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Description:: This dissertation comprises three distinct essays in mechanism design and economic theory. The first chapter studies the welfare implications of consumer data ownership and voluntary disclosure. I formalize this setting within a model of mechanism design with evidence and construct the seller's optimal mechanism. Perhaps surprisingly, I find that allowing...
Keyword:: Evidence, Mechanism Design, and Robust Contract
Subject:: Economic theory
Creator:: Vaidya, Udayan
Owner:: Scholarly Digital Publishing
Language:: en
Date Uploaded:: 05/31/2023
Date Created:: 2023-01-01
Resource Type:: Dissertation
Alternate Identifier:: etdadmin_upload_982001 and http://dissertations.umi.com/northwestern:16496

Description:: We consider general utility models and information structures of the agents and illustrate when economic conclusions for designing simple mechanisms in classical settings extends for general environments. We show that whether economic conclusions can be generalized depends on the details of the generalizations. For example, in single-item auction, competition and...
Keyword:: Algorithmic Game Theory, Mechanism Design, and Simple Mechanisms
Subject:: Computer science
Creator:: Li, Yingkai
Owner:: Scholarly Digital Publishing
Language:: en
Date Uploaded:: 06/22/2022
Date Created:: 2022-01-01
Resource Type:: Dissertation
Alternate Identifier:: etdadmin_upload_894020 and http://dissertations.umi.com/northwestern:15991

Description:: This dissertation presents research on the game theory of political power, both between and within nations. It first revisits a classical distinction between three different types of power or influence: information, rewards and threats. By presenting a binary-action Principal-Agent problem which incorporates the essential ingredients of all three types of...
Keyword:: Game Theory, Mechanism Design, and Political Economy
Subject:: Economics, Political science, and Economic theory
Creator:: Theisen, Alexander Scott
Owner:: Scholarly Digital Publishing
Language:: en
Date Uploaded:: 01/21/2021
Date Created:: 2020-01-01
Resource Type:: Dissertation
Alternate Identifier:: etdadmin_upload_742509 and http://dissertations.umi.com/northwestern:15094

Description:: In the first chapter I introduce the ideas that link selling information to surplus extraction. In my environment the seller may be uncertain about how much the buyer both has already learned before contracting with the seller (belief types) and is able to learn after contracting with the seller (information...
Keyword:: Screening, Selling Information, Mechanism Design, and Full Surplus Extraction
Subject:: Economics
Creator:: Mishara-Blomberger, Jonas
Owner:: Scholarly Digital Publishing
Language:: en
Date Uploaded:: 02/12/2020
Date Created:: 2019-01-01
Resource Type:: Dissertation
Alternate Identifier:: etdadmin_upload_662459 and http://dissertations.umi.com/northwestern:14641

Description:: This dissertation is a collection of three essays that study (dynamic) incentive provision in multi-agent settings with asymmetric information: delegation of projects in organizations, dynamic matching on a platform, and arbitration between partners in a dispute.', "The first chapter studies dynamic delegation of heterogeneous projects to agents with diverse capabilities....
Keyword:: Arbitration, Dynamic Delegation, Partnerships, Mechanism Design, Information Economics, and Dynamic Matching
Subject:: Economics
Creator:: Daniel Fershtman
Owner:: Scholarly Digital Publishing
Date Uploaded:: 10/08/2019
Date Modified:: 10/08/2019
Date Created:: 2018-01-01
Resource Type:: Dissertation

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