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Rethinking the Structure of Events: Heidegger on Kant and the Concept of Cause

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Morganna Lambeth

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Abstract

My dissertation draws on Heidegger's interpretation of Kant to argue that Kant overestimates the role that causality plays in structuring our experience. Heidegger suggests that Kant's analysis of experience mistakenly universalizes a fraction of our experience: the experience of material things. I defend the merits of this suggestion by offering a careful reconstruction of Heidegger's controversial interpretation of the imagination and applying this interpretation in detail to one of the most debated segments of the Critique of Pure Reason: the Second Analogy. In this chapter, Kant suggests that we must employ the concept of cause in order to be aware that an event (i.e. a change in states) has occurred. While Kant's mechanical account of events captures our experience of material things, I argue that his analysis does not capture our experience of events initiated by humans. I suggest that we experience human events rather as components of an overarching project oriented toward some future goal; more specifically, we experience human events as *a series of conditions* for that goal. My argument expands on Heidegger's ontology by identifying the structure of human events; further, it brings out Heidegger's contribution to Kant's debate with Hume over the legitimacy of causal reasoning, to ongoing debates in Heidegger's time about the success of Kant's arguments, and to contemporary Kant scholarship debating the Second Analogy.

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Morganna Lambeth

Marbach am Neckar, 2018

List of Abbreviations

I will use abbreviations to refer to English translations of Heidegger's works. I also occasionally refer to the original German text using the *Gesamtausgabe* ("GA") editions of Heidegger's works. In the chart below, I list titles and English translations, abbreviations, corresponding GA editions, and original year of publication (for books) or instruction (for seminars, marking "WS" for winter semester seminars and "SS" for summer semester seminars). I order the chart by original date. Full bibliographic information can be found in the list of works cited.

Title and Translation	Abbreviation	Gesamtausgabe edition	Original date
The Heidegger-Jaspers Correspondence (trans. Gary E. Aylesworth)	HJC	--	1920-1963
Being and Time (trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson) ¹	BT	GA 2	1927
Phenomenology and Theology (trans. James G. Hart and John C. Maraldo)	PT	GA 9	1927
Basic Problems of Phenomenology (trans. Albert Hofstadter)	BPP	GA 24	SS 1927
Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason (trans. Parvis Emad and Kenneth Maly) ²	PIK	GA 25	WS 1927-1928
Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics (trans. James S. Churchill)	KPM	GA 3	1929
Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik (<i>no translation used</i>)	--	GA 29/30	WS 1929-1930
The Essence of Human Freedom (trans. Ted Sadler) ³	EHF	GA 31	SS 1930

¹ I use the marginal page numbers to refer to pages in BT, which align with the page numbers in German editions of the work. For the remainder, I use the page number listed in the upper right hand corner.

² I occasionally refer to the written manuscript for this lecture course, using the citation "1927-1928 *Handschrift*."

³ I refer to the written manuscript for this lecture course using the citation "1930 *Handschrift*."

Introduction to Metaphysics (trans. Gregory Fried and Richard Polt)	IM	GA 40	SS 1935
What is a Thing? (trans. W.B. Barton and Vera Deutsch)	WT	GA 41	WS 1935-1936
Letter on ‘Humanism,’ (trans. Frank A. Capuzzi)	LH	GA 9	1947
The Question Concerning Technology (trans. William Lovitt)	QCT	GA 7	1954
Discourse on Thinking (ed. Manfred Stassen)	DT	--	1959
Zollikon Seminars (trans. Franz Mayr and Richard Askay)	ZS	GA 89	1959-1969

I will use the following abbreviations to refer to the Cambridge translations of Kant’s works:

Title and Translation	Abbreviation	Original date
The Critique of Pure Reason (trans. Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood)	CPR	1781: first edition 1787: second edition
Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics (trans. Gary Hatfield)	<u>Prol.</u>	1783
The Critique of Practical Reason (trans. Mary J. Gregor)	CPrR	1788
The Critique of the Power of Judgment (trans. Paul Guyer and Eric Mathews)	CPJ	1790
Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, (trans. Robert Louden)	<u>Anth.</u>	1798 (from lectures given 1772-1796)

For Kant’s works listed above, I always use the marginal page numbers reflecting the pagination of the German edition. Note that, for the Critique of Pure Reason, the number listed after “A” refers to the first edition of the work in 1781, while the number “B” refers to the second edition of the work in 1787.

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Introduction

Heidegger offers a harsh portrayal of our contemporary age. He suggests that we see the objects around us as “resources” [*Bestand*] that should be processed and arranged such that they fit efficiently and flexibly into human projects, whatever those projects may be. Heidegger provides compelling phenomenological descriptions of our contemporary approach to manmade objects like “the airliner that stands on the runway”; we expect the airliner to stand on the ready, prepared to be incorporated into any number of human projects as a flexible mode of transportation (QCT 17). He also considers natural objects like the Rhine River, an object “that appears as something at our command”; we experience the river as something that can and should be rearranged so that it can yield the most energy, “dammed up into the power plant” so that the force of its current can be converted into a supply of electricity for a nearby city (QCT 16). Heidegger’s highest criticism, however, is reserved for the contemporary understanding of humans, where he suggests that we also view them as objects to be controlled and manipulated – cogs in the machine of industrial processes, or “human resources” [*Menschenmaterial*] (QCT 18/GA 7: 21). Just as we might look out over a river and see nothing but a source of electricity, we see humans as resources to optimize, organize and rearrange so that they can serve our ends all the more efficiently and flexibly.

Our contemporary age, Heidegger suggests, does not appreciate human beings as what they are; “precisely nowhere does man today encounter himself, i.e., his essence” (QCT 27). Heidegger attributes this mistake to a surprising source: a framework of understanding that we inherited from modern philosophers, who failed fully to theorize

the exceptionality of human beings.⁴ One of his primary examples is Immanuel Kant, who failed, Heidegger alleges, appropriately to differentiate between our perceptual experience of humans and that of mechanical objects. Thus, in response to the crisis of the contemporary age, Heidegger attempts to intervene at the level of philosophy,⁵ offering a ‘destructive’ reading of Kant that can ‘retrieve’ what our current sensibility overlooks (cf. KPM xvii, 143). Heidegger’s critical interpretation of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason is an attempt to correct Kant’s error and recuperate an understanding of humans as unique: beings who, distinct from the objects of nature, interpret the world around them, specifically in terms of future goals and past traditions.

While Heidegger’s portrayal of our contemporary age is compelling, and his attempt to intervene at any level laudable, his view faces certain difficulties. First, his identification of Kant as a philosopher who failed fully to theorize the human being and recognize human exceptionality may strike those familiar with Kant’s philosophy as implausible. Kant’s practical philosophy and his works on history and politics form the basis of many contemporary understandings of humanity; these works certainly speak against the suggestion that Kant focused solely on the mechanical objects of nature, overlooking the special nature of the human being. Even the Critique of Pure Reason,

⁴ See, for example, Heidegger’s sixth appendix to “Age of the World Picture,” where he identifies the “modern interpretation of beings” offered by thinkers like Descartes, Leibniz, and Kant as predecessors to Nietzsche’s interpretation of beings, which typifies technology (AWP 77).

⁵ As Mark Wrathall notes, the prevailing “style of being” that characterizes an age is reflected, by Heidegger lights, in a number of phenomena including “science, religion, art, modes of production, and philosophical teachings” (Wrathall 2013: 328, translation mine). Of these phenomena, Heidegger’s own development of the so-called “history of Being” (a history that has come to a head in our contemporary, technological understanding of the world) focuses on philosophy. For an account of Heidegger’s history of Being that focuses on technology, see Wrathall and Lambeth 2011.

where Kant is at his highest level of concern with the mechanical, frames itself as a ‘Copernican Revolution’ that places humans in the center of metaphysics; we are to seek the basic properties of objects not in the objects themselves but in the finite knower who is constrained to understand objects in certain ways. If anything, one might argue, Kant over-theorized the human being. The dismissal from many contemporary scholars of Heidegger’s interpretation as a misreading seems warranted in this regard.

Second, Heidegger’s insistence that humans cannot be understood mechanically may seem too radical. For example, central to mechanical understanding is causality. Heidegger frequently pushes against the idea that we can understand humans causally (e.g. their anxiety, at BT 190; their death, at BT 246; their responsibility, at BT 282-284), but without deeply exploring why such an understanding would be inappropriate. On further consideration, it may seem too strong to suggest that humans cannot be understood causally – after all, it seems obvious that humans cause certain changes to come about in the world – and it may seem difficult to imagine other forms of understanding that could be adopted instead. It seems reasonable to understand human beings causally in at least some regards, and Heidegger does not offer any explicit arguments that speak against this commonsensical idea.

Heidegger’s compelling portrayal of the shortcomings of contemporary society, and his provocative ideas about its connection with Kant’s philosophy – ideas that require further development and defense – speak in favor of revisiting his interpretation of Kant, which is the task of the present dissertation. In particular, I will inquire into the justice of his reading of Kant and the justification for his rejections of causal understanding as it applies to humans and their practices.

Extending Heidegger's interpretation to Kant's arguments about causality demonstrates the merits of his interpretation. I argue that Kant overestimates the role that causality plays in our perception. While Kant suggests that we must use the concept of cause to identify events (i.e. to appreciate that an alteration or change has occurred), I suggest that we encounter many kinds of events in our world, not all of them mechanical; we encounter events initiated by humans, and we encounter events that are significant in terms of our practical goals. In determining the limited extent to which causality orders the world that we perceive, and more fully developing the alternatives to causal understanding, I promote a non-mechanistic understanding of the world around us, especially when it comes to understanding the human being.

Chapter Overview

I develop two Heideggerian lines of argument for the conclusion that the concept of cause has a more limited scope than Kant appreciates. First, Kant's own depiction of human cognitive life indicates that the concept of cause need not apply to every context wherein we identify events; this line of argument, then, amounts to an immanent critique. I build up this immanent critique in three chapters. As I explore in Chapter 1, Heidegger argues that, based on Kant's own depictions of the human cognitive faculties and the a priori concepts, the imagination must be the source of a priori concepts like the concept of cause. As I explore in Chapter 2, Heidegger argues that the Kantian imagination has a temporal structure. Namely, the imagination refers to the structure of human understanding, on Heidegger's view, where prior understanding anticipates and enables our experience of the world. As I discuss in Chapter 3, Heidegger suggests that, if the categories originate in the (temporally structured) imagination, this undermines their

universality. Kant's a priori concepts do not exhaust the possibilities for prior understanding. I show that the temporal structure of our understanding need not be tied to the a priori concepts that Kant identifies as universal; these concepts, like the concept of cause, may only apply to one context where we identify events. In fact, Heidegger suggests that the temporal structure of human cognition itself exceeds the categories; we cannot make sense of what is human by appealing to categories like causality.

Moving to the second line of argument, a consideration of the domains of experience that Heidegger discusses in his magnum opus, Being and Time, lends credibility to the idea that causal understanding is limited in its scope. In Chapter 4, I outline the contribution that Heidegger's interpretation of Kant's main argument about causality, the Second Analogy, to contemporary scholarship on the subject. In Chapter 5, I explore the merits of this interpretation. I argue that Heidegger's early phenomenology provides an account of domains of experience that Kant failed to address: while Kant considers how we experience natural objects subject to theoretical observation, Heidegger considers how we experience humans, and how we experience the objects we encounter when engaged in technical-practical projects like building, doing, and making. I build on this account to develop a non-causal theory of event identification in these alternate contexts. We do not, I argue, experience human and technical-practical events by employing the concept of cause. Rather, we experience these events as *conditions* – components of an overarching project that is oriented toward some future goal. In Chapter 5, I consider how my new account of experiencing events compares with Kant's treatment of teleology in the Critique of Judgment. Though Kant's analysis of teleology is compelling, I suggest that Kant's third Critique continues to treat a priori categories

like causality as universal constraints on our experience, affording teleology a secondary, merely 'regulative' role. However, my discussion points forward to a Heideggerian reading of Kant's critical project more broadly: doing away with Kant's claim that the physical-mechanical categories offered in the first Critique, like causality, are universal, we can read Kant's second and third Critiques as providing the alternate categories proper to experiencing the human and the technical-practical, respectively.

Part I: Immanent Critique of the Second Analogy

Chapter 1: A Case for Heidegger's Interpretation of the Kantian Imagination

In this chapter, I will do two things that are unusual. First, I will explore the merits of Heidegger's interpretation of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. In particular, I will consider Heidegger's suggestion that Kant's faculty of imagination should be considered the root of the two faculties that Kant pegs as indispensable for human cognition: sensibility (our faculty for sensing, receiving perceptual information) and understanding (our faculty for conceptually processing, organizing that information). From its first appearance, Heidegger's interpretation of the Kantian imagination has been viewed as idiosyncratic, unlikely, and inaccurate.⁶ Following suit, many contemporary scholars of Kant either dismiss the interpretation with some rapidity⁷ or disregard it entirely.⁸ I, however, will consider the reasons to endorse it, in particular exploring how Heidegger's interpretation brings out internal tensions in Kant's text.

Second, I will argue that Heidegger's interpretation of Kant is significant by suggesting that it is in dialogue with Kant and Hume's debate about causality. The idea that Kant and Hume are in dialogue about causality, while prominent at one time, has

⁶ Ernst Cassirer may have been the first to offer this criticism (cf. Cassirer 1967: 149). In contemporary scholarship, this charge is common both among scholars of Kant (cf. Banham 2006: 127, Friedman 2000: 61, Waxman 1991: 15) and of Heidegger (cf. Blattner 1999: 11, Golob 2013: 365, Gordon 2010: 161, Grene 1957: 68, Schalow 1992: 173).

⁷ Cf. Waxman 1991: 15; Höffe 2010: 172-173. See Longuenesse 1998 and Longuenesse 2005: 111-112, though, for brief endorsements of Heidegger's interpretation.

⁸ Many influential contemporary interpretations of the first Critique do not cite Heidegger's reading (cf. Wood 2005, Bird 2006, and Guyer 1987). There are a few exceptions that discuss Heidegger's arguments at length (cf. Goldman 2012 and Banham 2005); however, contrary to my inquiry, they do not discuss it in relation to the Second Analogy.

recently become less popular. A contemporary strand of Kant scholarship downplays Kant's engagement with Hume, suggesting that, especially in his arguments about causality – centrally, a chapter entitled the Second Analogy – Kant is more so in dialogue with rationalist thinkers like Leibniz. In fact, Heidegger concurs with this interpretation of Kant in his 1935 lecture course, What is a Thing?, similarly downplaying Hume's influence and emphasizing Kant's relation to rationalism. However, I will suggest that Kant and Hume are in dialogue about causality, and that Heidegger can continue this dialogue.

Pursuing this line of argument has theoretical payoffs. In the Second Analogy, Kant is at pains to establish that the faculty of understanding is the source of our ideas about causality; the a priori concept of cause is a concept that we must use to structure our experience. I will argue that this endeavor makes sense only as a response to Hume's suggestion that the imagination is the source of our ideas about causality – a suggestion that undermines the legitimacy of these ideas, as causality is figured as a “bastard of the imagination” (as Kant puts it at Prol. 4:258), rather than something that can accurately capture the world around us. Through Kant's engagement with Hume, we appreciate that for Kant, the legitimacy of our ideas about causality are intimately linked with the cognitive source of these ideas. Arguing (against Hume) that the understanding is the source of causality, Kant is able to suggest that we do legitimately apply the concept of cause to the objects we experience.

I will suggest, further, that Heidegger's interpretation of the faculty of the imagination in the first Critique – though it does not emphasize the Second Analogy,⁹ causality or Hume – directs us to a problem with Kant's intended method of response to Hume. If there is good reason to read the Kantian imagination as the source of sensibility and understanding, as Heidegger suggests, the imagination is re-identified as the source of our ideas about causality; Kant is not entitled to his suggestion that causality originates in the understanding, and legitimize it through that method. However, and as I will suggest further, Heidegger's interpretation can be developed to offer Kant an alternative avenue of response to Hume's skepticism about causation.

I will make my case in four steps: First, I will argue that it is worthwhile to read Kant's Second Analogy as a response to Hume. Second, I will suggest that Heidegger's interpretation of the Kantian imagination undermines Kant's response to Hume. Third, I will explore the features of Kant's first Critique that motivate Heidegger's interpretation. Finally, I will consider the alternative route that Heidegger offers Kant for responding to Hume's causal skepticism.

⁹ Heidegger's two works on Kant putting forth his interpretation of the imagination – his 1927-1928 lecture course on Kant, Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, and his 1929 book on Kant, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics – do not treat the Second Analogy. Instead, they focus on earlier chapters, like the Transcendental Aesthetic, Transcendental Deduction, and Schematism. By contrast, Heidegger's 1930 lecture course on Kant, Essence of Human Freedom, offers an extended treatment of the Second Analogy, devoting an entire section to the argument. However, he does this not with a view toward his interpretation of the imagination, but a new topic in Kant: freedom. For this reason, the discussion does not work out the implications of Heidegger's interpretation of the imagination on the Second Analogy, which I will do here. Heidegger's 1935-1936 lecture course, What is a Thing?, also devotes a couple of paragraphs to the argument, but again without reference to the imagination.

Before taking these steps, it will be useful to spell out some vocabulary. I will be discussing the *concept of cause*, that is, the idea that two things are connected necessarily, where the second must follow the first. I use the phrase with a caveat, as Hume does not consider it a proper idea, that is, one derived or copied from some impression (i.e. something we have sensed in the course of our experience). What is under discussion in this chapter, first, is the *cognitive source* of the concept of cause – that is, from which human faculty or capacity this concept originates. Second, I am concerned with *causal legitimacy* – whether we are justified in taking the concept of cause to capture the world around us accurately, and in applying the concept to those objects we encounter in the world. I take the latter phrase from Kant’s suggestion, already cited, that Hume takes the concept of cause to be a “bastard of the imagination” (Prol. 4:258) – an illegitimate concept that we are not justified in applying to the world around us. As I will argue presently, Kant is concerned with refuting this suggestion.

1. Kant’s Second Analogy as a Response to Hume

In this section, I will defend interpreting Kant’s Second Analogy as a response to Hume’s skepticism about causation. In so doing, I agree with a more traditional approach to the Second Analogy, despite contemporary scholarship that emphasizes the argument’s relationship to the rationalist tradition over Hume’s empiricism – and despite Heidegger’s 1935 interpretation, which also emphasizes Kant’s relationship to rationalism.

Kant scholars traditionally have seen Kant (following Kant’s own self-presentation) as mediating between two philosophical traditions that immediately preceded him: rationalism and empiricism. While rationalists like Descartes and Leibniz explore the metaphysical conclusions that one can reach as the result of a priori reasoning,

empiricists like Hume claim that our knowledge about the contents of the world comes from experience alone (though we can know some analytic truths, like tautologies, independently of experience, these do not make substantive claims about the world). In response, Kant's project is intended to clarify the extent to which human knowledge relies on a priori concepts on the one hand, and experience of objects on the other. Against the rationalists, Kant claims that we cannot have a priori knowledge about objects outside of our experience; we cannot reason our way to truths about God or the human soul. Against the empiricists, Kant suggests that we do have a priori knowledge about the objects that we experience.

On this traditional interpretation,¹⁰ the Second Analogy is thought to comprise Kant's response to Hume's skepticism about causation. So interpreted, the Second Analogy carves out the concept of cause as an a priori concept of the understanding that enables and structures our experience of objects. Though the concept is not derived from experience, Kant denies Hume's claim that it is consequently a figment of the imagination.

However, this traditional interpretation of the Second Analogy has been thrown into question by recent scholarship, part and parcel of a recent trend emphasizing Kant's rationalist over his empiricist heritage.¹¹ For example, Eric Watkins argues in Kant and the Metaphysics of Causality that it is a misreading to see Hume as Kant's primary target in the Second Analogy; rather, Kant is in closer dialogue with Leibniz and his

¹⁰ Cf. Allison 2004, Beck 2002, Friedman 1992, Höffe 2010, etc.

¹¹ Cf. Watkins 2005, who I will discuss at length in this section; and Dyck 2014, who expands contemporary consideration of Kant's rationalist heritage by considering his immediate rationalist predecessors, like Wolff and Baumgarten.

followers.¹² Surprisingly, Heidegger's 1935 work, What is a Thing?, is in agreement with this contemporary strand of Kant scholarship (though this strand does not cite Heidegger's interpretation).

In What is a Thing?, Heidegger similarly emphasizes Kant's indebtedness to rationalism over empiricism.¹³ Heidegger, indeed, seems reluctant to recognize a heavy Humean influence on Kant's Critique, though he must have been familiar with Kant's 'free admission' in the Prolegomena that Hume "interrupted [Kant's] dogmatic slumber and gave a completely different direction to [Kant's] researches in the field of speculative philosophy," (P 4:260).¹⁴ Heidegger argues however that,

[Kant] made the thinking through of English philosophy, especially Hume, fruitful for the formation of his own questioning. On the whole, however, the school-philosophy of Leibniz-Wolffian stamp remained so predominant that

¹² I will be contesting this reading. However, there are other things to endorse about Watkins' reading of the Second Analogy. For example, I concur that "the Analogies combine epistemological and metaphysical aspects. More specifically, the idea is that Kant is claiming that knowledge of objective temporal relations requires substantive ontological principles" (Watkins 2005: 200).

¹³ By contrast, Essence of Human Freedom (SS 1930) does mention Hume in connection with the Second Analogy, closer to the interpretation that I will offer here: "The discussion of this principle [of causality] by the English empiricist David Hume became an important impetus for Kant's own philosophizing" (EHF 124). Heidegger does not develop this thought further; indeed, a glance at the original manuscript shows that this sentence was written in later, as it is added in the margins with darker ink from the main text (*1930 Handschrift*: 33). Further, it should be noted that none of Hume's books appear in Heidegger's personal library (held in Freiburg). This is good evidence that Heidegger did not engage deeply with Hume's work; rather, his claim that Hume "was an important impetus for Kant" would seem to be based on Kant's own claims on the matter.

¹⁴ Heidegger cites the Prolegomena often, cf. PIK 7, 31, etc.

Kant...kept up the tradition of using the textbooks of the school-philosophy in his lectures and explaining them paragraph by paragraph (WT 114).¹⁵

We see from this passage that Heidegger acknowledges that Hume was of some help to Kant in the composition of the first Critique, but Heidegger takes the “predominant” influence on Kant’s thinking to be the Leibniz-Wolffian school.¹⁶ Heidegger goes on to explore Kant’s relationship to this school at great length and detail, but this is his sole reference to Hume in this work.¹⁷ Further, in a comment on the Second Analogy, Heidegger suggests with Watkins that the Second Analogy, like the First and Third Analogies, sheds light on Kant’s relation to Leibniz, again omitting Hume (235).¹⁸

¹⁵ Heidegger is correct that Kant used rationalist textbooks for his lectures. However, this fact does not adequately make the case that the empiricists failed to have a significant influence on Kant, particularly in the Second Analogy argument.

¹⁶ See also: Heidegger’s claim that, in establishing that the understanding possesses synthetic a priori knowledge, “with this insight Kant takes a stand against the entire tradition and above all against Leibniz” (PIK 286).

¹⁷ More so than Heidegger’s interpretations of Kant in the late 1920s, What is a Thing? views Kant in dialogue with his philosophical predecessors. By contrast, his 1927-1928 lecture course and 1929 book on Kant are most concerned with the German Idealist and Neo-Kantian traditions that arose after Kant, as Heidegger seeks to mark the difference between this dominant line of Kant interpretation and his ‘new discovery’ of Kant. The next chapter will consider this difference in more detail. However, rationalism continues to be a point of reference in the earlier interpretations, as Heidegger suggests, for example, that his own interpretation of Kant’s theory of the imagination shows that “with this insight Kant takes a stand against the entire tradition and above all against Leibniz” (PIK 286). Though Kant’s predecessors are not the main focus, Heidegger suggests that a merit of his interpretation (against the dominant strand of interpretation) is that it brings out Kant’s radical departure from rationalist predecessors.

¹⁸ Further, Heidegger indicates that British Empiricism is more emphasized in the second edition of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, and that these passages betray a misunderstanding in Kant of his own findings. In particular, the discussion of empiricism that Kant adds to the “Transition to the transcendental deduction of the categories” (at B127) replaces Kant’s first-edition claim that the imagination is the third faculty that contributes to human cognition (at A95). Heidegger argues that this replacement shows Kant thought his depiction of the imagination was too psychological (along the lines of empirical investigations into our concepts), a misunderstanding of the ontological status

I argue that a reading of the Second Analogy that minimizes Hume's influence is unbalanced, both on the part of more contemporary interpreters of Kant like Watkins and on the part of Heidegger's 1935 interpretation. Moreover, as we will see over the course of this chapter, such a reading of the Second Analogy prevents us from seeing a major contribution of Heidegger's interpretation of Kant – namely, that it can be used to continue the dialogue between Hume and Kant over the source and legitimacy of causal reasoning. Here, I will defend interpreting the Second Analogy as a response to Hume, first, by engaging with Watkins' argument against this interpretation and, second, by discussing one of the theoretical payoffs of keeping Hume in play.

I engage with Watkins in this section because Heidegger does not argue at length for his line on rationalism; Heidegger's claim that Kant was more concerned with Leibniz than Hume is an assumption, rather than the conclusion of an argument. Watkins, I suggest, does not offer compelling grounds for denying that the Second Analogy is Kant's response to Hume. Watkins argues that Kant cannot be most concerned with addressing Hume in the Second Analogy since their respective ontologies of causality differ: Hume thought causality pertained to two *events* that are often seen to follow one another, while Kant considered causality in relation to a *change in state*. However, with Lewis White Beck (2002), I take it that this shift in Kant's ontology is precisely what allows him to refute Hume. As I will explore in more detail in the next section, Kant argues that we must use the concept of cause to identify a change in state (which amounts

of the faculty of imagination (PIK 215-216). The discussion of British Empiricism covers over Kant's initial insight into the imagination. Though Kant invokes both Hume and Locke in this section (B127), Heidegger only makes reference to Locke in his analysis (PIK 215).

to a single event); with this argument in place, we can see that Hume, taking it for granted that we can identify single events, assumes the legitimacy of the concept of cause in an argument intended to question that legitimacy.¹⁹

Second, stepping away from the mechanics of Watkins' account, retaining Hume as a point of emphasis in the Second Analogy allows us to appreciate Kant's concern with the faculties in this argument.²⁰ As we will see in more detail shortly, Kant proceeds by way of process of elimination, eliminating the faculties of sensibility and imagination as the source of causal representation before settling on the understanding as its source. It would be difficult to understand Kant's preoccupation with the cognitive faculties in his account of causality, were it not for Hume. Indeed, when Kant recapitulates Hume's position on causality, he brings the role of the faculties to the fore. According to Kant, Hume "concluded that *reason* completely and fully deceives herself with this concept [the concept of cause], falsely taking it for her own child, when it is really nothing but a bastard of the *imagination*..." (Prol. 4:257-4:258). This account of Hume's position in place, we can see why Kant dwells on the faculties in the Second Analogy account of causality. Indeed, the faculties are again in play when Kant recapitulates his "solution" to Hume's problem. According to this solution, Kant

rescues the a priori origin of the pure concepts of the understanding and the validity of the general laws of nature as laws of the understanding, in such a way

¹⁹ For additional and plausible objections to Watkins' suggestion that their differing models of causality means that Kant is not replying to Hume, see Allison 2008: 540 fn.31.

²⁰ Watkins does recognize that Kant's "introductory argument" is "an argument from elimination that presupposes Kant's distinctive division of our epistemic faculties and thus would not seem to carry any force independent of the argument for his account of our faculties, an account that is not justified by specific or detailed argument in the *Critique*" (Watkins 2005: 209).

that their use is limited only to experience, because their possibility has its ground merely in the relation of the understanding to experience, however, not in such a way that they are derived from experience, but that experience is derived from them, a completely reversed kind of connection which never occurred to Hume (Proleg. 4: 313)

Kant suggests that he is able to answer Hume by establishing that a priori concepts, like the concept of cause, originate in the faculty of understanding. Indeed, Kant's argument from elimination in the Second Analogy attempts to show just that: no other faculty could be the source of the concept of cause other than the understanding. This origination, for Kant, means that the concept of cause enables and structures our experience. It is legitimately applied to our experience, then, not because it is derived from experience (like, say, the concept 'dog'), but because it forms a "law of understanding" in the processing of our experience. We will see these moves worked out in more detail in the following section.

Passages from the Prolegomena also bring out Hume's fit with Heidegger's interpretation of the Critique of Pure Reason. As the title of Heidegger's book on Kant suggests, Heidegger took Kant's main focus in the first Critique to be "the problem of metaphysics," where this science, as Heidegger puts it, "lacks binding proof of the insights it claims" (KPM 6). Consider, then, Kant's claim that "no event has occurred that could have been *more decisive* for the fate of this science than the attack made upon it by David Hume" (Proleg. 4: 257, emphasis my own). According to Kant, Hume had a "decisive" influence on Kant's take on the problem of metaphysics. Hume's attack on the concept of cause suggested to Kant a more generalized version of Hume's problem,

wherein the “general laws of nature” upon which the science of metaphysics is supposed to rely lack proper foundation. Hume showed that the concept of cause cannot be derived from experience; as no other source for principles involving causality (or other key metaphysical concepts left unconsidered by Hume) had been secured, the science of metaphysics was without foundation.

Further, Heidegger suggests that Kant’s answer to the problem of metaphysics must involve first and foremost the clarification of synthetic a priori knowledge (KPM 9); knowledge that can offer substantive principles (“synthetic”) about the objects that we experience, without being drawn from that experience (“a priori”). Therefore, it is significant in the block quote above that Kant’s proposed line of response to Hume is to rescue “the a priori origin of the pure concepts of the understanding” (Prol. 4: 313). Kant sought to answer Hume by establishing the a priori origin of fundamental concepts like the concept of cause in the faculty of understanding, and thereby to clarify the source, outside of experience, of the basic synthetic a priori principles that ground the science of metaphysics. Due to Hume’s decisive influence on Kant’s problem of metaphysics – Kant’s central problem, according to Heidegger – and Kant’s proposed line of response by way of carving out a space for synthetic a priori principles – Kant’s main task, according to Heidegger – we should expect Heidegger’s interpretation to extend easily to Kant’s engagement with Hume.²¹

²¹ Sacha Golob suggests that Kant’s reply to Hume is not a focus of Heidegger’s interpretation – “Heidegger’s commentary does not even mention [Hume]” (Golob 2013: 348) – and for good reason. Namely, Heidegger does not endorse Kant’s method of responding to Hume, where Kant argues that we legitimately apply the concept of cause to the world around us (in what Golob, following Cassam, calls a ‘world-directed transcendental argument’). Heidegger is not concerned with proving the validity of

Indeed, as I will develop in detail below, Heidegger's interpretation of Kant brings out a new, distinct objection to Kant's response to Hume in the Second Analogy. While Kant attempts to suggest that the concept of cause originates in the understanding, Heidegger suggests that categories like causality originate in an a priori faculty of the imagination. We will see that extending Heidegger's interpretation of Kant to the Second Analogy exploits a hole in Kant's argument; Kant did not consider the a priori faculty of the imagination in his argument from elimination, meant to establish that the faculty of understanding is the only possible faculty that could be the source of the concept of cause. Further, as Heidegger also offers an argument from elimination to suggest that the categories originate in the a priori faculty of the imagination, he employs the style of argumentation employed by both Hume and Kant in their debate. Whether Heidegger would like to be in dialogue with Hume or not, his work on Kant's faculty of the imagination poses a unique challenge to Kant's response to Hume in the Second Analogy. In so doing, his interpretation continues Hume and Kant's debate over causality, a debate with its particular focus on the human cognitive faculties that could be the source of causal reasoning.²²

ontological principles but probing the constitution of the ontological subject (with 'self-directed transcendental arguments'). While I agree that Heidegger does not endorse Kant's method of responding to Hume, I suggest that, even if Heidegger had good reason to avoid Hume in his interpretation of Kant, this should not make us wary of extending his interpretation in this direction. After all, Heidegger clearly has something to say about Kant's argument against Hume (namely, he challenges it, and, as Golob acknowledges at 2013: 362ff., he offers an alternate method of response to Hume), and I will argue, especially in the second half of the present dissertation, that this contribution advances contemporary debates about the Second Analogy.

²² I would like to point out a final reason to read the Second Analogy as a response to Hume: in the *Metaphysik Volckmann*, Kant discusses Hume's challenge to causality using one of his main examples from the Second Analogy, that of a ship moving

2. Imagination and Causality in Hume, Kant and Heidegger

The debate between Hume and Kant is centered on the cognitive source and consequent legitimacy of the concept of cause; that is, Hume and Kant disagree about which faculty is ultimately responsible for our idea of causality and, as a result of this disagreement, they disagree about whether we would be justified in taking such a concept to capture the world around us. While Hume argues that the concept of cause, as the mere product of the imagination, is illegitimate, Kant argues against Hume's causal skepticism (and for causal legitimacy) by identifying the understanding as the source of the concept.²³ In arguing that the imagination is the source of the categories – and thus re-identifying the imagination as the ultimate source of the concept of cause – Heidegger reopens the question about causal legitimacy. Ironically, and as we will see in detail in

downstream. In this earlier text, which precedes Kant's critical solution to Hume's challenge, Kant says: "Hume therefore grounded an entire skeptical philosophy on the question: How do we come by the concept of cause? Cause is that which contains the real ground of something else, and is fully identical with the real ground, e.g., the wind is the cause of the motion of the ship; now how does it come about that if the wind is posited something quite different – namely, the motion of the ship – also follows?" I am indebted to Paul Guyer's identification of this passage in relation to the Second Analogy, as well as his translation of it (Guyer 1987: 238).

²³ Since I aim to show the continuity of Heidegger's interpretation with central themes in Kant's text, I rely in this section on Kant's depiction of the debate about causal legitimacy, as well as his depiction of Hume's position. I leave aside, then, alternate depictions offered by contemporary Hume scholarship. Namely, I accept Kant's depiction of the debate with Hume as one about the cognitive source of the concept of cause (cf. P 4:257-258; Longuenesse 1998: 370), despite the recent suggestion that Hume was less concerned about the dividing lines between the human faculties, and more concerned about "ideas, impressions, and the way they interact" (Owen 1999: 76). Further, I portray Hume as a causal skeptic who holds that the source of the concept of cause is the imagination, despite recent scholarship that throws into question Hume's causal skepticism (cf. Owen 1999: 134, Beebe 2006: 36), as well as his views on the role of the imagination in causal reasoning (cf. Boehm 2013: 205). See also L.W. Beck's argument that Hume and Kant's positions on causality are more compatible than Kant may have appreciated based on his limited access to the Treatise (Beck 1978).

the next section, this challenge to Kant's position on causality is developed from Kant's own text.

