Anderson's definition, namely "it is an imagined political community—and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign," but not limited by ethnicity.¹⁹ Whether all the people in the territories claimed as either the PRC or ROC accepted their inclusion in the Chinese nation, both the CPC and KMT imagined them as communities over which their sovereignty extended.

In 2000, Charles Maier challenged scholars to seriously consider territoriality in modern nation-states. Maier stated that "territoriality means simply the properties, including power, provided by the control of bordered political space, which until recently at least created the framework for national and often ethnic identity."²⁰ By stressing the significance of territoriality in nationalism, Maier argued that control of physical space was as important for nation-states as

¹⁸ Thomas S. Mullaney, *Coming to Terms with the Nation: Ethnic Classification in Modern China*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2011).

¹⁹ Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, (London: Verso, 2006), 6.

²⁰ Charles S. Maier, "Consigning the Twentieth Century to History: Alternative Narratives for the Modern Era," *The American Historical Review* 105, no. 3 (2000): 807-31, 808.

intellectual concepts of nationalism. Anderson noted the importance of territoriality in his argument that “The nation is imagined as *limited* because even the largest of them... has finite, if elastic, boundaries.”²¹ Maier’s thesis is germane for PRC and ROC foreign relations because, as M. Taylor Fravel explained, “In response to... internal threats [PR] China traded territorial concessions for assistance in suppressing the state’s domestic foes.”²² Fravel’s insight is not limited to the PRC. The KMT acknowledged Mongolian independence in 1946 to secure Soviet support for their claims to represent the Chinese nation. The CPC then recognized Mongolian independence in 1949, also in part to satisfy the Soviet Union, and the KMT annulled the ROC’s recognition in 1953. Both the KMT and CPC constructed Chinese nationalism around concepts of territory rather than ethnicity, which makes Maier’s admonition particularly salient. KMT control never extended over all the territory they claimed. When considering Taiwan, CPC control has likewise fallen short of their claims. Consequently, “China” demonstrates that physical control of territory is unnecessary if boundaries are accepted internationally.

Territoriality is a concept untethered to the land it may or may not include.

In addition to a densely populated core, China has several key frontier regions. China’s frontiers are comprised of territory the Qing incorporated into their empire.²³ Scholars who analyze China’s frontier regions describe two key themes surrounding Tibet, Xinjiang, and Mongolia. The first is these areas were autonomous before the Qing took control of them in the

²¹ Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, 7 (original emphasis).

²² M. Taylor Fravel, *Strong Borders, Secure Nation: Cooperation and Conflict in China’s Territorial Disputes* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), 300.

²³ For more on the Qing empire and expansionism see: James A. Millward, *Beyond the Pass: Economy, Ethnicity, and Empire in Qing Central Asia, 1759-1864* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998); Laura Hostetler, *Qing Colonial Enterprise: Ethnography and Cartography in Early Modern China* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001); Peter C. Perdue, *China Marches West: The Qing Conquest of Central Eurasia* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005); Charles P. Giersch, *Asian Borderlands: The Transformation of Qing China’s Yunnan Frontier* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006).

seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and then largely autonomous again after the Qing's collapse in 1911. The second is that despite Tibet's and Xinjiang's pre-Qing autonomy and de facto independence after the Xinhai Revolution, they lacked international support for their claims of sovereignty at the end of the Second World War. Soviet support for Outer Mongolia's independence made it unique among these.²⁴ After 1949, the ROC was in a similar position as Mongolia had been in, except Taipei claimed to represent all of China. Without superpower backing, in this case the United States, Taipei's claims of sovereignty would have not received as much international support.

This work clarifies the construction of Chinese nationality through analyses of how officials in Beijing and Taipei used territorial claims to defend their international legitimacy. PRC officials used their control of the Chinese mainland to support their claims to rightfully represent China on the world stage, but nonetheless relinquished claim to the territory of Mongolia. ROC officials, on the other hand, continued to challenge PRC legitimacy through assertions that the government in Beijing only represented the CPC, not the people within China's borders, despite KMT lack of influence over the people they claimed to represent. My investigation into Beijing's and Taipei's constructions of China adds to knowledge on Chinese nationalism by demonstrating how both states employed territoriality in their competition to

²⁴ Melvyn C. Goldstein, *A History of Modern Tibet, 1913-1951: The Demise of the Lamaist State* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989); Uradyn Erden Bulag, *Nationalism and Hybridity in Mongolia*, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998); Uradyn Erden Bulag, *The Mongols at China's Edge: History and the Politics of National Unity*, (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2002); Hsiao-ting Lin, *Tibet and Nationalist China's Frontier: Intrigues and Ethnopolitics, 1928-1949*, (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2006); Liu Xiaoyuan, *Reins of Liberation: An Entangled History of Mongolian Independence, Chinese Territoriality, and Great Power Hegemony, 1911-1950* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006); Gardner Bovingdon, *The Uyghurs: Strangers in Their Own Land* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010); Uradyn Erden Bulag, *Collaborative Nationalism: The Politics of Friendship on China's Mongolian Frontier*, (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2010). Liu Xiaoyuan, *Recast All under Heaven: Revolution, War, Diplomacy, and Frontier China in the 20th Century* (New York: Continuum, 2010).

represent the nation and how their strategic deployments and refusals of reality affected concepts of what China was.

This work enhances literature on Chinese foreign relations, international relations, and nationalism in the post-war period. My analysis of CPC and KMT efforts to garner international support they represented China shows how each party conducted foreign relations in light of their sometimes conflicting, sometimes aligned, claims to legitimacy. By taking both parties' positions seriously, I reveal how China's contested status in the post-war period directly influenced PRC and ROC interactions with other states and why that mattered. My research into Beijing's and Taipei's efforts to gain legitimacy on the world stage also provides insight into how the UN both shaped, and was shaped by, international relations in the post-war period. After the Second World War the UN became the primary venue for states to present their positions on world events. It also became key to legitimating states internationally as well as a symbol of their authority for domestic audiences. By addressing how the China question unfolded in the world body, this piece shows how the UN's international legitimacy became tied to not only states' international legitimacy, but their domestic legitimacy as well. My investigation into how the CPC and KMT represented the Chinese nation at home and abroad demonstrates how concepts of the nation are deeply imbricated with territoriality in addition to ethnicity, history, and culture. Both parties sought to construct a nation that encompassed all peoples and areas incorporated into the Qing empire, though their ability to exert control over their claimed nations were vastly different. Additionally, this project will help the Chinese and Taiwanese publics and peoples of other nation-states to better understand China's and Taiwan's perceived places in the world. This understanding is invaluable as relations between the ROC and PRC continue to develop, even as

the status of Taiwan remains contested, by elucidating the different national imaginaries the CPC and KMT developed and presented to the world after 1949.

Methodological Foundation

To close this section, I must acknowledge the methodological foundations this work is based on. While this is an historical project, my approach is informed by social construction theory. In historical discourse, social construction theory is most analogous to deconstructionism or discursive analysis, but it places greater emphasis on the shared creation of the symbolism and meaning in language.²⁵ Few scholars have used social construction theory to explain international relations, but it has significant explanatory power for how actors shape and define perceptions of reality. Broadly defined, social construction theory posits that individual reality is dependent on the internalization and reification of socially constructed symbols.²⁶ Peter Berger and Thomas Luckman explain this process as “what is ‘real’ to a Tibetan monk may not be ‘real’ to an American businessman.”²⁷ CPC and KMT efforts to define China were, essentially,

²⁵ Some examples of deconstructionism and discursive analysis are: Chris Weedon, *Feminist Practice and Poststructuralist Theory*, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987); Joan Scott, “L’ouvrière! Mot impie, sordide...”: Women Workers in the Discourse of French Political Economy, 1840-1860,” in Joan Scott, *Gender and the Politics of History, Revised Edition*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999): 139-163; Judith R. Walkowitz, *City of Dreadful Delight: Narratives of Sexual Danger in Late-Victorian London*, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992); Brian Diemart, “Uncontainable Metaphor: George F. Kennan’s ‘X’ Article and Cold War Discourse,” *Canadian Review of American Studies* 35, no. 1 (2005), 21-55.

²⁶ For the foundations of social construction theory see: Max Weber, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* (1905), trans. Talcott Parsons, (New York: Routledge Classics, 2001); Alfred Schütz, *The Phenomenology of the Social World* (1932), trans. George Walsh and Frederick Lehnert, (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1967). For applications and contemporary uses of the theory see: Joseph R. Gusfield, *Symbolic Crusade: Status Politics and the American Temperance Movement*, (Urbana, Ill.: University of Illinois Press, 1963); Barbara J. Nelson, *Making an Issue of Child Abuse: Political Agenda Setting for Social Problems*, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984); Joel Best, *Threatened Children: Rhetoric and Concern about Child-Victims*, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990); Erich Goode and Nachmen Ben-Yahuda, “Moral Panics: Culture, Politics, and Social Construction,” *Annual Review of Sociology* 20 (1994), 149-171; Pierre Bourdieu, *Language and Symbolic Power*, ed. John B. Thompson, trans. Gino Raymond and Matthew Adamson, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991); Daniel Béland, “Insecurity and Politics: A Framework,” *Canadian Journal of Sociology* 32 (2007), 317-340.

²⁷ Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckman, *The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge*, (New York: Anchor Books, 1966), 3.

attempts to construct a reality that benefited their governments' claims to legitimacy. Borrowing from Sarah Maza, I refer to these constructed realities of the Chinese nation as "national imaginaries."²⁸ This is germane for Beijing and Taipei's competition for the UN China seat in that once people construct realities, they are difficult to dismantle, and each party's claims to legitimacy were built on what they claimed China was and was not. Claims-makers, the people who attempt to shape perceptions, are essential in the process of constructing how people perceive reality. Often a distinction is made between primary claims-makers, officials and crusading individuals, and secondary claims-makers, news outlets and media.²⁹ However, for the PRC and ROC most news media, such as *People's Daily* for Beijing or *Central Daily News* for Taipei, promulgated official views and such a distinction is not particularly relevant except to understand the transformation messages went through at different levels within the state. Thus, while the permutations these messages went through have the potential to provide insight into how deeply official images of China permeated both parties, disaggregating primary and secondary claims-makers is not essential for this project.

Structure

This work is structured to place Beijing and Taipei's competition to represent China within significant trends in the UN debate over which state was sovereign over the Chinese nation. By tracing debates within the world body, I track how PRC and ROC officials' claims evolved as their positions on the international stage changed over time. This structure places

²⁸ Sarah Maza used the term "social imaginary" to mediate debates in women's history over experience and discourse. She defined it as "the 'social imaginary': the complicated links between representations, emotional experience, and belief that go into the making of both subjectivity and community." Sarah Maza, "Stories in History: Cultural Narratives in Recent Works in European History," in *American History Review* (Dec. 1996), 1493-1515: 1515.

²⁹ Best, *Threatened Children*, 10-13, 18-19.

greater emphasis on the UN prior to 1971. The CPC's and KMT's struggle to represent China was drastically changed by the 1971 transfer of the UN China seat, but within the organization no states have presented genuine challenge to the PRC as China. The later chapters follow both parties as they recast their claims in light of their changed positions on the world stage, ending with the 1991 forced retirement of the original members elected to the ROC's National Assembly and Legislative Yuan in 1948, effectively ending the ROC's claim to represent all of China.

I have separated this work into three parts following significant trends and changes in the CPC-KMT competition in the UN and on the international stage. The first part, split between two chapters, focuses on the ROC tenure as China in the UN. The first chapter covers from 1950 to 1961 to argue the UN provided the environment for the CPC and KMT competition to represent China to develop. It briefly discusses CPC efforts to enter the UN in 1949 before turning to the Korean War in 1950. The UN determined the PRC was an aggressor in the war, which ROC representatives and their allies then used to argue the PRC was not a peace-loving state. Consequently, from 1950 to 1961 pro-ROC delegations in the UN stymied debate on Chinese representation in the UN. During this initial stage of the CPC-KMT competition, the CPC depicted the Chinese nation as revolutionary. The KMT, which also celebrated revolution as integral to modern China, refined its presentations of the Chinese nation to simultaneously celebrate revolution and traditional culture. The two parties' conflicting portrayals of China resulted in their placing different emphases on specific aspects of Chinese history, such as Sun Yat-sen's role in modern China.

The second chapter, and second half of part one, shows that as Beijing and Taipei's competition seemed no closer to a resolution, each side became more committed to their model

of China. This chapter focuses on the ROC and U.S. delegates' use of arcane rules to maintain power. They shifted to arguing Chinese representation was an "important question." According to the UN Charter, when delegates in the General Assembly determine a topic is "important" any subsequent votes on it require a two-thirds majority to pass. In 1961 U.S. officials persuaded the ROC that decolonization and growth in the UN meant the prior tactic of blocking debate on the question of Chinese representation was no longer tenable. Consequently, ROC and U.S. officials adopted a new tactic of allowing debate in the UN over which state was sovereign over China, but only after designating that debate as important. The ROC and U.S. tactic worked; the UN passed Resolution 1668 (XVI) that determined Chinese representation was an important question. After Resolution 1668, ROC delegates and their allies labeled these debates as important in every session from 1961 to 1971. Domestically, both the CPC and KMT deepened their contending national imaginaries of China. In the PRC, Mao Zedong launched the tumultuous Cultural Revolution to reclaim prominence in the Party as well as strip the remaining vestiges of traditional Chinese culture from the nation. Chiang Kai-shek responded to the Cultural Revolution with a Cultural Renaissance, positioning the ROC as the bastion of Chinese culture and tradition.

In 1971 the UN passed Resolution 2758 (XXVI), which recognized the PRC as the legitimate government of China and expelled the KMT, whose ROC was no longer recognized as an independent state. The UN debates along with ROC and U.S. maneuvering to maintain a role for the ROC in the world body from 1970 to 1971 are the focus of the third chapter. The UN passage of Resolution 2758 radically altered Beijing and Taipei's competition to represent "China." KMT leaders expressed the value of UN membership in their eventual willingness to go along with a U.S. proposal that would keep the ROC in the organization while ceding their place

as China on the Security Council. The PRC and its allies, however, maintained the one-China policy that held there was only one China and Taiwan was a part of it. The CPC victory on the international stage also heralded acceptance for their definition of China, even as the KMT had to find new ways to defend theirs.

The third part traces the reversal between the CPC and KMT for international acceptance of their authority to represent China after 1971. Chapter four shows that without access to the UN's international legitimacy, the KMT sought new avenues to defend its claim to represent China while the CPC tamed its most radical members. In 1972 U.S. President Richard Nixon was the first U.S. head of state to visit the PRC. During this historic trip, CPC leaders displayed China's material and cultural history to Nixon and his companions. Nixon's visit was only one of the PRC's diplomatic coups as it continued to gain recognition as China in the wake of Resolution 2758. PRC fortune was directly tied to ROC misfortune. The KMT sought to mitigate their diplomatic setbacks by highlighting continued economic ties with states that had recognized Beijing. The Cultural Revolution continued to roil China, but CPC leaders reined in its excesses and finally ended it with the arrest of the Gang of Four in 1976. KMT efforts to claim economic legitimacy were also shattered by the CPC in 1978 when Deng initiated the PRC's Opening and Reform policy.

The fifth and final chapter opens with U.S. recognition of the PRC as China in 1979. Once the international community fully accepted the CPC model of China, the CPC was no longer vested in presenting the Chinese nation as revolutionary while the KMT, liberated from its model, pursued radical changes for their state. By the 1980s, the KMT had little claim to represent China. The CPC's model of "China" was accepted internationally as the legitimate China. As the PRC economy expanded, the CPC became less tolerant of destabilizing events.

The CPC's intolerance culminated in the violent quelling of the 1989 Democracy Spring as Party leaders clarified that revolution and protest would not be tolerated in China. The following year, 1990, students in Taipei began the Wild Lily Student Movement. The KMT, no longer bound to its model of China, responded to student demands by enacting constitutional reforms that ceded its de jure claims to represent China and freed the ROC to pursue a new course.

After 1992 "China" was not conceptually contested in the realm of international relations. The CPC controlled the national imaginary of China both at home and abroad, and across the Taiwan Strait people's national imaginary of Taiwan developed outside the purview of the CPC, and even the KMT. In the UN and other international organizations, Beijing was indisputably the seat of the Chinese state and nation. Where the CPC had once sought to distance itself from the traditions and culture of China's ancien régime, they now embraced an historical legacy that reached unbroken from antiquity to the present. The KMT kept "China" in the name of their state, in no small part due to the CPC's continued one-China policy that threatened retaliation if the ROC attempted to represent itself as Taiwan. The ROC, however, eschewed its former claims to represent China and allowed the openly pro-Taiwanese Democratic Progressive Party to compete in local and national elections. The government and people of Taiwan no longer considered themselves a part of China, but a nation and state apart from China. In short, whether nationally or internationally, there was no question which state was China.

After nearly forty years of Qing rule, General Shi Lang brought Taiwan under imperial control. After Zheng Chenggong ousted the Portuguese from Taiwan, his family ruled a government that challenged the idea, though not the actuality, of the nascent Qing state. But Shi's victory ensured there were no domestic challenges to the Kangxi emperors' reign and added Taiwan and its offshore islands to China's territory. Three centuries later, the competition

between mainland and island for control of China was vastly different. The CPC had no Shi Lang to expel the KMT government across the Taiwan Strait. The KMT was also not intent on restoring a deposed imperial family to the throne. But after a little over forty years, the competition between mainland and island for control over the Chinese nation was concluded with no less certainty. The competing regime in Taiwan was not quashed or replaced, but any claims it had to represent China were ended as surely as those of the Ming. Much as in the seventeenth century, China was ruled by and associated with the government in Beijing.

Chapter 1:

Nothing Chinese Whatever, 1950-1961

The Long Island weather was cooler on Tuesday, 27 June 1950, than it had been the day before. It was still warm, though, as a blustery day settled into a fair, cool evening.¹ While the day slipped into darkness, ten men gathered in a section of the Sperry Gyroscope plant in Lake Success, New York, to discuss events on the other side of the globe. These men represented Britain, China, Cuba, Ecuador, Egypt, France, India, Norway, the United States, and Yugoslavia, in the United Nations on the Security Council. They had gathered in the UN's temporary headquarters to respond to the first major conflict faced by the heir to the League of Nations. Two days earlier, 25 June, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), commonly called North Korea, had crossed the 38th parallel in force to attack the Republic of Korea (ROK), or South Korea, to reunify the Korean Peninsula under DPRK control. In response, the United Nations Security Council had entreated Pyongyang to end the hostilities, a request the DPRK ignored. The representative for the Soviet Union, a founding member of the world body and permanent member of the Security Council, was conspicuously absent. Without the Soviet representative, only Aleš Bebler, Yugoslavia's representative, was there to oppose Warren Austin, the U.S. representative, when he declared the DPRK assault was, "in fact, an attack on the United Nations itself" and proposed the UN should intervene directly.² If the Security Council accepted Austin's proposal, member states could send military forces and material aid to the peninsula under the UN's flag to restore the status quo. The Security Council accepted Austin's proposal, seven to one, with Bebler opposing and the Egyptian and Indian

¹ United States Weather Bureau, "The Forecast," *New York Times*, 27 June 1950.

² United Nations Security Council (UN SC), 474th meeting, 27 June 1950, 5th year, *Security Council Official Records*, S/PV.474, p. 3, accessed 9 Aug. 2018, United Nations Official Document System (UN ODS).

representatives, unable to reach their governments for direction, abstaining. Thus, shortly before midnight, and long after darkness had settled over Long Island, the ten men passed Resolution S/1511, making the Korean Civil War a conflict of the collective global community.

As early as 1951, *U.S. News and World Report* labeled the then on-going conflict in Korea “The Forgotten War.”³ The DPRK instigated the Korean War shortly after the Second World War, consequently it received little attention in a war-weary United States, let alone war-torn Europe or Asia. A few years after the Korean conflict, the United States went to war in Vietnam and the Second Indochina War overshadowed the war on the Korean peninsula. Despite the oft-repeated moniker, the Korean War was not forgotten in East Asia nor neglected by scholars who have thoroughly examined the events leading up to and surrounding it.⁴ Whether or not commentators declared it forgotten, the conflict between the two Koreas was not considered a minor or inconsequential conflict. It threatened to be apocalyptic. Sir Benegal N. Rau, India’s UN representative and head of the Security Council in 1950, captured public sentiment on 27 June 1950 when he said of the Korean conflict that “Many see... the beginning of a third world war, with all its horrors.”⁵ A Gallup poll that August validated Rau’s assessment when it found 57 percent of Americans believed World War Three was underway.⁶

³ Richard Ernsberger Jr, “Interview: Melinda Pash, Why is Korea the ‘Forgotten War’?” *Historynet.com*, accessed 18 May 2020, <http://www.historynet.com/interview-melinda-pash-why-is-korea-the-forgotten-war.htm>. For examples of the ongoing use of this misnomer see: Clay Blair, *The Forgotten War: America in Korea, 1950-1953*, (New York: Time Books, 1987); Liam Stack, “Korean War, A ‘Forgotten’ Conflict that Shaped the Modern World,” *New York Times*, 1 Jan. 2018, accessed 11 Aug. 2018, <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/01/world/asia/korean-war-history.html>.

⁴ A brief selection of works on the Korean War are: Bruce Cummings, *The Origins of the Korean War*, 2 vols., (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1981–1990); Chen Jian, “China’s Strategies to End the Korean War,” chap. 4 in *Mao’s China and the Cold War* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001); William Stueck, *Rethinking the Korean War: A New Diplomatic and Strategic History* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002); David Halberstam, *The Coldest Winter: America and the Korean War* (New York: Hyperion, 2007).

⁵ UN SC, 474th meeting, 27 June 1950, 5th year, *Security Council Official Records*, S/PV.474, p.2, accessed 11 August 2018, UN ODS.

⁶ George H. Gallup, “World War III,” (19 Aug. 1950), *The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion, 1935-1971*, Vol. 2, 1949-1958 (New York: Random House, 1972), 933.

In addition to stoking fears of global annihilation, the Korean War altered U.S. strategy in Asia. Nascent American Cold Warriors used the war to mobilize against what they saw as a monolithic communism threatening the world. American perceptions of Soviet-directed communism germinating throughout the globe influenced U.S. policy as the Soviet Union and United States competed to spread their conflicting economic models and ideological theories of governance. One result of new U.S. policy was a permanent troop build-up on the Korean Peninsula—and throughout Asia—that continues seven decades later. U.S. President Harry S Truman also ordered the U.S. Navy's Seventh Fleet to the Taiwan Strait in response to the DPRK invasion, an about face on his administration's earlier decision to not interfere in China. U.S. policymakers no longer viewed Asia as a peripheral concern in confronting the Soviet Union, consequently Truman sought to bolster Chiang Kai-shek's faltering regime on Taiwan. The U.S. about face prevented the Communist Party of China from ending their rivalry with the Kuomintang on the battlefield. After 1950, the two parties' attempts to control the Chinese nation moved from the battlefield to the diplomatic arena.

The CPC's and KMT's ideological competition to represent "China" did not begin with the war in Korea, but that conflict constituted the first time that struggle was staged in the UN. On 1 February 1951, the General Assembly determined in Resolution 498(V) that the PRC was an aggressor against the UN in the Korean War. For the next decade, the KMT's Republic of China and U.S. delegates maintained that the CPC's People's Republic of China was an aggressive state in order to stymie debate on Chinese representation in the UN. They succeeded in dodging what became known as the "China Question" because the UN charter holds that

“Membership is open to all other peace-loving states.”⁷ While the Charter did not define what constituted a “peace-loving” state, ROC representatives and their allies argued that fighting UN forces, as the PRC had in Korea, was its antithesis.

Access to the UN’s international legitimacy influenced the CPC’s and KMT’s contrasting images of China. During the 1950s, each party maintained their state alone represented the Chinese nation. The CPC represented China as a revolutionary nation. They had recently defeated the KMT and established the PRC after a Civil War they cast as Chinese liberation, not only from the maladministration of the KMT but also from the shackles of traditional society. When the CPC sought the world’s preeminent intergovernmental organization’s recognition of their new state, however, they were stonewalled. Therefore, CPC leaders repurposed their established discourse on the revolutionary struggle to liberate China into a revolutionary struggle to liberate the UN. In CPC discourse, China was a revolutionary nation and state that would free the international system from traditions of imperial control.

The KMT faced a more difficult task as they represented China as a land of ancient culture and tradition. During this period, KMT officials continued to present their party as heirs to the 1911 Xinhai Revolution that had ended China’s millennia-old imperial system. Conversely, they had to defend the ROC’s continued existence without access to the Chinese nation’s territory. To differentiate themselves from the CPC, KMT officials transformed revolutionary struggle to a struggle against communism. The ROC’s international legitimacy, based in large part on UN membership, allowed the KMT to argue the CPC’s alien ideology of communism undermined the traditional foundations of Chinese society. The KMT turned to the

⁷ UN Charter, ch. 2, art. 4, § 1, accessed 2 Dec. 2018, <http://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/chapter-ii/index.html>.

past to support their right to represent China. During this period, KMT luminaries drew on Sun Yat-sen's legacy while casting him as a champion of traditional culture to bolster their right to govern the Chinese nation. They also employed the ROC's place in the UN to demonstrate international acceptance of their legitimacy. The KMT represented China as inseparable from its ancient traditions, which also influenced their approach to defending the international status quo and the ROC's position within it.

The UN made Beijing and Taipei's international competition to represent China possible and influenced their models of the nation. The CPC created a model of China that emphasized revolution, an archetype that aligned with their goals to transform both Chinese society and the international system. The KMT created a model of China that emphasized culture and tradition, a paradigm that supported their goal to reclaim rule over the Chinese nation and protect their position on the world stage. The CPC's characterization of China as revolutionary and the KMT's of China as traditional may seem foreordained, but they created these contrasting images, in part, to clearly differentiate their governments as they presented themselves as the true rulers of the Chinese nation. These distinctions were necessary as each party not only shared the same history and territory, they were also both Leninist parties led by autocrats. ROC leaders benefited from, and used, their position in the UN to bolster their depiction of China, while the PRC's exclusion led its leaders to challenge the international system as corrupt while presenting theirs. Both governments' interpretations of China for international audiences, though, influenced domestic policies and political narratives in both states to support their versions of the nation.

To understand this first stage in the PRC and ROC's competition, it is necessary to analyze events on the international stage and within each state. On the international stage, delegates to the UN deliberated on many events that concerned Beijing and Taipei. From the

Korean War, to the formal addition of Chinese UN representation to the world body's agenda in 1956, UN delegates discussed what China was, and Beijing and Taipei made clear what they thought of those debates. In this period the KMT participated directly in UN discussions and sought to shape international perceptions of China to benefit ROC legitimacy. In contrast, the CPC interacted with the UN as an outsider and, with few exceptions, had to rely on others to defend its international legitimacy in the organization. While excluded from the UN, CPC leaders constructed narratives about the world body and China to bolster their claims to sovereignty. CPC discourses on China were not limited to the UN, they were also presented in propaganda for foreign and domestic audiences. Leaders in Beijing portrayed foreign events to fit their interpretations of the world and China's place in it. The KMT enjoyed the UN's international legitimacy and relied on it to defend their claim to represent China. Much like the CPC, the KMT aligned its internal and external propaganda to reflect their views of China. While both states constructed different definitions of China, each relied on a shared history to do so. Consequently, each party had to distinguish themselves to bolster their domestic and international legitimacy.

The United Nations

The DPRK's blitz on the Korean Peninsula threatened the fragile post-war order, but it did resolve a problem vexing U.S. and ROC leaders: how to keep Beijing from representing "China" in the UN. Though the PRC sent troops to Korea surreptitiously as the People's Volunteer Army to push back U.S.-led UN forces, the world body responded by labeling the PRC an aggressor in the Korean War. For the next decade, ROC delegates and their allies maintained the PRC was an aggressive state, as per the world body's own declaration, to stymie any consideration of admitting Beijing. The PRC aided KMT efforts to portray it as aggressive

when, shortly after the Korean War was in abeyance, it instigated the First Taiwan Straits Crisis in 1954. During the crisis, the People's Liberation Army heavily shelled the ROC-controlled islands of Jinmen and Mazu. In 1956 India's delegation formally added Chinese representation to the UN agenda for the first time, but Beijing instigated a second crisis in the Taiwan Strait in 1958. India's success at moving the China question from a procedural to formal vote, however, indicates that U.S. preeminence in the UN was on the wane as new member states were admitted. Throughout this first stage, however, the ROC's position in the UN was secure and officials in Taipei used that international legitimacy to their advantage. The CPC also used UN membership to its advantage, though they asserted that a revolutionary China could save the world body from imperial machinations.

The Internationalization of the War in Korea

On 6 November 1950, Warren R. Austin, U.S. representative to the UN, shared a special report Douglas MacArthur, Commanding General United Nations Command, had sent the day before. In this report, MacArthur detailed PRC participation in the Korean War against UN forces starting from anti-aircraft fire in late August to evidence of army divisions engaged in combat by early November. In early September, MacArthur was warning the Security Council that the PRC might be assisting the DPRK. By November, however, MacArthur declared "it is apparent... that the United Nations are presently in hostile contact with Chinese Communist military Units deployed for action against the forces of the United Command."⁸ The PRC was, according to the Commanding General of UN forces in Korea, at war with the UN.

⁸ UN SC, "Note dated 2 September 1950 from the Permanent Representative of the United States of America to the President of the Security Council Transmitting the Third Report of the United Nations Command in Korea in Accordance with the Security Council Resolution of 7 July 1950 (S/1588)," accessed 18 Aug. 2018, UN ODS; UN SC, "Note dated 6 November from the Permanent Representative of the United States of America to the Secretary-

UN delegates wanted the CPC to explain why its citizens were fighting U.S.-led UN forces in Korea. Moscow had ended its boycott of the world body, however, so Beijing did have a powerful ally on the Security Council. Yakov A. Malik, Soviet representative to the UN, argued the UN had no role in Korea as Resolution S/1511 was “illegal in view of the fact it was adopted in the absence of two permanent representatives of the Security Council—the USSR and China—and that Mr. Tsiang [T.F. Tsiang 蔣廷黻, ROC representative to the UN], of the Kuomintang, who does not represent China, took part in the vote on that resolution.”⁹ Malik’s efforts to quash discussion were for naught, however he also demanded the PRC have the opportunity to present their side to the world body. Sir Gladwyn Jebb, representing the United Kingdom, agreed with Malik and proposed the PRC send representatives to explain its position in the ongoing Korean War. A majority of delegates accepted the British proposal to invite PRC representatives, though many clarified they did not consider the PRC a legitimate state; in the words of Austin it was “the Chinese communist régime” and the “Peking authorities” for French representative Jean Chauvel.¹⁰

The PRC made its position on Korea known before its delegation arrived at the UN. A little over a week after Austin presented MacArthur’s report, Malik shared a PRC Foreign Affairs Ministry representative’s response to “the so-called MacArthur special report and the declaration of the United States representative.”¹¹ In a similar but opposing response to

General Transmitting A Special Report Dated 5 November 1950 from the United Nations Command in Korea in Accordance with the Security Council Resolution of 7 July 1950 (S/1588),” p. 2, accessed 18 Aug. 2018, UN ODS.

⁹ UN SC, 519th Meeting, 8 Nov. 1950, 5th Year, *Security Council Official Record*, S/PV.519, p. 4, accessed 18 Aug. 2018, UN ODS.

¹⁰ UN SC, 520th Meeting, 8 Nov. 1950, 5th Year, *Security Council Official Record*, S/PV.520, p. 8, accessed 18 Aug. 2018, UN ODS.

¹¹ UN SC, “Letter Dated 14 November 1950 from the Representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the Secretary-General Transmitting a Statement by a Representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Chinese People’s Republic Dated 11 November 1950 (S/1902),” p. 1, accessed 20 Aug. 2018, UN ODS.

MacArthur, the Foreign Affairs Ministry representative detailed U.S. transgressions against the PRC, primarily that it had invaded PRC airspace and conducted bombings with civilian casualties. The representative also declared the U.S. Seventh Fleet's presence in the Taiwan Strait was an act of aggression against the PRC. The Foreign Affairs Ministry representative did not mention the UN in this response to the Commanding General of UN forces in Korea's report, transmitted to the Soviet Union's UN delegation, to share with the UN Security Council. The representative stated, "that the United States of America has invaded Chinese territory, violated Chinese sovereignty and is threatening Chinese security."¹² Moreover, the report claimed PRC citizens in Korea were volunteers who served under the direction of the DPRK and opposed U.S. aggression in Asia of their own volition. The Foreign Affairs Ministry representative was mute on the UN's role in the Korean War and only referenced that "the peoples of China and Korea resolutely demand that the United States aggressors and their collaborators shall cease their aggressive activities and withdraw their invasion forces."¹³ Thus, the PRC defended its role in Korea by claiming citizens were acting outside the state to assist the DPRK and that the conflict was not with the UN, but the United States. Beijing focused on the United States because it wanted to avoid appearing to be in a conflict with the world body. The Foreign Affairs Ministry representative accusations against the United States placed the PRC at odds with one state, albeit a powerful one; an accusation against the UN would be placing it at odds with the world. The representative presented a key aspect of Beijing's policy to defend its exclusion from the UN's

¹² UN SC, "Letter Dated 14 November 1950 from the Representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the Secretary-General Transmitting a Statement by a Representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Chinese People's Republic Dated 11 November 1950 (S/1902)," p. 2, accessed 20 Aug. 2018, UN ODS.

¹³ Ibid., 4, accessed 20 Aug. 2018, UN ODS.

international legitimacy: the UN resolutions were illegitimate because the United States controlled the world body, and their puppets in Taipei had usurped China's place therein.

Wu Xiuquan 伍修權 represented the PRC when the Security Council debated Beijing's involvement in Korea. Chen Tanqiu 陈潭秋, a founder of the CPC, introduced Wu to communism and Wu was among the first and few students to attend the USSR Comintern-established Moscow Sun Yat-sen University in 1925. After returning to China, Wu joined the CPC and served in several military roles. He endured the Long March, when the CPC retreated from KMT forces from the south to the west and north of China and Mao Zedong began his rise to preeminence. After returning from representing the PRC in the UN, the CPC appointed Wu Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs.¹⁴ Wu did not disappoint, demonstrated in his subsequent promotion, as he vociferously defended the PRC, lambasted the United States, and castigated the KMT and its representatives. That the CPC sent Wu, a high-ranking cadre, demonstrated that Beijing placed great value on the opportunity to represent the PRC in the UN, and consequently the world stage.

The CPC had recognized the importance of UN international legitimacy before the Korean War and already created a narrative to downplay the PRC's exclusion. Early in 1950, Zhang Xiruo 张奚若 published "We Should be Present in the United Nations!" in the *People's Daily*. He stated "This is our international struggle's official beginning. If it is the same as our domestic struggle, victory, in the end, will be ours."¹⁵ Zhang, an advocate of the position that the CPC name their new state a People's Republic, went on to lead the PRC's education ministry from 1952 to 1958. Zhang's article demonstrated how CPC leaders represented the UN to PRC

¹⁴ 張萬年，遲浩田，“歷史風雲中的一代英傑，”人民日報，4 Feb. 1998.

¹⁵ 張奚若，“我們應當出席聯合國！”人民日報，4 Feb. 1950.

citizens during the first stage of their competition with the KMT to represent China. Zhang neither attacked the UN nor denied its importance per se. Instead, Zhang claimed that imperialist states, particularly U.S. imperialists, were “attempting to use the United Nations as a mechanism for them to oppress weaker nations.”¹⁶ Or, in the earlier words of He Enjing 何恩敬, a Peking University law professor and head of law for Renmin University of China, “U.S. imperialism just wants to hold the United Nations under duress, to alter the United Nations’ principles.”¹⁷ The principles CPC officials claimed were under threat were the UN’s mandate to maintain international peace and, of course, representation for all people on the world stage. Thus, in Zhang and He’s formulation, presented in the CPC’s primary mouthpiece, the United Nations itself was a good and just organization, but imperialist states were subverting it. Zhang and He asserted former empires trying to reassert control over former colonies and the ROC representing China in the UN were undermining the organization’s principles. Imperial subversion of the world body would remain a significant CPC trope throughout this period. Within this criticism, however, was optimism. Zhang and He both maintained that U.S. imperialism would be defeated, and the PRC would attain its appropriate place in the world body.

Wu presented the CPC interpretation of the UN to the organization itself. On the afternoon of 28 November 1950, Wu presented the PRC’s position to the Security Council. Wu, the first representative of the PRC to address the world body, neither made the PRC a supplicant nor showed any signs of contrition. Wu stated he would only address the “Complaint of armed aggression against Taiwan” and would “not address the ‘so-called complaint of aggression upon

¹⁶ 張奚若, “我們應當出席聯合國!” 人民日報, 4 Feb. 1950.

¹⁷ 何恩敬, “聯合國的危機,” 人民日報, 22 Jan. 1950. Renmin University had a department of law until it became a school of law in 1988, see: “About Us, History,” *Renmin Law School*, accessed 26 July 2020, <http://www.law.ruc.edu.cn/eng/ShowClass.asp?unit=History>.

the Republic of Korea.”¹⁸ Wu’s reason was that the second topic did not address PRC Premier and Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai’s exhortation that the Security Council debate Beijing’s accusation “against armed aggression on Taiwan by the United States Government and the discussion of the armed intervention in Korea by the United States Government” as one topic, something the United States and its allies were unwilling to do.¹⁹ Wu argued the PRC should have placed its complaint against the United States in the Security Council, but due to U.S. manipulation Beijing was excluded, “for that reason, I must first of all protest to the United Nations for allowing even to this day the so-called ‘representative’ of the Chinese Kuomintang reactionary remnant clique to sit unashamed here in our midst.”²⁰ Wu’s denunciations were colorful, such as his refutation of Austin’s claim earlier that morning that the United States had done nothing aggressive towards the PRC, when he said “Very Well. Where then have the United States Seventh Fleet and the Thirteenth Air Force gone? Can it be that that they have gone to the Planet Mars? No, the United States Seventh Fleet and the Thirteenth Air Force have not gone elsewhere. They are in Taiwan.”²¹

Wu’s main argument, however, was that the United States was the genuine belligerent in Asia. Wu declared that Washington had established Japan as a military headquarters, a claim with verisimilitude as Japan was under formal U.S. occupation until 1951.²² He asserted that the

¹⁸ UN SC, 527th Meeting, 28 Nov. 1950, 5th Year, *Security Council Official Record*, S/PV.527, pp. 1-2, accessed 20 Aug. 2018, UN ODS.

¹⁹ UN SC, “Cable Dated 8 November 1950 From the Secretary-General to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic of China, and Cabled Reply Dated 11 November 1950 Addressed to the Secretary-General for the President of the Security Council, In Connection with the Resolution Adopted by the Security Council at its 520TH Meeting, Held on 8 November 1950,” S/1898, p. 2, accessed 20 Aug. 2018, UN ODS.

²⁰ UN SC, 527th Meeting, 28 Nov. 1950, 5th Year, *Security Council Official Record*, S/PV.527, pp. 2-3, accessed 20 Aug. 2018, UN ODS.

²¹ *Ibid.*, 15, accessed 20 Aug. 2018, UN ODS.

²² For more on post-war Japan see: John Dower, *Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Aftermath of World War II*, (New York: W.W. Norton, 1999); Laura Hein, “Revisiting America’s Occupation of Japan,” *Cold War History* 11, no. 4 (2011), 579-99.

U.S. military was not only fighting in Korea, it was also occupying Taiwan. Wu's claim that Taiwan was under U.S. occupation reflected CPC propaganda and Soviet rhetoric that the KMT did not represent the people in Taiwan, let alone all Chinese. Wu included Vietnam as a site of U.S. aggression, depicting U.S. material support for the French as pernicious as the military efforts it enabled. In 1950, Paris was aggressively trying to reestablish its former colonial control in Southeast Asia, with U.S. support, but U.S. aid was limited before the Vietnamese drove France out a few years later.²³ Overall, Wu portrayed a pugnacious Washington tightening control throughout Asia. Wu avowed "the United States Government is systematically building up a military encirclement of the People's Republic of China, in preparation for further attack on the People's Republic of China, and to stir up a Third World War" as the explanation for U.S. actions in the region.²⁴ Wu cast the United States as the aggressor in the region, thus demonstrating that the PRC, and by extension the DPRK, were defending themselves. Wu's excoriations of U.S. imperialism had valence in Soviet-allied states, therefore he also showed the PRC's dedication to the global communist movement. Moreover, through Wu, the CPC demonstrated it was unafraid of defying the United States on the world stage. Sending troops into Korea demonstrated Beijing's willingness to confront other powers as well, but its insistence that these troops were volunteers, renaming the PLA North East Frontier Force the PVA, obscured that willingness. Wu, and therefore the CPC, cast Beijing as responding to U.S. aggression, but demonstrated on the floor of the UN that the PRC was unafraid of challenging the United States.

²³ For more on the U.S. role in the First and Second Indochina Wars see: Andrew J. Rotter, *The Path to Vietnam: Origins of the American Commitment to Southeast Asia*, (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1987); Mark Atwood Lawrence, *Assuming the Burden: Europe and the American Commitment to War in Vietnam*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005); Kathryn C. Statler, *Replacing France: The Origins of American Intervention in Vietnam*, (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2007).

²⁴ UN SC, 527th Meeting, 28 Nov. 1950, 5th Year, *Security Council Official Record*, S/PV.527, p. 23, accessed 20 Aug. 2018, UN ODS.

Delegates in the UN did challenge Wu's claims. Chauvel noted Wu's inclusion of Vietnam in his remarks and pointed out that the conflict there was not on the agenda, though he agreed that events in Vietnam were linked to the other events in East Asia. Chauvel insinuated that the CPC, with Soviet backing, supported the Viet Minh who opposed the reassertion of French colonial rule in Vietnam. Malik took umbrage with Chauvel chastising Wu, noting representatives often included other items in Security Council meetings. Chauvel responded, "I just wanted to point out that when I made a remark about the speech of the representative of the Peking authorities, it was the representative of the USSR who replied. That is all I wanted to say," making clear France, like the United States, blamed Soviet-style communism for the turmoil in the region.²⁵ Chauvel's offhand remark also demonstrated that Washington and its allies viewed the CPC as an extension of the Soviet Union, rather than an independent party. The next day Chauvel stressed that it was the UN acting in Korea, not the United States. Austin highlighted that Wu had just challenged the world and defied the UN and claimed the PRC had been "Invited here to give information and to shed light, he [Wu] gave distortions, slanders, half-truths and outright lies, some big and some small."²⁶ Austin further warned, "General Wu went very far yesterday to show that his hand is against all men. Let him pay heed lest he go home from this place with all men's hands against him."²⁷ CPC willingness to challenge the international system was not lost on Washington or its allies. Wu's statements, though, did resemble those of Malik and the official communiques from the DPRK to the UN. Consequently, Wu further cemented views among Washington and its allies that a monolithic communism

²⁵ UN SC, 527th Meeting, 28 Nov. 1950, 5th Year, *Security Council Official Record*, S/PV.527, p. 27, accessed 20 Aug. 2018, UN ODS.

²⁶ UN SC, 528th Meeting, 29 Nov. 1950, 5th Year, *Security Council Official Record*, S/PV.528, p. 13, accessed 20 Aug. 2018, UN ODS.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, accessed 20 Aug. 2018, UN ODS.

challenged the liberal, democratic order the U.S. championed and further exacerbated international tensions in the early Cold War era.

The exchange between the representatives from the ROC and PRC, however, elucidated the competition between the two governments to define what China was and who the Chinese were. Tsiang, in English, discounted Wu's remarks, stating the "Council heard one of the strangest statements in its existence. I saw in that statement nothing Chinese whatever. Until yesterday afternoon I had not thought it possible for any Chinese, even a communist Chinese, to allow himself to be led around by his nose to do the bidding of his master."²⁸ Tsiang then asserted that the ROC was a sovereign state which held a legitimate place in the UN, and the U.S. military was in Taiwan at the request of the rightful government of China. Wu did not take Tsiang questioning his Chineseness well and, in Mandarin, again challenged ROC legitimacy, then proceeded to argue "this Kuomintang reactionary representative in front of me, disowned and denounced by the Chinese people, has no right whatsoever to represent China. I have serious doubts whether this man who spoke before me is a Chinese himself. The 475 million great people speak a language which, it appears, he does not know."²⁹ Wu and Tsiang's exchange presented the PRC's and ROC's differing views on what China was and who was, therefore, Chinese.

Tsiang asserted the PRC had not only adopted an ideology foreign to China, but that it was also subservient to the USSR. Wu, likewise, argued the ROC was a foreign imposition subservient to the United States, that had been rejected by the Chinese people. For Wu, Tsiang demonstrated the KMT foreignness when he literally did not speak China's language on the floor

²⁸ UN SC, 528th Meeting, 29 Nov. 1950, 5th Year, *Security Council Official Record*, S/PV.528, p. 8, accessed 20 Aug. 2018, UN ODS.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, 11, accessed 20 Aug. 2018, UN ODS.

of the UN. In many ways, Wu and Tsiang's disagreement about what was Chinese was defined by allegiance, to communism or liberal democracy. Both arguments, however, were striking more for their similarities than their differences. This is especially true as both men had studied abroad, Tsiang held a Ph.D. in history from Columbia and Wu had studied in the USSR, and both had long service in their respective parties. Though one difference was in Wu's putting China in opposition to the emergent international system while Tsiang placed it within. That the Security Council debate was about the PRC fighting U.S.-led UN forces in Korea magnified Wu's proclamations considerably. Thus, in the first exchange between Beijing and Taipei in the world body, their representatives demonstrated each state envisioned a different China.

The CPC's contention that the UN was under the thrall of U.S. imperialism blunted direct criticism of the world body at home even as the People's Volunteer Army fought U.S.-led UN forces in the Korean War. A Xinhua News press release on the Security Council's resolution to intervene in the conflict on the Korean peninsula, began "United Nations' Security Council, under U.S. imperialism's oppression, unlawfully passes U.S. imperialist resolution on Korea" and continued "without Chinese and Soviet representatives in attendance, resolution clearly violates Charter" and closed noting the DPRK also opposed the resolution.³⁰ The article itself discussed the Security Council's deliberations, but concluded with analysis that depicted the resolution as unlawful because neither Soviet Union nor Chinese delegates had been present. For PRC media and officials, Tsiang did not and could not represent China in any way, particularly not on the Security Council. Appearing on the first page of the *People's Daily*, this article was given prominence by the CPC as it sought to disassociate the UN from the Korean War. Instead,

³⁰ 新華社, "聯合國安理會在美帝壓迫下 非法通過美帝關於朝鮮的提案 沒有中蘇代表參加顯見決議違反憲章 朝鮮共和國聲明否認安理會非法決議," 人民日報, 28 June 1950.

CPC propaganda maintained that supposed UN forces in Korea were merely another example of the U.S. exploiting the world body for its imperial and aggressive agenda.

The CPC discourse on U.S. imperialism and its domination of the UN tied into their critiques of capitalism. Capitalism harmed not only the world body, but people throughout the world, including Americans. The American people were not represented by the U.S. government, as *Beijing Daily* editors argued when they printed a comic next to an article discussing the 1956 U.S. elections (fig. 1.1). The cartoon originally appeared in the U.S. periodical *World Affairs*, a journal founded in 1828 by the American Peace Society, which sought to enhance international understanding so that “right shall rule might in a law-governed world.”³¹ In the image, both the U.S. Republican and U.S. Democratic parties are shown in the pocket of “Monopoly Capitalists.” That the image originally appeared in U.S. media demonstrated some Americans recognized their plight and agreed with the CPC. The cartoon, regardless of its original context, amplified the CPC message that all people suffered under U.S. imperialism, even Americans. For CPC officials the United States embodied capitalism. Vladimir Lenin had argued in *Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism*, written in 1917, that British imperial trade had led “cartels [to] become one of the foundations of the whole of economic life. Capitalism has been transformed into imperialism.”³² Thus, U.S. capitalism was in reality the current form of imperialism that was most responsible for the ills of the world; the UN was just another casualty.

³¹ “Front Matter: The American Peace Society,” *World Affairs* 119, no. 1 (Spring 1956). I was unable to find the cartoon in digital volumes of the journal in 1955 or 1956 and queries in past volumes also did not yield this cartoon.

³² Vladimir I. Lenin, *Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism: A Popular Outline* (Petrograd: Znaniye Publishers, 1917; reprint New York: International Publishers, 1939), 22 (page citations are to the reprint edition).



Figure 1.1: *World Affairs* 世界知識, “..... ‘全景,’” [..... ‘The whole picture’], 北京日報, 28 Oct. 1956.

On 22 November 1950, Tainan’s *China Daily* ran a lead article on the UN that opened with Tsiang who had “bitterly denounced Soviet Russia using a bandit gang to dominate China, destroy the treaty charter and endanger world peace.”³³ A couple of years later, Taipei’s *United Daily News* led with an article on the UN discussing how ROC Foreign Minister Ye Gongchao 葉公超 “called on the United Nations to adopt clear policies and without the slightest ambiguity announce: communism already threatens world peace and security.”³⁴ The KMT established the *China Daily* in 1946 to spread their message in southern Taiwan. Wang Tiwu 王惕吾, a member of the KMT Central Standing Committee, founded the *United Daily News* in 1951. Thus, both papers reflected how the KMT wanted to present the UN to ROC citizens. The KMT’s presentation focused on high level officials not only addressing the UN, they proposed

³³ 本報敢譯, “討論我控蘇案,” 中華日報, 22 Nov. 1950.

³⁴ 中央社紐約聯合國總部, “聯合國應予譴責,” 聯合報, 14 Nov. 1952.

resolutions and stood up to communism and the Soviet Union. The KMT presented the world body as an important organization for maintaining international peace and security, and the ROC as an integral player in the international organization. Tsiang's and Ye's statements also highlighted what ROC officials wanted people to see threatening the UN: communism. While U.S.-led UN forces and the PVA fought in Korea, the KMT's image of voracious communism was not unique, but their presentations also bolstered their claims that the PRC did not represent China.

The Security Council did not decide whether the United States or PRC were aggressors in Asia when representatives resumed debate on 30 November 1950. After more back and forth between the U.S. and Soviet camps, representatives first voted on the PRC's claims regarding U.S. aggression in Taiwan. When Bebler, not only Yugoslavia's representative but acting president of the Security Council, called the vote on U.S. aggression, only Malik raised his hand in favor. When Bebler next called for a decision on PRC aggression in Korea, Malik was again alone when he raised his hand in opposition.³⁵ The Security Council's motion on U.S. aggression failed because only one member voted in favor, the motion on PRC aggression failed because the Soviet Union's position as a permanent member of the council gave it veto power. Moscow maintained the current UN action in Korea was illegal, as their representative was boycotting the UN and the KMT falsely represented China in the world body when Resolution S/1511 was passed. The PRC was a Soviet ally and an aggressor label would harm Soviet efforts to increase the number of allies it had in the world body. Thus, the representatives who wanted the PRC held to account turned to the General Assembly.

³⁵ UN SC, 530th Meeting, 30 Nov. 1950, 5th Year, *Security Council Official Record*, S/PV.530 pp. 21-25, accessed 20 Aug. 2018, UN ODS.

The General Assembly decided the PRC was an aggressor in the Korean War, a decision that benefited the ROC's claim to represent China. On 4 December 1950, the delegations from Cuba, Ecuador, France, Norway, the United Kingdom, and the United States requested the General Assembly add "Intervention of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China in Korea" to its agenda, which was accompanied on 5 December by a missive that explained the USSR's veto left the issue unresolved and in need of redress.³⁶ The General Assembly then further debated and discussed the PRC's activities in Korea, where delegates' arguments continued to reflect the burgeoning Cold War schisms revealed in the Security Council. In the morning of 1 February 1951, nearly four months after Austin first presented MacArthur's report, the General Assembly brought PRC participation in the Korean War to a vote. Forty-four other states found "that the Central Government of the People's Republic of China... has itself engaged in aggression in Korea."³⁷ The Soviet Union's delegation again cast a nay vote, along with those of India, Poland, Ukraine, Burma, Byelorussia, and Czechoslovakia.³⁸ Since this was the General Assembly the Soviet Union did not have veto power, however, and the decision became Resolution 498 (V). Shortly before the vote, C.P. Demchenko, Ukraine's representative, declared one reason that PRC aggression in Korea had come to a vote was that "the United States ruling circles need these lying accusations against the People's Republic of China in order to prevent the admission of People's Republic of China to the United Nations."³⁹

³⁶ United Nations General Assembly (UN GA), "Request for the Inclusion of an Additional Item on the Agenda of the Fifth Regular Session," A/1618, accessed 22 Aug. 2018, UN ODS; General Assembly, "Intervention of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China in Korea," A/1621, accessed 22 Aug. 2018 UN ODS.

³⁷ UN GA, "498 (V): Intervention of the People's Republic of China in Korea," A/Res/498(V), accessed 27 Aug. 2018, UN ODS.

³⁸ UN GA, 327th Plenary Meeting, 1 Feb. 1951, *General Assembly, Fifth Session, Official Records*, A/PV.327, p. 696, accessed 27 Aug. 2018, UN ODS.

³⁹ UN GA, 327th Plenary Meeting, 1 Feb. 1951, *General Assembly, Fifth Session, Official Records*, A/PV.327, p. 694, accessed 27 Aug. 2018, UN ODS.

Demchenko's statement reinforced claims made by CPC representatives and their allies in the UN. But he also demonstrated China's contested status in the organization was exacerbating Cold War polarizations.

Zhou Enlai maintained that the UN declaration the PRC was an aggressor in the Korean War was, in reality, a U.S. declaration. Printed in full on page one of the *People's Daily*, Zhou expounded on U.S. perfidy in the world body, arguing that "the American government manipulates and hijacks most states in the United Nations, committing violations of the United Nations Charter, and thus has it ever been."⁴⁰ Here, then, Zhou clearly detailed his charge that the UN labeled the PRC an aggressor in the Korean War due to U.S. machinations to further its imperialist agenda. That agenda was, according to Zhou, to "continue occupying North Korea and Taiwan, interfere with Vietnam and South East Asia, proceed to unilaterally conclude treaties with and re-arm Japan, cooperate with it [Japan] and the West to re-arm West Germany, and drive Asia, Europe and the world's people into the abyss of war, and thus fulfill its pipedream of world domination."⁴¹

Even though the UN labeled the PRC an aggressor against it in 1951, PRC officials like Zhou and Zhang, as well as intellectuals like He, had established a view of the world body that simultaneously delegitimized it and protected its international legitimacy. According to CPC rhetoric, the UN's actions were illegitimate only because it was dominated by the United States, evinced in part by the ROC's continued representation of China therein, therefore the PRC need not be constrained by the world body's rulings. The UN itself, however, was a legitimate organization dedicated to protecting world peace. Once the world body escaped U.S. control, and

⁴⁰ 新華社, "中華人民共和國中央人民政府外交部周恩來長關於聯合國大會非法通過誣衊我國的決議的聲明," 人民日報, 3 Feb. 1951.

⁴¹ Ibid.

the PRC was accorded its rightful place in both the General Assembly and Security Council, the organization could fulfill its mandate to prevent another conflict like the First or Second World Wars. The dual presentation of UN legitimacy allowed PRC officials and pundits to pursue their national self-interests without foreign constraint, but ensured that when they wielded UN legitimacy, an inevitable conclusion in their presentations, it would still be a significant marker of their own legitimacy for the public, both foreign and domestic.

The Korean War ended in an armistice on 27 July 1953, but the ROC and United States continued to use the General Assembly's labeling of the PRC as an aggressor in the Korean War to preclude renewed debate on Chinese representation in the UN until the next decade. At the UN's opening session on 15 September 1953, Soviet representative Andrei Y. Vishinsky asked the General Assembly resolve the question of Chinese representation, because "It need hardly be said that any decision taken in the General Assembly without the participation of the Central Government of the People's Republic of China can have no practical significance."⁴² U.S. representative John Foster Dulles moved that the General Assembly postpone the debate for the entirety of the eighth session. His primary justification was that:

We know that three years ago the Chinese Communists intervened with their armed forces as aggressors and participants in the communist scheme to overpower and seize the Republic of Korea. That fact of aggression has been found by the United Nations. After unnecessary and heartbreaking delays, the negotiations for an armistice were finally concluded about six weeks ago. That armistice was welcomed throughout the world, and nowhere more than the United States. But that armistice has not solved all the problems created by the communist aggression in Korea. Armed forces of communist China remain in Korea. The aggression has yet to be terminated, and the peace secured. The Chinese Communists in this matter have not shown convincing evidence of a genuine intention to end aggression and to make peace. Moreover, their continued actions elsewhere in Asia are far from reassuring.⁴³

⁴² UN GA, 432nd Plenary Meeting (Opening Meeting), 15 Sept. 1953, *General Assembly, Eighth Session, Official Records*, A/PV.432, p. 2, accessed 27 Aug. 2018, UN ODS.

⁴³ UN GA, 432nd Plenary Meeting (Opening Meeting), 15 Sept. 1953, *General Assembly, Eighth Session, Official Records*, A/PV.432, pp. 3-4, accessed 27 Aug. 2018, UN ODS.

Dulles's statement did several things. Primarily, it used the PRC's actions in the Korean War to label any discussion of Chinese representation as appeasement. Dulles also made a sentimental appeal, to subtly argue that discussing it so soon after hostilities ended would dishonor the armistice and those who died while it was negotiated. Towards the end, Dulles implied that the PRC was not only unrepentant, it continued to engage in troubling activities and thus was not a peace-loving state, a key provision for membership per the UN Charter. Tsiang also responded to Vishinsky's proposal, deepening Dulles's claim to argue "the Chinese communist régime is not only un-Chinese in its origin, it is also un-Chinese in its nature," to assert Beijing could not represent China in the UN.⁴⁴ Tsiang presented a view common among U.S. allies that because the CPC were beholden to the Soviet Union it was not a legitimate political party, let alone representatives of a legitimate state. Dulles's argument was more practical than Tsiang's in convincing, or at least garnering support, from U.S. allies, and the assembly voted against Vishinsky's proposal thirty-five to eleven, with eleven abstentions. That the ROC and United States were able to quash debates on which state represented China in the world body while the PRC was engaged in hostilities against U.S.-led UN forces on the Korean peninsula is unsurprising, but even after an armistice had been signed and active fighting concluded, Beijing's decision to send forces into Korea provided Taipei and Washington the ongoing means to prevent discussing Chinese representation for the next decade.

CPC Depictions of the UN

CPC represented UN legitimacy as bifurcated after fighting had ended on the Korean Peninsula, as ROC and U.S. delegations continued to stymie debates over Chinese representation

⁴⁴ Ibid., 4, accessed 27 Aug. 2018, UN ODS.

throughout this period. Jiang Nan 江南, a Xinhua News commentator, wrote an article simultaneously published in the *People's Daily* and the *Beijing Daily* in June 1954 that claimed, “The United States has consistently undermined the UN Charter, and interfered in the internal affairs of other states in the United Nations.”⁴⁵ Jiang demonstrated the CPC continued to represent the world body as dominated by the United States. Moreover, his article showed the CPC’s far-reaching control over media in the PRC. National and municipal media not only ran Xinhua News articles, those articles often appeared simultaneously in various newspapers throughout the nation. The CPC’s control over the media amplified their propaganda by saturating PRC media. Thus, the CPC’s characterization of the UN as a tool of U.S. imperialism was widely distributed and available to PRC citizens.

Cartoons were an important medium the CPC used to build a narrative that the U.S. controlled the world body. The CPC had used cartoons for propaganda long before the PRC was founded and viewed them as an important tool for reaching the masses.⁴⁶ The following cartoons (fig. 1.2 and fig. 1.3] were drawn in response to events in Lebanon and Jordan in the summer of 1958. In Lebanon there was an uprising, known as the 1958 Lebanon Crisis, in which Lebanon’s President Camille Chamoun claimed Egypt and Syria’s newly formed United Arab Republic (UAR) was fomenting dissent in Lebanon. Similarly, the King of Jordan, Hussein bin Talal, alleged the UAR was interfering in his state in what became known as the 1958 Jordan Crisis. The United States sent troops to support Chamoun and material to aid Hussein, Britain sent troops to assist Hussein, and both Chamoun and Hussein took their complaints to the UN. The

⁴⁵ 江南, “誰是聯合國道義權威的破壞者?” 人民日報, 3 June 1954, p.4; 江南, “誰是聯合國道義權威的破壞者?” 北京日報, 3 June 1954.

⁴⁶ Chang-tai Hung, *Mao's New World: Political Culture in the Early People's Republic*, (New York: Cornell University Press, 2010), 155-56.

UN sent observation groups to each state, which found no definitive evidence of UAR interference. In the end, U.S. and British forces left Lebanon and Jordan, while the newly elected Lebanese President Fuad Chehab and Hussein resumed normal relations with the UAR before the year was over.⁴⁷ PRC cartoonists, along with reporters and officials, used U.S. and British actions in these crises to portray the United States in control of the world body.

In figure 1.2, Chen Jinyan 陳今言 illustrated U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower engaged in shadow play. In the comic, Eisenhower stands at a “defendant’s seat” in front of a door labeled “UN General Assembly emergency meeting.” Casting a hopeful look towards an unseen audience, Eisenhower creates a dove’s shadow on the wall, which reads “I sent troops to the Mideast for ‘peace.’” To drive home the reality of U.S. militarism, Chen also drew Eisenhower in battle dress with a rifle leaning against the lectern. Chen portrayed the United States duping the UN over its role in Lebanon. Eisenhower’s dove of peace was a ploy to dissemble U.S. interference in Lebanon, his military garb showing the true intent of the United States. In figure 1.3, Xu Zhiqing 徐智清 showed Eisenhower hiding under a lectern wielding a bowler-hatted puppet to address the UN. Eisenhower speaks through a microphone, which is relayed via a speaker in the puppets mouth to the General Assembly. On the floor in front of Eisenhower lays a scroll that reads “U.S. and British resolution,” while the puppet holds a sheet reading “shamefaced-coerced seven power side resolution.” Xu, like Chen, also drew Eisenhower in military garb. Xu, however, depicted Eisenhower’s face as evil and cunning while out of his audience’s sight. Xu’s image conveys the idea that Britain, the bowler-hatted puppet, is doing the United States’ bidding in Jordan while concealing America’s true role. Chen’s and

⁴⁷ United Nations Office of Public Information, *Yearbook of the United Nations*, (United Nations: New York, 1958), pp. 36-51.

