The concept of epistemic infringement marks a novel entry into the social epistemology literature concerning epistemic misconduct. Epistemic infringement constitutively involves the systematic contravention of social and epistemic norms, particularly in a manner that serves to erode epistemic agency. This dissertation identifies epistemic infringement as a useful theoretical tool for further understanding social phenomena previously unexplored in contemporary philosophy, such as predatory grooming, as well as philosophically familiar phenomena, such as gaslighting and propaganda. It further develops and defends a novel account of epistemic agency and shows how this account is adaptable at both the order of individuals as well as collective entities.

Creator

• Leydon-Hardy, Lauren

DOI

• https://doi.org/10.21985/n2-2fv2-wv48

Subject

• Philosophy

Language

• en

Alternate Identifier

• http://dissertations.umi.com/northwestern:14687
• etdadmin_upload_663369

Keyword

• Predatory Grooming
• Gaslighting
• Epistemic Agency
• Collective Epistemology
• Epistemic Misconduct
• Propaganda

Date created

• 2019-01-01

Resource type

• Dissertation

Rights statement

• In Copyright