To be tempted is to be conflicted, but the conflict is not one of oscillation between two good options. Rather, it is normally easy to act on temptation and difficult to act against it. But this is puzzling, because unless temptation is a force that acts on us, it’s not clear why our motivation would sabotage itself in this way. In response to this, I offer a theory of inclinations as provisional decisions of the instinctive mind. Inclinations are what would guide our action if we were wholly creatures of instinct, but in the case of human creatures with the ability to question their inclinations and settle practical questions in light of their reasons, inclinations are also reason-laden, an inchoate grasp of the value of acting as we are inclined to act. This means that temptation is not an assault on rational nature in the form of an “urge” or the “flesh,” but an inevitable conflict that arises in a creature with a dual human-animal nature. Our task, on my view, is not to beat down temptation with a strong will but rather to cultivate our inclinations across time.

Creator

• Bruxvoort, Abigail

DOI

• https://doi.org/10.21985/n2-fmzd-s682

Subject

• Philosophy
• Ethics

Language

• en

Alternate Identifier

• etdadmin_upload_854362
• http://dissertations.umi.com/northwestern:15809

Keyword

• inclination
• temptation
• philosophy of action
• motivation
• moral psychology
• desire

Date created

• 2021-01-01

Resource type

• Dissertation

Rights statement

• In Copyright