Xu's cartoons provide a visual representation of the CPC narrative that the United States controlled and misled the UN. In both cartoons, Eisenhower stands in for U.S. imperialism, which deceived the world body while the United States pursued a militaristic foreign policy. The UN, however, was not criticized. Both Chen and Xu present the world body as a victim, defenseless against U.S. machinations.



Figure 1.2: Chen Jinyan 陳今言, “艾森豪威爾的拿手戲” [Eisenhower's forté], 北京日報, 15 Aug. 1958.



Figure 1.3: Xu Zhiqing 徐智清, “美製‘麥克風’” [American “microphone”], 南京日報, 22 Aug. 1958.

While the CPC represented China as a revolutionary state and nation that challenged traditional orthodoxies of the international order and celebrated revolution abroad, it did not accept any question of China's traditional boundaries or the nationality of the people contained therein. In the 1950s, outside of Taiwan, international support for Tibet provided the greatest challenge to PRC territorial integrity. On 12 March 1959 protestors in Lhasa, Tibet's capital, rose up and declared Tibet's independence in what became known as the 1959 Tibetan Uprising. The protest was short lived, however, and by 23 March the PLA had quashed the uprising, but not before the Dalai Lama, Tibet's religious leader, had fled in secret to India. In addition to not securing the Dalai Lama, the CPC also lost control of the international narrative of the uprising. In October, the Irish and Malta delegations proposed the UN General Assembly recognize Tibetans' distinct religion and traditions in light of the UN Charter and Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Their proposal culminated in Resolution 1353 (XIV) that "Calls for respect for the fundamental human rights of the Tibetan people and for their distinctive cultural and religious life."⁴⁸

The CPC, unsurprisingly, dismissed the UN resolution. A statement by the Democratic Parties, domestic political parties who accepted CPC leadership and had joined the united front, described the UN deliberations on Tibet as the "United Nations held under duress by the United States, brazenly discusses and merges passage of the illegal resolution of the so called 'Tibet Problem.'"⁴⁹ Wen Kexin 温可信 provided a visual critique of U.S. imperialism in the UN over the 1959 Tibetan Uprising. In figure 1.4, Wen drew Eisenhower desperately trying to hold on to sheets of paper, on which characters for different regions of the world were written, atop a desk

⁴⁸ United Nations, *Yearbook of the United Nations 1959*, (New York: UN Department of Public Information, 1960), 69.

⁴⁹ 本报综合报道, "愤怒抗议美国挟持联大干涉我内政," 南京日报, 25 Oct. 1959.

labeled “United Nations.” Eisenhower’s ink well and pen have spilled and ink drips to the floor, while a paper with the character for west lies in a damaged rubbish bin. The reason Eisenhower struggles to control these pages is a wind arising from voices outside bellowing “China’s Tibet region has had great achievements in democratic reforms, all nations condemn the UN General Assembly’s illegal resolution.” Similar to the cartoons by Chen and Xu, Wen depicts the United States controlling the UN. Wen’s piece, however, is more optimistic. Here, Eisenhower struggles to control the world. The “West” is literally in the trash heap of history, blown there by a wind rising in the East in response to U.S. meddling in the PRC’s domestic affairs. The East wind was often invoked in CPC propaganda to represent communism, and its eventual victory over capitalism, or the West. The Democratic Parties statement and Wen’s work furthered the CPC’s contention that the world body’s flaws were not inherent to the organization, but to the grasping hands of U.S. imperialism. They portrayed the UN resolution as another example of U.S. domination of the organization. That U.S. delegates had not proposed Resolution 1353 was insignificant within the CPC’s discourse on the world body.



Figure 1.4: Wen Kexin 溫克信, “一堆廢紙” [A pile of waste paper], 南京日報, 25 Oct. 1959.

KMT Depictions of the UN

KMT propagandists also recognized the value of visual media. Editorial boards in the ROC shared cartoons printed in the United States with the ROC public. Printing U.S. cartoons ridiculing USSR and non-aligned states' attempts to get the PRC into the UN provided a visual representation that the U.S. public supported the ROC. The cartoons were modified, however, to increase their effect on the ROC public. Figures 1.5 and 1.6 were both published as PRC allies sought to challenge the ROC's place in the world body. In figure 1.5, the artist drew a fat, ape-like man who walks toward the audience, in his wake skulls litter the ground and plumes of smoke rise into the sky. The plumes of smoke have the added effect of making the man seem odiferous. There's a signpost that reads "Geneva." In his pockets are a bomb, and something that appears to drip blood. To ensure the audience knows this figure represents the CPC, he wears a hat with an inverted hammer and sickle and the characters for "bandit party" appear on his jacket. The man's fingers pull his mouth into a grin with a caption underneath reading "You see, I can also smile!" This image portrayed the CPC as not only bloodthirsty, but inhuman. It also bolstered KMT claims that life under CPC rule was brutal and the communists had no concern for the people's welfare. The trail of ruin in the figure's wake as it headed towards Geneva supported claims that letting the PRC participate in international organizations like the UN was unthinkable, as the CPC continued to carry arms even as they forced a smile for the world.



Figure 1.5: *New York Telegraph* 紐約的電訊報, “你瞧，我也會笑!” [You see, I can also smile!], 聯合報, 21 Sept. 1955.

In figure 1.6, the *New York Telegraph* portrayed the UN’s reaction to PRC efforts to enter the world body. Here, the artist drew the PRC as a fat man standing in front of the door to the United Nations, with a dagger up his sleeve. The door, however, has been slammed in the man’s face with such force that he has jumped back, and his hat has been blown off his head. From within, the world body yells “beat it!” To preclude any confusion, “Chinese communist bandit party” is written on the man’s jacket, and he carries a letter of invitation from the Soviet Union to “Communist China” to attend the UN’s eighth session. This cartoon demonstrated that UN members considered PRC efforts to enter the UN as laughable. It bolstered the KMT narrative that only the Soviet Union was interested in getting the CPC into the world body. The PRC’s entry to the UN is physically blocked, and its legitimacy so low courtesies were unnecessary in their rejection. Moreover, the hidden dagger alluded that the PRC was too dangerous to get UN membership.



Figure 1.6: “匪幫碰壁圖” [Bandit gang hits a wall], 中華日報, 22 Sept. 1955.

These cartoons portrayed the CPC as bloodthirsty and uncivilized, supporting the KMT's contention that people on the mainland lived miserable existences. They also bolstered the KMT argument that their problems in the UN resulted from Soviet interference, as figure 1.5 showed the CPC's invitation as from the Soviet Union. Moreover, they built on U.S. and ROC tropes that the PRC was an aggressive regime. Figures 1.5 and 1.6 share another commonality that deserves mention. They both employ derogatory racial imagery. The figures represent Chinese communists as inhuman in figure 1.5, and the one in figure 1.6 is fat and unkempt with eyes squinted to slits. Both depictions present the figures wearing false smiles, fitting into contemporary American views of Asians as nefarious and cunning. While it is unsurprising that these images appeared in fifties-era America, that editors in the ROC chose to employ them is more startling. A likely reason goes back to the barb Tsiang hurled at Wu Xiuquan on the floor of the UN in 1950: the CPC were not Chinese. Therefore, the KMT had no compunction against using overly racialized images of the PRC in ROC media, as they hoped to bolster their claims

that the CPC were not just Soviet lackeys, they were alien rulers subjecting China to foreign ideals and habits.

Putting Chinese Representation on the Agenda

India changed how the UN approached the question of Chinese representation in 1956, though the ROC and its allies succeeded in precluding any debate. In previous years the question was brought up as a point of order, such as in Vishinsky's 1953 effort, or in the credentials committee, as the Soviet Union and their allies did in 1956.⁵⁰ In 1956, however, Indian representative Arthur S. Lall made a formal proposal the UN include "Representation of China in the United Nations" on the agenda.⁵¹ In an explanatory memorandum attached to the proposal, Lall argued, as many had before him, that the PRC was the true government of China and its absence harmed the UN's international legitimacy. Lall's proposal, however, resulted from the Asian-African Conference of 1955, commonly called the Bandung Conference. The conference led to the Non-Aligned Movement, in which states sought to avoid entanglement with either the United States or Soviet Union. Lall argued that PRC Prime Minister Zhou Enlai "was among the strongest supporters of the United Nations and of its Charter" at Bandung.⁵² After more debate, however, the UN passed Resolution 1108 (XI) that decided not to consider the question of Chinese representation in the UN's eleventh session.⁵³ Lall did formalize the question of Chinese representation in the UN by requesting the General Assembly put it on the agenda. The ROC,

⁵⁰ UN GA, "Report of the Credentials Committee," 8 Nov. 1956, A/3338, accessed 28 Aug. 2017, UN ODS.

⁵¹ UN GA, "Letter Dated 10 November from the Permanent Representative of India to the United Nations, addressed to the Secretary General," A/3338, accessed 28 Aug. 2017, UN ODS.

⁵² *Ibid.*, 2, accessed 28 Aug. 2018, UN ODS.

⁵³ General Assembly, "Resolution 1108 (XI). Representation of China in the United Nations," 16 Nov. 1956, accessed 28 Aug. 2017, UN ODS.

however, continued to represent China in the UN with minimal challenge throughout this period with the support of its allies, with the United States as its most important.

The KMT did not let India's 1956 formal request to add Chinese representation in the UN to the world body's agenda go unchallenged. The *United Daily News* stated, "T.F. Tsiang condemned India's violation of our legitimate authority."⁵⁴ The *Central Daily* "condemned India's scheme demanding bandits enter [the UN] in order to shed crocodile tears."⁵⁵ It then reprinted Tsiang's statements to the UN insinuating the Soviet Union was behind the request. The ROC's position in the UN allowed it to defend its interests on the world stage directly. Thus, KMT officials did not trouble UN legitimacy. They did build a narrative, however, that the ROC's problems in the UN stemmed from communist machinations. Thus, papers continued to show Tsiang as a powerful actor in the world body as he condemned and thwarted Soviet maneuvers, with U.S. support. The KMT presented ROC officials as important members of the world body in order to elide their greatest weakness: the CPC governed the vast majority of the nation they claimed to represent.

The CPC presented the UN in this period as a legitimate international organization, but one whose purpose had been corrupted. The PRC's exclusion from the world body meant officials, newspaper editors, and cartoonists had to explain their state's absence from a legitimate organization. In explanation, they defended the principles of the UN charter, while claiming bad actors in the world body had corrupted it. The PRC's dual presentation of UN legitimacy began with general aspersions against imperialism, as in Zhang's essay. After the Korean War, the narrative of U.S. imperialism attained valence in the PRC as Zhou, and other top CPC officials,

⁵⁴ "本屆聯合國大會中不談我代表權問題," 聯合報, 16 Nov. 1956.

⁵⁵ "蔣廷黻在聯大演說聯大無讓向俄屈服," 中央日報, 17 Nov. 1956.

claimed the PRC's aggressor label was the result of U.S. machinations; the PRC had not gone to war with the UN, it had acted to defend a communist ally from the United States. As the decade progressed, the CPC's argument that the United States had subverted the world body was presented as fact to PRC citizens, as Chen's, Xu's, and Wen's cartoons made evident. These disparate voices worked in tandem to present the UN as legitimate and its charter worth upholding, but U.S. imperialism was perverting the world body's principles. Moreover, the ROC's continued representation of China meant any resolutions the UN passed were unlawful. Thus, the PRC need not be constrained by the world body in pursuit of its national and international goals and its stance at home and abroad were the same.

During this period, the ROC presented the UN as a guarantor of world peace. Communism was, however, knocking at the gate. The KMT portrayed its representatives working with the United States to keep communism in check, drawing on UN legitimacy to bolster their own. High-ranking KMT officials and editors portrayed efforts to question the ROC's place in the world body as feeble and lay blame on the Soviet Union. After all, according to the KMT narrative bolstered by the UN's own resolution, the CPC was neither peace loving nor legitimate. KMT officials wielded their role in the UN to strengthen their legitimacy at home. Newspapers highlighted high-ranking officials like Tsiang and Ye making forceful statements in the UN and standing up to both the Soviet Union and the PRC.

The People's Republic of China

On 1 October 1949, Mao Zedong addressed the Chinese people from Tiananmen Square to announce the founding of the People's Republic of China. During that address, Mao famously declared "the Chinese people have stood up." Stood up to Japanese imperialism. Stood up to the corrupt KMT. Stood up to Western powers' interference in China's affairs. Mao's turn of speech

was invoked to show that China, after a century of humiliation, was no longer a passive player reacting to world affairs. There is a problem with this well-known and oft-repeated quote, though. That problem is: if Mao said it, he did not say it in Tiananmen Square on 1 October 1949.⁵⁶ The misattribution of this slogan to Mao on 1 October is intriguing, and points to Mao's important role as both the founder and intellectual leader of the new state. The slogan itself, though, demonstrates how CPC leaders sought to define "China." The PRC represented a break from the failures in China's past. One of old China's failures was not standing up to the international community. Thus, the nascent PRC state would not allow the Chinese nation to be bullied again. Their exclusion from the UN, however, complicated those efforts. Examining how the CPC presented "China" internally and externally reveals how the PRC's exclusion from the UN influenced their national imaginary.

China's Revolutionary Spirit

On 1 May 1950, International May Day, the PRC held parades in Beijing. As rain poured down, 200,000 Chinese marched across Tiananmen Square. Soldiers, sailors, airmen, workers, government officials, city officials, women, and students all participated. Editorializing on the event a couple of days later, the *People's Daily* proclaimed:

This is the Chinese nation's 中華民族 revolutionary spirit. Relying on this great spirit, and Chairman Mao's specially advocated way to seek the truth from facts, after thousands of tenacious battles, we finally drove off imperialism, overthrew bureaucratic capitalism and feudalism, and established the People's Republic of China. We must similarly use this revolutionary spirit and pragmatic spirit to build and industrialize our new country.⁵⁷

⁵⁶ SCMP Reporter, "The Famous Mao Slogan, that He Never Used," *South China Morning Post*, 25 Sept. 2009, accessed 1 Nov. 2018, <https://www.scmp.com/article/693526/famous-mao-slogan-he-never-even-used>. For video of Mao's address see: "What did Mao Zedong Really Say?," YouTube video, 2:35, posted by the *South China Morning Post*, 24 Sept. 2009, accessed 1 Nov. 2018, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ra9X7V5B5oE>.

⁵⁷ 本報特寫, "英雄的行列," 人民日報, 3 May 1950.

The CPC would often invoke the Chinese nation's "revolutionary spirit." In this *People's Daily* article, the PRC's revolutionary spirit not only drove imperialism, capitalism, and feudalism from China, it would also allow China to develop into an industrialized nation. Ren Yuanzhi 任遠志, in a moving tribute to her recently-deceased father Ren Bishi 任弼時, a veteran of the Long March, Secretary General of the CPC Politburo, and Secretary of the CPC Central Committee, expounded on this revolutionary spirit. Ren Yuanzhi was fifteen when she first met her father, because he was away serving the revolution, and when she first saw him "she was a child who had just cast off the old society and knew nothing of revolution's effects on society," though she later learned from her father and now vowed she, too, would serve the CPC and the revolution.⁵⁸ The CPC blamed old society, or traditions, for China's century of humiliation, and thus those traditions had to be cast off. This determined stance extended to the international arena, where the PRC's continued exclusion from the UN enhanced CPC perceptions that the old order, represented by the KMT and imperialism, U.S. imperialism in particular, was denying China its rightful place in the world.

The CPC's presentation of China's revolutionary spirit affected its representations of Sun Yat-sen, the founding father of modern China. During the 1950s, CPC leaders argued they were the inheritors of Sun's legacy and the party that had realized his goal for the Chinese nation. On the PRC's first anniversary, the *People's Daily* published a photo of Mao to the left of Sun Yat-sen's.⁵⁹ The *Beijing Daily* made a similar juxtaposition on the PRC's third anniversary (fig. 1.7). Editors placing Mao next to Sun presented the Chairman of the CPC as the inheritor of the Father of the Nation's spirit. Consequently, it reinforced CPC propaganda that they were the

⁵⁸ 任遠志, "掉我的父親," 人民日報, 31 Oct. 1951.

⁵⁹ "中華人民共和國萬歲 1 世界人民大團結萬歲!" 人民日報, 1 Oct. 1950.

heirs to Sun's legacy. Ahead of the ninetieth anniversary of Sun's birth, President of Renmin University Wu Yuzhang 吳玉章 and Renmin University Political-Economy Professor Li Zongzheng 李宗正 published articles in the *Beijing Daily*. Wu's article, "Sun Yat-sen's great revolutionary spirit," provided an interpretation of Sun's "New Three Principles of the People," to argue the CPC were carrying out Sun's vision for China and called for his readers to "carry on and develop Mr. Sun Yat-sen's unceasing progress of revolutionary spirit."⁶⁰ Li's piece traced the Three Principles to Russia's 1917 October Revolution, interpreting them as anti-imperial and anti-capitalist, and maintained "the New Three Principles of the People, after the October Revolution, perfectly suited our nation's historical development's new demands."⁶¹ In these depictions, Sun's revolutionary spirit is celebrated and associated with the CPC. Wu and Li both affixed "new" to the Three Principles, despite their decades of history, to more readily associate them with "new China" for the public. They also highlighted a commitment to fight imperialism, and by this period the CPC had cast U.S. imperialism as circumventing the UN's international role to serve its hegemonic agenda. Thus, even as they celebrated the father of modern China, Wu and Li also indirectly addressed international relations.

⁶⁰ 吳玉章, "孫中山先生偉大的革命精神," 北京日報, 10 Nov. 1956.

⁶¹ 李宗正, "不斷進步的孫中山的政治思想," 北京日報, 10 Nov. 1956.



Figure 1.7: “慶祝中華人民共和國成立三周年” [Celebrating the third anniversary of the founding of the People’s Republic of China], 北京日報, 1 Oct. 1953.

Sun was not immune from all criticism during this period. As early as 1950 the *People’s Daily* reprinted an article from the U.S. Communist Party newspaper *The Daily Worker* that read “The great patriot Sun Yat-sen led the revolution to overthrow the Manchu. But China still was not ruled by the people.”⁶² The CPC had to modify Sun’s life and principles to strengthen their legitimacy because the party he had founded was the KMT. On the twenty-seventh anniversary of Lenin’s passing, Chen Boda 陳伯達, who attained renown as an explicator of Mao Zedong Thought before serving as Mao’s personal secretary and later playing a significant role in the Cultural Revolution, wrote a piece commemorating the communist luminary. In the article, Chen associated Sun with communism writing “Lenin praised the great revolutionary of China—Sun Yat-sen” for his land-reform ideas.⁶³ Sun’s widow, Song Qingling 宋慶齡, who remained in the PRC, wrote articles in support of the new state.⁶⁴ On the PRC’s first anniversary Song claimed that the PRC’s founding “demonstrated the people’s liberation and the start of China’s rebirth. It

⁶² 亞特·希爾德斯, “聯合國美國代表們破滅了的舊夢,” 人民日報, 18 Nov. 1950.

⁶³ 陳伯達, “列寧是中國人民偉大的朋友和導師,” 北京日報, 21 Jan. 1951.

⁶⁴ 宋慶齡, “孫中山—中國人民偉大的革命的兒子,” 人民日報, 4 Nov. 1956; 宋慶齡, “孫中山—中國人民偉大的革命的兒子,” 北京日報, 4 Nov. 1956; 宋慶齡, “孫中山—中國人民偉大的革命的兒子,” 南京日報, 5 Nov. 1956.

was the origin of a new era, we have since then entered a new era of the people.”⁶⁵ Despite Sun’s problematic position as a founder of the KMT, his place in Chinese history was sacrosanct and the CPC could not disavow his role as the father of modern China in the social imaginary. Party leaders did, however, attempt to reposition Sun so he was aligned with the CPC. Therefore, publishing an article from a foreign paper with a minor critique of Sun was acceptable. Outright criticism, however, remained rare in the 1950s.

During the 1959 Tibetan Uprising, there was almost no discussion of Tibet in PRC papers. Within a week of the PLA’s success in quelling the uprising, however, PRC media was replete with articles describing Tibet and Tibetans’ place in China. On 29 March, the *Beijing Daily* ran a Xinhua News article on page one that stated the uprising was treasonous. It was sparked by imperialists and reactionary large serf owners whose “revolt was engineered by imperialism, Jiang Jieshi’s bandit gang, and foreign reactionaries.”⁶⁶ On 31 March, the *People’s Daily* ran a page-one op-ed that opened “The Tibetan local government and upper-level reactionary groups colluded with imperialism, Jiang Jieshi’s bandit gang, and foreign reactionaries to blatantly tear up the Seventeen Point Agreement on the peaceful liberation of Tibet, hijack the Dalai Lama, and launch an armed rebellion.”⁶⁷ The Seventeen Point Agreement was the 1951 agreement between Tibet and the CPC that affirmed PRC sovereignty over Tibet. Papers also ran articles that presented people from across the nation, including Tibet, Xinjiang, and Inner Mongolia, condemning the uprising and supporting the PRC.⁶⁸ In the PRC, the events

⁶⁵ 宋慶齡, “第一年的新中國,” 人民日報, 1 Oct. 1950.

⁶⁶ 新華社, “解放军迅速粉碎拉萨叛乱,” 北京日報, 29 Mar. 1959.

⁶⁷ 社論, “徹底平定西藏叛亂,” 人民日報, 31 Mar. 1959.

⁶⁸ 新華社, “青海, 內蒙古, 新疆各族人民聲討西藏叛國集團 剷除民族敗類 鞏固民族團結,” 人民日報, 30 Mar. 1959; 本報訊, “全國各族人民一致聲討叛逆,” 北京日報, 30 Mar. 1959; 新華社, “藏族人士表示十分憤慨,” 南京日報, 23 Apr. 1959.

in Tibet in were not treated as an uprising, something the CPC often supported as an expression of public will, but an imperialist and reactionary rebellion which undermined popular sentiment. The CPC claimed imperialists and the KMT fomented the rebellion among elites, upset with their diminished status in the PRC, who took up arms to undermine the people. PRC media depicted Tibetans, and other minority groups in China, supporting the Communist revolution under the CPC's guidance and condemning the 1959 Tibetan Rebellion, as CPC propaganda labeled the event. Wen's cartoon (fig.1.4) showed how the CPC portrayed foreign governments looking into what the PRC considered domestic affairs. The CPC's construction of imperial aggression to undermine the 1959 Tibetan Uprising was established long before this period, however, and was tied to the PRC's continued exclusion from the UN.

The CPC's response to the 1959 Tibet Uprising shows that China's revolutionary spirit was meant to serve the party, not challenge it. The CPC often celebrated protests and uprisings abroad, praising their revolutionary fervor, but domestic challenges to PRC integrity were not tolerated. The following year, military units dissatisfied with the pace of change in the newly decolonized Republic of the Congo began an insurrection. A Xinhua News article condemned the UN, under U.S. manipulation, for interfering in Congo's internal affairs and described how the "Congolese army and people continue to persist [in] their struggle against colonialism."⁶⁹ Zhou Enlai "Wished the people of the Republic of Congo further achievements in upholding the path of national independence and the struggle against colonialism and imperialism."⁷⁰ The CPC's depictions of rebellion in the Congo shows how the PRC crafted messages about protest abroad but not at home. The CPC presented the protests in Tibet as the result of imperialist

⁶⁹ 新華社, "强烈反对联合国军久留刚果," 北京日報, 3 Aug. 1960.

⁷⁰ 新華社, "我國承認剛果共和國," 解放軍報, 15 Aug. 1950.

sympathizers rebelling against the state. The uprising in the Republic of Congo, which had just begun decolonization, were presented as anti-imperialist. CPC propaganda presented imperialism as the enemy of the people both at home and abroad. Consequently, the people in the Congo were celebrated for rising up against imperialism, the people in Tibet were castigated for rebelling in service to it.

Across the Taiwan Strait

The CPC tied the ROC's continued existence to its claims that the United States manipulated the UN. CPC officials asserted that the KMT was occupying Taiwan, with U.S. support, against the will of the people there and maintained they would soon liberate the island. Indeed, calls to "liberate Taiwan" preceded Mao's 1 October 1949 declaration establishing the People's Republic of China. In March 1949 Xinhua News presented a discussion piece titled "The Chinese people will certainly liberate Taiwan," that claimed "U.S. imperialism's aggressive activities in China's territory of Taiwan are currently underway."⁷¹ In January 1950 the *People's Daily* ran an op-ed that called on the people to "Resist U.S. Imperialism's scheme to seize Taiwan."⁷² In this op-ed Washington supported the KMT to "turn Taiwan into a military base to invade China and oppose Far Eastern peoples."⁷³ "Taiwan is a part of China's sacred territory," a journalist wrote in the *People's Daily* shortly after the U.S. Seventh Fleet arrived in the Taiwan Strait during the Korean War, but "Jiang Jieshi's bandit gang has colluded with U.S. imperialism and carried out the brutal oppression and plundering of Taiwan. The Taiwanese people feel that this oppression and plundering are no different than under Japan's rule."⁷⁴ In CPC rhetoric, U.S.

⁷¹ 新華社, "中國人民一定要解放台灣," 人民日報, 16 Mar. 1949.

⁷² 社論, "反對美帝攫奪台灣的陰謀," 人民日報, 5 Jan. 1950.

⁷³ Ibid.

⁷⁴ 汪昭才, "我國特解放的領土一台灣," 人民日報, 31 July 1951.

machinations kept Taiwan outside of its rightful place in the PRC, not the KMT relocating the ROC there. The CPC blamed Taiwan's exclusion from their rule on the United States in order to delegitimize the ROC without suggesting a large group of Chinese in Taiwan supported the KMT. This benefited the CPC national imaginary of "China" and the "Chinese" as revolutionary; only a reactionary power like the United States could prevent a small part of the Chinese nation from modernizing in the correct way.

In 1954 the CPC seemed intent on liberating Taiwan and other areas still under KMT control in the First Taiwan Straits Crisis. From 3 September 1954 to 1 May 1955, the PLA shelled the ROC-controlled offshore islands Jinmen and Mazu, near Fujian's coast, and seized the offshore islands Dachen and Yijiangshan, near Zhejiang, from the ROC. Though the ROC lost some of its remaining territory, KMT officials used this event to secure a mutual defense treaty with the United States. Zhou Enlai stated that:

In spite of the opposition and warnings of the Chinese people, the U.S. government signed the so-called "mutual defense treaty" with the routed Jiang Jieshi traitor group in Taiwan on 2 December 1954. The U.S. government has attempted to use this treaty to legalize its armed invasion of China's territory, and to use Taiwan as a base to expand its aggression against China and prepare for a new war. This is a serious war provocation against the People's Republic of China and the Chinese people.⁷⁵

Zhou's statement aligned with the CPC's narrative that the United States was responsible for Taiwan's separation from China. He also asserted that the Chinese people were against the treaty, insinuating that KMT supporters were un-Chinese.

CPC opprobrium was reserved for the KMT, however, and not the people living under KMT rule. Jiang Zhaohe 蔣兆和, a professor at China's Central Academy of Fine Arts, provided

⁷⁵ “中華共和國外交部長周恩來關於美蔣‘共同防禦條約’的聲明,” 人民日報, 9 Dec. 1954; “中華共和國外交部長周恩來關於美蔣‘共同防禦條約’的聲明,” 北京日報, 9 Dec. 1954.

a visual interpretation of Beijing's sympathy for the people in Taiwan (fig. 1.8). In Jiang's image, a girl places her red scarf, symbol of the CPC youth-group Young Pioneers of China, on a sailor saying, "please take my glorious red scarf to Taiwan and be sure to give it to the suffering children." The sailor stands straight with a determined gaze fixed on the horizon, machine gun in hand, and hat that reads "Chinese people." While there are waves and a ship in the background, Jiang's sailor appears to look west. The sailor faced away from the sea, which is behind him, and on maps Taiwan would be across the sea to the east or southeast. Consequently, Jiang also subtly directed his audience to China's real enemy: the "West." The West, as it appeared opposed to the East in PRC rhetoric, was shorthand for the Cold War competition between democratic communism, the Soviet Union and PRC, and liberal capitalism, the United States and ROC. Zhou and Jiang presented the Chinese nation, which included Taiwan, opposed to the KMT. The CPC's contention that the KMT did not have the support of the people, only the support of a foreign power, delegitimized Taipei independence and sovereignty over Taiwan. The people in Taiwan would welcome PLA liberation so they, too, could join the CPC's revolution. The Chinese nation was, after all, a revolutionary one.



Figure 1.8: Jiang Zhaohe 蔣兆和, “請您把我最光榮的紅領巾一定帶給台灣苦難的小朋友們” [Please take my glorious red scarf to Taiwan and be sure to give it to the suffering children], 北京日報, 12 Nov. 1954.

On 24 May 1957, the Liu Ziran, or May 24, Incident provided a foundation for CPC rhetoric that the people in Taiwan were hostile to the KMT and the United States. A month earlier, on 20 March, U.S. Army Master Sergeant Robert G. Reynolds shot ROC Army Major Liu Ziran 劉自然 dead just outside of Taipei. Reynolds claimed he shot Liu in self-defense, after confronting him for peeping on his wife in the bath. Reynolds said Liu approached him with a three-foot long object, so he shot Liu, and shot him again when approached a second time, then Liu finally staggered away, and Reynolds called U.S. military police. U.S. officials initially did not even plan a trial, accepting Reynolds' version of events. ROC investigators, however, found Reynolds story flawed: Liu's body lay about 200 feet from Reynold's home, there was no weapon matching Reynolds' description nearby, and Liu lay facing towards, not away from, Reynold's home. U.S. officials relented to ROC pressure and court-martialed Reynolds for

involuntary manslaughter. The court martial, convened from 20 to 23 May with a jury of U.S. soldiers stationed in Taiwan, acquitted Reynolds of all charges.

On the morning of 24 May, Liu's widow, Ao Tehua 奧特華, went with her young daughter and a cousin to the U.S. embassy with a sign, in English, to protest Reynolds' acquittal. By the afternoon 6,000 people had gathered in front of the embassy to join Ao in demanding justice for Liu. Eventually the people's anger over the American failure to penalize Reynolds turned into violent protest. The crowd-cum-protestors sacked the U.S. embassy, surging through the compound in waves to overturn vehicles, smash furniture, and break windows. They tore down and shredded the U.S. flag, then replaced it with an ROC one. Protestors also shouted pro-ROC slogans and draped another ROC flag from an embassy balcony. In their final surge, the protestors found the American and Chinese embassy staff who had hid in an air raid shelter and assaulted them. Protestors also attacked other U.S. controlled buildings in Taipei, as well as Taipei's Municipal Police headquarters. As the protests continued into the evening, KMT officials dispatched three and a half army divisions to restore order to the capitol. In the final tally, the protestors caused damages to U.S. facilities were estimated at half a million U.S. dollars, or more than 4 million in 2015 dollars.⁷⁶

The Liu Ziran Incident was celebrated in PRC media as a popular uprising against the United States and the KMT. On 25 May 1957 a Xinhua News article declared in its title "Taipei erupts in large anti-American demonstration."⁷⁷ A *People's Daily* op-ed argued that KMT "efforts to stay in the motherland are struggling on whilst at death's door, they will not hesitate to let wolves into the room, allowing U.S. aggressors to occupy Taiwan, and there run amok

⁷⁶ Stephen G. Craft, *American Justice in Taiwan: The 1957 Riots and Cold War Foreign Policy*, Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 2015.

⁷⁷ 新華社, "台北爆發反美打示威 五千多憤怒搗毀美國大使館," 人民日報, 25 May. 1957.

lawlessly.”⁷⁸ A *PLA Daily* article claimed “Taiwan is China’s sacred territory, Taiwan compatriots in life and death never forget their wish to return to the motherland.”⁷⁹ The Liu Ziran Incident did culminate in anti-American protests, however the protestors were not anti-ROC, evinced by protestors displaying ROC flags. But CPC propaganda maintained that the KMT only held power through U.S. support, thus any actions by ROC citizens against the United States were actions against the ROC and for the PRC. The protests also bolstered the CPC model of China as revolutionary, because Chinese in Taiwan were represented as fighting U.S. imperialism through mass protest. China’s revolutionary spirit had ended colonialism and feudalism on the mainland, now the CPC portrayed that same national imaginary as awakened across the Taiwan Strait.

The Republic of China

In 1950, on the thirty-ninth National Day of the ROC, *Central Daily News* editors ran an op-ed on page one discussing “Revolutionary struggle’s fighting spirit.” The ROC’s National Day was a celebration of the 1911 Xinhai Revolution that had toppled the Qing and ushered China into the modern era. The KMT, like the CPC, was a revolutionary party. *Central Daily News* editors, however, made it clear that the revolution, based on Sun Yat-sen’s Three Principles of the People, had succeeded and that “Today Free China’s strength has surpassed the Xinhai Revolution period to become formidable.”⁸⁰ Chiang Kai-shek made a National Day statement, published on the same page, that declared “Our nation is a nation of moral integrity, our people a freedom loving people.”⁸¹ These statements reflect how the KMT both portrayed

⁷⁸ 社論, “台灣人民不可屈,” 人民日報, 25 May 1957.

⁷⁹ “台灣同胞行動起來了,” 解放軍報, 24 May 1957.

⁸⁰ 社論, “奮發革命的戰鬥精神,” 中央日報, 10 Oct. 1950.

⁸¹ 中央社, “告全國同胞書,” 中華日報, 10 Oct. 1950.

the revolution as completed and aligned themselves firmly with the United States. In the KMT's model, "China" had achieved modernity and international prestige through honoring the past and adhering to Chinese culture and tradition. *Central Daily News* editor's references to "Free China" and Chiang's claim of "a freedom loving people" likely struck many people in Taiwan as odd. The ROC had placed Taiwan under martial law in 1949—and martial law would remain in place for nearly four decades. The KMT references to freedom benefited the ROC as, despite KMT claims of national vitality, the ROC needed U.S. support. The ROC represented China in the UN during this period, though, so the KMT did have international clout that bolstered their definitions of China. An analysis of how the KMT presented "China" internally and externally demonstrates how UN membership influenced those presentations.

A Modern and Traditional China

During the fifties, the KMT presented China as both new and traditional. Guo Feng 郭風, a senior reporter for the *Central Daily*, penned an article on "New China's Blue Print" discussing how the ROC's Army Officer School was enhancing political education by following Sun Yat-sen's teachings. Guo argued "this model plan is Free China's educational foundation [and] this pioneering work, merits publicity."⁸² On the ROC's fortieth National Day, 1952, *United Daily* editors declared:

Revolutionary struggle, neither hard nor easy, is only history's endowment, exceedingly harsh, unable to succeed, only fail, and on the point of extinction; unable to surpass the present era and lead the day, on the point of appearing to drown under the mighty current, and a hundred steps back not recovered. The Kuomintang cherish revolution's history, the Kuomintang are on the point of manifesting history's will and force! Kuomintang comrades strive to do what is beyond one's power!⁸³

⁸² 郭風, "新中國的藍圖," 中央日報, 12 Dec. 1951. The original text has an unclear character, represented by X here, 「所以這副幅型是自由中國教育上的 X 項創舉, 值得宣揚」.

⁸³ "國民黨對國民革命的歷史任務," 聯合報, 10 Oct. 1952.

Guo and *United Daily* editors made it clear revolution was significant in creating China as a new state and nation. Revolution, however, was not a break from history. Guo argued that China's revolutionary spirit drew on Sun Yat-sen's teachings and even called the ROC "new China," a term often associated with the PRC. Guo did clarify, however, that "New China" was actually "Free China." *United Daily* editors tied revolution directly to history, and it was the Kuomintang, the party founded by Sun Yat-sen, with the support of the free world, who would realize history's mandate. KMT officials relied on history to explain the current state. H. T. Liang pointed out in the *Free China Review*, the KMT's primary English-language periodical, that "A product of Chinese tradition and Western Civilization, Dr. Sun lived in a place where old and new were brought together in vivid contrast."⁸⁴ China was no longer the land of any dynasty, but it was still a nation that adhered to the lessons and principles of history. The Xinhai Revolution had ushered in a new era under Sun Yat-sen's tutelage, but that era was not a break from China's historical trajectory so much as a correction to China's governance. *Chinese Daily* editors clarified in 1955 that "Now we are in the third phase of the revolution, we just need to wipe out communism's poison, [and] establish a Three Principles of the People society."⁸⁵ Revolution and the Three Principles of the People were not antithetical to Chinese culture and tradition. Revolution was about returning the KMT, inheritors of Sun Yat-sen's legacy, to their rightful place as rulers of the Chinese nation. Therefore, during this period, papers in the ROC often discussed revolutionary spirit and even a new China, but the revolution was transformed into a revolutionary struggle against communism. While the KMT was a Leninist party founded in the wake of the Xinhai Revolution, the revolution had succeeded until the CPC's rebellion upset the

⁸⁴ H. T. Liang, "Dr. Sun Yat-sen and the Kuomintang," *Free China Review*, Feb. 1955, 19.

⁸⁵ "效法國父革命精神," *中華日報*, 5 May 1952.

course of history. For the KMT in this period China was, in short, a modern nation-state that honored its past.

The China the KMT claimed to represent was largely outside of their control. That did not, however, mean the KMT was uninterested in Chinese territoriality. For the KMT, the largest threat to China's territorial integrity in this period was Mongolia. In 1955, Canada and the Soviet Union included the People's Republic of Mongolia (PRM), along with seventeen other states, in a package deal to admit new members to the UN. The UN had not admitted any new members since 1950, and UN delegates saw the package deal as a way to overcome the world body's deadlocked-admissions problem. The ROC had recognized Mongolia's independence in 1947 but rescinded that recognition in 1953. Thus, Tsiang vetoed Mongolia's admission to the UN when it came up for a vote in the Security Council. Tsiang's 1955 veto was the only one the ROC cast during its tenure in the world body. The KMT, with much of the Chinese nation beyond its control, could not afford to cede any territory it claimed to represent. KMT claims that Mongolia was a part of China were symbolic, the party had no influence over events there. The ROC's position in the UN, however, allowed KMT officials to defend the Chinese nation, as they saw it, on the world stage. So, while the PRM could claim decades of autonomy, Tsiang and Chiang used the ROC's position in the UN to protect the integrity of the Chinese nation. Essentially, Mongolia became a synecdoche for the China the KMT claimed to represent, and therefore they could not allow international recognition of the PRM. The KMT did not have sovereignty over the China they claimed to represent, but the ROC's place in the UN allowed Taipei to defend their imagined territory.⁸⁶

⁸⁶ Keith Allan Clark II, "Imagined Territory: The ROC's 1955 Veto of Mongolian Membership in the United Nations," *Journal of American-East Asian Relations* 25 (2018), pp. 263-295.

The Liu Ziran Incident

The Liu Ziran Incident presented a dilemma for ROC officials. On the one hand, protestors had not challenged ROC legitimacy. On the other, they had attacked U.S. personnel and destroyed U.S. facilities in Taipei, as well as assaulted fellow ROC citizens working with the Americans. In the United States, the protests in Taipei saturated U.S. news media, though they were presented to the American public as mob violence. An Associated Press piece, run in articles discussing the incident by the *New York Times*, *Washington Post and Times Herald*, *Chicago Daily Tribune*, and *Los Angeles Times* on page one, depicted “a frenzied mob of 3,000 took over the embassy compound, officially United States territory” and “While the mob was attacking the embassy, other rioters moved on the two-story building of the United States Information Agency... and left it a wreckage.”⁸⁷ Within the U.S. government, the protests caused concern at the highest levels and Eisenhower, in conversation with U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, stated “we must take a very serious look at these Asiatic countries, and decide whether or not we can stay there. It does not seem wise, if they hate us so much.”⁸⁸ James B. Pilcher, Counselor of Embassy in the Republic of Taiwan, made clear to ROC officials the material damage of the protests “was insignificant to the damage to US/GRC [Government of Republic of China] relations and the prestige to the GRC in the Free World. They [ROC officials] were obviously embarrassed and well aware of the consequences.”⁸⁹ The protests,

⁸⁷ Associated Press, “Anti-U.S. Rioters in Taipei Curbed by Chiang Troops,” *New York Times*, 25 May 1957; Associated Press, “Chiang’s Troops Quell Anti-U.S. Riots in Taipei,” *Washington Post and Times Herald*, 25 May 1957; Associated Press, “Troops Crush Anti-U.S. Riot by Formosans,” *Chicago Daily Tribune*, 25 May 1957; Associated Press, “33,000 Formosa Troops Crush Anti-U.S. Riots,” *Los Angeles Times*, 25 May 1957. Quote is taken from the *New York Times* article, but appeared in all these pieces, though occasionally with some alteration.

⁸⁸ “Memorandum of a Telephone Conversation Between the President and the Secretary of State, Washington, May 24, 1957, 8:35 a.m.,” in *Foreign Relations of the United States 1955-1957, Vol. III: China*, eds. Harriet D. Schwar and Louis J. Smith, (Washington: U.S. GPO, 1986), doc. 254.

⁸⁹ “Paper Prepared by the Counselor of the Embassy in the Republic of China (Pilcher),” Taipei, 25 May 1957, *Foreign Relations of the United States 1955-1957, Vol. III: China*, doc. 257.

therefore, posed a serious threat to U.S.-ROC relations. The American public had reason to wonder why citizens in an allied country had attacked the U.S. embassy and U.S. officials questioned the value of maintaining an official presence in the region. While U.S. Cold War calculations eventually overrode official concerns about the American presence in Asia, the possibility the ROC could lose U.S. support posed an existential threat to the KMT.

In Taiwan, KMT officials sought to mitigate the fallout from the Liu Ziran incident. Yu Hongjun 俞鴻鈞, the ROC Premier, blamed the event on “a small number of lawless elements, [who] used the Liu Ziran ruling’s resentful mood to incite the masses.”⁹⁰ Editors at the *Central Daily* asked “within the crowd were there or were there not bandit spies helping within, engaged in provocation: relevant authorities are conducting a thorough investigation.”⁹¹ *Central Daily* editors specifically linked the protests to communism, their common enemy with the United States and a theme the *New York Times* alluded to on the protests. Privately, U.S. officials were dubious CPC agitation had inspired the protests. Walter P. McConaughy, director of the U.S. Office of Chinese Affairs, stated “of the various possibilities that suggest themselves, that of Communist inspiration seems the least likely.”⁹² In a press conference at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ROC Foreign Minister Ye claimed “We are now certain that this incident was not the expression of any general anti-American sentiment,” rather it was a peaceful protest where emotions ran high and “unruly elements succeeded in turning the demonstration into mob violence.”⁹³ Yu, Ye, and *Central Daily* editors sought to shift blame for the protests away from

⁹⁰ 中央社, “俞院長治安不容擾亂呼籲同胞力特鎮靜,” 中華日報, 25 May 1957.

⁹¹ 本報訊, “劉案引起意外事件 美使館被民眾損毀,” 中央日報, 25 May 1957.

⁹² “Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Chinese Affairs (McConaughy) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson),” Washington, 26 May 1957, *Foreign Relations of the United States 1955-1957, Vol. III: China*, doc. 258.

⁹³ “Foreign Minister George K. C. Yeh’s Press Conference,” *Free China Review*, June 1957, 46.

ROC citizens. They cast doubt on how the protest turned violent in order to insulate the ROC from negative consequences in its relationship with the United States.

Chiang Kai-shek showed some contrition, however, and accepted some blame for the protests. Chiang drew on history to chastise the protesters, pointing to the aftermath of the 1901 Boxer Uprising which “not only greatly impaired our national sovereignty but also brought our nation such infamy that for many years China was looked upon as a barbarian country.”⁹⁴ He could have drawn on more recent history, such as the turmoil that surrounded the 1946 Shen Chong Rape Case when a U.S. Marine’s rape of a Peking University student set off protests in Beiping, as Beijing was then known.⁹⁵ The 1901 uprising against the Qing was less politically fraught than the 1946 rape for the KMT, though. Chiang did, however, say “It has been their [the CPC] practice to stir up mob violence to destroy friendly relations between China and various foreign powers.”⁹⁶ Chiang then castigated the CPC for lauding the Boxer Uprising, such as Song Qingling’s 1956 description of it as the “anti-imperialist patriotic Boxer Movement.”⁹⁷ Chiang’s statements reflected how the KMT employed China’s past to understand and explain the present. While the Boxers had represented elements of traditional Chinese culture, their attacks on foreigners in China made them anathema for the KMT. The KMT did need U.S. support if they were to retake the mainland, thus anti-foreign ideology would harm ROC national policy.

⁹⁴ “President Chiang Kai-shek’s Message to the Nation on the May 24 Incident,” *Free China Review*, June 1957, 8.

⁹⁵ For more on the 1946 Shen Chong Rape Case see: Robert Shaffer, “A Rape in Beijing, December 1946: GIs, Nationalist Protests, and U.S. Foreign Policy,” in *Pacific Historical Review* 69, No. 1 (Feb. 2000), 31-64; Yanqiu Zheng, “A Specter of Extraterritoriality: The Legal Status of U.S. Troops in China, 1943-1947,” in *The Journal of American-East Asian Relations* 22, No. 1 (2015), 17-44.

⁹⁶ “President Chiang Kai-shek’s Message to the Nation on the May 24 Incident,” *Free China Review*, June 1957, 8-9.

⁹⁷ 宋慶齡, “孫中山—中國人民偉大的革命的兒子,” 人民日報, 4 Nov. 1956. 宋慶齡, “孫中山—中國人民偉大的革命的兒子,” 北京日報, 4 Nov. 1956; 宋慶齡, “孫中山—中國人民偉大的革命的兒子,” 南京日報, 5 Nov. 1956. Paul Cohen discusses the Boxer Uprising’s rehabilitation in the PRC during the Cultural Revolution in: Paul A. Cohen, *History in Three Keys: The Boxers As Event, Experience, and Myth* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), Ch. 9.

Chiang's interpretation of the Boxers, though, also aligned with traditional Chinese narratives on their inefficacy and failure. In short, Chiang presented an orthodox view of Chinese history.

Chiang tied the CPC to the failed Boxers to both diminish their legitimacy and draw a distinction between proper and improper behavior for Chinese citizens. China, in these presentations, was a nation that learned from the past and engaged the international community as an equal. The KMT presented China as a modern state that drew on its history and traditions to explain the world and its role in it.

PRC: Soviet Satellite

Domestically and internationally, the PRC posed the greatest threat to the ROC. Therefore, KMT leaders and officials sought to delegitimize the state ruling the nation they claimed to represent. Chiang often invoked the mainland in his addresses to the nation. In 1952 he declared "our mainland suffers under traitor bandits and Russian invaders."⁹⁸ In 1954 Chiang stressed "Everyone knows, our current war to oppose communism and resist Russia is the final war that will decide our national revolution's success or failure."⁹⁹ In 1956 he stated, "now the mainland suffers the trampling of Russian communism's iron hoof."¹⁰⁰ Chiang was not alone in delegitimizing the PRC. *Free China Review* editors argued in 1953 that "Chinese Communist officials are completely subservient to the wishes of their soviet advisers and experts."¹⁰¹ Among these and other KMT officials' statements were Tsiang's many statements in the UN. The KMT narrative, then, was that the CPC were Soviet puppets. The PRC was not a legitimate state because its ruling party were not independent, and the Chinese nation suffered under their rule.

⁹⁸ "總統勗全國軍民," 聯合報, 10 Oct. 1952.

⁹⁹ "總統書告全國同胞," 聯合報, 17 Sept. 1954.

¹⁰⁰ "四十年國慶紀念," 聯合報, 10 Oct. 1956.

¹⁰¹ "News from the Mainland: Communist Record of Treason," *Free China Review*, Dec. 1953, 36.

Unlike the CPC, KMT officials and editors treated the 1955 Bandung Conference as a pointless exercise due to the PRC's participation. *Central Daily News* editors claimed the meeting would have no effect "because Soviet imperialism's ultimate wild ambition is to amalgamate and swallow the world."¹⁰² Wu Nan-ju 吳南如, Director of the ROC Information Bureau, pointed out the ROC was not against the meeting per se, but "the Chinese Communist regime, being a puppet regime created by Soviet Russia, has no right to represent the Chinese people."¹⁰³ Ku Zheng-kang 谷正綱, President of the Asian Peoples' Anti-Communist League and member of the KMT's seventh standing committee, wrote an open letter to the Bandung delegates wishing them luck while also warning them the meeting "might be diverted from its proper course by the presence at Bandung of Soviet Russian puppets in the persons of representatives from Peiping and Vietminh."¹⁰⁴ KMT officials' and editors' opposition to Bandung arose from the PRC's participation. In the KMT's ongoing struggle to represent China, any international recognition of the PRC was unacceptable. Therefore, the Bandung Conference had to be discredited. KMT efforts to minimize Bandung's significance aligned with their discourse on Chinese representation in the UN. The CPC represented Soviet interests, not Chinese ones. In this formulation, PRC participation at Bandung meant the Chinese people were not represented, as the PRC was not the rightful state of China.

During this period, the KMT created a model of China as a modern state that adhered to Chinese tradition. In order to differentiate themselves from the CPC, the KMT had to redefine

¹⁰² "粉碎匪幫的新詭計," 中央日報, 24 Apr. 1955.

¹⁰³ "Statement by Mr. Wu Nan-ju, Director of the Government Information Bureau in Regard to the So-called Afro-Asian Conference Opening at Bandung, April 18, 1955," *Free China Review*, May 1955, 50.

¹⁰⁴ "Text of an Open Letter Addressed by Mr. Ku Cheng-kang, President, Asian Peoples' Anti-Communist League, Republic of China, to Members of the Asian-African Conference, April 15, 1955," *Free China Review*, May 1955, 51.

their revolutionary foundations. To that end, while they continued to present the KMT leading the Chinese nation's revolution, that revolution was now against communism and informed by China's past. KMT officials, like Chiang and Wu, argued the PRC was not a legitimate state because the CPC were Soviet puppets. Tsiang elaborated on this topic at great length in the UN. KMT officials also downplayed Bandung's significance in order to lessen the PRC's participation in an international forum.

Conclusion

During this period, there was little to no debate in the UN about which state represented China. The PRC, justifiably, placed blame for their exclusion from the world body on the United States. The ROC blamed Soviet machinations for any questions about Chinese representation that did arise in the UN. Thus, each state aligned themselves with their primary allies in the nascent Cold War. With a shared past and similar goals for national reunification, both the CPC and the KMT created models of China that mirrored each other. The CPC claimed the ROC was illegitimate because the KMT were tools of U.S. imperialism. The KMT argued the PRC was illegitimate because the CPC were puppets of Soviet imperialism. Both parties defended China's boundaries as coterminous with the fallen Qing empire, though the PRC publicly supported PRM membership in the UN. Both parties presented the people living under rule by the other as yearning to return to the embrace of their rule. Whether China was presented as new or free, protests in either state were quickly quashed. So, while each state sought to defend their legitimacy and delegitimize the other, their models of China were more striking for their similarities than their differences.

Chapter 2:

An Important Question, 1961-1970

Neither the United Nations, the Communist Party of China, nor the Kuomintang could ignore Africa. In 1964 Tanganyika, a member since 1961, and Zanzibar, a member since 1963, withdrew from the UN. The two states amalgamated on 26 April 1964 and rejoined the organization on 1 November as the Republic of Tanzania. Tanganyika and Zanzibar had recognized the PRC within days of their independence, and Tanzania did not alter its relations with Beijing. The UN had also welcomed three other new members in 1964: Malawi, Malta, and Zambia.¹ Zambia had also established formal diplomatic relations with the PRC shortly after its independence. Beijing rewarded both Dar es Salaam and Lusaka for their recognition with millions in loans and grants during the sixties, but those numbers were insignificant compared to the PRC agreeing to build the Tanzania-Zambia railway, known as TAZARA. Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda, as the leader of a landlocked nation, wanted access to a port that was not controlled by imperial powers, the Portuguese territories of Angola and Mozambique, or racist regimes, Rhodesia and South Africa. Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere supported Kaunda's goals and the economic benefits the connection would bring. Beijing agreed to the project in 1967 and planning began in 1968. The 1,060-mile, \$400 million project started in 1970, was completed in 1975, and is still in operation. Beijing provided the equipment, materials, and expertise for the project and local costs were covered with a commodity credit agreement. Furthermore, the PRC provided the money for TAZARA as an interest-free loan

¹ United Nations, "Membership: Growth in United Nations Membership, 1945 to Present," accessed 20 July 2020, <https://www.un.org/en/sections/member-states/growth-united-nations-membership-1945-present/index.html>.

repayable over thirty years, after a ten-year grace period.² Tanzanian and Zambian delegates to the UN were, unsurprisingly, strong advocates for PRC interests in the organization, including its entry as a member. TAZARA was a significant challenge to the ROC's position in the UN.

The PRC's undertaking of one of the largest international projects in Africa also elevated its position on the continent and in developing countries globally. Dar es Salaam and Lusaka obtained tangible benefits from their relationship with Beijing, including experts who trained Tanzanian and Zambian citizens. In 1960, the UN increased its membership from eighty-two to ninety-nine states and by 1970 there were one-hundred and twenty-seven. Thirty-one of the forty-five new members had emerged from former African colonies winning their independence.³ Many leaders of these new states appreciated the PRC's anti-imperial rhetoric and its policy of non-interference in other nations' domestic affairs. Decolonization and the aims of newly independent nations in Africa altered the political calculus at the UN, transforming Beijing and Taipei's competition to represent China in the organization.

The 1960's were a time of significant change in the international arena. Decolonization changed not only how former empires governed, but also the existing world order as new states defended their national and international interests. Former empires and new states competed as equals in the UN, which remained the world's preeminent global organization, though some states were, to quote a cliché, more equal than others. Among those with more equality were the Republic of China and United States. As decolonization changed the international system, ROC

² Martin Bailey, "Chinese Aid in Action: Building the Tanzania-Zambia Railway," *World Development* 3, nos. 7 & 8, (July-Aug. 1975), 587-93; Jamie Monson, *Africa's Freedom Railway: How a Chinese Development Project Changed Lives and Livelihoods in Tanzania*, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2009).

³ Numbers tabulated from: United Nations, "Membership: Growth in United Nations Membership, 1945 to Present," accessed 20 July 2020 <https://www.un.org/en/sections/member-states/growth-united-nations-membership-1945-present/index.html>.

and U.S. delegates sought to mitigate the growing roster of UN member states who were not amenable to Taipei representing China in the world body. U.S. officials decided, with the ROC's begrudging support, that the question of Chinese representation could no longer be kept off the UN's agenda. U.S. and ROC officials' refusal to allow a vote angered not only the Soviet Union and its allies, but also many non-aligned and decolonized states. Officials from Washington and Taipei, however, did not want the People's Republic of China to take the ROC's place in the world body. On 17 September 1961, New Zealand's delegate proposed the UN General Assembly debate what had become known as the "China question." ROC and U.S. delegates, along with their allies, did not quash the New Zealand delegate's proposal when it was voted on in the Security Council a few days later. On 1 December 1961, however, U.S. representatives, along with those from Australia, Columbia, Italy, and Japan, proposed that Chinese representation in the UN was an "important question." The UN Charter states "Decisions of the General Assembly on important questions shall be made by a two-thirds majority of the members present and voting."⁴ Thus, U.S. representatives and their allies ensured that any change in the UN regarding the representation of China needed more than a simple majority to pass. From 1961 until 1971, Taipei and Washington designated Chinese representation an "important question" to defend the ROC's place in the world body.

CPC leaders were cognizant of but unconstrained by international perceptions as they refined their depictions of modern China as a revolutionary nation. While the CPC continued to control most of China's historical territory, the Party lacked the international legitimacy of UN membership. The CPC portrayed shifts in the UN debate on Chinese representation, not

⁴ UN Charter, art. 18, sec. 2. accessed 21 July 2020, <http://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/chapter-ii/index.html>.

incorrectly, as U.S. tactics to deny the PRC's place in the world body. While there were shifts in their favor, the UN seemed no more amenable to PRC membership in the sixties than it had been in the fifties. Consequently, the CPC refined their presentations of China as a nation freed from an inglorious past with little outside influence. This model appealed to new African leaders also seeking to break from their colonial histories. While the CPC sought to distinguish their state for liberating the people from traditional culture, they went to war with India in 1962 to defend borders established in China's imperial past.

The PRC's war with India and growing rift with the Soviet Union left the CPC more isolated and reduced their chances to enter the UN. Consequently, when Mao launched the Cultural Revolution meant to strip the final vestiges of pre-revolutionary China from the hearts and minds of the people, the CPC faced little international pressure to maintain accepted definitions of the nation. The Cultural Revolution was a direct assault on traditional Chinese culture and society, which resulted in chaos as competing factions within the PRC sought to demonstrate their revolutionary fervor. In the CPC's China, revolution was not an abstract concept, it was a lived reality that culminated in PRC society accepting Mao's calls to once and for all establish China as a nation un beholden to old ways or old thinking.

KMT leaders, still bereft of most of China's historical territory, deepened their depictions of China as a nation with a unique and relevant past as their place in the UN became less secure. The KMT retained the China seat in the UN throughout the sixties, but the world body's decision to debate the question of Chinese representation destabilized Taipei's position. KMT leaders turned to tradition and history to mitigate threats to their legitimacy to represent China at home and abroad. In the KMT's definition of China, the Chinese nation was inseparable from a past that stretched back five-thousand years to the near-mythical Xia dynasty. In response to the

PRC's attacks on traditional culture and ideology in the Cultural Revolution, Chiang Kai-shek declared a Cultural Renaissance in the ROC. KMT officials and media had already defined China as a nation that developed over millennia, thus the CPC's assault on China's culture and history freed Taipei to defend Chinese tradition and position the ROC as the reliquary for the spirit of the nation.

The United Nations

New Zealand's 1961 request that the General Assembly debate the question of Chinese representation was not an extraordinary event. Beginning in 1950 *The Yearbook of the United Nations* featured a section on "The question of the representation of China."⁵ New Zealand Prime Minister Keith J. Holyoake's request was less confrontational than Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs Andrei Gromyko's had been in the past. In 1960, with the Soviet Union and PRC's growing rift still hidden, Gromyko presented the General Assembly with a page-long jeremiad that the organization discuss which state represented China. Gromyko argued that the PRC had "been deprived of taking part in the work of the United Nations and China's place in the United Nations has been occupied by the Chiang Kai-shek clique, which has been rejected by the people of China and is sheltering under American bayonets on the United States-occupied island of Taiwan – an inalienable part of the People's Republic of China."⁶ Gromyko was no less strident in 1961 when he declared the PRC's exclusion from the UN was "simply for the reason that the Government of the United States of America takes a negative attitude towards the State system established by the great Chinese people," and China's place in the UN continued "to be

⁵ United Nations, *The Yearbook of the United Nations: 1950* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1951), 241.

⁶ United Nations General Assembly (UN GA), "Cable dated 5 September 1960 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, addressed to the Secretary General," A/4474, p. 2, accessed 20 July 2020, United Nations Official Document System (UN ODS).

unlawfully occupied by persons representing the Chiang Kai-shek clique, which was long ago overthrown by the Chinese people.”⁷ Despite a growing rift between the PRC and USSR, Gromyko’s invectives were in keeping with Soviet representations of China and the United States, however they were more crafted for theater than diplomacy. In comparison, Holyoake’s letter was three sentences that requested the General Assembly “should freely and fully discuss the vital issue with a view to ensuring that any action the Assembly may take will be based on the principles of the Charter and on a thorough consideration and examination of all the relevant factors.”⁸ Holyoake was rather more diplomatic than Gromyko, but this was a difference of style rather than substance. Before the sixties, India’s ambassador to the UN, Arthur S. Lall, made less bombastic requests than Gromyko that the General Assembly discuss Chinese representation, though they were more protracted and pro-PRC than Holyoake’s.⁹ Lall’s efforts, however, had met the same fate as Gromyko’s: voted down in the Security Council. Holyoake’s was the first entreaty to not come from the Soviet Union and its allies or India, but that also does not explain the ROC and U.S. officials’ decision to allow debate on Chinese representation in the General Assembly.

ROC and U.S. representatives allowed debate over which state should represent the Chinese nation in the UN were based on neither the tone, length, nor origin of Holyoake’s request. They stopped blocking debate because of changes in the world body itself. The substantive change in the UN during this period was decolonization and the admission of new

⁷ UN GA, “Letter dated 18 September 1961 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,” A/4874, p. 2, accessed 20 July 2020, UN ODS.

⁸ UN GA, “Letter dated 17 September 1961 from the chargé d’affaires, a.i. of New Zealand to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary General,” A/4873, p. 2, accessed 20 July 2020, UN ODS.

⁹ For example see: UN GA, “Letter dated 14 July 1958 from the Permanent Representative of India to the United Nations, addressed to the Secretary General,” A/3851, accessed 20 July 2020, UN ODS.

member states sympathetic to the PRC. Essentially, as the world body began to represent more of the world, the KMT had to work harder to defend its right to represent China. An analysis of the initial debates in the General Assembly on Chinese representation in the UN demonstrate ROC and U.S. representatives sought to maintain the KMT's claim to represent China in a UN that was more reflective of the world. The 1961 debates culminated in Resolution 1668 (XVI), determining the question of Chinese representation was an "important question," thus requiring a two-thirds majority to pass according to the UN Charter. Resolution 1668 established the precedent that ROC delegates and their allies used to maintain Taipei's place in the world body. When states sympathetic to Beijing claimed the PRC's successful 1964 detonation of an atomic bomb made its membership in the world body all the more important, pro-ROC delegates maintained Chinese membership was an important question. Likewise, when member states, primarily from Latin American and the Caribbean, in 1966 sought to form an exploratory committee on Chinese representation the UN deemed it too was an important question. Consequently, the ROC's place in the UN was more tenuous, if still secure, throughout this period.