2.1 Hume on Imagination and Causality

I begin with Hume's account of the imagination and its relationship to causality. Considering potential sources of the concept of cause, Hume offers an argument from elimination; eliminating other possible candidates, Hume concludes that the faculty he calls the "limited imagination" must be the source of the concept of cause. This source, as we will see, undermines causal legitimacy.²⁴

Hume differentiates between two senses of the term imagination. Hume's imagination in the "larger sense" is the faculty that uses the content of our sense experience to draw connections that go beyond that content; thus, the larger imagination is opposed to memory, which merely repeats the exact content of previous experiences (T 1.3.9.18n22; cf. T 1.1.3.1). Because connections can be drawn on the basis of reason (as when I conclude that this stool has fewer legs than that table) or on the basis of whimsy (as when I create the idea of a "winged horse" (T 1.1.3.4)), the larger imagination yields both legitimate and illegitimate products – in other words, products that accurately and inaccurately capture the world around us. By contrast, imagination in the "more limited sense" is restricted to the products of the larger imagination that do not legitimately

²⁴ My account of Hume's breakdown of the cognitive faculties and treatment of the concept of cause is largely based on his Treatise. However, there has been much scholarly debate on whether Kant had access to this work. Cf. Wolff 1960, which reviews the elements of the Treatise that Kant would have read in Beattie, and argues that "Kant never came into contact with Hume's first and greatest work" (123). De Boer 2016, further, provides an argument for what Kant may have found in the Enquiry that 'awoke him from his dogmatic slumber,' arguing that it could not have been anything from the Treatise.

represent the world around us, like the daydreams of the poet (T 1.3.9.5) or the delusions of the madman (T 1.3.10.9); the limited imagination, then, is opposed to the “demonstrative and probable reasonings” of the understanding that are subsumed under the larger imagination (T 1.3.9.18n22).

Hume argues that when we take two items – say, eating bread and feeling nourished – as being in a causal relationship, we take them to have a “necessary connection” (T 1.3.2.12). That is, we take it that the feeling of nourishment will always follow instances of eating bread (so long as certain conditions hold). Hume attributes such claims to the limited imagination, rather than to the “demonstrative and probable reasonings” of the understanding.

These “demonstrative and probable reasonings” carry two legitimizing elements that the concept of cause lacks (as do the other products of the limited imagination): First, these reasonings draw conclusions on the basis of ideas that are garnered from experience (for example, those of the stool and the table). Second, they draw conclusions about these empirical ideas by ‘surveying’ and ‘comparing’ them (for example, finding a basis for comparison in the number of legs of the stool and the table), which are the operations that Hume attributes to the understanding (T 1.3.7.5n21). By performing the operations of understanding on data derived from experience, one is justified in drawing conclusions about the world around us (that this stool has fewer legs than the table), even as one goes beyond the exact content of sense experience.

Hume argues that, when it comes to the concept of cause, the activity of the imagination lacks these two legitimizing elements. First, the idea that two items are causally (i.e. necessarily) connected is not derived from our sense experience of objects.

We do not perceive this causal connection, for “the power [that necessarily connects it to the effect] is not to be found in the sensible qualities of the cause” (T. 1.3.6.10).

Moreover, we would not be able to derive this idea from multiple experiences because our lack of experience of the future disallows us from abstracting a necessary connection from past experiences where two events have been constantly conjoined (T 1.3.6.11).

Second, the concept of cause does not come from the legitimizing operations attributed to understanding. Necessary connection is not established by surveying and comparing ideas, because we take conceptually disparate items to be causally connected (EHU 4.25); hence, the understanding cannot establish by mere comparison of ideas “the absolute impossibility for the one object not to follow, or to be conceiv’d not to follow upon the other” (T 1.3.14.12). For example, the act of eating bread is not conceptually linked to the feeling of nourishment; it is, rather, experience that suggests a link between them (though, as outlined above, experience does not entitle us to think of it as a necessary link). Thus, Hume concludes that the concept of cause is a product of the limited imagination. In particular, Hume suggests that our claims about causality arise from our expectation that some object will follow another as it has in the past (T.1.3.12.9; T 1.3.14.19). We misinterpret this internal sentiment of expectation as an idea that tells us something about the external world (T 1.3.9.6): namely, that two objects are necessarily connected via a ‘secret power’. The product of limited imagination, the concept of cause does not legitimately capture the world around us.

2.2 Kant on the Imagination and Causality

Kant argues against Hume’s conclusions about the concept of cause, but not without renegotiating the boundaries between the human cognitive faculties. Doing away

with a larger imagination that ranges over the understanding, Kant situates the imagination as a point of contact between the two faculties that are crucial to human cognition. These two faculties are sensibility, the faculty that passively (or receptively) receives sensible information about the outside world via intuitions, and understanding, the faculty that actively (or spontaneously) organizes that information via concepts.

Because cognition is a term of art for Kant, it is helpful to recall Kant's claim that cognitions "consist in the determinate relation of given representations to an object" (B137). As representations are given to sensibility (e.g. a representation of a horse) and put in determinate relations to an object through the understanding (e.g. identified as a horse), both are required for cognition (A50/B74). Neither a conceptually undifferentiated perceptual jumble (like when the horse runs by too quickly for me to identify what it is) nor a concept I dub 'horse' that has no sensory content, by themselves count as a cognition. We need both sensibility and understanding to cognize the horse, say, by taking the object before me to be a horse. As Allen Wood puts it, a cognition of an object is "a genuine *experience* of the object, grounding judgments about it" (Wood 2005: 30). A cognition is the conceptual processing of some sensible given.

The imagination is a point of contact between these conceptual processes and sensible givens. Kant defines the imagination as "the faculty for representing an object even *without its presence* in intuition" (B151) and assigns it the primary function of synthesis (A78/B103), "the act of putting different representations together, and of grasping what is manifold in them in one cognition" (A77/B102-3). As one might expect for a faculty that represents what is not present, Kant speaks of the "dreams" (B278),

“fantasy” (Anth. §28),²⁵ “delusion” (CPrR V:120) and “invention” (CPJ 5:240) for which the imagination is responsible; in line with Kant’s definition of synthesis, these imaginative acts put together empirical elements that are not joined together in our sensible experience. Kant would seem to agree with Hume that the imagination might produce representations like that of a winged horse.

However, unlike Hume’s account of the limited imagination, Kant suggests that the imagination’s representation of what is not present can contribute to operations that legitimately capture the world around us. In particular, Kant attributes two sorts of capacities to the imagination that (unlike fantasy) contribute to cognition of the world around us, allowing it to serve as a point of contact between the sensibility and the understanding. Though these additional capacities may seem puzzling to attribute to the imagination – in Hume, as in popular understanding, the (limited) imagination makes things up, rather than genuinely coming to know them – Kant is drawing, first and foremost, on the idea that the imagination is the capacity for representing what is not there. Sometimes, representing what is not there is simply a flight of fancy; but Kant suggests, further, that representing what is not there is a crucial capacity for our coming to know the world. It allows us to put our present experience (what is presently sensed) into contact with our past experiences (no longer present) – and it also represents the a priori concepts we possess independently of experience. Let’s consider these two capacities of the imagination – empirical and a priori – in further detail.²⁶

²⁵ I am indebted to Gibbons 1994 for directing me to the passages about imagination in the Anthropology.

²⁶ I will refer to the “empirical” and “a priori” capacities of the imagination, though Kant uses the terminology of “reproductive” and “productive”. Since Kant’s deployment of the

First, in its empirical capacity, the imagination puts together what is presently being sensed with what was previously sensed. Here, the contribution of the imagination is merely to represent the succession of perceptions, representing a past intuition in synthesis with a present intuition. This empirical function of the imagination allows for us to have a continuous, unified experience, allowing us to apply concepts to sensible intuitions; for example, this capacity of the imagination allows us to take it that the object we are currently perceiving is one and the same as the object we were perceiving a moment ago.

Kant also suggests that the imagination has an a priori function: it creates a sensible representation of the a priori concepts that we possess independently of experience. In the Schematism, Kant offers the imaginative forms, or schemata, that provide “a general procedure of the imagination for providing a concept with its image” (A140/B179-B180). The imagination forms these schemata, which put a priori concepts (or categories) in a sensible format, allowing for the representation of empirical information in accordance with those a priori concepts.

latter distinction is inconsistent, I take the empirical/a priori terminology to mark out a clearer distinction. Kant argues, for example in the Transcendental Deduction, that the reproductive imagination produces empirical content, whereas the productive imagination offers a priori content (A118); he contradicts this in the Schematism when he discusses the “empirical faculty of productive imagination” (A141/B181). Kant also argues that the reproductive imagination (blindly) follows the laws of association, while the productive imagination is spontaneous or free (e.g. at B152); he contradicts this in the Anthropology when he assigns association to the productive imagination (Anth. VII: 176). Aside from these inconsistencies, Kant’s two ways of distinguishing between the reproductive and productive imagination do not track the same mental acts. To take one such example, when we fantasize, we freely combine empirical elements, as in Hume’s example of the winged horse.

The a priori function that Kant allots to the imagination marks the most significant difference with Hume's account of the imagination. Hume has the imagination perform a posteriori work only; only after receiving content from sense experience does it compare ideas, produce daydreams, etc. However, Kant has the imagination perform a priori work, as well; the imagination schematizes concepts that shape experience, but are present in the mind independently of any experience. In fact, it is the positing of these a priori concepts – that are sensibly schematized by the a priori imagination but not ultimately sourced in it – that allows Kant to legitimize the concept of cause and downplay the role of the imagination in causal representation. Kant does not disagree with Hume's arguments about the limits of experiential knowledge; his move, rather, is to suggest that Hume overlooked a non-experiential source of knowledge in the a priori concepts of the understanding (B127), a source that can properly be attributed to the concept of cause, salvaging its legitimacy. The a priori reasoning of the understanding can inform us not only of (analytic) tautologies, but also of synthetic a priori truths about the world, for example that every event must have a cause.

Kant argues, then, that the concept of cause is an a priori concept that is schematized by the imagination a priori; defining causality similarly to Hume, Kant identifies the schema of causality as the schema of one thing following another necessarily in time (i.e. our schema of following according to a rule, A202-4/B248-249). In the Second Analogy, Kant argues that the concept of cause allows us to identify events.²⁷ Kant suggests that we must draw on the concept of cause to distinguish between the changing perceptions we have of stable objects – for example, when we see the roof

²⁷ My depiction of the Second Analogy in this section is developed from Lambeth 2015.

of a house, and then its basement – and the changing perceptions we have of changing objects – for example, when we see a ship upstream, and then see it further downstream. In the latter case of the ship, Kant suggests, the concept of cause allows us to identify the succession of perceptions as an event. In his argument, Kant adopts the strategy of considering which cognitive resources could be responsible for our experience of events, using process of elimination to settle on the understanding (in particular, its pure concept of causality); similar to Hume, then, Kant offers an argument from elimination for his conclusions. Identifying the understanding as the source of the concept of cause paves the way for Kant's conclusion that all events are caused, establishing the legitimacy of the concept cause.

Kant begins by arguing that neither sensibility nor the imagination could perform the task of identifying events. First, sensibility cannot tell us that our perceptions are in an objective order, representing an event. For one, Kant says, "time cannot be perceived in itself" (B233); for example, our perceptions do not come with a time stamp that might indicate the order of objective happenings. Moreover, sensibility provides the same sort of information – a succession of perceptions, each one different than the last – when we perceive both an event and a stable object. Since our perceptions come with no time stamp, and we experience perceptual changes when it comes to both events and stable objects, sensibility cannot identify events.

Likewise, Kant argues that the imagination cannot identify events. In this argument, Kant only considers the empirical capacity of the imagination, leaving out its a priori capacity; this poses a problem for his elimination of the entire imagination as the potential source of event identification. We will attend to this omission momentarily. At

any rate, Kant argues that when we perceive events, the imagination puts perceptions in order “with regard to temporal relations” (B233). However, as we saw in our discussion of the empirical imagination, the role of the imagination in these cases is simply to put perceptions in the order that they are perceived. The empirical imagination, then, does identical work ordering the perceptions of the house and the perceptions of the ship; the imagination tracks the order in which we perceived these things, and not the order in which things actually happened in the object (B233–234). As Kant puts it earlier in the first Critique, the imagination is “blind” (A78/B103); it does not distinguish between objective events (like the movement of the ship) and merely subjective successions of perceptions (like those of the house). Sensibility and imagination eliminated, the distinction between objective and subjective succession must come from the only remaining cognitive source: the understanding.

Next, Kant considers the character of experiencing events to determine how the understanding allows us to experience them. Kant argues that, when we experience events, we represent our changing perceptions as having been in an irreversible order (we could not have seen the ship downstream before seeing it upstream); by contrast, we take our perceptions of stable objects to be in an arbitrary order (we could have seen the features of the house in a different order). Thus, we take our perceptions of events to come in a necessary order; we had to perceive the states in that particular order. This finding provides a positive reason to think that the understanding allows us to identify events, for Kant holds that only the understanding can tell us that something is necessary; similar to Hume, Kant thinks that experience cannot tell us that something is necessary, for we have no experience of the future. However, if we find an a priori constraint on our

understanding, then we can conclude that something is necessary (for us finite knowers with this stable cognitive constraint). As our cognition is bound by this rule, so too are the objects that we will experience.

Kant argues that we take our perceptions to be in a necessary order by positing a causal relationship between the first state perceived and the second, as the concept of cause is our concept of one thing following another necessarily in time. The concept of cause, then, allows us to order objectively our perceptions, and thereby identify events. Because the concept of cause is our point of entry into the objective time order, Kant suggests, it is the condition for the possibility of experience; we only appreciate the happening of an event – experience an event – by way of the concept of cause. Thus, Kant concludes that all events are caused (for us finite knowers).

As Lewis White Beck argues, the Second Analogy points to a particular avenue of response to Hume: since Hume assumes in his argument that we can identify events (i.e., changes in state like feeling nourished), Kant shows us that Hume contradictorily presupposes causal legitimacy in an argument that questions its legitimacy (cf. Beck 2002).²⁸ However, beyond revealing contradictions in Hume's particular argument denying the legitimacy of the concept of cause, the Second Analogy argues for the legitimacy of the concept by indicating its status as an a priori concept of the

²⁸ This is where we see that the shift in Kant's ontology of causality – away from Hume – allows him to respond to Hume. Henry Allison argues, further, that Kant's argument in the Second Analogy responds to Hume by denying Hume's idea that we can imagine an event without imagining it to have a cause (these two ideas are separable); Kant argues, on the contrary, "that one cannot separate the thought of something happening from the thought of its having a cause" (Allison 2008: 541).

understanding – an a priori constraint on human understanding. The imagination, for its part, only provides the point of contact between this concept and the sensible world.

Elsewhere, Kant makes it clear that, according to his estimation, the understanding is the only source that could legitimize the concept of cause. In a passage from the *Transcendental Analytic*, Kant argues that the concept of cause “must either be grounded completely a priori in the understanding or be entirely abandoned as a chimera” (A91/B123).²⁹ In this passage, Kant suggests that the concept cannot be grounded in sensibility, because of the necessity implied by the concept; as noted, sensibility cannot tell us something (say, that B follows A) is necessary, only that something has happened very many times (in my experience, B has always followed A). Kant’s language here also recalls Hume’s proposed source of the concept of cause – namely, the imagination, author of chimeras. At any rate, since he identifies the understanding as the only possible ground for the concept of cause if it is to be legitimized, he must agree with Hume that, if the concept of cause originated in the imagination rather than the understanding, this would totally undermine its legitimacy. Kant’s argument, grounding the concept of cause in the understanding, salvages its legitimacy.

2.3 Heidegger on Imagination and Causality

Heidegger’s interpretation of Kant brings out a problem with Kant’s omission of the a priori imagination in the Second Analogy. As indicated above, one might object that this argument tracing the concept of cause back to the understanding offers an incomplete consideration of the imagination, overlooking one of its capacities: that of the a priori imagination. While the empirical imagination may not be able to differentiate an

²⁹ I am indebted to Friedman (1992: 161) for bringing this passage to my attention.

objective event from a subjective succession of perceptions, this is not the only capacity of the imagination. The a priori capacity goes wholly unmentioned in the Second Analogy, leaving an apparent gap in Kant's argument. Kant does, however, invoke the schemata of the a priori imagination in his introduction to the analogies, when he instructs us to remember that "appearances must not be subsumed under the categories per se, but only under their schemata" (A181/B223). Accordingly, it might be supposed that Kant expected the reader to keep the a priori work of the imagination in mind, though it is not mentioned in the Second Analogy proper. In particular, the a priori imagination must have schematized the a priori concept of cause, creating a procedure that allows for sensible information to be represented in accordance with this category. According to the analyses offered in prior sections, though, the understanding is the source of categories like causality, while the a priori imagination only does the "mediating" work of sensibly schematizing these categories (A138/B177). Perhaps, then, it goes without saying that the a priori imagination cannot ultimately be responsible for identifying events.

However, Heidegger's interpretation uses elements from Kant's text to motivate a reversal in the relationship between the a priori imagination and the categories, making this omission in the Second Analogy argument appear a conspicuous oversight. Following Kant's suggestion that the imagination is engaged in a priori activity, Heidegger attributes an even more robust a priori role to the imagination (owing, as we'll see in the next section, to its spontaneous receptivity). Rather than forming a priori schemata in accordance with the rules of the understanding, Heidegger identifies the 'transcendental power of the imagination' as originally producing the schemata.

Heidegger suggests that the transcendental power of the imagination forms “the pure image of time” prior to the intuition of any particular object, providing the general ontological properties that any encountered object will have (KPM 92). With this image, the imagination projects or represents “the totality of possibilities” for intuited objects (KPM 108), creating expectations for the empirical objects that we will encounter and enabling this encounter (KPM 92). Moreover, Heidegger suggests, the pure image produced by the imagination is the source of the forms of intuition and the categories of the understanding. In particular, the categories are only “artificially isolated” aspects of the pure image of time (KPM 104).

While Heidegger does not dwell on the concept of cause, his interpretation can be developed as a continuation of the debate between Kant with Hume. As Heidegger briefly acknowledges, his claim about the source of the categories includes the concept of cause, one of Kant’s categories: the concept of cause was constituted by the transcendental power of the imagination (PIK 289-290). Heidegger, then, follows Hume in suggesting that the imagination is the source of causal representation, but the capacity of the imagination he offers as its source is the peculiar a priori capacity of the imagination that Kant identifies and Hume does not recognize.

Heidegger’s interpretation reopens the question regarding the legitimacy of the concept of cause, as it undermines Kant’s strategy for establishing causal legitimacy. Both Kant and Hume attribute whimsical representations to the imagination, and neither see in it a capacity to establish necessary connection. Kant’s claim that the concept of cause is an a priori concept of the understanding protects it from a seemingly disastrous connection with this whimsical and arbitrary faculty. Kant’s strategy, then, for

establishing causal legitimacy is to suggest that it is legitimate owing to its status as an a priori concept of the understanding that stably constrains our cognition of the sensible world. Heidegger, however, reasserts the connection between the concept of cause and imagination, suggesting that the category of causality is ultimately derived from the a priori imagination (and not the understanding). By casting doubt on Kant's strategy for establishing causal legitimacy, the interpretation continues the debate between Kant and Hume. With Kant's strategy undermined, a new strategy is called for, if the concept of cause is to be legitimized. Heidegger's interpretation raises a question left unconsidered by both Kant and Hume: if the concept of cause originates not in the understanding, but in the a priori function of the imagination, can its legitimacy be maintained?

3. Textual Basis for Heidegger's Interpretation of the Kantian Imagination

Before getting to Heidegger's interpretation of the imagination, it is important to note that this reconstruction has a different character than the previous reconstructions of Hume and Kant. While Hume and Kant offer an unadulterated depiction of the imagination, Heidegger's depiction of the imagination is developed from Kant's text; it is an interpretation of Kant, rather than Heidegger's independent thoughts on the matter. Heidegger of course comes to Kant with a robust philosophical orientation of his own, but we will see, in this chapter and the next, that Heidegger's interpretation of Kant is driven by central features of Kant's text. In this section, I will piece together how Heidegger reads the relationship between Kant's faculties of receptive intuition, spontaneous understanding and mediating imagination. This interpretation helps us appreciate the textual basis for Heidegger's assertion that the concept of cause must originate from the imagination, rather than the understanding. Moreover, it shows

Heidegger's own argument from elimination, as he rules out sensibility and understanding as potential sources of categories like the concept of cause.

Many scholars of Heidegger suggest that Heidegger places a strong emphasis on receptivity. As Peter Gordon puts it “to be human in Heidegger’s view is to be gifted with a special sort of *receptivity*, or openness to the world” (Gordon 2010: 7). Such scholars take Heidegger’s interpretation of Kant, which insists on a receptive core to Kant’s purportedly spontaneous faculty of understanding, to offer evidence of Heidegger’s emphasis on receptivity. As William Richardson puts it, “it is of cardinal importance to realize it (and Heidegger insists upon it) that the primacy in the process of knowing belongs to intuition: thought plays a subordinate rôle – it is subordinate to intuition” (Richardson 2003: 108).³⁰ In this section, my reconstruction of Heidegger’s interpretation of Kant’s faculty of the imagination will provide evidence against this one-sided reading of Heidegger. While Heidegger may certainly seem to place an emphasis on receptivity in comparison to his neo-Kantian contemporaries and the German Idealists who inspired them – commentators who, in Heidegger’s eyes, placed undue emphasis on the spontaneous aspects of Kant’s depiction of cognition – Heidegger in fact offers a balanced reading of Kant, placing the “spontaneously receptive” or “receptively spontaneous” faculty of the imagination as the ‘root’ of human cognitive life. In this section, I reconstruct Heidegger’s argument that the imagination is the ‘common root’ of the two faculties Kant deems central to human knowledge (sensibility and understanding)

³⁰ Marjorie Grene goes in the opposite direction, saying that Heidegger equates Kant’s imagination with “the whole of human spontaneity” (Grene 1957: 67).

and consider to what extent this interpretation of the imagination is based on Kant's text.³¹

I focus on one of Heidegger's arguments for claiming that the imagination is the "common root" of the sensibility and the understanding (KPM 96). The argument goes as follows:

- (1) The imagination is the human cognitive faculty that is spontaneous and receptive.
- (2) The pure intuitions of the sensibility and the categories of the understanding require a spontaneously receptive (or receptively spontaneous) cognitive source.
- (3) Therefore, the imagination is their source.

I argue that (1) finds textual support in Kant's depiction of the imagination and that (2) finds textual support in Kant's depiction of the pure intuitions and the categories, jointly lending support to (3) being an underlying commitment of Kant's text. As the imagination, by argument from elimination, is the source of the a priori units (i.e. pure intuitions and categories) that each faculty relies upon in its respective contribution to cognition, this argument likewise provides evidence for Heidegger's claim that the imagination is the common root, or "condition for the possibility", of sensibility and understanding (KPM 103).

The textual evidence that Heidegger offers such an argument is provided in §29 of Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, in a passage that is placed right in the middle of the argument. At this point, Heidegger has already indicated the end point (what I have

³¹ The reading of Heidegger as a thinker who emphasizes passivity or receptivity might be motivated by his suggestion that time is the basic source of Kant's faculties, as he argues for in his interpretation of the transcendental deduction. However, it is important to note that, here, time refers to original temporality. This is not the timeline governing the passive faculty of sensibility. Rather, original temporality is both active and passive, and it is proper to the imagination, not sensibility. We will see this in more detail in the next chapter.

labeled step (3)) of his argument, asserting that “pure intuition and pure thinking lead back to the transcendental power of imagination” (KPM 97); in other words, transcendental power of the imagination is “the origin of pure intuition and pure thinking as transcendental faculties” (KPM 97). After discussing the relationship between imagination and sensibility (§28), Heidegger moves to discuss the relationship between imagination and understanding (§29). It is in the latter section that Heidegger takes a step back from the mechanics of his argument to take stock of what he has established, and what remains to be established. Here, Heidegger says that the imagination

is receptive, moreover, not just apart from its spontaneity. Rather, it is the original unity of spontaneity and receptivity and not a unity which was composite from the first. [step (1)]

Now it has been shown that on the grounds of its purity pure intuition possesses the character of spontaneity. As pure, spontaneous receptivity, it has its essence in the transcendental power of imagination. [step (2)a]

Now if pure thinking is to be of the same essence, then as spontaneity it must at the same time exhibit the character of a pure receptivity [step (2)b] (KPM 107).

In this passage, we see Heidegger assert that the imagination is both spontaneous and receptive, in line with what I have labeled step (1) of his argument. Moreover, Heidegger takes himself in this passage to have already shown that pure intuition “has its essence in the imagination,” a part of what I have labeled step (2) of his argument; let’s call this part (2)a. From the passage, we see that Heidegger takes it that his next task is to show (2)b,

that pure thought has “the same essence.” Now that we see this is his argument, let us see how Heidegger arrives at this argument.

Heidegger admits that, in offering the imagination as the “common root” or “condition of the possibility” (KPM 103) of sensibility and understanding, he departs from Kant’s text. While Kant presents sensibility and understanding as the two main sources of cognition,³² Heidegger insists that we must understand the first Critique as presenting a “triad of basic faculties” (KPM 96), with the imagination as primary. However, Heidegger emphasizes that, in seeking out the condition of the possibility of sensibility and understanding, he pursues a question that Kant himself raised. Kant suggests that the deduction requires “deep penetration into the primary grounds for the possibility of our cognition in general” (A98/KPM 117). Even more specifically, Kant asks about the conditions of the possibility of the understanding (“the faculty of thinking”) in the introduction to the first edition, though Kant did not put this forth as his central inquiry: “For the chief question always remains: What and how much can understanding and reason know, free from all experience? and not: How is *the faculty of thinking* itself possible?” (CPR Axvi. ff.). In a comment to which Heidegger returns again and again, Kant even attempts a vague answer to the latter question, suggesting that sensibility and understanding “may perhaps arise from a common but to us unknown root” (A15/B129). In trying to reach a more determinate answer, Heidegger pursues a question

³² Heidegger suggests that this “theory of the duality of stems” (KPM 96) is more strongly emphasized in the second edition of CPR, representing a later “shrinking back” in Kant from his crucial insight into the imagination in the first edition (KPM 112). John Llewelyn offers criticism of this position, arguing that the status of the imagination as “common root” is retained in the second edition, and thus Heidegger is “unduly pessimistic” about this edition (Llewelyn 2000: 36).

that is feasible within the framework of Kant's theoretical philosophy, even as he goes beyond Kant's depiction of the role of imagination.

One might suggest that the direction of Heidegger's interpretation would only be warranted if an answer to this question were required, under Kant's account, and not simply capable of being posed.³³ To be sure, Kant seems content to provide the forms of intuition and the categories as the ground level of explanation. However, the findings of the previous section suggest why scholars of Kant must pose this question: some answers to it (e.g. that the imagination is the condition of the possibility of the other faculties) undermine Kant's explicit claims (e.g. that the concept of cause originates in the understanding). Whether or not scholars will ultimately agree with Heidegger about the deep commitments of the first Critique – that is, that the text unequivocally points to the imagination as the root of the other two faculties – these commitments must be sought in order to probe the consistency of Kant's philosophical position in that text. Let's turn, then, to Heidegger's argument that the imagination is the condition of the possibility of the other faculties.

The argument begins with Heidegger's claim that the Kantian imagination is both spontaneous *and* receptive; while this seems to follow from Kant's idea that the imagination is a point of contact between the spontaneous understanding and the receptive sensibility, we do not find this emphasis in the letter of Kant's text. We will see in the next chapter, when we get to Heidegger's full, positive depiction of the imagination

³³ Along these lines, Martin Weatherston protests that "Heidegger has not shown that an analysis of this root is necessary for a deduction of the categories", and turns instead to "the larger context of [Heidegger's] own philosophy" to motivate Heidegger's inquiry (Weatherston 2002: 35).

as temporality, that the imagination is spontaneous and receptive, in Heidegger's view, due to the fact that it refers to what he calls "original temporality." However, Heidegger also suggests that these features of the imagination are apparent from the empirical work that Kant allots to it. The imagination does not rely on intuited objects for the representations that it produces "*without [their] presence* in intuition" (B151); the imagination forms these images itself, as when it recalls "what was perceived earlier" or 'freely composes' a new object out of previously perceived elements (KPM 92). In these cases, the imagination spontaneously produces an image that is receptive to past experience. These cases suggest that the "'formative power' [of the imagination] is simultaneously a 'forming' that takes things in stride (is receptive) and one which creates (is spontaneous)" (KPM 91). Heidegger draws on this spontaneity and receptivity in explicating the a priori function of the imagination.³⁴

Let's move, then, to step (2) of the argument, where Heidegger inquires into the source of the sensibility and the understanding. In seeking out the condition of the possibility of the understanding and sensibility, Heidegger specifically considers the cognitive source of the a priori units that each faculty uses to cognize objects. That is, Heidegger inquires into the origins of the intuitive forms of space and time, and the pure concepts of the understanding (i.e. the categories). On Kant's view, sensibility is dependent on the forms of space and time to receive information about objects (which are

³⁴ One might argue that the a priori productive capacity of the imagination, as Kant describes it, also reveals spontaneity and receptivity; a schemata is spontaneously produced, but it is receptive to the categories and forms of intuition. However, while this may provide evidence that Kant envisions the imagination as a spontaneously receptive faculty, this particular role of the productive imagination will not be maintained in Heidegger's interpretation.

intuited as spatio-temporal) and understanding is dependent on concepts like causality and substantiality to conceptualize them. Heidegger argues that the imagination is the condition of the possibility of both faculties, because the basic a priori units that Kant allots to each faculty – the pure forms of intuition and the pure concepts of understanding – must originate in a spontaneously receptive cognitive source: the imagination. In this argument, Heidegger relies on argument from elimination, closely approximating both Hume and Kant's own methods of argumentation in their debate.

Heidegger argues that space and time, the pure forms of intuition, originate in the imagination. His argument eliminates several potential sources for the forms of space and time, beginning with the usual source of our intuitions: the external world of our experience. He differentiates between pure intuitions and empirical intuitions, the latter “receiving something at hand or present” (KPM 122). In other words, sensibility receives information about external objects in empirical cases. Pure intuitions, by contrast, precede contact with the outside world, and in fact enable this contact to take place. A pre-empirical sense of space and time allows us to experience empirical objects as at a certain place and in a certain time; armed with the pure intuitions of space and time, the sensibility is then in a position to receive information about objects that are spatially and temporally ordered (KPM 99). Because space and time enable contact with external objects, the intuitions of space and time cannot be given externally; space and time are not intuited “in the manner of a thematic, apprehending, taking-in-stride of something at hand” (KPM 101). Thus, space and time must have a cognitive source (they cannot come from experience).

Considering the faculties that might be the source of the pure intuitions in lieu of the external world, Heidegger settles on the transcendental power of the imagination. Heidegger does not entertain the idea that sensibility might self-produce its forms of space and time, but we may supply Heidegger's reasoning. Namely: as a receptive faculty, sensibility only receives information (usually from the outside world) and does not produce or create images, as the imagination does. Spontaneity is required for this creative work.

Though the spontaneity of the understanding would seem to make it a contender for creating the pure intuitions, Heidegger argues in opposition to the Marburg school that the understanding could not be the source of space and time (KPM 102). He emphasizes that the intuitions of space and time are images, suggesting their source in the "image-giving imagining" (KPM 100) that "gives looks (images) from out of itself" (KPM 99), rather than the faculty of understanding, which deals in concepts and not images. Moreover, Heidegger suggests that "what is intuited in pure intuition does not have the unity which characterizes the universality of a concept" (KPM 100). While space and time are represented as a "unified whole", they are not unified in the way that concepts are; as Kant himself emphasizes in the Transcendental Aesthetic, "the universality of a concept" does not capture the unity of intuitions.

Heidegger's claim can be clarified by considering Kant's basic characterization of concepts in comparison with his characterization of space and time. According to Kant, "the understanding gives us rules" (A126). Concepts provide these rules, such that an object falls under a concept if it fulfills certain criteria; for example, the concept of a dog provides the criteria that the object must be a "four-footed animal" (A141/B180). Such

concepts serve to unify the object before us with others of their kind. However, space and time are not criteria that some (or even all) objects must fulfill in order to be classified as objects of a certain kind. Rather, space and time are the wholes within which objects appear (A24/B39ff.). They do not belong to any individual object (such that the object falls under a rule); objects show themselves within the unified, singular wholes of space and time. The pure intuitions, then, would not originate in a faculty that unifies with rules. Rather, the imagination must be the source of the forms of space and time. The imagination, after all, is the spontaneous cognitive faculty with the same format as our receptive faculty.³⁵

Heidegger also argues that the imagination produces the categories. As previously mentioned, Heidegger suggests that the individual categories are derived from a unified representation of the object's ontological properties that is provided by the transcendental power of the imagination. The "artificially isolated" categories name different aspects of this spontaneously projected representation (KPM 104).³⁶ In arguing for this position, Heidegger focuses on eliminating the understanding as a possible source of the categories. The external world of our experience and sensibility do not appear as contenders, likely for reasons already considered in the discussion of pure intuitions. Since the categories enable experience, their source could not be the external world; and, since sensibility is

³⁵ We will see this argument developed more fully in the next chapter, along with Heidegger's arguments about the source of the categories. To get Heidegger's complete argument in view (based not only on an argument from elimination, but also on the positive features of the imagination, on Heidegger's account), we will have to take on his identification of the imagination with original temporality.

³⁶ And in fact Heidegger suggests that such an isolation is misleading; "the categories *cannot* be taken as isolated concepts of the understanding; they are essentially related to time" (PIK 291).

merely receptive, it could not spontaneously create the categories. This leaves the understanding as the sole competitor of the imagination.

