Information policies are an effective way to alleviate information asymmetries, but the effectiveness of such policies depends critically on the underlying incentives people face. This dissertation is comprised of three papers that study the welfare effects of various information policies using game-theoretic models. The first paper analyzes how networks of social interaction affect the social value of public information dissemination. The second paper is dedicated to study mandatory disclosure regulations. The third paper develops a model of endogenous information sharing. The obtained theoretical insights can be useful for designing efficient information policies.

Creator

• Murayama, Kota

DOI

• https://doi.org/10.21985/n2-3f4t-pp74

Subject

• Economic theory

Language

• en

Alternate Identifier

• etdadmin_upload_744272
• http://dissertations.umi.com/northwestern:15141

Date created

• 2020-01-01

Resource type

• Dissertation

Rights statement

• In Copyright