In both Beijing and Taipei in this era, officials used their positions vis-à-vis the UN to explain the international system for domestic and international audiences. CPC officials used the UN's continued exclusion of the PRC to maintain their narratives that imperialist control and exploitation undermined the world body. In these narratives, however, their critiques of U.S. imperialism were joined by Soviet revisionism as the collapse of Sino-Soviet relations became public. The ROC's continued place in the UN remained a point of pride for KMT officials as they portrayed challenges to their state as the result of communist machinations. Thus, during the sixties China's place in the UN and the UN's place in PRC and ROC rhetoric remained much as

it had in the fifties. The ROC represented China, the PRC was outside the intergovernmental organization, and each state portrayed their position vis-à-vis the UN as emblematic of their legitimacy. The leitmotif of Chinese representation in the world body was different, though, as a more fractious organization debated which state was China.

Debating Chinese Representation

U.S. officials' concern over changes in the UN and their implications for the ROC began before the UN's sixteenth session opened in the autumn of 1961. On 2 May 1961, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs Harlan Cleveland submitted a memorandum on U.S.-UN strategy to U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk. Cleveland pointed out that "nearly every major matter handled by every Foreign Office in the world had to be handled both in bilateral diplomatic channels and in the multilateral channels of international organization."¹⁰ Cleveland went on to detail how the inclusion of new states in the world body had made it more difficult, but not impossible, for the United States to pursue its international goals. He highlighted that "there was literally no (repeat no) action item which was able to get a two-thirds majority in the General Assembly over our [U.S. representatives'] active opposition."¹¹

Cleveland directly addressed the ongoing conflict over Chinese representation in the UN. He detailed how U.S. representatives expended time, energy, and good will to keep the PRC out of not only the world body but its resolutions as well. He argued that the "China issue has

¹⁰ "Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Cleveland) to Secretary of State Rusk," Washington, May 2, 1961, in *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, Vol. XXV, Organization of Foreign Policy; Information Policy; United Nations; Scientific Matters*, eds. Paul Claussen, Evan M. Duncan, and Jeffrey A. Soukup, (Washington: U.S. GPO, 2001), doc. 169. *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, Vol. XXV, Organization of Foreign Policy; Information Policy; United Nations; Scientific Matters* hereafter referred to as *FRUS 1961-1963*, Vol. XXV.

¹¹ "Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Cleveland) to Secretary of State Rusk," Washington, May 2, 1961, in *FRUS 1961-1963*, Vol. XXV, doc. 169.

debilitated the vigor of the United Nations” and pointed to the previous moratorium on discussing China in the UN as a significant cause.¹² He concluded his remarks on Chinese representation by stating “United States objectives and interests in the United Nations require that the onus for the continuing failure to resolve the issue be shifted to the Communists.”¹³ At a U.S. strategy meeting on the UN later in 1961, Cleveland’s analyses were accepted by U.S. President John F. Kennedy, U.S. Ambassador to the UN Adlai Stevenson, and Special Assistant to the President Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., whom Kennedy had selected to lead White House planning for the sixteenth General Assembly. As for Chinese representation, Kennedy, Stevenson, Schlesinger, and Cleveland determined U.S. strategy was to “Ascertain by intensive consultations... what proposition can command a majority vote in the General Assembly.”¹⁴

Cleveland’s analysis and discussions with top U.S. officials resulted in the significant conclusion that the ROC and U.S. strategy to stymie debate on Chinese representation in the UN was no longer sustainable. Decolonization had resulted in more states entering the UN, particularly from Africa, and the U.S. ability to steer the world body, while still substantial, was reduced. Washington’s reduced ability to set the agenda in the world body made the ROC’s control of the UN’s “China seat” more integral to U.S. strategy. The ROC’s place in the UN, however, remained contested. U.S. officials wanted to both protect an ally who held a permanent seat on the Security Council and maintain U.S. prestige in the world’s premier intergovernmental organization. They determined the UN Charter’s important-question provision would resolve both issues. Officials in Washington still had to convince their counterparts in Taipei that

¹² “Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Cleveland) to Secretary of State Rusk,” Washington, May 2, 1961, in *FRUS 1961-1963*, Vol. XXV, doc. 169.

¹³ *Ibid.*

¹⁴ “Notes on Discussions,” Hyannis Port, 5 Aug. 1961, in *FRUS 1961-1963*, Vol. XXV, doc. 177.

allowing the UN to debate the ROC's place in the world body, with the protection that any changes require a super majority, was the best strategy for Taipei to remain in the organization and retain their power globally.

ROC Vice President Chen Cheng 陳誠 and Kennedy, along with other ROC and U.S. officials, held high level meetings in Washington to coordinate U.S.-ROC UN policy. Chen was in the United States from 31 July to 3 August 1961. Kennedy met with Chen the day he arrived for a meeting and luncheon. During the meeting, Kennedy reiterated "United States policy is to take every means to prevent the Chinese Communists from entering the United Nations" to protect U.S. prestige and the ROC's international position.¹⁵ After this first meeting, Kennedy hosted a luncheon in honor of Chen (fig. 2.1]. The *Free China Review* published a similar photo, in color and cropped off after Chen's wife Tan Xiang 譚祥, as the cover to their August edition.¹⁶ U.S. and ROC officials met again for another formal meeting on Chinese representation in the UN on 1 August, and the topic was also raised when Chen hosted Kennedy for a dinner before returning to Taiwan.¹⁷

The attendees of the two formal meetings reveal the importance the KMT attached to UN membership, and the significance of the ROC's UN membership for the United States. They included not only Kennedy, Chen, and Rusk but U.S. Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson, ROC Ambassador to the United States George K.C. Yeh 葉公超, and ROC ambassador to the UN T.F. Tsiang 蔣廷黻. These high-level meetings and social functions between Kennedy, Chen, and

¹⁵ "Memorandum of a Conversation," Washington, 31 July 1961, in *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, Volume XXII, Northeast Asia*, eds. Edward C. Keefer, David W. Mabon, and Harriet Dashiell Schwar, (Washington: U.S. GPO, 1996), doc. 45. *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, Volume XXII, Northeast Asia* hereafter referred to as *FRUS 1961-1963*, Vol. XXII.

¹⁶ *Free China Review* 11, Aug. 1961.

¹⁷ "Memorandum of Conversation," Washington, 1 Aug. 1961, in *FRUS 1961-1963*, Vol. XXII, doc. 46; "Editorial Note," in *FRUS 1961-1963*, Vol. XXII, doc. 47.

other senior officials in both states demonstrate that U.S.-ROC relations were of considerable value to each. That these officials were focused on Chinese representation in the world body demonstrates the American commitment to maintaining the ROC's claim to represent China in the UN was not hollow rhetoric. U.S. and ROC officials were vested in keeping the PRC out of the world body: Washington did not want to lose an ally in an increasingly fractious UN, Taipei did not want to lose access to the UN's international legitimacy, and neither wanted their international prestige tarnished.



“Meeting with and Luncheon in Honor of Chen Cheng, Vice President of the Republic of China,” 31 July 1961. (L – R): Vice President Chen; President John F. Kennedy; Vice President Lyndon Johnson; Tan Xiang, wife of Vice President Chen; Secretary of State Dean Rusk; various reporters in the background, including White House correspondent for United Press International (UPI) Helen Thomas (far right). North Portico, White House, Washington, D.C.

Figure 2.1: “Meeting with and Luncheon in Honor of Chen Cheng, Vice President of the Republic of China,” 31 July 1961, AR09, ST03, KN06, in White House Photographs, John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum. Digital identifier, JFKWHP-1961-07-31-A. Photo Credit: Abbie Rowe. White House Photographs. John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum, Boston, accessed 26 July 2020, <https://www.jfklibrary.org/asset-viewer/archives/JFKWHP/1961/Month%2007/Day%2031/JFKWHP-1961-07-31-A>.

Mongolia's application to join the UN, however, sparked discord between U.S. and ROC officials. Much as in 1955, ROC officials sought to deny Mongolia membership in the UN because they claimed it as Chinese territory. Consequently, U.S. officials had to not only convince their ROC counterparts that a new UN strategy was needed, they had to convince them not to derail it. During Chen and Kennedy's meetings, both sides agreed that an “important question” resolution was the best way to protect the ROC's position in the world body. At the 1

August 1961 meeting Chen pointed out “he was fully aware of the relationship between the Outer Mongolia Question and Chinese representation at the United Nations.”¹⁸ Mongolia’s application was tied to that of Mauritania, a country in Northwest Africa whose 1960 independence Morocco was contesting. The Soviet Union vowed it would veto Mauritania’s application if the ROC prevented Mongolia from entering. A number of African states, however, wanted Mauritania to succeed and Rusk pointed out to Chen, Tsiang, Yeh, and other ROC officials in the room, “GRC [Government of Republic of China] relationships with the African states can greatly strengthen its position in the United Nations.”¹⁹ Kennedy also sent a personal letter to ROC President Chiang that reiterated “if Mauritania is denied entry to the UN as a result of such action [an ROC veto of Mongolian membership], most if not all of the French African states will, however illogically and unjustly, retaliate by voting against the GRC on the Chinese representation issue.”²⁰ In the end, representatives from twelve African states informed Tsiang that if the ROC vetoed Mongolia’s application, they would vote in favor of seating the PRC.²¹ KMT officials relented; UN membership was more significant for the ROC than claiming territory it had never controlled. Mongolia’s entry into the world body was a direct result of decolonization in Africa. The twelve African states whose representatives approached Jiang were former French possessions, as was Mauritania. U.S. and ROC officials from Kennedy and Chiang on down acknowledged the importance of former African colonies who were now UN member states as possible constituents to support the KMT claim to represent China.²² Tsiang

¹⁸ “Memorandum of Conversation,” Washington, 1 Aug. 1961, in *FRUS 1961-1963*, Vol. XXII, doc. 46.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*

²⁰ “Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in the Republic of China” 15 Aug. 1961, in *FRUS 1961-1963*, Vol. XXV, doc. 179.

²¹ “Chiang Bows, Lets Mongolia get U.N. seat,” 26 October 1961, *Boston Globe*.

²² For more on ROC-African relations see: San-Shiun Tseng, “The Republic of China’s Foreign Policy Towards Africa: The Case of ROC-RSA Relations,” (PhD diss, University of the Witwatersrand, 2008).

did not prevent Ulaanbaatar from entering the UN in order to win African states' support for the ROC ability to represent China in the world body.

KMT officials had to explain the new “important question” strategy to ROC citizens in a way that maintained their claims to suzerainty over the Chinese nation. Central News special reporter for the UN Lin Jing 林靜 wrote a series of articles for the *Central Daily News* on ROC and U.S. strategy for Chinese representation in the UN in 1961 before the debate on Chinese representation was underway. In Lin's first article, he acknowledged that even discussing Chinese representation in the world body was “based on procedure, obviously a large transformation” but, in reality, it “conformed with tactics for an old battlefield, new form” that ROC and U.S. officials had prepared well in advance.²³ Lin pointed to growth in UN membership and a new U.S. administration as to explain the change in tactics. He also stated that, despite Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs Xu Shaochang's 徐紹昌 statement the *Central Daily News* had printed a week earlier, the ROC would not veto Mongolia's UN application.²⁴ Lin pointed to the Soviet threat to veto Mauritania's membership if the ROC blocked Mongolia, with the result that African state delegations “frankly speaking, they would on the so-called ‘Chinese representation’ question carry out ‘revenge’ towards our country.”²⁵ Lin's following articles went into greater detail on changes to the world body, the use of the important question strategy, and the significance of ROC-African relations.²⁶ Lin's articles served dual purposes. They presented the KMT's new UN strategy as different in form, but not character, from

²³ 林靜, “舊戰場新形勢 (一) 所謂「中國代表權」問題剖析,” 中央日報, 30 Sept. 1961.

²⁴ 中央社, “阻止外蒙入會 我國政策不變,” 中央日報, 23 Sept. 1961.

²⁵ 林靜, “舊戰場新形勢 (一) 所謂「中國代表權」問題剖析,” 中央日報, 30 Sept. 1961.

²⁶ 林靜, “混亂中的端緒 (二) 所謂「中國代表權」問題剖析,” 中央日報, 1 Oct. 1961; 林靜, “理論與現實票數 (三) 所謂「中國代表權」問題剖析,” 中央日報, 2 Oct. 1961.

previous years. Lin showed the strategy was well planned to demonstrate the ROC, with U.S. support, was in control of the situation. These articles also portrayed the important-question strategy and the ROC's acceptance of Mongolia in the UN to ROC citizens not as reversals in KMT policy, but rather as adroit maneuvering to protect the state's international prestige. The *Central Daily News*, the KMT's mouthpiece, ran Lin's pieces to inform people in Taiwan that the KMT was in control to stymie domestic doubt as to the party's ability to represent China on the international stage.

PRC officials were not silent about Chinese representation as ROC and U.S. officials pursued their new strategy. A *People's Daily* editorial, subsequently printed in the *Beijing Daily* and *Peking Review*, argued that the U.S. pursuit of labeling Chinese representation an important question was "in fact, attempted in the situation where it did not have assured control of over half the UN votes."²⁷ A Xinhua News report also asserted "the United States wants to use the so called 'important question' trick to continue its conspiracy to obstruct the restoration of China's lawful rights in the United Nations."²⁸ PRC media continued to portray the United States in control of the world body while highlighting that the important question resolution was a sign of growing U.S. weakness, though Beijing's claims that Washington's opposition to the PRC was making it more isolated internationally were more fantasy than reality. CPC officials also avoided assigning any agency to their KMT rivals, reserving their opprobrium for U.S. officials, thus delegitimizing the ROC by presenting it as solely a puppet of the United States.

Beijing was unable to present its case to the world body directly, but demonstrated it still had Soviet support, rift notwithstanding. A Xinhua News piece presented Gromyko's request that

²⁷ 社論, "堅決反對美國的新陰謀," 人民日報, 22 Sept. 1961; "堅決反對美國的新陰謀," 北京日報, 23 Sept. 1961; "Resolutely Oppose New U.S. Schemes at the U.N.," *Peking Review*, 29 Sept. 1961, 9-12.

²⁸ 新華社, "把恢復我在聯合國合法權利問題列入議程," 北京日報, 23 Sept. 1961.

the UN debate Chinese representation. The piece detailed Gromyko's opposition to the ROC representing China in the world body and his assertion that to protect world peace the UN could not "allow political zombies, the U.S.-protected Jiang Jieshi group's representatives entrenched in Taiwan, to continue occupying a seat in the United Nations."²⁹ Even though the PRC was not in the UN and the CPC was dissatisfied with the Communist Party of the Soviet Union under Nikita Khrushchev, the Soviet representative's remarks in the world body aided the PRC's international legitimacy. Gromyko's statements showed not only Soviet support for Beijing, they represented Taipei as U.S. puppets.

The General Assembly had several draft resolutions to consider as debates about Chinese representation began on 1 December 1961. The first was based on New Zealand's request titled the "Question of the representation of China in the United Nations."³⁰ The second was the Soviet Union's more pointed proposal for the "Restoration of the lawful rights of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations."³¹ In addition to these resolutions, Australia, Colombia, Italy, Japan, and the United States submitted another the morning before debates began. Called the five-power draft resolution, it sought to make any change to Chinese representation an important question that necessitated a two-thirds vote to pass per the UN Charter. As UN delegates set to debate Chinese representation, the U.S. and ROC delegations maneuvered to maintain Taipei's right to represent China in the world body.

Soviet Representative Valerian Zorin set the tone of debate for pro-PRC members of the UN. On 1 December, Zorin opened the debate remarking that "For more than ten years the States

²⁹ 新華社, "必須恢復中國在聯合國合法權利," 北京日報, 28 Sept. 1961.

³⁰ UN GA, "Agenda items 90 and 91," in *General Assembly Official Records, Annexes, Sixteenth Session*, (New York: United Nations 1961-1962).

³¹ Ibid.

which follow the line of exacerbating international tension have blocked discussions of this question by the General Assembly.”³² He argued that “For twelve years now China and the Chinese people have had no representation in the United Nations, and the seat of the People’s Republic of China in the Organization has been occupied by people who represent nobody.”³³ Zorin’s statements also veered into comedy describing U.S. opposition to Beijing as only ideological asking whether the PRC had “by any chance seized hold of some American territories? Has... [the PRC] advanced territorial claims to, say, California or Oregon? Is it preparing a crusade to San Francisco or Los Angeles? Nothing of the kind.”³⁴ Whether entertaining or scolding, Zorin’s comments reflected pro-PRC rhetoric established over the previous decade. He maintained, quite justifiably, that the United States was behind keeping the PRC out of the UN. Further, Zorin claimed that the ROC delegation only represented the KMT, not China or the Chinese people. While his comments were not unfamiliar, this was the first time Soviet or pro-PRC claims on Chinese representation in the world body were presented before the entire UN. The General Assembly’s open debate on which state was the legitimate representative of the Chinese nation allowed more UN members to challenge both the ROC and the United States. The open challenge to ROC legitimacy on the floor of the UN added to the precarity of the KMT’s claims to represent China.

The PRC did not have a direct representative in the UN, but they were not voiceless. As UN delegates debated Chinese representation, a Xinhua News article detailed the draft resolutions under debate and spoke highly of Zorin’s address. The article highlighted Zorin’s

³² UN GA, 1068th Plenary Meeting, 1 Dec. 1961, *General Assembly, Sixteenth Session, Official Records*, A.PV/1068, p. 892, accessed 20 June 2019, UN ODS.

³³ *Ibid.*, 894, accessed 20 June 2019, UN ODS..

³⁴ *Ibid.*, accessed 20 June 2019, UN ODS.

description of U.S. arguments that Beijing was not a peace-loving state as “in fact precisely the opposite” as the United States was the aggressor who was “occupying a part of China’s territory, the island of Taiwan.”³⁵ The piece went on to claim U.S. ambassador to the UN Adlai Stevenson had “slandered China as ‘warlike.’”³⁶ A *People’s Daily* article approved of Zorin’s claim that the U.S. opposed the PRC because it was against socialism and that Beijing’s seat in the UN was “occupied by the Jiang Jieshi group, which has been abandoned by history.”³⁷ Editors at the *Peking Review* presented a translation of a *People’s Daily* commentary for the Anglophone world. Writing under the pseudonym “Observer,” the author condemned Stevenson for “an utterly virulent, shameless campaign of slander and abuse against China. He almost exhausted the world’s vocabulary of name-calling in vilifying China.”³⁸ These articles did not mention ROC representatives nor counter KMT claims, they focused on the United States. They focused their opprobrium on Washington to portray the ROC as a U.S. puppet and deny any semblance of legitimacy for the KMT in the UN. PRC media also talked about China’s place in the UN—not the PRC—in order to represent their state as the genuine China. CPC officials maintained the UN continued to suffer under U.S. control, though the change in U.S. strategy showed that control was diminished. CPC officials were unable to address the world body directly, but they made their positions on Chinese representation in the UN known.

Tsiang opened the debate for the pro-ROC side. Speaking after Zorin on 1 December 1961, Tsiang stated that the case for PRC membership in the UN “can be summed up in one sentence: the Chinese Communist régime is un-Chinese in origin and un-Chinese in nature and

³⁵ 新华社, “聯大開始討論恢復中國合法權利問題,” 北京日報, 4 Dec. 1961.

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ “指出必須恢復中國合法席位驅逐蔣幫代表,” 人民日報, 4 Dec. 1961.

³⁸ Observer, “Refuting Stevenson,” *Peking Review*, 15 Dec. 1961, 7.

purpose. It, therefore, cannot represent China.”³⁹ He then argued that the CPC was a Soviet puppet and that “we are deeply troubled by the spectre of the rise of a new Soviet colonial empire.”⁴⁰ He also challenged the CPC’s dedication to peace to question PRC eligibility for membership under the UN Charter. Tsiang reminded delegates that the UN had determined the PRC was an aggressor in the Korean War. He then cited a 1960 article from the CPC mouthpiece *Red Flag* 紅旗, that he claimed “unequivocally declared that war is inevitable and that some wars are desirable,” to demonstrate that the CPC was still not peace loving, contrary to what Zorin had said.⁴¹

Tsiang’s salvos against the PRC did not introduce new elements to preclude its membership in the UN. He had argued since 1950 that the CPC wasn’t Chinese and thus could not represent China. ROC and U.S. delegates had also used the UN’s 1950 designation of the PRC as an aggressor in the Korean War to prevent the world body from discussing Chinese representation. Indeed, 1961 was the first year ROC and U.S. officials allowed the General Assembly to debate which state had the right to represent China in the UN. Consequently, while Tsiang’s statement diametrically opposed Zorin’s, it was similar in that neither proposed new justifications for which state should or should not represent the Chinese nation. While Zorin claimed the Chinese people had rejected the KMT, Jiang’s counter argument that the CPC was not Chinese was in keeping with KMT propaganda that China was a land of tradition and culture that the CPC denied.

³⁹ UN GA, 1068th Plenary Meeting, 1 Dec. 1961, *General Assembly, Sixteenth Session, Official Records*, A.PV/1068, p. 899, accessed 20 June 2019, UN ODS..

⁴⁰ Ibid., 901, accessed 20 June 2019, UN ODS.

⁴¹ Ibid., 902, accessed 20 June 2019, UN ODS..

The KMT did not limit its case against the PRC to the floor of the UN as the competition to represent China internationally entered a new phase. As the debate began, *Central Daily* and *Free China Review* editors presented analyses and verbatim scripts of Tsiang's speeches on the floor of the General Assembly.⁴² KMT media acknowledged the UN had changed and, consequently, a new method was needed to protect the ROC's place in the world body. Lin's articles depicted Taipei's changes to UN policy as neither drastic nor substantive to maintain the KMT's ability to wield the UN's international legitimacy to bolster its domestic legitimacy. *Central Daily News* editors presented Tsiang's speeches on the floor of the UN to highlight the ROC's role in the world body. Articles on Tsiang further demonstrated that the ROC was the government of China in the UN. Despite the uncertainty the debate introduced for the KMT's right to represent China, ROC officials and media employed narratives developed over the past decade to defend their state's position in the UN.

On 15 December 1961 the General Assembly voted on Chinese representation in the UN. As the final meeting on which state represented China began, Australian Ambassador to the UN James Plimsoll asked that priority be given to the five-power draft resolution. Zorin responded "the resolution submitted by Australia, Columbia, Italy, Japan, and the United States is a procedural trick designed to evade a solution to this question and such a trick cannot be given priority over a substantive solution of the problem."⁴³ Stevenson responded, in part, "it would be most advantageous if the Assembly could first decide what majority was required for the

⁴² 美聯社, "提穿俄帝陰謀," 中央日報, 2 Dec. 1961; 中央社, "蔣廷黻在聯大聲明 文全," 中央日報, 3 Dec. 1961; "United Nations on Trial," *Free China Review*, Dec. 1961, 7-12.

⁴³ UN GA, 1080th Plenary Meeting, 15 Dec. 1961, *General Assembly, Sixteenth Session, Official Records*, A.PV/1068, p. 1067, accessed 20 June 2019, UN ODS..

passage” of any question regarding Chinese representation.⁴⁴ UN delegates largely agreed with Plimsoll and Stevenson: they voted 61 to 21, with 20 abstentions, in favor of voting on the important question resolution first. Immediately thereafter, the General Assembly voted 61 to 34, with 7 abstentions, to pass the five-power draft resolution which became Resolution 1668 (XVI). The key portion of Resolution 1668 was that the General Assembly “*Decides*, in accordance with Article 18 of the Charter of the United Nations, that any proposal to change the representation of China is an important question.”⁴⁵ Afterwards, less than a majority of delegates supported the Soviet proposal to replace the ROC with the PRC, let alone a two-thirds majority. Thus, the ROC would represent China during the UN’s sixteenth session and continued to do so through the next decade.

CPC officials and media were quick to condemn the UN’s passage of Resolution 1668. *People’s Daily* ran an article, also printed in *Beijing Daily*, after Resolution 1668 was passed. Before it discussed the General Assembly votes and decisions, the piece opined “under the sinister obstinacy of the United States, the United Nations General Assembly rejected the Soviet proposal for the immediate restoration of the legitimate rights of the People’s Republic of China in the United Nations and the immediate expulsion of the Jiang Jieshi clique.”⁴⁶ Readers need not read the piece to understand the tone, however, as the title read “U.S. fiendishly thwarts return of

⁴⁴ United Nations, 1080th Plenary Meeting, 15 Dec. 1961, *General Assembly, Sixteenth Session, Official Records*, A.PV/1068, p. 1068, accessed 20 June 2019, UN ODS.

⁴⁵ United Nations, “1668 (XVI). Representation of China in the United Nations,” in *Resolutions adopted by the General Assembly during the Sixteenth Session*, Vol. 1, 19 September 1961—23 February 1962, *General Assembly, Sixteenth Session, Official Records*, Supplement No. 17, A/5100 (New York: United Nations, 1962), 66. Original emphasis.

⁴⁶ “美國窮凶極惡阻撓恢復中國在聯合國的合法權利 操縱聯大否決蘇聯提案通過美國五國提案,” 人民日報, 17 Dec. 1961; “美國窮凶極惡阻撓恢復中國在聯合國的合法權利 操縱聯大否決蘇聯提案通過美國五國提案,” 北京日報, 18 Dec. 1961.

China's legitimate rights in the United Nations."⁴⁷ A few days later, on 21 December, the PRC's Ministry of Foreign Affairs put out a statement published in the *People's Daily*, *Beijing Daily*, and *Peking Review* that "solemnly declares that this resolution, which tramples upon the U.N. Charter and infringes on China's sovereignty, is completely illegal and null and void. It sternly condemns and strongly protests against this action taken by the United Nations under the coercion of the United States."⁴⁸ Editors at the three publications took different approaches to describe the Foreign Ministry's statement, though all singled out the United States as responsible for the General Assembly passing Resolution 1668. *People's Daily* editors wrote an editorial in the same issue they printed the Foreign Ministry's statement. The editorial, of which the *Peking Review* ran an abridged version, again castigated the United States for blocking the PRC from entering the world body. The *Peking Review*'s English title, "U.S. Persists in Hostility to the Chinese People," was once again more benign than the *People's Daily* original Chinese title which, translated, read the "United States persists on being an enemy of the Chinese people."⁴⁹

Peking Review editors included a comic that portrayed U.S. opposition to the PRC as duplicitous (fig. 2.2). The image, drawn by Beijing comic artist Fang Cheng, portrayed a caricature of Adelson reading from a list of reasons the U.S. opposed allowing the PRC into the UN. Fang depicted a blank list that obscured U.S. occupation of Taiwan, thus demonstrating U.S. opposition to the PRC entering the world body was actually to maintain control over the island.

⁴⁷ "美國窮凶極惡阻撓恢復中國在聯合國的合法權利 操縱聯大否決蘇聯提案通過美國五國提案," 人民日報, 17 Dec. 1961; "美國窮凶極惡阻撓恢復中國在聯合國的合法權利 操縱聯大否決蘇聯提案通過美國五國提案," 北京日報, 18 Dec. 1961.

⁴⁸ "就美國操縱聯合國大會通過侵犯我國主權的非法決議 我外交部發表聲明提出強烈抗議," 人民日報, 22 Dec. 1961; "中華人民共和國外交部發表聲明 強烈抗議美國挾持聯合國侵犯我主權," 北京日報, 22 Dec. 1961; "China Strongly Protests Against Illegal U.N. Resolution" *Peking Review*, 29 Dec. 1961, 8-9.

⁴⁹ "U.S. Persists in Hostility to the Chinese People," *Peking Review*, 29 Dec. 1961, 5-7; "美國堅持與中國人民為敵," 人民日報, 22 Dec. 1961.

Fang also drew Adelson in formal attire above the list, visible to an audience, while he wore military fatigues behind the list to demonstrate U.S. claims were a subterfuge to mask U.S. militarism. CPC officials sought to mitigate Resolution 1668 by arguing it was illegal according to the UN charter and U.S. machinations once again had prevented the PRC from assuming its rightful place on the international stage. CPC media rarely mentioned the KMT, their rivals in the contest to represent China. When the KMT was mentioned, it was referred to as the Chiang Kai-shek clique or group, thus portraying it as the apparatus of one man. CPC officials, then, defended their international legitimacy by claiming it was U.S. manipulation of the UN that prevented the PRC from attaining its rightful place in the world body. CPC officials maintained the ROC was illegitimate. In PRC media the KMT did not represent a party, let alone a rival state able to represent the Chinese nation. Editors also referred to “China” being excluded from the UN to further marginalize the ROC which represented China in the organization.




Figure 2.2: Fang Cheng, “In Fact, There is Only One Reason,” *Peking Review*, 29 Dec. 1961, 7.

KMT officials were quick to claim victory as the ROC remained China in the world body. On 16 December 1961, editors for *Central Daily News* and *United Daily News* ran lead

articles on page one celebrating the UN passing Resolution 1668. *Central Daily News* editors described the scene as “The United Nations General Assembly today at 20:00 Greenwich mean time (4:45 in the morning of the 16th in Taipei) met, then in their first resolution once again prevented the Chinese Communists from entering the United Nations.”⁵⁰ Editors at *Central Daily News* first presented the full text of Resolution 1668 and depicted it as a defeat for the Soviet Union.⁵¹ Both papers also ran articles, next to those on Resolution 1668, that described Tsiang on the floor of the UN “denouncing Russia” or “Soviet Russia” for “resorting to underhanded politics.”⁵² Tsiang’s final speech before the General Assembly voted on what became Resolution 1668 was also printed in *Central Daily News* and *United Daily News*.⁵³ ROC media benefited from the ROC’s place in the world body, and continued to show Tsiang opposing the Soviet Union and the PRC. KMT officials also used Resolution 1668 to claim the international community supported the ROC as the legitimate government of China. Tsiang told a *United Daily News* reporter that “he anticipated we [the ROC] would receive fifty-six to fifty-seven votes in support, but the results compared to the expectations were even better, receiving sixty-one votes.”⁵⁴ *Free China Review* editors called readers attention to this a month later stating, “as the debate proceeded, it became obvious that those opposed to the Chinese Communists held a sizeable majority, that those favoring the Communists were in a small minority.”⁵⁵

⁵⁰ “聯大今晨表決結果 五國提案多數通過,” 中央日報, 16 Dec. 1961.

⁵¹ “聯大通過五國提案 我代表權益臻鞏固,” 聯合報, 16 Dec. 1961.

⁵² “將代表在聯大答辯 斥俄玩弄卑劣政治,” 中央日報, 1 Dec. 1961; “蔣廷黻斥蘇俄 玩弄卑劣政治,” 聯合報, 16 Dec. 1961.

⁵³ “蔣廷黻在聯大演說 文全 答辯所謂「中國代表權」問題,” 中央日報, 16 Dec. 1961; “蔣廷黻在聯大演說 答辯所謂「中國代表權」問題 全文,” 聯合報, 16 Dec. 1961.

⁵⁴ “自由國家團結 粉碎蘇俄陰謀,” 聯合報, 17 Dec. 1961.

⁵⁵ Editorial, “China’s U.N. Position,” *Free China Review*, Jan. 1962, 3.

Free China Review editors reprinted a comic from the American paper *New York World-Telegram* in their section on foreign press opinion (fig. 2.3) In the comic, the artist drew a caricature of an Asian man with a clownish face in dirty, ill-fitting clothes landing on his posterior after receiving a kick from a boot. The artist's rendering of a Qing-style official's cap 清代官帽 with a hammer and sickle in the peacock feather, knocked off during the fall, denoted that the man represented Chinese communists, or the PRC, with "Red China" written on his sleeve to ensure there was no confusion. The place from where he was ejected there rests a parcel labeled "UN" with the tag "world respect" resting atop another package with the script "membership." The title is presented as a shout directed toward the figure declaring, "No tickee—no washee!" This image served a dual purpose for editors at the *Free China Review*. First, it visualized the UN's rejection of the PRC as the state representing China internationally. Second, it showed international support for the ROC's position in the world body. The cartoon also employed racialized imagery of Chinese, similar to images discussed in the first chapter, and evoked Chinese laundries, artifacts of U.S. racial discrimination that forced Chinese immigrants to the United States into self-employment. An explanation for *Free China Review* editors to present this comic despite its negative-racial stereotyping of Chinese was that the CPC were, per KMT discourse, not Chinese.




Figure 2.3: “No Tickee—No Washee!” *Free China Review*, Jan. 1962, 63.

KMT officials’ celebration of Resolution 1668 reinforced the ROC as the legitimate state representing China. The UN passage of the resolution was represented as the international community supporting ROC legitimacy. Editors also showed Tsiang actively opposing communism and speaking for China, demonstrating that the ROC was an important member of the world body and participant in the Cold War. KMT officials, like their counterparts in Beijing, characterized their CPC rivals by presenting as Soviet puppets or communist bandits to further delegitimize the PRC. A significant difference in the two Parties approaches, though, was that ROC media did present cartoons of the CPC alone, where PRC media often only portrayed the KMT as subservient to the United States, when the KMT appeared at all.

Soviet Revisionism and the UN

CPC depictions of the UN underwent one significant shift during this period. After Josef Stalin died in 1953 and Khrushchev took control of the Soviet Union, Mao and other CPC leaders had become less enamored with their communist ally. Even before Mao knew that Khrushchev had denounced Stalinism in his 1956 report “On the Cult of Personality and its

Consequences,” or “Secret Speech,” the two leaders competed to lead the global communist movement. Mao and Khrushchev’s disagreements culminated in the Sino-Soviet Split that was public in the mid-sixties and escalated into border clashes between the two states later in the decade.

By the mid-sixties the CPC lambasted Soviet revisionism for being as damaging to the UN as U.S. imperialism. This was despite the Soviet Union’s continued public support of the PRC. After Stalin’s death, Khrushchev pursued a policy of peaceful coexistence with non-Communist states. CPC leaders portrayed Moscow’s non-confrontational strategy, as well as denouncement of Stalinism, as “Soviet revisionism.” CPC officials and media portrayed Soviet and American cooperation in the UN as deleterious to the organization. When U.S. and Soviet delegates worked together in the UN to obtain a ceasefire in the Indo-Pakistan War of 1965, the *People’s Daily* ran an article titled “United States and Soviet Union intensify collaboration to increase pressure on Pakistan.”⁵⁶ The article quoted Adlai Stevenson saying “Washington welcomes the United Nations Security Council resolution, we especially welcome the return to a common alignment with the Soviet Union.”⁵⁷ Editors ran another *People’s Daily* article that portrayed Khrushchev using the UN to work with the United States.⁵⁸ More damningly, *People’s Daily* editors showed Soviet delegates working with the ROC in the world body. Editors ran an article covering a UN forum on economics in Asia and the “Far East” that noted in the title “Soviet Union delegates again sit in a row with the Jiang clique and other puppets.”⁵⁹ After the

⁵⁶ “美蘇加緊合謀對巴基斯坦施加壓力,” 人民日報, 22 Sept. 1965.

⁵⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁸ “蘇政府急於利用聯合國同美國大做交易,” 人民日報, 27 Sept. 1965.

⁵⁹ “在聯合國亞洲及遠東經委會主辦的會議上 蘇聯代表又同蔣幫等傀儡排排坐,” 人民日報, 8 Dec. 1965.

twentieth-session of the UN drew to a close, *People's Daily* editors stated, and *Beijing Daily* editors repeated,

for many years up to now, the United Nations has been under U.S. imperialism's control, and committed many evil deeds. Now, the USSR's new leader has agreed to collaborate with U.S. imperialism, and at the same time manipulate and intensify exploitation of the United Nations, enthusiastically committing even more evil deeds.⁶⁰

PRC media represented Soviet revisionism as complicit with U.S. imperialism to incorporate Moscow into their narrative that imperial control was harming the UN. U.S. and USSR delegates had worked together in the UN since its founding, if not the world body would have ground to a halt. CPC officials, however, began highlighting moments of cooperation between the two superpowers to demonstrate Khrushchev's Soviet Union was working with the United States, the epitome of capitalism in CPC rhetoric. Consequently, Moscow was portrayed as weakening in the international communist struggle. Even as PRC media depicted the UN in the thrall of U.S. and USSR interests, it did not challenge the legitimacy of the world body. CPC officials portrayed the world body's actions as illegitimate, but those actions resulted from Washington and Moscow's manipulation of the UN.

Despite the Sino-Soviet Split, within the UN the Soviet Union continued to publicly support admitting the PRC and expelling the ROC. Nineteen sixty-two, however, was the last year Soviet delegates requested the UN discuss Chinese representation, thereafter Cambodian and Albanian delegates made the requests. Moscow's decision to leave proposals on Chinese representation in the organization to weaker states was a way to subtly express its displeasure with the PRC. While the CPC and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) disagreed

⁶⁰ 社論, “聯合國是美蘇政治交易所,” 人民日報, 27 Dec. 1965; “聯合國是美蘇政治交易所,” 北京日報, 28 Dec. 1965.

on the direction of communism, to the point of open hostility, that disagreement was not enough to completely end Soviet support for the PRC in the world body.

The General Assembly's debates on Chinese representation in the UN did not change substantively after 1961, though the PRC's ascension to the ranks of nuclear power provided pro-Beijing delegates another reason to champion its inclusion. In 1964 Vounsai Sonn, Cambodia's permanent representative to the UN, implored "the United Nations to realize the impossibility of perpetuating a manifestly absurd and unjust situation" of the ROC representing China in the organization.⁶¹ Sonn reasoned that the UN should admit the PRC because the Chinese people were unrepresented and it was a peaceful state, familiar tropes in pro-PRC rhetoric in the UN. His stated reasons did not include that the PRC had successfully detonated an atomic bomb on 16 October 1964. At the UN's twentieth session in 1965, however, PRC advocates argued that Beijing's possession of nuclear weapons were another reason it should represent China. That year, Albania, Algeria, Burundi, Cambodia, Congo (Brazzaville), Cuba, Ghana, Guinea, Mali, and Romania, requested the world body add PRC restoration to the agenda. They explained that the UN needed the PRC as a member for "the solution of any important international problems without the participation of China is inconceivable. This fact has been further confirmed... by the accession of China to the rank of a nuclear power."⁶² These delegates maintained the ROC was unable to represent China in the world body, a situation made more valid by the PRC's possession of nuclear weapons. Despite the PRC's new status as a nuclear power, the UN eventually passed Resolution 2025 (XX) wherein the UN recalled "its

⁶¹ UN GA "Letter Dated 19 November 1964 from the Permanent Representative of Cambodia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General," A/5761/ADD.4, p. 5, accessed 20 July 2020, UN ODS.

⁶² UN GA, "Letter dated 7 September 1965 from the Permanent Representatives of Albania, Algeria, Cambodia, Congo (Brazzaville), Cuba, Ghana, Guinea, Mali and Romania to the United Nations, addressed to the Secretary-General," A/5971/Add.2, p. 3, accessed 20 July 2020, UN ODS.

decision in Resolution 1668 (XVI) of 15 December 1961... that any proposal to change the representation of China is an important question. [It] *Affirms* that this decision remains valid.”⁶³

Thus, even though the CPC had elevated their state to a position enjoyed by very few others, ROC and U.S. delegates to the UN succeeded in making Chinese representation an important question to safeguard Taipei’s place in the world body.

The People’s Republic of China

Without diplomacy, culture was an internal affair for the PRC. As the world entered the sixties, CPC leaders strengthened their model of China as revolutionary while the ROC continued to wield the UN’s international legitimacy. Internally, CPC media and leaders presented versions of Sun Yat-Sen and National Day that solidified their China as a revolutionary nation. They lauded Sun for his revolutionary fervor and National Day for breaking the Chinese nation out of the past. In 1962, though, the CPC demonstrated territoriality and nationalism were more important than iconoclasm or the non-aligned movement as they deployed the People’s Liberation Army to resolve border disputes with India. Externally, the CPC openly challenged the CPSU claim to lead the international communist movement. Per CPC leaders’ portrayals, the CPSU had abandoned world revolution to collaborate with capitalists and imperialists. The CPC continued to delegitimize the KMT and ROC. Throughout the first half of the 1960s, CPC leaders employed the media to bolster their definition of China, denigrating the KMT’s rival depictions. When Mao initiated the Cultural Revolution in 1966, however, CPC portrayals of China as revolutionary were magnified as the PRC descended into the chaos of revolutionary fervor and Mao worship. The CPC faced little external pressure as it defended its

⁶³ United Nations, “2025 (XX). Representation of China in the United Nations,” in *Resolutions adopted by the General Assembly during its Twentieth Session*, 21 September to 22 December 1965, *General Assembly, Official Records, Twentieth Session*, Supplement No. 14, A/6014, (New York: United Nations, 1966), 2. Original emphasis.

claims to legitimacy by breaking the Chinese nation from the past to propel it into the future.

Mao and CPC leaders' lack of constraints resulted in a period that indelibly marked the nation their state represented.

Within Revolutionary China

The PRC entered the 1960s in the shadow of the failed Great Leap Forward. It also entered the sixties bereft of China's position in the United Nations. While the CPC lacked legitimacy on the international stage it did not want for domestic legitimacy. Despite the tragedy of the Great Leap Forward Famine that caused around 30-million deaths in the PRC, the Party had no domestic challenge to its rule.⁶⁴ During the relative calm of the early part of the decade, CPC leaders continued to portray China as a revolutionary nation as they celebrated Sun Yat-sen's legacy and the PRC's founding. In 1966, however, Mao launched the Cultural Revolution and transformed the rhetoric of revolution into anarchy. They were able to do this in part because without UN representation or Soviet support, Mao and other CPC officials were unfettered by international obligations to represent the continuity of the Chinese nation.

CPC propaganda celebrated Sun Yat-sen as the father of modern China. Sun's role, however, was tied not to the KMT he helped found, but to the CPC. In 1961 Dong Biwu 董必武, Vice Chair of the Communist Party of China along with Song Qingling 宋慶齡, wrote an article commemorating the fiftieth anniversary of the Xinhai Revolution that felled the Qing Dynasty. Dong posited that by the 1920s "through receiving Communist Party of China help, Mr. Yat-sen recognized if China's revolution was going to achieve genuine success, it must resolutely oppose

⁶⁴ For more on the Great Leap Forward Famine see: Jasper Becker, *Hungry Ghosts: Mao's Secret Famine*, (New York: The Free Press, 1996); Frank Dikötter, *Mao's Great Famine: The History of China's Most Devastating Catastrophe, 1958-62*, (London: Bloomsbury, 2010).

imperialism and feudalism, and it must genuinely support and rely on the power of the masses” and Sun “did not care about Guomindang rightist clique opposition” when he advocated a KMT-CPC United Front in the 1920s.⁶⁵ Song also wrote an article celebrating the Xinhai Revolution in 1961 that stated “After Sun Yat-sen passed away, Jiang Jieshi betrayed the revolution dragging China again into the dark abyss. Communist Party of China members carried on Sun Yat-sen’s revolutionary cause.”⁶⁶ Editors included photos directly linking Sun to Mao with the articles celebrating the Xinhai Revolution (fig. 2.4).⁶⁷ CPC rhetoric celebrated Sun’s revolutionary spirit and visually positioned Mao as his heir to endow the Party, embodied by Mao, with Sun’s spirit. Similar to images from the fifties discussed in the previous chapter, Mao was represented as the direct national heir of Sun’s philosophies. CPC officials thus conveniently elided the KMT and Sun’s role in that party’s founding. Sun was a revolutionary, therefore the reactionary KMT had no claim on his legacy in the PRC national imaginary.



Figure 2.4: Qi Guanshan 齊觀山, “首都隆重紀念辛亥革命五十週年。這是政協全國委員會主席周恩來致開會詞” [Capital grand commemoration of the fiftieth anniversary of the Xinhai Revolution. This is Chairman of the National Committee of the CPPCC Zhou Enlai’s opening remarks], 北京日報, 10 Oct. 1961.

⁶⁵ 董必武, “辛亥革命為新的革命鬥爭發展开辟了道路,” 北京日報, 10 Oct. 1961.

⁶⁶ 宋慶齡, “「辛亥革命會議錄」序言,” 人民日報, 10 Oct. 1961; 宋慶齡, “「辛亥革命會議錄」序言,” 北京日報, 10 Oct. 1961.

⁶⁷ Figure 2.4 is from *Beijing Daily*, but *People’s Daily* editors included a similar photo; 呂相友, “圖為大會席台上,” 人民日報, 10 Oct. 1961.

Song Qingling penned another article to commemorate Sun on his birthday in 1962. In the piece, Song argued “The historic cooperation between Sun Yat-sen and the Communist Party of China was no accident.”⁶⁸ It was no accident, in Song’s interpretation, as Sun felt the 1917 October Revolution in Russia demonstrated communism’s ability to defeat imperialism. She claimed Sun decided the KMT needed to cooperate with the CPC in the 1920s because “the Guomindang was like a dying man, he said this kind of cooperation would strengthen and restore blood flow.”⁶⁹ Song went further to maintain “the Guomindang rightists were not satisfied with Sun Yat-sen’s preference for socialism or refurbishing the practice of the Three Principles of the People.”⁷⁰ Thus, Song and Dong both delineated Sun as significant in Modern China. The CPC, not the party Sun founded, were the true inheritors of Sun’s legacy. CPC officials presented Sun in this light to simultaneously bolster their legitimacy while undermining the KMT’s. While not as integral in the 1960s as it had been in the 1950s, officials like Song and Dong associated modern China’s founding father with the CPC to maintain the narrative that Sun Yat-sen, a genuine revolutionary, supported the CPC as the true revolutionary party of China. Song’s and Dong’s pieces fit into the larger narrative that the China which had emerged from the fallen Qing empire was a revolutionary one.

Where CPC officials presented Sun as the harbinger of modernity, they represented National Day, 1 October 1949, as the defining moment of modern China. That CPC leaders like Zhou Enlai, Liu Shaoqi, and Mao Zedong presented the founding of the PRC as a seminal event in Chinese history is unsurprising. Their portrayals of National Day, however, served as a public spectacle to reinforce China’s revolutionary nature. From 1960 to 1965, *People’s Daily* and

⁶⁸ 宋慶齡, “孫中山和他同中國共產黨的合作,” 人民日報, 12 Sept. 1962.

⁶⁹ 宋慶齡, “孫中山和他同中國共產黨的合作,” 人民日報, 12 Sept. 1962.

⁷⁰ Ibid.

Beijing Daily editors ran pictures of Mao and Liu similar to the one below (fig. 2.5). The images were accompanied with red script, banners, borders, or a combination thereof, which were reserved for special events, to highlight the uniqueness of the day. Editors placed the images of Mao and Liu with the red text to signify that National Day was not a regular holiday, but a significant moment for all Chinese. In comparison, editors at the *People's Daily* ran banners in black and white on pages two and three to celebrate the Lunar New Year in 1961 and presented nothing unique for the one in 1963 (fig. 2.6). CPC officials placed more significance on the PRC's founding than the traditional New Year's holiday to highlight China's revolutionary nature. PRC media presented the traditional holiday as essentially a vestige of the past, where the PRC's revolutionary founding was what heralded China's future.



Figure 2.5: 北京日報, 1 Oct. 1963.



Figure 2.6: 人民日報, 15 Feb. 1961.

The 1962 Sino-Indian War

In the 1962 Sino-Indian War CPC leaders paradoxically demonstrated their commitment to liberate China from an inglorious past while simultaneously maintaining the borders established by the Qing empire. Though CPC leaders defined China as revolutionary, and despite the PRC and India's shared membership in the Non-Aligned Movement, they adhered to the territorial dictates of nationalism. CPC officials went to war with India based on two overarching assumptions. The first was that Indian leaders wanted to weaken PRC sovereignty over Tibet. The second was that the Indian military was slowly annexing PRC territory along the Indian-Tibetan border. John W. Garver argues CPC leaders' fears were inaccurate regarding Tibet, but accurate regarding China's borders. The PLA thwarted Indian encroachment and secured PRC control over the region, though not without causing lasting harm to Sino-Indian Relations.⁷¹ That CPC officials opted to use force against India to quash threats, perceived or not, against Chinese territory is unsurprising. Official justification for war with India, however, warrants consideration.

CPC officials invoked an agreement between an imperial power and, in CPC parlance, a break-away province as part of their justification for war with India. In 1914 British India and an independent Tibet demarcated their borders in an agreement named for the British India plenipotentiary Henry MacMahon. British India and Tibet representatives agreed to the McMahon Line at the 1914 Simla Convention which also included representatives from the ROC. At the time of the agreement, Tibet was independent from China and remained so until 1951. PRC officials considered the treaty invalid, as they maintained Tibet was a province of

⁷¹ John W. Garver, "China's Decision for War with India in 1962," in *New Directions in the Study of China's Foreign Policy*, eds. Alastair Iain Johnston and Robert S. Ross, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006), 86-130.

China and therefore unable to conclude international treaties. Despite the official PRC stance that “the Chinese government does not accept the illegal McMahon Line” the PLA kept its troops behind it.⁷² And when India sent troops past the McMahon Line, PRC media was quick to indicate the line’s significance. Xinhua News reported that Indian troops had gone north of the line by stating in the title that “infringing on ‘McMahon Line’ the Indian army expands provocation.”⁷³ On 22 September 1962 a *People’s Daily* editorial declared “As everyone knows, the so-called ‘McMahon Line’ is absolutely illegal, from the past to the present no previous Chinese government supported it.”⁷⁴ The editorial went on to argue, though, that the Indian Army transgressing the McMahon line was beyond the pale. Shortly before the PLA began its offensive in the Himalayas, editors at the *People’s Daily* and *Beijing Daily* ran a Xinhua News piece on the McMahon Line. While the article highlighted the line was incommensurate with PRC territorial claims, it also published the agreement in toto with map, seals, and signatures (fig. 2.7).⁷⁵ PRC media published the document to demonstrate their restraint. As the PLA prepared for war, the CPC sought to present itself as simply responding to foreign aggression.

⁷² 新華社, “侵越 ‘麥克馬洪線’ 的印軍擴大挑釁,” 人民日報, 21 Sept. 1962.

⁷³ Ibid.

⁷⁴ 社論, “是可忍, 孰不可忍!” 人民日報, 22 Sept. 1962.

⁷⁵ 新華社, “印度軍隊越過非法的麥克馬洪線的鐵證,” 人民日報, 20 Oct. 1962; 新華社, “印度軍隊越過非法的麥克馬洪線的鐵證,” 北京日報, 21 Oct. 1962.




Figure 2.7: Xinhua News Agency 新華社, “印度軍隊越過非法的麥克馬洪線的鐵證” [Irrefutable proof the Indian army crossed illegal MacMahon Line], 北京日報, 21 Oct. 1962.

PRC officials' justification for war with India did not rest solely on the McMahon Line, but their use of the agreement elucidates a paradox in the CPC's revolutionary nationalism. PRC media, in line with the official position, emphasized the line's illegality.⁷⁶ Editors and journalists denounced imperial Britain and an illegitimate authority, an independent Tibetan government, for presuming to demarcate China's borders. CPC officials further argued that Tibet's incorporation into the PRC rendered the agreement moot. Despite their rhetoric on the falsity of the line, however, that Indian troops crossed it was used as an integral aspect to chastise India in domestic media. Thus, even as the PLA went into the Himalayas to push Indian forces out of contested territory, the PRC media used an agreement reached in 1914 to demonstrate how brazen Indian efforts were. The CPC's revolutionary China had little use for China's past, except when it came to delineating territory. The CPC defined modern-China's borders as coterminous with those of the fallen Qing, though they had accepted an independent Mongolia. Thus, the PRC included Qing territorial acquisitions and CPC officials wanted Taiwan returned per agreements

⁷⁶ 新華社, “我國政府發表聲明鄭重提出三項建議,” 北京日報, 24 Oct. 1962.

made by the ROC in the Second World War. In the CPC paradigm, revolution stopped at China's borders.

The Cultural Revolution

As the sixties progressed, the PRC became more isolated and thus less constrained to represent China internationally. The PRC's war with India lost Beijing an ally in the Non-Aligned Movement. Beijing's relations with Moscow and its satellites had largely collapsed. The conflicts with India and the Soviet Union also reduced the PRC's chances of entering the UN. Moscow and New Delhi enjoyed international prestige and both states had been among Beijing's greatest advocates in the organization. When Mao launched the PRC into the turbulent Cultural Revolution era, there was little reason for the CPC to preserve China's national imaginary to present foreign audiences or states. Thus, when Mao called on the people to "bombard the headquarters" students transformed themselves into Red Guards who heeded Lin Biao, in his newly elevated position as Vice Chairman of the CPC and eventual successor to Mao, when he said to destroy the "Four Olds." Those Four Olds were: old culture, customs, habits, and ideals. During this campaign, Red Guards assaulted the material and cultural vestiges of China's past. The Cultural Revolution was the CPC's rhetoric of China as a revolutionary state made manifest. The UN's exclusion of the PRC was by no means the primary motivating factor for Mao's permanent revolution.⁷⁷ Lack of representation in the world body did, however, limit outside scrutiny or pressure as the CPC's China descended into chaos.

⁷⁷ For motivating factors of the Cultural Revolution see: Lynn T. White III, *Policies of Chaos: The Organizational Causes of Violence in China's Cultural Revolution* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989); Roderick MacFarquhar and Michael Schoenhals, *Mao's Last Revolution* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2006).

Sun Yat-sen's place in modern China was affected by the Cultural Revolution's assault on Chinese culture and tradition. CPC media did not attack Sun's legacy directly, unlike contemporary CPC luminaries like Liu Shaoqi who was criticized, purged, and died under harsh conditions meted out by his jailers. While Sun's reputation was not challenged overtly, his star dimmed considerably as Mao worship reached its apogee. Song Qingling wrote an article celebrating the hundredth anniversary of her husband Sun's birth as the Cultural Revolution was beginning to take off. She ended her article celebrating Sun by declaring "today to commemorate Mr. Sun Yat-sen, we must always follow our great mentor, great leader, great commander, great helmsman Chairman Mao."⁷⁸ At a ceremony celebrating Sun, Dong Biwu declared "We are the inheritors of Mr. Sun Yat-sen's revolutionary undertaking" in a piece that maintained Mao had realized Sun's revolutionary goals for China.⁷⁹

PRC media treated Sun as almost an afterthought as the Cultural Revolution progressed. The celebration of Sun's hundred-and-first anniversary received a perfunctory report.⁸⁰ Editors at the *People's Daily* paid even less attention to Sun in 1968. In one of the few references to Sun that year, an article on Mao addressing worker representatives and citizens in Beijing stated, amidst the adoring yells from the crowds, Mao stood with "portraits of Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin that accompanied the steadfast nobility of the square. A portrait of Sun Yat-sen was also erected on the square."⁸¹ Sun's significance for modern China, while not insignificant, could not compete with the revolutionary fervor that surrounded Mao worship. Sun remained China's first revolutionary, but he was eclipsed by Mao and his role in creating the PRC and realizing the

⁷⁸ 宋慶齡, "孫中山—堅定不移, 百折不撓的革命家," 人民日報, 13 Nov. 1966.

⁷⁹ "董必武副主席的開幕詞," 人民日報, 13 Nov. 1966.

⁸⁰ "北京, 上海, 廣州等地紀念孫中山誕生一百零一週年," 人民日報, 13 Nov. 1967.

⁸¹ "毛主席同全國工人代表和首都軍民歡迎國慶," 人民日報, 2 Oct. 1968.

goals of the revolution. In CPC rhetoric, Mao was a part of the communist pantheon, where Sun was not. While PRC media could redefine aspects of Sun's legacy to support the communist movement, presenting him as a member of that movement was incommensurate with their narrative that the Xinhai Revolution had been a bourgeois revolution. China's true revolution occurred in 1949 with the CPC's victory over the KMT on the mainland.

The CPC's elevation of Mao to divinity transformed National Day celebrations as well. After 1966, National Day celebrations were public spectacles honoring Mao as much as the founding of the PRC. Editors at papers like *People's Daily* and *Beijing Daily* often ran full page pictures of Mao as they celebrated the state's founding. As a Xinhua News piece put it in 1966 "The people of our country's successes in spiritual and material realms, are all victories of Mao Zedong Thought."⁸² While PRC media celebrations of Mao and Maoism were not new, the hagiography reached new heights as people sought to demonstrate their loyalty to the revolution through reverence to its physical embodiment. Essentially, during this period Mao worship became a proxy for dedication to the CPC's revolutionary China. For people in the PRC revolution was not an abstract concept, the CPC had transformed the Chinese nation in more than rhetoric as it pursued policies to redefine China. During the Cultural Revolution, though, Mao became an avatar of revolution as the people were impelled to cast of the final vestiges of traditional Chinese culture.

Domestically, the CPC faced few restraints as it continued to define China as a revolutionary nation. The PRC's isolation and distance from powerful advocates in the UN were not the cause of Mao's last effort to strip away traditional Chinese culture, but CPC officials did not have external pressure to maintain any established perceptions of China as they sought to

⁸² 新華社, "歡慶我國偉大成就 共祝毛主席萬歲無疆," 人民日報, 1 Oct. 1966.

transform the nation. Consequently, the Cultural Revolution marked the most radical assault on the national imaginary of China as the people and Party sought to destroy both the physical and cultural manifestations of China's past.

Outside Revolutionary China

CPC officials' efforts to represent the PRC as the legitimate state of China abroad did not stop in the halls of the UN. As the PRC entered the sixties, the CPC came to odds with the Soviet Union under Khrushchev. Khrushchev's transformations to communism challenged the CPC's legitimacy as a great revolutionary party. Beijing's competition with Moscow, however, furthered isolated the PRC. The KMT's ROC across the Taiwan Strait continued to present a direct challenge to the PRC's legitimacy that the CPC sought to undermine. Despite these challenges, among others, to the PRC's international legitimacy, Beijing's international relations did not escape the Cultural Revolution. As the nation heeded Mao's call for perpetual revolution, the China the CPC presented also changed even as the PRC grew more isolated on the international stage.

Before the Cultural Revolution

The CPC competition with the CPSU to define communism resulted in a public split between the PRC and USSR in the 1960s. Khrushchev's restructuring of Soviet policy after Stalin's death posed a direct challenge to the CPC's legitimacy. The CPC built itself on a Stalinist model with Mao and the Party serving as embodiments of the state. Denouncing Stalinism, particularly the cult of personality, Khrushchev indirectly denounced the communism practiced by the CPC. Consequently, CPC officials rebutted Khrushchev's interpretation and proceeded to argue Soviet revisionism was nearly as large a threat to international communism as U.S. imperialism. In 1963 the CPC moved from indirect to direct critiques of the CPSU under

Khrushchev. On 30 March 1963 the CPSU Central Committee wrote the CPC Central Committee. In this letter, the CPSU presented its vision for international communism after Stalin, but they also declared “It is clear to everyone we could also say many things to defend the CPSU’s Leninist line, defend international communism’s common policies, and respond to the utterly baseless attacks within recent articles published in the Chinese press.”⁸³ The CPSU’s letter showed that the CPC’s divergent interpretation of international communism was already well known to the Chinese public in the early sixties. Moreover, the CPC published it in the *People’s Daily* demonstrating to the people not only that their positions on communism were taken seriously in Moscow, but also that they did not need the Soviet Union’s support.

The CPC response to the CPSU ensured there was no question which party was holding true to the goals of international communism. The CPC presented the CPSU with a letter, published in all major PRC media outlets, that maintained the greatest threats to communism were capitalism and imperialism, both of which were embodied by the United States. The CPC, however, also took umbrage with the CPSU and stated “since you said our articles were ‘utterly baseless,’ were that bad, that [sic], why unlike us do you not publish your article and also publish our seven so-called ‘utterly baseless attack’ articles, for all Soviet Union comrades, all Soviet Union people to ponder over then judge who is right and who is wrong?”⁸⁴ Thus CPC officials announced not only their divisions with the CPSU on communism, but also insinuated that their interpretations were more defensible as they were willing to share them publicly. PRC media highlighted this when the CPSU responded that it would be inappropriate to print the articles in

⁸³ “蘇共中央三月三十日給中共中央的信,” 人民日報, 4 April 1963.

⁸⁴ “關於國際共產主義運動總路線的建議,” 人民日報, 17 June, 1963; “關於國際共產主義運動總路線的建議,” 解放軍報, 17 June, 1963; “關於國際共產主義運動總路線的建議,” 北京日報, 17 June 1963.

Soviet media.⁸⁵ The CPC presented their position vis-à-vis the CPSU on transparency and communism to demonstrate to PRC citizens that their revolutionary fervor was more genuine than their counterparts in the Soviet Union. While the Soviet Union had the first communist revolution, after the death of Stalin the CPSU had lost its way. The CPC, on the other hand, remained committed to the true revolutionary ideals of communism. For CPC officials China was, after all, the revolutionary state par excellence.

The Sino-Soviet Split was detrimental to the PRC on the international stage. The CPC published a series of articles criticizing the CPSU in 1963. That year, the Soviet Union did not request the UN expel the ROC and seat the PRC in the world body, instead it was the comparatively less prestigious or powerful state of Albania that made the request. Each year thereafter, the Soviet Union left the question of Chinese representation in the world body to delegates from other states. Thus, the PRC's chances to enter the UN had increased during this period with decolonization and the growing number of member states who supported Beijing, but the Sino-Soviet Split left the primary advocates for membership to less esteemed members of the organization. With an alternate China across the Taiwan Strait and in the UN, Beijing's loss of powerful, prominent advocates pushed the CPC to more radically differentiate their China to bolster their authority as they challenged KMT legitimacy.