Heidegger again draws on Kant's notion of a rule to motivate the claim that the imagination, and not the understanding, must be the source of the categories. As mentioned above, Kant thinks concepts provide rules that can unify objects of the same kind. He indicates, further, that categories are special rules: they are "laws" that "necessarily pertain to the cognition of objects" (A126). Our experience must be structured by these rules in order to be possible at all. Heidegger suggests that the initial establishment of the categories as 'ruling rules' requires a receptive moment, eliminating the (merely) spontaneous understanding as a possible source. The categories, rather than representing certain "at hand" concepts that might be employed at will, necessarily hold as "rules" when we are confronted with empirical objects (KPM 108). In our cognition of the world around us, we hold fixed this unified ontological depiction of the object; it is "opposed to anything random" (ibid). We do not, in other words, spontaneously produce new categories for each encounter with an object, but we constrain ourselves to an initial set of rules: the categories. For the categories to function as rules – and not just for their content to be spontaneously produced – they must be *received* as binding; "a ruling rule, is only there in the letting-be-ruled which takes things in stride" (ibid). The categories, then, are dependent on a source that is both spontaneous and receptive: the imagination. The transcendental power of the imagination, as opposed to the understanding, can

simultaneously *produce* the unified image from which the categories can be derived and *receive* this image as binding.³⁷

We have now seen Heidegger draw on the empirical work of the imagination (spontaneous and receptive), the character of the pure intuitions (as unified wholes) and the character of categories (as binding rules) to support his claim that the imagination is the condition of the possibility of the sensibility and the understanding. In so doing, we have unearthed the textual support and argument from elimination for his claim that the imagination, and not the understanding, is the source of the category of causality.

4. Heidegger's Alternative Route for Answering Hume

We have now seen that Heidegger's interpretation of the imagination undermines Kant's response to Hume, where Kant attempts to reestablish causal legitimacy, and we have seen that the textual support and argument from elimination for Heidegger's interpretation. This brings us to the question: what becomes of causal legitimacy under Heidegger's interpretation of Kant? Though Heidegger does not explicitly address Hume's skepticism about causation, he nevertheless points to an alternate route that Kant might take in order to respond to Hume.

In particular, Heidegger identifies the type of claims that are subject to legitimacy questions – questions of the sort, “does this claim accurately capture the world around

³⁷ Heidegger does not, in this section, attempt to make this depiction of the imagination phenomenologically compelling. We seem, rather, to be dealing with the structural features of the imagination, gestured at by Kant himself, that show the imagination ought to play more of a role in Kant's critical philosophy, serving as the ‘common root’ of sensibility and understanding. For those who are familiar with Heidegger's compelling phenomenological descriptions of our everyday experience, this type of argumentation may seem distinctly unsatisfying. The next chapter, however, will fill in a phenomenological account, where we *bind* ourselves to an articulated *image* of time by taking up what Heidegger calls a ‘comportment’.

me?” or “is this claim objectively valid?” In so doing, Heidegger identifies a class of claims that are not subject to legitimacy questions. Heidegger draws a distinction between *ontic* claims and *ontological* claims, arguing that, while we can ask about the legitimacy of ontic claims, such questions cannot meaningfully be posed at the ontological level. Heidegger thinks that Kant, radically, puts forth the idea that the concept of cause is an ontological concept and that claims of the sort – “all alterations have a cause” – are ontological claims. In so doing, Kant should have recognized that he has exempted the concept of cause from legitimacy questions. Kant need not answer Hume’s question, but should rather reject it as meaningless.

In order to make sense of this alternate route, I must first define Heidegger’s terms of art, ontic and ontological (section 4.1). From there, I will consider his argument that legitimacy questions – including questions about the legitimacy of the concept of cause – cannot meaningfully be posed about ontology (section 4.2).

4.1 Ontology and the Synthetic A Priori

Heidegger introduces the distinction between ontic and ontological in Being and Time. There, he suggests that ontic inquiry concerns specific objects, whereas ontological inquiry provides a general characterization of an object’s basic structure; an ontological inquiry, then, might inquire into “basic concepts” and principles defining an object as such (BT 10). An ontic claim is based on inquiry into specific objects, while an ontological claim provides a basic characterization of what all objects will share. To adopt more Heideggerian terminology, the distinction is between claims that characterize the particular *beings* we might encounter in our world, and claims that articulate our general understanding of *Being* (or, “the Being of beings”). This general, ontological

understanding, Heidegger suggests, first makes ontic knowledge about beings possible; in order to know any particular being, we must come with expectations about the sort of beings that populate our world.

In his interpretive works on Kant, Heidegger makes it clear that these terms capture a distinction initially made by Kant: ontological knowledge is synthetic a priori knowledge, which, for Kant as well as for Heidegger, makes synthetic a posteriori (ontic) knowledge possible.³⁸ In his 1927-1928 lecture series on Kant, Heidegger provides a fairly straightforward exposition of Kant's well-known distinctions between a priori and a posteriori on the one hand, and analytic and synthetic on the other.

Heidegger states that a priori knowledge "means a knowledge out of concepts, a knowledge completely free from experience" (PIK 28). While a priori knowledge is independent from experience (28), "a knowledge gained from experience (which is not free from experiences or a priori) Kant calls knowledge a posteriori" (34). As an example of the latter, Heidegger provides "the writing board is black," knowledge gained from perceiving this particular writing board (34). Likewise, a posteriori knowledge includes generalizations, say, about many writing boards that one has experienced. This a posteriori knowledge is based on experience, whereas a priori knowledge is arrived at independently from experience and "in advance" of it (28).

Further, Heidegger reviews that, with an analytic judgment, one clarifies what is already in the concept; in other words, in an analytic judgment, a predicate is attributed to a subject that is already contained in the concept of that subject. With a synthetic

³⁸ This is in fact already clear in the discussion from Being and Time, since Heidegger refers to Kant almost immediately to clarify the distinction, invoking the term a priori to clarify what he means by ontological (BT 11).

judgment, by contrast, one expands or amplifies one's knowledge by attributing a predicate that is not already contained in the concept of the subject; in such judgments, "I obtain a predicate that I first add to what is meant by the concept of subject, that I put together with the concept of subject, i.e., I enact a *synthesis*" (34). Kant's main concern, Heidegger recognizes, is with synthetic judgments a priori, where our knowledge is amplified, but not on the basis of some new experience; rather, "these a priori fixings state something about the objects, they let something be known about these objects, they *extend* our knowledge of the object" (32).

Heidegger borrows some examples from Kant to clarify this type of judgment. One example is the principle of causality itself – that is, the principle that every alteration must have a cause. We do not make this assertion, Heidegger notes, by simply analyzing the concept of cause (as with an analytic judgment), yet we know it independently from experience (PIK 35). Heidegger deems this principle ontological; "this proposition presents a knowledge of what belongs to the being called nature *as* a being, what belongs to this being with respect to its ontological constitution" (33). According to Heidegger, the synthetic a priori principles with which Kant is concerned make up an ontology in Heidegger's sense of the word. Kant is inquiring into "the ontological constitution of beings insofar as they are beings as such" (43).

Though we will shortly see that Heidegger's notion of ontology has at least two significant departures from Kant, Heidegger recognizes the foundational role that Kant wishes to attribute to synthetic a priori judgments. As previously mentioned, Heidegger takes any ontic claim about particular beings (the synthetic a posteriori in Kant) to presuppose and require an ontological understanding; "*beings are in no way accessible*

without an antecedent understanding of Being” (PIK 38). This view can be contrasted with the empiricist view that our first knowledge of the world is based on experience – we have a direct experience of some empirical fact, and our more general knowledge is built up from there. On the contrary, Heidegger suggests, “in each investigation of a presumably pure fact, preconceived opinions about the determination of the field within which the facts are to be found are always already lodged” (22).

Heidegger endorses the category of synthetic a priori, identifying it as Kant’s major discovery. Kant’s central insight, in other words, is the idea that we do not have immediate, unfiltered access to the objects around us, but that this access is always enabled and structured by a pre-understanding that offers a substantive depiction of the objects we can encounter in the world. Heidegger frames this as an extension of Plato’s central insight:

It was Kant who first saw clearly what Plato to a certain extent had already discovered, namely that the science of being, especially of nature, must first determine beings in their ontological constitution in order to make beings thematic (PIK 31).

In this passage, Heidegger credits Plato with discovering that we require ontological knowledge – knowledge of “beings in their ontological constitution” – in order to recognize any particular beings, or make those particular beings “thematic.” This knowledge, one surmises, would include our knowledge of the Platonic forms (concepts that particular beings approximate or instantiate). Heidegger credits Kant with recognizing this fundamental Platonic discovery.

However, Heidegger suggests that Kant goes beyond Plato in specifying what kind of knowledge ontological knowledge is. As Heidegger puts it,

the basic discovery of Kant consists in the realization that these peculiar kinds of knowledge – the preontological understanding of the being of beings and all ontological knowledge – are such as to signify an extension of the knowledge of beings while remaining nonetheless a knowledge which is free of experience and pure. Such kinds of knowledge are given in synthetic judgments a priori (PIK 35).

In this passage, Heidegger credits Kant with recognizing that the ontological constitution of beings – the knowledge we require in order to ‘thematize’ any particular being – is captured by the kind of knowledge that is ampliative or extensional and free from experience. This knowledge, then, is synthetic a priori. Kant’s central insight is that synthetic a priori knowledge determines the ontological constitution of objects, first enabling us to encounter any particular object at all; “what Kant discovers is precisely that underlying this correspondence of experience to objects, to beings, there is already an a priori knowledge upon which each empirical measurement depends, i.e., to which this measurement must correspond and conform” (39). In other words, while Plato recognizes that certain ontological principles underlie our experience of objects, Kant specifies the exact character of these principles, as both ampliative and free from experience.

Though Heidegger offers high praise for Kant’s discovery of synthetic judgments a priori, Heidegger’s own formulation of this type of judgment as ontological modifies Kant’s initial characterization in two significant ways. The first modification is one with which Kant would be sympathetic. The second is not.

First, Heidegger distinguishes between preontological knowledge and ontological knowledge. Preontological knowledge is knowledge about the Being of beings with which we operate implicitly, even prior to making it explicit; at this point, it is still only a background understanding of Being. Once the background understanding is made explicit – by someone like Kant who is “laying the foundation,” making explicit those claims upon which our ontic claims rest – the knowledge is no longer preontological; it is properly ontological. Ontological knowledge is the knowledge made explicit about the Being of beings.³⁹ Therefore, Heidegger states that “*the principle of causality is a preontological, respectively an ontological, knowledge of nature*” (32-33); this principle is a feature of our background understanding prior to being formulated explicitly. Kant would be sympathetic to this because he suggests that, in the Critique of Pure Reason, he is bringing out the synthetic a priori claims with which we implicitly operate, even if we do not explicitly formulate these claims. Kant is not trying to build up a new understanding of the objects in our world, but explicate what is already there; he is providing “an inventory of all we possess through pure reason” (Axx). Though Kant may not introduce terminology that marks the contrast between preontological and ontological, this distinction is consistent with the way that he formulates his project.

Heidegger’s second departure from Kant is his suggestion that there are multiple ontologies, and that Kant only captures one of them; Kant offers a “regional” ontology, rather than a “fundamental” (all-encompassing) ontology. There are multiple synthetic a priori understandings of Being, Heidegger suggests, that might open up a realm of

³⁹ Heidegger suggests that the science of Kant’s time comes to rely on an explication of preontological knowledge, distinguishing it from previous science (PIK 22).

particular (ontic) beings to us, and Kant only captures the realm of Nature.⁴⁰ We need not cross-check the accuracy of this interpretation against Kant's text, for Heidegger already acknowledges that this is a departure from Kant's understanding of his own findings.⁴¹ Heidegger suggests that Kant intended to do more than he in fact accomplishes: he wanted to capture the ontology that applies to all beings, at all times, so that any scientific inquiry into particular beings could be shown to rest on sound synthetic a priori principles. As Heidegger puts it,

...what Kant wants to examine is the *fundamental* problem of the possibility of a science of beings and *not* a so-called epistemology of the mathematical natural sciences. The question he poses is a fundamental one, which is not directed to a specific science of beings. Kant did not want to *adjust* metaphysics, as the science of a *particular* kind of being, to mathematical natural science, as another *particular* kind of the science of beings—and thus to decide the possibility of metaphysics with respect to the possibility of mathematical natural science (PIK 30).

⁴⁰ Heidegger suggests that it is possible to get to a single, fundamental ontology, and in fact this is what he achieves. According to Heidegger, he himself is the one who accomplishes Kant's fundamental aim: "If we radicalize the Kantian problem of ontological knowledge in the sense that we do not limit this problem to the ontological foundation of the positive sciences and if we do not take this problem as a problem of judgment but as the radical and fundamental question concerning the possibility of the understanding of being in general, then we shall arrive at the philosophically fundamental problematic of *Being and Time*. . . Being will then no longer be understood in terms of present-at-hand nature, but rather in that universal sense which encompasses in itself all possibilities of regional variation" (PIK 289).

⁴¹ Nonetheless, I note that Kant's reference to "eternal and changeless laws" (A xii) suggests that he would disagree with Heidegger's contextualization of his ontology within a certain region of beings and at a certain moment in history.

But, Heidegger suggests, Kant was unable to achieve a more fundamental ontology owing to an inherited prejudice favoring mathematical natural science – the science of Nature.

Because Kant considers as unshaken and self-evident the traditional science of beings as the science of what is present-at-hand, because in a way beings are taken to be identical with the beings that belong to present-at-hand nature, therefore natural science is therefore given a priority in the fundamental discussion of the possibility of a science of beings in general. However, because Kant, following the tradition, identifies *beings* with what is *present-at-hand* – as we shall see in our interpretation of the *Critique* – his posing of the problem suffers from a significant contraction (PIK 30).⁴²

Beginning in Chapter 3, we will explore more fully the justification and implications of this particular radicalization of Kant – namely, that Kant offers a ‘contracted’ ontology, rather than one that applies to all beings.

In this section, the important findings have been that Heidegger distinguishes between the ontological and ontical understanding of beings, this distinction corresponding to Kant’s own distinction between synthetic a priori knowledge and synthetic a posteriori knowledge. For Heidegger as for Kant, knowledge about the ontological constitution of beings is known prior to experience and makes the encounter with empirical beings possible; synthetic a priori knowledge provides advance expectations for what we will find in the world, allowing for and shaping that experience.

⁴² I alter this quotation so that instances of “extant” in the Emad and Maly translation are replaced with the more typical translation of Heidegger’s terminology (*Vorhandenen*) – “present-at-hand” (GA 25: 44).

In the next section, we will see why Heidegger thinks ontological knowledge cannot be the target of legitimacy questions – why it is meaningless to inquire into whether this knowledge accurately captures the world around us.

4.2 Insulating Ontology from Legitimacy Questions

Having reviewed Heidegger's distinction between ontical and ontological, I will examine a passage where he draws on this distinction to address the topic of legitimacy questions. In this passage, Heidegger argues that his identification of the imagination as the source of the categories does not downgrade the status of those categories, making them "merely imaginary" (KPM 97). Though Heidegger (of course) does not cite Hume here, the argument challenges Hume's position that, if the concept of cause originates in the imagination, this undermines its legitimacy; to the contrary, Heidegger suggests that an imaginative origin, in the sense that he is proposing, does not undermine the legitimacy of the categories. Let's see his argument for this claim.

Just prior to offering the argument reviewed in section 3 above, Heidegger asks himself: if he establishes that the imagination is the 'common root' of sensibility and understanding, "does not all knowledge come to be reduced to the imagination?" (KPM 97). Heidegger disagrees that his interpretation "reduces" knowledge, arguing that

...what is not really at hand is reputed to be 'merely imaginary.' But according to its essence, what is formed in the transcendental power of imagination is in no way something at hand, if indeed the transcendental power of the imagination can never be ontically creative. For that reason, what is formed therein can likewise never essentially be 'mere imagination' in the above sense. Rather, in general it is the horizon of objects formed in the transcendental power of the imagination—the

understanding of being—which first makes possible something like a distinction between ontic truth and ontic appearance (KPM 97).

In this passage, Heidegger defines as ‘merely imaginary’ that which ‘is not really at hand’; something like the winged horse, which is not there for us to find in the world, is merely imaginary in this sense. Heidegger denies that the transcendental power of the imagination would create or form something that is merely imaginary. The transcendental power of the imagination is not “ontically creative”; it does not form ideas about particular beings. According to Heidegger, the common root of sensibility and understanding is not that capacity of the imagination responsible for daydreams and hallucinations. The common root, rather, is that power of the imagination which forms “the horizon of objects” or “the understanding of being”; following the terminology introduced above, Heidegger is suggesting that the transcendental power of the imagination offers an ontology, rather than ontic information about a particular being. Importantly, Heidegger suggests that such the ontology supplied by the transcendental power of the imagination provides the standard by which we might distinguish between a claim that is true of particular beings – “ontic truth” – and a claim that is false or deceptive – “ontic appearance.” As Heidegger succinctly puts it early on in his Kant book: “ontic truth necessarily adjusts itself to the ontological” (KPM 11).

When Heidegger suggests that ontology allows us to distinguish between ontic claims that are true and those that are deceptive, he is arguing that our expectations about what it means to be a being provide a standard by which we can deem something to be real on the one hand or merely imaginary on the other. To support this claim, consider the sort of justification one would give for deeming something merely imaginary. For

example, suppose we were walking in the desert and thought we saw an oasis; when we arrive at the supposed location, however, we deem the oasis merely imaginary. If asked to justify this claim, we would likely appeal to the idea that there is nothing there – nothing that can be touched, nothing that allows for a continuous visual experience. Heidegger is suggesting that any time we conclude something is merely imaginary (or confirm it as true), an understanding of what it means to *be* is implicitly at work; in the case of the oasis, we took it that, what it means to be includes things like tangibility (substantiality) and stable visual properties (such that it can be viewed from multiple angles). Without such a standard, the conclusion that something is merely imaginary would not be possible.

From this discussion, we can tease out two reasons why Heidegger suggests that an ontology cannot be deemed merely imaginary. First, as previously mentioned, it does not produce particular beings that do not in fact exist in the world (e.g. it does not provide hallucinations of objects). But, second, we do not have a standard by which we could deem an ontology merely imaginary. The ontology provides the standard for distinguishing the true from the merely imaginary; when we consider the ontology itself, we run out of standards by which we could claim that basic ontological concepts and principles are true or merely imaginary.

Heidegger makes this second point even more forcefully in his lecture series, when considering Kant's claim in the A-deduction that the categories "have therefore a

priori ob-jective validity” (A111).⁴³ Here, Heidegger says that “the question of ‘ob-jective validity of...’ has meaning only on the basis of the constitution of the relation to ob-jects in general which is grounded in categories” (PIK 272). Here, Heidegger suggests that we must draw on an ontological understanding – for Kant, the categories – to establish that some piece of knowledge is objectively valid. The categories give meaning to the question “Is this piece of knowledge objectively valid?” because they give us a sense of what it means for something to be objectively valid. If we’re talking about the existence of some object, say, we know that it must have substantiality, be in causal contact with other objects, etc. The categories help us determine the objective validity of ontic claims. However, since ontological understanding provides us with our grip on objective validity, such a question – “is this piece of knowledge objectively valid?” – cannot be turned on ontology itself. Questions like “is it objectively valid that all objects are substances?” and “is it objectively valid that objects are in causal relationships with one another?” ask us to suspend the understanding of being supplied by the categories, as the categories are themselves being called into question. However, without an ontological understanding to fall back on, Heidegger suggests, we lose our grip on objective validity; the phrase no longer has the meaning typically supplied by the categories in the case of ontic claims. For this reason, “the meaning of this question is meaningless” (PIK 172).⁴⁴

⁴³ For more on Heidegger’s critique of the transcendental deduction – “the most disastrous segment of teaching in Kant’s philosophy to which one can refer” (PIK 209) – see Carr 2007.

⁴⁴ For this reason, Heidegger dismisses the “objective side” of “the task of the deduction” (PIK 225): “A *problem of validity* is absurd in such an inquiry and in this form [advocated for by the neo-Kantians] has never been Kant’s goal” (PIK 224).

From these discussions, we can see the alternate route that Heidegger offers Kant for responding to Hume's skepticism about causation. Rather than advocating for a different way to establish the objective validity of the concept of cause, Heidegger suggests that Kant ought to reject this inquiry as one that is meaningless. In identifying the concept of cause as a category – a component of our ontological understanding – Kant exempts it from legitimacy questions. He identifies the concept of cause as figuring into that class of understanding that cannot meaningfully be the target of legitimacy questions, as no standard remains to settle such questions. Having introduced the class of synthetic a priori judgments as conditions for the possibility of experience, Kant need not answer Hume's call to establish the legitimacy of causality – such a question is no longer meaningful.

Note that this route is not available to Hume, as a means to quell his own doubts about causality. Hume does not offer a place for ontology in his philosophical system. For Hume, all claims about beings are ontic claims; as such, they are all up for grabs when it comes to questions of objective validity. However, in introducing ontological knowledge that enables our encounter with objects, Kant introduces a dimension of knowledge about objects to which questions of legitimacy cannot meaningfully be posed, in Heidegger's view; this knowledge is, rather, the condition of or the standard for settling questions of legitimacy. Once the concept of cause is introduced as a category, it should not be situated as the object of legitimacy questions, but as the standard by which such questions are settled.

One puzzle that remains about Heidegger's alternate route relates to Heidegger's claim that Kant only succeeds in offering a regional ontology. Indeed, this claim seems to

complicate Heidegger's argument that, when it comes to ontological understanding, there is no further standard by which one could settle legitimacy questions – asking after the objective validity of ontological understanding is meaningless. If Heidegger agreed with Kant that ontology is singular, and that Kant had identified the single ontology for the objects of our experience, it would be easier to see that we indeed run out of standards when we inquire into the objective validity of the categories; there is only one set of categories, and they cannot be drawn upon to answer such inquiries. However, when Heidegger introduces the notion of multiple ontologies, he seems to supply us with a surplus of standards. One might suppose that, if we navigate multiple ontologies, there must be some higher standard allowing us to so navigate. How does one determine, for example, whether to draw on the ontology of natural science as opposed to the ontology of philology? Further, in the case of ontological revolutions – paradigm shifts – how does one decide between the previous ontology and the revolutionary one? If standards are available to help guide these cases, perhaps there are standards that could determine the objective validity of the Kantian categories.

These questions touch on central, much debated issues both in Heidegger's theory of truth and in the discussion of paradigm shifts in the philosophy of science. While I cannot do the topic full justice here, I will make a few remarks. First, in some passages, Heidegger seems to suggest that shifting between different regions of understanding is a function of changes in our practical interests, rather than a 'higher standard' that would allow us to select between different sets of categories. For example, in Chapter 5, we will see Heidegger's suggestion that when we take up an 'employing comportment' – when we aim to use or employ the objects around us – we take up a set of categories that

provide the basic constitution of equipment (PIK 15). By contrast, when we take a “knowing comportment” or a “scientific comportment” to the objects around us – when we aim to know or scientifically investigate those objects – we take up Kant’s categories (PIK 15, 19). In passages like this one, practical interests, rather than higher standards of validity, seem to explain how we navigate multiple ontologies.

However, an explanation like this one, even if developed as the best interpretation of Heidegger’s position, would still leave certain problems unresolved. While such an account might allow Heidegger to coherently maintain that we navigate multiple ontologies without ontological categories being subject to validity questions, such an account might not be very attractive. After all, if ontological categories were (contra Heidegger) open to legitimacy questions, this would allow for progress in our basic understanding of some domain; further, it gives us a base to criticize the fundamental tenets of harmful ideologies. These are important issues that I hope to explore elsewhere. Here, I simply flag that while Heidegger offers Kant an alternate route to respond to Hume’s skepticism about causation – indeed, continuing the dialogue between Hume and Kant about causality – questions remain open about the viability of this route.

Conclusion

I have argued that Heidegger’s claim that the Kantian imagination is the “common root” of the sensibility and the understanding is both in dialogue with Kant and Hume’s debate on causal legitimacy, and that it is derived from Kant’s text. The structure of Heidegger’s argument is remarkably similar to those offered by Hume and Kant. He draws on the characteristics of the faculties (according to Kant) and process of elimination to determine from which faculty the categories originate. In the debate

outlined above, Hume provides considerations for locating the concept of cause in the imagination (for Kant, the empirical imagination); Kant provides considerations for attributing the concept of cause to the understanding; and Heidegger provides considerations for attributing the concept of cause to the a priori capacity of the imagination. Heidegger's argument poses a special challenge to Kant's own, as it draws on Kant's depiction of the categories, and considers a possibility that Kant seems to have overlooked in his argument (as the a priori faculty of the imagination does not figure into the faculties under consideration for process of elimination).

I argued that Heidegger continues the debate between Kant and Hume about causal representation by casting doubt on Kant's response to Hume: Heidegger contradicts Kant's claim that the concept of cause comes from the understanding, suggesting instead that the imagination is its source. The interpretation, then, points us to a tension between Kant's response to Hume and those elements of his theory that suggest a more robust a priori role for the imagination. Kant may not be entitled to respond to Hume as he does, maintaining that the understanding is the source of categories like causality.

However, as we saw in the final section, Heidegger also provides Kant with an alternate avenue of response to Hume. Heidegger suggests that Kant need not take on Hume's causal skepticism, as Kant's transformation of the understanding of human cognition obviates the need to establish the legitimacy of categories like causality. Kant suggests that the categories enable and structure our experience; for this reason, according Heidegger, they are the standards by which we settle questions about the validity of some claim. As the categories enable the settling of legitimacy questions, they

cannot themselves be subject to them; there is no way to adjudicate such a question. If this alternate route is viable, Kant can reject Hume's question. Such a question is meaningless when posed about the ontological categories that structure our experience.

Chapter 2: Heidegger's New Discovery of Kant: the Kantian Imagination and Temporality

In a letter to Jaspers dated December 10, 1925, Heidegger describes lessons he is teaching on Hegel and Kant. While he has some complaints about the Hegel lessons – the students that “are so Hegelianized they do not even know themselves where their heads are at” – he reports that “the best part, however, is that I am beginning *to really love Kant*” (HJC 61). About a year later, on December 26, 1926, he reports that his love for Kant has acted as a buffer against the Kant scholars who criticize his interpretation: “when I think about how I have understood Kant (i.e. learned to love Kant), in the course of my work, then the momentarily successful hostility of a so-called Kantian is completely indifferent to me” (HJC 73).⁴⁵ Even in the face of ‘Kantian’ hostility, Heidegger persevered in his study and interpretation of Kant, as he reports two years later, in 1928:⁴⁶ “For the time being, I edify myself everyday with Kant, whom one can interpret with greater vehemence and thoroughness than Aristotle. I believe he must be discovered completely anew” (HJC 86).⁴⁷ In this chapter, I pose two questions: What is Heidegger’s *new discovery* of Kant? And, in what sense can it be called a discovery *of Kant*?

⁴⁵ The editor of the volume notes that this is a comment about Rickert.

⁴⁶ As Heidegger states in his 1927-1928 lecture course, “we are for Kant against Kantianism” (PIK 190).

⁴⁷ This idea that Kant must be discovered anew is made against the backdrop of German Idealist interpretations that emphasized Kant’s discussion of spontaneity/reason (especially those of Fichte and Hegel), following the lead of Kant’s second edition of the first Critique: “And yet in the second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason, did Kant not give mastery back to the understanding? And is it not a consequence of this that with Hegel metaphysics became ‘Logic’ more radically than ever before?” (PIK 171) Heidegger took the Neo-Kantians of his time to follow in this interpretation. For an overview of the Neo-Kantian situation into which both Husserl and Heidegger were intervening, see Crowell 2001.

At the end of Heidegger's 1927-1928 lecture series on Kant, Heidegger goes into more detail on his new discovery of Kant:

When some years ago I studied the Critique of Pure Reason anew and read it, as it were, against the background of Husserl's phenomenology, it opened my eyes; and Kant became for me the crucial confirmation of the accuracy of the path which I took in my search (PIK 292).

In this passage, we see Heidegger suggest that his new discovery of Kant resulted from reading it in light of Husserl's phenomenology. Heidegger suggests, further, that his reading of Kant confirmed his own philosophical 'path'. As Heidegger pursued Husserl's phenomenological method – most paradigmatically, in Being and Time, a book that was dedicated to Husserl in its first edition – he came to certain findings that his reading of Kant confirmed as accurate.

In this chapter, I will suggest that Kant's depiction of the imagination in the Critique of Pure Reason confirmed, in Heidegger's view, the fundamental temporal structure of human understanding that Heidegger entitled "care." In his interpretive works on Kant, Heidegger inquires into the temporality of cognition in detail, rooting this temporality in the faculty that Kant called transcendental imagination. This interpretation of the imagination is the center of Heidegger's 'new discovery of Kant' – the way that he has come to understand Kant, the source of his newfound love for Kant.

To inquire into Heidegger's new discovery of Kant, then, I will consider Heidegger's interpretation of Kant's theory of the imagination in the Critique of Pure Reason. I focus especially on Kant's discussion of synthesis in the Transcendental Deduction, which Heidegger takes to reflect the three temporal ecstases, or dimensions of

time, making up the overarching “care” structure of the imagination: reproduction as past, apprehension as present, and recognition as future. A close reading of Heidegger’s interpretation allows us to consider more generally Heidegger’s interpretive approach to Kant, as well as the justice of this interpretive approach. We will briefly orient ourselves by considering Heidegger’s method of textual interpretation in his late-1920s works on Kant, before moving on to the close reading of Heidegger’s interpretation of the imagination.

1. Preliminary Remarks on Heidegger’s Method of Interpretation

One way that Heidegger puts his method of interpreting Kant is that he aims to “to pursue even and precisely his labyrinths” (PIK 210). That is, he will not only acknowledge the special difficulties and inconsistencies in Kant’s thought; these labyrinths will form the ‘precise’ center of the interpretation. In his interpretation of Kant, Heidegger strongly endorses some of Kant’s claims (often, the depiction of the activity of the imagination), and rejects others of his claims (often, claims affording a primary role to the faculty of understanding), suggesting that there are two competing strands of thought in the first Critique. This interpretive method, of attending primarily to those moments where Kant “vacillates” and “hesitates,” and even where his argument “becomes unhinged,” seems to violate many reasonable approaches to textual interpretation.

Consider some typical forms of interpretation. Dieter Schönecker, an interpreter of Kant, identifies two aims of interpreting texts in the history of philosophy: coherency on the one hand, and truth or plausibility on the other. He argues that “it is not possible to interpret without asking about terminological and logical coherence as well as about

factual plausibility...In Kant scholarship, the two activities are mixed poorly”

(Schönecker 2001: 159, translation my own). Schönecker argues that, while philosophy proper aims for factual plausibility or truth, the history of philosophy ought to adopt the aim of terminological and logical coherence. Rather than ‘poorly mixing’ the distinct aims of coherence and truth, the philosophy of history ought to prioritize interpreting a text so that it comes out to be coherent over interpreting the text so that its claims turn out true. In Schönecker’s method of *kommentarische Interpretation*, “an interpretation is better if it coherently (consistently and comprehensively) accounts for more textual observations than another” (Schönecker 2013: 226). Therefore, in order to interpret a text, the historian of philosophy ought to engage in “exegetical, detailed, context-oriented and at the same time historically developed textual analysis” (Schönecker 2001: 161). We will call this method of textual interpretation, where one interprets with an eye toward maximum coherency, Interpreting for Coherency.

The method of interpretation that stands in opposition to Schönecker’s approach can be called, then, Interpreting for Truth. According to this method, one ought to interpret with an eye towards truth; we ought to interpret terms in such a way that most claims turn out true. Though not an interpreter of Kant, Donald Davidson is an advocate for this sort of interpretation. In his account of so-called “radical interpretation,” focusing primarily on the case of interpreting speakers of an unknown language, Davidson recommends that we rely on a principle of charity when we interpret: “the principle directs the interpreter to translate or interpret so as to read some of his own standards of truth into the pattern of sentences held true by the speaker” (Davidson 2001: 148). According to Davidson, we ought to provide interpretations that make a speaker’s beliefs

about the world, as revealed through his utterances, “largely consistent and true” (Davidson 2006: 137). Davidson also suggests that charity calls for maximizing agreement between speaker and interpreter: “We want a theory...that maximizes agreement, in terms of making [a speaker] right, as far as we can tell, as often as possible” (2006 p.136). While Davidson does not develop his method of radical interpretation with an eye toward Kant interpretation (or even the interpretation of a text), Interpreting for Truth would involve interpreting Kant so as to afford him true, plausible insights into the phenomena he attempts to explain. In order to interpret for truth, then, interpreters ought to consult their own beliefs about the phenomena under discussion in Kant’s text (i.e. what they hold to be true about this matter), and interpret Kant’s claims in light of those beliefs.

Interpreting for Coherency and Interpreting for Truth need not be at odds. For example, Interpreting for Coherency and Interpreting for Truth might converge on the set of claims, “All men are mortal; Socrates is a man; therefore, Socrates is mortal.” Interpreting the statements so that they are true also results in a coherent interpretation. However, in more complicated cases of interpretation, such as interpreting an entire philosophical treatise, the two methods of interpretation can come apart.

In his interpretation of Kant, Heidegger violates the method of Interpreting for Coherency. He takes there to be a fundamental tension between some of Kant’s claims (i.e. his depiction of the imagination) and others (i.e. his claims prioritizing the understanding). A particularly colorful way Heidegger states this tension is as follows:

the power of imagination and understanding battle with each other for priority as the basic source of knowledge. The battle surges back and forth, without a clear outcome. This makes the task of interpretation more difficult (PIK 198).⁴⁸

In Heidegger's reading of Kant, there is not coherency, but two competing strands of thought.

In reading Kant this way, Heidegger also violates the second kind of interpretation, Interpreting for Truth. The claims prioritizing the understanding are false; the claims providing insight into the imagination are true. He is committed to the idea, then, that there are a great number of false claims, prioritizing the understanding. As Heidegger puts it elsewhere, bringing out the substantial number of claims that Heidegger takes to be at odds with Kant's central insight,

the entire problematic of the Critique, in its structure and in the form of its execution, is not suited to the originality of the insight to which Kant arrives in the most decisive segment of the Critique, where he unhinges himself and undermines his own foundation (PIK 145).

Because Heidegger takes 'the most decisive segment' – the Transcendental Deduction – to undermine the truth of a substantial portion of the first Critique, Heidegger's interpretation does not maximize truth, either.

⁴⁸ Similarly, Heidegger suggests that "in Kant the notion of the pure concept of understanding vacillates," and with it, the task of the transcendental deduction: when the pure concepts are conceived as logical functions, the transcendental deduction seeks to demonstrate their juridical legitimacy; when they are categories, the transcendental deduction seeks to determine their essence (PIK 219). Heidegger also indicates, as we will see again below, that Kant's self-conceived methodology "vacillates between psychology and logic" (neither of which are capable of determining the essence of the categories, which Heidegger thinks is the right task for Kant to be pursuing; for that, phenomenology is required) (PIK 219-220).

