Defending Pragmatic Epistemic Instrumentalism: A Pragmatic Account of Epistemic Normativity

Weston, Nathan Michael

doi:https://doi.org/10.21985/n2-q7am-wb24

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Defending Pragmatic Epistemic Instrumentalism: A Pragmatic Account of Epistemic Normativity

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We often criticize people for having beliefs that are not sufficiently supported by the total available evidence. We do this even if those beliefs are instrumental to satisfying their desires. This leads to a question: why should people care about following the evidence, especially when doing so is not instrumental to getting what they want? The purpose of this dissertation is to answer that question by defending a novel account of epistemic normativity. According to pragmatic epistemic instrumentalism, the reason people have to follow their evidence stems from the existence of a unique social practice that aims at coordinating peoples’ beliefs on truth. The epistemic practice is constituted by a set of epistemic norms that govern both belief and inquiry. The most fundamental of these norms have force for anyone who participates in the practice, regardless of her particular desires or goals. All human agents have strong practical reason to participate in the epistemic practice because doing so is instrumental to satisfying their own desires, especially their desires for truth. Pragmatic epistemic instrumentalism explains why evidence matters by connecting it to one of the deepest human needs: the need to coordinate on truth. Because it explains epistemic normativity in terms of the desires and aims of a human community rather than solely in terms of the desires of particular agents, pragmatic instrumentalism is distinctly social in orientation. It is pragmatic because, unlike realist views that say normativity is a mind-independent fact, it says that epistemic normativity arises from creative human efforts to solve the truth coordination problem. Pragmatic instrumentalism does not abandon objectivity, though. It says that the correct epistemic norms are not simply the ones that “work,” but the ones that are most conducive to successfully coordinating on truth. By grounding epistemic normativity in a truth-aimed social practice to which all humans have reason to commit, pragmatic instrumentalism connects epistemic normativity to our practical concerns without letting the practical encroach upon or override the epistemic. This allows pragmatic instrumentalism to uphold the preeminence of epistemic norms in human life without making epistemic rationality too idealized or demanding. It also allows pragmatic instrumentalism to account for the fact that epistemic norms are universal and categorical, while also allowing for legitimate pragmatic reasons to believe in cases where the epistemic practice gives way to exigent practical concerns. Pragmatic epistemic instrumentalism therefore vindicates the intuition that there are good pragmatic reasons to believe, while, at the same time, upholding the view that following the evidence is of primary importance in human life.

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