In the 1960s the CPC maintained Taiwan was under U.S. occupation against the will of the Taiwanese people. In 1961 Xinhua news reported on celebrations for the fourth anniversary of the Liu Ziran Incident, the 1957 anti-American protests in Taipei discussed in the first chapter. At the celebrations in Shanghai Wu Dingfu 吳丁福, a member of the Shanghai Municipal

⁸⁵ 新華社, “蘇共中央發表聲明認為 在蘇聯報刊上發表中共中央復信不適宜的,” 人民日報, 20 June 1963, p. 1; 新華社, “在蘇聯報刊上發表中共中央復信不適宜的,” 解放軍報, 20 June 1963.

People's Congress who had emigrated from Taiwan, "pointed out the Taiwanese are inseparable members of the great Chinese national 中華民族 family."⁸⁶ In that same issue of the *People's Daily*, Xinhua News reporter Ding Gu 丁固 interviewed a former ROC soldier named Wu Benxiang 吳本祥. According to Ding, Wu had recently left Taiwan and during the interview said "beautiful Taiwan, under the iron hoof of the U.S. aggressors, has become an island where the people are destitute and suffering."⁸⁷ The following year, Secretary General of the Taiwan Democratic Self-Government League Xu Mengshan 徐萌山 penned a piece on the Liu Ziran Incident that declared "it made clear the Taiwanese people's strong will to oppose American imperialism and shows the revolutionary tradition of the Chinese nation 中華民族 against foreign aggression."⁸⁸ PRC media celebrated the Liu Ziran Incident to demonstrate Taiwanese opposition to the United States and argue the incident demonstrated all Chinese, including those on Taiwan, were revolutionary. The people on Taiwan, per this narrative, would join the PRC and its revolution but the U.S. backed ROC prevented them from doing so. These articles depicted Taiwan as firmly under U.S. control, further delegitimizing the KMT who appeared as puppets, if at all.

After the Cultural Revolution

The Cultural Revolution had a significant effect on how the CPC portrayed the outside world. As the nation descended into the tumult of the Cultural Revolution the state entered a period of intense isolation. The Sino-Soviet Split had already reduced the PRC's allies as Soviet states in Eastern Europe, except Albania, sided with the Soviet Union. As the Cultural

⁸⁶ 新華社, "福州上海廣州旅大舉行紀念會," 人民日報, 25 May 1961.

⁸⁷ 丁固, "来自台湾的控诉," 人民日報, 25 May 1961.

⁸⁸ 吳本祥, "台灣人民一定要同美國侵略者鬥爭到底," 人民日報, 24 May 1962.

Revolution progressed, the CPC recalled its diplomats to participate in the pogroms and self-criticisms of the period.⁸⁹

In PRC media, the outside world supported the Cultural Revolution and reified Mao Zedong. Editors at the *Beijing Daily* ran pictures of people from across the world reading Mao's teachings under banners like "Great leader Chairman Mao, the people of the world adore you" or "The brilliant light of Mao Zedong Thought illuminates the whole world."⁹⁰ The photos displayed the joy of people around the world reading the words of Mao and how much they respected and adored him. These pictures included quotes like one Xinhua News attributed to Syrian revolutionaries who purportedly said "Chairman Mao is the great leader of all Chinese people and all the world's peoples who are oppressed, Chairman Mao's people's war ideology has world guiding significance."⁹¹ Sometimes the persons quoted in PRC media received the nebulous moniker of "world revolutionaries of every country" who lauded Mao Zedong Thought as "the highest and most lively Marxism-Leninism in the contemporary era."⁹² Another Xinhua News article opened with snippets from a Red Song, or songs glorifying Mao and the Cultural Revolution. The article explained "this is little Abdullah forcing a song in Chinese in heartfelt adoration of Chairman Mao."⁹³ Abdullah was a thirteen-year old Syrian who loved Chairman Mao and, communist, China. Essentially, PRC media extended the cult of Mao into an international phenomenon. The outside world presented to people in China was one as devoted to the cult of Mao as the Chinese nation. Normalizing Mao worship abroad bolstered it at home and

⁸⁹ For more on how the Cultural Revolution's effected the PRC Foreign Ministry see: Ma Jisen, *Cultural Revolution in the Foreign Ministry of China: A True Story* (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 2004).

⁹⁰ "偉大領袖毛主席 世界人民熱愛您," 北京日報, 28 Sept. 1967; "毛澤東思想光耀照亮全世界," 北京日報, 26 Dec. 1967.

⁹¹ "偉大領袖毛主席 世界人民熱愛您," 北京日報, 28 Sept. 1967.

⁹² "毛澤東思想是革命的人民的靈魂," 人民日報, 14 Jan. 1967.

⁹³ "外國小年兒童熱愛毛主席," 北京日報, 1 June 1968.

significantly added to Mao's stature as the leading revolutionary of not only China but the entire world. Editors and reporters in the Cultural Revolution did this not only to elevate Mao's prestige, but also to protect their own positions. To question Mao or the worship of him was tantamount to questioning the revolution. And during this period the revolutionary nature of China was sacrosanct in the PRC.

The Republic of China

In the sixties KMT officials used the ROC's position in the UN to defend their conception of China and maintain power in the international sphere. ROC celebrations of National Day and Sun Yat-sen were intended to demonstrate that, despite CPC control of the mainland, the KMT were the heirs to Sun's legacy and the legitimate rulers of the nation. The Cultural Revolution sweeping through the PRC, however, provided the KMT with an opportunity to demonstrate they were the true inheritors of China's cultural legacy. Chiang responded to Mao's Cultural Revolution with a Cultural Renaissance that celebrated China's past. The ROC's place in the UN remained a key factor in KMT foreign relations. When France recognized the PRC in 1964 it represented a fundamental challenge to KMT legitimacy. The CPC's control of the mainland was also something KMT officials had to explain, thus they continued to portray the PRC as a Soviet puppet and challenge the Chineseness of the CPC.

Within Traditional China

The ROC entered the 1960s with a growing economy and greater domestic legitimacy on Taiwan than they had in the fifties. With the KMT's presence firmly established, officials refined their definitions of China as a modern state that remained true to its past. Consequently, celebrations of National Day, also called Double Ten Day for its occurrence on the tenth day of the tenth month, and Sun as Father of the Nation acknowledged the importance of revolution

while simultaneously emphasizing continuity with China's past. The Cultural Revolution in the PRC, however, provided the KMT with their greatest opportunity to position their China as the authentic nation-state, one that continued to honor the national imaginary of China's millennia-long history.

During the sixties, ROC media celebrated Sun's role in China's revolution, however Sun's revolutionary spirit was for freedom and aligned with Chinese tradition. A *China Daily News* editorial commemorated Sun's ninety-ninth birthday in 1964 by declaring that the KMT's struggles, adherence to the Three Principles of the People, and dedication to revolutionary freedom, "will allow us to become an inextinguishable torch for liberty and justice."⁹⁴ A *United News Daily* editorial that same year was more specific as it enjoined readers to remember Sun and his teachings. It argued that people in Taiwan could overcome their current adverse situation through ardent steadfastness, determination, and the "belief our anti-communist counterattack revolutionary war must succeed, that the national revolutionary objective of national rejuvenation and rebuilding will be completed."⁹⁵ On the hundredth anniversary of Sun's birth, editors at *China Daily News* elaborated that "to speak of revolutionary spirit, our founding father 國父 vowed to overturn autocracy."⁹⁶ Editors at *United Daily News* explained "speaking from his [Sun's] philosophy, the Three Principles of the People amalgamated essential ideas from traditional Chinese culture and advanced trends in world science."⁹⁷ T.C. Chang, an author of several pieces on Sun's philosophy, wrote an article on Sun's legacy for the *Free China Review* that claimed "Sun always identified himself with the traditions of Chinese history and culture"

⁹⁴ 社論, "以完成革命紀念 國父," 中華日報, 12 Nov. 1964.

⁹⁵ 社論, "自然的偉大," 聯合報, 12 Nov. 1964.

⁹⁶ 社論, "非常事業賴有非常精神," 中華日報, 12 Nov. 1965.

⁹⁷ 社論, "光同日月·萬世共仰," 聯合報, 12 Nov. 1965.

and “he devoted his life to reconstruction of China in the spirit of her cultural tradition and modern requirements.”⁹⁸ It was not possible for ROC media to deny Sun’s role as a revolutionary, after all, it was a revolution that led to the creation of the ROC from the ashes of the Qing empire. KMT officials cast Sun’s revolutionary spirit as for liberty and against autocracy to repurpose that spirit to suit their model of China as a nation that adhered to time-honored principles. KMT propaganda that cast Sun’s revolutionary ideals as for freedom had the added benefit of aligning them with the United States, their primary benefactor. These arguments also presented Sun as against the KMT’s rivals, the CPC, whom they cast as exercising authoritarian control over the mainland. By claiming the Three Principles of the People, a bedrock of ROC governing philosophy, was based on traditional Chinese culture, editors also defended Chinese culture as capable of supporting modern ideologies. Consequently, Sun was a revolutionary, but KMT officials presented the revolution he espoused as a complement to China’s long history.

United Daily News included a graphic account to honor Sun’s hundredth birthday that infused his revolutionary spirit with traditional elements of Chinese culture. The text was written by Yang Rude 羊汝德, a reporter, editor, and writer who was also Secretary General of the National Press Association among other prominent roles.⁹⁹ Several artists collaborated to draw the comic titled “Founding Father Mr. Sun Yat-sen and the National Revolution.”¹⁰⁰ In one hundred-and-fifty-five panels over thirteen pages, the comic recounted Sun’s life from his birth

⁹⁸ T.C. Chang, “Dr. Sun Yat-sen’s Political Philosophy,” *Free China Review*, April 1965, 17, 19.

⁹⁹ National Museum of Taiwan Literature 國立台灣文學館, “2010 年台灣文學年鑑: 羊汝德,” in *The Almanac of Taiwan Literature Research Resources* 《台灣文學年鑑檢索系統》, p. 153, accessed 20 July 2020, <http://almanac.nmtl.gov.tw/opencms/almanac/pdfView.html?atype=People&ctype=F&volume=2010&id=2011122010153154>.

¹⁰⁰ 羊汝德, “國父孫中山先生與國民革命,” 聯合報, 12 Nov. 1965.

to his death and continued into Chiang's leadership of the ROC on Taiwan. While the comic was focused on Sun as a revolutionary, it was within the concepts of revolution laid out by the KMT with allusions to Chinese history and culture. In one tale from Sun's youth Yang tells of his meeting an old Taiping soldier whose stories aroused in Sun the desire to "overthrow the Manchu Qing and restore the Han's revolutionary ideology."¹⁰¹ In this rendition, revolution was a Han tradition. The Han were, and remain, the dominant ethnic group in China. Consequently, Sun did not want to overthrow Chinese tradition only the Manchu who ruled Qing China. Yang portrayed Sun's transformation of the secret Tongmenghui into the public KMT as natural because "the revolution had already succeeded."¹⁰² Thus in this iteration, the goal of the revolution was the toppling of the Qing and the KMT were the inheritors of the revolution's success.

Yang recounted one story from Sun's early years where he damaged a statue in a temple dedicated to the Northern Emperor 北帝 in his hometown (fig. 2.8). The image showed Sun addressing his peers with the statue's hand in his own. On the surface, Sun's desecration of a statue in a temple appears to be a revolutionary act against Chinese tradition and beliefs, acts that people would reenact across the PRC during the Cultural Revolution. Yang's explanation and description of this event, however, reshaped its anti-traditional image. Yang detailed Sun did this to "do away with old superstitions 破除迷信." The idiom Yang used is commonly associated with Ximen Bao 西門豹, an engineer and official from the State of Wei during the Warring States period (475-221 BCE). In "Ximen Bao Does Away With Old Superstitions 西門豹破除迷

¹⁰¹ 羊汝德, 海虹畫, "國父孫中山先生與國民革命," 聯合報, 12 Nov. 1965, panel 17.

¹⁰² 羊汝德, 李靈伽畫, "國父孫中山先生與國民革命," 聯合報, Nov. 1965, panel 75.

信,” Ximen convinced a village along the Yellow River in Northern Wei to abandon the practice of sacrificing women to appease Hebo 河伯, the god of the Yellow River. Thus, Sun’s desecration of a statue in a temple to dispel superstitions had precedent in ancient Chinese history and was relatively more humane, as in the original tale Ximen tossed a woman, a witch in the story, and her three acolytes into the river to drown. Yang’s portrayal of Sun vandalizing a statue linked revolution to Chinese tradition going back millennia. Sun reenacting Ximen Bao’s act of enlightenment placed state reform, or revolution, as a goal Chinese officials had pursued for thousands of years.



Figure 2.8: Yang Rude 羊汝德, Hai Hong 海虹畫 [Illustrator], “國父孫中山先生與國民革命” [Founding father Sun Yat-sen and the national revolution], 聯合報, 12 Nov. 1965, panel 25.

Yang’s comic on Sun’s life also reiterated themes from Chinese culture to bolster Chiang as Sun’s heir. Yang portrayed the Shanghai massacre, the KMT’s 1927 communist purge, as the result of KMT leaders realizing the CPC were engaged in treachery during the Northern Expedition. The cartoon that Yang Zhenyi 楊震夷 drew to accompany it showed a young man in a crisp uniform, likely Chiang, booting a man in a crumpled uniform who represented the CPC.

Chiang's booting of the man has knocked a smiling mask off to reveal a sinister countenance underneath. In the background a crowd looks on with approval in front of a large picture of Sun and the flag of the ROC (fig. 2.9). The positioning of the communist purge before the visage of Sun insinuated not only that he would have approved, but also that he would have sided with the KMT against the CPC. Another panel Yang Zhenyi drew depicted Jiang engaged in an act of filial piety. The period for the image was shortly after the KMT returned from Chongqing to Nanjing at the end of the Second World War. The image showed Chiang, the only identifiable figure, in front of other officials bowing to the statue of Sun erected in the Sun Yat-sen Memorial on Nanjing's Purple Mountain. Yang Rude's accompanying text proclaimed that as "the entire country celebrated victory, President Chiang stood beside other high officials and led them in paying their respects during a memorial ceremony at the Sun Yat-sen Mausoleum."¹⁰³ Yang Rude's description and Yang Zhenyi's drawing reinforced that Chiang treated the founding father of modern China with filial piety, a concept deeply intertwined with traditional Chinese culture.

¹⁰³ 羊汝德，楊震夷畫，“國父孫中山先生與國民革命，”聯合報，12 Nov. 1965, panel 142.



Figure 2.9: Yang Rude 羊汝德, Yang Zhenyi 楊震夷畫 [Illustrator], “國父孫中山先生與國民革命” [Founding father Sun Yat-sen and the national revolution], 聯合報, 12 Nov. 1965, panel 122.

KMT official National Day celebrations reinforced the significance of Chinese tradition and culture even as they honored the revolution that led to the ROC. On the fiftieth anniversary of National Day in 1961, Chiang proclaimed to the nation that “the Xinhai Revolution is a tradition that inherited a five-thousand-year theory on morality inherent to the civilization of the Chinese people 中華民族, founded on the norms of twentieth-century democracy sciences for a modern country.”¹⁰⁴ Editors at the China Daily News reprinted that quote to open their discussion of the Xinhai Revolution.¹⁰⁵ Chiang reiterated these themes in his 1963 National Day address saying the world was facing turbulent times, “especially our Chinese nation 中華民族, in the same ways faced in five-thousand years of historical culture, an era to turn to honor or disgrace, to grow or decline—this too is precisely when our Chinese nation will again be reborn

¹⁰⁴ 中央社, “總統國慶日書勉同胞 加強團結充分準備提早完成軍事反攻,” 聯合報, 10 Oct. 1961.

¹⁰⁵ 社論, “發揚辛亥革命的精神,” 中華日報, 10 Oct. 1961.

in a new era!”¹⁰⁶ The ROC’s fifty-fourth anniversary occurred the same year as Sun’s hundredth birthday, Chiang addressed both Double Ten Day and Sun’s legacy, including his attempts at revolution, but also declared that “after the Xinhai Revolution, the democratic rights in the Chinese nation 中華民族 of five-thousand years commenced.”¹⁰⁷ Chiang’s pronouncements included calls to retake the mainland, touched on the perfidy of communism, and extolled Sun Yat-sen and the revolution. Throughout this period, though, his comments also pointed to a China with traditions that stretched back five-thousand years. The continuity of the nation is a key tenet of nationalism, a continuity CPC leaders acknowledged through their attempts to eradicate Chinese tradition in the PRC, whereas in the KMT the model of China the ROC represented the same Chinese nation and culture that had transitioned to modern governance. Thus, for KMT leaders the ROC represented a new state for a nation of traditions and norms that need not be abandoned. Double Ten Day presented ROC leaders with a moment to highlight not only the importance of toppling the Qing, but also that changing the state did not change the nation.

The Chinese Cultural Renaissance

Mao Zedong’s Cultural Revolution in the PRC provided KMT officials an ideal situation to present the ROC as the true China. The Cultural Revolution did not proceed without comment in ROC media. On 10 Oct. 1966 the *China Daily News* presented a series of articles by reporters on the mainland, that the editors declared introduced by stating that:

China cannot perish, China’s five-thousand-year-old historical culture really cannot be extinguished. The communist bandits’ struggle to expose and criticize Chinese culture is

¹⁰⁶ 中央社, “蔣總統國慶書告軍民 突擊抗暴形成新連同心奮起必滅匪偽,” 聯合報, 10 Oct. 1963; 中央社, “今逢五十二年國慶總統勗勉全國軍民,” 中華日報, 10 Oct. 1963.

¹⁰⁷ 中央社, “反攻復國解放球同胞 重建大陸完成革命,” 聯合報, 10 Oct. 1965; 中央社, “總統國慶昭告全國軍民反攻復國前途絕對有利,” 中華日報, 10 Oct. 1965.

them destroying themselves against the Great Wall. Chinese people's national spirit 民族精神, Chinese people's traditions are a cultural line of defense, forever through the ages they will invariably exist!¹⁰⁸

KMT officials' remonstrations against the CPC and the Cultural Revolution are neither surprising nor unique for the period. How KMT leadership dealt with the chaos roiling the PRC, however, was.

On the one-hundred-and-first anniversary of Sun's birth in 1966, Chiang called for a Chinese Cultural Renaissance. Chiang's call for a Cultural Renaissance purportedly came during his speech dedicating a new building honoring Sun called the Yat-sen Building that contained a new Chinese Cultural Hall. During the speech, Jiang reiterated the theme that "by originating *San Min Chu I* (Three Principles of the People—Nationalism, Democracy, People's Livelihood), he [Sun] made possible the restoration of China's cultural tradition."¹⁰⁹ During the speech editors at *Free China Review* claimed Chiang had stated that "we must think of these buildings as bases for our national reconstruction and as banners under which we shall strive for the renaissance of Chinese Culture."¹¹⁰ The original text, however, was closer to "[we] must think of this as a banner for a base of rejuvenation to rebuild the national culture 民族文化."¹¹¹ The *Free China Review*'s translation of Jiang's speech, written after the fact, was a minor alteration to conform it to the KMT's initiative to identify China and its culture more closely with the ROC than the PRC. Editors at *Free China Review* stated plainly that the Cultural Renaissance "is the Republic

¹⁰⁸ 本報記者, "中國歷史文化的空前浩劫," 中華日報, 10 Oct. 1966.

¹⁰⁹ "President Chiang Kai-shek and the Opening of the Chinese Cultural Hall of Chung-shan Building on the 101st Anniversary of Dr. Sun Yat-sen's Birthday," *Free China Review*, Dec. 1966, 87, original emphasis; 中央社, "總統發表紀念文," 聯合報, 12 Nov. 1966; 中央社, "中山樓中華文化堂落成 將總統發表紀念專文," 中華日報, 12 Nov. 1966.

¹¹⁰ "President Chiang Kai-shek and the Opening of the Chinese Cultural Hall of Chung-shan Building on the 101st Anniversary of Dr. Sun Yat-sen's Birthday," *Free China Review*, Dec. 1966, 89.

¹¹¹ 中央社, "總統發表紀念文," 聯合報, 12 Nov. 1966; 中央社, "中山樓中華文化堂落成 將總統發表紀念專文," 中華日報, 12 Nov. 1966.

of China's answer to the Chinese Communists and their efforts to destroy China's traditional culture in the current 'cultural revolution.'"¹¹² Whether the Cultural Renaissance originated from Chiang's speech or was a subsequent decision is relatively insignificant. What was significant about KMT officials' declaration of a Cultural Renaissance, however, was that they were no longer constrained in advocating their state's legitimacy by its adherence to tradition.

The Cultural Renaissance did not lead to a significant change in the nature of KMT propaganda. On 13 November, the day after Chiang's speech, ROC media asserted he had told those gathered there to remember Sun and declared a "Chinese Cultural Renaissance 中華文化復興 holiday, expressing praise, to encourage mainland comrades to rise up and oppose the bandit Mao's tyrannical rule."¹¹³ Editors at *China Daily News* ran a banner on page two declaring a selection of articles were part of a "Chinese Cultural Revolution activities special publication."¹¹⁴ A Central News Agency article in that section claimed Chiang had expounded on the Cultural Renaissance saying that the:

Founding Father elucidated the Three Principles of the People to carry on our Chinese nation's 我中華民族 five-thousand-year glorious Confucian orthodoxy and encourage compatriots of the whole country to act in carrying on Chinese culture's Confucian orthodoxy, be resolute in destroying the communist bandits, have confidence in the recovery of mainland territory.¹¹⁵

That was not to say, however, that the Cultural Renaissance meant simply the glorification of past accomplishments. Editors at *China Daily News* highlighted that "the present practice of Cultural Renaissance activities is not only to restore ancient ways, it also even more

¹¹² "The Month in Free China," *Free China Review*, Dec. 1966, 4.

¹¹³ 本報訊, "勗勉全國同胞發揚中華道統文化," 聯合報, 13 Nov. 1966.

¹¹⁴ "中華文化復興運動特刊," 中華日報, 13 Nov. 1966.

¹¹⁵ 中央社, "總統闡釋中華文化道統," 中華日報, 13 Nov. 1966.

wants active acceleration of innovation.”¹¹⁶ They pointed to the European Renaissance as evidence this new policy would spur inventiveness rather than stagnation. Even as the KMT presented themselves as the bastion of traditional Chinese culture, they still sought to maintain the ROC as a modern state. On the second anniversary of the Cultural Renaissance, and Sun’s one-hundred-and-second birthday, Chiang again declared that “Our Chinese nation was able to expand and persist, experience five-thousand years and not fall, simply due to the benevolent roots of our national culture.”¹¹⁷ Thus for Chiang and KMT officials the Cultural Renaissance was an opportunity to demonstrate that the ROC represented Chinese culture and tradition. Their depictions were a direct contrast with the CPC’s assault on traditional Chinese culture in the Cultural Revolution. Editors at *China Daily News* highlighted this renaissance would spur innovation and experimentation in the ROC, but within the parameters of China’s imagined past.

KMT officials and media had already established that Sun, the Three Principles of the People, and even the Xinhai Revolution reflected traditional Chinese culture. While the Cultural Renaissance resulted in a change of emphasis, such as extolling Confucian orthodoxy, the KMT narrative that China was a land with millennia long culture and traditions was not new. The Cultural Revolution in the PRC, however, allowed KMT leaders to definitively associate their state with a China that had existed from time immemorial. The KMT lacked access to the vast majority of Chinese territory, but by claiming the real China was comprised of ancient cultures and traditions they sought to supersede their lack of territorial control with control of something far more significant: the soul of the nation.

Outside Traditional China

¹¹⁶ 社論, “一個必須澄清的觀念,” 中華日報, 23 Nov. 1966.

¹¹⁷ 中央社, “文化復興運動推行週年 總統呼籲同胞篤實踐履,” 聯合報, 12 Nov. 1967.

During the sixties, the ROC continued to represent China in the UN. The U.S. and ROC strategy to allow debates on Chinese representation in the world body, albeit as an important question that required a two-thirds majority to pass, was a setback for KMT officials. The ROC's place in the UN, however, was not directly threatened. Despite the KMT's continued position in the world body the ROC did face challenges to its ability to represent China. One significant challenge was French recognition of the PRC in 1964. France was the first major, non-communist, state to switch recognition from Taipei to Beijing. The PRC remained a challenge to ROC legitimacy, but KMT leaders presented the CPC as controlling the mainland rather than representing it, a position aided by the KMT model of China as a nation of traditions and culture.

France's recognition of the PRC in late January of 1964 posed a genuine challenge to the ROC. While the United Kingdom was the first European power to attempt establishing formal relations with the PRC in 1950, CPC officials had refused to exchange ambassadors and only agreed to establish *chargé d'affaires* offices in 1954. Consequently, Paris and Beijing's announcement of diplomatic relations on 28 January 1964 was a setback for the KMT, a setback the CPC was happy to elaborate on.¹¹⁸ U.S. President Lyndon B. Johnson urged Chiang not to sever ties with France right away, but within two weeks the ROC broke off relations.¹¹⁹ By breaking off relations with France the KMT not only lost a European ally, but also they could potentially lose French support in the UN. France was a permanent member of the Security

¹¹⁸ 新華社, “中國和法國決定建立外交關係 兩國政府商定在三月個月內任命大使,” 人民日報, 28 Jan. 1964; 社論, “祝賀中法建交,” 人民日報, 29 Jan. 1964.

¹¹⁹ “Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Republic of China,” Washington, 16 Jan. 1964, in *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, Vol. XXX, China*, ed. Harriet Dashiell Schwar, (Washington: U.S. GPO, 1998), doc. 3; Don Cook, “Chiang Breaks With France, Takes De Gaulle Off Hook,” *Boston Globe*, 11 Feb. 1964.

Council and thus if Paris backed the PRC it could pose a fundamental threat to the ROC's place in the organization.

KMT officials and media pursued a dual strategy to mitigate France's recognition of the PRC. Firstly, they highlighted the number of states that recognized the ROC versus the PRC. Secondly, they presented the change in relations as the decision of one man, French President Charles de Gaulle, than one made by the people of France. Amy Chien argued in *Free China Review* that "Despite its occupation of the mainland for 14 years, Peiping [Beijing] has done badly in making friends. The diplomatic trend has not been encouraging except for the French aberration."¹²⁰ Chien proceeded to detail how most states in Latin America, Africa, and Asia supported the ROC, with Europe offering the least support in part because of Soviet satellites in Eastern Europe. Chien stressed the success of ROC diplomacy by describing the state's support among African states, particularly in their votes on Chinese representation in the UN. Editors for *Free China Review* highlighted that "most of the French-speaking African countries assured the republic of China they want no part of Communism, that they have no intention of recognizing Peiping on the grounds of Gaullist realism."¹²¹ *Free China Review* editors made it clear De Gaulle was to blame for recognizing the PRC. They wrote of "De Gaulle's highly personalized recognition" and called PRC recognition "the expression of De Gaulle's megalomania."¹²² Chien also positioned French recognition of the PRC as "De Gaulle's recognition of the Peiping [Beijing] regime."¹²³ An article in *New Life Daily News* also pointed out "as the Chinese announcement put it, it is our belief that the break will not adversely affect the traditional

¹²⁰ Amy Chien, "Story of a Diplomatic Comeback," *Free China Review*, Mar. 1964, 20.

¹²¹ "The Month in Free China," *Free China Review*, Mar. 1964, 3.

¹²² "The Month in Free China," *Free China Review*, Mar. 1964, 3.

¹²³ Amy Chien, "Story of a Diplomatic Comeback," *Free China Review*, Mar. 1964, 20.

friendship of the two countries.”¹²⁴ Thus while French recognition of the PRC was a setback for the ROC, KMT officials and media were able to cast it as less a decision of France than of De Gaulle to mitigate the damage to their international legitimacy. They also reiterated international support for the ROC as the legitimate government of China. KMT supporters like Chien or *Free China Review* editors pointed to the ROC’s continued diplomatic ties, particularly as Taipei retained its place in the UN throughout this period to further lessen the blow to ROC prestige cause by French recognition of the PRC.

The existence of the PRC continued to challenge the KMT’s legitimacy. Thus, KMT officials pursued several avenues to discredit the state run by the CPC. One theme they pursued was to argue the collapse of the CPC was imminent. Editors at *United Daily News* pointed out for readers that Chiang told attendees at the tenth annual Overseas Chinese Holiday held in Taipei in 1962 that “the day of the communist bandits’ destruction is not far off.”¹²⁵ In Chiang’s address for the ROC’s fifty-second anniversary in 1963 he maintained that “what’s more, Mao’s party on the mainland, an aspect of their principle deep set troubles is the contradiction that ‘without, the party opposes communism, within, the party opposes Mao’!”¹²⁶ Editors of the *Free China Review* discussed Chiang’s 1963 Double Ten Day speech and included claims he made such as “‘We firmly believe that both subjective and objective conditions for our return to the mainland are ripening so fast we do not have to wait [three to five years] before we can bury Mao’s regime.’”¹²⁷ On National Day 1965 He Yuwen 何雨文, an author, wrote a page-length piece on purported uprisings in the PRC that included a map to show how tenuous CPC control

¹²⁴ “Chinese Press Opinion,” *Free China Review*, Mar. 1964, 64.

¹²⁵ 本報訊, “共匪沒忘為期不遠 僑胞即將苦盡甘來,” 聯合報, 21 Oct. 1962.

¹²⁶ 中央社, “蔣總統國慶書告軍民 突擊抗暴形成新連同心奮起必滅匪偽,” 聯合報, 10 Oct. 1963.

¹²⁷ “The Month in Free China,” *Free China Review*, Nov. 1963, 3; 中央社, “蔣總統國慶書告軍民 突擊抗暴形成新連同心奮起必滅匪偽,” 聯合報, 10 Oct. 1963.

of the mainland was (fig. 2.10). In He's map, each purported uprising was marked with small explosions, providing readers a visual demonstration of the people's clashes with CPC cadres. The position of the explosions had the added effect of portraying the CPC becoming more isolated as unrest encroached from the south and west. Thus, official pronouncements from KMT leaders like Chiang or articles and images from pundits like He represented the CPC just managing a tenuous grasp on the mainland. ROC media depicted CPC control of the mainland as illusory in order to bolster the KMT's claims to legitimacy. The people on the mainland did not accept CPC rule, therefore demonstrating that the KMT was the rightful party to speak for China.



Figure 2.20: He Yuwen 何雨文, “中國大陸遍地烽火圖” [Beacon fires everywhere on mainland China], 中華日報, 10 Oct. 1965.

The Cultural Revolution provided the KMT a key argument for the CPC's illegitimacy. KMT officials and ROC media had represented China as a nation of culture and traditions before 1966. When Mao called for a Cultural Revolution and Jiang responded with a Cultural Renaissance, ROC media used it to demonstrate the illegitimacy of the PRC. Editors at *United News Daily* argued that Mao Zedong Thought was so antithetical to Chinese culture that the CPC

had to launch the Cultural Revolution to destroy traditional culture.¹²⁸ *Free China Review* editors cited a speech Chiang made for Youth Day to claim “all of Mao’s wickedness, bribes, and suppressions have not been able to win the mainland away from faith in the Three Principles of the People of Dr. Sun Yat-sen and in the unceasing inspiration of Confucianism.”¹²⁹ He Yuwen wrote on Double Ten Day of 1967 that “the fundamental problem [for the CPC] is mainland ideas to oppose Mao, oppose Party, are due to the fundamental conflict between Chinese traditional culture and communism, up to so-called ‘Mao Zedong Thought.’”¹³⁰ Essentially, KMT officials and Media had established that China was a nation of culture and traditions. The CPC’s Cultural Revolution was consequently antithetical to the nation itself and, therefore, not Chinese. The people, in the KMT’s narrative, resisted communism as it was incommensurate with China’s supposed millennia-long history.

Conclusion

The 1960’s marked a period of growth and change in the UN. Decolonization significantly altered the political calculus in the organization as its membership swelled. During this period of flux, the ROC maintained its role as China in the world body, but it got harder as France showed. Even as ROC and U.S. officials allowed the question of Chinese representation to be debated, they maneuvered to make it an important question per UN parliamentary rules. The world body’s passage of Resolution 1668 set the precedent that U.S. and ROC delegates used to ensure the China in the UN was the one under KMT control. The CPC continued to build on their model of China as revolutionary as the PRC’s location in the international order remained stagnant. With the ROC still representing China in the UN and the divide between

¹²⁸ 本報記者, “中國歷史文化的空前浩劫,” 聯合報, 10 Oct. 1966.

¹²⁹ “The Month in Free China,” *Free China Review*, May 1967, 3.

¹³⁰ 何雨文, “匪偽政權還能爭亂幾時?” 中華日報, 10 Oct. 1967.

CPSU and CPC on the tenets of communism, there were few external checks when Mao launched the Cultural Revolution. Consequently, the CPC model of China as a revolutionary state reached its apogee as the nation was plunged into chaos. The KMT's state continued to represent China in the UN. The world body's open questioning of Chinese representation, however, introduced instability into the ROC's international legitimacy. KMT officials and media mitigated this assault by deepening their claims to represent a Chinese nation that had existed, and continued to exist, from time immemorial. Chiang countered Mao's Cultural Revolution with a Cultural Renaissance that provided KMT leaders the ideal platform to identify their China as one of continuity. The KMT still controlled little of China's traditional territory, but now they were able to lay claim to China's spirit.

Chapter 3:

The Week that Broke Jade, 1970-1971

On 21 October 1971 Daniel R. McColgan, a New Yorker who worked in public relations, illegally entered the United Nations and attempted to address the General Assembly. A well-dressed man with a briefcase, McColgan was able to get through UN security and onto the rostrum before he was intercepted and arrested. McColgan swore he was acting alone and did not have ties to any organization; he only wanted to express support for Beijing in the ongoing debate over whether the People's Republic of China (PRC) or Republic of China (ROC) could represent China in the UN.¹ McColgan failed to share his thoughts on the China question with the General Assembly, but UN delegates debated Chinese representation at length from 18 to 25 October. In the end, the General Assembly passed UN General Resolution 2758 (XXVI) which determined "to restore all rights to the People's Republic of China and to recognize the representatives of its Government as the only legitimate representatives of China to the United Nations, and to expel forthwith the representatives of Chiang Kai-shek from the place which they unlawfully occupy at the United Nations and all the organizations related to it."² McColgan's efforts, unsurprisingly, were gratuitous as the debate over which state had the authority to represent China in the UN came to a close.

Resolution 2758 was a seismic shift in the PRC and ROC's competition to represent China. The UN's 1971 transfer of Chinese representation from the ROC to the PRC realigned the

¹ Stravapoulos, United Nations General Assembly (UN GA), Twenty-Sixth Session, Meeting 1973, 21 Oct. 1971, in *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-Sixth Session: Plenary Meetings, Verbatim Records of Meetings: 21 Sept.-22 Dec. 1971*, Vol. 2, (New York: United Nations, 1974), 22. Don Shannon, "Intruder Throws U.N. Session Into Confusion," *Los Angeles Times*, 22 Oct. 1971. *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-Sixth Session: Plenary Meetings, Verbatim Records of Meetings: 21 Sept.-22 Dec. 1971*, Vol. 2, hereafter referred to as *Plenary Meetings-2*.

² UN GA, "Restoration of the lawful rights of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations," Resolution 2758 (XXVI).

KMT and CPC's competition for international legitimacy. PRC representatives finally entered the world body after twenty-two years of exclusion. ROC representatives, on the other hand, were forced to defend their right to represent China with neither the authority of UN membership nor China's traditional territory. KMT officials had argued their UN membership demonstrated international support for their claims to sovereignty over China, a nation of ancient tradition and culture. CPC officials had defined China as a revolutionary nation that had broken from the past to become "modern," in part, to counter the PRC's exclusion from the world body. The UN's passage of Resolution 2758 fundamentally altered where the ROC and PRC stood on the international stage, consequently KMT and CPC officials had to realign their rhetoric and policies to reflect their states' new international positions. KMT officials metamorphized from stalwart defenders of the UN into some of its harshest critics, a reversal reflected in CPC officials' bolstering the organization that they had previously portrayed as subservient to U.S. imperialists and Soviet revisionists. Within these rhetorical turns, the KMT remained committed to a national imaginary that depicted China as a nation of culture and traditions versus a paragon of revolution for the CPC. With the ROC's and PRC's altered international roles, however, the two parties' national imaginaries began to change as well.

Resolution 2758 would also alter the international system. The UN admission of the world's most populous state bolstered the organization's legitimacy and added a self-described "Third World" country with veto power to the Security Council. The UN's decision that the PRC represented China, a new situation despite the rhetoric of restoring its rights, also elevated the organization's role as an arbiter in the internal affairs of states. The KMT and CPC had fought a civil war that the CPC had won in 1949. While the CPC was in control of China domestically, the KMT was able to represent it internationally because of its place in the UN. Resolution 2758

aligned the domestic and international legitimacy of the PRC, but that realignment represented a verdict, albeit a delayed one, by the UN that the CPC had won the Chinese Civil War. Pro-PRC advocates contended this was only acknowledging the reality of which state was sovereign over the Chinese nation. The UN's 1971 ruling, as Pro-ROC advocates pointed out, however resulted in the unprecedented decision by the organization to remove a member state and replace it with another one. This would be neither the first nor last time the UN determined the legitimacy of a state, but the organization demonstrated a new commitment to check superpowers—primarily the United States—and protect the self-determination of nations through admitting Beijing. The UN also began to act more forcefully as a peacekeeper with the removal of the divisive “China question.”

McColgan's support for the PRC made him an outlier among his fellow Americans, many of whom opposed “Red” China entering the UN. His opinion that the PRC should represent China in the UN was, however, in line with many states in the world body. An analysis of how the CPC and the KMT portrayed China and the world body in the lead up to, the UN's passing of, and then the aftermath of Resolution 2758 demonstrates how unexpected and metamorphic the transfer of UN membership was for each state. While both parties used UN legitimacy to bolster their claims to represent China, their differing interpretations of what China was resulted in very different depictions of both China and the world body. For the CPC, revolutionary China would liberate the UN from imperial powers. For the KMT, China as a land of tradition and culture would uphold the UN Charter and maintain world peace.

Lead up to Resolution 2758

Before the UN passed Resolution 2758, both KMT and CPC representatives used their positions relative to the UN to bolster their domestic and international legitimacy. ROC officials

continued to defend their state as the legitimate representatives of China. They maintained that the PRC was not a peace-loving state and ROC control of the UN's "China seat" was necessary to defend the organization and its principles. KMT propaganda maintained that the ROC was the only government representing the Chinese people, whether they were on the Mainland, Taiwan, or overseas, by virtue of its adherence to Chinese traditions and culture.

CPC representatives continued to depict the UN as corrupted by imperialism to domestic and foreign audiences. They argued that U.S. and Soviet imperialism threatened the world. In CPC rhetoric, imperial powers used the UN as a tool in their competition for world hegemony. PRC officials maintained that adherence to the international system only benefited the superpowers, thus Beijing's revolutionary spirit was a necessary corrective to the current international system. CPC rhetoric portrayed the ROC in the UN as a tool of the United States, not the Chinese people.

ROC Depictions of the UN

ROC officials and supporters argued both at home and abroad that any recognition of the CPC would threaten world peace. Pro-ROC rhetoric represented the CPC as dedicated to subversion and violence, thus PRC representatives would potentially seek to destabilize any and all established states and undermine any organization, no matter their legitimacy. KMT officials maintained that a CPC presence in the world body would not only hinder the organizations' ability to maintain peace, it could lead the UN to dissolve much as its predecessor the League of Nations had. They employed this narrative to defend the ROC's diplomatic ties as more states became interested in dealing with the PRC. In 1969, Taipei had formal diplomatic relations with seventy-one states to the forty-eight that recognized Beijing. The ROC's and PRC's competition for diplomatic recognition with other countries shifted little by 1971, as sixty-eight states

continued to recognize Taipei while fifty-three recognized Beijing.³ Decolonization and the non-aligned movement resulted in a number of states recognizing the PRC, in addition to states in the Soviet sphere, but most states still maintained diplomatic ties with the ROC.

Canada's recognition of Beijing late in 1970 was a significant diplomatic setback for Taipei. In response to Canada's recognition of the PRC in October 1970, *United Daily News*, a pro-KMT paper published in Taipei, proclaimed that what Canadian Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau "wanted from Peiping [Beijing] is trade and friendly relations. What Mao Tse-tung expects from the tie with Canada is the opportunity to communize the North American continent."⁴ Taipei's English-language *China News* went further to argue, "the United States is torn by divisions and schisms, it is ripe for the infiltration and subversion which Mao has promised" that were now possible with PRC representatives in Canada.⁵ H.P. Tseng, an international affairs analyst in Taiwan, claimed the "West's" milquetoast attitude toward communism had developed from people's belief that "negotiation has replaced confrontation and that struggle is disappearing from the earth."⁶ He went on to state "Because they have gone to sleep and lost touch with reality, many of the peoples of the free world have fallen into error" as "World War III actually got under way some time ago" and "Communists aggress totally, employing political, diplomatic, cultural, and social means."⁷ ROC advocates were using the PRC's self-proclaimed status as a revolutionary state against it. Tseng argued that if states established diplomatic ties with Beijing, CPC officials would undermine those states and the

³ Michael Y.M. Kau, "Beijing's Campaign for Reunification," in *Taiwan in a Time of Transition*, ed. Harvey Feldman, Michael Y.M. Kau, and Ipyong J. Kim, 175-200 (New York: Paragon House, 1988), 188.

⁴ "From the editorial page," *Free China Review*, Nov. 1970, 56.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 57.

⁶ H.P. Tseng, "Waging the Good Fight," *Free China Review*, Jan. 1971, 20-21.

⁷ *Ibid.*

international order. While the editorials were primarily aimed at domestic audiences they were also reprinted in the ROC's primary English-language mouthpiece the *Free China Review*, where Tseng published his article, demonstrating ROC officials were looking to reach an international audience also. In these depictions, Canada and other states that recognized Beijing had fallen prey to communist machinations that would undermine not only their national sovereignty but also weaken the ongoing international conflict with communism.

While covert threats were dangerous, KMT officials also argued that Mao Zedong, and thus the CPC, celebrated open conflict. In a 12 November 1970 address to the General Assembly on Chinese representation in the UN, ROC Foreign Minister Wei Tao-ming 魏道明 stated "Mao Tse-tung revels in war, believing not only that it is inevitable, but desirable" and thus the CPC's state was unfit for membership in an organization dedicated to peace.⁸ The ROC ambassador to the United States, James C.H. Shen 沈劍虹, told the National Press Club that, regardless of the CPC's proclaimed intentions, "We know from their own boasts that their aim is the subjugation of the world."⁹ Whether overt or covert, ROC officials like Wei and Shen depicted the CPC as inherently violent which precluded their ability to participate in the UN. The CPC's dedication to external aggression was certainly debatable, and somewhat ironic as the United States was at war in Vietnam, though the Cultural Revolution continued to roil people's lives in the PRC. KMT rhetoric that the PRC was not a peace-loving state, however, had been a dedicated theme since the UN labeled the PRC an aggressor during the Korean War and played into popular perceptions of communism in the United States, the ROC's primary benefactor. Wei and Shen's

⁸ "Foreign Minister Wei Tao-Ming's address at the U.N. General Assembly on the so-called question of Chinese representation," *Free China Review*, Dec. 1970, 77.

⁹ "Address by James C.H. Shen, Ambassador to the United States, at the National Press Club in Washington," *Free China Review*, July 1971, 73.

images of the CPC also implied the PRC was a rogue state, unlike the ROC that adhered to international norms. ROC supporters argued that failure to recognize PRC aggression would have dire consequences for the world body.

Leaders in Taipei claimed that allowing an aggressive state like the PRC into the world body would result in the UN's demise. In a 1970 *New York Times* commemorative supplement celebrating the UN's twenty-fifth anniversary, as UN delegates debated Chinese representation, ROC President Chiang Kai-shek urged readers to "remember that durable peace can be built, not on the shifting sands of opportunism, but only on the rock of moral strength."¹⁰ Chiang referred to two biblical passages, Matthew 3:24-26 and Luke 6:47-49, to invoke the parable of the Wise and Foolish Builders. He juxtaposed states that had recognized the PRC with the foolish builder who built his house on sand to have it washed away, while those who supported the ROC were like the wise builder whose house was built on rock and able to withstand the storm. Written in a piece to commemorate the UN it also insinuated that the world body would suffer a similar fate to the parable's foolish builders. The passage further served to highlight Chiang's Christianity, which had helped him secure American support since his conversion after marrying Soong May-ling 宋美齡 in 1927. Chiang's allusion to a biblical story simultaneously challenged those who recognized Beijing and demonstrated a commonality with the predominantly Christian states of Western Europe and the Americas.

Chiang was certainly not the only ROC official to claim that admitting the PRC into the UN would harm the world body. On 21 October 1970 ROC Premier and Vice President C.K. Yen 嚴家淦 told the UN General Assembly that ROC representatives understood members'

¹⁰ Chiang Wan-li, "Rock of moral strength," *Free China Review*, Nov. 1970, 32.

desire to strengthen the UN by increasing membership. But, he argued, “to admit in the name of universality, a regime that glorifies war and violence, that has made subversion of established governments its principle goal in foreign policy, it is to negate the basic purposes of the Charter, thus undercutting the very foundation of the United Nations. Far from strengthening the United Nations, this is a sure way to destroy it.”¹¹ During the 1970 debate, editors at the English-language *China News* claimed, “Nations which seek to relax tensions have not stopped to consider the mischief the Chinese Communists could work in the U.N. Paralysis of the Security Council would be total,” and therefore the UN would be unable to carry out its primary mission to ensure world peace.¹² Two days after the vote *China News* editors avowed the ROC could survive without the UN, but that was “not the point in defending our seat. We are fighting the Communists and trying to save the United Nations itself.”¹³ KMT officials and ROC media created a narrative that the CPC was a subversive group that glorified violence, and if CPC officials were to represent China in the world body the organization would no longer function as a peacekeeper.

On 12 November 1970 the Committee of One Million took out a nearly full-page advertisement in the *New York Times* to argue against admitting the PRC to the UN (fig. 3.1). The Committee was a pro-KMT lobby group formed in the United States in 1953 by conservative members of the U.S. Congress, U.S. state governors, retired military officers, and diplomats among other influential American citizens.¹⁴ The Committee’s primary objective was

¹¹ “Vice President C.K. Yen’s speech at the 25th anniversary commemorative session of the General Assembly of the United Nations,” *Free China Review*, Nov. 1970, 79.

¹² “From the editorial pages,” *Free China Review*, Dec. 1970, 55.

¹³ Wang Chien-nung, “Matter of conscience,” *Free China Review*, Dec. 1970, 17.

¹⁴ For more information on the Committee of One Million see: Stanley Bachrack, *The Committee of One Million: “China Lobby” Politics, 1953-1971* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1976).

to keep the United States from recognizing the PRC which included blocking Beijing from entering the UN. Above a picture of Mao Zedong, the Committee asked, “Recognize him?” and answered, “You bet your life! That’s why the U.N. shouldn’t!” The advertisement also added a rifle to the traditional communist symbol of a hammer and sickle, insinuating the violent nature of Chinese communism. The Committee’s advertisement then used the PRC’s revolutionary foreign policy to claim that governments that recognized Beijing had come to regret it. Except for a few examples, such as Beijing’s detention of British officials in 1950 and military skirmishes with India in 1959 and 1962, the advertisement provided few specifics and instead relied on CPC officials’ statements to argue that Beijing was attempting to subvert the governments of states that had recognized the PRC. These assertions were in line with claims by ROC officials and their supporters that recognizing the PRC allowed communists to infiltrate governments with the only evidence the rhetoric PRC officials themselves used. The advertisement also employed the title’s question and answer format to argue “Who says down with peace and up with war: Mao Tse-tung. Who says ‘political power grows out of the barrel of a gun’? Mao Tse-tung. Who promises to disrupt if not destroy the United Nations if it is ever admitted? Red China.”¹⁵ Thus ROC supporters argued that if the PRC were to enter the UN it would be the end of the world body. This would come about because Mao Zedong and his government were dedicated to violence. Consequently, if Beijing entered the UN, it would corrupt the world body and subvert its principle goal of maintaining global peace. Essentially, the Committee used the PRC’s self-proclaimed revolutionary nature to argue it threatened the international system.

¹⁵ Committee of One Million, “Recognize him?” *New York Times*, 12 Nov. 1970.



Figure 3.3: Committee of One Million, “Recognize him?” *New York Times*, 12 Nov. 1970.

ROC supporters also contended that the PRC did not represent the Chinese people. The Committee argued that “the more than 700 million Chinese still on the China mainland survive today in slavery. *Mao’s advocates in the U.N. insist that the best way to help a slave is to dignify a tyrant.* They ask that YOU who are free show your appreciation of those who are NOT by voting FOR the slave-master.”¹⁶ A 14 November 1970 editorial in *Central Daily News*, the KMT’s primary mouthpiece, reinforced the Committee’s argument stating “recognition of the Peiping regime as the representatives of the Chinese people would amount to recognizing the hijacker as the representative of the hijacked passengers.”¹⁷ Shen’s address to the United Nations also employed this rhetoric, referring to the “submerged masses of mainland China.”¹⁸ By

¹⁶ Committee of One Million, "Recognize him?" *New York Times*, 12 Nov. 1970. Original Emphasis.

¹⁷ "From the editorial page," *Free China Review*, Dec. 1970, 54.

¹⁸ “Address by James C.H. Shen, Ambassador to the United States, at the National Press Club in Washington,” *Free China Review*, July 1971, 74.

representing Chinese on the mainland as slaves or hijacked victims, not citizens, KMT officials, supporters, and editors sought to portray the PRC as an illegitimate state that destroyed humanity. Thus, allowing PRC representatives into the UN would only serve the interests of the CPC, not the people who lived under their rule.

KMT officials maintained that the ROC was the only state able to represent the Chinese people. In his speech to the UN General Assembly, ROC Vice President Yen rejected the Pro-PRC argument that Beijing's exclusion left over 700 million people without UN representation. Yen stated that claim ignored "the reality of the regime's existence. The fact is that the Chinese Communist regime... can represent only a tiny fraction of the Chinese people, roughly about two percent," and he cited the ongoing Cultural Revolution on the mainland meant even that percentage was too high.¹⁹ Yen's statement demonstrated ROC officials' logic that the CPC only represented itself and not the Chinese people. Foreign Minister Wei also contended that the ROC was the only representative government of China "and as such, it commands the allegiance of all Chinese people, including those on the mainland and elsewhere."²⁰ ROC Permanent Representative to the UN Liu Chieh 劉鍇 also told a U.S. Medical Aid Association that "in the minds of Chinese people, only the Republic of China's government can truly present their aspirations to the world and represent them in international organizations because it is the legal government."²¹ An ROC statement sent to the UN in August 1971 included Liu's argument that

¹⁹ UN GA, "1875th Plenary Meeting, Commemorative Session, 14 to 24 October 1970," *General Assembly Official Records*, A/PV.1875, 20 Oct. 1970, p. 15; "Vice President C.K. Yen's speech at the 25th anniversary commemorative session of the General Assembly of the United Nations," *Free China Review*, Nov. 1970, 80.

²⁰ "Foreign Minister Wei Tao-Ming's address at the U.N. General Assembly on the so-called question of Chinese representation," *Free China Review*, Dec. 1970, 79.

²¹ "劉鍇在紐約對演講斥兩個中國謬說," 中央日報, 11 Dec. 1970.

Taipei was China's only legal government as its key component.²² ROC officials' undermining the PRC's ability to represent the Chinese people was an integral aspect their claim to represent China, because PRC supporters claimed Beijing's exclusion from the UN left nearly a quarter of the world's population without representation. KMT advocates rebutted that argument by claiming, with scant evidence if any, that the CPC only represented themselves. The KMT represented the genuine Chinese nation through the ROC, which was the bastion of Chinese culture and tradition and therefore the legitimate representative of Chinese on the mainland, Taiwan, or elsewhere in the world.

Before the UN passed Resolution 2758, ROC advocates defended Taipei's place in the UN by challenging the PRC. On 24 September 1971 Yen summed up pro-ROC discourse in an address to the Legislative Yuan, which was reprinted in the KMT's English-language periodical the *Free China Review*. Yen emphasized Beijing's violence by stating "there is no doubt and no need to seek further supporting evidence that the Chinese Communists are determined to accomplish their goal of 'world revolution' through violence," though they now minimized that fact. He emphasized that the ROC was defending its position in the UN "not only to protect the lawful rights of the Republic of China and the dignity of the United Nations Charter, but also to prevent collapse of the United Nations itself." Then he drew on a report the Legislative Yuan had prepared in June 1971 to argue that the PRC did not represent the Chinese under its suzerainty, as "the Chinese Communists have not really controlled the mainland in any sense during the last 20 years and the people have continuously revolted against the regime's tyranny."²³ Thus Yan presented Beijing as inherently violent, defended ROC participation in the UN as necessary for

²² "Statement of the Republic of China on the so-called Representation of China in the United Nations," *Free China Review*, Aug. 1971, 72.

²³ "Premier Yen Chia-kan's administrative report to the Legislative Yuan," *Free China Review*, Oct. 1971, 69-70.

the world body's survival, and claimed the CPC did not represent the people under its control.

The dominant narrative in ROC supporters' arguments was that Taipei was a responsible actor in the international system and thus the only government capable of representing China on the international stage. Yen and other ROC officials were not the only ones attempting to portray the UN and its relationship with China, though, as CPC officials had a competing vision of the UN and China's place in it.

PRC Depictions of UN

PRC officials continued to challenge UN legitimacy in the lead up to Resolution 2758. The CPC portrayed the UN's illegitimacy not as inherent to the organization, but as the result of its domination by imperial powers. CPC rhetoric maintained that the UN and its goals were worthwhile, but the PRC's exclusion from the organization had allowed U.S. imperialism and Soviet social imperialism to undermine both the organization and its mission. PRC media provided relatively scant coverage of the UN before Resolution 2758's passage; China's representation in the world body seemed unlikely to change and the Cultural Revolution had turned the nation inward. Some PRC officials remained attentive to international events and the UN, though, and maintained the narrative that imperialism was harming the world body. CPC rhetoric focused on the United States as the primary imperialist power, a theme that dated back to the Korean War and effectively mirrored ROC and U.S. tropes of PRC aggression. By this period, the PRC and Soviet Union's disagreements had culminated in the Sino-Soviet Split, which had escalated to border skirmishes along the two states' borders. Consequently, CPC propaganda represented U.S. imperialism as only marginally more repugnant than the Soviet Union's social imperialism. PRC advocates critiqued the UN and defended the PRC's legitimacy

outside of the international system from the perspective of a world controlled by imperialist powers.

CPC officials challenged the UN's international legitimacy by castigating the imperialism they claimed dominated international relations. On 20 May 1970 Mao Zedong called on the "People of the world, unite and defeat the U.S. aggressors and all their running dogs!"²⁴ Mao avowed "U.S. imperialism, which looks like a huge monster, is in essence a paper tiger, now in the throes of its death bed struggle."²⁵ Mao represented global popular resistance to the ongoing U.S. war in Indochina, as well as the internal unrest of the U.S. civil rights movement, as evidence that people across the world, including Americans, were turning against Washington. An article in the *Peking Review*, the PRC's primary English-language mouthpiece, criticized Portuguese troops for entering Guinea in an effort to remove Sékou Touré, the leader of Guinea's Chinese-communist style government, who was supporting a guerilla movement in Portuguese Guinea. The article claimed that Portugal would not have acted without U.S. support and that "these disgusting performances by U.S. imperialists are by no means accidental. A rough run-down of historical facts enables one to see the collusion between the United States, a new colonialist villain, and Portugal, an old imperialist gangster."²⁶ Another *Peking Review* article, responded to Nixon's 25 February 1971 foreign policy radio address to the U.S. Congress, where over twenty-three minutes he focused on the war in Vietnam and other international issues.²⁷ Described as "long winded and enormously tedious," Nixon's speech "clearly revealed U.S.

²⁴ Mao Zedong, "People of the World, Unite and Defeat the U.S. Aggressors and all Their Running Dogs," *Peking Review* Special Issue, 23 May 1970, 9.

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ "U.S. Imperialism—Backer and Arch Criminal Behind Armed Aggression Against Guinea," *Peking Review*, 4 Dec. 1970, 11, 24.

²⁷ "February 25, 1971: Radio Address About Second Annual Foreign Policy Address to the Congress," in Presidential Speeches, Richard M. Nixon, accessed 7 July 2020, <https://millercenter.org/the-presidency/presidential-speeches/february-25-1971-radio-address-about-second-annual-foreign>, UVA Miller Center.

imperialism's stubborn persistence in aggression and its ambitions for world hegemony"

according to the article.²⁸ The article dismissed Nixon's peace plans as nothing more than power politics. CPC rhetoric portrayed the United States as the dominant imperial power, followed closely by the Soviet Union, and imperialism had perverted the international system. In this narrative, the people were resisting imperialists machinations, but imperialism was entrenched in the international system, of which the UN was the most significant and visible organization.

PRC media argued that superpower hegemony threatened UN authority in the international arena. Of particular interest for PRC papers was the rise of anti-U.S. sentiments among UN members. Many state delegations denounced U.S. foreign policy during the UN's twenty-fifth commemorative celebrations, which PRC media reprinted for domestic and international audiences.²⁹ Even as editors celebrated resistance to the superpowers on the floor of the UN, they continued to portray the world body as in thrall to imperialism. A *People's Daily* editorial, reprinted in the *Peking Review*, argued that "the two superpowers are encountering bigger and bigger difficulties in making deals through the United Nations and their schemes to contend for the domination or partition of the world are heading fast for bankruptcy." The article opened, however, by describing the UN as "manipulated by U.S. imperialism and its collaborator," the Soviet Union.³⁰ Thus, while some states may have begun using the UN as a platform to denounce U.S. and Soviet influence, the superpowers continued to use the organization for their imperial agendas. Following the 1970 vote that kept the PRC out of the

²⁸ "Big Exposure of U.S. Imperialism's World Hegemony Ambition," *Peking Review*, 12 Mar. 1971, 26.

²⁹ "聯合國紀念會成了各國人民遣責美帝的講壇," 人民日報, 1 Nov. 1970; "Samdech Sihanouk Denounces Crimes of U.S.-Manipulated U.N.O.," *Peking Review*, 6 Nov. 1970, 19-20; "U.N. Anniversary Session Becomes Platform for Denouncing U.S. Imperialism," *Peking Review*, 6 Nov. 1970, 21-22.

³⁰ "聯合國紀念會成了各國人民遣責美帝的講壇," 人民日報, 1 Nov. 1970; "U.N. Anniversary Session Becomes Platform for Denouncing U.S. Imperialism," *Peking Review*, 6 Nov. 1970, 21.

UN, a *People's Daily* article blamed U.S. control of the UN for the ROC continuing to represent China in the world body.³¹ Another *People's Daily* piece, also reprinted in *Peking Review*, asserted that the United States had manipulated the world body to maintain U.S. troops in South Korea under UN auspices, which was “another sordid record of how U.S. imperialism has used the United Nations as a tool for aggression” and that “the so-called U.N. ‘resolution’ on the Korean question is nothing but the sole dictate of U.S. imperialism.”³² Even as PRC media celebrated growing resistance to the United States and Soviet Union in the UN, they contended that the UN remained subservient to imperialism, particularly as practiced by the United States and Soviet Union. Adherence to the international order exemplified by the UN, therefore, benefitted the superpowers at the expense of weaker states and their peoples.

CPC rhetoric claimed that Beijing would never seek to enter the ranks of the superpowers nor use force to further its international goals. To highlight Beijing's resistance to U.S. and Soviet style diplomacy, *People's Daily* editors stated, “U.S. imperialism is now calling China a ‘potential superpower,’ implying that China may also squeeze into the ranks of the superpowers someday. Thank you, American lords, but China will never accept this kind of compliment! China will never accept the big power position.”³³ *People's Daily* editors explicitly rejected the current international system and reaffirmed the CPC national imaginary of a revolutionary China that rejected hegemony. Thus, editors insisted that imperialism was the primary problem in the international arena. Whether that imperialism was American or Soviet, the PRC would resist a system controlled by superpowers and revolutionize it. CPC protestations that the PRC would

³¹ “美帝注意操縱表決機器阻撓恢復我國在聯合國的合法權利,” 人民日報, 23 Nov. 1970.

³² ‘Renmin Ribao’ Commentator, “Fresh Criminal Evidence of U.S. Imperialism’s Hostility to the Korean People,” *Peking Review*, 4 Dec. 1970, 9.

³³ “Down With the Doctrine of Big-Nation Hegemony,” *Peking Review*, 29 Jan. 1971, 7.

not employ force to achieve national or international goals likely struck many as hollow, particularly as pro-ROC advocates had cited Beijing's participation in the Korean War as justification to keep them out of the UN for decades. The CPC narrative that they were not interested in becoming a superpower, however, aligned their state with the emergent Third World that supported the CPC claim to represent China, and advocated that the PRC enter the UN.

The key difference between CPC and KMT narratives was each party's access to the international legitimacy provided by the UN. CPC officials sought to diminish that legitimacy by attacking the international system that the UN was emblematic of. Locked out of the world body, they portrayed the organization as merely another weapon in Washington's and Moscow's arsenals to further their international ambitions. KMT officials declared that ROC participation was essential to maintaining the world body's legitimacy based on its adherence to the international system and dedication to traditional narratives of the state and nation. CPC supporters, in comparison, argued that the international system was corrupted by imperialism and, therefore, needed to be revolutionized. CPC and KMT officials altered their depictions of UN international legitimacy almost immediately after the organization passed Resolution 2758. Their contending representations of China would take a few more years to metamorphosize, but the two parties switched positions on the international stage was a significant moment in altering their national imaginaries of China.