In failing to interpret for truth, as well as for consistency, Heidegger might seem a particularly uncharitable interpreter of Kant. However, one of the aims of this chapter is to consider what, if anything, justifies this interpretive method. William Barrett suggests one line of justification, namely that “from a philosophical rather than a doxographical point of view, Heidegger’s use of the Kantian apparatus and analysis is justified by the significance of his conclusions” (Barrett 1967: 357). In particular, Barrett suggests, Heidegger’s interpretation brings out the temporality required “for the mind’s forming any concepts whatsoever” (358); Heidegger “points out that all of our understanding must be within the perspectives of time” (375).⁴⁹ Even more specifically, Heidegger brings out the necessary ‘futurity’ that is required to make sense of any present experience. Barrett suggests, then, that the reading is justified because Heidegger reaches philosophically interesting conclusions in his interpretation of Kant, even though he can be accused of “stretch[ing] Kant a bit in order to find his own ideas latent in Kant’s work” (357).

I would like to explore the idea that Heidegger’s reading can be justified even more strongly, on both philosophical and doxographical grounds.⁵⁰ After all, the suggestion that the text is justified philosophically but not doxographically seems to overlook the careful, line-by-line, even microscopic analyses that Heidegger carries out over the course of his Kant interpretation. Further, Heidegger’s interpretive method seems to offer another sort of charity: that of affording Kant radical, groundbreaking

⁴⁹ Barrett also notes that Heidegger’s emphasis on temporality in Kant had become “much less eccentric” at the time he wrote the article (1967), as more interpreters have begun to suggest the centrality of time in Kant.

⁵⁰ A discussion with Georg Bertram was very helpful for formulating the larger argument in this paper, and especially that offered in this paragraph.

insights, insights that, according to Heidegger's estimation, offer the most compelling line of response to Kant's main question in the first Critique.⁵¹ Heidegger thinks that Kant's claims about the imagination contain a deep insight. To preserve this insight, Heidegger must reject a great many *others* of Kant's claims that are at odds with this insight. To hold that, the imagination ought to be interpreted as the common root of sensibility and the understanding, and that the imagination refers to the temporal structure of human cognition, Heidegger must (to name a specific case that we saw in the last chapter) set aside Kant's claim that the understanding, and not the imagination, is the source of the concept of cause. Further, as we will see in the next chapter, he must deny Kant's claim that the categories are universal in a strong sense – that human cognition is bound to them, and must rely on them in any and every context of experience. Heidegger is not 'stretching' Kant's claims, but selecting a certain subset of claims that he takes to be deeply insightful. However, preserving the insight of these claims means contradicting other claims that appear in the work.

Further, Heidegger's identification of Kant's central insight is directed by Kant's stated aims in the text. Commenters typically assume that Heidegger is guided here by his own philosophical insights; Heidegger sticks with the line in Kant that most resembles his own findings about the temporality of Dasein in Being and Time. However,

⁵¹ Heidegger indicates an additional form of charity in laying an interpretive emphasis on inconsistencies. In particular, Heidegger claims that Kant is inconsistent about his methodology in the central argument of his book, the transcendental deduction. However, Heidegger suggests, approvingly, that "an unclarity of direction," a failure to fully conceive one's own methodology, reveals more "proximity to phenomena"; instead of pursuing a pre-conceived plan, one grapples with the "darkness of phenomena" that one is trying to explain (PIK 220). Suggesting that a thinker is inconsistent about their methodology is, for Heidegger, a compliment.

Heidegger does not portray his interpretive method this way. Rather, Heidegger emphasizes that he is pursuing the questions that Kant posed, in particular what Kant dubs “the real problem of pure reason”: “the real problem of pure reason is now contained in the question: How are synthetic judgments a priori possible?” (B19) Heidegger affirms: “This possibility of ontological understanding, the possibility of a nature in general, the possibility of synthetic knowledge a priori, is the guiding ontological problem overall of the Critique” (PIK 276). Heidegger takes Kant’s exploration of the imagination to be his most promising insight into the fundamental question Kant poses at the outset of the work.

I suggest that, in pursuing this interpretive method, Heidegger occupies a middle ground between Interpreting for Coherency (with Schönecker) and Interpreting for Truth (with Davidson). Heidegger is keeping an eye on the phenomena to be explained (how are synthetic a priori judgments possible?) as well as the text (what does Kant suggest about such judgments?). In allowing Kant deep insight into the temporal structure of human cognition, he must hold the other claims in tension with these insights as false. However, Heidegger does provide an explanation for the lack of coherence and for the falsities in Kant’s thinking.

First, Heidegger suggests that Kant’s passages prioritizing the understanding stem from prejudices that Kant inherited from the philosophical tradition. For example, Heidegger says: “Here [in calling the categories ‘pure concepts of understanding’] is manifest a primacy of understanding, of the logical – a primacy which runs through the entire history of Western philosophy since the beginning of the problem of the categories in antiquity and which receives a new impetus in Kant” (PIK 198). Kant provides deep

insight into the temporal structure of the imagination when he affords the imagination primacy. However, when Kant follows the tradition in prioritizing the understanding, he undermines his own insight into the imagination.

Further, according to Heidegger, Kant is occasionally led astray by attempting to insert himself into traditional philosophical debates, even though his own thought has gone far beyond these problems. For example, in the Transcendental Deduction, Kant attempts to establish the legitimacy of the categories, responding to the problems of dogmatic metaphysics, where categories were applied haphazardly to objects beyond our cognitive reach – for example, to establish claims about God’s existence. However, for Kant’s own system, the inquiry into the validity of our basic categories is “an inquiry which already in itself is impossible” (PIK 209). As we discussed above, Heidegger thinks that synthetic a priori knowledge – i.e. the knowledge making up an ontology – are not subject to legitimacy questions. This discussion brings out a further charity of Heidegger’s interpretive method: namely, Heidegger emphasizes the line in Kant that he takes to be innovative, going beyond traditional accounts concerning what is primary in human cognition.

Second, Heidegger suggests that Kant was inconsistent about his theory of imagination, because Kant was afraid of his own insight into the imagination. For example, Heidegger claims that reading the first Critique such that the understanding is primary misses “the dimension of human Dasein, into which Kant in fact looked, only to be scared away from it” (PIK 189). Further, Heidegger speaks of

the typical hesitation which is manifest in Kant whenever he is to express himself clearly about the position of the power of imagination among the faculties...Kant

retreats before the consequence of eliminating the priority of transcendental apperception, of understanding, that is, of the traditional, unfounded privileged position of logic. Kant is afraid of sacrificing transcendental apperception to the transcendental power of the imagination (PIK 279)

In this passage, Heidegger argues that Kant hesitates to name definitively the relationship between the imagination and the other faculties; what is the place of the imagination among the human cognitive faculties? Recognizing the priority of the imagination – a conclusion that is suggested, as we will see, in Kant’s discussion of synthesis in the *Analytic of Principles*, the role of the imagination in the *Transcendental Deduction*, and the clarification of the activity of the imagination in the *Schematism* – would unseat the priority of the understanding, in opposition to traditional philosophical dogma. For reasons that are not fully spelled out in this passage, Heidegger asserts that Kant is afraid of unseating – or “sacrificing” – the core of the faculty of understanding, that is, transcendental apperception.

Elsewhere, Heidegger suggests that Kant feared inquiring more deeply into the imagination and assigning it primacy among the faculties for human cognition, because undermining the primacy of the understanding would undermine the moral rules that Kant outlined in the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals in 1785 (between the first and second editions of the Critique of Pure Reason).⁵² Rather than being governed by

⁵² Heidegger relates the primacy of the understanding with the status of Kant’s moral rules too hastily. These rules, after all, stem from a different faculty—reason. Heidegger occasionally appears to conflate the faculties of understanding and reason (cf. PIK 28; further, the passage currently under discussion transitions from speaking of ‘understanding’ to speaking of ‘pure reason’ without comment (KPM 112f.)). Because Kant associates both reason and understanding with our spontaneity, Heidegger might be

determinate rules, the imagination is an “abyss.” As Heidegger asks, “will not the Critique of Pure Reason have deprived itself of its own theme if pure reason reverts to the transcendental power of imagination? Does not this ground-laying lead us to an abyss?” (KPM 117). Heidegger answers this question in the affirmative, claiming that “in the radicalism of his questions, Kant brought the ‘possibility’ of metaphysics to this abyss. He saw the unknown. He has to shrink back. It was not just that the transcendental power of imagination frightened him, but rather in between [the two editions] pure reason drew him increasingly under its spell” (KPM 118). This passage suggests not only that Kant shrank back from the imagination in fear, but also that he was drawn under the spell of something else, namely, pure reason. I will shortly suggest that, on Heidegger’s reading, Kant fell under the spell of reason precisely because it quelled the anxieties that were provoked by the abyss of the imagination.

It might be odd that Heidegger’s interpretation of Kant, self-proclaimed as a ‘violent’ one (PIK 247), would claim to have insight into a mental state like being frightened. On what grounds could Heidegger claim to have access to Kant’s fear? A

right that the primacy of the (both) receptive and spontaneous faculty of imagination would undermine the universal bindingness of moral laws along with the primacy of the understanding. Indeed, Heidegger suggests an explanation of this sort – where the theoretical rules of the understanding and the moral rules of reason have a linked fate – when he claims that “To the extent that the essence of the subjectivity of the subject lies in its personality, which, however, is synonymous with moral reason, the rational character of pure knowledge and of acting must be solidified. All pure synthesis and synthesis in general must, as spontaneity, fall to the faculty which in a proper sense is free, the acting reason” (KPM 118). However, Heidegger must do more to establish this conclusion (for example by acknowledging the differences between understanding and ‘moral reason’ and specifying the precise relationship between them). Because moral rules are not the focus of this dissertation, I leave the point aside here.

later discussion suggests, however, that Heidegger was not attributing a particular mood to Kant but a basic existential disposition:

Anxiety is that basic disposition which places us before the Nothing. The Being of the being, however, is in general only understandable – and herein lies the profoundest finitude of transcendence – if in the ground of its essence Dasein holds itself into the Nothing... ‘Anxiety’ thus understood, i.e. according to fundamental ontology, completely removes the harmlessness of a categorical structure from ‘Care’” (KPM 167).

Heidegger’s discussion of the Nothing in this passage invokes his earlier discussions of the “unknown” and “abyss” from which Kant (supposedly) shrank back. This suggests that the fear he also took Kant to feel is a manifestation of anxiety.

In Being and Time, Heidegger suggests that all human beings feel anxiety due to our fundamental existential structure, whereby we must reveal the world in light of some project but have no overriding reason to pursue that project over another. We are ‘Being-the-basis-for-a-nullity,’ responsible for the interpretation we do pursue, as well as those that we do not (BT 285). Due to our fundamental responsibility for the way that we interpret the world and live our lives, we all feel a deep anxiety. There are two possible responses to feeling anxiety. First, we can face that anxiety (this is the authentic response). It corresponds to ‘remembering again’ (KPM 164) – remembering the source of our interpretations. In so doing, we discover our fundamental responsibility for everything that we do. Second, we can flee from that anxiety, busying ourselves with worldly affairs so as not to face our fundamental responsibility (this is the inauthentic

response). It corresponds to ‘forgetfulness’ (KPM 163), forgetting that and how we are interpreting.

Heidegger’s suggestion that Kant shrank back from the imagination – the structure of human existence that reveals our finitude, the Nothing at the core of our being – suggests that Kant took the second route. Indeed, his usage of the term ‘fear’ also suggests this point. In Being and Time, Heidegger suggests that those who are inauthentic attempt to dispel their deep anxiety – which is not about anything particular (e.g. anxiety over a deadline), since it is anxiety regarding one’s responsibility for any path at all that one could take – by finding something concrete to be anxious about (BT 186). One tries to attribute the feeling of anxiety to that impending deadline, to the possibility of failure, to worldly disasters that could happen. Heidegger’s claim that Kant was frightened, then, suggests that Kant attempted to cover over his anxiety with something concrete, something out there in the world that could distract him from his deep anxiety.⁵³

⁵³ Heidegger does claim that “Kant’s laying of the ground for metaphysics, as unprecedented, *resolute* questioning [*entschlossenes Fragen*] about the inner possibility of the manifestness of the Being of beings, must come up against time as the basic determination of finite transcendence, if in fact the understanding of Being in Dasein projects Being from itself upon time, so to speak ” (KPM 170, italics mine). This passage may seem to pose a problem for my account because Heidegger suggests resoluteness (*Entschlossenheit*) is a moment of authenticity – of facing one’s deep anxiety – and he seems to attribute resoluteness to Kant in the passage. However, a closer reading of the passage shows that Heidegger is not attributing resoluteness to Kant; in fact, this passage supports my argument.

Notice, first, that Heidegger is describing questioning as resolute. This questioning is resolute, Heidegger suggests, if it “comes up against time as the basic determination of finite transcendence.” This suggestion makes it clear that Heidegger is not referencing the questioning that Kant in fact carried out in the Critique of Pure Reason. After all, Heidegger acknowledges that Kant did not identify time as the basic determination of finite transcendence; much to Heidegger’s frustration, Kant attempts to place the understanding, and the categories of understanding that Kant takes to determine our cognition, outside of time. In so doing, Heidegger suggests, Kant did not take his line

What rationale could Heidegger have for taking Kant to be fearful, then, if we interpret fear as an inauthentic fleeing from deep anxiety? Heidegger's evidence appears to be this: (1) Kant almost identified the null structure of human existence that provokes anxiety, and (2) in place of fully identifying it, Kant offers the concrete determinations of the categories. According to this narrative, Kant came very close to discovering the fundamental structure of care in his discussions of the imagination. As we will see in more detail later, Kant elucidated two temporal ecstases – past and present – that make up the care structure, but failed to carry the argument to its natural conclusion by elucidating the future. This suggests that Kant was in contact with the source of anxiety, the fundamental structure of human existence that reveals our finitude. Rather than fully revealing this fundamental structure, though, Kant retreated to the concrete determinations of the categories: the features of the objects in our world that Kant took to be constant, necessitating, irrefutable constitution of objects that we have no choice but to use.⁵⁴ With the categories, Kant renders Dasein's finitude as a "quality which is at hand"

of questioning to its appropriate, and to Heidegger quite obvious, conclusion. Heidegger's claim in this passage, then, is that if one carries out Kant's line of questioning resolutely – without shrinking back out of fear – one arrives at the correct answer, namely that time is the basic determination of finite transcendence. The passage suggests that Kant was not resolute, as he did not arrive at this answer.

Heidegger was also fond of Kant's claim in the *Prolegomena* that the first *Critique* requires a "resolute reader" (4: 274). In the passage at KPM 170, Heidegger likely echoes Kant's language to suggest that Heidegger is just the 'resolute reader' that Kant sought. Incidentally, Heidegger appends this passage from the *Prolegomena* to his lecture series on Kant, underlining Kant's use of "resolute" [*entschlossen*] and writing in – "Freedom!" [*Freiheit!*] (1927-1928 *Handschrift*: note to p.4).

⁵⁴ Heidegger also suggests that Kant's depiction of the "I" speaks to his shrinking back: "What is the motive of this fugitive way of saying 'I'? It is motivated by Dasein's falling; for as falling, it flees in the face of itself toward the 'they'" (BT 322). In particular, Heidegger suggests that, in Kant, the being of the subject is "ontologically quite indefinite" (BT 321) and that ultimately Kant forces "upon the problematic of the Self an

[*vorhandene Eigenschaft*], rather than recognizing “the constant although mostly concealed trembling of all that exists” (KPM 167).⁵⁵ Kant chained the structure of human cognition to the categories, rendering it harmless; there is no fundamental choice or responsibility one has for the way one interprets the world. The idea that Kant is, in Heidegger’s estimation, inauthentic, also adds more depth to Heidegger’s admission that his interpretation is a “violent” one. In *Being and Time*, he claims that “existential analysis...constantly has the character of *doing violence* [*Gewaltsamkeit*], whether to the claims of the everyday interpretation or to its complacency and its tranquillized obliviousness” (BT 311). To reveal Dasein’s existential structure, we must struggle against the “tendency to cover things up” (BT 311).

Heidegger provides, then, a twofold explanation for the claims that Heidegger deems inconsistent with Kant’s central insight, and that he would like to reject in Kant’s thought: first, Kant accepts the supremacy of logic and understanding from the tradition, and still attempts a dialogue with this tradition even as his thought surpasses it, and, second, Kant is afraid to undermine the traditional supremacy of logic and understanding, as this would undermine the universality of Kant’s rules of the understanding, especially moral laws. Further, in interpreting Kant the way that he does, Heidegger attributes to

inappropriate, ‘categorical’ horizon” (BT 322). While Kant clearly makes claims denying that the categories apply to the subject – for example, the subject is not a substance – Heidegger may think here that Kant gives us little else (e.g. in the form of basic concepts) with which to make sense of the subject. As Heidegger complains elsewhere, Kant does not specify how categories like possibility ought to be interpreted differently when applied to the human being (PIK 258). We will look at the latter claim in more detail in the next chapter.

⁵⁵ I replace “shimmering” (Taft’s translation) with “trembling” as a translation for *Erzittern*, since this better captures the fragility or instability of our interpretations that Heidegger is trying to communicate with this passage.

Kant a compelling, innovative insight into the structure of the imagination, and suggests that Kant proceeds in such a way that he is close to the phenomena he is attempting to explain. The charity Heidegger exercises here, I think, resembles a charity with which many philosophy instructors are familiar. We see the promise in our students' writing; we push them to develop these ideas further, and at the same time identify the parts of their writing that might get in the way of their most promising line of argument.⁵⁶ While this is a method that may not read work so that most of the claims turn out to be coherent or true, such a method seeks out and attempts to foster the growth of the best, most exciting ideas that we encounter when we read.

In this section, I have offered a preliminary characterization and defense of Heidegger's interpretation of Kant. While many see him as stretching Kant or reading himself into Kant, I have argued that Heidegger occupies a middle ground between two accepted interpretive methods: Interpreting for Truth and Interpreting for Coherency. Heidegger keeps fixed the leading questions of Kant's analysis, and then identifies a line of response that is both coherent and plausible; he must then reject the other coherent line of response appearing in Kant's text, which is implausible. I will continue to remark on Heidegger's interpretive method as I consider his interpretation of the imagination.

⁵⁶ Another reason that it is important for Heidegger to address the competing strand of argument (rather than just emphasizing the good one) is that this is the strand most emphasized by post-Kantian interpreters, including the Neo-Kantians of his time. Proceeding as if the strand of argument prioritizing the understanding did not exist would be a puzzling and unconvincing way to proceed, given the contemporary state of Kant scholarship.

2. The Temporality of the Imagination

In his interpretation of Kant, Heidegger identifies the transcendental imagination with the structure of 'care'. This interpretation is based on three crucial parts of the Critique of Pure Reason: first, the Metaphysical Deduction, where Kant offers his table of categories; second, the Schematism, where Kant explains the contribution of the imagination in putting the categories in a sensible format; and, third, the A-edition version of the Transcendental Deduction, Kant's central argument explaining the applicability of the categories to the phenomenal world. Heidegger's interpretation of the imagination revolves around the Transcendental Deduction. The Metaphysical Deduction offers an "anticipation" of the role of imagination that is developed in the Transcendental Deduction (PIK 227; 231). The Schematism, by contrast, 'grounds' the Transcendental Deduction (PIK 292).

In these treatments of Kant's text, we will see that Heidegger pulls apart two competing strands of thought. This follows his interpretive method discussed above of pursuing the contradictions in Kant's text, and differentiating the more plausible line of thinking (in Heidegger's view) from the line that is inspired by traditional prejudices and fear of unseating the priority of the understanding.

Heidegger sees the general purpose of these sections as elaborating the unification of sensibility and understanding, two faculties or capacities that have been analyzed only independently at this point in the text. By the capacity of sensibility, an object is given to human cognition in an intuition; sensibility is our capacity to receive information, such that we can know external objects. The forms of sensibility are space and time; these are the forms that information about the object can take. The object shows up as spatio-

temporal, within these two intuitive wholes. By the capacity of understanding, the object is thought or conceptualized. The forms of understanding are entitled categories, and they include fundamental concepts like causality and substantiality. We use these concepts to think and make sense of given objects. On Kant's view, it is crucial to bring these two capacities together. Only then will we have insight into synthetic a priori knowledge, conceptual knowledge about what given objects are like, prior to any particular object being given – for example, knowledge that every event must have a cause. Establishing the point of contact between sensibility and understanding will show that and how prior conceptual knowledge of what is given is possible. According to Heidegger, the imagination is key to solving this puzzle: it ensures that sensibility and understanding are unified in the right way.

2.1 Anticipation: The Table of Categories

To appreciate Heidegger's interpretation of the imagination, we must begin with the sections of the Metaphysical Deduction where Kant offers his table of judgments and table of categories (§9-10). Heidegger argues that these sections reveal that the categories are essentially related to time, despite Kant's attempt to define them in a purely logical manner. While Kant suggests that the categories 'arise' from the logical functions of the understanding (Prol. 4:323-324),⁵⁷ Heidegger argues that, in fact, the Metaphysical Deduction shows us that "the time-related synthesis of the power of imagination, represented generally, yields the pure concept of understanding" (PIK 225). These

⁵⁷ Kant's claim in full: "Here lay before me now, already finished though not yet wholly free of defects, the work of the logicians...I related these functions of judging to objects in general, or rather to the condition for determining judgments as objectively valid, and there arose pure concepts of the understanding..." (Prol. 4:323-324). I am indebted to Strawson for identifying this quote (see Strawson 1966: 76).

sections of Kant's work, ostensibly devoted to understanding independent from sensibility, already touch on the problem of how these two faculties can come together.

In §9, Kant provides a table of judgments that list the logical rules of thought. The categories – the basic concepts of the understanding that humans must rely upon in all cognition of objects – are subsequently provided in a table of categories in §10. Kant moves, then, from the logical rules of thought to the metaphysical rules for the objects we will encounter, suggesting that the former are the “origin” for the latter (B159).⁵⁸ As Kant puts the relationship in the B-deduction, “the categories are nothing other than these very functions for judging, insofar as the manifold of a given intuition is determined with regard to them” (B143). Kant suggests that one arrives at the categories by applying the forms of judgment to the objects we intuit; both tables can be traced back to the faculty of understanding, which is bound to certain forms of judging and therefore certain forms of judging objects. Heidegger argues, however, that the categories have a different source.

Heidegger begins by disputing Kant's claims about the source of the table of judgments. Kant argues that “if we abstract from all content of a judgment in general, and attend only to the mere form of the understanding in it, we find that the function of thinking in that can be brought under four titles” (A70/B95). Merely considering the forms that judgment can take, Kant suggests, we arrive at the four moments of the table

⁵⁸ Kant's claim, in full: “In the metaphysical deduction, the origin of the a priori categories in general was established through their complete coincidence with the universal logical functions of thinking...” (B159). Prior to the Metaphysical Deduction, further, he proposes to “research the possibility of a priori concepts by seeking them *only in the understanding as their birthplace* and analyzing its pure use in general” (A66-7/B90, emphasis mine). This line continues to be taken up by secondary literature: “the whole purpose of the Metaphysical Deduction is to derive the categories of the former [transcendental logic] from the logical functions specified (supposedly on independent grounds) in the latter [general logic]” (Allison 2004: 140)

of judgments – quantity, quality, relation, and modality – and the logical forms of judgment that fall under these headings. However, Heidegger argues that Kant does not earn this claim; rather than developing “the possible forms of judgment from out of the essence of judgment in general as a mode of unification...Kant simply confronts us with the finished table of the forms of judgment” (PIK 175). In other words, Kant offers no developed consideration of judgments to demonstrate that judgment can take these (and only these) forms; Kant presents it rather as an obvious truth that these are the forms of judgment. Heidegger suggests, on the contrary, that this is not an obvious truth; “it is not clear at all that, if we ‘consider’ the mere form of judgment as such, we will ‘find’ something like the table” (PIK 176). In fact, Heidegger continues, it is not even clear from Kant’s discussion, that these four moments play a role in formal logic; “he even fails to *demonstrate* these four characteristics in formal logic, as the essential and necessary four main moments of the *form* of judgment as such” (PIK 177).

Heidegger admits that logicians have historically identified the four moments as fundamental components of logic, but notes that, even according to Kant, “logic is that philosophical discipline which is the least grounded and the least rigorously developed” (PIK 177). In particular, “since its inception in Plato and Aristotle logic is permeated by more or less ontological questions” (PIK 177). Therefore, even if the four moments are an accepted component of logic, they may have an ontological rather than a logical origin. Kant is not justified in assuming that the four moments represented in the table of judgment are actually derived logically, independent of our contact with objects.

Heidegger admits that criticizing the table of judgments is not new. Following Lotze,⁵⁹ many commentators have used formal logic to criticize the table, and have rejected the categories deduced from it on that basis; if the table of judgment is faulty, then the prospect of deriving the categories from this table is a non-starter. Heidegger agrees with these commentators that “the entire table cannot at all be justified and developed in terms of formal logic and that this table cannot be obtained by way of an inflection of the ‘logical functions of understanding’” (PIK 176). However, Heidegger suggests that such criticism fails to acknowledge that the categories may have a different source. If the categories can be derived from elsewhere, we cannot reject them only on the basis of formal logic. Unlike the previous commentators, Heidegger suggests there may be another source of the categories.⁶⁰

There are two possible sources, Heidegger suggests, for the Kantian table of categories: they could be “obtained purely logically—regardless of the *object-relatedness* of thinking,” as Kant suggests. Or, they could be “obtained first *transcendentally*, by

⁵⁹ As William R. Woodward notes in his intellectual biography of Lotze, Lotze proposed several reconstructions to the table of judgments in his *Logik*, including suggesting that all judgments are affirmative (in contradiction to Kant’s claim that three different forms of judgment, including negative judgments, fall under the heading “Quality”), and suggesting that modality does not belong to logic proper (Woodward 2015: 161-162). Heidegger suggests that Lotze’s objections to Kant were largely taken up by the neo-Kantians of his day, resulting in widespread criticism of the table of judgments (PIK 178). According to Allison, Strawson has offered a similar line of criticism more recently: “critics like Strawson, appealing to the conception of logical form operative in modern logic, question not merely Kant’s catalogue of these forms but also, and primarily, the whole project of moving from them to anything like Kantian categories” (Allison 2004: 146; cf. Strawson 78-80).

⁶⁰ Heidegger also provides an alternate explanation concerning Kant’s starting point, the table of judgments. This table, Heidegger suggests, is not a source of the categories; rather, it is merely an “*index for completeness and division* of pure concepts of understanding” (PIK 199).

relying upon judgment as an *object-related* function of unification” (PIK 176-177).

Heidegger defends the latter source. As reflected in Heidegger’s emphases in the preceding two quotations, Heidegger takes his primary dispute with Kant to concern the relationship between categories and objects. Kant suggests that the forms of judgment are independent of our thought about objects; the categories represent correlative rules for the way we must think about objects, which subsequently can be applied to the actual objects that we experience. However, Heidegger suggests that the categories arise only in relation to the object, from thought that is already related to the object – thought, as Heidegger puts it later, that is already related to intuition (181).

Heidegger attempts to demonstrate the transcendental source of the categories by way of the text that Kant places between the table of judgments and the table of categories that are supposedly derived from it. In these six paragraphs, Kant first introduces, and then expands upon, his term ‘synthesis’ – the “still unclear *unification of intuition and thinking itself*” (PIK 181). Heidegger argues that the synthesis Kant discusses in these paragraphs can be attributed to neither of the two roots of knowledge that Kant has so far identified in his analysis of human cognition – neither understanding nor sensibility. Synthesis, then, occupies a strange place in the taxonomy of faculties that Kant has at his disposal at this point in the text. It belongs to no faculty, somewhere between the two roots of knowledge.

Kant defines synthesis as “the action of putting different representations together with each other and comprehending their manifoldness in one cognition” (A77/B103). Heidegger argues that synthesis cannot be an act of understanding, because synthesis makes acts of understanding possible. In order to perform an act of conceptual analysis,

for example, one must be able to hold together and compare different elements at once; “this many must be given to me *in one* so that I have a dimension within which I can move while comparing” (PIK 187). By giving the many in one, synthesis gives the understanding something to conceptualize. As a precondition for acts of understanding, synthesis cannot be a member of those acts.

Further, by providing a ‘dimension’ or “*zone [Umkreis]*” wherein one can compare phenomena and perform these acts of conceptual analysis, synthesis betrays a receptivity that is incompatible with the purely spontaneous understanding. The forms of intuition – space and time – are single wholes within which phenomena can appear. Synthesis gives such a whole, putting together the many in one – not a list of conceptual properties, but a single space or time within which representations can be compared conceptually. Therefore, synthesis “has the character of intuition, of giving-to-oneself, of letting-be-given” (PIK 189). However, synthesis cannot be an act of intuition, precisely because it is an act – the act, namely, of putting together. Intuition, our passive faculty for receiving empirical information, does not act. Between the spontaneous understanding and the receptive intuition, “this synthesis is something like a *spontaneous thinking* and something like *giving of an intuition*, while being neither one or the other” (PIK 187).⁶¹

⁶¹ As I suggested in the last chapter, Heidegger, rather than prioritizing receptivity as many interpreters have suggested (e.g. Gordon), is trying to occupy a middle ground (some interpreters, more in line with my reading, discuss a “middle voice,” e.g. Moore 2017). Neither pure activity nor pure receptivity has the capacity to serve as the fundamental root of human cognition. In light of this finding, we must read Heidegger’s emphasis on receptivity as a correction to a tradition – particularly a tradition of Kant interpretation – that has prioritized spontaneity. “That knowledge is thinking is never disputed, since antiquity. But that all thinking is based on intuition and stands in service to intuition – and in what way – that is a crucial problem which slips away again and again in the interpretation of philosophical knowledge” (PIK 57). Heidegger’s answer

While Kant tries to confine himself to the logical functions of understanding in his introduction of the categories, Heidegger argues that §10 is “above all” concerned “with object-relatedness, with relatedness of thinking to intuition, which we deliberately leave nameless” (PIK 181). Heidegger eventually names this relatedness the imagination (227) – following, indeed, Kant’s own attribution of synthesis to the imagination in this section (A78/B103).⁶² Heidegger’s interpretations of the Schematism and Transcendental Deduction expands on the synthesis of the imagination, providing further explanation concerning why this synthesis of the imagination should be considered the source of the categories.

In this anticipation of Heidegger’s larger interpretation of the imagination, Heidegger identifies a problem with Kant’s main line of argument in the Metaphysical Deduction and searches the text for other viable options for making the argument. Heidegger disputes Kant’s claim that the table of categories can be derived from the logical forms of judgment. In so doing, he joins previous commentators who call into question the table of judgments. However, rather than rejecting the table of categories on this basis, Heidegger seeks out a different, more promising source of the categories in Kant’s intriguing, though underdeveloped, discussion of synthesis in the Metaphysical

here, though, is not to claim the opposite (namely that receptivity is fundamental) but to suggest that spontaneity and receptivity are equally important features of human cognition.

⁶² “In view of what was interpreted earlier by way of anticipation from §10 of the Critique, we know that, in order to be determinable in thinking, the manifold of intuition must, so to speak, be first prepared and rendered accessible. This comportment [*Verhaltung*], by which the subject relates to what is intuitive, first of all imparts to itself what is intuited, and brings to itself what is intuited as determinable for thinking—this comportment is the synthesis of the power of imagination” (PIK 227; GA 25: 335).

Deduction. Heidegger's interpretation of the Schematism, which we will see next, fills out this alternate story of origin for the categories.

2.2 Ground: The Schematism

In the Schematism, Kant outlines the activity of the imagination in 'schematizing' the categories of the understanding – that is, making them applicable to the world of sense. While the brief eleven pages of the argument come late in the book, after Kant completes the Transcendental Deduction, Heidegger notes that Kant called the chapter "one of the most important" in 1797 (KPM 80). Heidegger agrees with this estimation. In particular, Heidegger argues that the Transcendental Schematism chapter, and not the Metaphysical Deduction and its table of judgments, brings out the true origin of the categories.⁶³ Indeed, Heidegger argues that "in the Transcendental Schematism the categories are formed first of all as categories" (KPM 77-78); schematism is "the original and authentic concept-formation" (KPM 78). Heidegger takes Kant's discussion of the activity of the imagination in the Schematism chapter to reveal the actual source of the categories.

In order to show that Kant's Schematism chapter reveals the actual origin of the categories, Heidegger offers a close reading of the chapter. As opposed to Heidegger's discussion of the Metaphysical Deduction, he argues that his interpretation of the Schematism brings out that

⁶³ "The 'schematism of pure concepts of understanding' basically means nothing other than elimination of the previously assumed essence of categories as notions. It even means a fundamental retracting of their initially assumed character as pure concepts of understanding, i.e., means negating the idea of pure concepts of understanding" (PIK 273).

The Schematism chapter is not ‘confused,’ but rather is constructed in an incomparably lucid way. The Schematism chapter is not ‘confusing,’ but rather leads with an unheard-of certainty into the core of the whole problematic of the Critique of Pure Reason (KPM 80).

From this passage, we can see that Heidegger does not read this chapter as if there were two competing strands of thought contained therein. Rather, he suggests that his interpretation brings out that the chapter is clear and univocal. This chapter speaks most strongly in favor of the strand of argument in the Critique of Pure Reason prioritizing the imagination, and it unseats the primacy of the understanding suggested by other sections, like the Metaphysical Deduction. Therefore, in this portion of Heidegger’s interpretation, he offers a close reading that brings out a clear, consistent line of argument in the chapter.

While Heidegger does not cite secondary literature at this juncture, it must be remembered that, as Allison puts it, “the Schematism has a long-standing reputation for difficulty and obscurity” (Allison 2004: 202). Likely, Heidegger mentions the clarity and consistency that his reading offers of this chapter to bring out a distinct benefit of his interpretation. Further, since many commentators have suggested that the chapter is superfluous (as Allison notes), Heidegger’s ability to articulate the chapter’s purpose (indeed, central purpose) is another benefit of his interpretation.

Heidegger nods to the centrality of the Schematism chapter for his interpretation in his 1927-1928 lecture course on Kant. In particular, he argues that “the present interpretation, which appears to be violent, can be justified only in view of the doctrine of the Schematism” (PIK 247). In particular, he suggests that the Schematism shows that “Kant, in a fumbling and rough sort of way, indeed seeks the core of the transcendental

deduction in time” (PIK 247). In other words, the Schematism chapter brings out the “time-relatedness” of the categories (PIK 247). Despite these remarks on the importance of the Schematism chapter to his interpretation of Kant, Heidegger does not treat the arguments of this chapter in detail in his lecture course on Kant. In his last three pages of the lecture course, where he does discuss the chapter, he suggests rather that the Schematism was in the background of earlier parts of the interpretation:

In the way we set out to interpret the transcendental aesthetic and analytic, especially the transcendental deduction, we fundamentally dealt with the problem of the Schematism...the Schematism grounds the transcendental deduction, although Kant does not understand the Schematism this way (PIK 292).

