This dissertation comprises three distinct essays in mechanism design and economic theory. The first chapter studies the welfare implications of consumer data ownership and voluntary disclosure. I formalize this setting within a model of mechanism design with evidence and construct the seller's optimal mechanism. Perhaps surprisingly, I find that allowing...
This dissertation comprises three essays in distinct areas of economic theory, yet all are related to experimentation and learning. In the first chapter, I study how organizations assign tasks to identify the best candidate to promote among a pool of workers. Task allocation and workers’ motivation interact through the organization’s...
This dissertation contains two topics. The first topic focuses on how to use information design to minimize costs of implementing a policy that guarantees 100% passing rate of all participants by providing enough compensation for the their effort. The second topic explores an auction setting which involves financially distressed business...
The first chapter of the dissertation analyzes a moral hazard problem where a firm incentivizes a team of complementary workers in the presence of trust concerns. As we show, when concerned about team members not trusting each other, the firm typically sacrifices statistically-relevant information, compensating some workers based solely on...
This dissertation studies the limitations of incentive design in organizations and how they lead to inefficient outcomes. Chapter 1 studies how a coalition coordinates its members when they freely join and leave. It characterizes the conditions under which such coordination prevents the coalition from forming in the first place. In...
This dissertation comprises three essays that study dynamic decisions under uncertainty--in particular, ambiguity. The first two chapters develop new decision models that emphasize the role of making statistical inferences in decisions. The third chapter highlights, in the context of persuasion, how different decision models can lead to distinct conclusions in...
This thesis revisits classic optimal tax theory, recognizing that most people live in multi-person households. We derive optimal tax schedules for married agents, seriously taking the distinction between interpersonal and interhousehold inequality. After showing how individual-oriented utilitarianism typically leads to a misalignment between the households’ and the government’s objectives, which...
This dissertation leverages methodologies from computer science to understand sources of complexity in economic theory. Chapter 1 considers time complexity: how much time is needed to make a decision. Chapters 2 and 3 consider informational complexity: how much and what kind of data is needed to make a decision. I...
This dissertation studies interactions between a non-Bayesian decision maker (DM) and a sophisticated information provider who wants to influence the DM. In the essay ``Strategic Justifications," an auditor receives a justification from a self-interested expert who wants to convince the auditor that she acted in good faith for her clients....
This dissertation consists of three chapters on contract theory. In Chapter 1, ``Agency in Hierarchies: Middle Managers and Performance Evaluations'', I study the optimal joint design of incentives and performance rating scales in a principal-manager-worker hierarchy. The principal wants to motivate the manager and the worker to exert unobservable effort....