To Resolution 2758

ROC & U.S. Strategies

At the twenty-fifth session of the UN, in 1970, a majority of delegates voted to replace the ROC with the PRC. Decolonization had increased the organization's membership with states

that found the PRC's revolutionary internationalism appealing and other states had accepted CPC sovereignty over China and provided Beijing with diplomatic recognition. Consequently, U.S. officials determined that the "important-question" strategy was untenable in the contemporary international environment. As discussed in chapter two, if the UN labels an issue an "important question" it requires a two-thirds majority to pass, rather than a simple majority. Pro-ROC delegates had labeled any change in Chinese representation in the UN an important question since 1961, placing a significant obstacle before pro-PRC delegations. U.S. representatives decided the best way to maintain the ROC's place in the world body of 1971 was a strategy of dual representation for both Beijing and Taipei. Dual representation would allow PRC representatives to enter the UN while not displacing completely those from the ROC.

KMT officials, however, neither wanted to lose the ROC's place in the UN nor abandon their long adherence to the one-China policy. They originally preferred to continue using the important-question strategy to both safeguard their place as China in the organization and keep the PRC out. On 11 March 1971 ROC permanent representative to the UN Liu met with U.S. permanent representative to the UN George H.W. Bush. Liu expressed concern over U.S. officials' pushing for a strategy of dual representation in the organization. He informed Bush that any changes to the ROC's position in the UN would "have grave repercussions in Taiwan" and that access to the Security Council was essential to his government.³⁴ The ROC's seat in the Security Council was a key concern in KMT officials' resistance to the dual-representation strategy precisely because the ROC had linked its international and domestic legitimacy to UN

³⁴ "Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State," 11 Mar. 1971, in *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Vol. V: United Nations 1969-1972*, Evan M. Duncan, ed., (Washington: U.S. GPO, 2004), doc. 336. *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume V: United Nations 1969-1972* hereafter referred to as *FRUS 1969-1976*, Vol. V.

legitimacy. Representing China on the Security Council also provided Taipei with actual diplomatic power as China could veto proposals brought before it.

KMT officials' unwillingness to cede control of the Security Council was problematic for U.S. representatives. By April 1971 Bush had ascertained that any discussions on the PRC entering the UN without addressing China's seat on the Security Council would prove hopeless.³⁵ In a 23 April 1971 meeting Chiang Kai-shek told U.S. Ambassador Robert Murphy, who was acting as President Nixon's personal representative, that he would rather continue to use the important question tactic as "yielding of the ROC's seat in the Security Council to the Peiping regime would undermine the foundations of the ROC's very existence."³⁶ Ambassador Shen told Marshall Green, the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, "The ROC would find it intolerable to have its SC [Security Council] seat affected." In that conversation, Shen highlighted that the ROC would vote against dual representation based on its one-China stance, but "the ROC had not yet decided whether it would work against a DR res [dual representation resolution]; that would depend on its content."³⁷ This sentiment was echoed again in a 23 July 1971 meeting on the ROC's position in the UN between Murphy and ROC Vice Premier, as well as Chiang's son, Chiang Ching-kuo 蔣經國. Vice Premier Chiang kept referencing Murphy's earlier meeting with Chiang Kai-shek to argue that the Security Council seat was not a separate question from ROC representation in the UN and "volunteered that he 'took a dim view' of the DR approach." Though when Murphy pushed him on whether the ROC

³⁵ "Letter From the Representative to the United Nations (Bush) to the President's Assistant For National Security Affairs (Kissinger)," 17 April 1971, *FRUS 1969-1976*, Vol. V, doc. 346.

³⁶ "Record of Conversation," 23 Apr. 1971, *FRUS 1969-1976*, Vol. V, doc. 349.

³⁷ "Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Republic of China," 15 July 1971, *FRUS 1969-1976*, Vol. V, doc. 374.

would agree to dual representation if it was the only method to maintain ROC representation in the UN “CCK [Chiang Ching-kuo] only nodded in assent.”³⁸

KMT officials linked ROC domestic legitimacy to the international legitimacy supplied by the UN. ROC veto power as a permanent member of the Security Council was both symbolic and real. While the ROC had only used its veto power once in 1955, to deny UN membership to the People’s Republic of Mongolia, the ROC’s position in the Security Council was foundational to KMT claims to represent China. In 1949 the CPC stripped the KMT of most markers of national prestige and power, such as the territory, population, or economy of China. ROC control of the UN China seat, however, provided the KMT with international prestige and authority few other states could claim. Consequently, KMT access to the UN and the legitimacy it provided “China” were integral to their claims to represent the Chinese nation. During the 23 April meeting between Murphy and President Chiang, Chiang told the ambassador that if the ROC lost the China seat on the Security Council “the ROC would have no choice but to act according to the Chinese proverb, ‘rather be a jade broken than an earthen tile intact.’” This turn of phrase means it is better to fail while maintaining one’s principles rather than succeed through their sacrifice. Thus, Chiang made the ROC’s position in the UN a matter of principle that he, as well as the KMT, would prefer defeat to maintain those principles. While unstated, the principle was that there was only one-China, and the KMT would rather quit the UN than lose its claim to represent all of China. As the year progressed, though, ROC officials modified their stance, otherwise as Murphy had quipped to Chiang, “if we, under the old formula [important question], should encounter defeat, then the jade would really be broken.”³⁹

³⁸ “Telegram From the Embassy in the Republic of China to the Department of State,” 23 July 1971 *FRUS 1969-1976*, Vol. V, doc. 379.

³⁹ “Record of Conversation,” 23 Apr. 1971, *FRUS 1969-1976*, Vol. V, doc. 349.

Canada compelled KMT officials to tacitly support dual representation. When Canada declared “it had decided that if the ‘Important Question’ resolution was introduced in relation to the ‘Albanian Resolution’ [the proposal that became Resolution 2758] in the next session of the UNGA Canada will vote against the Important Question Resolution,” KMT resistance to dual representation dissipated.⁴⁰ Ottawa had, in effect, announced to ROC and U.S. delegates their previous tactic to deny the PRC UN membership would be more difficult. In other words, the UN could change Chinese representation with a simple majority, rather than the two-thirds majority required for “important questions” discussed in chapter two. Consequently, KMT resolve to risk international isolation based on principle was tested.

In July 1971 ROC officials abandoned their opposition to dual representation in the UN, and even jettisoned their attempts to maintain the Security Council seat. On 26 July Ambassadors Shen and Liu met with U.S. Secretary of State William P. Rogers to inform him the ROC had decided it would accept dual representation in the UN. After they had presented the KMT’s formal position, Rogers asked Shen to summarize the salient points, the most significant one was for the United States to “make sure that there is nothing in the DR resolution about SC seat; if others wish to amend that resolution, let them, provided US and Japan do not co-sponsor such amendment and we [ROC officials] hope US and Japan will refrain from voting for such amendment.”⁴¹ The following day in Taipei ROC Foreign Minister Chow Shu-kai 周書楷 also conveyed the ROC’s new position to U.S. Ambassador to the ROC Walter P. McCaughy. When McCaughy pressed Chow on the question “Would the GRC [government of Republic

⁴⁰ “Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission of the United Nations,” 16 July 1971, *FRUS 1969-1976*, Vol. V, doc. 375.

⁴¹ “Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Republic of China,” 27 July 1971, *FRUS 1969-1976*, Vol. V, doc. 382.

of China] consent to remain in the UNGA in the event of the passage of an Assembly resolution which included a recommendation for the transfer of the Security Council seat to the Chicomps?" Chow responded that question had not been answered.⁴² Thus ROC officials were still not in complete agreement on what the loss of the China seat on the Security Council would mean for ROC participation in the UN. By early September, though, ROC officials had concluded that maintaining access to the UN was preferable to exclusion and Chow "indicated that GRC did want our [United States'] dual representation resolution to succeed" to McConaughy.⁴³

KMT officials wanted dual representation for China in the UN to succeed. Chow's innocuous statement, as reported by McConaughy, failed to communicate the enormity of this shift for the KMT. Essentially, Chow, Shen, and Liu told U.S. officials the KMT was willing to relinquish its claim that there was one China, and it was represented by the ROC. It would be CPC insistence, or at least perceived insistence, that there was one China that resulted in the ROC's complete exclusion from the world body. KMT protestations that the ROC was the sole legitimate government of China had become less tenable after the CPC had governed the vast majority of Chinese territory and people for twenty-two years as the PRC. The KMT relented on pursuing its one-China policy in the UN because ROC officials determined that even reduced access to UN legitimacy was preferable to no access. Despite KMT propaganda, the ROC was no closer to returning to the mainland in 1971 than they had been when the CPC won the Chinese Civil War in 1949.⁴⁴ ROC authority to represent China was illusory, but it was an illusion that

⁴² "Telegram From the Embassy in the Republic of China to the Department of State," 27 July 1971, *FRUS 1969-1976*, Vol. V, doc. 383.

⁴³ "Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon," 11 Sept. 1971, *FRUS 1969-1976*, Vol. V, doc. 406.

⁴⁴ By the early 1950s most U.S. officials already believed the ROC would be unable to militarily retake the mainland, see: Leonard H.D. Gordon, "United States Opposition to Use of Force in the Taiwan Strait, 1952-1962," *The Journal of American History* 72, No. 3 (Dec. 1985): 637-660.

many in the international community accepted. KMT officials, presented with potentially losing all claim to sovereignty, agreed to abandon the illusion to maintain international recognition of the ROC as a legitimate state. While Chiang maintained that the ROC's position was one of principle, it turned out earthen tiles were sometimes more practical than broken jade. The UN provided the ROC with prestige that KMT leaders used to bolster their claim to represent China; even if those claims were problematized by PRC participation in the UN, UN membership would still be significant for both the domestic and international legitimacy for the ROC. Unfortunately for Chiang and other KMT officials, whether ROC legitimacy remained intact would be determined by the General Assembly.

General Assembly

As the UN's Twenty-Sixth Session began in 1971, pro-PRC and pro-ROC factions clashed over the question of Chinese representation in the world body. Supporters of the PRC, and those ready to acknowledge that the CPC had ruled China for decades, backed the Albanian Resolution that called "to expel forthwith the representatives of Chiang Kai-shek from the place which they unlawfully occupy at the United Nations and in all organizations related to it."⁴⁵ Supporters of the ROC championed the U.S. proposal for dual representation that argued "the United Nations should take cognizance of the existence of both the People's Republic of China and the Republic of China and reflect that incontestable reality in the manner by which it makes provision for China's representation."⁴⁶ There was no little irony in the U.S. proposal, as various delegations had made similar appeals in the UN since 1949 only to be stymied by pro-ROC

⁴⁵ UN GA "Agenda Item 93: Restoration of the lawful rights of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations," in *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-Sixth Session: Annexes 1971, 21 Sept.-22 Dec. 1971* (New York: United Nations, 1972), 3. *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-Sixth Session: Annexes 1971, 21 Sept.-22 Dec. 1971* hereafter referred to as *Annexes 1971*.

⁴⁶ UN GA "Agenda item 96: The representation of China in the United Nations," *Annexes 1971*, 1.

delegations, including those from the United States. As the General Assembly opened, the two camps competed to set the agenda, not waiting for formal debate before fighting to advantage either the Albanian Resolution or dual-representation.

On 22 September 1971 UN delegates decided whether the agenda should include item 101, the Albanian Resolution; “Restoration of the lawful rights of the People’s Republic of China in the United Nations,” and item 105, dual representation; “The representation of China in the United Nations.” When the items came up for inclusion, Bush posited that they should be combined under the title ‘Questions of China’ and that “his delegation was not opposed to the consideration of item 101 by the General Assembly, but believed that its wording was both pejorative and polemical.”⁴⁷ Albania’s Foreign Minister Reis Malile cited statements by PRC Foreign Minister Chen Yi 陳毅 that there was only one China: the PRC. Malile argued that the U.S.-sponsored resolution was obfuscating the matter, because “the former government [ROC] had been overthrown and the Chinese people, in exercise of its sovereignty, had chosen a new government,” the PRC, which was the only legitimate representative of China.⁴⁸ After further debate the committee voted to recommend including both items on the agenda, but voted against combining them. Two days later, when representatives met to accept the recommendations for the General Assembly’s agenda, the issue of Chinese representation again became a point of contention. After the committee added the Albanian Resolution without incident, the dual representation proposal met with opposition. Malile reemphasized the pro-PRC position that “the United States proposal does not depart from the well-known United States policy of opposition

⁴⁷ Bush, UN GA, Meeting 191, 22 Sept. 1971, in *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-Sixth Session: General Committee, Summary Record of Meetings, 22 Sept.-9 Dec. 1971*, (New York: United Nations, 1974), 4. *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-Sixth Session: General Committee, Summary Record of Meetings, 22 Sept.-9 Dec. 1971* hereafter referred to as *General Committee*.

⁴⁸ Malile, UN GA, Meeting 191, 22 Sept. 1971, in *General Committee*, 4.

to China and it is designed to maintain here, in the United Nations, the Chiang Kai-shek puppet, who represents nothing.”⁴⁹ Bush countered that dual representation offered an imaginative “solution to an old problem. We here talk about universality, and I cannot get through my mind that universality means the expulsion of a Member that has been in good standing for some 25 years.”⁵⁰ The committee voted to include dual representation in the end, but the contest over the agenda set the lines of debate over the China question.

ROC representatives were vocal as they defended their place in the UN. They continued to challenge PRC legitimacy and championed their record in the world body. On 8 October 1971 Chow addressed the UN General Assembly and maintained Taipei’s long-standing claims that the PRC was neither peace loving nor represented the Chinese people, but also avowed that the ROC was “a member of impeccable standing.”⁵¹ Chow brought these themes up again on 18 October, when the debate on Chinese representation began in earnest, and asserted “the whole purpose of Albania, Algeria and other henchman of the Chinese Communist régime has been the expulsion of the Republic of China from the United Nations.”⁵² He reiterated that not only was the ROC a sitting member of the UN, it was also one that had “scrupulously and consistently discharged all of its Charter obligations.”⁵³ On the eve of the vote, Liu made the case that “the fact that control of the mainland was wrested from the Government of the Republic of China does not in any way alter the legitimate rights of the Government of the Republic of China in the United Nations,” and singled out the Albanian resolution’s call for expulsion as setting a

⁴⁹ Malile, UN GA, Meeting 1937, 24. Sept. 1971, in *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-Sixth Session: Plenary Meetings, Verbatim Records of Meetings: 21 Sept.-22 Dec. 1971*, Vol. 1, (New York: United Nations, 1974), 2. *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-Sixth Session: Plenary Meetings, Verbatim Records of Meetings: 21 Sept.-22 Dec. 1971*, Vol. 1 hereafter referred to as *Plenary Meetings-1*.

⁵⁰ Bush, UN GA, Meeting 1937, 24. Sept. 1971, in *Plenary Meetings-1*, 5.

⁵¹ Chow, UN GA, Meeting 1959, 8 Oct. 1971, in *Plenary Meetings-1*, 2.

⁵² Chow, UN GA, Meeting 1967, 18 Oct. 1971, *Plenary Meetings-2*, 4.

⁵³ Chow, UN GA, Meeting 1967, 18 Oct. 1971, *Plenary Meetings-2*, 4.

dangerous precedent for the world body.⁵⁴ ROC representatives defended their rights to UN representation by arguing that the ROC was not only the only legitimate representative of the Chinese nations, it had adhered to the traditions and norms of the international system.

Moreover, while Chow's addresses were substantive, the ROC foreign minister's presence throughout this debate also signaled UN membership's continued importance to ROC leaders.

ROC officials were not alone in portraying their potential removal as an unprecedented and dangerous event in UN history. ROC allies also argued that the Albanian Resolution would expel a sitting member of the organization. On 27 September 1971 Japanese Prime Minister Kiichi Aichi, as U.S. and ROC officials had planned, presented a resolution that "any proposal in the Assembly which would result in depriving the Republic of China in the United Nations is an important question" and affirmed the ROC's continued right to the "China seat" on the Security Council.⁵⁵ At the same session, José Antonio Mora-Otero of Uruguay avouched that the ROC had upheld the UN Charter's principles; expelling it was unjustified.⁵⁶ On 4 October U.S. Secretary of State William P. Rogers noted that two states claimed to represent China, and avowed that "the United States wants to see the People's Republic of China come to the Assembly, take its seat, and participate" and even went on to state the PRC should have the Security Council's China seat.⁵⁷ Roger's position represented a significant shift for U.S. representatives, who had maintained through 1970 that the PRC did not represent China in any form. Roberts went on to argue, though, that "it would be unrealistic to expel the Republic of China, which governs a population of Taiwan larger than the populations of two-thirds of the 130

⁵⁴ Liu, UN GA, Meeting 1976, 25 Oct. 1971, in *Plenary Meetings-2*, 10-11.

⁵⁵ Aichi, Japan, UN GA, Meeting 1941, 27 Sept. 1971, in *Plenary Meetings-1*, 5.

⁵⁶ Mora-Otero, UN GA, Meeting 1941, 27 Sept. 1971, in *Plenary Meetings-1*, 9.

⁵⁷ Roberts, UN GA, Meeting 1950, 4 Oct. 1971, in *Plenary Meetings-1*, 3.

United Nations Members” and that “it would be unjust to expel a Member which has participated for over 25 years... with unfailing devotion to the principles set forth in the Charter.”⁵⁸ During the debate on Chinese representation, Bush reiterated that both sides agreed the PRC should enter the UN, but argued “one fundamental point divides us, and that is simply whether to retain or expel the Republic of China,” and expelling the ROC would set a dangerous precedent.⁵⁹ Other ROC defenders attested that dual representation was the only answer to the China question as there were now two governments who represented China, thus claims that only the PRC could be in the UN were unfounded.⁶⁰ On the eve of the vote Bush highlighted the main argument of the opposition to the Albanian Resolution stating that “the Republic of China should not and must not be expelled or deprived of its United Nations representation.”⁶¹ Proponents of dual representation’s plea rested on the position that the ROC was a legitimate state. Consequently, removing Taipei from the world body would set a dangerous precedent.

Proponents of the Albanian Resolution argued that talk of expulsion was spurious, as there was no state being expelled. Many representatives maintained that the only reason the ROC was still in the organization was because, in the words of Dugersurengiin Erdembileg, Mongolia’s ambassador to the UN, “The United States representatives and those who speak out against the restoration of the lawful rights of the People’s Republic of China in the United Nations resorted to all kinds of tricks.”⁶² For proponents of the Albanian Resolution the question

⁵⁸ Roberts, UN GA, Meeting 1950, 4 Oct. 1971, in *Plenary Meetings-1*, 3.

⁵⁹ Bush, UN GA, Meeting 1966, 18 Oct. 1971, in *Plenary Meetings-2*, 9.

⁶⁰ Gonzalo Facio, Costa Rica, UN GA, Meeting 1966, 18 Oct. 1971, in *Plenary Meetings-2*, 15; Kiichi Aichi, Japan, UN GA, Meeting 1968, 19 Oct. 1971, in *Plenary Meetings-2*, 11; Tiwo Oluwah Dosumu-Johnson, Liberia, US GA, Meeting 1970, 20 Oct. 1971, in *Plenary Meetings-2*, 9.

⁶¹ Bush, UN GA, Meeting 1976, 25 Oct. 1971, in *Plenary Meetings-2*, 13.

⁶² Erdembileg, UN GA, Meeting 1976, 25 Oct. 1971, in *Plenary Meetings-2*, 19; Nesti Nase, Albania, UN GA, Meeting 1966, 18 Oct. 1971, in *Plenary Meetings-2*, 4; Athanasius Pratt, Sierra Leone, UN GA, Meeting 1969, 19 Oct. 1971, in *Plenary Meetings-2*, 11.

was not whether the PRC should be allowed into the UN, as “China has always been a member and is, in fact, a permanent member of the Security Council.”⁶³ In this formulation, the issue was not about admitting the PRC: Beijing was the legitimate representative of the Chinese people and already a member of the UN.⁶⁴ Tanzanian Minister of State for Foreign Affairs I. Elinewinga summed up this position by arguing, “it has never been an issue of admitting a member or expelling a member from the United Nations. Taiwan is a province of China, and once the rightful representatives of the people of China take their seat in the organs of the United Nations, there can be no room for those who hitherto have pretended to represent China.”⁶⁵ This argument discredited the KMT’s claim to represent China, and accordingly challenged one of the ROC’s main claims to legitimacy.

Elinewinga also pointed to another argument employed by representatives in favor of the Albanian Resolution: there was only one China. Pro-PRC delegates invocation of the one-China policy was a persuasive argument. Both KMT and CPC officials were steadfast that there was only one China, and consequently only one seat for China in the UN, until ROC representatives reversed themselves and declared their support for dual representation for Beijing and Taipei earlier that year. Well before the debate was underway, many pro-PRC advocates agreed with Zambia’s Foreign Minister Elijah Mudenda that “there is only one China, and for that reason, we will oppose most energetically any attempts by the United States or its allies to introduce a two-China policy.”⁶⁶ Even though the PRC and Soviet Union’s relations had already deteriorated

⁶³ Arikpo Okoi, Nigeria, UN GA, Meeting 1941, 1 Oct. 1971, in *Plenary Meetings-1*, 20.

⁶⁴ Vernon Mwaanga, Zambia, UN GA, Meeting 1969, 19 Oct. 1971, in *Plenary Meetings-2*, 1; Olof Rydbeck, Sweden, UN GA, Meeting 1970, 20 Oct. 1971, in *Plenary Meetings-2*, 1.

⁶⁵ Elinewinga, Tanzania, UN GA, Meeting 1951, 4 Oct. 1971, in *Plenary Meetings-1*, 11.

⁶⁶ Mudenda, UN GA, Meeting 1945, 29 Sept. 1971, in *Plenary Meetings-1*, 15; Max Jakobson, Finland, UN GA, Meeting 1969, 19 Oct. 1971, in *Plenary Meetings-2*, 5; Shunmugam Jayakumar, Singapore, UN GA, Meeting 1976, 19 Oct. 1971, in *Plenary Meetings-2*, 23.

considerably, including border skirmishes in 1969, Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko reiterated Moscow's long-standing commitment to one China represented by the PRC.⁶⁷ The premise that there was only one China was effective because, as Ceylon's, modern-day Sri Lanka, representative pointed out, "Even those who unlawfully occupy China's seat here, claiming to be the representatives of the Republic of China, maintain that there is only one China."⁶⁸ The KMT's well-known dedication to the one-China policy directly impeded its allies' efforts to press for dual representation in the UN. Thus Samar Sen, India's permanent representative to the UN, argued that while "a gloomy danger of expulsion of Member States has been mentioned... The simple issue before us is that there is only one China—and that is the People's Republic of China. There is only one Chinese seat in the United Nations, and the People's Republic of China alone is entitled to it."⁶⁹ Therefore, pro-PRC members maintained Chinese representation was a settled issue, the problem was which state was the legitimate representative of the Chinese nation. Regardless of KMT representatives' efforts to cast the ROC as a legitimate state, UN delegates directly challenged Taipei's claim to represent China.

Late in the evening on 25 October 1971 the debate over China's representation ended and the voting began. The U.S. delegation thought the UN would vote the next day, but the Albanian delegation pressed for a vote as soon as the debate had ended.⁷⁰ After some legislative maneuvering, the General Assembly decided to first consider whether removing the ROC from the UN was an important question. At 9:47 p.m. in New York the votes were cast. The result was 59 against to 55 for, with 15 abstentions. Even traditional U.S. allies support for the ROC had

⁶⁷ Gromyko, UN GA, Meeting 1942, 28 Sept. 1971, in *Plenary Meetings-1*, 11.

⁶⁸ Hamilton Amerasinghe, Ceylon, UN GA, 19 Oct. 1971, in *Plenary Meetings-2*, 5.

⁶⁹ Sen, UN GA, Meeting 1975, 22 Oct. 1971, in *Plenary Meetings-2*, 8.

⁷⁰ Anthony Austin, "Crushing Defeat for the U.S., or a Blessing in Disguise?" *NYT*, 31 Oct. 1971.

diminished considerably, reflecting diplomatic shifts in a number of states and likely a response to the Nixon administration's public overtures to the PRC that were underway even as the UN debated Chinese representation. In all, only four of the fourteen North Atlantic Treaty Organization countries in the UN, including the United States, supported labeling Chinese representation an important question. Six members of NATO, including Great Britain, France, and Canada, voted against the important-question resolution and four members, including Italy and Turkey, abstained.⁷¹ A *New York Times* reporter captured the delegates reactions in the chamber when the important question was defeated:

The Tanzanians, who were the floor managers for Peking, jumped from their seats in the front row and did a little victory dance. The Algerians, fellow cosponsors, embraced one another. The Albanians sedately shook hands. Others stood up, applauded, cheered. Rhythmic clapping beat against the walls.⁷²

After this significant setback for the ROC and United States, which included some delegations changing their votes and others not showing up, Bush attempted to have the Albanian Resolution amended to remove the words calling for the ROC's expulsion. Acting President of the General Assembly Adam Malik of Indonesia decided, after debate over whether Bush was out of order, that the amendment would be considered. Bush's motion to delete the words expelling the ROC from the UN in the Albanian Resolution failed by a vote of 61 to 51, with 16 abstentions. It was after the failure of this final attempt to keep the ROC in the UN that Chow stood up and told the assembly "in view of the frenzied and irrational manners that have been exhibited in this hall, the delegation of the Republic of China has now decided not to take part in any further proceedings of this General Assembly."⁷³ After a few more words thanking

⁷¹ West Germany, also a NATO country, only had observer status in the UN from 1955 until 1973.

⁷² Anthony Austin, "Crushing Defeat for the U.S., or a Blessing in Disguise?" *New York Times*, 31 Oct. 1971.

⁷³ Chow, UN GA, Meeting 1976, 25 Oct. 1971, in *Plenary Meetings-2*, 40.

the delegates of friendly governments, the ROC delegation turned to walk out of the hall for the last time. Before they made it to the door Bush left his chair, went over to Liu and put his arm on his shoulders while expressing his regret over the motions' defeat.⁷⁴ When the General Assembly voted on the Albanian Resolution after 11 p.m., succeeding 76 to 35, with 17 abstentions, there were no ROC representatives present to hear Malik announce "the draft resolution has been approved and the Government of the People's Republic of China will be notified accordingly."⁷⁵

ROC Reactions

ROC representatives no longer had access to the UN to express their reactions to the final vote, but instead had to turn to other outlets to demonstrate their shock, minimize the event, and warn of the world body's imminent collapse. The day after the vote Chiang Kai-shek addressed the Chinese people and emphasized the ROC's withdrawal, rather than expulsion, from the world body. He explained, "The United Nations, which this country helped to establish after so many trials, has finally degraded itself and become a den of iniquity. History will surely show that our announcement of withdrawal from the United Nations actually presaged the demise of the United Nations itself."⁷⁶ While Chiang's statement reiterated familiar KMT tropes regarding the significance of the ROC for the world body, it also minimized the UN's importance. KMT officials further belittled the world body's significance by claiming the UN no longer addressed important issues, particularly as the UN's "polluted environment problem was now apparent with the bayonet charge over the so-called 'Chinese representation' question."⁷⁷ The KMT also issued a statement that stressed, "withdrawal from the United Nations will not detract from our

⁷⁴ George Bush with Victor Gold, *Looking Forward* (New York: Doubleday, 1987), 115.

⁷⁵ President, UN GA, Meeting 1976, 25 Oct. 1971, in *Plenary Meetings-2*, 41.

⁷⁶ "Message of President Chiang Kai-shek to the Chinese People," *Free China Review*, Oct. 1971, 68.

⁷⁷ "聯合國成立二十六週年," 中央日報, 25 Oct. 1971.

dignity.”⁷⁸ Ambassador Shen told American reporters that in the near future the ROC would not try to reenter the UN, and that ROC officials felt the “expulsion’s result damaged the United Nations much more than the Republic of China.”⁷⁹ KMT officials maintained these positions in both public and private. At a meeting between ROC and U.S. officials after Resolution 2758’s passage, Chow expressed that “he feared no decent country would want to be associated with the United Nations and it might ‘go down the drain.’”⁸⁰ ROC officials made these statements in an effort to diminish the UN’s legitimacy for both foreign and domestic audiences. The KMT narrative that now challenged the UN’s legitimacy was intended to insulate the ROC from the loss of that legitimacy. ROC officials like Chiang, Shen, and Chow had long represented the ROC’s place in the UN as substantive to their claims to represent China. Having lost that legitimacy, ROC officials continued to claim the ROC was rightful representative of China and it was the UN that was in the wrong. Resolution 2758 had harmed the world body’s legitimacy, not the ROC’s, in this narrative.

ROC media and KMT officials also redefined the ROC’s loss of UN membership not as expulsion, but as a principled decision to leave the world body. The day after the UN passed resolution 2758, Chiang announced “Yesterday, before the United Nation’s General Assembly voted on a proposal by a bandit country like Albania, my head delegate Chow Shu-kai already made a statement, declaring the Republic of China’s withdrawal from the United Nations.”⁸¹ Tainan’s KMT-affiliated *China Daily News*, asserted “withdrawal from the United Nations is a painful event.”⁸² A reporter for *United News* in Taipei simply labeled an analytical article on the

⁷⁸ “對外交報告決議交,” 中央日報, 29 Oct. 1971.

⁷⁹ “聯合國違背創立宗旨我不考慮重新加入,” 中央日報, 5 Nov. 1971.

⁸⁰ “Memorandum of Conversation,” 29 Oct. 1971, *FRUS 1969-1976*, Vol. V, doc. 433.

⁸¹ “總統書告全國同胞決不改變國家目的,” 聯合報, 27 Oct. 1971.

⁸² “聯合國在暴力下敲響喪鐘,” 中華日報, 27 Oct. 1971.

loss of UN membership “After our withdrawal from the United Nations.”⁸³ All of these pieces went on to reassure the ROC public that lack of UN membership would have little to no effect on the nation or the state. These pieces also changed the discourse from one of failure to one of pride: ROC representatives had left the world body; the UN had not expelled them. In this narrative, the UN had failed to live up to its charter, and so the ROC withdrew from the world body in protest. KMT officials recast their defeat as victory in order to maintain their right to represent China, though now without the UN’s international legitimacy. ROC media presented Chiang’s broken jade, while conveniently ignoring the earthen tile which had also been broken.

KMT officials also highlighted Taipei’s continued international support, particularly from the United States, in the aftermath of Resolution 2758. These efforts were primarily directed towards the people of Taiwan, and *Central Daily News* ran many articles expressing Americans’ continued support of the ROC. Shortly after the UN passed Resolution 2758, *Central Daily News* editors reprinted letters to the editor written by Americans to U.S. newspapers to demonstrate American “resistance to the United Nations’ expulsion of the Republic of China.”⁸⁴ On 2 November 1971 the *Central Daily News* also printed a picture of a group of Americans (fig. 3.2), with adults and children of both Asian and European decent, celebrating Chiang’s birthday. In the picture several people hold ROC flags while they stand next to a cake and a sign that read

⁸³ 張作錦, “我們退出聯合國之後,” 聯合報, 27 Oct. 1971.

⁸⁴ “痛斥聯大無恥,” 中央日報, 1 Nov. 1971.

“Happy Birthday Pledge to Return Free China to the United Nations” above a picture of Chiang.⁸⁵



Figure 3.4: United Press International Telephoto 合眾國際社電傳照片，中央日報，2 Nov. 1971.

In addition to showing the U.S. public's support for the ROC, *Central Daily News* editors also highlighted U.S. legislators' support. They had begun to present reports on U.S. congressmen threatening to withdraw U.S. financial support from the UN if the ROC were expelled during the debate in the General Assembly.⁸⁶ In the wake of Resolution 2758's passage, though, articles went into detail about the amount of financial support the United States gave the UN and argued that the “United Nations’ vote to expel the Republic of China has resulted in the whole American nation’s anger and worry” which were driving congressional efforts to cut U.S. funding for the world body.⁸⁷ ROC officials and editors were attempting to assuage any fears the public on Taiwan may have had by highlighting not only official U.S. support but also the American public’s support for the ROC. The *Central Daily*’s presentations of continued U.S.

⁸⁵ “聯合國際社電傳照片,” 中央日報, 2 Nov. 1971.

⁸⁶ “美眾議員群起呼籲支持我在聯合國席位,” 中央日報, 23 Oct. 1971.

⁸⁷ “對聯大會非法行為美各階層咸表憤怒,” 中央日報, 29 Oct. 1971.

support for the ROC also further challenged UN legitimacy by demonstrating people in the world's non-communist superpower also did not accept the UN's decision.

PRC Reactions

For CPC representatives, the UN's passage of Resolution 2758 was a resounding victory, though they stressed that it was inevitable and victory for the world. Unlike ROC officials, though, PRC officials now had access to the legitimacy provided by UN membership, which they highlighted in PRC media for domestic and foreign audiences by reprinting the speeches made in the UN welcoming the PRC to the world body.⁸⁸ Editors at *People's Daily* employed UN imagery to celebrate the PRC's newfound place in the world. They presented an article that described how every morning the flags of over a hundred nations flew over New York's East River and "now amid them one is particularly eye catching, it is the scarlet of the People's Republic of China's five-starred red flag."⁸⁹ *Beijing Daily* editors presented a photo celebrating the PRC flag flying at the UN a month later in a collage of images celebrating "history's irresistible tide" (fig. 3.3).⁹⁰ Despite these celebrations, CPC officials publicly avowed that the PRC entering the UN had been inevitable. Privately, PRC officials were caught off guard by the sudden change in their international status. Ma Jisen, a former editor of the CPC English-language *China Daily* opinion section among other PRC publications, details that officials in the foreign ministry only planned to send an advance party to the UN before sending a full delegation, however Mao declared in a meeting at Zhongnanhai "it (the advance party) is not

⁸⁸ "熱烈祝賀恢復我國在聯合國的一切合法權利," 北京日報, 2 Nov. 1971; "熱烈祝賀恢復我國在聯合國的合法權利," 北京日報, 4 Nov. 1971; "熱烈祝賀恢復我國在聯合國的合法權利," 北京日報, 5 Nov. 1971, p. 3; "熱烈祝賀恢復我國在聯合國的合法權利," 北京日報, 6 Nov. 1971; "Greetings on the Restoration of the Legal Rights of the People's Republic of China In the United Nations" *Peking Review*, 19 Nov. 1971, 23-38; "Speeches Welcoming China's Delegation" *Peking Review*, 26 Nov. 1971, 21-38.

⁸⁹ "在聯合國的第一週," 人民日報, 25 Nov. 1971.

⁹⁰ "歷史潮流不可抗拒," 北京日報, 23 Dec. 1971.

necessary.... We'll send a delegation now.”⁹¹ Even as the PRC was embroiled in the ongoing tumult of the Cultural Revolution, CPC leaders were attentive to the significance of representing China in the UN. The China seat provided the CPC with a potent symbol they represented China, and the real power of the veto. PRC legitimacy now extended to the international stage.




Figure 3.5: “中華人民共和國的五星紅旗在紐約的東河之賓聯合國大樓上空迎風飄舞” [The five-starred crimson flag of the People's Republic of China dances in the wind before the United Nations building on New York City's East River], 北京日報, 23 Dec. 1971.

PRC media portrayed the PRC's ascension to international credibility as inevitable due to the global support for Beijing by the “people” of many nations. The PRC issued an official statement that argued Resolution 2758's passage “reflects the general trend of the people of the world desiring friendship with the Chinese people.”⁹² *People's Daily* editors published workers' discussion groups and People's Liberation Army aviators extolling international comity for PRC entry to the world body, demonstrating that CPC officials encouraged this perspective while not limiting it to official pronouncements.⁹³ A 28 October 1971 *People's Daily* editorial, also printed in *Peking Review*, echoed the importance of international friendship and argued, “this is a

⁹¹ Ma, *The Cultural Revolution in the Foreign Ministry*, 331.

⁹² “Statement of the Government of the People's Republic of China” *Peking Review*, 5 Nov. 1971, 6.

⁹³ 唐山四二二水泥廠工人評論組 and 秦皇島港務局工人評論組, “全世界人民的勝利,” 人民日報, 3 Nov. 1971; 雄鷹, “人民勝利美帝慘敗,” 人民日報, 5 Nov. 1971.

historical trend no force on earth can hold back.”⁹⁴ Thus people in the PRC were cognizant of how their state’s diplomatic efforts had allowed it to replace the ROC in the UN. More importantly, PRC representatives were now able to employ the UN to enhance their position as China’s legitimate government, an aspect Mao likely foresaw in his decision to send a full delegation to the UN in 1971 rather than an advance party to observe before participating in the world body.

PRC media also used this event to demonstrate that the tide was turning against the United States and Soviet Union. The same 28 October 1971 *People’s Daily* editorial that cited the irresistible historical trend in the PRC’s favor, claimed “the vote also reflects the resistance of ever more countries to the truculent acts of U.S. imperialism in imposing its will on others in the United Nations. It is becoming more and more difficult for one or two superpowers to manipulate and monopolize the organization.”⁹⁵ A *Peking Review* article argued further that Resolution 2758 represented an important victory for the people of the world and proved “the complete bankruptcy of the U.S. imperialist plot to use the U.N. to push its power politics,” especially in keeping the PRC out of the UN.⁹⁶ Growing international opposition to imperialism had been a consistent theme in CPC discourse on the UN, the PRC obtaining its place in the world body was emblematic of that trend and, per this formulation, would become a catalyst for further anti-imperialism. PRC media used Beijing’s newfound international standing to avow that the international community had legitimated PRC revolutionary internationalism and repudiated the power politics practiced by former Great Powers. PRC advocates did not limit the scope of U.S. defeat to the UN, though, they argued in Resolution 2758’s “wake the United

⁹⁴ “歷史潮流不可抗拒,” 人民日報, 28 Oct. 1971; “Irresistible Historical Trend” *Peking Review*, 5 Nov. 1971, 7.

⁹⁵ “歷史潮流不可抗拒,” 人民日報, 28 Oct. 1971; “Irresistible Historical Trend” *Peking Review*, 5 Nov. 1971, 7.

⁹⁶ “A Victory for World’s People, Crushing Defeat for U.S. Imperialism,” *Peking Review*, 29 Oct. 1971, 6.

States' hegemonic world position is deteriorating more and more with each passing day.”⁹⁷ CPC representatives used the PRC's entry to demonstrate that the world body was becoming less of an imperial tool, rehabilitating the UN's international legitimacy by virtue of PRC participation in it. Indeed, Resolution 2758 allowed the CPC to not only rejuvenate the UN, but also to argue that U.S. hegemony was beginning to decline. The positioning of U.S. imperial power as in decline was particularly valuable as U.S.-PRC relations were beginning to thaw ahead of Nixon's historic trip to China, thus allowing CPC officials to start focusing their opprobrium on Soviet social imperialism while maintaining that the PRC's revolutionary role in international affairs would benefit the world system.

Resolution 2758 represented a substantive change for the ROC, the PRC, the UN, and the entire international system. U.S. and KMT officials had realized after 1970 that a new approach was needed if the ROC were going to maintain a place in the world body. While ROC officials initially wanted to continue using the important-question strategy to keep the PRC out of the world body, by late July they agreed to the U.S. proposal to raise dual Chinese representation. Within the UN, the debate came down to delegates in favor of dual representation arguing that the Albanian Resolution would expel a sitting member. The states that supported the Albanian Resolution, however, argued that there was only one China; there could be no expulsion of a non-state. Before the vote came up in the General Assembly, Bush thought there were enough votes to keep the ROC in the UN, he was mistaken. Bush was not entirely incorrect when he recalled that “in the end it was a different kind of ‘Dual Representation’ policy—Washington's ambivalence on the question of recognizing Beijing—that had undercut the case we tried to make to save Taiwan,” but the debate over which state represented China was not determined by the

⁹⁷ “聯合國大會通過恢復我在聯合國合法權利,” 人民日報, 31 Oct. 1971.

United States alone.⁹⁸ In the wake of Resolution 2758's passage, KMT representatives attempted to minimize the UN's significance, a process they began by arguing that allowing the PRC into the UN would undermine the UN charter. In comparison, CPC representatives started to emphasize the UN's international legitimacy, and argued China's revolutionary spirit would reform the world body. Once the PRC took the UN's China seat it had a vested interest in defending the organization's legitimacy, while Taipei's loss of representation in the UN resulted in KMT officials' need to denigrate that legitimacy in order to defend the ROC's.

Conclusion

The PRC's and ROC's competition to represent China was profoundly influenced by the international legitimacy provided by UN membership. Before Resolution 2758's passage, ROC and PRC supporters represented the UN role in international relations quite differently. KMT officials argued that it was an organization of peace and that it was therefore necessary to keep the PRC out of the UN, or else its international role would be diminished. Essentially, they argued that the UN was a legitimate force in international relations and the ROC deserved to represent China in the world body due to its traditional support of the international system. CPC officials, on the other hand, argued that the superpowers had corrupted the UN's role in the international arena. In the lead up to Resolution 2758, U.S. and KMT officials realized they needed a new strategy to keep the ROC in the UN. ROC representatives originally resisted U.S. officials' proposal to seek dual representation, but by July 1971 they realized that it was their best option for retaining a presence in the UN. ROC officials' willingness to abandon their long held one-China policy demonstrated UN membership's importance to the KMT assertions that they represented the Chinese nation. While ROC officials were willing to go along with dual

⁹⁸ Bush and Gold, *Looking Forward*, 116.

representation, the motion never came to a vote. The Albanian Resolution, which called for the expulsion of ROC representatives from the UN, was adopted as Resolution 2758 and negated any place for the ROC in the world body. In the immediate aftermath of the UN passing Resolution 2758, ROC supporters minimized their expulsion by claiming the world body's demise was imminent and highlighted continued international, primarily American, support for their state. PRC supporters argued that this was an inevitable event and a serious blow to U.S. imperialism. As both states adjusted their UN narratives to reflect the altered international landscape, their depictions of the organization's international role remained in opposition, though their positions were reversed. CPC and KMT depictions of China, however, would continue to reflect their preestablished models.

When Daniel McColgan illegally attempted to address the General Assembly on that Thursday morning of 21 October 1971, few people could have foretold that in less than a week the UN's China seat would change hands. McColgan display of support for Beijing aligned with the majority view of Americans.⁹⁹ Majority support for the PRC also extended to the halls of the world body and, despite ROC efforts, after over a decade a majority was enough. Thus, after twenty-two years, on 25 October 1971 the UN's "China question" was finally answered. That answer, that the PRC was China's legitimate representative, significantly altered the international competition between the CPC and KMT to represent China that began when Mao Zedong declared the founding of the People's Republic of China on 1 October 1949 while Chiang Kai-shek was making his way, along with the remnants of the Republic of China, to Taiwan. Following the 1971 transfer of the UN's China seat, the competing governments claiming to represent China continued on different paths. The PRC became more involved with international

⁹⁹ "30 May:" Gallup 1971, p. 2308.

organizations after entering the UN, with the world body's imprimatur the CPC represented China with little challenge on the international stage, even as revolutionary fervor continued to sweep through the nation. The ROC attempted to reestablish their international legitimacy to represent China on an economic foundation, a strategy that seemed effective until domestic events in the PRC undercut those arguments as well. Chiang had avowed it was better to be a broken piece of jade than an intact earthen tile, after Resolution 2758 his proposition would be tested.

Chapter 4

Third World Champion, 1972-1978

New York City was hot, humid, and sunny on 25 August 1972 as the United Nations Security Council convened to discuss Bangladeshi membership.¹ In 1971 East Pakistan had fought a war of independence against West Pakistan and seceded to become the People's Republic of Bangladesh. Huang Hua 黃華, vice-chairman of China's UN delegation, along with other CPC officials, claimed that this was not an independence movement, but an attempt by the Soviet Union and India to dismember the sovereign state of Pakistan, comparing it to U.S. attempts to separate Taiwan from the PRC.² PRC delegates, seeming to borrow from the ROC playbook, argued that the situation was reminiscent of the 1930s when the League of Nations did not block Japan from establishing the puppet Manchukuo regime in Northeast China, also known as Manchuria. Huang and other PRC delegates demonstrated that China's experience with Japan and the League in 1931 still influenced the perspective in Beijing, and Taipei, that intergovernmental organizations that failed to defend weaker states would eventually collapse.³

As for Bangladesh, PRC delegates asserted India was attempting to become a superpower at Pakistan's expense. The Chairman of the PRC's UN delegation Qiao Guanhua 喬冠華 declared at a 7 December 1971 emergency Security Council meeting that "the Indian expansionists usually do not have so much guts. Why have they become so flagrant now? The reason is that a superpower, Soviet social-imperialism, is backing them up."⁴ Consequently, Qiao

¹ "Weather Report and Forecast," *New York Times*, 25 Aug. 1972.

² "Huang Hua Condemns Soviet Union for Supporting Indian Aggression" *Peking Review*, 10 Dec. 1971, 8. "Renmin Ribao" Commentator, "A Just Cause Enjoys Abundant Support While An Unjust Cause Finds Little Support," *Peking Review*, 17 Dec. 1971, 10.

³ For more on Japan and the League of Nations see Thomas Burkman, *Japan and the League of Nations: Empire and World Order, 1914-1938* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2008).

⁴ "Condemning Soviet-Supported Indian Aggression Against Pakistan" *Peking Review*, 17 Dec. 1971, 11.

and Huang opposed Bangladeshi UN membership and claimed China was upholding UN principles by doing so. The following year, the Committee on the Admission of New Members reported to the Security Council that Bangladesh met the requirements for membership. On that recommendation, India, the USSR, the United Kingdom, and Yugoslavia again sponsored Bangladesh for membership in the UN. China disagreed, and Huang cast China's second veto in the world body. When Huang acted in China's name to stymie Bangladeshi membership, he was not representing the same China that had blocked Mongolia's entry in 1955. The PRC now represented China in the world body and the ROC was on the sidelines. Thus, CPC officials wielded China's authority in the world body to deny the entry of Bangladesh.

In the wake of Resolution 2758, CPC and KMT officials transformed their narratives on China and the international system to defend their changed positions. The CPC now controlled not only most of China's traditional territory, the PRC also enjoyed the international legitimacy of UN membership. U.S. President Richard M. Nixon's 1972 visit, which was public knowledge before the UN passed Resolution 2758, also boosted the PRC's international prestige. The CPC used the PRC's role as "China" in the organization to argue that the era of imperial control, whether Soviet or American, of the world body was at an end. CPC delegates to the UN vetoed Bangladeshi membership to demonstrate superpowers could no longer control the organization. Beijing's delegates also attacked racism and apartheid in Africa in the UN to position the PRC as a member and champion of the "Third World." The Third World referenced a collection of states, often from the global south, that were aligned with neither U.S. liberal capitalism nor Soviet communism.

KMT officials now had to interact with the world bereft of their most potent claim that the ROC represented China. KMT leaders sought to mitigate their newfound status as outsiders

by claiming the PRC's entry into the UN signaled an end to the world body. To defend the ROC's continued claim to represent China, KMT officials denigrated the organization that they had used to bolster ROC authority as China for decades. Within a year of taking China's place in the UN, twenty-seven states switched recognition from the ROC to the PRC. The ROC claim to represent China was no longer deniable for most states. KMT officials were especially troubled when Japan, the dominant regional power in East Asia during this period, recognized Beijing in 1972. In 1972 the KMT had neither China's traditional territory nor UN international legitimacy to support its claim to represent China. As the ROC hemorrhaged diplomatic recognition as China, Nationalist leaders turned to the economy to defend their status as China. KMT officials highlighted that while states were severing diplomatic relations with the ROC, they maintained economic ones. Essentially, the KMT elevated the economy to defend ROC sovereignty, absent Chinese territory or formal diplomatic relations.

The International Arena

Nixon Goes to "China"

Nixon's 1972 visit to the PRC was an historic event that captivated many around the world. U.S. media extensively covered Nixon's trip to Beijing at the time.⁵ Robert Healey, political editor for the *Boston Globe*, commenting on that years' Democratic primaries for U.S. president, said that they "will pale a bit in the shadow of the news for the next eight days from China."⁶ A Gallup Poll found ninety-eight percent of Americans were aware of Nixon's visit, the

⁵ Max Frankel, "President Arrives in Peking For Formal Welcome by Chou," *The Atlanta Constitution*, 21 Feb. 1972; Stanley Karnow, "Chou Welcomes President in Peking," *Boston Globe*, 21 Feb. 1972; Aldo Beckman, "Nixon Greeted in Peking," *Chicago Tribune*, 21 Feb. 1972; AP, "Mao, Nixon Talk: 'Frank and Serious' Discussion," *Los Angeles Times*, 21 Feb. 1972; Max Frankel, "A Quiet Greeting," *New York Times*, 21 Feb. 1972.

⁶ Robert Healey, "Political Circuit: No news tops Nixon in China," *Boston Globe*, 21 Feb. 1972.

highest awareness of an event in the poll's thirty-seven years.⁷ The visit spawned the political adage that "Only Nixon could go to China," to signify only someone with unassailable credentials against a purported enemy could deal with that enemy. The moment even permeated U.S. popular culture, such as when Spock presented it as a Vulcan saying in *Star Trek VI: The Undiscovered Country*.⁸ Later scholars have neglected neither the visit nor its significance in the Cold War.⁹

PRC and ROC media also detailed the significance of this moment in time, though their representations of that significance were quite different. For CPC officials, Nixon's visit symbolized an important shift in their international standing. Combined with Beijing's recent acquisition of UN membership, CPC officials portrayed the U.S. President meeting with their leaders and touring their cities as evidence that the PRC's authority to represent China was accepted on the international stage. CPC leaders' agenda for Nixon's trip, though, indicate they understood the value of historical diplomacy even as the Cultural Revolution continued to roil the country. For KMT officials, Nixon's visit to the mainland added salt to ROC diplomatic wounds. Taipei had been recently divested of membership in the UN, and now the leader of their primary benefactor and ally was meeting with the KMT's sworn enemies. ROC media focused on not only official KMT opposition to the visit, but also ROC citizens' protests and continued U.S. official and public support for Taipei to lessen the damage of Nixon meeting with CPC officials.

⁷ "March 12: American Image of China," in *The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion 1972-1977, Volume 1: 1972-1975*, George H. Gallup, ed. (Wilmington, Del.: Scholarly Resources Inc., 1978), 20.

⁸ *Star Trek VI: The Undiscovered Country*, directed by Nicholas Meyer, (Paramount Pictures, 1991). Spock says the quote at 4:10 in this YouTube clip: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rW9WGibEF04> (Accessed 8 July 2020). Vulcans are a fictional race in the Star Trek universe.

⁹ For example see: Margaret MacMillan, *Nixon & Mao: The Week that Changed the World*, (New York: Random House, 2007); Chris Tudda, *A Cold War Turning Point: Nixon and China, 1969-1972*, (Baton Rouge: Louisiana University Press, 2012).

CPC leaders treated Nixon's visit as a significant moment in Sino-American relations.

Xinhua News releases on Premier Zhou Enlai and U.S. National Security Assistant Henry Kissinger's agreement on Nixon's trip, however, were muted.¹⁰ Additionally, before Nixon arrived in Beijing on 21 February 1972, PRC media continued to criticize both the United States and its President. On 30 January, a commentator for the *People's Daily*, whose piece was reprinted in the *PLA Daily* and *Beijing Daily*, claimed Nixon's State of the Union and budget that year were "a big pile of hollow words and word juggling, but he was still unable to cover up that U.S. imperialism is bogged down in crises, its situation declines day by day."¹¹ A few days later, editors for *People's Daily* criticized Nixon's characterization of the Paris Peace Talks, talks between Hanoi and Washington to end the ongoing Vietnam, or Second Indochina, War. On 25 January, Nixon made a televised address about the discussions with Hanoi, both public and private, after rejecting a peace plan proposed by North Vietnam representatives.¹² The *People's Daily* editorial cited a statement by North Vietnam to argue "Nixon's plan to toss out the 'Eight Point Peace Plan' is in order to befuddle the American people and world opinion, and shirk responsibility for blocking a peaceful resolution to the Vietnam problem, so that it [the United States] can continue pursuing its 'Vietnamization' plan for the war."¹³ Just days before Nixon arrived in Beijing, editors at PRC papers presented a Xinhua News article that criticized announcements he and U.S. Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird had made on U.S. foreign policy

¹⁰ 新華社, "公告," 解放軍報, 28 Oct. 1971.

¹¹ 《人民日報》評論員 "評美國總統咨文," 解放軍報, 30 Jan. 1972; 《人民日報》評論員 "評美國總統咨文," 北京日報, 30 Jan. 1972,.

¹² Richard Nixon, "Address to the Nation Making Public a Plan for Peace in Vietnam," 25 Jan. 1972, online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, accessed 21 July 2020, <https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/address-the-nation-making-public-plan-for-peace-vietnam>, The American Presidency Project.

¹³ 人民日報社論, "美帝必須立即停止侵越戰爭," 解放軍報, 4 Feb. 1972; 人民日報社論, "美帝必須立即停止侵越戰爭," 北京日報, 4 Feb. 1972.

claiming they “showed clearly the foreign policy of U.S. imperialism relies on ‘strength’ to serve as a backup force to carry out aggressive policies and power politics worldwide.”¹⁴

Not all PRC media coverage of the United States was negative prior to Nixon’s arrival. A Xinhua News reporter wrote about the welcome PRC delegates to the UN received from Americans in New York City. The piece quoted Qiao Guanhua saying “the American people are a great people, peoples of both the United States and China possess a profound friendship.”¹⁵ The article also related stories of people on the streets of New York giving warm welcome to PRC delegates. One anecdote related how a PRC delegate was strolling in Central Park when a lawyer and his wife came over to say “‘Welcome to New York! Your arrival here was the most significant event of 1971!’”¹⁶ Overall, however, PRC media continued to portray the United States and Nixon as rapacious imperialists and warmongers. CPC officials often separated the people from the state when they chastised other governments and the above article also demonstrated to PRC citizens that even Americans welcomed CPC control of the UN China seat. When Nixon and those accompanying him arrived in Beijing, however, public attacks on the United States and its President were replaced with detailed coverage of their activities and speeches.¹⁷ These reports were accompanied with many photos of PRC and U.S. officials and the events they participated in, including the iconic photo of Mao and Nixon shaking hands. The U.S. delegation and its activities in the PRC were covered extensively at the time and have

¹⁴ 新華社, “美國總統尼克松提出對外政策報告,” 解放軍報, 18 Feb. 1972; 新華社, “美國總統尼克松提出對外政策報告,” 北京日報, 18 Feb. 1972.

¹⁵ 新華社記者, “中, 美兩國人民的深厚友誼,” 解放軍報, 6 Jan. 1972; 新華社記者, “中美兩國人民的深厚友誼,” 北京日報, 6 Jan. 1972.

¹⁶ 新華社記者, “中, 美兩國人民的深厚友誼,” 解放軍報, 6 Jan. 1972; 新華社記者, “中美兩國人民的深厚友誼,” 北京日報, 6 Jan. 1972.

¹⁷ 新華社, “毛澤東主席會見尼克松總統,” 北京日報, 22 Feb. 1972; 新華社, “美國總統尼克松昨日到達北京周總理設宴歡迎尼克松和夫人,” 北京日報, 22 Feb. 1972; 新華社, “周恩來總理的祝酒詞,” 北京日報, 22 Feb. 1972; 新華社, “尼克松總統的祝酒詞,” 北京日報, 22 Feb. 1972.

continued to garner the attention of scholars. The CPC agenda for Nixon's trip, however, also demonstrated that officials in Beijing were well aware of the need to present China's historical heritage even as the Cultural Revolution encouraged people to assault Chinese traditions and beliefs.

In addition to meetings and banquets, CPC officials presented different aspects of PRC society and culture to their American guests. Nixon and other U.S. officials saw the Red Ballet *The Red Detachment of Women* with high-level CPC officials on their second evening in Beijing, which provided an intriguing photo of Mao's wife who was a member of the far left-wing, later labeled the Gang of Four, Jiang Qing 江青 standing between Nixon and his wife Thelma Catherine "Pat" Nixon.¹⁸ CPC officials also put on gymnastic exhibitions and gave factory tours for the visiting Americans. Cadres also demonstrated that China's cultural heritage was essential in presenting themselves as the rulers of China, despite their claims that China's past was something the Chinese people needed liberation from. On 24 February 1972, the third day of the U.S. delegation's visit, Foreign Minister Ji Pengfei 姬鵬飛 and Deputy Prime Minister Li Xiannian 李先念 took Nixon, Pat Nixon, and other U.S. officials to the Great Wall and the Ming Tombs just outside of Beijing (fig. 4.1).¹⁹ The following day, Vice Chairman of the Military Affairs Commission Marshall Ye Jianying 葉劍英 accompanied the Americans to the Palace Museum 故宮, or Forbidden City, and to see unearthed historical relics.²⁰ When Nixon and Pat Nixon visited Hangzhou, Zhou Enlai and CPC Secretary and Governor of Zhejiang Province Nan

¹⁸ 新華社, "尼克松總統和夫人觀看革命現代舞劇《紅色娘子軍》," 北京日報, 22 Feb. 1972.

¹⁹ 新華社, "尼克松總統和夫人遊覽長城和定陵," 北京日報, 25 Feb. 1972.

²⁰ 新華社, "尼克松總統和夫人參觀故宮和出土歷史文物," 北京日報, 26 Feb. 1972.

Ping 南萍 took them on a tour of Hangzhou's historical West Lake.²¹ Cadres Xu Hanbing 許寒冰 and Li Yumin 李玉民 also took Pat Nixon to see the West Lake's Lingyin Temple 靈隱寺, which lore claims was founded by the Indian monk Huili 慧理 in 326 CE.²²



Figure 4.6: Xinhua News Agency 新華社, “尼克松總統和夫人遊覽長城和定陵” [President Nixon and wife tour the Great Wall and Dingling], 北京日報, 25 Feb. 1972.

CPC officials treated the visiting American delegation to the physical manifestations of Chinese culture and traditions. That CPC leaders exhibited the cultural heritage of China to a head of state and their accompanying dignitaries was, on the surface, unsurprising. Nixon's visit, however, garnered international attention and occurred during the Cultural Revolution. Zhou Enlai had realized the significance of the Palace Museum and at the beginning of the Cultural Revolution in 1966 famously sent People's Liberation Army troops to protect it and its artifacts from Red Guards intent on destroying China's material past.²³ The Palace Museum, however,

²¹ 新華社, “尼克松總統和夫人離京到達杭州訪問,” 北京日報, 27 Feb. 1972, p. 1. UNESCO awarded the West Lake heritage site status in 2011, see: UNESCO, “West Lake Cultural Landscape of Hangzhou,” *World Heritage List*, accessed 8 July 2020, <https://whc.unesco.org/en/list/1334/>.

²² 新華社, “尼克松總統和夫人離京到達杭州訪問,” 北京日報, 27 Feb. 1972; “東晉南北朝,” *Lingyinsi.org*, Alvin, ed., 16 May 2014, accessed 8 July 2020 https://www.lingyinsi.org/detail_1051_8714.html.

²³ 謝蔭明, 瞿宛林, ““文化大革命”中誰保護故宮,” 党的文獻, accessed 8 July 2020, https://cul.sohu.com/20070119/n247712022_2.shtml.

was only one site of China's material culture and history people sought to destroy. Indeed, from the Summer Palace 頤和園 in Beijing to the Qixia Temple 棲霞寺 in Nanjing the scars of the Cultural Revolution left on China's material history remain visible decades later (figs. 4.2 & 4.3). The year after Nixon's visit the CPC launched the Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius Campaign that attacked Lin Biao as a reactionary who opposed the Party and was influenced by Confucian thinking. Consequently, CPC leaders taking their American visitors to historical sites in China was unusual for domestic audiences at the time. Zhou, Ji, and other high-level officials, however, demonstrated their awareness that to represent China, the CPC needed to fulfill the dictates of nationalism, particularly the plasticity of the nation through time. PRC membership in the UN resulted in Beijing establishing diplomatic ties with other states and in order to represent themselves as China they needed to present themselves as the inheritors of a nation with a past. Consequently, while CPC leaders could criticize Confucius for advocating slavery, they also needed to defend the historical imaginary of a nation that reached into the distant past.



Figure 4.7: Photo of damaged statues in the Thousand Buddha Grotto 千佛岩 of the Qixia Temple 棲霞寺, Nanjing. Photo by author, 2012.



Figure 4.8: Photo of a damaged statue, with head restored, in the Summer Palace 頤和園, Beijing. Photo by author, 2016.

The KMT and ROC media did not neglect Nixon's 1972 trip to the PRC. KMT officials, unsurprisingly, represented the moment quite differently than their counterparts across the Taiwan Strait. On 18 February 1972, shortly before Nixon arrived in Beijing, the ROC Foreign Ministry reiterated that the CPC "absolutely has no right to represent the people of the Chinese mainland" and any agreements made between the United States and the "communist bandit puppet regime" the "Republic of China government will refuse to accept without exception."²⁴ The National Assembly on 22 February also claimed the CPC did not represent the people and declared that Nixon's visit to the mainland had "deeply harmed the rights and interests of the Republic of China state" and "increased the suffering of mainland Chinese people."²⁵ The official KMT narrative reaffirmed their position that the CPC was a rogue element that did not represent the Chinese people. The Foreign Ministry reiterated the government would refuse to acknowledge any agreements between Washington and Beijing, highlighting that the PRC lacked

²⁴ 本報訊, "匪偽係一叛逆集團無權代表中國人民," 中央日報, 18 Feb. 1972.

²⁵ 本報訊, "國大發表嚴正聲明," 中央日報, 22 Feb. 1972; 本報訊, "國民大會發表嚴正聲明 匪偽無權代表我國人民," 聯合報, 22 Feb. 1972.

U.S. diplomatic recognition where the ROC was officially China in the United States. The National Assembly's statement pointed to Nixon's trip as harming both the Chinese people and state to represent the U.S. President was making a mistake in visiting the mainland.