Though we are to understand that the Schematism was behind his interpretation of Kant in the lecture series – forming the ‘ground’ of his interpretation of the Transcendental Deduction – we must turn to his 1929 book on Kant, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, to find his extended development of Kant’s argument in the Schematism chapter.

Heidegger suggests that the “systematic place of the Schematism chapter” reveals its centrality to Kant’s inquiry in the first Critique (KPM 63). As Heidegger elaborates in the lecture course, he takes Kant to adopt “the external architectonic of formal logic, i.e., concept, judgment, and conclusion” in his book (PIK 292). Having provided the fundamental concepts, or categories, in the Analytic of Concepts, and looking forward to the basic principles constituting experience that are offered in the second chapter of the Analytic of Principles, the Schematism chapter makes up the “judgment” that allows for the transition from categories to the world of our experience. However, Heidegger is

critical of the structure of Kant's presentation. First, Kant takes on the "*external* architectonic of logic" when Heidegger thinks that logic is not the proper subject matter of the categories (as we saw above, Heidegger suggests that the categories have an ontological, rather than a logical, origin). Second, in beginning with concepts, Kant ties the temporal activity of the imagination to the categories, preventing inquiry into the synthesis of the imagination on its own and how the "concrete variations" of this synthesis are developed "as regional principles of nature" (PIK 292); in so doing, Heidegger suggests, Kant "deprives himself of a clear and radical result" (PIK 292). Nevertheless, Heidegger suggests that Kant's placement of the Schematism chapter "betrays the fact that these eleven pages of the Critique of Pure Reason must constitute the central core of the whole voluminous work" (KPM 63), adding further evidence for the importance of the chapter that Kant remarked upon in 1797.

Heidegger argues that Kant's discussion in the Schematism chapter brings out the a priori activity of the imagination – the structure of transcendence – that first enables the encounter with the object.⁶⁴ In particular, Heidegger suggests that the imagination carries out a prior "turning-toward" the object – a horizon that enables the encounter with any empirical object. Heidegger argues that "the turning-toward must in itself be a preparatory bearing-in-mind of what is offerable in general" (KPM 63); that is, prior to any encounter with a particular empirical object, we must have a sense of "what is offerable in general" – what the contents of the world are like. This "horizon" will guide our experience of any particular object. Heidegger argues that "the pure power of the

⁶⁴ The argument "leads the transcendental power of imagination and the self-forming of transcendence and its horizons to demonstrate their unifying function in their innermost occurrence" (KPM 62-63).

imagination carries out the forming of the look of the horizon” (KPM 64).⁶⁵ More specifically, Heidegger suggests that, “transcendence is formed in the making-sensible of pure concepts,” which are “unities as such which regulate all unification” (KPM 64). The imagination forms an image of pure concepts, creating the horizon within which an empirical object can be encountered. In what follows, I will reconstruct Heidegger’s development of Kant’s argument in the Schematism, which leads to this role of the imagination.

Heidegger argues that Kant uses the language of ‘subsumption’ to introduce the main problem of the chapter. Heidegger refers explicitly to a passage where Kant states that:

In all subsumptions of an object under a concept the representations of the former must be *homogenous* with the latter...how is the *subsumption* of [appearances] under the [categories], thus the *application* of the category to the appearances possible, since no one would say that the category, e.g., causality, could also be intuited through the senses and contained in the appearance?” (A137-138/B176-177/KPM 78).

⁶⁵ Heidegger indicates that, in “forming the look of the horizon,” the imagination is both spontaneous and receptive; therefore, Heidegger calls it a “double forming” (KPM 64). First, as spontaneous, “it ‘creates’ this horizon as a free turning-toward” (KPM 64); creating and forming are activities. Second, as receptive, “it provides for something like an ‘image’” (KPM 64). Heidegger’s term ‘image’ connotes reliance on something given, as he says that “the expression ‘image’ is to be taken here in its most original sense, according to which we say the landscape presents a beautiful ‘image’ (look)...” (KPM 64). The landscape already in place, it can provide the beautiful image; taking a look at it depends on what is already there. The imagination, then, spontaneously creates an image of the given, in the “making-sensible of the horizon” (KPM 64).

In the case of empirical concepts, the sensible content corresponding to the concept has been provided over the course of experience, enabling the identification of instantiations of these concepts in the world (i.e. the ‘subsumption’ of objects under those concepts). As Heidegger puts this point, “the empirical concepts were drawn from experience and are therefore ‘homogenous’ with the content of the being they determine. Their application to objects, i.e. their use, is no problem” (KPM 78). However, since categories are a priori concepts, it is not clear how we apply these concepts to the sensible world; we do not derive these concepts from the world, so we do not pick up their sensible content from experience. Heidegger suggests that this discussion of reveals the main problem to be treated by the chapter: “in the question concerning the possible use of the categories, their particular essence itself first becomes a problem. These concepts present us with the question of their ‘formation’ in general” (KPM 78). The chapter presents the problem, then, of the ‘essence’ and ‘formation’ of the categories. We are concerned not just with their application, but also with the sensible content of these categories and the source of that sensible content (not from experience).

Heidegger argues that even though Kant begins the chapter with the question of subsumption, “the traditional idea of subsumption” is ultimately not at issue in his discussion of the categories (KPM 79). Therefore, “Kant introduces the problem in a more superficial form as a guide to the question concerning the possible subsumption of appearances under categories” (KPM 63). According to the characterization of subsumption in “traditional Logic,” Heidegger explains, “to use concepts means in general: to apply them to objects, or rather – seen from the standpoint of the objects – to bring these objects ‘under concepts’” (KPM 77). However, Heidegger notes that, in

Kant's initial discussion of the synthesis of the imagination, Kant discusses "bringing to concepts" – where "pure synthesis...yields the pure concept of the understanding" – rather than bringing *under* concepts as with analytical judgments (A78/B104). Therefore, when it comes to the categories, 'subsumption' – the placing of an object under a more general concept – is not the right term to consider their relation to appearances, at least not as it is traditionally understood. Rather, Heidegger suggests that 'ontological subsumption' is at issue, where concepts are applied to the form of our sensibility (time) rather than the objects themselves. The question of subsumption directs the reader to the question of the essence or formation (i.e. the sensible content) of the categories, which, according to Heidegger, is the main problem of the chapter. Empirical concepts pick up sensible content from experience, enabling their application to objects in a 'subsumption'; what is the sensible content of categories, and in what sense are they applied to objects? Kant uses subsumption to enter into the problem of the chapter, though his treatment of the categories will depart from the traditional idea of subsumption.

Heidegger first considers the activity of the imagination in empirical cases of concept application – that is, cases of traditional subsumption. He analyzes Kant's definition of 'schema' (its plural, 'schemata') as a "representation of a general procedure of the imagination for providing a concept with its image" (A140/B179/KPM 68). In ordinary empirical cases where we perceive a concrete particular, Heidegger argues, the imagination provides a schema "representing the rule" of a concept that determines

“how”⁶⁶ the concept is to be located in the sensible world. Heidegger suggests that “conceptual representing means the giving of the rule for the possible attainment of a look in advance in the manner of its regulation” (KPM 67); or, more briefly, the schema represents “the rule governing the specific making-sensible” (KPM 68). According to this schema, a ‘schema-image’ is formed in the representation of an object. This means that we do not have an image of a concept ahead of time, in advance of perceiving the empirical object. Rather, the way the concept attains an image is by shaping the image of some particular object, at the moment of perceiving the empirical object; as Heidegger puts it, “the making-sensible of concepts is a completely specific procuring of characteristic images” (KPM 71). Ahead of time, we have only the ‘ability’ to represent the empirical object in light of the concept (KPM 67). The schema refers to that ability, rather than an image.⁶⁷ Heidegger suggests that the formation of a schema for a concept is what Kant calls schematism (KPM 68).

Heidegger argues that the schema-image that is informed by the schema refers to the way in which an empirical object offers a ‘general look’; with the general look, the being is not a ‘this-here’ (KPM 65) but, say, a fine example of a house.⁶⁸ Heidegger

⁶⁶ His claim, in full, is that “the representing of the ‘how’ is the free ‘imaging’ of a making-sensible as the providing of an image in the sense just characterized, an imaging which is not bound to a determinate something at hand” (KPM 68)

⁶⁷ “The schema is indeed to be distinguished from images, but nevertheless it is related to something like an image, i.e., the image character belongs necessarily to the schema” (KPM 68)

⁶⁸ Along these lines, Heidegger also says that “what is essential to the schema-image first becomes clear: it does not get the character of its look only or first of all from the content of its directly discernible image...it gets the character of its look from the fact that it springs forth and how it springs forth from out of the possible presentation represented in its regulation; thus, as it were, bringing the rule into the sphere of possible intuitability” (KPM 70)

suggests that, when we form a general look, we represent a particular “as” falling under or fulfilling a concept – say, representing something ‘as’ a house. The schema, then, shapes our representation of what is given; “this ‘as,’ which goes with an ability something has to appear empirically, is what we represent in connection with the determinate house” (KPM 67). Heidegger suggests that, with the ‘as’,

what we have perceived is the range of possible appearing as such, or, more precisely, we have perceived that which cultivates this range, that which regulates and marks out how something in general must appear in order to be able, as a house, to offer the appropriate look (KPM 67).

The schema is the ability to represent a house *as* a house. It specifies the “range of possible appearing” for a house – the way something must look in order to appropriately be classified as a house. When we represent something that is sensed *as* a house, we represent it as meeting those standards. The features conforming to the concept of house become salient in our perception of the individual object. With the schema, the object before us “has assumed one determinate [appearing]” (KPM 67).

Heidegger argues that “beyond the representation of this regulative unity of the rule, the concept is nothing. What logic refers to as concept is grounded in the schema” (KPM 69). To be actualized – located in the empirical world such that it actually informs our experiences – the empirical concept is dependent on the schema provided by the imagination, the prior ability to employ that concept (by shaping a perception with that concept). Without a schema, the concept could not be discerned in the sensible world; such a concept would be completely impotent. Heidegger indicates that the categories are likewise dependent on the imagination, though in a different way; “the pure concepts of

the understanding...require an essentially pure discernibility...the pure concepts must be grounded in pure schemata, which procure an image for them” (KPM 72). With the schemata of the categories, the categories are actualized in a ‘pure image’ rather than an empirical one (where, say, the look of a house is shaped by a concept).

While Kant argues that “the schema of a pure concept of the understanding is something which can never be reduced to any image whatsoever” (A142/B181/KPM 72), Heidegger takes this claim to mean that the pure concepts will not be reduced to the sort of image that corresponds to empirical concepts. Empirical concepts are brought to image when they inform our perception of some determinate object in a schema-image. Because the pure concepts establish the preliminary relationship to the object, the pure concepts will not correspond to a schema-image that already assumes such a relation (where the object, already opposite the subject, has certain properties).⁶⁹ However, Heidegger argues that “the schema of the pure concept of the understanding can also be brought very nicely into an image, provided that ‘image’ is now taken as ‘pure image’” (KPM 73). This reading, Heidegger suggests, makes sense of Kant’s reference to a “pure image” (A142/B182) immediately after he claims that the schema of pure concepts cannot be “reduced to an image,” and his use of the phrase in a later chapter (A320/B377/KPM 73).

In particular, Heidegger argues that, in the ‘ontological subsumption,’ the categories inform a pure image of time. As Heidegger notes, Kant claims in the Schematism chapter that “the pure image...for all objects of the senses in general [is] time” (A142/B182/KPM 73). Indeed, Heidegger maintains that time is the only option in Kant’s

⁶⁹ Rather, “they represent those rules in which objectivity as preliminary horizon for the encountering of objects is formed” (KPM 73).

system for what the categories, as a priori concepts, could shape. Time, an a priori form of intuition, “is such as to procure a look prior to all experience” (KPM 73). Further, time is the universal form of all intuition (as opposed to space, which only forms “outer sense”); if the categories are to underlie all (and not just outer) experience, they must inform time. Heidegger argues, then, that “time is not only the necessarily pure image of the schemata of the pure concepts of the understanding, but also their sole, pure possibility of having a certain look” (KPM 73-74). There are no other options in terms of what the categories could shape a priori; no empirical objects are given, and space is not wide-ranging enough for the task Kant allots to the categories. Further, time offers the flexibility to be formed by the four moments listed on the table of categories. Time, Heidegger argues

is formable in a variety of ways. Through internal self-regulation in time as pure look, the schemata of the notions pass their image off from this and thus articulate the unique pure possibility of having a certain look into a variety of pure images (KPM 74).

The schemata of the various categories form the a priori intuition of time into a ‘pure image of time’, articulating what time looks like. In particular, time is articulated as a ‘pure sequence of nows’.

To argue that the categories order time a priori – forming it into an image where time is a pure sequence of nows – Heidegger uses the category of substance as an example. In order to confirm his interpretation, Heidegger must demonstrate that “what is meant by the notion Substance can itself procure a pure image a priori in time” (KPM 76). Based on the First Analogy (A182/B224 ff.), Heidegger reports that “substance, as a

notion, signifies first of all just: that which forms the ground (subsistence)” (KPM 75).

However, based on the table of categories (A80/B106), substance is not a ground for just anything: “Substance is a category of relation (between Subsistence and Inherence). It signifies that which forms the ground for a ‘thing which adheres’” (KPM 76). Heidegger argues that the pure image of time as a sequence of nows reflects this character. First, “time, as pure sequence of nows, is always now. In every now it is now” (KPM 75). Even as the moments of time flow forward, time retains its character as a now. For this reason, “time gives the pure look of something like lasting in general” (KPM 76). Second, “time, however, is as a sequence of nows precisely because in every flowing now it is a now, even another now. As the look of what lasts, it offers at the same time the image of pure change in what lasts” (KPM 76). As a sequence of nows, time continually undergoes change as its moments tick by; however, it retains, at the same time, its character as now. Time as a sequence of nows, then, is a subsisting ground of change. In other words, it is formed by the category of substance.

As schematized, the category of substance informs not only our image of time, but also the whole of experience. Heidegger argues that

the objectivity in the letting-stand-against becomes discernible and distinct a priori, provided that substance belongs to it [objectivity] as a constitutive element... in this preliminary view of the pure image of persistence, a being which as such is unalterable in the change can show itself for experience (KPM 76).

Substance partially constitutes objectivity (what it means to be an object), providing a sense of lasting over change. The image of time provides a measure for objects that

persist over change, as Kant seems to indicate with his claim that “to time, therefore, which is itself unchangeable and lasting, there corresponds in appearance that which is unchangeable in existence” (A144/B183/A176). Generalizing from the example of substance, Heidegger argues that, forming time into an image, the imagination creates a “horizon of transcendence” in which individual objects can show up (KPM 76). Ordering the intuition of time, given a priori, determines in advance how given objects will show up for us; “this single and pure ontological horizon is the condition for the possibility that the being given within it can have this or that particular, revealed, indeed ontic horizon” (KPM 76).

Heidegger argues that “in the Transcendental Schematism the categories are formed first of all as categories” (KPM 77-78), making Schematism “the original and authentic concept-formation” (KPM 78). A category is not an empty concept but a concept that informs and indeed constitutes our experience. In the transcendental schematism, categories form an image of time that can actually make a difference to our experience. Heidegger argues that

The letting-stand against of that which is objective and which offers itself, of the being-in-opposition-to, occurs in transcendence due to the fact that ontological knowledge, as schematizing intuition, makes the transcendental affinity of the unity of the rule in the image of time discernible a priori and therewith capable of being taken in stride (KPM 74).

With the schema of the category – an image of time – the pure concept is ‘discernible’ and can shape the world of our experience. The categories of the understanding together work to create an image of time as a pure sequence of nows, providing the framework

within which objects show up. In so doing, they form a horizon “that must be unthematic but must nevertheless be regularly in view” (KPM 87). While we do not perceive time the way we perceive a particular object like a house, our background understanding of time structures all of our experiences of particular objects (which appear, for example, at a certain point in time, persisting in that time and changing in that time). In providing a horizon, the schematizing transcendental imagination forms “that which makes up in advance the rough sizing up of all possible objects as standing against, the horizon of a standing-against. This horizon is indeed not object but rather a Nothing” (KPM 87). Our background understanding of time shapes our experience without being an actual object that we find in our experience; in this sense it is a “nothing,” a framework that we bring to organize the world, rather than a member of that world.

Heidegger offers a close reading of the Schematism chapter in order to argue that the transcendental activity of the imagination is the actual origin of the categories. Articulating an image of time as a pure sequence of nows, the categories are constituted as categories – that is, rules constituting experience, in particular by way of our background understanding of time. In light of his claim that the categories form a horizon, namely, the pure image of time, Heidegger reads the Transcendental Deduction as describing the activity of the imagination as it forms each dimension of time: past, present, and future. To see what Heidegger takes to be the detailed activity of the imagination, as it forms a horizon enabling us to encounter empirical objects, we now turn to the Transcendental Deduction.

2.3 The Transcendental Deduction

To argue that the power of imagination grounds the other faculties, Heidegger inquires into the syntheses of apprehension, reproduction and recognition that Kant discusses in the A-Deduction. Heidegger argues that the transcendental power of the imagination carries out each of these syntheses; they make up the activity of the imagination. This activity makes up the three ‘stages of objectification’ – the most basic cognitive activity that allows us to encounter and know any objects at all.⁷⁰

Before diving into Heidegger’s interpretation, then, a brief overview Kant’s argument in the A-Deduction is in order. Though this argument has been the subject of numerous interpretive debates, I will attempt to depict it in a barebones way that skirts some of the controversies it has accumulated over years of scholarly exegesis. The previous sections of Kant’s treatise outline the faculties of sensibility (our faculty for passively sensing) and understanding (our faculty for actively conceptualizing what we sense) separately; the transcendental deduction will bring them together, reconciling the receptive, sensing aspect of human cognition with the spontaneous, conceptualizing aspect. In the A-Deduction, Kant outlines three sorts of syntheses: the synthesis of apprehension, the synthesis of reproduction, and the synthesis of recognition. Each of the three syntheses will carry out some form of ‘putting together,’ according to the definition of synthesis we saw in the Metaphysical Deduction. The synthesis of apprehension

⁷⁰ In particular, Heidegger suggests that the three syntheses allow us encounter objects by establishing a prior relationship to “nature” or “the object in general”: “The object of experience is nature, and relation to the object in general means relation to nature as such. But what determines nature as such is not itself again something present-at-hand behind appearances, behind objects of experience, but is their unifying unity, which is to be constituted in the synthesis of apprehension, of reproduction, and of recognition” (PIK 237).

constitutes our ability to apprehend something immediately before us (e.g. what we are currently looking at, say, a glove on the floor). The synthesis of reproduction constitutes our ability to recall previous apprehensions (e.g. what we saw in the past). The synthesis of recognition constitutes our ability to re-identify what we apprehend (e.g. recognizing the glove the next time we see it). Kant maintains that all three syntheses are required for us to have any perceptual experience at all, and Kant discusses these syntheses with the aim of establishing that the categories of the understanding apply to the world we sensibly intuit. To carry out this aim, Kant also introduces a third faculty, the faculty of imagination (our ability to represent what is not present), which mediates between sensibility and understanding.

Heidegger's primary revision to Kant in his interpretation of the A-deduction concerns the faculties that are at work in each of the three syntheses. Kant attributes the synthesis of apprehension to sensibility, the synthesis of reproduction to the imagination, and the synthesis of recognition to the understanding. However, Heidegger wishes to attribute a much larger role to the imagination:

Kant considers primarily the synthesis of reproduction as the synthesis of the power of imagination. But our interpretation goes further and tries to take all three syntheses back into the originally conceived transcendental power of imagination (PIK 232).

In his interpretation of the A-Deduction, then, Heidegger suggests that the "transcendental power of the imagination" is responsible for all three syntheses. While this interpretation certainly goes beyond Kant's explicit claims, Heidegger suggests that the interpretation allows Kant to achieve a goal that is not fully executed in Kant's

argument as it stands: if the transcendental imagination grounds all three syntheses, sensibility and understanding can be reconciled successfully.⁷¹

I will shortly reconstruct Heidegger's discussion of each of the individual syntheses, but first I will make a few general remarks about his discussion. Heidegger suggests that Kant's "point of departure" in each of these sections is to begin with an "empirical" synthesis and then transition to a "transcendental" synthesis that makes the empirical synthesis possible (PIK 232). That is, Heidegger takes Kant to begin with a synthesis that must take place for us to have a particular perceptual experience (e.g. an empirical synthesis required to perceive the glove), and then elaborates a synthesis that grounds the empirical synthesis, and therefore every particular perceptual experience (the transcendental synthesis). The transcendental synthesis must be a priori – in fact, completely a priori (that is, pure) – because it is required for us to have any experience at all. It is not possible for us to have some prior experience, then, that could form some part of this synthesis. In each case, Heidegger endeavors to attribute the transcendental synthesis to the transcendental power of the imagination (again dubbed 'transcendental' because it is a condition for the possibility of any experience at all). Heidegger's argument, for each of the three syntheses, relies in part on his claim that the transcendental synthesis has both active (spontaneous) and passive (receptive) components, so neither active understanding nor passive sensibility could carry out the

⁷¹ Here is Heidegger's own summary of what Kant must achieve with the argument: "What is important for Kant now is to give an a priori phenomenology of the transcendental constitution of the subject. This phenomenology should make understandable how the categories, in their structural and functional connections, are essentially caught between pure intuition, pure power of imagination, and pure thinking and how these three basic sources are centered in the pure power of imagination insofar as precisely this power renders intuition as well as understanding possible" (PIK 225).

synthesis. Heidegger also appeals to the positive attributes of the imagination to make his case.

Central to Heidegger's interpretation of the imagination, we will see, is its relation to time. Following Kant's claim that all our representations are "subject to time" (A99/PIK 231), Heidegger suggests that all of our fundamental faculties responsible for constructing representations will also be related to time (PIK 229). Further, the faculty of imagination ought to be understood as "original time" or "temporality":

going beyond Kant, we must say something else, namely that the *power of imagination* is possible only as related to time; or put more clearly, this power *itself* is time understood as original time, which we call *temporality* (PIK 232).

Heidegger endeavors to show that the transcendental imagination is temporality by arguing that the three transcendental syntheses, attributed to the transcendental power of imagination, are also related to time (PIK 229). In particular, each of the transcendental syntheses distinguishes or articulates a dimension of time; the synthesis of apprehension articulates the present moment; the synthesis of reproduction articulates the past; and the synthesis of recognition articulates the future. The transcendental imagination, as temporality, grounds these three syntheses.

Heidegger suggests that he 'goes beyond Kant' in conceiving of time as "original time" or "temporality" (PIK 232). Kant, he argues, offers only an "ordinary sense" of time: "for Kant time is the pure succession of the sequence of nows given in pure intuition: now, and now, and now – that is, a constant sequence of nows" (PIK 232). That is to say, Kant thinks we have a pure intuition (i.e. a prior sense of time) where time is simply a sequence of nows – a constant, never-ending timeline where we always occupy

the present “now”. The past is a “no-longer now,” whereas the future is a “not-yet now.” The representations of the subject are bound to this timeline; time organizes our series of representations, where many are “no-longer” and one is “just-now or right now.” These representations are ordered in time and related to each other on that basis (e.g. one representation is earlier than the other).

While Kant’s official notion of time is time as a sequence of nows, Heidegger suggests that Kant’s discussion of synthesis gestures at original temporality. The transcendental syntheses articulate the understanding of time as a sequence of nows, but this articulation is enabled by a deeper structure, the structure of temporality, where the temporal ecstases of past, present, and future are held together. Heidegger’s interpretation of the A-Deduction will “render visible the pure synthesis of the transcendental power of imagination in its original relatedness to time” (PIK 232).

In Being and Time, Heidegger argues that original temporality is the structure of Dasein, or human beings, differentiating it from other sorts of beings, like rocks, trees, tables, and chairs. At its base, Heidegger argues, Dasein is fundamentally a being who is “being-already-in-a-world” – Dasein already has a personal history, a cultural and historical location, and projects in which it is already invested. Moreover, Dasein is a being that is “ahead-of-itself” – it is always oriented toward what it would like to be or accomplish. Heidegger calls this fundamental structure of Dasein’s existence, that of previously being immersed in a world and oriented toward future projects, “care” (BT 192). He suggests that, within this structure of “ahead-of-itself-already-being-in,” the future has priority: “the character of ‘having been’ arises from the future, and in such a way that the future which ‘has been’ (or better, which is ‘in the process of having been’)

releases from itself the Present” (BT 326). Our orientation toward the future draws on the past, informing our interpretation of the present moment. Arguing that the present is always informed by past and future, Heidegger brings out the way in which human existence is ‘ecstatic’ – the way in which human existence is outside of itself, beyond a bare relationship with what is present (BT 329). Indeed, Heidegger suggests that every human experience is shaped by the three temporal ‘ecstases,’ referring to the past, present and future; for this reason, he also refers to original temporality as ‘ecstatic temporality’. Heidegger argues that “*the primordial unity of the structure of care lies in temporality*” (BT 327); in particular, “its essence is a process of temporalizing in the unity of the ecstases” (BT 329). Temporality is the process of interpreting the present in light of future projects and past traditions, and this process characterizes human existence.

In his interpretation of Kant, Heidegger argues that this structure of temporality is a precondition for the ordinary sense of time that Kant explicates, and that, at various crucial junctures in Kant’s text, Kant gestures at original temporality. These findings, I argue, are what confirmed, for Heidegger, the path he took in Being and Time where he afforded original temporality a fundamental role, as the “ground” of ordinary time (BT 329).

Heidegger believes that his model of time has something to offer Kant. In original temporality, the dimensions, or ecstases, of time are unified as the structure of human existence. The dimensions refer to one another, forming a whole. The projection toward the future must take up the past; in so doing, the future and past inform our encounter with what is present. Heidegger takes it that this model of time can bring out the unity of the three transcendental syntheses that Kant describes: apprehension (seizing of what is

present), reproduction (reaching back into the past), and recognition (projecting in advance). Importantly, the structure brings together the transcendental apprehension of time, which Kant attributes to sensibility, and the transcendental apperception directing recognition, which Kant attributes to understanding. Though the Transcendental Deduction is meant to bring out the connection between intuition and understanding, such that the concepts of the understanding apply to what is given to sensibility, Heidegger thinks that Kant's solution reproduces the duality or opposition between these two faculties. However, bringing in Heidegger's model of time shows that time (sensibility) and apperception (understanding) belong to the same original, unified whole.

However, Kant's argument has something to offer Heidegger, as well. In the Transcendental Deduction, Kant outlines the basic preconditions for experiencing what Heidegger will term Nature, the realm of the present-at-hand. Heidegger argues that the preconditions that Kant identifies, which constitute Kant's ordinary model time, require original temporality. Engaging with Kant's text, then, allows Heidegger to argue that ordinary time is derivative of original temporality. Heidegger has argued for this thesis before – of course, in Being and Time – but the previous argument established this conclusion indirectly, by way of a third model of time, dubbed 'world-time'.⁷² In brief, Heidegger attempted to derive world-time from original temporality, and then ordinary time from world time. Insofar as engaging with Kant's argument allows Heidegger to establish a direct dependency of ordinary time upon original temporality, it offers an

⁷² This model of time applies to our everyday dealings with equipment. This model of time – where it is always “time for something,” say, time to eat lunch (BT 414) – is discussed at length in Being and Time (see BT II.6), but it is not mentioned once in Heidegger's interpretive works on Kant.

additional, and perhaps more promising,⁷³ argument for Heidegger's thesis that ordinary time is derived from original temporality. I will work out this thesis in more detail as I reconstruct Heidegger's interpretation of the Transcendental Deduction.

2.3.1 The Synthesis of Apprehension

In his argument outlining the basic requirements for us to have any perceptual experience at all, Kant begins with the synthesis of apprehension. Kant attributes the synthesis of apprehension to sensibility; indeed, his section introducing this synthesis is entitled "On the synthesis of apprehension in the intuition" (A98). In his interpretation, however, Heidegger aims to show that the synthesis of apprehension is grounded in the transcendental power of the imagination. As Heidegger points out, this interpretation agrees with one passage in Kant, where Kant claims that the imagination is "an active faculty for the synthesis of the manifold" and "its action, when immediately directed upon perception, I entitle apprehension" (A120/PIK 231).⁷⁴

Heidegger's primary argument takes Kant's claims about the empirical synthesis of apprehension as its jumping off point, and ultimately traces this synthesis back to a transcendental synthesis carried out by the imagination. In particular, Heidegger argues that the empirical synthesis of apprehension – where we intuit a manifold – requires "an

⁷³ Especially in light of William Blattner's objections to Heidegger's argument grounding ordinary now-time in original temporality in *Being and Time*, it is worth exploring the alternate route to this conclusion that is offered in Heidegger's interpretive works on Kant (cf. Blattner 1999). Blattner says that he avoids these works in *Heidegger's Temporal Idealism*, and does not identify them as parts of Heidegger's 1920s corpus that are informative about his theory of time (xv-xvi)

⁷⁴ Heidegger argues that this passage offers "purely external" evidence for his thesis, as it does not yet get at the deep reasons to attribute apprehension to the imagination (PIK 231). Heidegger invokes this passage with less modesty at KPM 126, where it is offered as straightforward rather than 'purely external' evidence.

already operative regard for the now” (234). First, we require a regard for the now to intuit something particular, different from the other intuitions in a sequence. Second, we require a regard for the now to take each intuition as a plurality, where it can change its character from a not-yet-now to a now to a no-longer-now. Heidegger suggests that the regard for the now is provided by a transcendental synthesis of the imagination. Because the empirical synthesis of apprehension is dependent on a prior regard for the now, and that advance appreciation is provided by the transcendental synthesis of the imagination, the empirical synthesis of apprehension is grounded in the transcendental synthesis of imagination.

Heidegger relies on a close reading of the text to argue that the transcendental power of the imagination must ground the synthesis of apprehension, as described by Kant. Heidegger emphasizes Kant’s claim that “every intuition contains a manifold in itself” (A99/PIK 233). Heidegger suggests that an appreciation of the now is required in order for empirical intuition to contain a manifold. In particular, “while intuiting, the mind must distinguish time in the sequence of impressions, that is, the mind must be oriented to time as the succession of nows. The mind must always already, whether explicitly or not, say now – now – now” (PIK 233). Whatever we intuit, we intuit as happening at a particular now in “the sequence of impressions.” This is necessary for our impression to become an intuition, that is, contain a manifold.

Heidegger argues that apprehension requires a prior appreciation of the now, because an intuition containing a manifold requires (A) that we individuate it, and (B) that it is unified.⁷⁵

Beginning with (A), Heidegger supports his argument by recounting Kant's claim that a manifold "would not be represented as such (i.e. a manifold) if the mind did not distinguish the time in the succession of impressions on one another" (A99/PIK 233). Heidegger acknowledges that "Kant's expression is ambiguous" (PIK 233); time could be distinguished on the basis of our sequence of impressions, or the distinguishing of time could precede those impressions. What is at stake here is not whether time is given a priori; Kant has already argued for this conclusion in the Transcendental Aesthetic. Rather, the question is whether time is *differentiated* a priori, or articulated as a sequence of nows prior to experience. Heidegger rejects the first reading of A99, where we have a series of impressions and deduce that they are in a time that runs as a sequence of nows. Rather, Heidegger argues that an advance appreciation of time enables us to experience a sequence of impressions: "only on the background of a now which is always already said – only in an advance view of the differentiated succession of nows – can the offer of impressions as a sequence of impressions be made" (PIK 233).

Heidegger insists on this interpretation, because an advance appreciation of the now enables us to differentiate impressions even in the case where their content is identical; "even when the same impression with the same content returns, this second

⁷⁵ In KPM, Heidegger provides a shorter and different reason for his suggestion that the synthesis of apprehension requires an advance appreciation of time: "this synthesis has the peculiarity that within the horizon of the succession of the sequence of nows, it takes up 'exactly' the offer of the impression of each look (image). It is an immediate forming-from..." (KPM 126).

impression is necessarily another impression and different from the preceding one, insofar as it originates in a new now” (PIK 233). All content being equal (as, say, when one sees a house one day, and then sees it again the next), we can differentiate the impression on the basis of its position in time.⁷⁶ Here, Heidegger proposes interpreting Kant in a way that allows Kant the stronger position. If Kant were suggesting that our appreciation of time as a sequence of nows derives from our impressions, he would be put in the unfortunate position of needing to explain how we distinguish impressions of identical content. Thus, Heidegger argues that an advance appreciation of time as a differentiated sequence of nows is required for us to receive individual impressions; “a sequence of impressions can be offered to us as a sequence as such only when we first understand something like succession” (PIK 235).

In addition to enabling us to individuate our impressions, Heidegger suggests (B) that the advance appreciation of the now enables us to appreciate the unity of each impression. Heidegger supports this leg of his argument by recounting Kant’s claim that “for each representation, insofar as it is contained in a single moment, can never be anything but absolute unity” (A99/PIK 234). On the basis of this claim, Heidegger suggests that the transition from impression to intuition requires appreciating an impression as a multiplicity in an act of unification: “if this offering of isolated unities is to turn into a multiplicity, that is, into the unity of an empirical intuition, then a unification is needed” (234). Heidegger suggests that an advance appreciation of the now allows for the necessary unification. Experiencing an impression as a now means at the

⁷⁶ This argument challenges Hume’s view, as recounted by Henry Allison, “that the idea of time arises from the perception of a succession,” for example the sounding of five distinct notes played on a flute (Allison 2008: 546).

same time appreciating it as a “just now no longer” and a “no longer not yet” (234); “the now contains itself the possibility of an articulation of a plurality” (234). Heidegger suggests that Kant terms this unifying synthesis apprehension proper, “or seizing [*Aufgreifen*]” (234). Seizing of the impression so that it is a plurality is reliant on an advance appreciation the now.

Heidegger suggests that the synthesis that transforms something from an isolated impression to a unified intuition is both spontaneous and receptive. Heidegger lays out its “twofold character” in the following passage:

(1) Seizing is directed at nothing short of the offering: it allows the impressions to be given receptively – this seizing is a seizing *of* something. (2) But this unification at the same time *takes up* what is offered here; it is a spontaneous *seizing* (PIK 234).