ROC media did not rely solely on official statements from the government to discredit Nixon's trip. On 21 February 1972, editors at *China Daily News* wrote about a group of 3,500 Taiwanese university and college professors who claimed Nixon's visit "harmed friends, helped enemies, and at the same time disgraced the United States itself."²⁶ The number of scholars grew to 3,942 by the time they asserted that the mainland and its citizens were part of the ROC, reminded readers that Mao had led the PRC against the United States in Korea and Vietnam, and cited ROC-U.S. ties as Pacific neighbors who "traditionally had battled sincerely" together.²⁷

Central Daily News editors discussed the academics' letter saying:

In Chinese history, literati were the pillars of society, their support and opposition sufficiently represented the support and opposition of all popular sentiment. Qin Shi Huang's 秦始皇 savage method of burning books and burying Confucian scholars alive was intended to destroy the literati and secure his regime, but the result backfired and the second generation [of Qin emperors] was overthrown.²⁸

Qin Shi Huang founded the first imperial dynasty of China, the Qin, which only lasted from 221 to 206 BCE. The editorial invoked Qin Shi Huang and the short reign of his dynasty as a warning that Nixon should heed scholars who warned of dealing with the CPC. The scholars also reinforced KMT rhetoric that the ROC was the legitimate state of the Chinese nation by virtue of its adherence to a historical imaginary of China. Both the *Central Daily* and *China Daily News* printed the name of each scholars who had signed the statement, over several pages, providing

²⁶ 社論, "願再正告美國尼克森總統," 中華日報, 21 Feb. 1972.

²⁷ 本報訊, "大專教授三千餘人對美國總統提出忠告," 中央日報, 23 Feb. 1972.

²⁸ 社論, "中國知識分子的正義呼聲," 中央日報, 23 Feb. 1972.

readers a visual representation of several thousand modern-day literati opposing Nixon's visit to the PRC.²⁹

ROC media did not rely solely on scholars' protests, they also demonstrated ordinary Chinese were against Nixon going to Beijing. The Central News Agency published a photo of a man they described as a thirty-year-old shopkeeper and ROC citizen, surname Cai 蔡, who went to the U.S. embassy in Taipei to protest Nixon's trip (image 4.) The image shows Cai holding a sign that reads, in English, "Nixon—TRAITOR Stop to interfere in OUR **RIGHTS**," which editors translated into Chinese for readers, along with detailing his background and purpose.³⁰ *China Daily News* editors presented Cai and his protest before the U.S. embassy to show that regular citizens were active in their opposition to U.S. officials visiting the PRC. Whether or not Cai's message was widely circulated, *China Daily News* editors included it so ROC citizens in Tainan could see a Taipei protestor denouncing the visit. The Central News Agency reported that the General Secretary of the Overseas Chinese Salvation Federation Liang Ziheng 梁子衡 opposed Nixon's visit and any agreements made between the United States and the PRC. Liang stated that "regardless of what his [Nixon's] motives are, from overseas Chinese' point of view, he has already harmed reason and good sense, therefore overseas Chinese are unanimously opposed to this action by Nixon."³¹ The article portrayed Liang's statement as representative of all overseas Chinese. Editors at *Central Daily News* presented Liang's piece alongside a local report from the ROC National Worker Federation that also opposed Nixon's visit.³² *China Daily*

²⁹ 按姓氏筆劃順序排列, "中華民國大專院校教授對美國尼克森總統訪問匪區之聲明簽名教授名單," 中華日報, 23 Feb. 1972; 本報訊, "大專教授三千餘人對美國總統提出忠告," 中央日報, 23 Feb. 1972.

³⁰ 本報真收合眾國際社傳真照片, 中華日報, 23 Feb. 1972.

³¹ 中央社, 本報訊, "華僑一致反對尼克森匪區行," 中央日報, 23 Feb. 1972.

³² Ibid. The local reporting was presented, without an individual title, on the ROC National Worker Federation statement.

News reported over 1,800 members of the Chinese Literature Association had also written that the ROC was the only legitimate government of China in opposition to U.S. officials going to the PRC.³³ Editors maintained scholar attitudes reflected the attitudes of the people and Cai was a visual representation that ROC citizens felt betrayed by Nixon conversing and dining with CPC leaders. ROC media presented other organizations and citizens alongside scholars to show not only the widespread opposition to the visit, but also their support for the ROC and the KMT narrative that the people on the mainland were not represented by Beijing.



Figure 4.9: Genuine photo received from United Press International by this paper 本報真收合眾國際社傳真照片，中華日報，23 Feb. 1972.

Americans who opposed Nixon's visit or expressed support for the ROC were also featured in ROC papers. Before Nixon arrived in Beijing, *Central Daily News* editors ran a Central News Agency piece on members of the U.S. congress that "especially reminded President Nixon to take into account the United States and Republic of China's long-lasting relationship and their commitments."³⁴ The article cited U.S. House Minority Leader Gerald Ford, who "requested President Nixon stand by the Republic of China—United States' long-term

³³ 本報訊，"中國文協嚴正聲明，" 中華日報，24 Feb. 1972.

³⁴ 中央社，"與匪會談審慎將事顧及中美長期關係，" 中央日報，19 Feb. 1972.

alliance.”³⁵ A couple of days into Nixon’s trip, *United Daily News* ran another Central News article on a special meeting of the U.S. House of Representatives where members again expressed support for the ROC.³⁶ *Central Daily News* editors also printed a piece on U.S. Senator Stuart Symington discussing Washington’s pursuit of new relations with Asian countries and saying “forgetting the value of United States and Republic of China relations would be an extremely significant mistake.”³⁷ Another Central News Agency piece presented the results of a *New York Daily News* poll saying it “showed the desire that this U.S. administration’s senior officials must not abandon the Republic of China.”³⁸ Editors at *United Daily News* ran a piece by a “Washington Observer” who claimed “though he [Nixon] is making great efforts to improve CPC and U.S. relations, nevertheless liberal and conservative public figures are not all commenting favorably, ordinary citizens also display an equivalent indifference.”³⁹ ROC media also presented articles on American religious groups, authors, and others to demonstrate Nixon’s trip was unpopular throughout the United States.⁴⁰ ROC media portrayals of American support had verisimilitude, as American views of the ROC remained favorable and the PRC largely unfavorable in this period.⁴¹ KMT discourse presented widespread American suspicion of and opposition to Nixon visiting the PRC to assuage ROC audiences’ concerns Taipei might lose U.S. support so soon after losing UN membership.

³⁵ 中央社, “與匪會談審慎將事顧及中美長期關係,” 中央日報, 19 Feb. 1972.

³⁶ 中央社, “重申支持我國,” 聯合報, 25 Feb. 1972.

³⁷ 中央社, “美議員提出警告促勿忘中美盟誼,” 中央日報, 27 Feb. 1972.

³⁸ 中央社, “美輿論忠告尼克森切勿背棄中華民國,” 中華日報, 24 Feb. 1972.

³⁹ 中央社, “尼克森匪區行聲望大見跌落,” 聯合報, 26 Feb. 1972.

⁴⁰ 中央社, “八十位美國人白宮門前禮拜,” 聯合報, 22 Feb. 1972; 中央社, “麥堅泰在舊金山領導反攻大遊行,” 中央日報, 26 Feb. 1972; 合眾國際社, “尼克森騙人民,” 中華日報, 24 Feb. 1972.

⁴¹ In a Gallup Poll on foreign countries, Americans responded to “How would you rate Communist China?” with: Highly favorable, 3%, Fairly favorable, 20%, Fairly unfavorable, 25%, Highly unfavorable, 46%, No opinion, 6%. To “How would you rate Nationalist China?” they responded: Highly favorable, 10%, Fairly favorable, 43%, Fairly unfavorable, 25%, Highly unfavorable, 13%, No opinion, 9%. See: “June 30: Rating of Foreign Countries,” *The Gallup Poll*, 39.

ROC media coverage of Nixon's trip sought to bolster ROC legitimacy and demonstrate the ROC was losing neither popular nor official U.S. support. Official ROC statements that the CPC did not represent the Chinese people buttressed the KMT claim to represent China. ROC media presented ROC citizens and groups opposed to the trip, going so far as to call Nixon a traitor, to demonstrate that the ROC represented the Chinese people. Finally, by presenting U.S. members of congress and citizens warning Nixon to not change U.S. relations with an ally, editors mitigated fears Washington might recognize the PRC. Nixon's trip, coming just a few months after the ROC lost its UN membership, compounded the difficulties the KMT faced as they sought to maintain the illusion of their sovereignty over the Chinese nation. ROC media detailed citizens and officials in both the ROC and the United States discussing the traditional ties between the two states to demonstrate the KMT was losing support from neither ROC citizens nor Americans. ROC media reliance on tradition, with editors at *Central Daily* even going back to Qin Shi Haung, demonstrated that even as KMT claims to represent China had suffered from the loss of UN membership they continued to present themselves as the heirs of a Chinese nation that stretched back into antiquity. Whether scholars in Taiwan represented a new literati able to speak for the populace or not, however, Nixon's trip and experiences in the PRC problematized KMT reliance on culture and tradition to claim the right to represent the Chinese nation. While the KMT brought many artifacts with them to Taiwan, some of China's most iconic material history remained in the PRC. Although the Great Wall cannot be seen from space, it remains a rather difficult object to relocate. In other words, as the PRC won more allies and eased tensions with the outside world, foreign visitors would begin to associate Beijing with Chinese traditions simply by virtue of its physical manifestations that Red Guards may have defaced but could not obliterate.

Redefining the UN

CPC and KMT depictions of the UN shifted radically as each Party adjusted to the PRC representing China in the world body. Where PRC media had once portrayed the UN as an imperialist tool, they now portrayed it as an anti-imperial organization. Huang and other CPC officials tied the UN's new anti-imperialism to the PRC entering the organization. PRC delegates vetoed the Bangladesh application for UN membership and cited it as a demonstration that the organization now stood against imperialism. CPC officials also used their position in the UN to align the PRC with the Third World by attacking racism and apartheid in Africa. Casting the PRC in this light, the CPC represented the PRC as a Third World power that was an alternative to either U.S. or Soviet models of modernity. Conversely, where KMT officials had once employed their place in the UN as central to ROC legitimacy, they now attacked the legitimacy of the world body. KMT schadenfreude aside, ROC media presented assaults on U.S. prestige in the world body to suggest UN dysfunction in the wake of ROC expulsion, or withdrawal in KMT propaganda. Essentially, CPC officials had challenged the international legitimacy of the UN before representing China in the world body and now they defended UN authority in the international arena to bolster their own. KMT officials, on the other hand, had once relied on the international legitimacy of the UN to defend their state and now they sought to undermine UN authority on the international stage to lessen the effect of having lost it. The Chinese critics and defenders of the UN switched along with membership as each side transformed their narratives for a new reality.

The CPC was quick to transform their narrative that the UN was an imperial tool into one that presented the organization as a legitimate source of resistance to U.S. and Soviet imperialism. On New Year's Day 1972 an editorial published simultaneously in *People's Daily*,

Red Flag 紅旗, and *People's Liberation Army Daily* 解放軍報 declared “the era has passed when representatives of the two super powers sat together making backroom deals to wantonly manipulate the fate of other countries.”⁴² The editorial cited Beijing’s entry into the UN as both the result and cause of this change in international affairs. An Zhiyuan 安致遠, representing the PRC, argued in a speech at the UN Economic and Social Council that the government in Beijing was dedicated to defending weaker states in the international system.⁴³ Wang Junsheng, another PRC delegate, at that same meeting asserted that the PRC supported third-world countries because “China is a developing country. The Chinese people, who suffered long from imperialist oppression and exploitation, have profound sympathy for the people of developing countries in their miseries and predicament.”⁴⁴ PRC representatives employed the realities and discursive projections of a shared colonial history to avow their solidarity with the third-world.⁴⁵ After the UN’s twenty-seventh session in 1972 *Peking Review* editors ran a Xinhua News Agency piece that declared “for a long time, these [third-world] countries have been bitter against the power politics and hegemony of the superpowers but frequently would not dare to speak out. One of the characteristics of the 27th Session was that the representatives of a number of small and medium sized countries... made bold moves to condemn pointblank the hegemony of the two superpowers.”⁴⁶ While the article detailed other states’ challenges to the superpowers, it also focused on PRC representatives’ significant roles in those challenges. The piece was not explicit, but the most significant change in the UN’s twenty-seventh session was PRC delegates’ presence

⁴² 社論, “團結起來, 爭取更大的勝利,” 人民日報, 1 Jan. 1972.

⁴³ 新華社, “聯合國經社理事會舉行組織工作會意,” 人民日報, 8 Jan. 1972.

⁴⁴ “Struggle of the Developing Countries,” *Peking Review*, 14 July 1972, 16.

⁴⁵ Juan de Onis, “U.S. Denounced by Many at U.N. Parley” *New York Times*, 21 Apr. 1972; “Third World Countries Play Increasingly Important Role in International Affairs,” *Peking Review*, 27 Oct. 1972, 15-16.

⁴⁶ “Challenge to Superpowers’ Power Politics” *Peking Review*, 29 Dec. 1972, 10.

and willingness to stand up to the United States and Soviet Union. Thus, other states challenges to the superpowers were facilitated by the PRC holding its proper place in the world body.

U.S. officials prognosticated that CPC officials would cast Beijing as a defender of weaker states against the superpowers soon after it entered the UN.⁴⁷ Their forecasts proved correct. CPC officials and delegates sought to demonstrate that the world body was becoming a place where weaker states could stand up to the superpowers because Beijing now represented China in the organization. PRC advocates continued to assert Beijing's revolutionary internationalism was fundamentally different than the old order, but now they mobilized the UN's international legitimacy to bolster their claims and called on an historical imaginary to align the PRC with the Third World. CPC efforts to recast the UN from being an imperial tool to an anti-imperial one were apparent in many of the topics that came up for discussion in the UN, particularly on the Bangladesh application for membership and racism in Africa.

PRC delegates presented their position on Bangladeshi membership in the UN as anti-imperialism in the UN made manifest. On 8 August 1972 the Foreign Minister of the People's Republic of Bangladesh Abdus Sad Azad submitted Dhaka's request for UN membership to the Security Council.⁴⁸ The PRC delegation was the only member to oppose the Bangladesh application for membership when the Committee on the Admission of New Members met a few days later. Huang's objection was that two UN resolutions from 1971 had not been fulfilled. The resolutions were one passed by the General Assembly and a second by the Security Council that

⁴⁷ "Memorandum From John H. Holdridge of the National Security Council to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)" 22 Nov. 1971, *FRUS 1969-1976*, Vol. V, doc. 447.

⁴⁸ United Nations Security Council (UN SC), UN GA "Application of People's Republic of Bangladesh to membership in the United Nations. Note by Secretary-General (transmitting letter of 8 August 1972 from Minister for Foreign Affairs of People's Republic of Bangladesh)," S/10759 (A/8754), 8 Aug. 1972, accessed 26 July 2020, UN ODS.

India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh withdraw their armed forces to their own territories and uphold the Geneva Conventions of 1949, particularly on the repatriation of prisoners of war.⁴⁹ Pakistan's permanent representative to the UN A.I. Akhund detailed Islamabad's opposition in an official letter that argued the earlier UN resolutions on Bangladesh remained unfulfilled, but also claimed Dhaka had yet to repatriate 90,000 Pakistani prisoners and that it was not protecting non-Bengalis. Akhund used these pretexts to claim "'Bangladesh' is obstructing peace on the subcontinent. 'Bangladesh' has, thus, by its action and conduct, failed to show that it is a peace-loving State."⁵⁰ That Pakistan opposed Bangladesh entering the UN was not surprising. Akhund's language, reminiscent of ROC and U.S. arguments against the PRC after 1950, demonstrated how the debates on Chinese representation in the UN continued to shape questions of membership even after they were settled. Eleven delegations of the fifteen on the committee, including those from France, India, the United Kingdom, the USSR, and the United States, voted in favor of full consideration of Bangladesh's application despite the objections of the PRC and Pakistan.⁵¹ Pakistan, however, was not on the Security Council in 1972, so the opposition to Bangladesh's application was made by PRC delegates who now held China's permanent seat there.

PRC delegates portrayed their presence in the UN as a bulwark against imperialist manipulation of the organization during Security Council debates on Bangladesh membership. The Security Council deliberated on two proposals for Bangladesh membership on 24 and 25

⁴⁹ The first meeting of the committee to consider Bangladesh's application was on 11 August 1972. UN SC, "Report of the Committee on the Admission of New Members," S/10773, 23 Aug. 1972, accessed 21 July 2020, UN ODS.

⁵⁰ UN SC, "Letter dated 20 August 1972 from the Representative of Pakistan to the President of the Security Council," S/10766, 21 Aug. 1972, accessed 21 July 2020, UN ODS.

⁵¹ UN SC, "Report of the Committee on the Admission of New Members," S/10773, 23 Aug. 1972, accessed 21 July 2020, UN ODS.

August 1972. PRC delegates proposed the first which included a preamble that delayed Dhaka's membership until previous UN resolutions on the subcontinent were resolved.⁵² The second proposal made by India, the USSR, the United Kingdom, and Yugoslavia, called the four-power draft proposal, was a simple statement admitting Bangladesh.⁵³ Huang opened the debate explaining that Bangladesh must satisfy the 1971 resolutions before attaining membership. He argued the proposal was meant to uphold the UN Charter and principles of the organization. Huang concluded by stating "Since China is a Member of the United Nations it must act according to principles" and went on to claim:

If the Soviet Union, India, and other countries should insist on obstructing the passage of the very right and reasonable draft resolution submitted by the Chinese delegation... the Chinese delegation, in defence of the resolutions of the General Assembly and Security Council and the principle of the Charter, as well as the interests of the people on the South Asian subcontinent, will categorically vote against it.⁵⁴

Indian and Soviet delegations pushed most forcefully for Bangladeshi membership, though only PRC delegates were against its admission. On 24 August Indian representative Samar Sen asserted that China's draft resolution went against the first paragraph of Article 4 in the UN Charter. Article 4 stipulates "Membership in the United Nations is open to all peace-loving states which accept the obligations contained in the present Charter and, in the judgement of the organization, are able and willing to carry out these obligations."⁵⁵ Sen pointed to the International Court of Justice determination on Article 4 in 1948 that "the conditions stated in

⁵² UN SC, "China: draft resolution," S/10768, 21 Aug. 1972, accessed 21 July 2020, UN ODS; Consejo de Seguridad de las Naciones Unidas [United Nations Security Council], "China: proyecto de resolución, Corrección [China: draft resolution, correction]," S/19768/Corr.1, 23 Aug. 1972, accessed 21 July 2020, UN ODS.

⁵³ United Nations, "India, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and Yugoslavia: draft resolution," S/10771, 23 Aug. 1972, accessed 21 July 2020, UN ODS.

⁵⁴ United Nations, "1659th Meeting: 24 August 1972," *Security Council Official Records*, 24 August 1972, S.PV/1659, p. 2, accessed 21 July 2020, UN ODS.

⁵⁵ UN Charter, Ch. 2, Art. 4, § 1, accessed 21 July 2020, <http://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/chapter-ii/index.html>.

paragraph 1 Article 4 must therefore be regarded not merely as the necessary conditions, but as the conditions which suffice.”⁵⁶ Consequently, Sen claimed Huang’s proposal that Bangladeshi membership be postponed until previous UN resolutions were resolved had no bearing on Dhaka’s application. Sen also highlighted the size and population of Bangladesh and the number of member states that had recognized it as further evidence it deserved membership. Soviet and Yugoslav representatives reiterated many of Sen’s points, particularly on the legality of Bangladesh’s application under the Charter and the size of its population and number of diplomatic exchanges. In concluding his remarks that day, though, Sen also noted “Some of the arguments we have heard over the last two or three weeks remind us cruelly of identical arguments used not long ago to prevent the exercise of the legitimate rights of a much larger and more powerful Asian state.”⁵⁷ Sen’s rebuke of Huang was not subtle, as the state he eluded to was unequivocally the PRC. Advocates of Bangladeshi admission to the UN used arguments similar to those in support of the PRC before the organization passed Resolution 2758. PRC officials made claims that echoed those used against their own admission, an irony not lost on other delegates. That opponents’ and proponents’ rhetoric on Dhaka entering the UN mirrored the debates on Chinese representation demonstrate the institutional memory those arguments built in the world body. Thus, while the UN had resolved the question of which state represented China, that question had established the language and reasons delegates used when a state’s membership was contested.

The PRC proposal failed with three votes in favor and three against with nine abstentions, falling short of the nine votes needed to pass. Huang blamed Moscow and New Delhi for the

⁵⁶ UN SC , “1659th Meeting: 24 August 1972,” *Security Council Official Records*, 24 August 1972, S.PV/1659, p. 3, accessed 21 July 2020, UN ODS.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, 4, accessed 21 July 2020, UN ODS.

defeat. He maintained that the PRC draft resolution was reasonable and that it had been offered in defense of the Charter, “However, as the result of the strenuous obstruction and sabotage by the Soviet and Indian delegations, such a draft resolution, which is in full accord with the principles of the Charter, could not be adopted.”⁵⁸ Huang went further to claim that the entire question of Bangladesh only arose after “The Soviet Government supported the Indian Government in launching a war of aggression against Pakistan” in 1971.⁵⁹ Huang also found “It necessary to point out here that in recent years Soviet social-imperialism has played and is playing a most insidious role in the development of the situation on the South Asian subcontinent” and “In recent years, with honey in mouth and dagger in heart, they [the Soviets] have committed aggression, subversion, control and interference in the name of support and assistance against a series of third world countries.”⁶⁰ Huang demonstrated that the animosities between Moscow and Beijing that culminated in the Sino-Soviet Split, discussed in the second chapter, had not abated. He also substantiated that the CPC was not only willing to oppose a superpower in the UN, they were willing to publicly attack them to defend weaker states. Huang portrayed the role of China in the UN as a bulwark against great-power hegemony. When excluded from the UN, CPC officials had often claimed the organization had been subverted by imperial powers. With a place in the world body, however, CPC officials like Huang sought to demonstrate that era was over.

On 25 August 1972 Huang proved that the PRC was willing to use the power that a permanent seat on the Security Council afforded it. When the council met on 25 August, the

⁵⁸ UN SC, “1660th Meeting: 25 August 1972,” *Security Council Official Records*, 25 August 1972, S.PV/1659, p. 7, accessed 21 July 2020, UN ODS.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, 8, accessed 21 July 2020, UN ODS.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 9, accessed 21 July 2020, UN ODS.

delegations of Guinea, Somalia, and Sudan sought to add an addendum to the four-power draft resolution to delay membership until the prisoners of war issue was resolved. The Security Council voted four to four, with seven abstentions, to pass the amendment, thus rejecting it as it did not acquire the nine necessary votes in favor. The council then proceeded to vote on the four-power draft resolution admitting Bangladesh. Eleven states voted in favor, three abstained, and China voted against it, thus “*The draft resolution was not adopted, the negative vote being that of a permanent member of the Council.*”⁶¹ Huang reiterated that the veto was deployed to protect the principles of the UN in his explanation, but also stated “The people of the whole world are clearly aware that the Chinese people has [sic] consistently and firmly supported the just struggles of the oppressed nations and people of the world and firmly opposed imperialist schemes of aggression, interference, control and subversion. This is a fact that cannot be altered by any sophistry of social-imperialism.”⁶² Huang portrayed the veto as emblematic of how PRC participation in the world body signaled an end to imperial manipulation of the organization. PRC representatives were redefining the UN to claim its international authority in defense of the PRC’s depiction of China as a revolutionary nation. Now that Beijing had access to the UN’s international legitimacy it portrayed an organization revolutionized, transformed into a bulwark against superpower politics that the PRC could use to defend weaker states around the globe. In comparison to the ROC’s single use of its veto power, in 1955 against Mongolian UN membership because ROC representatives argued Mongolia remained a part of China discussed

⁶¹ UN SC, “1660th Meeting: 25 August 1972,” *Security Council Official Records*, 25 August 1972, S.PV/1659, p. 10, accessed 21 July 2020, UN ODS. Original emphasis.

⁶² *Ibid.*, 15, accessed 21 July 2020, UN ODS.

in the first chapter, the first PRC veto demonstrated Beijing was willing to act on matters not strictly in its own self-interest.⁶³

CPC officials did not limit their discussions on Bangladesh to the halls of the UN. PRC media also presented their delegates' anti-imperial rhetoric and actions to domestic audiences. A Xinhua News article, that appeared in local and national PRC papers, reprinted the entirety of Huang's 11 August 1972 statement on Bangladesh, alongside an analysis that reiterated the Soviet Union and India were behind its separation from Pakistan.⁶⁴ Editors at *Peking Review* also reprinted Huang's argument against the Security Council even considering Bangladeshi membership.⁶⁵ PRC media outlets again provided full transcripts of Huang's veto of Bangladesh membership along with analyses supporting the CPC narrative that "Our representatives uphold principles and cast vote opposing the proposal of Soviet, Indian, and other states."⁶⁶ CPC officials bolstered their image as influential actors on the world stage through their control of the UN's China seat, much as KMT officials had for the ROC. Editors reinforced not only Beijing's international legitimacy, but also its right to represent China domestically by reprinting Huang's arguments in the UN with supporting analyses. PRC media represented UN membership to the people to demonstrate not only that Beijing was a defender of weaker states, but also to show

⁶³ Bangladesh obtained UN membership in 1974.

⁶⁴ 新華社, "就'孟加拉國'申請加入聯合國問題發言," 解放軍報, 12 Aug. 1972; 新華社, "堅決反對目前審議「孟加拉國」加入聯合國問題," 北京日報, 12 Aug. 1972; 新華社, "聯合國安理會討論'孟加拉國'申請加入聯合國問題," 解放軍報, 12 Aug. 1972; 新華社, "聯合國安理會討論'孟加拉國'申請加入聯合國問題," 北京日報, 12 Aug. 1972.

⁶⁵ "Consideration of Bangla Desh's Application for U.N. Membership Opposed," *Peking Review*, 18 August 1972, 12-13.

⁶⁶ 新華社, "我代表堅持原則投票反對蘇印等國提案," 解放軍報, 27 Aug. 1972; 新華社, "我代表堅持原則投票反對蘇印等國提案," 北京日報, 27 Aug. 1972; "U.N. Security Council Debates on 'Bangla Desh's' Application for U.N. Membership," *Peking Review*, 1 Sept. 1972, 9; 新華社, "揭露蘇聯社會帝國主義企圖進一步控制南亞次大陸," 解放軍報, 27 Aug. 1972; 新華社, "揭露蘇聯社會帝國主義企圖進一步控制南亞次大陸," 北京日報, 27 Aug. 1972; "Soviet Social-Imperialism's Attempt to Further Control South Asian Subcontinent Exposed," *Peking Review*, 1 Sept. 1972, 6-9.

that the world accepted the PRC as China. Essentially, CPC officials transformed the organization that they had portrayed for decades as corrupted by imperialism into an anti-imperial bulwark by virtue of the PRC assuming its rightful place in the world body.

Africa was a focal point for CPC officials to demonstrate that Beijing was committed to the Third World in the UN. The PRC had long pursued friendly relations with African states, such as supporting TAZARA, as discussed in the second chapter, and a number of African states had reciprocated by championing PRC entry into the world body.⁶⁷ On 27 January 1972 Ji Pengfei, appointed after Chen Yi passed away earlier that month, denounced colonial legacies of racial discrimination and apartheid in Africa and stated “the Chinese Government considers that, in order to uphold the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter” the UN should support the end of racial discrimination in southern Africa.⁶⁸ Ji pointed out that “leaders of the Chinese government on many occasions as early as in the 1950s” had expressed “support of the African people and other non-white people in South Africa in their struggle for fundamental human rights and against racial discrimination.”⁶⁹ In the past, those efforts had been stymied by colonial and imperial powers in the UN, but now “the Chinese government is ready to work jointly with all countries within or without the United Nations that uphold justice” to work to end racial discrimination in Africa.⁷⁰ Deputy Permanent Representative of China to the UN Chen Chu 陳楚 presented Ji’s statements to the organization stating they would “expound on the

⁶⁷ For more on Sino-African relations see: Chris Alden, *China in Africa* (London: Zed Books, 2007); Jamie Monson, *Africa’s Freedom Railway: How a Chinese Development Project Changed Lives and Livelihoods in Tanzania* (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 2009).

⁶⁸ UN SC, UN GA, “Letter dated 27 January 1972 from the Deputy Permanent Representative of China to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General,” A/8660, S/10528, 28 Jan. 1972, p. 3, accessed 21 July 2020, UN ODS.

⁶⁹ Ibid., 2, accessed 21 July 2020, UN ODS.

⁷⁰ Ibid., 3, accessed 21 July 2020, UN ODS.

Chinese Government's stand for supporting national independence and opposing racial discrimination."⁷¹

From 28 January to 4 February the Security Council met in Addis Ababa to discuss matters pertaining to Africa. At one meeting there, Huang Hua argued that "according to the purposes and principles of the UN Charter, the United Nations should support the African people's just cause of opposing imperialism, colonialism and neocolonialism and winning and safeguarding national independence."⁷² Huang employed UN legitimacy to demonstrate that opposition by the PRC and African states to imperialism were in the spirit of the UN Charter, even though imperialist powers continued to thwart their efforts. A *People's Daily* editorial asserted that this opposition to imperialism had become possible because "after China's legal rights in the United Nations were restored, China's delegates in the United Nations General Assembly, Security Council, and other United Nations organizations repeatedly reaffirmed the Chinese government's solemn position of support for African people's struggle against racism and apartheid."⁷³ CPC officials' statements in the UN were also reprinted widely in PRC media.⁷⁴ Thus CPC officials were able to use Beijing's UN membership to demonstrate their value as a revolutionary power to Africa, as well as other third-world countries, while

⁷¹ UN SC, UN GA, "Letter dated 27 January 1972 from the Deputy Permanent Representative of China to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General," A/8660, S/10528, 28 Jan. 1972, p. 1, accessed 21 July 2020, UN ODS.

⁷² United Nations, "1630th Meeting: 31 January 1972," *Security Council Official Records*, S/PV.1630, p. 10, accessed 21 July 2020, UN ODS.

⁷³ "支持各國人民爭取民族獨立和基本人權的鬥爭," 人民日報, 1 June 1972.

⁷⁴ 新華社, "黃華代表就非洲問題作了總發言" 解放軍報, 1 Feb. 1972; "China's Position on Racial Discrimination In Some Areas of Africa," *Peking Review*, 4 Feb. 1972, 14-15; "China Supports Africa's Struggle Against Imperialism and Colonialism" *Peking Review*, 11 Feb. 1972, 15-17; "Supports Just Stand of African Countries," *Peking Review*, 3 Mar. 1972, 18; 新華社, "中國人民堅決支持非洲人民的反帝反殖鬥爭," 北京日報, 24 Nov. 1972.

simultaneously reaffirming the authority of the UN in international affairs that Beijing now had access to.

In Taiwan, the KMT sought to mitigate the damage the ROC's loss of UN membership had on their domestic legitimacy. On 18 October 1971 a *Central Daily* editorial claimed the UN's destruction was already underway. The editorial cited past statements by CPC officials that the UN was an imperial tool and detailed Beijing's continued attacks on U.S. imperialism in the UN.⁷⁵ By December, *China News Daily* argued that UN proceedings had degenerated to the point that "the Republic of China need feel no regret at its absence from such proceedings. This country is saving money and not lending its name and personnel to nonsense."⁷⁶ The editorial cited tensions between the PRC and Soviet Union as the cause for degeneration of debate in the UN and justified the ROC's absence from the world body. Chiang Kai-shek delivered a 1972 New Year's Day message that maintained the ROC had withdrawn from the UN, rather than been expelled, and its withdrawal was actually a "step taken in pursuit of our determination to defend the principles of the U.N. Charter, which we feel were violated by the admission of the Mao Tse-tung regime."⁷⁷ He went on to assert that since the PRC had entered the UN "the Maoist delegates have already behaved so outrageously and viciously that the United Nations is today no longer what it was. Do not be surprised if future developments should lead to the quickened disintegration of the world body."⁷⁸ Chiang simultaneously upheld the ROC's position on the international stage, while questioning that of the UN. He equated the CPC's adherence to revolution as an accelerant in the UN's demise. In another address, Chiang reiterated the UN

⁷⁵ "聯合國毀滅的開始," 人民日報, 18 Nov. 1971.

⁷⁶ "From the editorial page" *Free China Review*, Jan. 1972, 55.

⁷⁷ "President Chiang Kai-shek's New Year's Day message" *Free China Review*, Jan. 1972, 75.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*

lacked international authority because it had “destroyed its own Charter and position” by admitting the PRC and that “the United Nations has ignored righteousness and justice and has bowed to evil and submitted to violence.”⁷⁹ Chiang also employed Nixon’s “silent majority” rhetoric to claim that world opinion supported the ROC in its continuing struggle against communism. Claims by Chiang and ROC media that the UN was in decline were consistent with earlier KMT predictions that the UN would not survive without the ROC. Essentially, KMT officials had established a narrative that the ROC was integral to the UN that they invoked once the PRC had taken their place in the world body. The UN faded in ROC media significantly in 1972 and its appearances remained infrequent on the pages of papers in Taiwan, if appearing at all, thereafter. Not long after the passage of Resolution 2758, KMT leaders focused less and less on the world body as they shifted their claims for domestic and international legitimacy away from the UN.

ROC media did not rely solely on KMT officials to claim the UN had declined and its collapse was imminent. A Central News Agency article on an overseas Chinese meeting in the Chinatown of San Francisco, California, shortly after Resolution 2758 was passed reiterated international support for the ROC and the narrative of UN decline. One local leader, Zhou Jiajing 周家京, claimed the UN decision caused a great disappointment but that the majority of overseas Chinese continued to support the ROC. Zhou concluded by saying that “The United Nations action tolerating Beiping [Beijing] to enter the organization and expelling the Republic of China is extremely immoral, is dangerous, is a symbol this world organization has begun on the path of its final days.”⁸⁰ Lin Die 林疊, another leader, said that by tolerating “Beiping’s”

⁷⁹ “President Chiang Kai-shek’s Freedom Day message” *Free China Review*, Feb. 1972, 75.

⁸⁰ 中央社, “全美華僑聲明 支持政府決策,” 聯合報, 30 Oct. 1972.

entry, “the United Nations is presently disintegrating, it will follow in the footsteps of the League of Nations.”⁸¹ In 1972, as the UN was opening its twenty-seventh session, another Central News Agency article published in *Central Daily News* reported on a meeting of the U.S. Free China Committee. Walter Judd was responsible for this committee. Judd was a former U.S. Congressman who had long supported Chiang Kai-shek and had been a principle member of the Committee of One Million that opposed any U.S. recognition of the PRC beginning in the 1950s. The Central News Agency article on the meeting reaffirmed the PRC was not maintaining peace and stability as a UN member and quoted Judd asking “Beiping will or has by the United Nations to what extent been transformed—Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai always say they can cause the United Nations to transform?”⁸² Judd’s question was rhetorical, a device to demonstrate that the PRC would change the UN, and not for the better. As per KMT and pro-KMT discourse, PRC influence in the UN would inherently harm the organization and its mission to protect world peace. Members of San Francisco’s Chinatown and Judd reaffirmed KMT rhetoric that PRC entry into the UN signaled the world body’s decline. Lin’s comment that the UN would collapse much as the League of Nations had was a common trope in KMT discourse on the organization, that also surfaced in CPC discourse.

The UN’s 1971 transfer of Chinese representation from the ROC to the PRC had a profound impact on both parties’ depictions of the organization. CPC officials wielded the UN’s international legitimacy to position themselves as the champions of weak states. Huang and other officials portrayed vetoing Bangladeshi membership in the world body as not against the people of Bangladesh, but as opposing Soviet and Indian machinations against Pakistan. Likewise, PRC

⁸¹ 中央社, “全美華僑聲明 支持政府決策,” 聯合報, 30 Oct. 1972.

⁸² 中央社, “例舉共匪罪狀 斥聯合國可恥,” 中央日報, 27 Oct. 1972.

delegates to the world body challenged apartheid and racism in Africa to simultaneously defend weaker states as they emerged from colonialism and criticize the old order. CPC officials presented their presence in the UN as the remedy to the imperial illness they had once diagnosed within the world body. The ROC, on the other hand, lost a key claim to its international authority that threatened its domestic legitimacy as well. KMT officials sought to mitigate this challenge in the immediate aftermath of Resolution 2758 by proclaiming the end was nigh for the UN. By 1972, however, ROC media made little mention of the world body. Much as the General Assembly's resolution to seat the PRC made the ROC cease to exist in the UN, KMT officials and media allowed the UN to fade away for the people in Taiwan.

The ROC Adrift

KMT officials turned to the economy to defend the ROC's position on the international stage after the UN passed Resolution 2758. At a meeting between ROC and U.S. officials shortly after the PRC had replaced the ROC in the UN, ROC Foreign Minister Chow Shu-kai 周書楷 detailed that the economy and external security would become Taipei's main concerns.⁸³ By December 1971 "Chow told the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Legislative Yuan that foreign policy would be closely coordinated with economic goals."⁸⁴ ROC Minister of Economic Affairs Sun Yun-suan 孫運璿 argued that "the superiority of our economic system is a sure guarantee that we shall be able to deal the Chinese Communists a smashing blow and win the economic war."⁸⁵ An advisor for the Council for Economic Cooperation and Development also declared the ROC "will have to wage an economic offensive against the Chinese Communists."⁸⁶ KMT

⁸³ "Memorandum of Conversation," 29 Oct. 1971, *FRUS 1968-1976*, Vol. V, doc. 433.

⁸⁴ Chang Meng-hao, "Toward China's tomorrow" *Free China Review*, Dec. 1971, 14.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, 15.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*

officials redefined the competition for international legitimacy as economic rather than diplomatic. Taipei maintained trade relations with states even after they had recognized the PRC and cut diplomatic ties with the ROC, thus KMT officials sought to use economic relations to compensate for official diplomacy.

KMT officials also advocated creating an alternative to the UN. The secretary-general of the ROC National Security Council, Huang Shao-ku 黃少谷, proposed the creation of an alternate “United Nations of Culture, Art, and People” to replace the existing and, in KMT rhetoric, now discredited UN. “We shall devote even greater efforts to the promotion of economic, trade and cultural contacts with all nations,” he argued.⁸⁷ Huang insinuated that the Cultural Revolution in the PRC demonstrated the CPC was unable to represent the Chinese nation, but also focused on the ROC economy as a significant factor in international relations. The World Anti-Communism Alliance held their seventh annual meeting in Washington in 1974 and published a bulletin of the meeting’s conclusions. Among other recommended actions, the Alliance “called for disbanding the United Nations” and establishing a new organization dedicated to universal human rights.⁸⁸ The KMT remained dedicated to employing culture and tradition, evinced in the Cultural Renaissance, to present the ROC as the true government of China. Huang’s and the Alliance’s calls for alternatives to the UN, however, also stressed that the ROC should use its growing economy to enhance its international position.

The ROC economic turn appeared successful in its early stages. By July 1972 a *Free China Review* piece highlighted Taiwan’s economic strength and noted “nearly three quarters of a year have passed since the U.N. episode and several months since Nixon’s trip to the China

⁸⁷ Chang Meng-hao, “Toward China’s tomorrow” *Free China Review*, Dec. 1971, 17.

⁸⁸ 中央社, “世盟強調解救大陸 鼓勵反毛反攻行動,” 中央日報, 13 Apr. 1974.

mainland. Not one dire prediction [of investors fleeing the ROC] has come to pass. External investment in the first months of 1972 exceeded that in the comparable period of 1971.”⁸⁹ After Beijing replaced Taipei in the UN, KMT officials turned to the economy to defend the right of the ROC to act as China on the world stage. They even portrayed economics as offensive, casting economic competition as a war with the government in Beijing. Additionally, the turn to the economy allowed KMT advocates to argue UN membership was unnecessary for Taipei’s international position as people continued to invest in and states trade with the ROC despite its exclusion from the world body. Thus, after Resolution 2758, KMT officials began to rely on the economy to defend Taipei’s international prestige rather than the legitimacy UN membership had provided. The ROC economy and informal relations with other states, however, were a reaction to Taipei’s sudden and quick decline on the international stage.

States began establishing formal diplomatic relations with Beijing quickly after the PRC replaced the ROC in the UN. Seven states switched recognition in the few months left in 1971 after the General Assembly passed Resolution 2758. In 1972 another eighteen states followed suit. By 1978 twenty-eight more states would recognize Beijing, bringing the total during this period to fifty-eight. Some of these new relations were with recently decolonized nations, such as Cape Verde which gained independence from Portugal in 1975, but other states, such as Thailand, Australia, and Spain, switched recognition from Taipei to Beijing. The PRC also exchanged ambassadors with the United Kingdom in 1972, elevating their relations to full diplomatic status over two decades after the CPC initially refused London’s 1950 recognition. The international legitimacy of the UN was central to the dramatic diplomatic shift in favor of the PRC. KMT officials turned to the economy to legitimate the ROC as an international entity

⁸⁹ Chen Ying-che, “Expression of confidence,” *Free China Review*, July 1972, 8.

as more states established diplomatic relations with the PRC. ROC leaders like Chow and Huang elevated ROC economic diplomacy because even as states, such as Canada and Italy in 1971, severed diplomatic ties with the ROC they maintained economic ones.⁹⁰

One of the most disturbing diplomatic reversals for the ROC was Japan's recognition of the PRC on 29 September 1972. CPC leaders not only celebrated their diplomatic coup over the KMT, they again demonstrated the importance of China's national imaginary in international relations. The PRC-Japanese joint statement on the establishment of diplomatic relations stated in its second point that the "Japanese government recognizes the government of the People's Republic of China is the sole legal government of China." The third point asserted that "Taiwan is an inseparable part of the People's Republic of China's territory."⁹¹ These two points of the joint statement highlight that the one-China policy made diplomatic relations with either the PRC or ROC a zero-sum game. Both the CPC and KMT were unyielding in representing their state as the sole legitimate government of China. Consequently, any state that recognized one had to break off diplomatic relations with the other. The language of the joint statement was, therefore, commensurate with those made between the PRC and other states, but no less a challenge to KMT leaders. More significantly, however, was how PRC media presented Sino-Japanese relations to the people and the importance they placed on culture.

PRC media detailed a shared national imaginary that Sino-Japanese relations stretched back into antiquity. *People's Daily* editors claimed in an editorial, reprinted in *PLA Daily* and *Beijing Daily*, that "China and Japan have a two-thousand-year history of relations."⁹² Editors at

⁹⁰ "In Taiwan, an Uneasy Calm" *New York Times*, 24 Jan. 1972.

⁹¹ 新華社, "中華人民共和國 日本國政府 兩盒聲明," 北京日報, 30 Sept. 1972.

⁹² 人民日報社論, "中日關係史的新篇章," 解放軍報, 30 Sept. 1972; 人民日報社論, "中日關係史的新篇章," 北京日報, 30 Sept. 1972.

Beijing Daily included two other Xinhua News articles with statements on the two-thousand-years of friendship between China and Japan.⁹³ In one of those pieces, dedicated to the history of Sino-Japanese cultural exchange, the author went back to the ancient historian Ban Gu's 班固 the *History of Han* 漢書 written in the first century.⁹⁴ The article stressed Sino-Japanese friendship had started in ancient times when Chinese and Japanese made contact on the Korean peninsula and the seas. It stressed that "Chinese and Japanese people braved perilous stormy seas, endured the hardship of drifting for months at sea, not recoiling in the least, persisting in visiting each other, seeking friendship, seeking knowledge" and established a Sino-Japanese history of friendly relations.⁹⁵ Even as the Cultural Revolution challenged Chinese traditions and culture, PRC media represented the establishment of relations with Japan as the resumption of an enduring relationship that stretched back millennia. Despite CPC rhetoric on the ignominy of history and traditional Chinese culture, in diplomatic relations the Party was attentive to the dictates of nationalism that maintain nations are perpetual, existing both forward and backward in time. The emphasis on a historical friendship was also likely meant to ameliorate years of anti-Japanese sentiment in the PRC. That these pieces all focused on an ancient relationship, though, demonstrates that CPC leaders were aware of the significance of presenting themselves as the inheritors of Chinese culture even as they sought to abolish it. As more states recognized the PRC after the UN passed Resolution 2758, CPC officials had to mold their state into the China the world recognized. Thus, Xinhua News presented Ban Gu's work to establish an historical

⁹³ 新華社, "我國的近鄰—日本," 北京日報, 30 Sept. 1972; 新華社, "歷史悠久的中日兩國文化交流," 北京日報, 30 Sept. 1972.

⁹⁴ 新華社, "歷史悠久的中日兩國文化交流," 北京日報, 30 Sept. 1972.

⁹⁵ Ibid.

imaginary of two-thousand years of Sino-Japanese relations even as reading Ban Gu's work remained verboten in the PRC.

Although *Free China Review* editors published an article that avowed the change in ROC-Japan relations was "received in Taipei with reactions more of sorrow than of anger," this was a serious diplomatic setback for the KMT.⁹⁶ Yang Ming-che, the author, asserted that Taiwan's economic strength would ameliorate any potential harm from Japan's change in diplomatic ties. He cited the strength of the Taipei stock market and that Japanese officials wanted to maintain economic ties with the ROC. The reason Tokyo would not cut ties with Taipei was that "Japan would obviously prefer not to sacrifice the Taiwan market even if that on the mainland were bigger, which it is not."⁹⁷ The author's argument was based on Taiwan's economic growth which was contrasted with the mainland's economic malaise during the Cultural Revolution. By 1973 Taipei only maintained diplomatic ties with thirty-one countries, while Beijing was recognized by eighty-nine states as China's legitimate government.⁹⁸ As the diplomatic tide turned against the ROC, its economy became the defining feature of its right to represent China. While countries severed diplomatic ties with Taipei, ROC media argued that these countries remained economically invested in Taiwan. So even as the ROC's competition for international legitimacy with the PRC was diplomatically in decline, KMT officials mobilized the economy to defend their country's authority on the international stage.

KMT efforts to mobilize the economy to defend ROC authority to represent China were problematic. In 1972 the ROC had a GDP of \$7.999 million and a population of 15.141 million, or \$528 per capita, where the PRC had a GDP of \$113.688 million and a population of 871.770

⁹⁶ Yang Ming-che, "More in sorrow than in anger" *Free China Review*, Oct. 1972, 19.

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, 21.

⁹⁸ Kau, "Taiwan and Beijing's Campaign for Unification," 188.

million, or \$130 per capita. Consequently, Yang's position was not based on material reality but perception. The PRC market, whether by GDP or population, was considerably larger than that of the ROC, though ROC citizens had more purchasing power than their PRC counterparts. As the decade progressed, KMT leaders succeeded in increasing ROC GDP a staggering 240 percent to \$27.186 million, or a per capita of \$1,602, in 1978. The CPC also improved the PRC's economy, though it contracted from 1977, and in 1978 it had increased the GDP a more modest 32 percent to \$149.541 million, or \$155 per capita. In comparison, the U.S. economy grew 84 percent from 1972 to 1978 and Japan's grew 219 percent.⁹⁹ Thus the PRC economy lagged behind other states,' particularly in the region, but it was not stagnate over this period. While KMT officials mobilized the economy to defend their claim to represent the Chinese nation and maintained economic ties with states even as they lost diplomatic recognition, the ROC quite simply could not compete with the PRC's territory and population. When Deng instituted economic reforms in the PRC in 1978, he effectively dissolved the economic foundation for the KMT right to represent China.

UN Resolution 2758 changed the PRC and ROC competition to represent China on the international stage dramatically. While Kissinger arranged Nixon's trip to the PRC before the UN passed the resolution, even his visit to plan Nixon's later one made international headlines and elevated Beijing's status. The PRC's inclusion in the world body also led to it establishing diplomatic relations with states that had recognized the ROC, as well as recently decolonized

⁹⁹ Amounts are in 2019 U.S. dollars and percentages are rounded to the nearest hundredth. Figures available on countryeconomy.com, "Taiwan GDP-Gross Domestic Product," "Taiwan-Population," "China GDP-Gross Domestic Product," "China-Population," "United States (USA) GDP-Gross Domestic Product," "Japan GDP-Gross Domestic Product," accessed 21 July 2020, <https://countryeconomy.com>. The World Bank does not present separate data on the ROC, which they identify as "Taiwan, China," for their explanation see: The World Bank, "Where are Your Data on Taiwan?" accessed 21 July 2020, <https://datahelpdesk.worldbank.org/knowledgebase/articles/114933-where-are-your-data-on-taiwan>.

nations. CPC leaders demonstrated that, along with UN membership and increased diplomatic ties, the PRC had to represent a China familiar to the world. Thus, Nixon walked the Great Wall, toured the Forbidden City, and participated in other activities celebrating an ancient Chinese culture in addition to enjoying Red Dramas or acrobatics. PRC media also invoked an imaginary past to claim two-thousand years of relations with Japan. Essentially, to represent China, CPC officials had to present a China already familiar to the world. KMT officials, on the other hand, presented statesmen, scholars, and citizens from both Taiwan and the United States either opposing Nixon's visit or warning him to not change U.S.-ROC relations. These ROC and American officials, citizens, and scholars demonstrated that the United States continued to recognize Taipei as the legitimate government of China. As more states established diplomatic relations with the PRC, however, KMT leaders elevated their economic focus and diplomacy to defend their international legitimacy. Without UN membership or some of the most enduring symbols of China, KMT officials had to defend their right to represent China and, as one of the Four Asian Tigers, economic diplomacy was the route they chose.

Resurrecting the Past in the PRC

The 1970s were a period of significant change in the PRC. Even though the Cultural Revolution was entering its sixth year in 1972, CPC leaders had endeavored to increasingly rein in some of its excesses. In 1973, the Party reinstituted the National College Entrance Examination and students started returning to schools and universities. Revolution, however, remained the sine qua non of CPC rhetoric and people's lives during this period. The Party's 1974 launch of the Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius Campaign 批林批孔 marked a period of intense attacks on China's most renowned scholar for being a reactionary and supporter of slavery. The campaign, though, also opened discussions on Chinese history for people in the

PRC. Consequently, even as CPC leaders and PRC scholars attacked the legacy of Confucius, they renewed people's focus on the mythos of a China that existed in the distant past. Zhou Enlai died in January of 1976; Mao passed that September. Hua Guofeng, who Mao had recently elevated as his successor, took control of the CPC and within a few weeks arrested the most radical members of the Party who became known simply as the Gang of Four. PRC media, as well as Party leaders, laid blame on the Gang of Four for the Cultural Revolution's excesses. Deng Xiaoping successfully sidelined Hua Guofeng and by 1978 the PRC would undergo reform rather than revolution.

Lin Biao, who replaced Liu Shaoqi after his ouster, was part of the CPC's inner circle and a significant participant in the ongoing Cultural Revolution. According to officials in Beijing, however, in 1971 Lin plotted to assassinate Mao. Mao had eliminated the position of chairman of state, Liu's old position, which put Lin directly behind Zhou in the party hierarchy. Lin's plot was discovered, and he attempted to flee with his family by plane to the Soviet Union. Lin's plane crashed in Mongolia on 13 September 1971 and there were no survivors. PRC media did not initially disclose that Mao's close comrade-in-arms, as PRC discourse characterized him, had betrayed the Party and state. Indeed, Xinhua News continued to present speeches and letters from foreign officials that referenced Lin after the date of his purported plot and demise.¹⁰⁰ Lin's position by Mao's side was not mere rhetoric, as PRC media often presented images of him beside the Chairman with his copy of *Quotations From Mao Zedong*, or Little Red Book, in hand (fig. 4.5). Consequently, the Party's declaration in 1973 that Lin was a traitor was greeted with some skepticism by the public, unlike their denunciations of Liu in 1966. To overcome this

¹⁰⁰ 新華社, “黎清毅夫總理的講話,” 解放軍報, 26 Sept. 1971; 新華社, “阿爾巴尼亞黨政領導同志點我黨政政領導同志 最熱烈祝賀中華人民共和國成立二十二週年,” 解放軍報, 1 Oct. 1971.

potential challenge to CPC domestic legitimacy, officials launched one of the most audacious campaign of the Cultural Revolution: The Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius Campaign.¹⁰¹ That CPC leaders launched a campaign against Lin for purportedly supporting Confucianism was an odd tactic. As late as 1964, Mao himself praised elements of Confucian teachings. Other high-level cadres had also expressed support for aspects of Confucianism.¹⁰² Confucius and his teachings, however, also represented the Four Olds Lin had urged people to destroy early in the Cultural Revolution: old customs, old culture, old habits, and old thinking. Thus, there was some irony in the CPC linking Lin to Confucius to attack him as a counterrevolutionary.



Figure 4.10: 北京日報, 1 July 1971. The caption below reads: 偉大領袖毛主席和他的親密戰友林彪副主席 [Great leader Chairman Mao and his close comrade-in-arms Vice Chairman Lin Biao].

The CPC launched the Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius Campaign to simultaneously justify Lin's ouster and further the goal of the Cultural Revolution to liberate PRC citizens from the shackles of traditional Chinese culture. The Shanghai branch of the Ministry of Communications presented an interpretation of the campaign's importance and pointed out that

¹⁰¹ Jonathan Spence, *The Search for Modern China*, 3rd Ed., (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2013), 554-555, 570-573.

¹⁰² A. James Gregor and Maria Hsia Chang, "Anti-Confucianism: Mao's Last Campaign," *Asian Survey* 19, no. 11 (Nov. 1979), 1073-92. The discussion on Mao's earlier support for some Confucian teaching is on p. 1077.

to support the revolution people “must also break completely with old traditions, concepts, and practices.”¹⁰³ Tsinghua University students in Beijing met to condemn Confucius and Lin stating that “everyone recognized the doctrine of Confucius and Mencius were the monarchs’ philosophy, in Chinese history representatives figures of the reactionary ruling classes used them as reactionary-thought weapons to oppress laborers.” The title of the article stated, emphatically, that Lin was a disciple of Confucius.¹⁰⁴ Students at Peking University also met and declared “everyone recognized that Lin Biao’s reactionary thinking can be traced to the doctrines of Confucius and Mencius, Lin Biao is a dyed-in-the-wool disciple of Confucius.”¹⁰⁵ CPC officials in Shanghai and students in Beijing demonstrated similar understandings of the campaign as it began. Confucius was a reactionary, Lin followed Confucian philosophy: therefore, Lin was a reactionary. The party line, commensurate with the Cultural Revolution, was that people needed liberation from this outmoded way of thinking to avoid becoming reactionaries themselves.

What, however, was the outmoded way of thinking people should fight against? Zhu Youzhang 朱有章, a political commissar in the PLA, pointed out some people might think “Confucius died more than 2,000 years ago, I have not read his books, his influence is not great, I do not have any good criticisms.”¹⁰⁶ Zhu went on to argue that, though Confucius died millennia earlier, his thoughts expressed “the interests of slave owners and nobles, and can be used to serve all exploiting classes.”¹⁰⁷ Zhu encouraged people to criticize Confucius, but his piece highlighted one of the campaigns initial problems. People in the PRC knew of Confucius

¹⁰³ 本報訊, “批孔是批林的一個組成部分,” 解放軍報, 25 Jan. 1974.

¹⁰⁴ 本報訊, “林彪是一個地地道道的孔老二的信徒,” 北京日報, 25 Jan. 1974.

¹⁰⁵ 本報訊, “動員群眾繼續深入開展批林批孔鬥爭,” 北京日報, 29 Jan. 1974.

¹⁰⁶ 朱有章, “抓好批林批孔這件大事,” 解放軍報, 25 Jan. 1974.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid.

and could accept the link between Lin and Confucianism, but they lacked sufficient knowledge to critique the sage.

PRC media and CPC officials first had to open up the rhetorical space to attack the man whose philosophies had influenced the region that became China for millennia as well as educate them on his perfidy. In March of 1973, editors at *PLA Daily* published a poem that opened “Restore monarchies founder—Kong Qiu, conservatives lean on him, reactionaries exalt him, restored monarchies rely on him, that is right he is Confucius 孔老二, from time immemorial an evil tyrant.”¹⁰⁸ The poem went on to detail Lin’s comity with Confucius and ridiculed them both for being run over by “the wheels of history.”¹⁰⁹ The authors of the poem, Yi Sha 易莎 and Lu Yang 魯泱, also denigrated Confucius by discursively diminishing his stature, a rhetorical device employed by authors during this campaign. In Chinese, writers use the courtesy name of Confucius, *Kongfuzi* 孔夫子, sometimes shortened to *Kongzi* 孔子. Late into 1973, authors who attacked Confucius still used his courtesy name.¹¹⁰ By 1974, however, journalists, students, and officials in the PRC predominately referred to Confucius by either his given name, Kong Qiu 孔丘, or as second son of Kong, *Kong Lao'er* 孔老二, as he was his father’s second-born son. In the poem, Yi and Lu present Confucius first by his given name then the diminutive title to strip away the dignity bestowed by his courtesy name. This discursive diminution of Confucius in the PRC allowed his critics, including the authors of the articles cited above, to symbolically denude

¹⁰⁸ 易莎, 魯泱, “嘲孔老二師徒,” 解放軍報, 11 Mar. 1974.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid.

¹¹⁰ 史斌, “孔子是逆歷史潮流, 與人民為敵的反動份子,” 新北大, 18 Sept. 1973; 勁雲戈, “右傾機會主義和孔子思想,” 解放軍報, 22 Nov. 1973.

his stature in Chinese philosophy and tradition. Thus, as PRC media informed the people on the sage's sins, they did so in a way that also reduced the significance attached to *Kongfuzi*.

PRC media published a flurry of articles to fill in citizens' lacuna of knowledge on Confucius and why his teachings were odious. Xu Songyan 徐松延, a soldier, wrote that Confucius' concept of benevolence was ludicrous because he supported class separation. Xu also stated the "the 'benevolent' second son of Kong 孔老二 only spoke of 'benevolence' to slaveholders and nobles, to the revolutionaries who dared touch the exploitative slave system, he was dedicated to repression."¹¹¹ Zhang Xuelin 張學林, a soldier in Beijing who only had three years of education but who repeatedly studied the party line and Mao Zedong Thought, found five instances where Lin Biao had quoted "restrain yourself and return to the rites 克己復禮" from the *Analects*. Zhang claimed Confucius "wanted slaves to 'restrain themselves,' not to revolt, and to accept the oppression of the slave-holding class" and that "'return to rites' is simply restore the monarchy."¹¹² Zhang's position on the meaning of "restrain yourself and return to the rites" was similar to that of the students at Tsinghua and Peking University who had claimed Lin had meant it to "restore the old order of capitalism."¹¹³ Jin Zhibai 靳志柏, an author, wrote a polemic arguing CPC leaders from Chen Duxiu to Mao had always opposed Confucianism. Jin opened his piece with "Kong Qiu served as the first fight-to-the-finish reactionary class in Chinese history—serving as the ideological representative for the waning slave-holding class," and closed with "the second son of Kong 孔老二 worked to the bone to

¹¹¹ 徐松延, "愛人民 恨敵人," 解放軍報, 26 Jan. 1974.

¹¹² "反覆學習黨的基本路線 五次批判 '克己復禮'" 解放軍報, 13 Apr. 1974.

¹¹³ 本報訊, "林彪是一個地地道道的孔老二的信徒," 北京日報, 25 Jan. 1974; 本報訊, "動員群眾繼續深入開展批林批孔鬥爭," 北京日報, 29 Jan. 1974.

restore the monarchies' slave system and long ago became a laughing stock of history.”¹¹⁴ As this brief selection shows, PRC media asserted Confucius' protected slave holders, the bourgeoisie, and oppressed slaves, the people. Xu posited that the Confucian concept of benevolence was impossible in a class-based society. Zhang highlighted “restrain yourself and return to the rites” really meant that the oppressed should obey their oppressors and maintain monarchical rule. Jin reiterated CPC revolutionaries had always opposed Confucius as a reactionary and representative of slave holders, despite evidence to the contrary. Xu, Zhang, and Jin were by no means the only participants in redefining Confucian tenets for the Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius Campaign as PRC media was saturated with anti-Confucian articles. PRC citizens' renewed focus on the imagined continuity of Chinese history, however, had an unintended consequence.

The attacks by citizens, scholars, soldiers, and officials on Confucius in PRC media resulted in significant public attention to an historical China from which to derive lessons for modern China. Scholars began writing articles on the ancient competition between Legalism and Confucianism. Qin Shi Huang founded China's first dynasty based on Legalist philosophy which advocated consolidation of power in the state and sovereign with strict laws to encourage stability. Han Fei, the principle philosopher of Legalism, considered Confucianism utopian and under Qin Shi Huang Confucianists were killed and their works destroyed. Legalism and Qin Shi Huang were reviled after the Han took dynastic control from the Qin and based their rule on Confucianism, though Han and future dynastic administrations relied on the Qin's Legalist foundation. During the Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius Campaign, CPC commentators rehabilitated Qin Shi Huang and his role in Chinese history. A PLA propagandist based in

¹¹⁴ 靳志柏, “批孔與路線鬥爭,” 解放軍報, 5 July 1974; 靳志柏, “批孔與路線鬥爭,” 北京日報, 5 July 1974.

Hunan, Shi Shiyin 石世印, argued that based on the perfidy of Confucianism, Qin Shi Huang killing Confucians and burning their writings was “at that time, obviously a progressive measure to counter usurpers’ restoration of monarchy, and was a revolutionary dictatorship against reactionaries.”¹¹⁵ Editors at *People’s Daily*, *PLA Daily*, and *Beijing Daily* all published a piece by the Mass Criticism Group at Peking and Tsinghua Universities writing under the name Liang Xiao 梁效.¹¹⁶ The students drew on the literary classic *Dream of the Red Chamber* 紅樓夢 to critique Confucianism.¹¹⁷ The students’ article was likely inspired by a piece written by Peking University professors for *Beijing Daily* in 1973. The professors, however, had invoked the classic as a critique against feudalism rather than Confucianism and it was presented to a local audience.¹¹⁸ Editors at *Peking Review* published a piece on Liuxia Zhi, who was called Robber Zhi 盜跖 in the *Zhuangzi* 莊子. The *Zhuangzi* is an eponymous work written by the sage Zhuangzi 莊子 during the Spring and Autumn period (770-476 BCE) that is a foundational text for Daoism. Editors introduced the piece on Robber Zhi, as “*the following article describes and comments on Liuhsia Chih’s [Liuxia Zhi’s] actions against the slave system and discusses his main points criticizing Confucius.*”¹¹⁹ At the CPC’s call to Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius, editors, students, and authors reimagined figures from ancient Chinese history and classical Chinese literature to demonstrate the perfidy of Confucianism.

The Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius Campaign resulted in PRC media and citizens presenting an historical imaginary of China that stretched back to antiquity. CPC leaders

¹¹⁵ 石世印, “林彪孔丘愚昧政策的破產,” 解放軍報, 11 Feb. 1974.

¹¹⁶ 梁效 is a homophone for *liang xiao* 兩校 (two universities).

¹¹⁷ 梁效, “封建模式的孔老二,” 解放軍報, 29 June 1974; 梁效, “封建模式的孔老二,” 北京日報, 7 July 1974.

¹¹⁸ 陳熙中, 胡經之, 侯忠義, “《紅樓夢》—形象的封建社會沒落史,” 北京日報, 22 Sept. 1973.

¹¹⁹ Tang Hsiao-wen, “Liuhsia Chih Denounces Confucius,” *Peking Review*, 21 June 1974, p. 7. Original emphasis.

envisioned the campaign as a way to discredit Lin as he had, on occasion, quoted Confucius.

Scholars, editors, and propagandists, however, had to explain why Confucius and his philosophy were wrong. This led them to reinterpret Chinese history and literary classics to demonstrate that China's revolutionary spirit went back to the ideological competition between Confucians and Legalists. Essentially, CPC officials and cadres used PRC media to present revolution as a Chinese tradition. While CPC leaders had long presented the Taiping Civil War (1850-64) as a revolutionary movement, scholars in the PRC during the campaign took that revolutionary spirit back to Qin Shi Huang. The CPC, whether intentionally or not, was reenacting KMT efforts to define revolution as a Chinese tradition. PRC media represented China's revolutionary tradition quite differently than ROC media, but the emphasis on the past to defend the present was the same. After Resolution 2758, CPC leaders realized that Chinese culture and history was valuable in presenting "China" to other states, consequently PRC media portrayed Chinese history displaying a revolutionary tradition even in the depths of a campaign to expel the remnants of traditional Chinese culture.

On 9 September 1976 Mao Zedong, the Great Helmsman of the CPC's modern China and avatar of revolution in the PRC, passed away. Mao was preceded in death that January by Premier Zhou Enlai, the PRC's consummate diplomat. The CPC Central Committee had made Hua Guofeng the acting premier in February and in April its first vice-chairman and premier of the State Council. Thus, Hua became the leader of the PRC when Mao died, and he set out to present himself in Mao's image. Less than a month after Mao died, Hua arrested the most radical members of the CPC to shore up his power and labeled this group the Gang of Four. The Gang of Four included: Yao Wenyuan 姚文元, a literary critic and politician; Zhang Chunqiao, 張春橋 head of the Shanghai CPC; Wang Hongwen 王洪文, a close associate of Zhang; and Jiang Qing,

a former actress, Mao's third wife, and purported leader of the ultra-leftist group. The CPC made the groups arrest public on 22 November, at a rally of 150,000 to support Hua's chairmanship of the Party in Beijing. Editors at *Beijing Daily* reported that the people "angrily denounced the heinous crimes of the 'Gang of Four.'"¹²⁰ The *PLA Daily* also reported that the crowds "angrily denounced the heinous crimes of the Wang Hongwen, Zhang Chunqiao, Jiang Qing, Tao Wen Yuan anti-party group that usurped party and state powers."¹²¹ The CPC blamed the excesses of the Cultural Revolution on the Gang of Four, claiming they had gone against Mao. The Party also rehabilitated leaders who had been purged during the ten years of tumult. Among those leaders was Deng Xiaoping, who had twice been stripped of leadership roles in the CPC. Thus, the CPC simultaneously ended the Cultural Revolution and placed the blame for the period on the Gang of Four, allowing the PRC to return to normalcy. The PRC's new normal, however, would not be the normal it had experienced from 1949 to 1966.

PRC citizens had lived with revolution for nearly three decades by 1976. With the end of the Cultural Revolution and Mao's reign, the CPC became less focused on revolution as an end. While the Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius Campaign represented one of the most explicit attacks on Chinese tradition and culture of the Cultural Revolution era, the CPC decision to castigate the scholar was also using a historical imaginary for mass politics. In 1975, the historian Merle Goldman argued in the *China Quarterly* that the discussion of China's ancient past "for the generation born after 1949, who knew nothing of history except for the modern era, and even those born after the May Fourth movement, when the past was rejected, this campaign

¹²⁰ "熱烈慶祝華國鋒統治任中共中央主席，中央軍委主席 熱烈慶祝粉碎「四人幫」反黨集團篡黨奪權陰謀的偉大行李，" 北京日報，22 Oct. 1976.

¹²¹ "熱烈慶祝華國鋒統治任中共中央主席，中央軍委主席 熱烈慶祝粉碎「四人幫」反黨集團篡黨奪權陰謀的偉大行李，" 解放軍報，22 Oct. 1976.

must have been a sharp awakening.”¹²² While Goldman did not acknowledge the work of historians in China or Taiwan, the extended public discussion and focus on an ancient China in the PRC were new.

PRC citizens, officials and scholars debated the tenets of Confucianism, Legalism, and Daoism, analyzed their foundational texts in classical Chinese, and reproduced versions of them in vernacular Chinese. The Criticize Confucius, Criticize Lin Campaign represented China to the PRC public as a nation that had existed since antiquity. Whether CPC leaders launched the campaign to reconsolidate power or eradicate traditional Chinese culture once and for all, the campaign reinforced the temporal plasticity of nationalism that maintains nations have always existed. The CPC’s newfound interest in history occurred as they were presenting foreign visitors China’s historical material culture to bolster their claim to represent the Chinese nation and detailing historical relationships with other states. For CPC leaders, history, and the tradition and culture bound up in its retelling, was not solely for the benefit of visiting delegations, it also became a central focus for their citizenry. As more states recognized the PRC as China, the CPC became more dedicated to preserving and presenting a nation whose roots stretched back into antiquity than to revolutionizing the people.

ROC Domestic Events

The KMT entered the 1970s facing a series of challenges to its authority to represent the Chinese nation. The UN’s expulsion of the ROC in favor in the PRC was only the first in a series of international setbacks for the beleaguered KMT. More U.S. leaders visited the PRC after

¹²² Merle Goldman, “China’s Anti-Confucian Campaign,” *The China Quarterly*, no 63 (Sep. 1975), 435-462: 461-62. For a critique of Goldman’s argument that the campaign was primarily to reinforce centralism and unity at the end of the Cultural Revolution see: A. James Gregor and Maria Hsia Chang, “Anti-Confucianism: Mao’s Last Campaign,” *Asian Survey* 19, no. 11 (Nov. 1979), 1073-92.

Nixon and states continued to switch diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Beijing. Amid these international difficulties, Chiang Kai-shek still referenced a China that went back to the Xia or Zhou dynasties in his national addresses, but references to international appeasement began to overshadow his representations of China's imagined historical legacy. The ROC continued to celebrate the Cultural Renaissance, and criticized the attacks on Confucius in the PRC, but the activities around the movement were routinized in the media. Even as the CPC's assault on traditional Chinese culture continued, the KMT emphasis on China as a nation of traditions and culture lessened domestically. As the PRC drew more international support and recognition, KMT officials' ability to represent the ROC as the repository of Chinese tradition and culture were challenged by the extant artifacts the CPC possessed. In 1975 Chiang passed away and though the country mourned, the change in leadership did not result in a substantive change in policy.

By 1972, Chiang's national addresses focused less on the national imaginary of a China that existed for millennia and more on the KMT's successes in recent history. In his 1972 Double Ten Day statement, Chiang began with a call to remember the history of the national revolution, followed with a discussion of Sun Yat-sen and the unification of China through the KMT's Northern Expedition. Chiang was invoking a markedly different historical past, one focused on the twentieth century revolution, not antiquity. A key theme in the address, one highlighted by *Central Daily News* editors, was "international appeasement sinisterly lingers on in successive challenges."¹²³ Editors at *China Daily News* reiterated Chiang's theme of appeasement stating that "today the countercurrent of international appeasement and communist bandits smiling faces

¹²³ 中央社, "總統書告全國軍民同胞," 中央日報, 10 Oct. 1972; 中央社, "總統發表國慶文告," 聯合報, 10 Oct. 1972.

towards foreign expansion together result in the wicked helping the wicked.”¹²⁴ In Chiang’s 1973 New Year’s message, however, he claimed “from the first century to now, the life blood of Chinese people [中國人] all streamed from the energetic, vigorous action of the nation [民族], moreover contained in the profound and long-lasting moral integrity of culture.”¹²⁵ For National Day in 1973 Chiang maintained the KMT’s revolutionary successes in the Northern Expedition and War of Resistance all occurred as “international forces appeased our enemies.”¹²⁶ In 1974, Chiang again told ROC citizens Sun Yat-sen had succeeded in China’s national revolution, discussed the Three Principles’ of the People, and cited the importance of China’s five-thousand year history. He also made a point that the “traitor Mao’s 毛賊 large effort on the mainland to ‘criticize Confucius’ ‘praise Qin’ is an attempt to destroy, repress, and carve up the corpse of historical culture’s origins.”¹²⁷ The term Chiang used for Mao Zedong, 毛賊, that appeared often in ROC media, also means petty thief or pilferer, which was a way to diminish him. Chiang’s public discourse after Resolution 2758 maintained KMT tropes established after 1949. He continued to cite the importance of traditional Chinese culture, Sun Yat-sen and his Three Principles’ of the People, and criticized the CPC. One change in his rhetoric, however, were the references to appeasement. By discussing the PRC’s rising position on the international stage as appeasement, Chiang portrayed the ROC as stalwart in its defense of democracy and liberty. Though unnamed, the appeasers in Chiang’s rhetoric were those states who recognized the PRC. Chiang was associating these states with those that had failed to check Adolf Hitler and Nazi

¹²⁴ 社論, “再造辛亥革命的光輝勝利,” 中華日報, 10 Oct. 1972.

¹²⁵ 中央社, “六十二年開國紀念,” 聯合報, 1 Jan. 1973.

¹²⁶ 中央社, “總統昭告全國軍民 衝破橫逆再開新局,” 中華日報, 10 Oct. 1973; 中央社, “總統勉勵沈著果決 衝破橫逆再開新局,” 聯合報, 10 Oct. 1973.

¹²⁷ 本報訊, “總統書勉全國軍民 奮鬥復國有志竟成,” 中華日報, 10 Oct. 1974.

Germany aggression as they began expanding in Europe. Representing the ROC's loss of diplomatic status as defending ideals associated with the "free world," or American-style liberal democracy, lessened the internal perception of the ROC's loss of international legitimacy as impinging on domestic legitimacy. The KMT was, after all, acting in the interest of the world.

The KMT Cultural Renaissance continued throughout the seventies, but the once prominent campaign garnered less attention in this period. In September 1973, *Central Daily News* published a series of articles by the philosopher Wang Bangxiong 王邦雄 on the Cultural Renaissance Movement and modernization. Wang argued the movement's goal of modernization through analyzing culture was to "save the nation from disaster and ensure its survival," the same goal of literati and scholars for a century.¹²⁸ In the final piece, Wang opened with "Our modernization, in the final analysis, is not the same as Japan's or other Afro-Asian countries able to not run up against so much traditional resistance, able to not pass through long periods of excessive changes of traditional transformation."¹²⁹ Wang referenced Chinese culture's unique challenge to highlight the uniqueness of Chinese culture compared to those of other societies. Wang's thoughtful analysis of culture and modernization in China, however, did not receive as much attention as earlier commentaries on the Cultural Renaissance. ROC media continued to cover activities and pieces on the movement, particularly those by the well-known politician who was editor-in-chief of a publication dedicated to the Cultural Renaissance Chen Lifu 陳立夫, but the focus on Chinese culture waned after 1971.¹³⁰ KMT dedication to presenting their state as the bastion of Chinese culture became less pronounced after the UN passed Resolution 2758. As

¹²⁸ 王邦雄, "文化復興與現代化, 上," 中央日報, 8 Sept. 1973.

¹²⁹ 王邦雄, "文化復興與現代化, 下," 中央日報, 10 Sept. 1973.

¹³⁰ "文化復興與工作展望," 中央日報, 12 Nov. 1973; 本報訊, "文化復興會擬定計劃充實國民精神生活," 中央日報, 5 Sept. 1974; 本報訊, "發揚三民主義精神 推行文化復興運動," 中央日報, 4 Nov. 1974.

more states' dignitaries visited the PRC, the ROC's claims to represent China based on honoring traditional Chinese culture were undercut by the material culture extant in Beijing, Xi'an, Nanjing, and many other locations across the Taiwan Strait. Despite the CPC's continued attacks on tradition and culture, the KMT representation of the ROC as the bastion of Chinese culture and tradition suffered as the leaders of other nations stood atop the Great Wall, toured the Forbidden City, or strolled along the West Lake.

On 5 April 1975, Chiang Kai-shek passed away. He had led the KMT on the Northern Expedition, governed China through the War of Resistance against Japan, fought the CPC for years until the KMT was defeated in the Chinese Civil War, and then reestablished the ROC on Taiwan. Chiang Kai-shek was as much part of the ROC pantheon of nationalist leaders as Sun Yat-sen, not entirely dissimilar to Mao's position in the PRC. With Chiang's passing, however, the ROC did not undergo a dramatic shift in its policies or leadership. C.K. Yen 嚴家淦, ROC vice-president, took over the presidency for the remainder of Chiang's term. On 20 May 1978 the ROC National Assembly elected Chiang Ching-kuo 蔣經國 the new President of the ROC.

Conclusion

The UN passage of Resolution 2758 significantly changed the competition between the CPC and KMT to represent China. In the UN, PRC delegates depicted their presence as a bulwark against imperialism, defender of decolonization, and opponent of racism. CPC leaders had access to the international legitimacy of the UN and controlled most of China's historical territory. Consequently, the CPC was more committed to presenting a China the world recognized for visiting heads of state, like Nixon, or in establishing diplomatic relations, like Japan. Even as the CPC launched the Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius Campaign, PRC media deepened representations of a China that stretched into antiquity. Essentially, CPC leaders and

pundits repurposed Chinese culture and traditions to defend their right to represent China. KMT officials, once among the staunchest defenders of the UN, claimed the world body was now infected with communism and would not long survive the ROC's absence. KMT leaders, bereft of both the UN's international legitimacy and the majority of China's historical territory, also suffered challenges to their authority to represent China as the leader of their most prominent ally visited their sworn enemies and states severed diplomatic ties with Taipei. ROC media focused on ROC opprobrium and U.S. supporters to mitigate Nixon's visit to Beijing and turned to economic diplomacy to defend their place on the world stage. Essentially, KMT officials' portrayals of the ROC as a bastion of Chinese culture and tradition could not compete with the material culture of China extant in the PRC. Domestically, however, KMT propaganda did not undergo significant changes.

In 1978, new leaders took the helms of the PRC and ROC. Deng Xiaoping was able to secure his control of the party at the Third Plenum of the Eleventh Central Committee of the CPC. While socialism remained important, Deng made the economy the foundation of the Party, or socialism with Chinese characteristics. The ROC National Assembly elected Chiang Ching-kuo as the ROC's new president. Although Chiang did not initially set out to reform the ROC, he was left little choice as Deng's Reform and Opening Up policy resulted in rapid economic growth in the PRC. Essentially, Deng undercut KMT officials' attempts to redefine their authority as China based on ROC economic performance. Thus, as the seventies drew to a close, the CPC and KMT competition to represent China had undergone seismic transformations.

Chapter 5

Students and States, 1978-1992

It was rainy, but not too cold, in Washington D.C. on 31 December 1978.¹ The weather must have seemed appropriate to Republic of China Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs H.K. Yang 楊西崑, who would later become known as “Mr. Africa 非洲先生” for his long-serving role as ROC Ambassador to South Africa. That dreary December evening, Yang stood outside and watched as the ROC flag was lowered for the last time in the U.S. capitol (fig. 5.1).² Eight years earlier, Yang had urged ROC President Chiang Kai-shek to engage in sweeping reforms to the government on Taiwan ahead of the UN passage of Resolution 2758 that replaced Taipei with Beijing in the world body. Yang’s proposed reforms included changing the name of the Kuomintang-led state from the Republic of China 中國民國 to the Chinese Republic of Taiwan 中華台灣共和國.³ Yang sought the name change in order to express Taiwan’s complete independence from “China,” only including the ethnic descriptor “Chinese” to indicate the identity of many people on Taiwan, a formulation similar to Arab republics. Yang was ahead of his time. He told U.S. Ambassador to the ROC Walter P. McConaughey Jr. in 1971 that “Chiang [Kai-shek] was impressively open-minded and willing to listen,” but Soong Mei-ling 宋美齡, Chiang’s wife, “seems determined not to budge an inch from the old claims, pretensions and

¹ “The Weather,” *Washington Post*, 1 Jan. 1979.

² Editors at *Central Daily News* included the photo on 2 January 1979. 王嗣佑, “我駐美大使館舉行降旗典禮,” 中央日報, 2 Jan. 1979.

³ 台灣新聞組, “譚慎格講往事: 楊西崑增提「中華台灣共和國」” 世界新聞網 [worldjournal.com], 17 Mar. 2014, accessed 21 July 2020, https://archive.is/20140422043331/http://www.worldjournal.com/view/full_van/24749352/article-譚慎格講往事-楊西崑曾提-中華台灣共和國-?instance=bc_bull_left1#selection-967.0-967.21.

‘return to the Mainland’ slogans.”⁴ In the end, Chiang did not act on Yang’s radical proposal and the Republic of China remained. Thus, Yang stood in Washington and watched as the ROC flag was lowered for the last time on American soil. Yang had wanted to end the zero-sum competition between the People’s Republic of China and the ROC to represent China, but he had been unsuccessful. The next day, 1 January 1979, the United States and PRC established formal diplomatic relations. The PRC’s flag would now fly in the U.S. capitol, as it did at the UN’s New York headquarters. The ROC had within a decade lost its seat in the UN and diplomatic ties with its primary benefactor. As the United States joined many other governments in rejecting KMT authority as China, ROC politicians and leaders had to reframe their depictions of the nation they sought to represent.



Figure 5.11: “Last Flag-Lowering,” *Los Angeles Times*, 1 Jan. 1979.

By 1979, the PRC’s and ROC’s competition to represent “China” had largely concluded.

In 1978 twenty-one states recognized the ROC to the one-hundred-and-twelve for the PRC.

Compared to 1971 this was a dramatic reversal, as Taipei had represented China in the UN and

⁴ “Telegram From the Embassy in the Republic of China to the Department of State,” 30 Nov. 1971, in *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976*, Vol. XVII, China, 1969-1972, Steven E. Phillips, ed., (Washington: U.S. GPO, 2006), doc. 174.

had been recognized by sixty-eight governments to the PRC's fifty-three. By 1990, the ROC managed to increase its diplomatic ties to twenty-eight states, but the PRC had also increased its relations to one-hundred-and-thirty-nine.⁵ The KMT had lost international credibility as the representative of the Chinese nation. The CPC, on the other hand, faced little challenge to its claims that it represented China. Consequently, both parties' and their respective states' national imaginaries underwent significant changes during the 1980s. Under Deng Xiaoping's leadership, the CPC moved away from representing China as a revolutionary nation and emphasized economic growth and social stability. The KMT, now led by Chiang Kai-shek's son Chiang Ching-kuo, started to reform the ROC. Student protests in the PRC in 1989, however, would culminate in Beijing definitively demonstrating revolution was solely the purview of the CPC while student protests in the ROC in 1990 led the KMT to heed student calls and revolutionize the ROC.

On the international stage, the CPC's depictions of the Chinese nation were no longer challenged in a meaningful way. Sino-American Normalization in 1979, even by its very name, challenged any remaining claims by the KMT that they represented China. With U.S. recognition, the PRC was accepted by all the major powers, as well as many minor ones, as the sole government of China. When the CPC sent the People's Liberation Army to resolve border disputes with Vietnam in 1979, it was similarly represented as the Sino-Vietnam War. By 1980 the PRC was China. The ROC was Taiwan, the Pescadores, and some of China's offshore islands, but the CPC ensured states continued to recognize those areas as a part of China when establishing formal diplomatic ties.

⁵ Michael Y.M. Kau, "Taiwan's and Beijing's Campaigns for Unification," in *Taiwan in a Time of Transition*, eds. Harvey Feldman and Michael Y.M. Kau, (New York: Paragon House, 1988): 188.

With their international legitimacy unchallenged, the CPC changed their definition of China from a revolutionary nation to a reformist one. The CPC's new perspective on reform, however, was not without radical implications for the people of China. In 1979, the Party sought to revolutionize the economy through the One-Child Policy. CPC leaders adopted this campaign as a way to safeguard the PRC's economic growth, but the results led to international opprobrium and domestic resistance. Though the CPC kept the policy in place for decades, they curtailed the more draconic aspects to mitigate external and internal challenges to their prestige. International pressure had become a greater factor in CPC decision making than it had been during its years of international isolation. It was students, however, who forced CPC leadership to emphatically distance the PRC from revolution. In 1986 students protested for greater participation in the government. Those protests were significant but did not receive much international attention. In 1989 students once again agitated for significant changes to CPC governance. Students began the 1989 Democracy Spring in Beijing as they occupied Tiananmen Square, where seventy years earlier student protests were celebrated as the May Fourth Movement and forty years earlier Mao Zedong had proclaimed the founding of the PRC. The 1989 protests drew international attention, and, on 4 June, the CPC forcefully expelled the protestors from the square. The CPC's message was clear: people calling for revolution was no longer tolerated in the PRC. Thus, as the CPC no longer faced challenges to its representation of China, it was no longer restrained by past claims that China was revolutionary. China was what the CPC said it was.

Internationally isolated, the KMT was no longer constrained by narratives that it represented a Chinese nation beholden to millennia of tradition. Throughout this era, the KMT slowly began to make governmental reforms to allow greater political participation by the

Taiwanese people. In 1986 Chiang lifted martial law, allowing even greater public participation and debate in Taiwan's governance. The Democratic Progressive Party 民主進步黨 (DPP) arose from opposition groups in the ROC and became a viable alternative in newly competitive local elections. Students, however, were also the catalyst of change in the ROC. In 1990, students were dissatisfied with the pace of reform and, similar to their peers in Beijing a year earlier, students gathered at Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Square in Taipei to protest. KMT leaders responded by hearing and agreeing to the students' demands. By 1992, the ROC underwent a political revolution as their final claims to represent China were discarded in favor of representing Taiwan. Essentially, the KMT was no longer constrained by the national imaginary of China and revolutionized the state to reflect the demands of the people.

The International Stage

By 1979, few states challenged PRC authority to act and define China on the international stage. Sino-American Normalization that year signaled that all major powers accepted that the government in Beijing represented China. PRC media and CPC officials celebrated their diplomatic victory, particularly the U.S. agreement that Taiwan was a part of China. ROC media and KMT officials sought to mitigate this disaster for their foreign relations by highlighting continued American support. The U.S. Congress did pass the Taiwan-Relations Act to continue offering some assistance to their former ally, but that did little to diminish the reality that Beijing now represented China in the United States. That same year, the PRC nominally went to war with Vietnam over border disputes. In the Sino-Vietnam, or Third Indochina, War, Beijing demonstrated a continued willingness to use force to defend its borders, as well as project power in international affairs. Despite the PRC's brief foray into military

adventurism in Vietnam, there was no debate the CPC represented China on the international stage in the 1980s.

Sino-American Normalization

The United States change in diplomatic relationship with the ROC and PRC had significant political consequences for both the KMT and CPC. For the KMT, U.S. recognition of the PRC posed a significant challenge to ROC legitimacy. Chiang and other KMT leaders represented the loss as not only damaging to the ROC but also the free world. ROC media also provided reports of continued American popular and congressional support for Taipei and criticisms of Carter's decision to mitigate perceptions of Taiwan's isolation. Taipei's discussion of history and culture, however, devoted little attention to China's national imaginary as they focused on the U.S.-ROC relationship since the KMT had relocated to Taiwan. For the CPC, U.S. recognition of their state was celebrated as a momentous occasion that signaled their unchallenged legitimacy to represent China. CPC leaders portrayed their diplomatic victory as the beginning of Taiwan's reunification with the mainland. PRC media in their discussions of Sino-American relations and Taiwan's place in China relied on the national imaginary of an historical China that stretched back into antiquity. After eight years as China in the UN, Sino-American Normalization signaled near-universal acceptance of the CPC's claim to represent the Chinese nation. With that acceptance, CPC leaders and PRC media turned to Chinese history and tradition as they presented China to the world.

KMT leaders were given little time to prepare either the party or the people for the ROC's loss of U.S. recognition. It was after 2 a.m. 16 December 1978 in Taipei when U.S. Ambassador to the ROC Leonard S. Unger informed Chiang that the United States would recognize the PRC on 1 January 1979. U.S. President Jimmy Carter's administration planned to

make the announcement public at 9 p.m. 15 December eastern standard time in the United States, or 10 a.m. 16 December in Taiwan. U.S. Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance had directed Unger to inform Chiang that all previous U.S.-ROC agreements would remain in place, except for the 1954 Mutual Defense Treaty, and Washington would continue to sell Taipei defensive weapons.⁶ These assurances did little to ameliorate the news for Chiang. Unger reported “President Chiang took my presentation very badly and predicted the gravest consequences.”⁷ Those consequences included the destabilization of Taiwan, handing the island over to the PRC, and that people around the world would lose confidence in the United States. Chiang “said bitterly that in past he had great confidence in the U.S. and never imagined the U.S. would proceed in this way.”⁸ As for Unger’s request not to divulge the information before the formal announcement, Chiang responded “to make such a tremendous decision and give the GROC [government of the ROC] only seven hours’ notice and no opportunity for discussion,” he could not guarantee he would keep the decision private.⁹ Chiang’s sense of betrayal was palpable and he was not alone in his shock. The U.S. President’s Assistant on National Security Affairs Zbigniew Brzezinski related that the Soviet Ambassador to the United States Anatoly Dobrynin “‘looked absolutely stunned’” on hearing the news.¹⁰ After thirty years of competition with the CPC, the KMT was losing its most valuable ally, after already having lost so many others following Resolution 2758. The

⁶ “Backchannel Message From Secretary of State Vance and the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to the Ambassador of the Republic of China (Unger),” 15 Dec. 1978, in *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977-1980*, Vol. XIII, *China*, David P. Nickles, ed., (Washington: U.S. GPO, 2013), doc. 171. *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977-1980*, Vol. XIII, *China*, hereafter referred to as *FRUS, 1977-1980*, Vol. XIII.

⁷ “Backchannel Message From the Ambassador to the Republic of China (Unger) to Secretary of State Vance and the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski),” 15 Dec. 1978, *FRUS, 1977-1980*, Vol. XIII, doc. 173.

⁸ *Ibid.*

⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰ “Backchannel Message From Secretary of State Vance and the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to the Ambassador of the Republic of China (Unger),” 15 Dec. 1978, *FRUS, 1977-1980*, Vol. XIII, doc. 171, fn. 2.

KMT loss of diplomatic recognition by their primary benefactor, a superpower whose international clout was only challenged by the Soviet Union, cemented the ROC's international isolation.

Most troubling for Chiang and other KMT leaders was the language of the U.S. statement as well as the U.S.-PRC joint communiqué. The U.S. statement opened with "As of January 1, 1979, the United States of America recognizes the People's Republic of China as the sole legal government of China."¹¹ The U.S. statement continued on to claim this would not affect economic or cultural ties with Taiwan. In a section on U.S. confidence that the people on the island would continue to enjoy peace and prosperity, it also asserted that the U.S. "continues to have an interest in the peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue and expects that the Taiwan issue will be settled peacefully by the Chinese themselves."¹² The joint communiqué, which Carter read to the U.S. nation in the evening of 15 December 1978, among the general statements about PRC recognition stated "The Government of the United States of America acknowledges the position that there is but one China and Taiwan is a part of China."¹³ While the language of the U.S.-PRC joint communiqué was standard for states recognizing Beijing, it was damning coming from Taipei's soon to be erstwhile ally. The U.S. statement pointed to the ROC's dilemma in that the KMT continued to represent it as "China," thus if there was a sole legal government of China that was in Beijing, Taipei not only did not represent China, it was not a sovereign state. On the surface, thirty years after the KMT had lost the Chinese Civil War, the reality that the KMT did not represent China was rather mundane. For those thirty years, however, the United States had

¹¹ "Backchannel Message From Secretary of State Vance and the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to the Ambassador of the Republic of China (Unger)," 15 Dec. 1978, *FRUS, 1977-1980*, Vol. XIII, doc. 171.

¹² *Ibid.*

¹³ *Ibid.*

supported Taipei's claim to represent China. For twenty-two of those years, the UN had also maintained that illusion. The KMT's loss in one decade of both U.S. and UN recognition accelerated government reforms the nationalists had begun. The CPC's acquisition of that recognition, on the other hand, would lead them to harden their control over the Chinese nation-state.

On 17 December 1978 editors at *People's Daily* informed the PRC public that the United States and PRC would establish diplomatic relations on 1 January 1979. They printed the U.S.-PRC joint communiqué which included the phrase “normalization of Sino-American relations 中美關係正常化.”¹⁴ This phrase, presented in English in the U.S. version, explicitly denied that the United States had been in a relationship with China after 1949.¹⁵ KMT leaders and ROC media, unsurprisingly, opposed this characterization of U.S. recognition of the PRC. Despite Chinese representatives, like Shen and Yang, being in Washington, the implicit meaning behind normalization was that the United States and China were now restoring their relationship. In other words, the term Sino-American Normalization itself nullified KMT claims to represent China and elided the fact that the United States had never severed relations with “China.” Washington had recognized a different China, and the joint communiqué declared that was a mistake.

Chiang and ROC media sought to mitigate the damage U.S. recognition of the PRC to did to Taipei's domestic and international legitimacy. In the evening of 16 December 1978, a few hours after the ROC public learned the United States would recognize the PRC, Chiang gave a

¹⁴ 新華社, “中華人民共和國和美利堅合眾國關於建立外交關係的聯合公報,” 人民日報, 17 Dec. 1978.

¹⁵ “Backchannel Message From Secretary of State Vance and the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to the Ambassador of the Republic of China (Unger),” 15 Dec. 1978, *FRUS, 1977-1980*, Vol. XIII, Doc. 171.

televised address to the nation. “The Communist bandits will use the U.S. government’s weakness” to “cajole and coerce” the ROC, Chiang declared.¹⁶ He called on the ROC public to work together to overcome this “unfortunate matter” and despite any hardships they would succeed in defeating the CPC.¹⁷ In a published statement, Chiang asserted that the U.S. decision “not only seriously injured the rights and interests of the government and people of the Republic of China, moreover it will bring about grave effects for the entire free world.”¹⁸ He also referred to the decision as Washington “breaking faith and going back on their word.”¹⁹ Editors at *China Daily News* expanded on Chiang’s statement and provided three reasons Washington and Beijing establishing relations would harm the free world. The first was that Washington, with only eight-hours’ notice, had broken off relations with an ally, thus other U.S. allies would have to be wary of U.S. agreements for fear the United States could unilaterally end them. The second was that it might embolden communists in the United States, Japan, and “bandits,” or the CPC, to make common cause with the Soviet Union and potentially instigate World War III. The third was that Carter, in establishing relations with “gross human-rights abusers, the notorious communist bandits,” would undermine his human-rights based foreign policy.²⁰ Editors at *United Daily News* quoted U.S. Senator Barry Goldwater’s critiques of the agreement in a piece that focused on U.S. traditions and historical Sino-American comity. In the editorial, they argued that “Carter’s action will cause all people of the free world to believe the United States cannot be

¹⁶ 台北訊, “總統呼籲全國軍民放棄笑我共同奮鬥,” 聯合報, 17 Dec. 1978; 中央社, “蔣總統要求全國軍民 拿出最大決心力量 克服困難邁向目標,” 中華日報, 17 Dec. 1978.

¹⁷ 台北訊, “總統呼籲全國軍民放棄笑我共同奮鬥,” 聯合報, 17 Dec. 1978; 中央社, “蔣總統要求全國軍民 拿出最大決心力量 克服困難邁向目標,” 中華日報, 17 Dec. 1978.

¹⁸ 本報訊, “卡特承認匪偽政權一切後果由美負責,” 中華日報, 17 Dec. 1978; 台北訊, “蔣總統昨發表嚴正聲明此舉損害整個自由世界,” 聯合報, 17 Dec.

¹⁹ 本報訊, “卡特承認匪偽政權一切後果由美負責,” 中華日報, 17 Dec. 1978; 台北訊, “蔣總統昨發表嚴正聲明此舉損害整個自由世界,” 聯合報, 17 Dec. 1978.

²⁰ 社論, “克服艱難 開創新局,” 中華日報, 17 Dec. 1978.

trusted, it not only violates the traditional founding spirit of the United States, it also shames all American people.”²¹ The *United Daily News* editorial discussed U.S. founding principles and U.S.-ROC friendship, but did not invoke an imagined history that linked Sino-American relations to the founding of the United States. Chiang portrayed the U.S. decision to recognize the PRC as damaging not only the ROC but the free world, a portrayal ROC media reiterated. Editors at *China Daily News* highlighted that theme as they pointed to the potentially dire consequences of U.S.-PRC relations. Chiang also cast Washington’s decision as breaking its word, a theme *United Daily News* editors delved into as they analyzed the history of Sino-American friendship and U.S. principles. Chiang and ROC media represented their diplomatic loss as a loss for the free world to portray the ROC as an important member of the non-communist international community. They invoked a recent-historical relationship in order to demonstrate the irregularity of this decision. ROC media also focused on Carter and his administration to limit perceptions U.S. citizens supported Sino-American Normalization.

ROC media also presented accounts of continued American support of the ROC. On 17 December 1978, *United Daily News* editors ran a story about American expats opposing the Carter administration’s announcement. The story focused on Aaron Henderson 亞倫・韓德生, staff member of an American Christian Church in the Taipei suburbs, who began the campaign that had that morning already garnered over ten American signatories. Henderson opposed Carter’s decision because the CPC did not respect human rights or democracy, Carter’s “capitulation” to the communists would harm U.S. prestige, and Taiwan for three decades “was a vanguard in protecting peace in the free world” and abandoning the ROC was a “historic

²¹ 社論, “為卡特總統承認共匪向美國人民及國會議員呼喚,” 聯合報, 17 Dec. 1978.

mistake.”²² Editors at *United Daily News* also claimed the “vast majority of the American people all oppose recognizing the communist bandits’ false regime and sacrificing the Republic of China.”²³

Chinese expats in the United States upset over Carter’s decision were also featured in ROC papers. In one image, a woman holding an ROC flag was “choked with tears” as the ROC Ambassador to the United States James C.H. Shen 沈劍紅 prepared to leave Washington (fig. 5.2). Behind the visibly distraught women was a sign that read “Send Carter to Red China Keep Taiwan.” This image showed that ROC citizens’ distress at losing U.S. recognition was visible in the United States. The picture of the women was under one showing Shen and Goldwater “embracing each other” and above another where Shen also appeared verklempt as he prepared to board his plane. ROC media presented Henderson and emotional overseas Chinese to demonstrate Americans and ROC expats were critical of Sino-American Normalization. Goldwater’s presence highlighted there were still U.S. officials who supported the ROC. Goldwater, of course, was not the only politician who showed support for the beleaguered KMT.

²² 台北訊, “抗議卡特政府屈從共匪荒謬行徑,” 聯合報, 17 Dec. 1978.

²³ 社論, “為卡特總統承認共匪向美國人民及國會議員呼喚,” 聯合報, 17 Dec. 1978.



Figure 5.12: Shi Kemin 施克敏, “沈劍紅在別情依依中告別華盛頓” [C.H. Shen bids Washington sorrowful farewell in reluctant parting], 聯合報, 31 Dec. 1978. (合眾國際社, 美聯社傳真照片)

ROC media presented the public on Taiwan with stories of U.S. politicians criticizing the Carter administration and supporting the ROC. The Central News Agency reported Former California Governor Ronald Reagan denounced the “Carter administration’s ‘reckless act’” and continued to support the ROC government and people.²⁴ The piece quoted Reagan saying “like most Americans, I feel the Carter administration’s announcement appeared out of nowhere and am distressed because the Republic of China has continuously been a faithful ally.”²⁵ A *Central Daily News* reporter also presented former U.S. Ambassador to the UN, Head of the U.S. Liaison Office in China, and Director of the Central Intelligence Agency George H.W. Bush criticizing Sino-American Normalization. In his critique, Bush said Carter had caved to demands the CPC had made since 1972. Consequently, “the result of the Carter administration doing this, has caused the United States to turn into a country that sells out its friends.”²⁶ U.S. Congressman Fred Richardson, during a visit to Taipei, told reporters the U.S. Congress had several strategies

²⁴ 中央社, “斥責卡特鹵莽謬行 籲我繼續樂觀奮鬥,” 中央日報, 25 Dec. 1978.

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ 王嗣佑, “卡特賣友就敵使美喪失信譽,” 中央日報, 25 Dec. 1978.

to “seek a remedy for the Republic of China’s rights and interests.”²⁷ Richardson was not the only U.S. official who advocated safeguarding the ROC, as even Carter’s agreement stipulated U.S. arms sales to Taipei would continue through 1979.²⁸ ROC media presented Reagan and Bush’s criticisms of Sino-American Normalization, along with continued official U.S. support for the ROC, to show American politicians would not abandon Taiwan. Reagan and Bush’s comments were particularly valuable as both were career politicians with presidential aspirations, thus presenting the ROC public with the possibility a future U.S. administration could overturn Carter’s recognition of the PRC.

By 1979, the KMT could only claim sovereignty over the areas actually under its control and calls to return to the mainland faded. For KMT leaders and the ROC public the loss of U.S. recognition was a severe blow. Chiang claimed this was a setback for not only Taipei but the entire free world to mitigate the damage to ROC legitimacy and prestige. ROC media elaborated on Chiang’s claim to warn that U.S.-PRC diplomatic relations would undermine U.S. foreign policy and potentially lead to a Third World War. ROC media also presented U.S. citizens and politicians’ criticizing Carter’s decision to show the KMT still had popular and official support in the United States. Despite these efforts, however, Washington and Beijing entering into diplomatic relations severely damaged KMT claims to represent China. The ROC remained in power on Taiwan, but world powers and a global majority acceded to the CPC’s claim that there was one China, the PRC, and Taiwan was a part of China. U.S. leaders made it clear that the United States would maintain economic and cultural ties with the ROC, but the U.S.-PRC joint communiqué made it clear that Taiwan not only did not represent China, it was also a part of the

²⁷ 台北訊, “美國會將從三方面對我權益謀求補救,” 聯合報, 1 Jan. 1979.

²⁸ 中央社, “其他條約仍然有效,” 中華日報, 20 Dec. 1978; 中央社, “美與共匪之間並無秘密協議,” 中華日報, 20 Dec. 1978.

China governed by the CPC. Consequently, the CPC effectively undercut KMT claims that the ROC was a bastion of Chinese culture and civilization. After all, the international community accepted that the Chinese nation was represented by the CPC. Deng Xiaoping's economic reforms also took the wind out of the KMT's brief effort to wage an economic offensive to win international prestige.

CPC leaders and PRC media lauded Sino-American Normalization. In those celebrations, though, they demonstrated that Chiang and other KMT leaders' fears were not unfounded. The CPC statement on U.S.-PRC relations made it clear that the leadership in Beijing viewed U.S. recognition as an important step in reunifying China or, per PRC discourse, liberating Taiwan. PRC media also invoked the national imaginary of China in their celebrations. U.S. recognition of the PRC as China removed the CPC's final impediment to present their China as the genuine one on the international stage.

The CPC was not discreet in its hope that Sino-American Normalization would lead to Taiwan rejoining "China," which meant the PRC. Deng and the PRC issued official statements detailing key points of the U.S.-PRC joint communiqué. The official PRC statement highlighted that the joint communiqué "reaffirmed that Taiwan is a part of China." It then went on to state "resolving Taiwan's return to the motherland, the method of completing national reunification, is entirely an internal affair of China."²⁹ Deng stated "as everyone knows, the People's Republic of China is the only legitimate government of China, Taiwan is a part of China."³⁰ Deng then reiterated that the manner of Taiwan's return to China was an internal affair. Editors at *People's*

²⁹ 新華社, "就中美兩國建立外交關係 我國政府發表聲明 重申台灣是中國的一部分。解決台灣歸回祖國, 完成國家統一的方式, 這完全是中國的內政。鄧小平副總理應邀將於明年一月正式訪問美國," 人民日報, 17 Dec. 1978.

³⁰ Ibid.

Daily were more explicit than either the official statement or Deng. The editors discussed the greatness of American and Chinese people and the benefits of securing peace in the Asian-Pacific region, as well as the international benefits of U.S.-PRC joint opposition to hegemony, a not-so subtle critique of the Soviet Union. When they got to Taiwan, however, they went beyond simple statements that it was a part of China and that reunification was an internal issue. They argued “Taiwan compatriots are our blood brothers 骨肉兄弟.”³¹ *People’s Daily* editors then asserted:

We day and night think of our Taiwan compatriots. Taiwan compatriots also continuously yearn for the motherland. After the establishing of U.S.-PRC diplomatic relations, Taiwan compatriots will inevitably strive and make great effort for national reunification with the motherland... We believe Taiwan will return to the embrace of the motherland, the day when Taiwan compatriots reunite with their motherland loved ones certainly will arrive.³²

The China Association of Science and Technology, a non-profit, non-governmental organization, held a meeting on the PRC securing U.S. diplomatic recognition where they reaffirmed the beliefs of the *People’s Daily* editors. There, acting director of the China Geological Society Xu Jie 許杰 stated he believed that every geologist in China, like all people in the PRC, “sincerely wish together to warmly welcome Taiwan’s science and technology workers and Taiwan’s vast numbers of patriotic compatriots are soon able to return to the embrace of the motherland.”³³ On the day of Sino-American Normalization on 1 January, the Minister of Defense of the PRC Xu Xiangqian 徐向前 also announced that the PLA would stop shelling the ROC’s offshore islands, including Jinmen. Xu justified the cessation of hostilities saying Sino-American Normalization would “contribute to peace and stability in Asia and the world, and cause Taiwan to return to the

³¹ 社論, “歷史性的大事,” 人民日報, 17 Dec. 1978.

³² 社論, “歷史性的大事,” 人民日報, 17 Dec. 1978.

³³ 新華社, “中美建交為兩國科技交流開辟廣闊前景,” 北京日報, 20 Dec. 1978.

motherland.”³⁴ The Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress of the PRC also published a “Message to Compatriots on Taiwan” on 1 January. The letter explicitly pointed out “our international status is more and more elevated, international activity more and more important” and argued that there was only one China, the PRC, and called on the people of Taiwan to rejoin their homeland.³⁵ Deng explained at the National Political Consultative Conference the next day that the letter was to establish an agenda for Taiwan’s return and linked it to his Four Modernizations and Sino-American Normalization, an opinion shared by other CPC officials there.³⁶ The CPC had won UN recognition for the PRC at the beginning of the decade and at the end the United States also confirmed Beijing was the legitimate government of China. Consequently, PRC media, scholars, and CPC officials presented U.S. recognition as the final blow to the KMT. They interpreted their unhindered access to PRC international legitimacy to represent China as a key avenue to win back Taiwan. The PRC’s ascent on the international stage was inversely related to the ROC’s descent. Thus, CPC leaders, editors at *People’s Daily*, and scholars like Xu viewed Taiwan’s return to “China” as inevitable.

CPC leaders and PRC media also deployed China’s historical imaginary in their celebration of Sino-American Normalization and the potential of Taiwan’s return. On 1 January 1979 Xinhua News produced an article on the history of Sino-American relations. The piece traced those relations to the eighteenth century, claiming in “1783 the American War of Independence ended. The first American ship ‘the Chinese Empress’ on 28 August 1784 arrived

³⁴ 新華社, “停止爆擊大, 小金門等島嶼,” 人民日報, 1 Jan. 1979.

³⁵ “中華人民共和國人大常委會 告台灣同胞書,” 人民日報, 1 Jan. 1979; N.P.C. Standing Committee, “Message to Compatriots in Taiwan,” *Beijing Review*, 5 Jan. 1979, 16-17. Editors at *Peking Review* changed the publication’s name to *Beijing Review* starting 1 Jan. 1979 to align with the pinyin romanization system developed in the PRC, see: “‘Peking Review’ Announcement,” *Peking Review*, 29 Dec. 1978, 5.

³⁶ 新華社, “台灣歸回祖國提上具體日程,” 人民日報, 2 Jan. 1979; 新華社, “台灣歸回祖國提上具體日程,” 北京日報, 2 Jan. 1979.

in Guangzhou, from this began Sino-American trade.”³⁷ The article also discussed cultural exchanges and the economic contributions made by Chinese immigrants to the United States had made. The article highlighted the U.S. role in revolutionary China stating, “the great pioneer of the Chinese Revolution Mister Sun Yat-sen, while preparing for the Xinhai Revolution, visited the United States many times.”³⁸ The article maintained that after the 1949 revolution “contact between the people of both countries were broken off for over twenty years.”³⁹ Thus, in this article, Sino-American relations were traced back to the founding of the United States, Sun Yat-sen’s role as a revolutionary and his connection to the United States was represented positively, and the U.S. relationship with the ROC was a break in Americans’ contacts with China. Xinhua News representations of post-1949 U.S.-ROC relations as a break in Sino-American relations further undermined KMT legitimacy for PRC audiences. PRC media’s tracing of historical relations with the United States demonstrated that CPC officials accepted the importance of history in international diplomacy. Despite CPC depictions of the Qing as feudal and corrupt, they celebrated Sino-American contacts during that period as their own. The vast majority of the world had agreed the PRC was China, thus the CPC began invoking China’s historical imaginary to bolster its authority both at home and abroad.

CPC leaders and PRC media also explicitly invoked China’s national imaginary in their discussions of Taiwan. In the Standing Committee’s “Message to Compatriots in Taiwan,” CPC leaders declared “Our Chinese nation is a great nation... it enjoys a long history and splendid

³⁷ 新華社, “中美人民友誼源遠流長,” 人民日報, 1 Jan. 1979; 新華社, “中美兩國人民的傳統友誼和交往,” 北京日報, 1 Jan. 1979.

³⁸ 新華社, “中美人民友誼源遠流長,” 人民日報, 1 Jan. 1979; 新華社, “中美兩國人民的傳統友誼和交往,” 北京日報, 1 Jan. 1979.

³⁹ 新華社, “中美人民友誼源遠流長,” 人民日報, 1 Jan. 1979; 新華社, “中美兩國人民的傳統友誼和交往,” 北京日報, 1 Jan. 1979.

culture and has made outstanding contributions to world civilization and human development.

Taiwan since ancient times has been an inseparable part of China.”⁴⁰ In the messages conclusion, the Standing Committee maintained “Unifying the motherland is a sacred duty that history has given our generation.”⁴¹ Editors at *Nanjing Daily* ran a section a couple of weeks later on “Taiwan—the motherland’s treasure island.” The section included a piece on relations between Taiwan and the mainland that began in 230 C.E., during China’s Three Kingdoms Period (220-280 CE) when the state of Wu had sent troops to “Yizhou, modern day Taiwan province.”⁴² The article went on to claim the Pescadores 澎湖 “became part of China’s administrative territory” during the Southern Song (1127-1279 CE). It then continued to trace Taiwanese history through successive dynasties until the Qing ceded the island to Japan after the 1895 Sino-Japanese War. The short history of Taiwan concluded with “after the Second World War, it was finally returned to the embrace of the motherland.”⁴³ The article closed saying that “Taiwan from ancient times to now is simply as close as flesh and blood with the Chinese mainland.”⁴⁴ Thus, CPC leaders and PRC media represented Taiwan as an integral part of China since antiquity. Their proposed timeline was problematic, as most scholars credit the Qing establishing sovereignty over the island after ousting the descendants of Zheng Chenggong, the seventeenth-century Ming loyalist discussed in the introduction. Taiwan The Standing Committee in its address to Taiwanese maintained that China itself was a nation steeped in history and culture. Editors at *Nanjing Daily* demonstrated Taiwan was deeply imbricated with Chinese history.

⁴⁰ “中華人民共和國人大常委會 告台灣同胞書,” 人民日報, 1 Jan. 1979; N.P.C. Standing Committee, “Message to Compatriots in Taiwan,” *Beijing Review*, 5 Jan. 1979, 16-17.

⁴¹ “中華人民共和國人大常委會 告台灣同胞書,” 人民日報, 1 Jan. 1979; N.P.C. Standing Committee, “Message to Compatriots in Taiwan,” *Beijing Review*, 5 Jan. 1979, 16-17.

⁴² “台灣與大陸血肉相連,” 南京日報, 16 Jan. 1979.

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ Ibid.

Essentially, CPC officials and media invoked a national imaginary of China to impel people on Taiwan to return to their proper place within the Chinese nation.

For the CPC, Sino-American Normalization was not just about establishing diplomatic relations between the PRC and the United States. Sino-American Normalization also represented the final step towards national reunification. CPC officials recognized the damage losing U.S. recognition did to ROC legitimacy, both at home and abroad, and sought to capitalize on it to convince the people of Taiwan to return to the Chinese nation. CPC leaders and PRC media invoked a China that stretched into antiquity to demonstrate Sino-American comity as well as Taiwan's traditional place with the Chinese nation. With U.S. recognition, the PRC no longer faced any credible challenge to its ability to represent China. As the internationally recognized government of the Chinese nation, CPC officials invoked China's national imaginary to bolster their claims to govern the nation.

Teaching Vietnam a Lesson

Sino-American Normalization benefitted the CPC in its relations with South East Asia by providing the PRC implicit U.S. support against Vietnam. On 25 December 1978, Vietnamese forces invaded Kampuchea, the former and current state of Cambodia. By mid-January 1979, Vietnamese troops had reached the Thai border, ousted Pol Pot's Maoist revolutionary communist party, the Khmer Rouge, and installed a Vietnamese sponsored government in Phnom Penh. On 17 February 1979 the CPC sent the People's Liberation Army into Vietnam. The CPC ostensibly sent forces into Vietnam to resolve territorial disputes and protect overseas Chinese and people of Chinese ancestry, the Hoa. Hanoi's recent occupation of Kampuchea,

however, was the most significant factor.⁴⁵ Before the PLA went into Vietnam, Deng Xiaoping met with Carter and secured tacit U.S. approval of the action. CPC representatives argued in the UN in the lead up to and during the campaign that it was in response to Vietnamese aggression and border violations. Vietnamese officials and their allies represented the Sino-Vietnam War as the PRC enacting revenge for the ousted Pol Pot regime and pursuing regional hegemony. For local audiences, PRC media maintained the war was done to defend China's borders and celebrated the PLA while showing Vietnamese celebrating them as well. Across the Taiwan Strait, KMT officials represented the war in Vietnam as evidence that U.S. recognition of the PRC had endangered the region and harmed world peace. ROC media also presented international criticism to portray Taiwan as the answer to PRC aggression. Despite international criticism, the Third Indochina War demonstrated the international community accepted that the PRC was China. No states switched recognition from Beijing to Taipei in protest, and the PRC strengthened its ties with Association of Southeast Asian Nation (ASEAN) members anxious over Vietnam's strength in the region after defeating the United States in 1975.

Deng Xiaoping visited the United States from 28 January to 5 February 1979. On that first evening, Brzezinski hosted a dinner in honor of Deng where attendees discussed foreign affairs. Deng requested a private meeting with Carter when Vietnam came up, which U.S. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance had assured him would be arranged.⁴⁶ On 29 January Carter held

⁴⁵ Huynh Kim Khanh, "Into the Third Indochina War," *South East Asian Affairs*, (1 Jan. 1980), 327-46; John F. Cooper, "The Sino-Vietnam War's Thirtieth Anniversary," *American Journal of Chinese Studies* 16, no. 1, (April 2009), 71-74; 陳翔 Chen Xiang, "從層分析法的視角看 1979 年中越戰爭的根源 [The Origins of the Sino-Vietnam War in 1979 from the Perspective of the Level of Analysis Approach]," 紅河學院學報 [Journal of Honghe University] 12, no. 6 (Dec. 2014), 5-8 [English provided in original]. Chen cites Vietnam's annexation of Kampuchea as a reason for the Sino-Vietnamese War, but emphasizes Cold War dynamics for the international aspect of the conflict.

⁴⁶ "Memorandum From Michael Oksenberg of the National Security Council to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)," *FRUS, 1977-1980*, Vol. XIII, doc. 201.

a welcoming ceremony for Vice-Premier Deng. “The history of friendly contacts between our two peoples goes back for nearly 200 years,” Deng stated in his remarks.⁴⁷ This brief comment demonstrated Deng was aware that to represent China, the CPC had to represent a China that existed in international discourse and history. U.S.-PRC relations were certainly not friendly during many periods after the PRC was founded in 1949, but Deng elided those conflicts in favor of a portraying a centuries-long, favorable relationship. Deng and other CPC leaders highlighted Chinese history in foreign affairs to associate their state with a China that had long engaged others on the international stage.

After the welcoming ceremony, Carter and Deng convened more meetings and a luncheon to discuss U.S.-PRC relations and world affairs. In the early evening of 29 January, Deng, Carter, Vance, and a few other delegates moved into the Oval Office to discuss Vietnam. Deng told Carter and the others there that ASEAN states were wary of Vietnam’s control of Kampuchea and that Hanoi had been violating Chinese territory. Moreover, Vietnam was acting in the interests of the Soviet Union. Consequently, Deng wanted to “give them [Vietnam] an appropriate limited lesson... If we do not punish them, their violent actions will continue on a greater scale.”⁴⁸ After laying out Vietnamese transgressions and PRC strategy, Deng told Carter “we need your moral support in the international field.”⁴⁹ Carter agreed to share intelligence but could not advocate violence. At a follow up meeting the next day, Carter read a statement on why the United States could not support a punitive war by the PRC against Vietnam, including

⁴⁷ Jimmy Carter, *Jimmy Carter: 1979 (In Two Books), Book I—January 1 to June 22, 1979*, Public Papers of the President of the United States, (Washington: U.S. GPO, 1980), 190-91.

⁴⁸ “Memorandum of Conversation,” *FRUS, 1977-1980*, Vol. XIII, doc. 205.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*

“our claim of peace and stability resulting from normalization would be refuted to some extent.”⁵⁰ Carter, however, did remain committed to providing the PRC with intelligence.⁵¹

For Deng and the CPC, Sino-American Normalization came with tangible benefits as the CPC factored world opinion into its foreign relations. Deng’s meetings with Carter not only secured the PRC access to sophisticated U.S. intelligence on Soviet and Vietnamese operations, it also ensured that Washington was unlikely to condemn the PLA “teaching Vietnam a lesson.” While Carter stated the United States could not support aggression in the region and detailed a number of reasons his administration thought the action was a poor choice, he did not object outright. Deng had adroitly used his meetings with Carter to garner tacit U.S. support of the war as the PLA prepared for the offensive operation in the south. In his meeting with Carter, Deng also said he would discuss the action with Japanese Prime Minister Masayoshi Ōhira 大平 正芳. Deng demonstrated that the CPC placed a significant emphasis on international cooperation after less than a decade of reengagement with the world following Resolution 2758. Through reaching out to the United States and Japan, as well as holding previous discussions with ASEAN members, the CPC sought to mitigate any harm to the PRC’s international prestige. Consequently, the CPC was able to pursue a punitive war against Vietnam without damaging its nascent ties with the United States, receiving a public rebuke from Washington or its allies, or significantly damaging the PRC’s reputation on the world stage.

Publicly, the CPC represented their war with Vietnam as a border conflict. Deng had told Carter the PRC would portray the war as a border issue to alleviate international perceptions it

⁵⁰ “Oral Presentation by President Carter to Chinese Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping,” *FRUS, 1977-1980*, Vol. XIII, doc. 206.

⁵¹ “Memorandum of Conversation,” *FRUS, 1977-1980*, Vol. XIII, doc. 207.

was a punitive invasion, which it was. The day after PLA troops began their offensive, Xinhua News presented a series of complaints the Foreign Ministry had given the Vietnamese embassy in Beijing that were also sent to the UN.⁵² Hanoi's infractions were that "Vietnam authorities sent armed personnel one after another to violate Chinese territory, kill Chinese people, shoot Chinese trains, and created new serious incidents of bloodshed" according to those complaints.⁵³ An unnamed Xinhua News reporter claimed that "With my own eyes saw Vietnamese military aggressors fire guns and artillery towards our country's border region, a crime of savage provocative warfare."⁵⁴ On 19 February editors at *PLA Daily* wrote the conflict was to resist aggression and protect the PRC's borders. They maintained that "we will not attack unless we are attacked; if we are attacked, we will certainly counter-attack, this is our firm and unshakeable principle."⁵⁵ Editors at *People's Daily* and *Beijing Daily* also reprinted the *PLA Daily* editorial.⁵⁶ PRC UN Representative Chen Chu 陳楚 repeated the PLA editors' phrase verbatim on the floor of the UN while making the PRC case against Vietnam in the Security Council.⁵⁷ Editors at *Peking Review* wrote that the conflict ensued after "Vietnamese armed intrusions had seriously threatened the peace and security of China's southern borders. Driven beyond forbearance, the frontier forces were forced to counterattack."⁵⁸ Thus, PRC media and CPC officials presented a

⁵² United Nations Department of Public Information, *Yearbook of the United Nations 1979*, vol. 33 (New York: United Nations Publication, 1982), 299.

⁵³ 新華社, "我外交部照會越南駐華大使館 最強烈抗議抗議越南侵犯中國領土織造新的嚴重流血事件," 人民日報, 17 Feb. 1979.

⁵⁴ 新華社記者, "是可忍, 孰不可忍——來自中越邊境的報告," 人民日報, 17 Feb. 1979.

⁵⁵ 社論, "保衛我國邊疆和平安定," 解放軍報, 19 Feb. 1979.

⁵⁶ 《解放軍報》二月十九日社論, "保衛我國邊疆和平安定," 人民日報, 19 Feb. 1979; 解放軍報社論, "保衛我國邊疆和平安定," 北京日報, 19 Feb. 1979.

⁵⁷ 聯合國安全理事會, "第二一一四次會議臨時逐字紀錄," 23 Feb. 1979, S/PV.2114 (Chinese), p. 29, accessed 26 July 2020, United Nations Official Document System (UN ODS).

⁵⁸ "Frontier Forces Counterattack Vietnamese Aggressors," *Beijing Review*, 23 Feb. 1979, 3.

narrative to mitigate domestic concerns of military adventurism or international criticism by claiming it was done in self-defense.

CPC officials and PRC media represented the conflict with Vietnam as a response to Vietnamese aggression to diminish perceptions the war was a punitive action against Hanoi. Their representations of the war as a border skirmish provided an explanation that the international community could accept. Deng had made it clear during his meetings with Carter that was the reason for portraying it as defensive, even though the primary cause was the ousting of Pol Pot's Khmer Rouge in Kampuchea. Deng and CPC officials understood that waging a defensive war was less likely to arouse concerns on the world stage, particularly if it was short. PRC media also claimed the war was in response to Vietnamese provocations to present PRC citizens with a domestically acceptable justification. Deng had started the PRC on the path of reform, and a punitive war against a neighbor would not have aroused much sympathy or support in the populace as they sought to realize Deng's Four Modernizations. PRC media not only portrayed the Sino-Vietnam war as defensive, they also sought to show that ordinary citizens in Vietnam, rather than opposing PLA troops, celebrated them.

PRC media represented Vietnamese welcoming and praising PLA troops. On 2 Feb. 1979 Xinhua News reporter Guo Diancheng 郭殿成 wrote about Vietnamese reactions to PLA troops in a border town. Guo claimed "the city is in good order, Vietnamese residents and Chinese soldiers give each other cheerful welcomes" and an older resident had written and posted "Welcome the Chinese People's Liberation Army to protect the peace and cherish the people!" in Chinese characters beside his door.⁵⁹ Guo also included stories of Vietnamese thanking PLA

⁵⁹ 郭殿成, " '中國軍隊紀律嚴明! ' " 人民日報, 2 Mar. 1979.

soldiers for giving them rice and treating them with respect. Another Xinhua News article on PLA troops entering the city of Lang Son in Vietnam near China's border included a picture of two women and two men PLA soldiers and an elderly Vietnamese woman, over eighty according to the caption, all smiling after the soldiers gave her rice (fig. 5.3). According to the reporter, the woman responded "'Chinese and Vietnamese peoples will always be comrades and brothers.'"⁶⁰ *PLA Daily* reporters related a story where PLA soldiers encountered a couple of Vietnamese commoners at the foot of a mountain after chasing Vietnamese troops. Initially frightened, soldiers reassured the commoners they were safe, invited them to sit, and offered them food. Upon the offer of food the Vietnamese complained their government did not care for the common people and when the soldiers gave them extra provisions to take with them, they "stared blankly past our soldiers into the distance, quite a while unable to say a word."⁶¹ Another story from the *PLA Daily* article was about a PLA publicity group who found an elderly women's home in disarray because "Vietnamese troops trampled it beyond being presentable." The cadres began to clean and reorganize the house, eventually the woman stood up and proclaimed, "I still remember bygone events, you remain as good as in the past."⁶² The past events the woman alluded to were Chinese assistance to Vietnam during the Second Indochina War (1955-1975) with the United States. *Beijing Review* editors also portrayed Vietnamese welcoming PLA soldiers for foreign audiences. Editors presented an article on how Hanoi had kept grain sent by the PRC from the Vietnamese people and claimed, "many Vietnamese inhabitants were moved to tears when they received rice from Chinese frontier troops."⁶³

⁶⁰ 新華社記者，周重要攝，“戰後諒山，”人民日報，7 Mar. 1979.