This summarizes the two requirements for intuiting a manifold described above. Our appreciation of the now enables us to receive the content of differentiated impressions; it provides the structure or order that is filled by “the offering.” Further, our appreciation of the now allows us to unify the impression as something that was at one time not yet now, is currently now, and will eventually be now no longer. The advance appreciation of the now allows for the empirical intuition of a manifold.

Though apprehension, in Heidegger’s view, is both spontaneous and receptive, Heidegger acknowledges that Kant lays more emphasis on the spontaneous aspect by terming this aspect apprehension proper. However, “even the spontaneity of putting and taking together goes only so far as to be a having-the-offering-there” (PIK 234). In other words, the spontaneity of apprehension relies upon, or is dependent upon, receptivity.

One unifies an impression into a manifold only insofar as an impression is first given; only insofar as one allows for having of an impression due to the empty structure of the now. An advance appreciation of the now is required for both the receptivity and spontaneity of apprehension.

This advance appreciation of the now, Heidegger argues, is provided by an a priori synthesis, an original apprehension; this is the transition from empirical apprehension to its transcendental conditions. While empirical apprehension “is directed to what is offered affectively in sensation,” pure apprehension “is that which a priori unifies a manifold” (PIK 235). In this pure apprehension, something is given a priori that is unified as a manifold. The pure apprehension “underlies the empirical intuition and its apprehension” (PIK 235). For empirical apprehension, the advance appreciation of the now is required both for differentiating an impression and unifying it as a multiplicity. The pure apprehension provides an advance of appreciation of the now that is required for both sides of empirical apprehension.

Heidegger suggests that pure apprehension apprehends a pure intuition of time as a succession of nows. The pure intuition is receptive: in the intuition there is a “letting-givenness-to-occur” because the pure form of time is given (PIK 235). Further, the pure intuition is spontaneous, a grasping and unification of the whole; “the pure intuition of time carries in itself an original seizing of the manifold which already belongs to a ‘now’” (PIK 235). This spontaneity allows us to grasp a succession of nows:

pure intuition is not simply an isolated grasping of a whole lot of nows that simply have no relation to each other. Rather each now as now, in order to be intuited as what it is, requires to be taken together with other nows. This taking-

together has the character of a unification and in fact in each case unifies the just-now as no-longer-now and right-now as not-yet-now unto a now (PIK 235). In the transcendental synthesis of apprehension, an intuition of time is given and subject to acts of unification, where nows are put into succession and related to one another; the right-now, for example, is flanked by the no-longer-now and the not-yet-now. “The pure, apprehending synthesis does not first take place within the horizon of time, but instead it first forms precisely the like of the now and the sequence of nows” (KPM 126). However, Heidegger suggests that the spontaneity of apprehension is to be differentiated from spontaneity of the understanding:

This synthesis of apprehension is pure *syndosis*, that is, spontaneity of reception.

In this synthesis of apprehension, there is nothing like a conceptual determination in the sense of comparison, reflection, and abstraction—nothing like the logical function of the understanding (PIK 235).

In the transcendental synthesis of apprehension, we spontaneously unify the succession of nows and set them in relation together. While a concept groups things together on the basis of their similarities (i.e. there is a rule unifying all of them), the synthesis of apprehension involves setting nows into a successive relationship with one another. This is not spontaneity of the understanding.

Heidegger attributes this spontaneity rather to the imagination; pure apprehension “is a *mode of the pure power of imagination*” (235-236), which “only now *develops* time as a pure succession of nows” (PIK 236). The imagination unifies what is given – time – into a succession of nows. Rather than unifying with a rule, Heidegger suggests, the imagination unifies by “forming an image” (PIK 236) (an unsurprising depiction in light

of the Schematism). In so doing, the transcendental imagination forms the advance appreciation of the now that is required for empirical apprehension. Heidegger dubs the transcendental synthesis of apprehension “the first stage of objectification” where “on the basis of the now itself the original unity and manifoldness become detachable” (PIK 236). In other words, in first forming the now, unifying can be differentiated from what is unified – activity from what is given. In the transcendental synthesis of apprehension, “standing over against what is intuited” is achieved and this “is grounded in time in the sense of a pure apprehending intuition of time – is grounded in the pure time-related imaginative synthesis” (PIK 236).

In offering this interpretation of the synthesis of apprehension, Heidegger both attends to Kant’s claims and goes beyond them. He provides an interpretation of what it means to have a manifold of intuition, which Kant does put at the center of his account of apprehension, and attempts to put the strongest version of the argument forward (where the sequence of nows is appreciated in advance of any impression). However, in considering the transcendental requirements for having such a manifold, Heidegger describes a transcendental synthesis and attributes this synthesis to the imagination. This description and attribution are not explicit in Kant’s text, as Heidegger indicates: “Kant does not say what [pure apprehension] is and how it functions as a mode of the power of imagination” (PIK 236). Instead, Heidegger expands on Kant to offer an interpretation of what he might mean by “original receptivity” and “pure apprehension,” based on Heidegger’s understanding of what is required for the manifold of intuition that Kant does detail. While this is an expansion, it is not a tangent; it is an attempt to further

develop those places where “Kant proceeds summarily and crudely,” using Kant’s preceding analysis as a guide (PIK 236).

2.3.2 The Synthesis of Reproduction

As with the synthesis of apprehension, Heidegger takes Kant’s discussion of reproduction to begin with an empirical synthesis, and then transition to the transcendental synthesis upon which the empirical synthesis relies. Again, Heidegger attributes the transcendental synthesis grounding the empirical synthesis to the transcendental imagination. On this point, he agrees with Kant, as Kant attributes the synthesis of reproduction to the imagination. Therefore, in this section of his interpretation, Heidegger is not at pains to rule out the other faculties in order to prove that the imagination is behind the synthesis of reproduction. The idea that the imagination carries out the synthesis of reproduction is not in question.

However, one aspect of Heidegger’s interpretation is more controversial. Heidegger argues that the synthesis of reproduction is merely one “mode” of the imagination’s transcendental activity. Heidegger acknowledges that, in Kant’s discussion of the transcendental synthesis of reproduction,

it is not clear whether this pure synthesis of reproduction is to be the only accomplishment of the power of imagination, or only one mode [of it]. If Kant means the former, then the power of imagination here is not yet grasped in its originality (PIK 240).

In other words, while Heidegger agrees with Kant that the pure synthesis of reproduction ought to be attributed to the transcendental power of the imagination, he insists that this is only one mode of the transcendental power of imagination. Heidegger does not justify

this interpretive move in his discussion of reproduction. This justification, rather, is left to the discussions of apprehension and recognition that flank the discussion of reproduction, which reveal the other modes of transcendental imagination. Therefore, Heidegger offers a more straightforward interpretation of reproduction than of the other two syntheses; he does not take liberties with the text that require extensive justification. However, the interpretation reflects his larger arguments that the imagination, because spontaneously receptive, is the fundamental root of human cognition, and that the imagination is identical with what Heidegger calls temporality.

Notice, then, two points of emphasis in his interpretation: First, his language indicates the simultaneous spontaneity and receptivity that is required for the transcendental synthesis of reproduction. As Heidegger argues throughout his interpretation that the spontaneity and receptivity of the imagination secures its place as the fundamental root of human cognition, his language fits well with the larger moves of the interpretation. He would be remiss not to point to the receptivity and spontaneity of the act of synthesis that belongs most explicitly to the imagination in Kant's text. Second, Heidegger's interpretation argues that "the pure synthesis [of reproduction] again proves to be time-related," as was the synthesis of apprehension before it (PIK 236), in support of Heidegger's larger argument that the transcendental imagination is temporality. To fit the interpretation of reproduction into the broader argument, my reconstruction will bring out these elements.

Heidegger recalls that, Kant's empirical synthesis of reproduction reproduces "something which was already once brought-forward, that is, was offered – in the apprehending unity of reproduction" (PIK 237). In other words, the empirical synthesis of

reproduction brings forward something that was apprehended in the past. However, the representation that it reproduces is not “freely invented” by the imagination; rather, it “has a certain necessity” (PIK 237). Namely, the imagination reproduces representations that “are associated with each other” (PIK 237). When one representation tends to follow another in our experience, like an eraser and chalk, we associate them together; consequently, when we represent the one (say, we see the eraser), we transition to a representation of the other (the chalk). Heidegger notes that “here we are confronted with a peculiar intuiting which does not immediately go back to an affection. Rather this intuiting of a manifold offers something by itself from out of itself” (PIK 237). While sensibility intuits what is presently before oneself, imagination can intuit something that is no longer present.

Kant argues that “this law of reproduction, however, presupposes that the appearances themselves are actually subject to such a rule” (A100). As Heidegger puts this point, reproduction would not be possible “if there were not in objects themselves such a being-present-at-hand-together [*Zusammenvorhandensein*] and such a following one another” (PIK 237).⁷⁷ Reproduction presupposes that the objects of our representations (say, erasers and chalk) are related to one another, following upon one another in rule-governed ways. Heidegger suggests that this necessary presupposition for empirical reproduction points to a prior relationship we have to “the object as such” (PIK 237) – that is, not a particular object that we perceived at some specific occasion, but any object we might ever perceive. Prior to any empirical case, the “mind must be capable of retaining what is represented,” whatever it may be (PIK 237). Because the empirical

⁷⁷ I alter this quote to reflect the typical translation of *Vorhandensein*.

synthesis of reproduction relies on an advance ability to retain, it points to a transcendental synthesis: “this possibility of empirically retaining presupposes the possibility of an a priori retaining” (PIK 238).

Heidegger suggests that Kant “argues indirectly” for the claim that an advance ability to retain is required for experience – that is, for us to ‘relate to this object called nature’ (PIK 237). Kant, on Heidegger’s construal, argues that experience of the object would not be possible *were it not the case* that we have a prior ability to retain. In other words, Kant supposes that we have no ability to retain; he supposes that our representations of objects “simply slip away,” coming and going with the presence of the object itself (PIK 238). As Kant puts this thought experiment: “if I were always to lose the preceding representations...from my thoughts and not reproduce them when I proceed to the following ones...” (A102). If this were the case, we would not be able to ‘reach out and back,’ as Heidegger puts it, for some object that we have encountered before. Even if we encountered the same object again, Heidegger conjectures further, we would not appreciate it as the same. Everything would be experienced as if for the first time; “mind would be tied firmly to each phase of the now” (PIK 238). If this were the case, “an experience in the sense of a progressive retaining determination of the region of objects would remain impossible” (238). In other words, we would not be able to determine the relationships between objects outside of those relationships appearing in the present moment. For example, even if the chalk and eraser appeared alongside one another in the present perception, one would not appreciate that the chalk and eraser frequently coincide. To appreciate relationships between objects beyond the present

moment, it cannot be the case that our intuitions simply slip away; we require the prior ability to retain to have experience.

Heidegger argues that the transcendental synthesis of reproduction creates “the overall possibility of going back into the past” where I have “an open horizon of the past at my disposal” (PIK 238). Heidegger suggests that, in the transcendental synthesis of reproduction, “time *as* past offers itself immediately—not as the present but immediately as it itself, as past” (PIK 238-239). The past is immediately given. Further, the past is unified with the present; there is a “unification of each [no-longer-now] with each actual now” (PIK 238). Time is “distinguished” as a sequence of nows, where no-longer-nows are unified, put in sequence, with the present now.

The transcendental synthesis of reproduction has both a receptive and a spontaneous component. One receives the past as past, with its distinctive character of being no longer; further, one actively unifies the moments of time, such that the present moment can be put into contact with any moment past; “we can place ourselves quite freely at any given point in time. That is why for Kant pure intuition is a pure *play* of the power of imagination” (PIK 239). As Heidegger describes the spontaneity and receptivity of the transcendental synthesis, “this synthesis of the pure retaining of the no-longer-now is an immediate offering as well as a free and constant, possible reaching back” (PIK 238-239).

Kant suggests that “the synthesis of apprehension is therefore inseparably combined with the synthesis of reproduction” (A102). Heidegger interprets this claim to mean that the syntheses require one another; they are interdependent. On the one hand, Heidegger says that “*apprehension itself is not possible without reproduction*” (PIK 239).

Apprehension requires reproduction, because “already in *seizing* what is immediately given as intuitive there occurs a *reaching beyond and reaching back...*” (PIK 239). Heidegger suggests, then, that reproduction is required for the active component of apprehension, *seizing*, which amounts to appreciating the plurality of an impression – namely, appreciating that the right-now was at one point a not-yet-now and will eventually be a no-longer-now. The transcendental synthesis of reproduction constitutes our appreciation of the no-longer-now; it ‘puts the past at our disposal’. Without the transcendental synthesis of reproduction, we would not appreciate that what we presently apprehend can become past; we would not grasp the plurality that makes an impression a manifold of intuition. On the other hand, the synthesis of reproduction also requires the synthesis of apprehension; “in the same way and inversely everything retainable as something which can be brought forth must be capable of being displayed in each actual phase of the now of apprehension” (PIK 239). Anything retained must have also been apprehended.

With apprehension and reproduction, then, we have the first two ‘stages of objectification’ which “build the foundation for all possibility for something to stand over against as object” (PIK 240). Heidegger provides a temporal reading of both stages; they are “*the manner in which pure time is disclosed a priori in its now and no-longer-now, as present and past*. They are what time constitutes as pure intuition” (PIK 240). Next, we will consider the third stage of objectification: the synthesis of recognition.

2.3.3 The Synthesis of Recognition

Heidegger’s discussion of the synthesis of recognition does not follow the structure of the previous two syntheses. This deviation can be attributed to two factors:

First, Heidegger suggests that Kant himself deviates from his previous method of beginning with an empirical synthesis and then considering the transcendental synthesis that underlies it (PIK 241). Therefore, Heidegger's discussion does not proceed in this order. Second, Kant introduces a fourth element in this argument, in addition to the three syntheses that he outlines: transcendental apperception. Apperception is not a fourth synthesis, but, Heidegger suggests, "the original ground" of the unity of the syntheses (PIK 241). The addition of this fourth element complicates Kant's discussion of recognition, and Heidegger's discussion of Kant on recognition. In this section, we will follow Heidegger's discussion of recognition; in the following, we will consider transcendental apperception and the unity of the three syntheses.

Heidegger's interpretation of the synthesis of recognition, and the 'I think' of transcendental apperception, is the most controversial part of his interpretation of the A-Deduction. Heidegger acknowledges that

we must explicitly emphasize that *in interpreting the third synthesis we go way beyond Kant*, because now the problem of the common root of both stems of knowledge becomes acute. We are concerned with understanding time and the I-think more radically and in the direction which is certainly visible in Kant, but which is not taken by him, i.e., in the direction of the synthesis of the power of imagination (PIK 243).

Rather than examining the letter of Kant's text in regard to the synthesis of recognition, Heidegger orients his interpretation to the prior two syntheses; based on the synthesis of apprehension and the synthesis of reproduction, what sort of synthesis remains as a requirement for basic cognition? Further, Heidegger keeps in view Kant's goal of

reconciling sensibility and understanding. Heidegger suggests that his own interpretation can successfully unify sensibility and understanding, achieving the goal that Kant set out.

Controversially, Heidegger argues that the synthesis of recognition is related to time. Heidegger argues that this conclusion is already suggested by the tight link that Kant draws between the three syntheses, and the relation to time that is established in the first two syntheses. In particular, Kant argues that the three syntheses are interdependent. As Heidegger paraphrases, Kant argues that “the synthesis of reproduction, too, in turn will not be possible without the synthesis of recognition” (PIK 240). Since the synthesis of apprehension requires reproduction, the synthesis of recognition “too belongs to apprehension” (PIK 240). Due to the interdependence of the three syntheses, and the direct relationship to time of the apprehensive synthesis and reproductive syntheses, Heidegger argues that “obviously the third synthesis of recognition cannot be without an essential relation to time” (PIK 241).

However, Kant does not make this sort of argument here; he does not say what Heidegger would like him to say. Heidegger notes that, for Kant, reason “is not subject to the form of time” (A551/B580/KPM 129)⁷⁸ and the principles of logic cannot include temporal relations (A152/B192/KPM 129). Accordingly, Heidegger remarks, “precisely this relation to time is not brought to light in the Kantian interpretation of the synthesis of recognition” (PIK 241). Heidegger argues that Kant’s “special difficulties” in this argument are apparent from the disproportionate length of the section in comparison to

⁷⁸ This passage is another example where Heidegger transitions hastily between the faculty of understanding and that of reason.

the prior two syntheses, and from Kant's failure to clearly follow his "customary procedure" beginning with the empirical synthesis and transitioning to the transcendental synthesis (PIK 241).⁷⁹

Heidegger emphasizes the lopsidedness of Kant's treatment of the third synthesis, which Kant attributes to the understanding (PIK 242). The first two syntheses are related to time, but in Kant's discussion of the synthesis of recognition, "*the inner rupture in the foundation of Kant's problem becomes clear: the lack of connection between time and transcendental apperception*" (PIK 242). Heidegger indicates that the solution Kant offers to connect intuition and concept in the A-Deduction ultimately reproduces the opposition between them; "in the end he again places intuition on one side and concept on the other" (PIK 242). Instead of establishing the unity of intuition and concept, Kant's solution re-describes the problem. We are therefore left, in Kant's text, with an "unresolved problem of transcendence" (PIK 252); with the understanding cut off from time, it is not clear how our concepts come into contact with the sensible world.⁸⁰

Rather than following Kant's lopsided treatment of the synthesis of recognition, Heidegger infers the character of this synthesis by considering its fit with the other two syntheses. Heidegger develops his interpretation of the synthesis of recognition in two steps: first, he suggests that it is a synthesis of identification, creating the possibility to

⁷⁹ Heidegger suggests that Kant's concept of time might be at fault for these difficulties: "perhaps it is no accident, but rooted in Kant's concept of time, that he must fail in working out the synthesis in concept in its relation to time" (PIK 241).

⁸⁰ Heidegger suggests that a more satisfying solution can be reached if one inquires into the "common root" of the three syntheses: "only then do we have the possibility of rendering all three syntheses visible in their unified ground with respect to relatedness to time. But then we will also be able to bring the transcendental apperception into an inner relationship with time" (PIK 243).

recognize the same thing again; second, he suggests it is a synthesis of pre-cognition, establishing our relationship to the future. Heidegger's proposal of new terms for the synthesis (i.e. 'identification' and then 'pre-cognition') reflects his suggestion that Kant was misguided even in his naming of the synthesis; Kant provides a "wrong interpretation which is already announced in calling this third synthesis 'recognition'" (PIK 241).⁸¹

Heidegger first proposes that we interpret the synthesis of recognition as a synthesis of *identification*, since identification provides the final element needed to complete the prior two syntheses. Here he follows Kant's suggestion that, without a synthesis of identification, the synthesis of recognition would fall short: "Without consciousness that that which we think is the very same as what we thought a moment before, all reproduction in the series of representations would be in vain" (A103/KPM 129). With the synthesis of apprehension, Heidegger suggests, "the intuitive offer becomes an offer as such and stands over against in the most elementary manner" (PIK 244). With the synthesis of recognition, the possibility of retaining "what is offered" is established. With these two syntheses in place,

we could, so to speak, run again and again through the sequence of offers, in the direction of what is past and back to what is just now present...But does that mean that we could return to what was previously intuited in the sense of intuiting it again? We can do this only if we can recognize what we previously intuited as the same as what we intuit now (PIK 244).

⁸¹ Heidegger objects to this term because it contains "cognition" in it, yet the three syntheses are supposed to secure the possibility of one cognizing at all; cognition can not figure as part of the transcendental conditions for cognition (PIK 245).

While the syntheses of apprehension and reproduction open the past and the present to us, Heidegger argues, these syntheses fail to be informative without an additional ability to re-identify. In particular, reproducing ‘what is past’ is only informative if we can identify it as something we have experienced before (rather than, say, something new). The synthesis of recognition provides this ability to identify the same thing again (e.g. this is the same glove as I saw on the floor yesterday).

Heidegger suggests that the synthesis of identification cannot be done subsequently to the synthesis of apprehension and recognition, such that “we first take up and apprehend, then reproduce, and then identify what we perceived with what is brought again” (PIK 245). Rather, in order to re-identify – to take what is perceived right now (i.e. apprehended) to be the same as what we perceived before (which is now reproduced) – our initial apprehension must pick out something discrete. In other words, our apprehensions must identify an individual, such that we can re-identify that individual with another (apprehended) individual. As Heidegger puts this point, “we cannot identify what is brought forth again with what is offered at first, if we do not hold on to this from the beginning already as one and the same” (PIK 246). Identification of an individual must be carried out at the moment of apprehension, rather than coming subsequent to apprehension.

Further, Heidegger argues that in order to pick out a discrete individual in the first place, we must have a prior familiarity with a “unified interrelation of beings” (PIK 246). We must have a basic, “ontological” sense of what differentiates one being from another – how beings are set against one another (PIK 248). This prior familiarity allows one to

select the individual, differentiating it from the other aspects of our current perception.

As Heidegger puts this point,

what is offered in apprehension shows itself each time already against the background of that which is present to us in advance. Factically and essentially, we never begin with the simple grasping of something present as though prior to this grasping nothing had been given. We never begin with a now. Rather in beginning, that is, in apprehending, there is already present to us an interrelation of beings which is somehow unified without its unity's being conceptually clear to us (PIK 246).

In other words, when we apprehend an individual, we pick it out against a background. This background is not just the 'background noise' of our current perception (e.g. everything that is not the glove), but an "advance" background appreciation – even if it is not "conceptually clear to us" – of a context, a "regional totality" (as Heidegger goes on to put it), or an "interrelation of beings" (as he puts it here). This background allows us to appreciate how one being could be differentiated from another, allowing us to pick out the individual. We do not "begin with a now," having "grasped nothing." When we identify something, we do it "against a background" that has been grasped "in advance."

Therefore, Heidegger traces the synthesis that is required to complete the synthesis of apprehension and the synthesis of recognition to a transcendental synthesis of *pre-cognition*. The synthesis of pre-cognition "opens up and projects in advance a whole" (PIK 246); it is "an advance awaiting of a regional unity of offerable beings" (PIK 246). In other words, the synthesis of pre-cognition secures our advance appreciation of the totality of beings – the context that we face, where beings are

interrelated to one another. Due to this advance appreciation of the context, we can pick out an individual; as Heidegger puts this point, “this taking-in-advance of a regional totality makes possible for the first time the identification of individual objects of this region” (PIK 248). Picking out an individual allows us, in turn, to re-identify those individuals, in complement to the syntheses of apprehension and reproduction.

As Heidegger’s heavy use of the word “advance” in this argument might suggest, he takes the transcendental synthesis of pre-cognition to relate to the future. In particular, the synthesis of cognition relates to the future by projecting a whole in advance:

by tracing recognition back to identification and this again back to an advance taking of a regional totality, it becomes clear...the moment of time (the temporal moment), to which the synthesis of *re*-cognition relates, is precisely the future, having in advance (PIK 246).

In the synthesis of pre-cognition is a “seizing in advance” (PIK 248). By way of this synthesis, we await or expect to find a certain context. This synthesis, then, relates to the future. The transcendental synthesis of pre-cognition opens up the future, such that it is ‘awaited’ in any experience that we have.

Because Kant attributes the synthesis of recognition to the understanding, Heidegger suggests that, if his interpretation of the synthesis of recognition is right, this means that *understanding too* is basically a *time-related* activity and is not, as Kant thought, a spontaneity independent of time, ever against pure intuition of time as a faculty of receptivity (PIK 247).

Heidegger suggests that this interpretation achieves a desiderata that Kant’s explicit argument does not manage: while Kant offers an argument where the transcendental

apperception of the understanding and the pure intuition of time “both lie in the subject” “next to each other,” Heidegger’s interpretation brings them together (247). On his view, the categories “emerge from” the synthesis of recognition (PIK 247). Heidegger’s argument that the synthesis of recognition is related to the future already suggests, then, that the categories are a function of our advance awaiting or seizing of a context. However, Heidegger’s discussion of transcendental apperception will bring out, further, that “the origin of the categories is time itself” (PIK 247). This is because transcendental apperception, as “originally temporal,” secures the unity of the three transcendental syntheses. This discussion will bring out, further, why the imagination must carry out the transcendental synthesis of recognition.

Heidegger interprets the synthesis of recognition as an “advance awaiting” of some context or region, suggesting that this synthesis opens the horizon of the future. Heidegger supports his interpretation by suggesting that it lends more coherence to Kant’s depiction of the three syntheses; the synthesis of recognition, as Heidegger interprets it, completes the other two syntheses. Further, he suggests that the interpretation will lead to a more satisfying solution to the Transcendental Deduction, bringing out the relationship between sensibility and understanding. We will see the latter point developed in Heidegger’s treatment of transcendental apperception.

2.3.4 The Unity of the Three Syntheses

Heidegger suggests that, with transcendental apperception, Kant introduces the “ground” securing the unity of the three syntheses (PIK 241). However, he criticizes the “strange road” that Kant takes in elucidating transcendental apperception, where it is depicted “as Constant and Permanent I” (PIK 252). Rather than posing an unchanging, a-

temporal subject, Heidegger argues that transcendental apperception, as ground of the three syntheses, is related fundamentally to time: “this interpretation includes the crucial temporal factor of this transcendental apperception, which Kant thought to be free from time” (PIK 267).⁸²

Heidegger argues that the three syntheses, as three stages of objectification, establish our relationship to an object; transcendental apperception, on the other hand, supplies a subject that stands opposed to that object. The three transcendental syntheses, Heidegger argues, establish our relationship not to a particular empirical object, but an “object of experience”; “a closed region of beings, namely the realm of the present-at-hand,” the “object of experience is this whole in its wholeness” (PIK 242).⁸³ As we saw in Heidegger’s interpretation of the synthesis of recognition, the transcendental synthesis of recognition ‘awaits’ a totality, offering expectations about the context that we will find. These expectations, Heidegger argues further, ought to be understood as rules. Building on Kant’s claim that the ‘object of our cognition’ “is opposed to being determined at

⁸² Heidegger’s disagreement with Kant concerning the nature of transcendental apperception connects with a further disagreement about the task of the transcendental deduction. In inquiring into “the a priori grounds of the possibility of experience” (PIK 252-253), Heidegger suggests, Kant does not in fact push toward a juridical question, but rather questions the make-up of the knowing subject: “*the problem of the transcendental deduction as the elucidation of the ontological essence of categories is by no means a juridical question of validity. Rather, this problem is basically what we call a fundamental ontological interpretation of Dasein*” (PIK 252).

⁸³ I alter Taft’s translation (‘realm of the extant’) to reflect the typical translation of ‘*Vorhandenen*’ – ‘present-at-hand’. In this passage, Heidegger reveals that he takes Kant’s term ‘experience’ to be narrow in scope. He refers here to “nature” and the “realm of the present-at-hand.” Heidegger’s discussion of nature in *Being and Time* suggests that nature does not encompass all that is (cf. BT 11). However, Heidegger has to earn the conclusion that Kantian experience is narrow in scope, only referring to “nature,” and we will see this idea developed throughout the remainder of the dissertation, beginning with Chapter 3.

pleasure or arbitrarily rather than being determined a priori” (A104/PIK 250), Heidegger argues that “‘Object’ means what is to the contrary – contrary to an arbitrary, unattached, chaotic way of taking representations together” (PIK 250). The transcendental synthesis of recognition, providing the rules that govern some totality of beings, “offers an advance a priori regulating of all empirical knowledge” (PIK 250). Our experience of any empirical object will conform to the rules offered by the synthesis of recognition – conforming, that is, to the prior, unified framework with which we face the region of beings. Bound to the prior expectations we have of a context, our representations of objects will not be arbitrary (as in dreams or hallucinations), but rule-governed.

The rules that govern objects are, namely, Kant’s categories. Drawing on his interpretation of the Schematism, Heidegger suggests that the categories function to form our understanding of time as a sequence of nows. As we saw, for example, the category of substance comprises our understanding of that sequence as undergoing change while staying the same. Likewise, according to the concept of cause, the moments of time – each ‘now’ – follow one another necessarily in time. The categories articulate the time line, which we anticipate in advance of any experience. Our grasp of the timeline enables our experience of concrete particulars (e.g. as substances with causal properties), where we individuate, retain, and re-identify them. This understanding of time is the prior, unified framework that enables and structures our experience of objects.

Based on Heidegger's analysis of the Schematism, the content of the categories is essentially temporal.⁸⁴ Beyond their temporal content, Heidegger also argues that the categories depend upon the 'original temporality' of the subject. It is here that we broach Heidegger's interpretation of transcendental apperception – Kant's name for the subject who undertakes the various syntheses of the A-Deduction.

Heidegger credits Kant with recognizing that the concepts we use to identify and re-identify the objects that we apprehend cannot operate in a vacuum. As is evidenced by Kant's invocation of transcendental apperception, Kant takes the employment of basic a priori concepts (categories) to rely upon a subject of a certain kind, who is "the vehicle of all concepts" (A341/B399f./PIK 255). However, Heidegger disagrees with Kant on how to characterize that subject. They disagree, in other words, on what sort of subject is required for categories like causality and substantiality to effectively constitute the objects that we experience. What is "the vehicle of all concepts?"

As Heidegger acknowledges, Kant takes the subject undergirding the a priori categories to be an a-temporal subject. This subject is self-conscious, providing unity to the various apprehensions we have; each perception belongs to the same transcendently apperceptive subject. With transcendental apperception, one identifies oneself as the owner of various experiences (of objects), identifying a permanent 'I' that comes into contact with various objects. Transcendental apperception allows one to apply concepts, bringing together the stages of identifying and re-identifying an object under the umbrella of one consciousness.

⁸⁴ Here, I am using the adjective temporal to refer to content that conceptualizes time as a sequence of nows. The categories do not conceptualize original (i.e. ecstatic) temporality.

Heidegger objects to depicting the subject as a permanent, unchanging point of reference outside of time. However, he does think that Kant gestures at a more promising solution in his depiction of transcendental apperception. He agrees, first, that the subject must be, in a certain sense, ‘conscious’ (A105). Second, he agrees that the subject must be a “fixed and abiding self” (A107) though he disagrees with Kant on the nature of this fixedness. Finally, he is extremely interested in Kant’s suggestion – added to the B-edition – that transcendental apperception is an ability [*Vermögen*] (B158). Heidegger builds these clues into his own account of the subject that Kant’s account requires – the subject that must serve as “vehicle” to the categories (so that the categories to be taken up at all).

Using these pointers, Heidegger traces the subject that the categories require from a knowing subject to a temporal self. First, Heidegger suggests we interpret transcendental apperception as a comportment. He argues for this conclusion by drawing on Kant’s claim that transcendental apperception is self-consciousness, or self-knowledge. Transcendental apperception is the ability to know/calculate a material thing that stands opposite an observing, knowing subject. One anticipates finding a world of a certain kind that relates to oneself in a determinate way. The comportment is the prior ability to know the material thing – and oneself, as knower.

Heidegger reasons that, because transcendental apperception is ‘pure’, i.e. prior to the reception of concrete particulars, it must be knowledge about the spontaneity of the subject. Therefore, transcendental apperception is knowledge of activity. As Heidegger puts this point, apperception is “a knowledge not of what is empirical but of what is pure, i.e., a knowledge of what is merely subjective, a knowledge of activity itself” (PIK 253).

Knowing one's activity, Heidegger suggests further, "means grasping of oneself with respect to abilities; taking oneself in the sense of 'I am able to' and 'I can'" (PIK 254). However, the knowledge of transcendental apperception is not a *state* of knowing what one can or is able to do, in the sense of contemplating a fact. Rather, this knowledge is a "comportment" [*Verhalten*] (PIK 254/GA 25: 375).

Heidegger uses the example of moral disposition to elucidate the meaning of comportment. Moral disposition is not a "quality" that we possess, but an orientation: "moral disposition of a human being is a basic position toward a realm of possibilities which the human being controls on the basis of his moral disposition" (PIK 254). We have a certain moral disposition when we can interpret the world in light of that disposition. When we are good, say, we can discern the good course of action and take that course. The moral disposition orients one's taking of a situation – one's sense of which possibilities for action are available and attractive in that situation. It provides the basic starting point, orientation, or position that allows someone to discern what is good and how to do it. Human beings 'control' the 'realm of possibilities' on the basis of their moral disposition because the world shows up in light of that disposition. If one had a different disposition, say, the disposition to be greedy, different possibilities would show up. One would see the world in terms of dollars and cents; money-making opportunities would appear. With a disposition or comportment, one is open to certain possibilities; indeed, Heidegger offers "openness for" as a synonym for "comportment toward" (PIK 277). A comportment is a "mode of being" that enables us to discern the world around us in terms of the possibilities that it holds (PIK 254).

Transcendental apperception is the basic, “transcendental” comportment that opens up a region of empirical objects. Heidegger characterizes the basic comportment provided by transcendental apperception as a “free self-binding” (PIK 255). A comportment is binding, because when one takes up one comportment, others are excluded. Every orientation opens a space of possibilities and forecloses others, enabling acting on those possibilities. A charitable and a greedy comportment, say, are incompatible with one another; the possibilities that appear under a charitable comportment are distinct from those that appear under a greedy comportment (an opportunity to be charitable, for the one, is a piteous waste of money, for the other). The comportment is free in that the subject actively takes up the comportment and interprets the world in light of it.⁸⁵ When one is being charitable, one is actively making sense of the world from a charitable perspective. Considering the more fundamental comportment of transcendental apperception, one binds oneself with an oppositional relationship to the object, where the object is ‘resistant’ (PIK 250), i.e., regulated by rules. Binding itself to the object in an oppositional relationship, the subject actively makes sense of things in light of this relationship.

Heidegger suggests that transcendental apperception makes employment of the categories possible by “*self-identification of the ‘I’ with itself*” (PIK 256). In order to make sense of the self-identification carried out by transcendental apperception, Heidegger looks to Kant’s claim that the syntheses require a “fixed and abiding self”

⁸⁵ “This grasping of the ‘I’ is only possible as a free transposition into one’s ‘I can’...this grasping of the ‘I’ is always spontaneous...The self is what is grasped as freedom only insofar as I am free in this possibility to be myself the determining factor for all intuiting” (PIK 257).

(A107). Heidegger argues that “this ‘fixedness’ means the stance [*Stand*] which has its own way of standing, namely that of a self” (PIK 256). The self is the interpreting comportment that finds objects of a certain kind; supporting and maintaining itself in that comportment, the self is “fixed.” Further, the self is “‘abiding’ and continues and is *constantly* itself, indeed in the manner of ‘I can’ of moral disposition” (PIK 256). A moral disposition is not a one-time action; one is not charitable having performed a single charitable action (this could, after all, be some fluke in one’s normal way of proceeding). Rather, someone has a charitable disposition only if possibilities for future action are open:

In the field of subjectivity, where freedom primarily determines the mode of being of the subject and this mode of being is characterized by the ‘I can,’ the faculty, i.e., possibility, is higher than actuality. Here it is not actuality that constitutes existence but rather the ‘I can’ as ‘I am able to’ (PIK 256).

The single charitable act that one has actually carried out (or the sum of charitable acts from the past) does not establish one’s having a charitable disposition; rather, one only has such a disposition insofar as these possibilities continue to be available to oneself. If one no longer has access to the charitable way to proceed, then one’s disposition has changed; one is no longer charitable, despite the number of charitable acts that one has, in fact, carried out. The future, then, has priority for a comportment. The self is fixed and abiding when it projects itself into the future.

Heidegger traces the ability that underlies our employment of the categories back to a more basic ability, the ability to take up a comportment at all. He argues that:

Experience and object-relatedness is only possible when the resistance of a binding regulation of all syntheses springs from that which is fundamentally pure possibility, i.e. from the free 'I can.' *Thus the 'I' in its actuality is pure possibility; this 'I can' is just existing existence* (PIK 258).

Because we can take up an orientation, making sense of the world by way of a comportment, we can relate to a resisting, rule-governed object. In particular, transcendental apperception binds itself with the rules offered by the categories; these rules are “understood in advance and accepted as binding – these rules are nothing but unities which lie in the possible free forms of synthesis as such” (PIK 259). The categories rely on transcendental apperception, because they offer rules that limit or constrain our taking of the objects that we encounter. In order to be in operation, these rules must be taken up. However, rules can only be taken up by a being capable of being limited, that can bind future actions by anticipating the rule; the categories can only be taken up by a being that is “open” for possibilities (PIK 259). Transcendental apperception freely binds itself with the categories, taking up a constrained comportment toward the future objects that it will encounter.

In short, Heidegger argues that, if the categories are to be employed, the subject is required to take a certain stance on the make-up of its world and its own place in that world. Construing transcendental apperception as a future-directed comportment, Heidegger argues that this specific, knowing comportment is dependent on a further, more fundamental ability to take up a comportment at all. Taking a stance relies on the temporal structure of human existence, where one anticipates a world of a certain kind, and one's own place within that world (e.g. one experiences oneself as a knower who can

determine the properties of rule-governed objects). Therefore, Heidegger argues that our employment of the categories is ultimately dependent on a temporally structured self (rather than simply a knowing subject).

Heidegger's argument makes two more important steps: first, he argues that the temporal structure of the subject refers to the imagination. Second, he spells out the sense in which the imagination is both spontaneous and receptive. These steps contribute to the claim that interpreting the imagination as the fundamental faculty allows us to bring together understanding and sensibility – apperception and time – finally achieving Kant's goal of explaining how categories can pre-shape our experience of sensible objects.

Because the Schematism is in the background of his reading of the Transcendental Deduction, Heidegger already reads the ability to wield concepts – a future-oriented ability, actualized in the perception of empirical particulars – as a function of the imagination. However, the discussion of the 'productive imagination' in the A-Deduction reinforces his identification of the imagination with this ability. In particular, Heidegger recounts Kant's claim that "the principle of the necessary unity of pure (productive) synthesis of imagination, prior to apperception, is the ground of the possibility of all knowledge, especially of experience" (A118/PIK 278). Heidegger interprets this claim to mean that the productive imagination is prior to apperception in that transcendental apperception "is grounded, like sensibility, in the common root of pure time-related synthesis of the productive power of imagination" (PIK 278), finding evidence for this conclusion in Kant's brief characterization of the productive imagination.

In particular, Kant suggests that the productive imagination forms an "image" of "the manifold of intuition" (A120) – that is, time. In contrast to the "ontically creative"

imagination whereby it imagines some being which is not there (e.g. the winged horse, the absent friend), Heidegger suggests that “the productive synthesis of the power of imagination is only ontologically creative, in that it freely forms the universal horizon of time as the horizon of a priori resistance, i.e., of objectness” (PIK 283). Forming an advance image of time itself, Heidegger suggests, “*productive synthesis* is nothing other than *the unity of the three syntheses insofar as they can be considered purely in terms of their ecstatic character*” (PIK 281). In particular, productive imagination forms an image of time as a sequence of nows through its acts “of making visible again the nows that have been; of an in-advance forming, that is, of letting the now which is not yet present be sighted; and of forming an image, which brings the now which is present directly before or in front of us” (PIK 282). In so doing, the productive imagination forms the horizon of time within which any empirical object can appear: “only by freely taking together the three horizons of time as one is the unified horizon of objectness as such formed. Every empirical knowledge of specific objects must already presuppose an advance, free formation of the overall horizon of time” (PIK 282). While Kant’s brief comments on the productive imagination gesture at original temporality, Kant’s more extended discussion of imagination in the Schematism provides the further textual evidence that the image of time provided by the imagination enables our encounter with empirical objects.

Heidegger argues that the imagination – that is, original temporality – is both spontaneous and receptive: “Time is pure original receptivity and original spontaneity” (PIK 267). What Kant calls transcendental apperception is the spontaneous moment, corresponding to the dimension of future. The receptive moment, whereby time is *given*,

corresponds to the dimension of past. When transcendental apperception takes up and articulates the given intuition of time, the image of time as a pure sequence of nows emerges. Temporality is the unified framework bringing apperception and time together, so that they do not stand merely opposed to one another. Heidegger argues that temporality “properly understood has the full extension from the future via the past (alreadyness) into the present in each case” (PIK 267-268). In the initial characterization of original temporality, a projection of the future selectively takes up what is given in order to reveal the present. This depiction of transcendence, independent of a particular project (e.g. being a charitable person) or tradition (e.g. notions of charity from one’s culture), shows the bare structure of human existence. Taking a stand on the realm of possibilities means forming what is given to constitute the present. In the stand that Kant outlines, apperception forms time to constitute a sequence of nows. Nestling transcendental apperception in the structure of original temporality brings out its unity with time, rather than having them sit side by side, as in Kant’s solution (where apperception is removed from time).

With these arguments, Heidegger suggests that he has actually brought out the relationship – the unity – between sensibility and understanding, accomplishing the task that Kant set out for himself in the Transcendental Deduction:

But if the productive power of imagination is in this way nothing but the most original unity of the three modes of synthesis, then this power has essentially already unified in itself pure intuition and pure thinking, pure receptivity and pure spontaneity – or put more precisely, this power is the root which releases both from out of itself (PIK 283).

While Kant's solution reproduces the opposition between understanding (a-temporal apperception) and sensibility (time), Heidegger brings out their 'common root' in the imagination. Heidegger develops this reading from Kant's text by following the temporal reading of the three syntheses motivated by Kant's treatment of apprehension (present) and reproduction (past), and by Kant's suggestion that apperception must serve as the 'vehicle' for the categories.⁸⁶ Following these claims, Heidegger reasons that transcendental apperception must be the basic orientation of subject to object, a temporal orientation wherein the subject projects a 'sequence of nows' opposed to it, in which particular objects can appear. This orientation is grounded in temporality, the ability to take up a comportment (whatever that comportment may be). The orientation of subject to object is grounded in the productive imagination.

3. Heidegger's Interpretive Strategy Revisited

With Heidegger's full interpretation of the imagination in view, we can conclude by returning to the interpretive concerns articulated at the outset of this chapter. In particular, consider the charge that Heidegger reads himself into Kant. We are now in a position to appreciate two ways in which such a charge lacks justice. First, it does not do justice to the more complicated relationship to Kant's text that Heidegger indicates in his lecture course on Kant: as we have seen, Heidegger reports that "when some years ago I studied the Critique of Pure Reason anew and read it, as it were, against the background

⁸⁶ "Although the interconnection of time and apperception, of receptivity and spontaneity, is ontologically unclear and not established in the *Critique*, nevertheless there is a legitimate kernel in the methodical priority which is given to the transcendental apperception. Now, if the connection between time and apperception becomes visible on the basis of temporality, then the methodical priority must inevitably be placed on temporality itself, which is now no longer on the side of sensibility and receptivity" (PIK 270).

of Husserl's phenomenology, it opened my eyes; and Kant became for me the crucial confirmation of the accuracy of the path which I took in my search" (PIK 292). By Heidegger's own admission, Kant 'confirmed' Heidegger's path in Being and Time – where, of course, Heidegger offers his depiction of temporality. Indeed, several commentators, principally Theodore Kisiel, have argued for heavy Kantian influences into Heidegger's text. If we take this seriously, we have, then, another explanation for the parallels in their thought (that Heidegger suggests) that does not require attributing irresponsible interpretive strategies to Heidegger. If Heidegger is reading his philosophical insights into Kant, we have to remember that Being and Time was inspired by Kant. His account of temporality draws on Kant's thought on time; the idea of a priori categories is built into Heidegger's own philosophical system (though transformed). Reading these elements of Heidegger's thought into Kant, is reading Kant into Kant. If we accept that Heidegger was deeply influenced by Kant and endorsed many central elements of Kant's thought, then we have another, more doxagraphically acceptable reason for the parallels between Kant's deepest insights (according to Heidegger) and Heidegger's own depiction of temporality.

Further, having seen the structure of care put forth by Heidegger and gestured at in Kant's text, we can now appreciate that any interpretation of a text will involve reading oneself into it. Heidegger takes it as a basic fact of human existence that we interpret the world around us in terms of future projects and past traditions. As many commentators have noted, Heidegger expands the domain of hermeneutics, from the problem of interpreting a text to simply any understanding we might ever form. In both cases, our personal history and future ambitions will form the understanding that we form. As

Gadamer famously puts this Heideggerian insight, “*all understanding is self-understanding*...in every case that a person who understands, understands himself (*sich versteht*), projecting himself upon his possibilities.” (Gadamer 2013: 221). As Georg Bertram puts this point, all understanding involves understanding both oneself and “everything else which falls in one’s view” (Bertram 2002: 38, translation my own). Instead of merely projecting oneself onto the surrounding world, this world helps to inform one’s own sense of self. If this is a fundamental truth about human understanding, for a text and any other kind of understanding, then the demand that Heidegger refrain from reading himself into the text seems unreasonable. Forming a neutral reading of the text is not possible.⁸⁷

In favor of Heidegger’s approach to interpretation, Kant’s own comments about textual interpretation do not propose the neutral reading of a text. Kant himself says that

⁸⁷ North American commentators have more recently moved away from the language of self-understanding when discussing Heidegger’s hermeneutics. For example, when describing Heidegger’s hermeneutic strategy, William Blattner says “the phenomenologist’s job is to put Dasein’s ontological pre-understanding into words, to express it where it was heretofore unexpressed. This is an interpretive enterprise, not a naively descriptive one: the phenomenologist must try to say how a particular understanding of being is involved in our prelinguistic practices” (Blattner 1999: 17). Here, what seems to be at stake in Heidegger’s hermeneutics is the background understanding that implicitly lies behind our engagement with the world around us – not a self-understanding. Similarly, Steve Crowell says that “the process of phenomenology is thus ‘hermeneutic’; it interrogates our everyday understanding so as to reveal their experiential sources, interprets them so as to expose what they conceal, brings them into the fluidity of living thought” (Crowell 2001: 208). Again, what is at stake appears not to be the self but the “experiential sources” that inform everyday understandings. However, for both of these depictions of hermeneutics, we must remember that Dasein will be implicated in the pre-understanding that Blattner discusses, and the experiential sources mentioned by Crowell. Any everyday understanding will be enabled by Dasein’s temporal structure. Further, that understanding will be built upon one’s future projects and past traditions. While these depictions of Heidegger’s hermeneutics do not draw upon the language of self-understanding, they equally bar the possibility of developing an understanding that is detached from the perspective of the person who understands.

“it is by no means unusual...to find that we understand [an author] better than he understood himself,” (A314/B370) and laments that “many historians of philosophy...are thus incapable of recognizing beyond what the philosophers actually said, what they really meant to say” (Kant 1973). Following Kant’s own example, perhaps we should not be timid about trying to ascertain what he really meant to say and striving to understand him better than he understood himself. Kant himself encourages looking beyond ‘what the philosopher actually said,’ as Heidegger has done in his interpretation of Kant.

These considerations aside, I will conclude with a general depiction of the interpretive approach that we have now seen in Heidegger’s interpretation of the imagination. Heidegger reads Kant as offering two competing strands of thought. According to the first strand, more prominent and taken up by secondary literature, understanding is the primary faculty, for example being the source of the categories that constitute human experience. Heidegger, sensitive to the challenges that this strand of argument faces, brings out another strand of thought in Kant, where the imagination is the fundamental faculty (and source of the categories). The benefits of this reading include:

- (1) If the categories originate in the imagination, then they are not derived from the table judgments, which was largely regarded as logically suspect in Heidegger’s time.
- (2) If the synthesis of recognition is interpreted as related to time (namely the future), then it fits more coherently with the syntheses of apprehension (related to the present) and recognition (related to the past).
- (3) If we ground the syntheses in the structure of original temporality, then time and transcendental apperception are united as two dimensions of original temporality; this avoids reading the Transcendental Deduction such that it concludes with transcendental apperception opposed to time, reproducing the duality

between understanding and sensibility that the argument was initially supposed to resolve. While Heidegger's interpretation does not maximize coherence or truth, it does attribute a strong, radical argument to Kant, offering its own kind of charity.

Chapter 3: Revising Kant's Categories with Heidegger

In the last chapter, I examined Heidegger's method of interpreting Kant in his 1927-1928 lecture course, Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason (PIK), and his 1929 monograph, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics (KPM). I suggested that Heidegger interprets Kant as providing two strands of argument that are in tension with one another in the Critique of Pure Reason: first, a strand of argument offering the a-temporal understanding as the fundamental faculty of human cognition; second, a strand of argument offering the temporal imagination as that fundamental faculty. While the post-Kantian tradition in large part has taken up the first strand of argument, Heidegger prefers the second strand of argument. The second strand of argument, Heidegger suggests, provides a more promising depiction of human cognition. To name a few benefits of the interpretation that were reviewed in the last chapter, Heidegger's interpretation avoids objections to Kant's derivation of the categories from purely logical functions of the understanding (if Kant's logic is wrong, this imperils the categories, as well); Heidegger's interpretation offers a more coherent depiction of the transcendental syntheses, where all three of the syntheses are related to time; and, most importantly, Heidegger's interpretation reconciles sensibility and understanding by identifying them as components of the same, unified structure of temporal imagination.

However, as I will explore in the discussion that follows, Heidegger's interpretation has costs, too. Based on Heidegger's reading of the imagination, Kant's claims about the categories – that is, the basic concepts (like causality and substantiality) upon which human cognition relies – require revision. Indeed, Heidegger's interpretation refigures the imagination as the source of the categories: “this concept springs from the

imaginative synthesis which is related to intuition and that means to time. The birthplace of pure concepts of understanding is not the faculty of understanding which is pure, isolated, and functions logically” (PIK 193). While Kant identifies the understanding as the source of the categories, Heidegger maintains that the imagination is their true birthplace.

Further, Heidegger suggests repeatedly that the categories are limited in scope, only capturing a regional ontology. Heidegger’s suggestion stands in obvious tension with Kant’s claim that the categories are universal.⁸⁸ While Heidegger does not offer a robust defense of this revision to Kant’s theory of the categories in his interpretive works on Kant, I suggest that this position is a consequence of his interpretation of Kant’s faculty of imagination. The imagination, Heidegger argues, refers to the temporal structure of human cognition, ‘care’. According to the structure of care, any experience of the present moment is enabled by prior expectations – an anticipation of the future that is formed on the basis of the past. While this structure enables us to interpret the world in terms of Kantian categories, I will argue that the structure of care is underdetermined; we *can* take up the Kantian categories to make sense of the present, but we *need not*. The structure of care, on its own, does not bind us to any particular set of categories with which we must interpret the world. The temporal structure of care requires that we draw on some prior understanding to make sense of the present moment, but it does not specify which prior understanding we take up. Therefore, Heidegger’s identification of the

⁸⁸ To be exact, Kant claims the categories provide rules that are universal in that “no exception at all is allowed to be possible” (B4; cf. A71/B96). For example, “the very concept of cause so obviously contains the concept of a necessity of connection with an effect and a strict universality of rule that it would be entirely lost if one sought, as Hume did, to derive it from a frequent association...” (B5).

Kantian imagination with the structure of ‘care’, and his suggestion that the imagination is the source of the categories, undercuts Kant’s claims about the universality of the categories; it undercuts, that is, our fundamental reliance on certain a priori concepts across all contexts of experience. The temporal structure of human cognition does not commit us to the categories.

The first section will explore this lack of necessitation between the temporal structure of care and Kant’s categories of understanding. I will argue that, if human cognition is most fundamentally temporal, this interpretation undermines a robust determination of the categories that it uses to cognize the world; while human cognition can take up Kant’s categories, it can rely on other categories to make sense of different contexts. In other words, Heidegger’s temporal interpretation of the imagination underdetermines the categories at its disposal; it need not rely on the Kantian categories of causality, substantiality, etc.

Even further, as I shall explore in the second section, Heidegger’s interpretation of the imagination already provides a context, internal to the first Critique, where the Kantian categories fall short. While the categories can be used to conceptualize the mechanical objects of nature, they do not apply to a being who is fundamentally temporal – as humans are, according to Heidegger’s interpretation of Kant. Following Heidegger’s interpretation, the Transcendental Deduction reveals a being who exceeds categorical determinations even as it grounds such determinations. We need a temporal being in order for the categories to be put to use, but in virtue of its temporality, the categories cannot be used to make sense of that temporal being. Taken together, these sections will articulate Heidegger’s challenge to the universality of Kant’s categories: human cognition

need not take up the categories in its interpretation of the world around it, and the categories *ought not* be used to interpret the human being.

Before getting to these sections, though, I will review the relationship between the imagination and categories that we saw Heidegger put forth in the last chapter, as this relationship drives Heidegger's revisions to Kant's theory of the categories. Heidegger suggests that the categories – the rules that Kant identifies as enabling and structuring our experience of empirical objects – are grounded in the temporal structure of human existence, 'care'.⁸⁹ Heidegger identifies the temporal structure of existence – whereby a projection toward the future, based on what was given in the past, enables our present encounter with an object – with Kant's transcendental faculty of the imagination. Within this temporal structure, the categories function as future anticipations; we expect to find a world with the basic, ontological properties that are captured by the categories.⁹⁰ In particular, the categories articulate a pure image of time (as a sequence of nows) that precedes and underlies any present experience we have of an object.⁹¹ Let's see the implications of this interpretation for Kant's theory of the categories.

⁸⁹ For this reason, the notions – i.e., the categories abstracted from intuitive content – ought to be attributed to the imagination, as well. "The functions of the unity of understanding, that is, the notions, belong to the productive power of imagination as the unities of the synthesis of pure understanding" (PIK 186).

⁹⁰ Therefore "categories cannot be taken as isolated concepts of understanding; they are essentially related to time" (PIK 291). They belong "essentially to the original whole of the pure time-related imaginative synthesis" (PIK 291). In particular, "categories are transcendental grounds of the synthesis of recognition...As transcendental grounds, categories do not exist outside transcendental synthesis, but are identical with it" (PIK 271).

⁹¹ "Because categories are nothing but constitutive characters of objectness in general and because this objectness is constituted on the basis of the time-related pure synthesis, therefore the categories have their necessary origin in time itself" (PIK 272); "categories are such determinations as to constitute pure time as a priori ability to resist, as objectness"

1. The Universality of the Categories

In Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, Heidegger suggests that the system of knowledge that Kant identifies is not “fixed” – rather, it is subject to historical change. Heidegger says that “the Metaphysics of Dasein is no fixed and ready-for-use ‘organon’ at all. It must always be built up anew amid the transformation of its idea in the working-out of the possibility of metaphysics” (KPM 162). In this passage, Heidegger suggests that metaphysics is not a fixed system, like the zoology of animals (an example he cites just before this passage), but rather undergoes transformations. Against Kant, Heidegger suggests our categories are variable, not fixed.

Heidegger contrasts the variability of the categories with the invariability of the care structure: “all association with beings, even if it appears as if there were just beings, already presupposes the transcendence of Dasein – namely, Being-in-the-world” (PIK 165; cf. PIK 281). The structure of care underlies any particular association with beings. The temporal structure of human existence is universal, while the categories that Kant identifies are not.⁹² Accordingly, Heidegger suggests that an inquiry like his own – which

(PIK 288); “as *rules* of synthesis the *unities* which belong to pure imaginative synthesis and their a priori possible changes determine every object in an a priori manner” (PIK 285).

⁹² I wish to address a piece of apparent counterevidence to this claim. In Emad and Maly’s translation of PIK, they offer the following sentence: “To be sure, the Kantian ontology of the present-at-hand is reduced to a fundamentally more radical and more universal ontology than Kant himself sees—indeed to a regional ontology” (PIK 136). As written, this passage contradicts others of Heidegger’s claims about universality; for example, Heidegger’s claim that, if one inquires into “the ecstatic constitution of Dasein,” “Being will then no longer be understood in terms of present-at-hand nature, but rather in that universal sense which encompasses in itself all possibilities of regional variation” (PIK 289). In the first passage, Heidegger, puzzlingly, seems to suggest that a regional ontology is a ‘more universal’ one; in the second, Heidegger suggests that a universal ontology “encompasses...all possibilities of regional variation.”

inquires into fundamental ontology, i.e., the ontology of Dasein – provides the universal ontology that Kant in fact sought; “being will then no longer be understood in terms of present-at-hand nature, but rather in that universal sense which encompasses in itself all possibilities of regional variation” (PIK 289).⁹³ While Kant provides a regional ontology, the ontology of Dasein is universal.

Heidegger suggests, further, that inquiring into the ontology of Dasein will never arrive at fixed metaphysical categories for the entities that it will encounter. Inquiry into finite human understanding, Heidegger argues, cannot “attain absolute knowledge of finitude, secretly put forth, which is ‘true in itself’” (KPM 166). Such an inquiry cannot arrive at an absolute knowledge of basic metaphysical categories that are universally true, regardless of time or place, whether they are Kant’s categories or some other set of basic categories. Rather, Heidegger suggests that

finitude becomes manifest according to its ownmost essence if it is made accessible through unswerving application accompanied in turn by the originally grasped, basic question of metaphysics which, to be sure, can *never* be claimed as the *only* one possible (KPM 166).

However, if one interprets the PIK 136 passage with an eye toward Heidegger’s change in prepositions, one arrives at a translation that does not contradict Heidegger’s other claims. I suggest that in this passage, Heidegger suggests that “the Kantian ontology sinks into [*sinkt in*] a fundamentally more radical and more universal ontology than Kant himself sees.” Rather than itself being universal, the Kantian ontology is subordinated to the ontology of Dasein, the being who indeed can take up Kantian categories to understand a specific region (and whose being provides the basis for any other ontological understanding). Further, Heidegger suggests that the Kantian ontology sinks “to [*zu*] a regional ontology.” Kant does not offer the overarching, general, indeed universal ontology that applies to all beings; Kant’s categories capture only a region of being (GA 25: 200).

⁹³ I have altered this translation, replacing Taft’s ‘extant’ with ‘present-hand’.

In other words, finite human understanding is realized in a particular application; we must interpret the world in some way. However, the particular way we interpret the world in a given context (e.g. at a particular moment in history), “can *never* be claimed as the *only* one possible.”⁹⁴ In Heidegger’s view, inquiry into human understanding will not provide us with a particular application, a concrete set of categories, to which human cognition is universally bound.

While Heidegger repeatedly alludes to the narrow scope of the categories, he does not provide an explicit argument explaining why the categories should not be considered universal, according to his interpretation. However, I argue that this claim is an outcome of his interpretation of the imagination. If the imagination is the source of the categories, and the imagination refers to the structure of care, then this undermines the universality of the categories. The categories are not universal, because there is a lack of fit between the structure of care and the categories. The categories provide a content that can ground our interpretations of the world. However, a being who is characterized by the care-structure need not take up this interpretation over others; it is not chained to this particular content. The structure of care is underdetermined in terms of the categories that it takes up. While the structure of care has a “transcendental neediness” (KPM 165) – it requires some sort of ontological framework to make sense of the world – other

⁹⁴ While the translation is ambiguous, the original German passage makes it clear that it is the application (*der Einsatz*) that cannot be claimed as the only one possible, rather than the basic question of metaphysics (*die Grundfrage*): “[Endlichkeit] sich ihrem eigensten Wesen nach offenbart, wenn sie durch einen unentwegt von der ursprünglich begriffenen Grundfrage der Metaphysik geleiteten Einsatz zugänglich gemacht wird, *der* freilich nie als der einzig mögliche beansprucht werden kann” (GA 3: 237; italics mine).

frameworks besides Kant's categories could meet this need. Therefore, grounding the categories in the temporal structure of care undermines their universality.

Let us consider the underdetermination of the care structure in more detail. Heidegger describes the care structure of human beings (i.e. 'Dasein') in the final chapter of Being and Time:

Essentially ahead of itself, [Dasein] has projected itself upon its potentiality-for-Being before going on to any mere consideration of itself. In its projection it reveals itself as something which has been thrown. It has been thrownly abandoned to the 'world', which falls into it concernfully. As care—that is, as existing in the unity of the projection which has been fallingly thrown—this entity has been disclosed as a 'there' (BT 406).

In order to be 'there', in a present moment where one makes sense of something, a human cognizer must, first, 'project upon its potentiality-for-Being' – project toward the future. One holds expectations about what the world is like and how one fits into that world. However, these expectations are informed by the past; that is why "in its projection [Dasein] reveals itself as something which has been thrown." One has access to a network of meanings that one did not create but that one takes up in one's interpretation of the world nonetheless. Our experience of the present moment is structured and enabled by expectations (oriented toward the future) that are prior (taken up from the past). According to Heidegger's depiction of the structure of care, the human, most fundamentally, is a being who is oriented toward the future, in a way that is informed by the past, revealing the present in light of the anticipated future and the past that has been taken up.

In his interpretation of Kant, Heidegger argues that the structure of care is the source of the Kantian categories. These categories, like causality and substantiality, constitute a world of objects. In the structure of care, these categories anticipate the sorts of objects that we will find in our world. For example, we expect the changes that we encounter to proceed according to causal laws. These categories, projected onto the future, were given previously. However, while these categories can be taken up by the structure of care, there is nothing about the structure of care that necessitates that we take up the categories as opposed to some other form of pre-understanding. According to the structure of care, we reveal the world in light of *some* project – we take up some set of expectations that shape our experience of the world around us – but the project itself is not specified. The bare structure of care is not bound to the categories.

While I have made my argument so far by considering a pared-down depiction of care – only dealing with the basic temporal structure that, by Heidegger’s lights, must underlie all employment of the categories – I would like to take a moment to show that, even Heidegger’s more developed depiction of care does not commit us to determinate categories that we must take up to interpret the world around us.

As we have seen, Heidegger offers a temporal definition of care (i.e. the being or ontological structure of Dasein) as “ahead-of-itself-Being-already-in-a-world” in “Being-amidst” (BT 192). As William Blattner notes, this definition offers a temporal interpretation of the existentials of Dasein (i.e. the elements articulating its basic a priori ontological structure) that Heidegger enumerated previously in non-temporal terms.⁹⁵ The

⁹⁵ I also agree with Blattner that the temporal definition of care – ordinary temporality – is neutral with regard to whether one is authentic or inauthentic. One reveals the world in

three existentials of understanding, thrownness, and falling make up the three temporal ecstases that are unified to form Dasein's ontological structure. They are called 'ecstases' because they are ways in which Dasein is outside of itself. These three ecstases unify to form ecstatic temporality, or original temporality.

Dasein is primarily ahead-of-itself – that is, oriented toward the future. This corresponds to the existential that Heidegger calls understanding or possibility (BT 144). Dasein is always oriented toward what it would like to be, i.e., some identity that it is actively pursuing, which Heidegger calls a for-the-sake-of-which.⁹⁶ With the for-the-sake-of-which comes an anticipation of oneself (e.g. the things one must do to maintain the identity) as well as an anticipation of the world that one will inhabit; my stable identity as a philosopher comes with a stable world of things that allow me to pursue that identity. One's pursuit of an identity, then, comes both with a self-understanding (one is this sort of person) and an understanding of the world around oneself (one is surrounded by this sort of equipment). Heidegger calls this a projection: "with equal primordially the understanding projects Dasein's Being both upon its 'for-the-sake-of-which' and upon significance, as the worldhood of its current world" (BT 145).

One's pursuit of an identity is future-oriented in a local sense in that for-the-sakes-of-which necessarily include certain, local goals toward which one is oriented (i.e. the philosopher is trying to finish reading the book, or trying to finish writing the manuscript). These local goals can be accomplished. However, the larger, global identity

light of a future project and past traditions regardless of whether one takes up that project authentically.

⁹⁶ "In the for-the-sake-of-which, existing Being-in-the-world is disclosed as such, and this disclosedness we have called 'understanding'" (BT 143).

that one pursues can never be accomplished; being a philosopher is an ongoing project – an ongoing way of understanding oneself and the world around oneself – that must be sustained.⁹⁷ It is always only a “potentiality-for-being” (BT 144), and never complete; precisely when one would take one’s task to be complete, one would cease being a philosopher (one no longer inhabits the world of philosophy, carries out the characteristic tasks of a philosopher, is motivated by this for-sake-of-which to engage in those tasks, etc.). When one does pursue an identity, one is ahead of oneself. In this way, one is outside of oneself – looking toward local goals that are not yet accomplished in the immediate present and anticipating a stable world and stable identity that continues beyond the immediate present.⁹⁸

However, the way that one is ahead of oneself is, as Blattner puts it, “guided” by the past. One is “already-being-in-the-world,” which corresponds to the existential of state-of-mind or thrownness (introduced at BT 135). One’s pursuit of an identity is guided, first, by a sense of which possibilities are available in one’s world (there is no use, in today’s world, trying to become a knight of the round table).⁹⁹ Second, as Blattner emphasizes, one’s pursuit of an identity is guided by things about oneself, things that already matter to oneself (e.g. one likes to read, one takes education to be important).¹⁰⁰ While these cannot determine one’s identity (for example, personal preferences can point

⁹⁷ “As long as it is, Dasein has always understood itself and always will understand itself in terms of possibilities” (BT 145).

⁹⁸ “Dasein is constantly ‘more’ than it factually is, supposing that one might want to make an inventory of it as something-at-hand and list the contents of its Being, and supposing one were able to do so” (BT 145).

⁹⁹ “In every case Dasein, as essentially having a state-of-mind, has already got itself into definite possibilities” (BT 144).

¹⁰⁰ “Existentially, a state-of-mind implies a disclosive submission to the world, out of which we can encounter something that matters to us” (BT 137-138).

in a number of directions), they feed into one's project. Finally, one's pursuit of an identity is standard, governed by pre-created norms. When one pursues an identity, one is not re-inventing the wheel (e.g. inventing what it means to be a philosopher from the ground up); one enters a world that preceded one's individual efforts.¹⁰¹ "Delivered over" to a prior web of significations, we are, again, outside of the immediate present.

Completing the structure of originary temporality is Being-amidst, which is associated with the ecstasis of the present and corresponds to the existential "falling."¹⁰² In the present, one is engaged with entities of a certain kind.¹⁰³ The type of being-amidst that Heidegger takes as "exemplary" in Being and Time is "using, handling, production of the available...that is, being-amidst what belongs to everyday needs" (BT 352). In the present moment, one engages with entities, for example by using and handling them. This present engagement is determined by the identity one pursues (e.g. one engages in such-and-such a task to be a philosopher) and one's prior familiarity with the world (interacting with a pre-established network). In the present, one is outside of oneself in that one's attention lies amidst the entities bound in one's pursuit of a future identity.

The three temporal ecstases are unified in that they are interdependent.¹⁰⁴ One cannot project into a possibility (i.e. pursue a future identity) absent a context that offers

¹⁰¹ "the world which has already been disclosed beforehand permits what is within-the-world to be encountered" (BT 137).

¹⁰² "Falling reveals an essential ontological structure of Dasein itself...it constitutes all Dasein's days in their everydayness" (BT 179).

¹⁰³ "Dasein is proximally and for the most part 'alongside' the world of its concern" (BT 175).

¹⁰⁴ Here, I depart from Blattner's account where the unity of the ecstases is supposed to be guaranteed by the fact that originary time is non-sequential (they are not divided into separate, divided moments). This is a negative way of putting their unification (they are unified in comparison to, because they are not parts of, another model of time), and a

up some possibilities to pursue (i.e. an inherited world). Likewise, taking up the past is enabled by one's project – the past must be put toward something to be operational. Further, one's pursuit of that possibility and appropriation of an inherited world are actualized in a present moment. None of the ecstases can stand on their own; though they can be described independently, they cannot function independently. Together, they make up the unified, ontological structure of Dasein's being.

When one takes on a particular identity – appropriating a world that has been and engaging in present activity – one adopts a comportment of a certain kind. Heidegger argues that Dasein “comports itself towards its Being as its ownmost possibility. In each case Dasein is its possibility, and it ‘has’ this possibility...” (BT 42). One comports oneself when one directs oneself toward a determinate possibility – seeking out an identity, pursuing a particular project, trying to be a certain kind of person. Here, we must avoid two misunderstandings of comportment: First, comporting oneself is not purely self-regarding. When one directs oneself toward a possibility one likewise discovers a world of entities that are bound up in that possibility. Second, comporting oneself is not completely active in the sense of a spontaneous determination of oneself. As suggested by the discussion of ‘thrownness’ above, one's direction toward a possibility is guided by an already discovered world (where certain possibilities are available, and certain things already matter to oneself). A comportment is a kind of stance that one takes; it is a way of holding oneself (Heidegger's word for comportment is *Verhaltung* or *Verhalten*, which

downstream consequence of the fact that they are interdependent. They cannot be divided into a sequence of separate moments due to their interdependence – but interdependence is the primary reason to take them to be unified.

contains the word *halten*, to hold). This basic stance determines the specific activities or behavior (*Handlung*) in which Dasein engages.

These concepts offer a more developed account of Dasein's temporality. I argue that this structure offers no determinate categories that one must adopt to understand the world around oneself. Heidegger's account suggests that one's understanding of entities will be determined by one's pursuit of a possibility – one's taking a stance or comporting oneself. However, which stance one will take is left indeterminate here; indeed, the structure of care is the structure of taking any kind of stance at all (adopting any sort of understanding of beings at all), no matter which one. If Heidegger is right that the structure of care underlies the employment of Kant's categories (as we saw him argue in the last chapter), then the categories depend on a structure that need not take up the categories. The structure of care is underdetermined in terms of the understanding of entities that it offers.