⁶¹ 劉良凱，黃惠群，吳順祥，“‘你們還象當年那樣好’”解放軍報，12 Mar. 1979.

⁶² Ibid.

⁶³ Xinhua correspondents, "Distributing Grain to Vietnamese Inhabitants," *Beijing Review*, 9 Mar. 1979, 16.



我边防部队某部在撤离前再次去看望住在某地的八十多岁的越南老大娘，并把缴获的中国大米送给她。老大娘抚摸着背米的战士的脸说：“中越人民永远是同志加兄弟”。
新华社记者 周重要摄（传真照片）

Figure 5.13: Xinhua News Agency Reporters 新華社記者, Zhou Zhongyao (photographer) 周重要攝 “戰後諒山” [Lang Song after the fighting], 人民日報, 7 Mar. 1979.

PRC media portrayals of PLA troops' generosity and Vietnamese people's gratitude served a dual purpose for the CPC. Primarily, it attempted to demonstrate to domestic and international audiences that not only was the PLA's invasion of Vietnam beneficial for the common people, the Vietnamese themselves welcomed PLA troops in the region. Moreover, PRC media reinforced perceptions of Hanoi's maladministration of Vietnam through showing the suffering of ordinary citizens who received greater care and concern from PLA troops than they did their government. CPC officials showed comity between PLA soldiers and Vietnamese citizens to demonstrate the Third Indochina War, while purportedly conducted to defend China's borders, was also caused by the lack of Hanoi officials concern for their citizenry. PRC media represented Hanoi neglecting its people in pursuit of regional hegemony, thus tying the Vietnamese occupation of Kampuchea into Vietnam's offenses.

KMT officials and ROC media argued the PRC's war with Vietnam demonstrated that Sino-American Normalization, and recognition of the PRC in general, was detrimental to peace in the region. An 18 February 1979 Central News Agency piece discussed the ongoing war and

Vietnamese resistance against the “Chinese communist invaders.”⁶⁴ Editors at *Central Daily News* argued the “Chinese communists are not a ‘peace loving’ authority.”⁶⁵ The editors listed PRC involvement in the Korean War, the Sino-Indian War, the Second Indochina War, and the ongoing Third Indochina War claiming they were “all militaristic and belligerent, clear proof of blind faith in military force.”⁶⁶ They also maintained that the “United States and bandits establishing diplomatic relations, actually mistook as ‘construction of stability and peace,’ was totally wishful thinking.”⁶⁷ *United Daily News* editors on 25 February published a collection of pieces on Soviet criticism of the conflict that included a report from *Agence-France Presse* that described PLA troops entering Vietnam as “Chinese communists invading Vietnam.”⁶⁸ As the war drew to a close, a Central News Agency article discussed how “Chinese communists ceased invasion operations against Vietnam.”⁶⁹

ROC media paid significant attention to the Sino-Vietnamese War, as had PRC publications. Where PRC media portrayed PLA troops welcomed by Vietnamese, ROC publications portrayed the PLA as invaders. Editors’ described the PLA as invaders to demonstrate the CPC was aggressive and dedicated to military adventurism. They listed PRC conflicts throughout the region since 1950 to argue the CPC had a pattern of pursuing its agenda through armed aggression, and Sino-American Normalization had not checked that impulse. Consequently, ROC media used the CPC decision to punish Vietnam to demonstrate the veracity of their claims that U.S. recognition of the PRC had resulted in less peace and stability in the

⁶⁴ 中央社, “越共抽調陸空部隊 緊急對抗入侵匪軍,” 中華日報, 19 Feb. 1979.

⁶⁵ 社論, “共匪大越南是為挑起美俄大戰,” 中央日報, 20 Feb. 1979, p. 2.

⁶⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁸ 法新社, “俄對匪侵越加強批評 揚言將採懲罰行動,” 聯合報, 25 Feb. 1979.

⁶⁹ 中央社, “揚言越正規軍 準備投入戰場,” 中央日報, 14 Mar. 1979.

region. While this narrative attempted to bolster KMT claims that the ROC could serve as a check to the PRC across the Taiwan Strait, those depictions did little to sway world opinion. KMT attempts to cast the CPC as warmongers were further complicated by ASEAN members' view that PRC actions were an effective curb on perceived Vietnamese goals of hegemony in the region.

PRC Domestic Scene

By the 1980s, the CPC did not have to defend its interpretation of China from that of the KMT. Under Deng, the *raison d'être* of the Party and state shifted from revolution to reform. The CPC's one-child policy, with its campaign-style enactment and radical transformation of the family, was aberrant during this period. The Party did not launch their strict limit on births to revolutionize society, however. CPC leaders, like Deng, and scientists, like the cyberneticist Song Jian 宋健, sought to limit births to bolster the PRC economy. While the campaign itself drastically altered life in China, the CPC enacted it as a rational accompaniment of economic reform. CPC leaders' reactions to student agitation for greater participation in government, however, revealed revolution was no longer acceptable in the once revolutionary state. CPC leaders effectively controlled the narrative surrounding the 1986 protests, casting student protestors as an unrepresentative minority and linking them to the Red Guard of the Cultural Revolution. Student protesters posed a much greater challenge to the CPC in 1989. Party Leaderships lost control of the narrative surrounding the 1989 Democracy Spring. On 4 June the CPC sent soldiers to clear Tiananmen. Unable to control domestic and international perceptions of student unrest, the CPC abandoned any remaining pretense China was a revolutionary state. By this period, China was what the CPC determined it was.

The One-Child Campaign

The CPC's one-child campaign was an aberration during the PRC's reform period. The CPC launched the campaign as part of its economic reforms even as the Party was moving away from Mao-era campaigns. As Tyrene White noted, "though the scope of the birth planning campaign did not quite rival the most radical campaigns of the Maoist era, it was a classic campaign of major proportions."⁷⁰ Song Jian was the principle advocate of radically reducing birthrates in the PRC. In 1972 Song had encountered works by a group of scholars, primarily based at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, known as the Club of Rome. These scholars were American and European scientists who viewed population growth as a threat to global health. Club of Rome scholars also argued population growth would undercut a state's economic gains. Song and Club-of-Rome influenced cyberneticist model of population growth became the accepted narrative for family planning in the PRC.⁷¹ PRC media defended the one-child policy by claiming "China was forced to drastically curtail childbearing due to the immediate and future threat to economic development posed by rapid population growth."⁷² Consequently, even as the CPC under Deng reformed the economy and moved away from revolution as a goal or tactic for the state, their focus on the economy resulted in a radical assault on the Chinese family.

The CPC's pursuit of limiting the population to protect the economy was a dramatic change for PRC citizens, that was culturally and socially revolutionary, but it was not revolutionary in the Maoist sense. The CPC's one-child policy quickly became a routinized economic campaign with predictable patterns of intensity and emphasis.⁷³ The CPC did not enact

⁷⁰ Tyrene White, *China's Longest Campaign: Birth Planning in the People's Republic, 1949-2005*, (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 2006), 3.

⁷¹ Susan Greenhalgh, *Just One Child: Science and Policy in Deng's China*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008). Ch. 4.

⁷² White, *China's Longest Campaign*, 1.

⁷³ *Ibid.*, 10.

a policy to limit births in the PRC to intentionally disrupt traditional culture or familial structures. Officials like Deng and scientists like Song perceived population growth as an impediment to economic growth. CPC leaders perceived the one-child policy as a rational component to modernize the PRC. While initially draconian, with some easing over time, the CPC pursuit of single-child households adhered to scientific principles as they understood them. The CPC launched the one-child policy as a campaign, a political style familiar to both cadres and citizens. Their goal was not revolution per se, however, it was the advancement of material wealth and growth in the People's Republic. Thus, while CPC leaders and scientists radically altered Chinese families for generations, that was not the goal in and of itself. CPC leaders also did not envision the policy as instigating social or political change. During this period, the Party pursued Deng's Four Modernizations as their goal, the radical transformations to Chinese society caused by the one-child policy were a casualty of CPC economic planning.

Student Protests in the PRC

CPC leaders' responses to student activism demonstrated that by the 1980s the PRC was no longer a revolutionary state. In 1986 students from the University of Science and Technology of China (USTC) in Hefei, Anhui, staged protests demanding political reform. Other students also began to protest and the unrest quickly spread to other cities in the region, such as Nanjing and Shanghai, and even reached Beijing and Tianjin. The 1986 student protests were short lived, however, and by mid-January 1987 students had returned to their classes without achieving their goals. Despite the relatively mild protests, CPC leaders removed General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPC Hu Yaobang 胡耀邦 from his post for not responding forcefully enough to quell the protests. When Hu passed in 1989 students once again took to the streets to demand greater political reform and economic security in a wave of protests that became known as the

1989 Democracy Spring, or 1989 Tiananmen Square Protests, or the June Fourth Incident 六四

事件 in the PRC. Unlike the 1986 student protests, the 1989 protests garnered international attention as students from Beijing and across the country occupied Tiananmen. Party leaders waived on how to deal with student demands for greater political participation and government reform. On 4 June the CPC sent in the PLA to clear the square. While scholars and PRC officials offer different numbers for casualties from the 1989 Tiananmen Crackdown, the CPC response to student agitation for governmental reform made one thing clear: revolution was no longer tolerated in the once revolutionary state.

Astrophysicist and Vice President of USTC Fang Lizhi 方勵之 disseminated the ideas that led students to protest in 1986. Fang stated in a 1991 interview that USTC students had two main grievances when they took to the streets in 1986. The first was students wanted the right to nominate candidates to the National People's Congress. The second was Fang's lectures inspired students to seek political reforms, "which made the central government very unhappy."⁷⁴ Fang tried to prevent the students from leaving campus to protest because he "knew under communist rule taking to the streets was very dangerous."⁷⁵ For his role in the 1986 student protests, the CPC stripped Fang of his Party membership and his position as Vice-President of USTC.⁷⁶ As Fang pointed out, however, he had opposed the student protests. Students took to the streets demanding greater participation and political reform themselves. Consequently, Party leaders had to explain why a number of the PRC's rising generation of elites was marching for change

⁷⁴ “方勵之夫婦訪談錄，方勵之李淑嫻 1991 年六月 4 日,” 64Memo.org, (27 Sept. 2007), accessed 21 July 2020, <https://web.archive.org/web/20070927043149/http://64memo.org/b5/7698.htm>

⁷⁵ “方勵之夫婦訪談錄，方勵之李淑嫻 1991 年六月 4 日,” 64Memo.org, (27 Sept. 2007), accessed 21 July 2020, <https://web.archive.org/web/20070927043149/http://64memo.org/b5/7698.htm>

⁷⁶ 新華社, “中共安徽省開出方勵之黨籍 方勵之公開鼓吹資產階級自由化,” 人民日報, 20 Jan. 1987; “Government Changes University Leaders,” *Beijing Review*, 19 Jan. 1987, 8-9.

throughout the country. CPC officials criticized Fang, along with a few other liberal academics, but they could not place all the blame for the protests on a handful of academics.

CPC leaders and PRC media pursued several strategies to deflect students' 1986 calls for reform. One strategy Party leaders used was to diminish the scale of the protests. Several local reporters interviewed Shanghai Municipal Government officials asking about the situation where "some portion of higher education students had took to the streets" and "a small number of university students continuously for days took to the streets to march."⁷⁷ During the interview, an official responded to one question that he "first must point out one thing, a large majority of students" had concerns about reform and advancing democratic socialism, but some students did not understand the reality of the situation.⁷⁸ Jiangsu Municipal Government officials discussed the protests saying "Recently, a minority portion of Nanjing University and college students on campus continuously post small-character posters, large-character posters, put forward suggestions on education, administration, etcetera" for government reform, democratic socialism, and other topics.⁷⁹ Beijing Municipal Government officials reiterated the theme of few students protesting when they stated some opponents of socialism were "futilely using the opportunity of a small number of students taking to the streets to demonstrate to cause disturbances."⁸⁰ Despite CPC claims that only a small minority of students were protesting, Xinhua Daily articles also covered Shanghai Public Transportation Company Assistant Manager Hong Jie 洪潔 discussing significant disruptions to the Shanghai mass transit system. Even as he described significant disruptions from the protests, Hong maintained that a "portion of students

⁷⁷ 新華社, "上海市人民政府發言人答記者問," 北京日報, 24 Dec. 1986.

⁷⁸ 新華社, "上海市人民政府發言人答記者問," 北京日報, 24 Dec. 1986.

⁷⁹ 本報訊, "江蘇省人民政府發言人發表談話," 南京日報, 27 Dec. 1986.

⁸⁰ 新華社, "北京市人民政府發言人發表談話," 人民日報, 31 Dec. 1986.

took to the streets to demonstrate.”⁸¹ He Dongchang 何東昌, Deputy Director of the State Education Commission, was explicit at a press conference where he stated the number “joining the demonstrations only constitute one or two percent of university students, most people are onlookers.”⁸² *Peking Review* editors cited He’s lower percentage for Anglophone audiences.⁸³ Municipal cadres and reporters avowed that the number of students protesting for reform were few. CPC officials and PRC media downplayed the number of participants to represent these students and their demands as exceptions, rather than the norm, on campuses across the nation. The CPC’s official minimization of the protests allowed them to maintain that most of the PRC’s next generation of intellectuals supported Deng’s economic reforms and the Party’s governance.

CPC officials also invoked memories of the Cultural Revolution and the Gang of Four to criticize student protesters and deflect attention from their calls for political reform. *Nanjing Daily* reporters interviewed biology professor Zhou Kaiye 周開業 who compared the 1986 protests to the turbulent Cultural Revolution era. Zhou lamented “‘Cultural Revolution’ style turbulence caused our country’s science culture to fall a large distance from the world’s advanced countries.”⁸⁴ An education official interviewed by Xinhua News reporters commented on students’ writing big-character posters and calling for democratic reforms. The official stated “the ‘cultural revolution’ (1966-1976) showed that big-character posters served to destroy normal democratic life and to disrupt social stability and unity.”⁸⁵ *Beijing Daily* reporters described people taking advantage of the protests to cause trouble during the 1987 New Year

⁸¹ 新華社, “上海部分學生上街遊行 妨礙了人民的正常生活秩序,” 北京日報, 26 Dec. 1986.

⁸² 新華社, “我們要建設具有中國特色的社會主義, 不能照搬西方的民主制度,” 北京日報, 31 Dec. 1986.

⁸³ “He Dongchang on Student Demos,” *Beijing Review*, 5 Jan. 1987, 5.

⁸⁴ 本報訊, “發歷史感慨 囑以安定團結大局為重 吐肺腑之言 望珍惜當前的大好時光,” 南京日報, 27 Dec. 1986.

⁸⁵ “Demonstrations Good Intentioned, But...” *Beijing Review*, 27 Dec. 1986, 7.

celebrations in Beijing claiming “very few people with ulterior motives everywhere whipped up trouble on New Year’s Day in Tiananmen Square.”⁸⁶ *People’s Daily* reporters pointed out that some students in Shanghai “publicly suggested that everyone be diligent and not repeat the mistakes of the Red Guards.”⁸⁷ PRC media linked the student protestors to the Cultural Revolution explicitly, as in the case of Professor Zhou and the students’ reference to Red Guards, and implicitly, such as describing turmoil linked to student protests. That Red Guards had exacerbated violence and chaos during the early Cultural Revolution era before Mao dispersed urban youth to the countryside made these particularly effective allusions to discredit the students. Editors and reporters used the lived memory of PRC citizens to undercut sympathy they might have had with student demands for greater political participation.

On 16 January 1987 the CPC held an enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee. Xinhua News reported Hu Yaobang presented a self-criticism at the meeting and “asked the Central Committee to approve his resignation as general secretary of the Party Central Committee.”⁸⁸ Deng and other CPC leaders laid blame for the 1986 protests on Hu. CPC cadres, particularly those opposed to quick reform of the Party, viewed Hu’s less doctrinaire approach to socialism warily and felt he should have stymied the student protests more quickly. Zhao Ziyang 趙紫陽 took over as acting general secretary until his official confirmation in November 1987. The CPC managed to divert significant attention from the 1986 student protests. PRC media and CPC officials minimized the number of participants to claim it was only

⁸⁶ 本報訊, “首都十五萬大學生歡度元旦 少數人在天安門廣場遊行被制止,” 北京日報 2 Jan. 1987.

⁸⁷ 本報訊, “上海一些大學生在反恩: 上街遊行搞大民主不可取,” 人民日報, 2 Jan. 1987.

⁸⁸ “中共中央政治局擴大會議公報,” 人民日報, 17 Jan. 1987; “中共中央政治局擴大會議公報,” 北京日報, 17 Jan. 1987, p. 1; “中共中央政治局擴大會議公報,” 南京日報, 17 Jan. 1987; “Zhao Replaces Hu as Acting Party General Secretary,” *Beijing Review*, 26 Jan. 1987, 5. *Beijing Review* editors translated this sentence as Hu “requested the Central Committee to approve his resignation as general secretary.”

a handful of students, who were too young and naïve, who had taken to the streets in protest.

News outlets and cadres also invoked the chaos of the Cultural Revolution to discredit the students as rebellious and inconsiderate of public welfare. CPC leaders were largely successful in controlling the narrative of the 1986 student protests. A few years later, however, students captured the world's attention as they once again took to the streets.

1989 Democracy Spring

On 16 April 1989, Xinhua News reported that “the passing of comrade Hu Yaobang is a great loss for the party and the country.”⁸⁹ Hu passed away the day before and the Xinhua News article was not uncommon for high-level CPC officials. CPC leaders, however, had ousted Hu for his perceived failure to tamp down on student protests in 1986. Consequently, students viewed Hu as a martyr in their efforts to achieve greater political participation. Students in Beijing began to gather in Tiananmen to memorialize Hu and his passing. As students gathered in Tiananmen to honor Hu, they also began calling for the reforms their counterparts had called for in 1986. Unlike the 1986 student protests, however, students in 1989 garnered national and international attention as they occupied one of the enduring symbols of modern China.⁹⁰ The CPC sought to mitigate students demands as they had a few years earlier. Students, however, were bolstered by China's recent past as the seventieth anniversary of the May Fourth Incident was that year. CPC officials sought to redefine May Fourth to strip its symbolic portent from the protesters and chastised them for causing disorder. As students continued to occupy Tiananmen, CPC leaders chose to forcefully end the protest and clear the square. The 1989 Democracy

⁸⁹ 新華社, “胡耀邦同志昨逝世,” 南京日報, 16 Apr. 1989; 新華社, “偉大的無產階級革命家政治家胡耀邦同志逝世,” 北京日報, 16 Mar. 1989.

⁹⁰ For more on the 1989 Democracy Spring see: Zhao Dingxin, *The Power of Tiananmen: State-Society Relations and the 1989 Beijing Student Movement*, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001).

Spring, or June Fourth Incident, pushed the CPC to demonstrate that revolution was no longer acceptable in the PRC.

Student protests in the 1989 Democracy Spring were more steeped in symbolism than those of 1986. Ninety-eighty-nine was the seventieth anniversary of the May Fourth incident. In 1919, students in Beijing protested the Chinese government's weak negotiations at the Paris Peace Conference and subsequent Treaty of Versailles that ended the First World War. The students considered the transfer of Shandong from Germany to Japan as particularly pernicious. The May Fourth protestors succeeded in preventing the Beijing government from signing the Treaty of Versailles and Shandong was eventually returned to China. May Fourth became one of the defining moments in modern Chinese history.⁹¹ CPC leaders, including Mao Zedong, had used May Fourth to bolster their legitimacy to represent the Chinese nation claiming it was inspired by the 1917 Russian Revolution.

In 1989, CPC leaders sought to distance the current protestors in Tiananmen from those who had gathered there seventy years earlier. Consequently, CPC leaders began to highlight the patriotism of May Fourth as student protestors continued to occupy Tiananmen during the Democracy Spring. In CPC rhetoric, the goals of May Fourth had been achieved when the Party had founded the PRC. During the lead up to and celebrations of May Fourth, PRC media depicted the 1919 protestors as patriotic and the 1989 protestors as unpatriotic. The CPC's narrative, then, was that despite the echoes of May Fourth in students taking to the streets calling

⁹¹ For some general overviews of May Fourth see: Chow Tse-Tung, *The May Fourth Movement: Intellectual Revolution in Modern China* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1960); Vera Schwarcz, *The Chinese Enlightenment: Intellectuals and the Legacy of the May Fourth Movement of 1919* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986). For works that focus on students see: Jeffrey Wasserstrom, *Student Protests in Twentieth-Century China: The view from Shanghai* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1991); Fabio Lanza, *Behind the Gate: Inventing Students in Beijing* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010).

for greater political participation, the students in 1989 were not the inheritors of the spirit of May Fourth which was about patriotism and whose goals the CPC had already achieved.⁹²

CPC leaders recast the May Fourth Movement from a protest against the state into a rallying cry to serve the state to strip students of their symbolic status. Students and their place as elites in China afforded them a unique role in Chinese society. Student protests in 1919 became a seminal moment in Chinese nationalism, a moment CPC leaders had employed to validate their right to lead the nation. Students were also integral to the Great Leap Forward as they built dams and sought to eradicate the Four Pests. Students Red Guards were also principle actors in the Cultural Revolution. Essentially, students had been symbols of revolution since shortly after the fall of the Qing dynasty and the CPC had continued to mobilize their revolutionary symbolism after founding the PRC. In the 1980s, however, under Deng's leadership the Party celebrated reform, not revolution. While not the only difference, a significant one during this period was the CPC's unchallenged status as China, both domestically and internationally. After the UN passed Resolution 2758 in 1971, the CPC began redefining China and its role in the world. With U.S. recognition in 1979, along with the recognition of most other states, the PRC was China. Thus, when students gathered in Tiananmen in 1989 CPC leaders wavered between appealing to students as a revolutionary authority and quelling them as an unopposable authority. In the end, party hardliners like Deng and Jiang Zemin determined the student protests must end. On 4 June 1989 the CPC deployed the PLA to clear any remaining students from Tiananmen. CPC leaders' decision to quell the protestors and resist their calls for political change signaled an end to a revolutionary China in the PRC.

⁹² Keith Allan Clark II, "May Fourth Memories: PRC Media Representations of an Historical Moment, 1959 and 1989" in *Uses of the Past: Representations and Modern China*, Ying-kit Chan and Fei Chan, eds., (Berlin: De Gruyter, forthcoming 2020).

ROC Domestic Scene

During the 1980s, few states recognized the ROC as China. Despite the lack of international recognition, the KMT continued to govern Taiwan, the Pescadores, and some of China's offshore islands. In 1986 Chiang lifted martial law in the ROC. Chiang's reforms benefited the nascent Democratic Progressive Party. In a moment that seemed to reflect events in the PRC a year earlier, Taiwanese students gathered in Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Square in Taipei to protest the slow pace of reform in the ROC. The 1990 student protests in Taipei became known as the Wild Lily Student Movement 野百合學運. Contrary to their counterparts across the strait, KMT leaders accepted student demands and agreed to revolutionize politics in the ROC. During this period the KMT was no longer able to represent its state as China. Freed from the constraints of representing the Chinese nation, KMT leaders were able to radically restructure the ROC in response to domestic dissatisfaction. The KMT no longer sought to maintain the illusion that they represented the Chinese nation and instead focused on governing the people and territory that they did.

Ending Martial Law

ROC leaders represented martial law as necessary even as Taiwanese society grew more restive and began challenging KMT hegemony. Chiang Ching-kuo did institute a number of reforms beginning in the 1970s to bolster Taiwanese participation in the KMT government. Those reforms resulted in a pseudo-opposition party developing on the island. The *Dangwai*, or outside the party, Movement 黨外運動 resulted from the KMT allowing non-KMT politicians to compete in some ROC elections. Under KMT rule other parties remained illegal, however, so people unaffiliated with the Nationalists were known as *Dangwai*. In 1979, however, *Dangwai*

leaders had planned protests in Kaohsiung that resulted in a government crackdown and a hardening of KMT policy against democratization on Taiwan.⁹³

At the beginning of the decade, KMT leaders appeared set on maintaining martial law in the ROC. In 1981, *Central Daily News* editors discussed ROC Premier Sun Yun-xuan 孫運璿 telling the Legislative Yuan that the “government according to the law enacted martial law in Taiwan, it served as a necessary measure effective at preventing communist bandit infiltration and subversion.”⁹⁴ In their discussion of Sun’s comments, editors maintained that martial law on Taiwan “was based on real need and safeguarded national security” and also tied it to economic stability in the ROC.⁹⁵ The following year, Minister of the Interior Lin Yang-kang 林洋港 told the Legislative Yuan it was not time to end martial law, in part because the ongoing struggle with the CPC was “based on methods, and is not necessarily a war of military force, it also encompasses economic warfare, diplomatic warfare, and psychological warfare.”⁹⁶ KMT leaders and ROC media maintained that martial law was integral to Taiwan’s safety and development throughout the early part of the decade.⁹⁷ In late 1984, Governor of Taiwan Chiu Chuang-huan 邱創煥 defended martial law on Taiwan to reporters, stating it was not only legal but that the situation warranting it remained unchanged. Chiu also argued “the effect of implementing martial law had a trivial effect on democratic governance.”⁹⁸ KMT leaders safeguarding martial law throughout the first half of the decade demonstrated that change in the ROC was gradual and

⁹³ Murray Rubenstein, “Political Taiwanization and Pragmatic Diplomacy: The Eras of Chiang Ching-kuo and Lee Teng-hui, 1971-1994,” in *Taiwan: A New History*, Expanded Edition, Murray Rubenstein, ed., (New York: Routledge, 2007), 436-95.

⁹⁴ 社論, “戒嚴令不可輕言取消,” 中央日報, 22 Mar. 1981.

⁹⁵ 社論, “戒嚴令不可輕言取消,” 中央日報, 22 Mar. 1981.

⁹⁶ 本報訊, “對匪鬥爭為全面性 先求安全再求發展,” 中央日報, 17 Mar. 1982.

⁹⁷ 本報訊, “不可輕言取消戒嚴令,” 中央日報, 25 May, 1982; 戎撫天, “戒嚴的成本與效益,” 聯合報, 22 Sept. 1982.

⁹⁸ 本報霧峰, “顧全國家整體安全 實施戒嚴令有必要,” 中央日報, 12 Dec. 1984.

measured. *Central Daily News* editors, Sun, Ling, and Chiu, all maintained that the law had succeeded at preventing communist subversion, thus protecting Taiwan's peace and stability. Chiu also represented martial law as having a negligible effect on democracy in the ROC. KMT leaders had begun to reform their governance of Taiwan to allow more domestic participation. Those reforms, however, remained gradual and incremental. After the Kaohsiung Incident, political liberalization on Taiwan seemed no closer than at earlier periods in the ROC.

In 1986 Chiang Ching-kuo adroitly maneuvered the KMT into ending martial law and increasing the potential for reform in the ROC. In the spring of 1986, and in purported ill health, Chiang created an ad hoc committee from members of the KMT Central Standing Committee to recommend reforms. Chiang tasked the committee with lifting martial law, allowing other political parties, reorganizing ROC parliamentary organs and increasing native Taiwanese representation in them, and reforming the KMT itself. Hard-line members of the KMT resisted Chiang's calls for reforms, but leading *Dangwai* officials sensed the mood of the public and created the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), Taiwan's first independent political party, in September. Rather than suppress this new party, Chiang used the DPP as a catalyst to quell opposition by hardliners and push forward reforms for the KMT and ROC.⁹⁹ Chiang's reforms were adopted on 15 October 1986. Chiang explained "times have changed, the environment has changed, the tide has also changed," therefore the KMT needed to develop new concepts and methods to govern the state.¹⁰⁰ Chiang realized that the continued existence of the ROC was dependent on moving away from claims the KMT would retake the mainland and policies that disenfranchised Taiwanese. Chiang's reforms reflected an awareness that the KMT could no

⁹⁹ Rubenstein, "Political Taiwanization and Pragmatic Diplomacy," 446-47.

¹⁰⁰ 本報訊, "以開闊的胸襟推動革新 使民主憲政更和諧完美," 中央日報, 16 Oct. 1986.

longer govern the ROC as China. Since 1971 a significant majority of the international community recognized the PRC as China, and even the ROC's primary benefactor had recognized Beijing as the seat of China in 1979. Chiang's reforms sought to bolster the domestic legitimacy of both the party and state as the ROC's international legitimacy was severely curtailed in the eighties.

Wild Lily Student Movement

While Chiang's reforms to KMT governance were significant, the rising Taiwanese middle class still considered the pace of change in the ROC too slow. In March 1990 students from Taiwan National University and throughout Taipei gathered at Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Square to force the KMT to enact greater reforms. The 1989 Democracy Spring which had unfolded in Tiananmen the previous year influenced students and KMT leaders as they sought common ground. Fan Yun 范雲, President of the Student Association of National Taiwan University, told reporters that the Tiananmen protestors provided a model for their own, though the environments were different.¹⁰¹ The student protests in Taipei became known as the Wild Lily Student Movement and was largely successful, in part due to the awareness on both sides of the tragedy in Tiananmen. In the initial stages of the protest, ROC media highlighted the disorganization and chaos unfolding in the square. Before he passed away in January 1988, Chiang had selected Taiwanese-born Lee Teng-hui 李登輝 as his Vice-President and successor. On assuming the presidency, Lee not only continued but deepened reforms to the party and state. Lee's liberalism and Taiwanization policies worried old-guard KMT officials, such as mainland-born General Hau Pei-tsun 郝柏村. Lee's position as ROC president was threatened by the

¹⁰¹ 范雲, “「天安門」提供可循模式,” 聯合報, 20 Mar. 1990.

factionalism that had developed in the KMT. As students protested before the Chiang Kai-shek Memorial, Lee faced a contentious internal election for president as he maneuvered to maintain his position. Lee compromised with KMT hardliners to maintain the presidency, selecting Hau to serve as Premier of the ROC.¹⁰² Lee and the student protestors' fates were closely intertwined. Indeed, one of the protestors' demands was for the open election of the ROC president. Once Lee had secured his position, however, he met with student protestors and agreed to their requests. Consequently, the reforms which had begun under Chiang Ching-kuo were continued under Lee and when students took to the streets demanding greater political participation and reform they were met with accommodation rather than resistance. By 1990 KMT leaders had largely accepted the reality that the ROC no longer represented China and the ROC would undergo a political revolution in the 1990s.

ROC media highlighted chaos and disorder, as well as implicated the DPP, as the Wild Lily Student Movement began. On 18 March, the third day students occupied Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Square, protestors took down and destroyed the ROC flag. Editors at *Central Daily News* ran an article on the protestors' destruction of the flag that opened "yesterday during DPP resistance activities, a portion of the crowd was aroused to an uproar of extreme unremittent outbreaks of violent activity."¹⁰³ Editors at *United Daily News* ran an article that claimed the crowd "roared 'topple the Kuomintang,'" then the flag pole was taken down, the ROC flag destroyed, and a DPP flag raised.¹⁰⁴ Editors at both papers reported that a young man had attempted to prevent the protestors' destruction of the flag and, per *Central Daily News*, was "by

¹⁰² Rubenstein, "Political Taiwanization and Pragmatic Diplomacy," 448-50.

¹⁰³ 台北訊, "民進黨員不法行徑遭致不滿," 中央日報, 19 Mar. 1990.

¹⁰⁴ 高源流, 楊金巖, "鋸倒旗杆 火燒國旗," 聯合報, 19 Mar. 1990.

the crowd beaten and injured until blood covered his face.”¹⁰⁵ The editors presented the young man’s image, bloody and unbowed, to accompany their depictions of his heroic effort (fig. 5.4).¹⁰⁶ Reporter Chen Yongfu 陳永富 wrote protestors were painting slogans opposing the ongoing national assembly and that on “the faces of the snowy white walls, appear the heated words and expressions ‘burn down the Yat-sen Building,’ ‘old soldiers kill old thieves.’”¹⁰⁷ Chen also linked the protestors to the DPP. Editors presented a brief article beside Chen’s piece on protestors disrupting couples’ wedding photos as the square was “transformed into a field of trash, dirty and messy, a nightmare of betel nut residue and multi-colored spray paint.”¹⁰⁸ KMT-affiliated media associated the student protestors with both disorder and the DPP to undermine both groups calls for greater reform in the ROC. Editors juxtaposed the disorderly, violent protestors with the courageous defender of the flag to insinuate support for the ROC was also honorable. Essentially, KMT media initially portrayed student protestors similar to how CPC media had portrayed student protestors the previous year to discredit their calls for reform. The KMT, however, was not limited by past definitions of the state and its reforms were deeper and more far reaching than the ones across the strait. Consequently, the fates of the protesters in Chiang Kai-Shek Memorial Square would not resemble that of their peers in Tiananmen.

¹⁰⁵ 本報記者，邢定威攝，中央日報，19 Mar. 1990.

¹⁰⁶ 本報記者，邢定威攝，中央日報，19 Mar. 1990; 本報攝影組，“毀旗 護旗，”聯合報，19 Mar. 1990. The two papers provided different images of the young man, but both showed him injured with blood streaming down his face.

¹⁰⁷ 陳永富，“中正紀念堂「變色」！”聯合報，19 Mar. 1990.

¹⁰⁸ 台北訊，“損失 保留追訴權！”聯合報，19 Mar. 1990.



Figure 5.14: This Paper's Reporters 本報記者, Xing Dingwei (Photographer) 邢定威攝, 中央日報, 19 Mar. 1990.

Lee formally won election to the presidency on 21 March 1990. Lee's adroit maneuvering to reassure conservative elements of the KMT had secured his position earlier, however, and he sought to assuage the student protestors. KMT media depictions of the Wild Lily Student Movement changed quickly with Lee's support for the students. One of the primary changes was the differentiation between student protestors and the DPP. Editors at *Central Daily News* even portrayed the students crafting a Wild Lily for the protests in a positive light (fig. 5.5). On 19 March, the day protestors tore down the ROC flag, Lee directed ROC Minister of Education Mao Kao-wen 毛高文 to read a statement to students in Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Square. In the statement Lee proclaimed "I completely understand your matters of concern, I affirm this pledge to everyone: on matters of reform, the government will certainly increase the pace, and certainly will as soon as possible give everyone a clear and definite accounting."¹⁰⁹ The next day, 20 March, Lee expressed concern for students' safety, acknowledged their

¹⁰⁹ 何振忠, "李總統將與學生當面溝通," 聯合報, 20 Mar. 1990.

patriotism, and invited a student delegation to the presidential residence.¹¹⁰ On 21 March the

Central News Agency reported student delegates met with Lee who told them he:

absolutely supported the display and sentiment of student patriotism and love of the land, but President Lee also stressed to the student representatives that reform, particularly with regards to reforming the structure of the national constitution, really can't change today or tomorrow, but needs some time.¹¹¹

Lee's support for student demands represented not only his own desire for reforms, but an awareness that reforms were necessary for the KMT to maintain domestic legitimacy. Lee had appeased KMT hardliners to maintain his presidency, but the Wild Lily Student Movement also demonstrated to the hardliners that reform was necessary. Consequently, Lee was able to agree to student demands for greater political participation and governmental reform.



神精的動活坐靜次這製趕上晚天昨生學的系術藝
(攝崧新彭者記報本) “—合百野—”物徵象

Figure 15.5: Taipei News 台北訊, “「台灣野百合」完成” [“Taiwan Wild Lily” completed], 中央日報, 20 Mar. 1990.

¹¹⁰ 張昆山, “李總統將與學生當面溝通,” 聯合報, 20 Mar. 1990.

¹¹¹ 中央社, “李總統: 「儘速改革 但要給我時間」 ” 聯合報, 22 Mar. 1991.

By the 1980s, the KMT was no longer able to claim it represented China. The KMT legitimacy crisis first played out on the international stage. From the UN passing Resolution 2758 in 1971 to the cascading loss of diplomatic recognition from a majority of states that included the ROC's primary benefactor the United States in 1979. KMT leaders like Chiang and Lee recognized that the loss of international legitimacy meant they needed to bolster the ROC's domestic legitimacy. Chiang began the ROC's reform process by lifting martial law in 1986 and allowing the DPP to form as an alternative to the KMT. Many Taiwanese felt the pace of reform in the ROC remained too slow. Consequently, students took the example of their peers in Tiananmen in 1989 to demand greater political participation and reform. Unlike the 1989 Democracy Spring protestors, however, the 1990 Wild Lily Student Movement met with success. After securing his presidency, Lee met with students and supported their demands for reform. In 1990, Lee essentially agreed to revolutionize the state.

Conclusion

Yang Hsi-kun was in South Africa as the ROC underwent radical changes in the 1980s. Yang had declared "We shall return" as the ROC flag was lowered in the U.S. capitol for the last time in 1978.¹¹² Yang's quote echoed the purported words of U.S. General Douglas MacArthur as he fled the U.S. colony of the Philippines when the Japanese invaded during the Second World War. Representatives of the ROC did not, however, return to the United States as the ROC underwent dramatic democratic changes. Yang, who passed on 1 June 2000 at age 91, lived to see the ROC transition from a one-party autocratic state to its nascent stages as a democracy. It is speculative, but interesting, to consider what if Chiang Kai-shek had accepted Yang's 1971

¹¹² 賴心瑩. "非洲先生楊西崑妻兒爭產," 蘋果日報, 26 July 2004, accessed 21 July 2020, <https://tw.appledaily.com/headline/daily/20040726/1109700>.

proposal to rename the ROC and redirect the KMT from “one-China” and “retake the mainland” tropes? Would the Chinese Republic of Taiwan have a place in the UN and diplomatic ties with the United States? While an entertaining counterfactual exercise, Chiang Kai-shek did not accept Yang’s proposal and even as Chiang Ching-kuo and Lee Teng-hui reformed the party and state the ROC remained the official name of the island nation once controlled solely by the KMT.

The CPC entered the 1980s with no real opposition to claims it represented the Chinese nation. In 1979 Beijing and Washington established formal diplomatic relations. With U.S. recognition, the CPC succeeded in winning over a key ally of the KMT. PRC media and CPC leaders reasoned Sino-American Normalization would lead to the return of Taiwan to the motherland. While Taiwan joining the PRC was unrealistic, Deng and other CPC leaders did secure tangible benefits from Sino-American Normalization. Deng secured Carter’s tacit approval to launch a punitive war against Vietnam that gave the CPC both intelligence and diplomatic cover. Cumulatively, Sino-American Normalization and the Third Indochina War demonstrated the international community accepted the PRC was China, and the CPC controlled the PRC.

The CPC’s control of the nation was not challenged, directly. On the domestic front, Deng’s Four Modernizations and economic reform became the *sine qua non* of the CPC’s governance of the PRC. CPC leaders, influenced by scientists like Song Jian, conceived of population planning as a rational part of economic planning and enacted a campaign that radically altered Chinese families. The CPC carried out the one-child policy not to reform the family, however, but as a way to realize economic goals. Students, however, forced the CPC to abandon its previous definition of China as a revolutionary nation. In 1986 students, inspired by intellectuals like Fang Lizhi, took to the streets to call for greater political participation. CPC

cadres succeeded in controlling the narrative of those protests. While short lived, the 1986 student protests formed the roots for student protests in 1989. The party vacillated between accommodation and opprobrium of the protestors, but on 4 June 1989 CPC leaders deployed the PLA to Tiananmen to forcefully quell the protests. The CPC decision to use force against students calling for political change signaled questions of governance were not for the masses to decide, they were controlled by the state. During the 1989 Democracy Spring, or June Fourth Incident, the CPC demonstrated that revolution was no longer tolerated in the PRC.

The ROC entered the 1980s with few states recognizing it as China. The ROC's loss of official U.S. recognition compounded the KMT's diplomatic isolation. Chiang Ching-kuo and ROC media portrayed the Carter administration's decision as harmful to the free world and presented both U.S. politicians and citizens condemning it. ROC media used the Third Indochina War to argue U.S. recognition of the PRC had resulted in less stability and peace in the region. The KMT, however, was unable to regain a position on the world stage as states continued to recognize the PRC as China despite the CPC's military foray into Vietnam.

The loss of diplomatic ties with the majority of the world influenced Chiang Ching-kuo's efforts to reform the KMT and ROC. Chiang succeeded in ending martial law in 1986, despite the KMT's vociferous defense of it just a few years earlier. Chiang's reforms also allowed politicians who identified as *Dangwai* to form the DPP, the ROC's first opposition party. Chiang passed in early 1988, but his chosen successor, Taiwan-born Lee Teng-hui, continued Chiang's policies of reform. The Taiwanese middle class, however, felt change was progressing too slowly. Much as in the PRC, students in the ROC were the catalyst in the KMT redefinition of the nation. In 1990 students gathered in Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Square to demand greater political participation and reform in the ROC. The student protest in Taipei, known as the Wild

Lily Student Movement, and the state response to those protests, were both informed by the 1989 Democracy Spring movement and crackdown. The environment in Taipei was, as Fan Yun noted, much different than in Beijing. Lee acknowledged the protestors patriotism and agreed to student demands. The students' success was due, in part, to liberal KMT officials' pursuit of reform, but also resulted from KMT freedom to redefine the ROC without adhering to depictions of their state as China.

Conclusion

In 1993, ahead of the forty-eighth session of the United Nations, delegates from Belize, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Panama requested the organization put the representation of the “Republic of China in Taiwan” on the agenda. The delegates’ explained that while Resolution 2758 had placed the People’s Republic of China in the UN and excluded the ROC, “despite the decision, the Republic of China in Taiwan continued to exist as an independent political entity.”¹ The delegates’ request was not for Taipei to represent “China,” rather they sought membership for the ROC as it existed on Taiwan. Another six signatories joined the request that the 21 million citizens of the ROC deserved full UN membership because the state had “full jurisdiction over a specific territory, and... is an independent political and legal entity with a democratic system of government and its own institutions, laws, and security and defence arrangements – elements which make it totally distinct from the People’s Republic of China.”² Their request, however, went unheeded. The 1993 *Yearbook of the United Nations* only mentions Taiwan three times; one of those was as

¹ United Nations General Assembly (UN GA), “Request for the Inclusion of Supplementary item on the Agenda of the 48th Session: General Assembly: Consideration of the Exceptional Situation of the Republic of China in Taiwan in the International Context, Based on the Principle of Universality and in Accordance with the established model of Parallel Representation of Divided Countries at the United Nations: Letter Dated 6 August 1993 from the Representatives of Belize, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and Panama to the United Nations Addressed to the Secretary-General,” 9 Aug. 1993, A/48/19, p. 3, accessed 26 July 2020, United Nations Official Document System (UN ODS).

² Ibid, p. 4. UN GA, “Consideration of the Exceptional Situation of the Republic of China in Taiwan in the International Context, Based on the Principle of Universality and in Accordance with the established model of Parallel Representation of Divided Countries at the United Nations,” 21 Aug. 1993, A/48/19/ADD.1, accessed 26 July 2020, UN ODS; UN GA, “Consideration of the Exceptional Situation of the Republic of China in Taiwan in the International Context, Based on the Principle of Universality and in Accordance with the established model of Parallel Representation of Divided Countries at the United Nations,” 22 Aug. 1993, A/48/19/ADD.2, accessed 26 July 2020, UN ODS; UN GA, “Consideration of the Exceptional Situation of the Republic of China in Taiwan in the International Context, Based on the Principle of Universality and in Accordance with the established model of Parallel Representation of Divided Countries at the United Nations,” 23 Aug. 1993, A/48/19/ADD.3, accessed 26 July 2020, UN ODS.

“China (mainland and Taiwan Province),” in a discussion of drug trafficking in Asia.”³ The UN’s decision from twenty-two years earlier was not questioned within the world body. Resolution 2758 had settled not only the question of which state represented China, the PRC, but had also determined that Taiwan was a part of China.

The KMT and CPC competed to represent China in the UN for twenty-two years, thus there is an appealing symmetry in Taipei’s attempt to rejoin the organization after twenty-two years of exclusion. The ROC that sought to join the UN in 1993, however, was markedly different from the ROC that had helped found the organization in 1945 and then been ousted in 1971. By 1993, the Kuomintang had radically transformed the Republic of China from a one-party state claiming to represent China to a Taiwan-focused democracy. Domestic concerns were an impetus for moves by Lee Teng-hui and the KMT as a whole to democratize and Taiwanize the ROC. After his election in 1990, Lee had listened to protestors’ demands for greater participation during the White Lily Student Movement. Through those reforms, KMT leaders not only made the ROC more representative for the people of Taiwan, they also dismantled the ROC’s remaining claims to represent “China.” The ROC’s National Assembly, elected in 1947, was finally reformed and new representatives were elected in 1991. The Second National Assembly revised the ROC constitution to exclude the mainland by limiting the state’s jurisdiction to “the free area of the Republic of China,” or in other words Taiwan, the Pescadores, and some smaller offshore islands.⁴ The reforms explicitly distanced the ROC from

³ Dept. of Public Information, United Nations, *Yearbook of the United Nations 1993*, Vol. 47, Yobert K. Shamapande, ed., (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1994), pp. 611, 1107, 1248. The quoted text is from “International Drug Control,” p. 1107.

⁴ “Taiwan (Republic of China)’s Constitution of 1947 with Amendments through 2005,” [Constituteproject.org](https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Taiwan_2005.pdf?lang=en), trans. Max Planck Institute, (Oxford University Press), accessed 20 Mar. 2020, https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Taiwan_2005.pdf?lang=en.

the KMT's claim to represent all of China, a claim that the ROC's new opposition party, the Democratic Progressive Party, actively fought in favor of an independent Taiwan. ROC attempts to rejoin the UN, however, were faced with the PRC's one-China policy that claimed Taiwan as sovereign and inseparable Chinese territory.

From 1993 to 2006 Taiwan's allies petitioned the UN General Assembly to allow the ROC to participate in the organization. ROC representatives did not seek full membership for their island nation because membership would require Security Council approval. PRC delegates would not allow any resolution that could undermine Beijing's claim that Taiwan was a part of China, and as China in the UN they wielded veto power on the Security Council. Where ROC representatives in the UN had once stymied debate on Beijing joining the world body, PRC delegates now did the same to Taipei.

The United Nations' "China Seat"

The KMT was quite successful in representing China in the UN long after the CPC controlled the Chinese mainland. In 1949 Chairman of the CPC Mao Zedong had declared the founding of the PRC as KMT President Chiang Kai-shek established the ROC in exile on Taiwan. The CPC immediately requested UN membership, but ROC representatives and their allies shelved discussion until 1950. In 1950 the CPC paused their war with the KMT to aid the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in its attempt to unify the Korean peninsula by force. Beijing's participation, however, came after the UN had voted to safeguard and restore the Republic of Korea. The PRC was, per the UN, on the wrong side of the Korean War. Consequently, ROC delegates and their allies argued the PRC was not a peace-loving state and stymied any discussion on Chinese representation in the UN until 1961. A decade after the Korean War, the world had changed. Former empires had splintered, and new nation states had

emerged from former colonies. ROC delegates and their allies, primarily the United States, changed tactics as these new states joined the world body. In 1961 the UN debated Chinese representation for the first time. But before that debate began, ROC and U.S. representatives had convinced the UN that Chinese representation was an “important question,” thus requiring a two-thirds majority for any change to pass. The ROC and their allies’ important-question strategy proved effective, and the KMT continued to represent China in the UN for the next decade.

After the KMT had excluded the PRC from the world’s premier international organization for twenty-two years, the CPC was able to exclude the ROC not only from the UN but eventually from most international organizations altogether. In 1971 the UN passed Resolution 2758 that determined the PRC represented China and expelled KMT representatives from the organization. Before the UN ousted the ROC, states both new and old had begun challenging the KMT’s claim to represent all of China. In 1970, the UN’s designation that Chinese representation was an important question saved ROC membership for the first time as a majority of UN delegates voted the PRC should represent China. Thus, KMT officials accepted the warnings of their American counterparts that they should pursue other avenues, including dual representation with the PRC, to maintain the ROC’s place in the world body. As the UN began its annual debate in 1971, however, the organization had moved beyond KMT efforts to keep a presence for their state. When the ROC and its allies important-question resolution was defeated, PRC advocates celebrated their victory and passed Resolution 2758 shortly thereafter.

After 1971, the PRC represented China in the UN. Mao and other CPC leaders dispatched a delegation immediately after Resolution 2758 to participate in the world body and its deliberations. The CPC had portrayed the organization under the thrall of imperial powers, be they American or Soviet, before 1971. Once PRC delegates represented China in the UN,

however, they portrayed the organization as freed from imperial constraints. CPC officials depicted the PRC's first veto in 1972, of Bangladeshi membership in the organization, as a defeat for imperialism. PRC media asserted Bangladesh was a Soviet-backed Indian puppet meant to weaken Pakistan. PRC representatives also attacked ongoing apartheid in Africa to demonstrate support for decolonization and the "Third World," or areas outside of American or Soviet spheres of influence. Once Beijing gained recognition in the UN as China, states around the world switched diplomatic recognition from the ROC to the PRC. By 1979, even the United States, Taipei's stalwart ally and primary benefactor, recognized Beijing as the legitimate government of China. When the CPC launched a punitive attack against Vietnam in 1979, states neither challenged the PRC's place in the UN nor its peace-loving nature. While ROC representatives sought to claim U.S. recognition had emboldened Beijing and threatened regional stability, by the 1980s even military adventurism was not enough to disassociate the PRC from China. After the UN passed Resolution 2758, the world had accepted that the PRC was the state that represented the Chinese nation. The ROC's expulsion from the world body resulted in the island nation becoming diplomatically isolated even as its economic ties developed and flourished.

The CPC and KMT's competition to represent China also influenced the international system as it clarified the sovereignty and legitimacy, both international and domestic, of states. While the UN was heir to the League of Nations, the UN confronted a world far different from that of the League. Many of the organs of the two intergovernmental organizations were similar, but the UN benefited by learning from the League's failings. The new world body also developed in a world of imperial decline as the principle of national self-determination the League once espoused became more real. Pro-ROC and pro-PRC delegates defined and refined

the terms of state sovereignty as they debated which government represented the Chinese nation.

As new states emerged from the ashes of former empires, they sought the international legitimacy UN membership provided. KMT officials recognized the significance of the UN for foreign relations and adroitly maintained their international authority as China. The KMT, through access to the UN, for decades represented a nation outside of their control on the international stage. ROC representation of China in the world body, however, became a point of international criticism against superpower politics in the organization. Consequently, as the UN began resembling more of the world, the ROC position in the UN became more tenuous. Resolution 2758 represented a turning point not just for the KMT-CPC competition to represent China, it also signaled a shift in the UN towards greater participation and international authority for less powerful states.

National Imaginaries of “China”

The CPC and KMT competed vigorously to represent China on the international stage. Within that competition, each party also constructed a national imaginary of China to legitimate their rule of the nation at home and abroad. I do not mean that the communists or the nationalists lacked differing philosophies of governance, nor that each defined China solely to differentiate themselves from their rivals. Instead, the CPC and KMT represented Chinese history and tradition to benefit their authority for national and international audiences. The CPC portrayed China as a nation of revolution, made modern after freed from the constraints of China’s ignominious semi-feudal, semi-colonial past. The KMT depicted China as a nation of tradition, both modern and with a culture that began millennia earlier with the near-mythical Xia dynasty (c. 2070-1600 BCE). Whether communist or nationalist, Chinese officials had a shared history, territory, and even political structure; their similarities were greater than their differences.

Therefore, the CPC and KMT differentiated their right to sovereignty over China based on adherence to an imagined past. Both the CPC and KMT invoked an imagined history of China that elevated moments to support their definition of China and obscured those that did not. Or, to quote the author George Orwell, “‘Who controls the past,’ ran the Party slogan, ‘controls the future: who controls the present controls the past.’”⁵ In other words, both the CPC and KMT represented a past China to domestic and international audiences that elevated and minimized an historical China to bolster their authority to represent China in the ever-changing present.

The CPC and KMT revised their conceptualizations of China over time, as each party crafted their national imaginaries to benefit their current authority to represent China. The UN was an important site of international legitimation, and thus membership, or lack thereof, affected both CPC and KMT national imaginaries. States did create alternative international realms, such as the non-aligned movement, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), or the Warsaw Pact, with varying degrees of formality and success. While these organizations altered some of the functions and significance of the UN, the world body continued to be the dominant venue of global governance and largely synonymous with the international system. Before the world body passed Resolution 2758, the KMT represented China as a nation of traditions and culture that reached into the ancient past. KMT representatives linked the ROC to past regimes, in part, to legitimate their right to represent a China familiar to the international community. Excluded from the world body, the CPC portrayed China as a nation that had freed itself from the myths and superstitions of the past. The PRC was largely outside the international system the UN accommodated and sustained, thus the CPC had little incentive to defend a China

⁵ George Orwell, *1984*, Part 1, Chap. 3, accessed 21 July 2020, <http://www.george-orwell.org/1984/index.html>. The Complete Works of George Orwell. The quote also appears in Part 3, Chap. 2.

recognizable to that system. Mao Zedong and the Cultural Revolution in the PRC and Chiang Kai-shek and the Chinese Cultural Renaissance in the ROC made stark contrast of the parties' competing national imaginaries.

After the UN passed Resolution 2758, PRC and ROC authority to act as China on the international stage was flipped. CPC and KMT national imaginaries underwent changes that correlated with UN membership. CPC depictions of a revolutionary China were tempered with references that not only acknowledged an ancient China, but celebrated it. The CPC crafted an itinerary for U.S. President Richard M. Nixon's 1972 visit that purposefully displayed China's material culture, aligning the PRC with internationally accepted concepts of China. KMT exhortations that the ROC represented an ancient past grew muted after being stripped of UN membership. As the ROC hemorrhaged diplomatic recognition in the wake of Resolution 2758, KMT officials focused less on ancient culture and traditions as they defended their authority on the international stage. In 1989, CPC officials demonstrated their social imaginary of China no longer included revolution when they violently ended the 1989 Democracy Spring. In 1990, KMT officials distanced the ROC from tradition when they agreed to student demands for greater political reform during the White Lily Student Movement. After the reforms, which effectively ended ROC posturing as China, the ROC Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Square where the students had gathered in Taipei was renamed Liberty Square. The ROC had, in short, become revolutionary.

One China

In December 2019, people in Wuhan, Hubei, PRC, started to fall ill. Scientists identified a novel coronavirus, SARS-CoV-2, as the culprit and designated its illness as COVID-19. Within a few short months, the world was combatting a pandemic that had upended societies and

economies. The World Health Organization (WHO), founded by the UN in 1948, sought to lead the global response to the most disruptive viral infection since the 1918 Flu ravaged societies over a century before. This was, arguably, what the UN created the WHO for as it led the international effort to contain the spread of the virus. The PRC continued to exclude the ROC from participating with international organizations, including the WHO, during the COVID-19 pandemic.

In April 2019 WHO Assistant General-Director Bruce Aylward demonstrated the health organization's exclusion of Taiwan in dramatic fashion. Yvonne Tong, a reporter for the public news broadcaster Radio Television Hong Kong (RTHK), was interviewing Aylward, a Canadian epidemiologist and WHO official. During the interview, Tong asked Aylward about whether the WHO might consider Taiwan's membership, Aylward pretended not to hear the question, then ended the call when asked again. When Tong called back to discuss how Taiwan was handling the outbreak, Aylward told her they'd already discussed China.⁶ Aylward's performance, captured on video, was viewed around the world and the WHO issued a statement that it had not neglected Taiwan, a statement Taiwanese officials disputed.⁷ While Aylward brought international attention to Taiwan's absence from the WHO, the PRC response went largely unnoticed.

The Hong Kong government publicly rebuked RTHK for Tong's interview of Aylward. Hong Kong Commerce and Economic Development Secretary Edward Yau Tang-wau, whose office oversaw RTHK, issued RTHK's reprimand. A year earlier, the CPC was rumored to be

⁶ "Govt says RTHK has breached 'One China' principle," *RTHK.HK*, 2 April 2020, accessed 11 July 2020, <https://news.rthk.hk/rthk/en/component/k2/1518442-20200402.htm>.

⁷ Ben Blanchard, "Taiwan says WHO not sharing coronavirus information it provides, pressing complaints," *Reuters*, 30 Mar. 2020, accessed 11 July 2020, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-taiwan-who/taiwan-says-who-not-sharing-coronavirus-information-it-provides-pressing-complaints-idUSKBN21H1AU>.

considering Edward Yau as a replacement for Chief Executive Carrie Lam during tumultuous 2019 protests in Hong Kong.⁸ Yau had not been sympathetic to Hong Kong protestors or their calls for greater independence from Beijing. While the world fought COVID-19, Yau declared that Tong's interview had "breached the One-China Principle." Yau explained further that "It is common knowledge that WHO membership is based on sovereign states. RTHK, as a government department and a public service broadcaster, should have proper understanding of the above without any deviation."⁹ Yau was explicit that, for pro-Beijing officials, the one-China policy remained sacrosanct even in the midst of a pandemic. That a Hong Kong politician and official defended the concept of a greater China that includes Taiwan and Hong Kong obfuscates the development of separate identities among people living in all three areas.

The CPC dedication to "one China" that includes Taiwan has long been incongruous with the perceptions of the people governing and living in Taiwan. Put another way, the PRC denies that a Taiwanese nation-state has developed out of what nominally remains the ROC. The ROC state is an independent polity that is sovereign over the regions it governs, which advocates that the "Republic of China in Taiwan" gain UN recognition pointed out in 1993. That there is a state separate from the PRC that governs Taiwan is indisputable. Taiwanese support of their state's independence has also strengthened over time. In 1995 fifty-four percent of Taiwanese would have considered unification with China if it were to become wealthy and democratic. By 2018, however, Taiwanese support for unification had fallen to twenty-eight percent. Taiwanese also

⁸ Denise Tsang, "Commerce chief Edward Yau dodges questions on whether he'll be next Chief Executive, as rumours swirl he's among favourites to replace Carrie Lam," *South China Morning Post*, 20 June 2019, accessed 11 July 2020, <https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/politics/article/3015358/commerce-chief-edward-yau-dodges-questions-whether-hell-be>.

⁹ "Govt says RTHK has breached 'One China' principle," *RTHK.HK*, 2 April 2020, accessed 11 July 2020, <https://news.rthk.hk/rthk/en/component/k2/1518442-20200402.htm>.

no longer consider themselves “Chinese.” A June 2018 poll revealed ninety-three percent of Taiwanese viewed themselves as “both Taiwanese and Chinese,” with only three-and-a-half percent identifying as solely Chinese. Those who considered themselves solely Taiwanese, in comparison, had increased from seventeen-and-a-half percent in 1992 to fifty-six percent in 2018.¹⁰ People’s Taiwanese identity began to develop before the democratization of Taiwan, but increased participation in their own governance increased Taiwanese dedication to their distinct historical experiences, which Taiwan’s economic performance helped facilitate.¹¹ Essentially, Beijing promotes a Chinese national imaginary that now confronts a Taiwanese national imaginary that developed organically. PRC officials, however, remain largely able to dictate the role Taiwan plays on the international stage whether as nation, state, or nation-state.

Nearly three decades after Taipei first attempted to rejoin the international community in 1993, its ability to participate in international organizations remains at Beijing’s discretion. Shortly after the SARS epidemic in 2003 the WHO held votes considering representation for Taiwanese health agencies, a victory in and of itself. When Ma Ying-jeou took over as ROC President in 2008, Taiwan gained even more authority in the WHO, though as “Chinese Taipei.” Ma’s support for unification was a significant reason Beijing allowed greater Taiwanese participation, as the PRC wanted to increase Taiwanese support for Ma. The Taiwanese public, however, remained critical of unification and contested Taiwan being labeled as “Chinese Taipei.” In 2010, an internal WHO memorandum clarified that the proper label for Taiwan was

¹⁰ Syaru Shirley Lin, “Analyzing the Relationship between Identity and Democratization in Taiwan and Hong Kong in the Shadow of China,” *The ASAN Forum* (20 Dec. 2018), accessed 17 July 2020: <http://www.theasanforum.org/analyzing-the-relationship-between-identity-and-democratization-in-taiwan-and-hong-kong-in-the-shadow-of-china/>. Lin also discusses the development of a Hong Kong national imaginary, without using that term.

¹¹ Chuang Ya-chung, “Taiwanese Identity in a Global/Local Context: The Use and Abuse of National Consciousness in Taiwan,” in Christian Aspalter, ed., *Understanding Modern Taiwan: Essays in Economics, Politics, and Social Policy* (Aldershot, Hampshire: Ashgate Publishing Ltd., 2001), 53-66.

“Taiwan Province of China.”¹² Essentially, Beijing determined nearly all aspects of Taiwanese participation with the WHO. The CPC remained dedicated to the one-China policy, and Taipei has been unable to garner the international support necessary to establish its authority to represent Taiwan. Five decades after the UN passed Resolution 2758, the PRC has developed into an international power few states are willing to challenge. Consequently, Taiwan remains in an international grey zone, neither sovereign nor subject of the nation it once claimed. The international system the ROC once championed now leaves the island nation largely subject to the strictures of the PRC’s conception of “China” on the international stage.

¹² Sigrid Winkler, “Taiwan’s UN Dilemma: To Be or Not To Be,” *Brookings*, 20 June 2012, accessed 11 July 2020, <https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/taiwans-un-dilemma-to-be-or-not-to-be/>.

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