It might seem odd to speak about the structure of care as something that is empty or underdetermined. In particular, this might seem odd because Heidegger emphasizes the situatedness of human beings in Being and Time: our experience is always structured by a prior understanding (even if it is contingent, based on one's historical and cultural moment). Precisely the structure of care dictates that we never have an unmediated experience where the pure structure of human existence comes into contact with the world, absent categories of any kind (Kantian or otherwise). We are transcendently needy in that we *require* prior, situated understanding to have any experience at all. In light of this feature of the care structure, it may seem problematic to consider the care structure abstractly, absent the concrete understanding with which the structure always

actualizes itself. Further, it may seem mistaken to suggest that the structure of care is underdetermined, as it is always determined by some prior understanding.¹⁰⁵

However, Heidegger himself considers the structure of care abstractly; in this way, my argument does not stray from Heidegger's own inquiry into care. Heidegger defines it abstractly even as he emphasizes our prior, necessary situatedness. For example, in Being and Time, Heidegger is able to isolate and define the structure of care as "ahead-of-itself-Being-already-in-the-world" even as he reminds us that Being-already-in-the-world means that the human being "has in each case already been thrown *into a world*" (BT 192).¹⁰⁶ The very structure of our being means that we are already engaged in a world of meaning, but the structure of our being can be characterized independently of the particular network of meaning that we have taken up from the past. Further, when Heidegger recasts the structure of care in Kantian vocabulary (where the imagination is care), he again characterizes the structure of human existence abstractly, independently from the forms of understanding that the imagination takes up. For example, Heidegger claims that "as productive, the power of imagination freely reaches out into the future, into alreadiness (the past), and into the present; and throughout this reaching the power of imagination is originally unifying" (PIK 282). Heidegger characterizes the basic, temporal structure of care (i.e. the imagination) independently from the Kantian categories that this structure can take up. Following Heidegger's lead, we can consider

¹⁰⁵ I thank Georg Bertram for raising this objection, and the participants in his research colloquium for further discussion of it.

¹⁰⁶ For another example of Heidegger defining the care structure abstractly in Being and Time, see my discussion of BT 406 above.

the structure of care abstractly, even as we allow that the structure of care must be filled by some determinate content.

Recognizing with Heidegger that the structure of care will never be without content, it remains possible to ask if there are stable conceptual resources to which this structure is bound in every concrete realization. Looking at the structure of care that persists across concrete realizations of the structure, there is nothing about this structure itself that dictates such a result. The structure is underdetermined not in that it is ever without concrete determination, but in that it need not reproduce the same concrete content across all of its possible determinations.¹⁰⁷

While the care structure is not chained to the categories, this does not fully establish that there are other interpretations available to us besides Kant's categories. However, in the next section, we will begin to explore one domain where the categories fall short.

2. Exceeding the Categories

In his interpretive works on Kant, Heidegger suggests two different ways in which the categories are not universal but limited, being subject to variation. First, as I mentioned above, Heidegger suggests that Kant's categories are limited historically; the categories that Kant identifies have not been taken up across every epoch of human history. Second, Heidegger suggests that Kant's categories are limited in that they apply to only one 'region' of our experience, even within Kant's historical moment. In

¹⁰⁷ There is a further sense in which the care structure is undetermined: within its three temporal ecstases, the past is determined and the future is undetermined. Even if one takes up the categories there is room to fail and room to interpret differently in the future. I thank Georg Bertram for making this point.

particular, Kant's categories capture our experience of the region of objects studied by natural science, or 'present-at-hand nature.' For example, as we already saw in the last section, Heidegger claims that, if one appreciates the ontology of Dasein, "being will no longer be understood in terms of nature's being present-at-hand, but rather in that universal sense which encompasses in itself all possibilities of regional variation" (PIK 289). If we appreciate the fundamental temporal structure of human beings, we will not be limited to the categories of understanding that capture present-at-hand nature. Rather, appreciating the temporality of Dasein captures the structure of cognition – projecting into the future, as informed by the past – common to every region that Dasein understands, even as the conceptual content of that region varies.

Commentators on Heidegger's interpretation of Kant have brought out the historical dimension of Heidegger's position. According to this dimension, the Kantian categories are not "invariant" but historically contingent (Lafont 2007: 105); the basic categories that humans use to make sense of the world have changed over the course of history, Kant capturing but one moment of this history. Scholars of Kant, like Michael Friedman, have also posed this problem to Kant's depiction of the categories independently of Heidegger's interventions. Friedman, for example, appeals to recent scientific developments to suggest that the Kantian categories have been displaced (cf. Friedman 1994).

Moving forward, my dissertation will build on this research to develop Heidegger's idea that the categories change not only over the course of history, but also across different domains of understanding. In Heidegger's terms, the categories that Kant identifies apply to the realm of "present-at-hand Nature" – material things that proceed

according to mechanical laws. However, they do not apply to “ready-to-hand” equipment, nor do they – more germane to the current discussion – apply to “Dasein,” or the human being. This idea can be developed, first, as an internal critique of Kant’s text, as Kant’s own discussion of human cognition, as interpreted by Heidegger, offers a being who exceeds the categories; the human cognizer cannot be made sense of in light of the categories.

In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant makes it his task to argue that the phenomenal world, the world of our experience, is subject to the categories of understanding. To do so, Kant outlines the basic requirements of human cognition, which determine what form the world of our phenomenal experience can take. However, Heidegger indicates that, in shedding light on the form of human cognition, Kant already reveals a being that exceeds the categories. Because we surely encounter humans, with our sort of cognition, in the phenomenal world – not just rocks, rivers, tables, and chairs, but humans – this challenges the proposed reach of the categories.

Heidegger suggests several times that, while Kant’s Critique gestures at the temporality of the human being, it does not do full justice to the ontology of the human being, instead sticking to the ‘ontology of the present-at-hand’ (PIK 258). However, Heidegger’s remarks on this topic are brief, and may not be convincing to those who are sympathetic to Kant’s take on the universality of the categories. While Kant devotes extended discussion to each category in his attempt to prove that these categories are the most basic elements of all understanding, Heidegger offers only a few sentences suggesting that the categories cannot do justice to the ontology of Dasein. I will review Heidegger’s remarks here and offer a preliminary analysis motivating Heidegger’s

suggestion that Kant's categories cannot capture the temporal structure of the human being. However, making Heidegger's suggestion plausible will be the task of the second half of the dissertation, where I provide an in-depth analysis of the concept of cause, as Kant elaborates it, arguing that the concept belongs only to a regional ontology. Another way in which Heidegger's suggestion falls short is that these late 1920s works, where Heidegger already suggests that Kant cannot capture the ontology of Dasein, do not consider the works in Kant's corpus that might speak to Heidegger's concerns about conceptualizing humans. For example, it is not until his 1930 course, Essence of Human Freedom, that Heidegger offers a detailed reading of Kant's practical philosophy. Thus, in order to complete Heidegger's argument, the second half of the dissertation will also take a broader view of Kant's critical works.

I will review two examples where Heidegger suggests, briefly, that Kantian categories do not capture the ontology of the human being. First, Heidegger says that Kant provides a glimpse of the human being, who is

not existing in the sense of nature, and rather existing in the sense of freedom...However, misunderstanding is encouraged in that Kant indeed fails to clearly differentiate ontologically the concepts of actuality and possibility in relation to Dasein, the 'I,' and nature. Ontologically, Kant depends entirely on the traditional ontology of what is present-at-hand. He clearly grasps the mode of being of the subject only when he grasps this being in an ontic and not ontological manner (PIK 258).

Kant only captures Dasein ontically, because Kant discusses the downstream consequences of Dasein's temporal structure without fully explicating that structure.

While Kant does not detail the structure of care, he does suggest that we make sense of the world by applying categories that we have a priori, in advance. He suggests a consequence of the structure of care (making sense of the world categorically) without outlining the structure of care. While Kant accurately captures those categories that we apply to objects of nature, “the traditional ontology of the extant,” he does not consider the different sorts of concepts that are required to make sense of the being who applies categories.¹⁰⁸

Heidegger suggests that capturing the ontology of Dasein would require, for one, differentiating “ontologically the concepts of actuality and possibility in relation to Dasein...and nature” (ibid). While Heidegger does not carry out such a differentiation here, we can imagine a basic outline, using the structure of care developed in the last section. Consider possibility, for example. For an object of nature, possibility refers (according to Kant) to an object that can exist, because it “agrees with the formal conditions of experience (in accordance with intuition and concepts)” (A218/B266). However, for Dasein, a possibility is something that we can orient ourselves toward – that we can take up in our current interpretation of the world around us. Only offering the categories that apply to objects, Kant fails to develop those concepts that could be used to make sense of that being who wields those categories, though his analysis of the categories is dependent on such a being.

¹⁰⁸ Heidegger, in fact, suggests that no categories could capture the ontology of Dasein. To highlight the distinction between Dasein and entities (who are not temporally structured, do not comport themselves toward and make sense of the world around them), Heidegger proposes that we call the components of Dasein’s ontology “existentialia” rather than categories. Therefore, “existentialia and categories are the two basic possibilities of characters of Being” (BT 45).

Heidegger identifies the concept of cause as another of Kant's categories that fails to conceptualize the human being; this example, indeed, will be the paradigmatic case I explore in the chapters that follow. Kant argues that objects are determined by the concept of cause; in any change that an object undergoes, its present state must follow from the past necessarily, according to a rule (A188/B232). However, Heidegger argues that this concept cannot be turned on the subject who understands objects in this way. Our cognition of the world, Heidegger suggests, is built on grounds or foundations, rather than being determined by causes; "the phrase '*a priori* grounds of possibility' does not mean motives and causes which determine the faculty of experiencing, but rather it means ground, basis, and foundation" (PIK 222-223). The concept of cause cannot capture the process of human understanding – where we indeed take up categories like causality.

When we draw on the concept of cause, we take up the idea that a present state follows necessarily from a past state, according to rules. For example, we take a ship's position downstream to follow necessarily from its position upstream, according to physical laws specifying that an object of this kind in these circumstances (not just this particular ship on this particular occasion) will behave in this way. Heidegger, suggests, however, that we cannot draw upon the concept of cause to make sense of human cognition; we cannot take the present state of understanding (say, the state of knowing that the ship moved downstream) to follow necessarily from '*a priori* grounds of possibility.' That is, we cannot take the *a priori* constitution of the subject to cause a state of knowledge in the subject. One issue with this model, I suggest, is that it does not acknowledge that we actively take up and apply the categories to process the objects we

come to cognize. Our mental states are not necessitated from without but processed from within. We participate in the process of knowing by projecting expectations and making sense of our present experience in light of those expectations. Suggesting that mental states are simply caused in us does not do justice to the active process whereby we conceptually process sensible input by applying categories.

In his interpretation of Kant, Heidegger offers provocative but brief examples that suggest the human cognizer described by Kant cannot be conceptualized using Kant's categories. We cannot use the concepts of possibility and actuality as they are developed in relation to natural, extant objects, in order to conceptualize the human being; nor can we make sense of cognition using the concept of cause. In this section, I have offered a preliminary discussion of Heidegger's reasoning. However, in the second part of the dissertation, I will offer an extended discussion considering why the category of causality does not apply to the human being, and which form of understanding can conceptualize the changes that are brought about by humans.

Conclusion

We have seen a revision to Kant's depiction of the categories, which arises from Heidegger's interpretation of Kant: because the categories are grounded in the temporal structure of care, the categories are not universal. 'Care' refers to an underdetermined structure of human existence, where orientation toward the future, drawing on past experience, reveals what is present. The categories can give content to the care structure – we can draw on the categories to anticipate and make sense of the world around us – but this structure is not bound to the categories. While the underdetermination of the care structure does not establish that there are other sets of categories besides the set that Kant

identifies at our disposal, the temporal structure of human cognition that is suggested in Kant's text already points to a being who exceeds Kant's categories. For example, applying the concept of cause to an instance of human cognition (i.e. taking a mental state to be caused by some previous state) fails to capture the active process of cognition, where we take up a category and use it to make sense of the world around us; the category grounds our experience without causing it. On Heidegger's interpretation, Kant was wrong to take the categories as a universal (ahistorical and domain-independent) set of rules that bind human cognition across all regions of our experience.

While promoting the strand of argument in Kant prioritizing the imagination has its benefits, this discussion has brought out an apparent cost. If we accept that the imagination is the fundamental faculty of human cognition, and that it is in fact identical with the temporal structure of care, we must deny Kant's claim that the categories are universal. This claim was undoubtedly quite important to Kant. Even if Heidegger offers a close reading of Kant's text, and internal textual grounds to motivate his interpretation prioritizing the imagination, this may still seem inadequate as support for an interpretation that does away with a cornerstone of Kant's theory of the categories.

However, the second part of the dissertation will offer further considerations in light of Heidegger's suggestion that the categories are not universal. Focusing on the concept of cause, I will argue that this category only does the work that Kant attributes to it in one context of understanding. While Kant argues that we must employ the concept of cause to identify events (or changes, like a ship moving downstream), I will argue that this depiction of event perception does not apply to every context where we perceive events. Kant captures what it is like to take a theoretical, observational approach to the

mechanical events of nature, but he does not capture what it is like when we encounter events as we go about our everyday lives, pursuing practical projects like building, doing, and making. Further, Kant does not capture what it is like to perceive events initiated by humans. The argument of the second part of the dissertation, then, provides additional reasons to opt for Heidegger's interpretation of Kant: if we narrow the scope of the categories, Kant's claims about them do not face counterexamples based on other contexts of understanding. In other words, narrowing the scope of the categories leaves Kant with a stronger argument. Therefore, in the argument that follows, I will attempt to recast Heidegger's challenge to Kant's theory of the categories – which at first blush seems like a cost of his interpretation – as a benefit.

Part II: Phenomenological Reconstruction of Experiencing Events

Chapter 4: The Heideggerian Reading of the Second Analogy

In this part of the dissertation, I will draw on Heidegger's early phenomenology to provide a phenomenological reconstruction of the various contexts where we experience events (i.e. contexts where we experience change, like the movement of a ship). Based on this reconstruction, I will argue that Kant's account of experiencing events in the Second Analogy does not capture every context where we experience events. As the next chapter will detail, Heidegger suggests that Kant captures what it is like to take a theoretical, observational approach to the mechanical events of nature. However, Kant does not capture what it is like when we experience events as we go about our everyday lives, pursuing practical projects like building, doing, and making. Further, Kant does not capture what it is like to experience events initiated by humans. Kant's account does not apply, then, to our experience of the beings that Heidegger calls the ready-to-hand (*Zuhandensein*) nor does it apply to the beings that he calls *Dasein* (i.e. humans). The account applies narrowly to what Heidegger terms the present-at-hand – material things considered in terms of their physical properties.

Before offering this argument, however I will bring out the contributions that my argument makes to ongoing debates in contemporary Kant scholarship. Rather than justifying the Heideggerian reading of the Second Analogy (the task of the next chapter), this chapter will seek to situate the reading within these ongoing debates. We will see that Heidegger contributes to debates about the scope of Kant's account of event perception (Section 1). Further, Heidegger weighs in on whether Kant's argument describes what is necessary for *explaining* events or for *experiencing* them (Section 2). This second debate will allow me to clarify the precise target of the Heideggerian interpretation (Section 3).

We will see that Heidegger reads the Second Analogy as an account of *experience* – not *explanation* and not *perception* – and suggests that Kant’s argument is narrow in scope on that basis. Following this clarification, I will outline the structure of my argument in the remaining chapters (Section 4).

1. Contribution to the Scope Debate

There has been ongoing debate about the scope of the Second Analogy’s account of experiencing events. Even more broadly, there has been ongoing debate about the scope of the account of perceptual experience offered by the Analytic of the Critique of Pure Reason (not just causality, but all the basic categories that Kant takes to constitute our perceptual experience). Contemporary Kant scholars have posed the question as follows: in the Second Analogy, and in Kant’s account of experience more broadly, is he referring to a special kind of “scientific experience,” or everyday, “commonsensical experience” (Watkins 2005: p.195)?¹⁰⁹ I suggest that an extension of Heidegger’s interpretation of Kant offers a valuable contribution to this debate.

In the contemporary literature, there are three prominent answers to this question. In arguably the most popular camp, some commentators suggest that Kant aims to capture everyday, commonsensical experience in his account of event perception, and in the first Critique more broadly. For example, Beatrice Longuenesse argues that, in the Second Analogy, Kant is concerned with “the succession of events or states of affairs as we perceive them *in the objects of ordinary experience*—the freezing of water, the moving of a ship, the warming up of a stone,” rather than the events we experience “in the context of a scientific image of the world—for instance, the objective, as opposed to the

¹⁰⁹ As this citation might suggest, my framing of this issue is indebted to Watkins.

merely apparent, succession of positions of heavenly bodies” (Longuenesse 2005: 232, *italics hers*).¹¹⁰ In the Second Analogy, Longuenesse suggests, what is at stake are the ordinary changes we experience in our everyday lives. Indeed, as this passage brings out, Kant’s examples, such as experiencing a ship move downstream, offer up ordinary events that we might encounter as we go about our day-to-day routines.

Michael Friedman, by contrast, suggests that Kant captures scientific experience with the Second Analogy. Friedman proposes, in understanding the argument, that we take as our paradigm of objective experience not the world of everyday objects of ordinary sense perception, but rather the world of massive objects or bodies (and, in particular, the system of the heavenly bodies) described by the Newtonian theory of universal gravitation (Friedman 1994: 36).

Friedman argues that the causal law offered by the Second Analogy orders scientific, rather than ordinary, experience. Further, appealing to Kant’s discussion of Newton in the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science, Friedman thinks that Kant only manages

¹¹⁰ She follows Strawson in this interpretation, though, unlike Strawson, she defends Kant’s argument; Strawson argues that, while Kant intended to analyze the ordinary objects of experience (specifically, their changes), his argument was not successful. Specifically, Strawson (like Lovejoy) suggests that Kant’s argument includes a “non-sequitur” in that it uses the requirements of human cognition to draw a conclusion about the properties of objects, when the requirements of cognition has no bearing on the actual constitution of the world around us.

Longuenesse also attributes to Henry Allison and Gerd Buchdal the position that the Second Analogy refers to everyday experience. Unlike Allison and Buchdal, Longuenesse thinks that Kant argues for a strong principle of causality in the Second Analogy, where events proceed in accordance with “universal and strictly necessary causal laws” (Longuenesse 2005: 231). For Allison and Buchdal, we just think of events as constrained by irreversibility – a “loose sense” of causality that does not comment on laws. Longuenesse suggests that Paul Guyer also thinks the Second Analogy is about ordinary objects, though, as we will see in Section 2, not our perceptual experience of them.

to capture a particular kind of scientific experience: the experience of the Newtonian scientist. While the Newtonian understanding of the world was prevalent during Kant's time, it has since been displaced, Friedman suggests, by more contemporary scientific categories. Friedman takes the scope of the Second Analogy to be quite narrow: not just the experience of the scientist, but that of the particular, Newtonian scientist of Kant's time.

In a third interpretive camp, Eric Watkins and Karl Ameriks suggest that neither "commonsensical experience" nor "scientific experience" by themselves capture the full scope of Kantian experience; rather, Kant attempts to capture both. Watkins suggests that Kant is trying to identify the categories that correspond both to our commonsensical and our scientific experience, which Watkins takes to be consistent with one another. Ameriks, by contrast, argues that the principles provided, for example by the Analogies, attempt to establish the connection between our commonsensical experience and scientific experience, which, in Kant's time, were first appreciated as being at odds with one another. Ameriks suggests that in our ordinary, commonsensical experience, we assume our judgments are justified by the principles of modern science: "particular statements about houses and boats are to be considered as backed up by reference to items that are instances of general laws covering in an exact way all sorts of theoretical entities" (Ameriks 2001: 34). For this assumption to pan out, both sorts of experience must be governed by the same underlying principles, despite their apparent conflict, and Kant's philosophy "aims to articulate the philosophical principles they need to share in order to be jointly understandable and acceptable" (Ameriks 2001: 34). There is continuity between both domains, Ameriks argues, with both drawing on the same

fundamental concepts: there are “weaker ‘everyday’ uses of these concepts, and also stronger, scientifically determined employments of them” (Ameriks 2001: 45). Despite Watkins and Ameriks’ disagreement about the level of continuity between the domains of scientific and commonsensical experience, both think that Kant, in his account of experience, attempts to capture both.

I argue that, in his own interpretation of Kantian ‘experience’, Heidegger falls into the camp of Michael Friedman, suggesting that Kant captures a specific kind of scientific experience. Further, both Heidegger and Friedman provide a critical interpretation of the Second Analogy: while Kant meant to tell us something about ordinary experience, he was only successful at capturing a kind of scientific experience.¹¹¹ This is one outcome of Heidegger’s attempt to “understand [Kant] better than he understood himself” (PIK 2) and provide an analysis of “what Kant should have said” (PIK 229); rather than taking Kant’s word for it, Heidegger offers a critical take on the actual scope of Kant’s argument, and where the categories effectively apply. Likewise, Friedman acknowledges that “Kant’s transcendental explanation of the possibility of objective experience is of course intended to apply to all of experience – including experience at a more commonsensical level of ordinary middle size objects” (Friedman 1994: 38); however, “the distinction between ordinary experience and scientific

¹¹¹ According to Heidegger, this claim distinguishes him from the neo-Kantians of his time. While both Heidegger and the neo-Kantians think Kant captures the basic categories of scientific experience alone, Heidegger thinks that Kant had grander designs: Kant wanted to offer a universal ontology, but he was only successful in offering the ontology of a specific, scientific domain. “For me, what matters is to show that what came to be extracted here as theory of science was nonessential for Kant. Kant did not want to give any sort of theory of natural science, but rather wanted to point out the problematic of metaphysics, which is to say, the problematic of ontology” (PIK 194).

experience...becomes a fundamental problem for Kant” (Friedman 1994: 38).

Though Kant may have wanted to provide an account of event perception that captures our ordinary experience of objects, Friedman suggests, in the end he was unable to go beyond the narrow bounds of Newtonian scientific experience of events and capture what ordinary experience of an event looks like. Both Heidegger and Friedman shift, in their interpretations of the Second Analogy, from the intended scope of the argument to the effective scope of it.

However, Heidegger’s contribution to this debate is not merely to offer additional considerations to opt for Friedman’s interpretation, perhaps adding to the “plausible textual and philosophical evidence in its favor” racked up on all sides of this debate (Watkins 2005: 195). Rather, Heidegger’s rationale for adopting a narrow interpretation of experience – and of the Second Analogy more specifically – avoids some of the problems that Friedman’s own interpretation faces. In particular, Henry Allison brings out two sorts of issues with Friedman’s interpretation of the Second Analogy. I argue that Heidegger, while arguing along with Friedman that the argument has a narrow scope, can avoid both of Allison’s objections.

First, Allison objects that Friedman’s interpretation of causal laws is too strong. In particular, Friedman suggests that the experience of events described in the Second Analogy makes reference to specific, scientifically grounded causal laws, as this is the only way to deem the order of states necessary. As Friedman puts it,

all events or changes of state (that is, changes in state of motion or acceleration) are rigorously and uniquely ordered in virtue of a precise mathematical law – a law that has in turn a strictly universal and more than merely inductive status in

virtue of which it counts as necessary in precisely the sense of Kant's official category of necessity (Friedman 1994: 36).

However, Allison suggests that, on Kant's account of experiencing events, we merely assume that there are specific causal laws at work; we need not explicitly know the laws when we identify that a change has occurred (Allison 1994: 298-299). Further, Allison alleges, Friedman regularly discusses the principle of causality as the necessary connection between two events (e.g. eating bread and feeling nourished), rather than two states (e.g. ship upstream and ship downstream). In so doing, Friedman grounds his argument about the scope of the Second Analogy on an incorrect reading of the text (Allison 1994: 300).

I think that Allison provides plausible objections to Friedman's reading of the Second Analogy; however, whether or not one agrees with Allison's interpretation of the text, the argument for a narrow-scope reading of the Second Analogy would be much improved if it did not rely on a controversial reading, and could instead accommodate a weaker reading of the argument. I suggest that Heidegger's arguments for taking the scope of the Second Analogy to be narrow do not rely on Friedman's controversial reading. I argue that, even on a weak reading of the Second Analogy – where we only assume the existence of necessary causal laws underlying the changes we experience (that are not rigorously specified), and the causal laws are connecting states rather than disparate events – Heidegger provides considerations in favor of a narrow-scope reading of Kant's argument. On the Heideggerian account, simply the idea that we order the states we perceive with the concept of cause – one thing following another necessarily in time – is enough to confine Kant's account to scientific experience. Further, the

Heideggerian account can accommodate the suggestion that the law of causality connects two states, rather than two distinct events.

Allison also identifies a second issue in Friedman's suggestion that the Second Analogy captures only a specific kind of scientific experience. Allison points out that, while Friedman considers the experience of the Newtonian scientist at length, Friedman fails to account for our ordinary experience of events; if the Second Analogy account does not apply here, what kind of experience of events is in play? Allison argues that it is especially important for Friedman to address the constitution of our ordinary experience, as our rigorous, scientific determinations of events and their causal laws are built upon less secure, ordinary experiences of the same phenomena. Therefore, even with Friedman's in-depth exploration of Newtonian science, "we still need an account of how the causal principle functions with respect to experience that is less than 'genuinely objective'" (Allison 1994: 301).

By contrast, Heidegger's early phenomenology does address other contexts of experience, providing the resources to fill out the account of non-scientific event experience. In particular, Heidegger provides detailed phenomenological descriptions of everyday experience and our experience of humans, and these descriptions can be developed to account for the other contexts where we experience events. Thus, Heidegger cannot be accused of treating scientific domains of experience exclusively, and ignoring how experiencing events might work in other domains. Rather than narrowly focusing on scientific events, Heidegger provides us with the means to comment on other experiences of events.

In providing the resources needed to address the “weak” interpretation of the Second Analogy argument, and an analysis of the other contexts where we experience events, Heidegger provides compelling considerations to take the effective scope of the Second Analogy to be narrow, only capturing a certain kind of scientific experience. Heidegger’s argument, then, can supplement Michael Friedman’s defense of this position.

However, mounting the argument in this way does deviate somewhat from Friedman’s depiction of the scope of the Second Analogy. In pursuing a ‘weak interpretation’ of the Second Analogy, I do not offer considerations in favor of Friedman’s suggestion that we identify events in regard to specific, Newtonian causal laws. On this weak interpretation, I suggest, Kant captures what it is like to take a theoretical, observational attitude to events generally, rather than only within the paradigm of Newtonian physics. While Friedman relativizes the scope of the Second Analogy both across contexts (it captures scientific, rather than everyday, experience), and across times (Kant captures Newtonian science, but not “twentieth century physics,” Friedman 1994: 29), my argument only relativizes the scope across contexts.¹¹² On this reading of the Second Analogy, even the scientist of today could use the concept of cause to order the events being observed, as this merely involves taking the second state perceived to follow from the first necessarily, according to some (not necessarily specified) rule. Unlike Friedman, the argument I offer in this part of the dissertation is compatible with the idea that there has not been historical variation in scientific

¹¹² This is not to say that my argument could not be supplemented with further reasons to historically relativize Kant’s categories; rather, I flag here only that historical relativization will not be an outcome of my argument in this dissertation, though I am interested in pursuing this topic elsewhere.

experience; further arguments, which I do not have the space to offer here, are required to support the stronger position.

Before moving to the next section, I would like to remind the reader that, even though Heidegger offers (with Friedman) a critical take on the scope of the categories – Kant did not achieve as much as he intended to in his Second Analogy argument – Heidegger's early phenomenology proceeds from some basic Kantian considerations. In this way, Heidegger's reconstruction of different contexts of experience is still Kantian in nature. When I say that Heidegger takes on Kantian considerations, I do not mean merely the claims that Heidegger attributes to Kant in his controversial reading of the text. I do not wish to assume that Heidegger is right that the complex machinery I discussed in Chapter 2 (i.e. the form of original temporality) underlies Kant's analyses in the Transcendental Deduction. Indeed, I hope that the argument in this part of the dissertation can serve as independent grounds for adopting Heidegger's interpretation (in addition to textual grounds, there are philosophical reasons to limit the scope of Kant's arguments).

However, I argue that Heidegger adopts a Kantian starting point even on a more mainstream reading of Kant's project. In particular, as I outlined in Chapter 1, Heidegger accepts the idea that our experience of empirical (ontic) objects is structured and enabled by synthetic a priori (ontological) knowledge that we possess ahead of time. As he considers the contexts of experience that Kant neglects in his analysis (on Heidegger's view), he follows the Kantian procedure of considering the ontological structures that constitute our perceptual experience of particulars in these contexts. As Heidegger approaches these other contexts, he aims to capture the prior understanding, or expectations, that are at work in this context. In particular, we will see Heidegger inquire

into the prior understanding that enables and structures our experience of the ready-to-hand, and the prior understanding that enables and structures our experience of humans. I argue that this is the basic, Kantian starting point that Heidegger takes to his phenomenological analyses, even as he disagrees with Kant on the scope of the categories, relativizing them to but one domain of experience.

2. Contribution to the Experience/Explanation Debate

The second debate concerning the interpretation of the Second Analogy concerns whether Kant's argument describes what is necessary for *experiencing* an event or a change, and what is necessary for *explaining* an event or a change. I acknowledge that my descriptions of the Second Analogy have so far tipped the hat in favor of the first interpretation, where it treats our experience of an event. However, considering the explanation interpretation will be instructive for making the target of the Heideggerian interpretation precise.

In the first camp, interpreters argue that Kant is describing what is necessary for experiencing or being aware of an event. Henry Allison is a good spokesperson for this camp.¹¹³ Allison argues that “the Second Analogy is concerned with *the form of the thought* of an objective succession, the condition for which is supplied by the schema of causality” (Allison 2004: 257; italics mine). The argument provides, in other words, what is required for us to think an event – to access that an event is happening. Allison argues that, on Kant's account, “the schema [of causality] provides the transcendental condition for that *initial experience* of an event” (Allison 2004: 257, italics mine). In order to be

¹¹³ Longuenesse also falls in this camp (Longuenesse 2005: 233).

aware of an event, we must draw on the schema of causality to order our perceptions; we must, that is, take the second state we perceived to follow the first, according to a rule.

Paul Guyer is a good spokesperson for the second camp. Guyer suggests that the Second Analogy describes what we must do to confirm a judgment that an event has occurred – that is, which conceptual resources are necessary for us to justify or explain our judgment that an event has occurred. Guyer argues that, according to the causal principle that Kant defends in the Second Analogy, “an event can be determined to have occurred only if there is a rule which entails that one of its constituent states must have succeeded the other” (Guyer 1987: 259). Generalizing beyond the causal principle, Guyer claims that “to call a principle a condition of the possibility of experience is to say no more and no less than that it is a necessary condition for the justification, verification, or confirmation of the judgments about empirical objects that we make on the basis of our representations” (Guyer 1987: 246). Accordingly, the concept of cause goes toward “constituting the framework for our epistemic practice of judging about objects, rather than that of constituting either the objects themselves or the psychological processes by which we come to have images of or beliefs about them” (Guyer 1987: 246). Our initial experience or awareness of the event does not draw on the concept of cause; however, we must draw on this concept to explain our judgment that an event has occurred.

Heidegger’s interpretation falls squarely into the first camp. Across his interpretative works on Kant, Heidegger makes it clear that he takes Kant to be concerned with “the antecedent understanding of being” that makes a particular being ‘accessible’ or makes the ‘encounter’ with a being possible (PIK 38). Further, Heidegger suggests that categories like causality enable our encounter with objects, offering the “preliminary

horizon for the possible encountering of all objects” (KPM 73). These categories are in use – shaping our experience of objects – prior to our engaging in epistemological practices like justifying our claims. Accordingly, Heidegger suggests that the Second Analogy is about our experience of events, arguing that “the preliminary transcendental representation of [the causal] law is already the condition of the possibility of us at all encountering events as such” (EHF 131). Experiencing events, rather than explaining them, is at issue in the Second Analogy.

My analysis that follows will concentrate, then, on the interpretation of the Second Analogy as an account of experiencing events, rather than explaining them. Focusing on this interpretation will bring out Heidegger’s main intervention. Following Section 1 above, I will argue that as an account of experiencing events, the Second Analogy is narrow in scope: it does not capture our experience of human events or our experience of ready-to-hand events.

However, I would like to note that Heidegger does provide resources to argue for a narrow-scope reading of Guyer’s version of the Second Analogy. Heidegger suggests that, in offering an ontology of the present-at-hand alone, Kant’s categories do not apply to every area of scientific explanation. For example, rather than material things, history attempts to explain humans, and biology attempts to explain life. Based on their differing subject matter, Heidegger suggests that each area will rely on disparate fundamental concepts. Therefore, by extension, a historical or biological explanation of an event will not rely on the concept of cause from Kant’s ontology; it will not make appeal to causal laws to justify the judgment that a (historical or biological) change has occurred. This account suggests that justifying a claim like “Petrarch opened the Renaissance” (Danto

1965: 157) – or even, “the Renaissance opened” – requires different conceptual resources than justifying a claim like “the ship changed location.” I flag this as a potential area for further research, but leave the point aside here so as to focus on Heidegger’s main intervention.

Moving forward, I will argue that we can draw on different conceptual resources to organize our perceptions such that we experience an event (leaving aside what might be required to explain an event). On that note, I will in the next section make a few remarks on Heidegger’s approach to perception.

3. Heidegger on Perception

In this section, I will anticipate and respond to an objection to this part of my project. The objection is that Kant narrowly focused on perceptual experience; in the Second Analogy, for example, Kant concerns himself with perceiving an alteration or a change. I have proposed to use Heidegger to suggest that Kant does not capture every domain of experience with his account; our perceptual experience of change is different in other domains. It might be objected, however, that Heidegger does not have the resources to make such a claim, for Heidegger attempts to move away from accounts of experience that privilege perception.¹¹⁴

First, I will clarify the relationship between experience and perception in the Second Analogy. Though perception is a major player in the Second Analogy, it should

¹¹⁴ For example, Heidegger discusses “the remarkable priority of ‘seeing,’” noting that Parmenides set the stage for a Western philosophical tradition that privileged perception: “Being is that which shows itself in the pure perception which belongs to beholding, and only by such seeing does Being get discovered. Primordial and genuine truth lies in pure beholding. This thesis has remained the foundation of Western philosophy ever since” (BT 171).

be noted that the upshot of the argument is that the concept of cause is required for *experience*, not perception (B234).¹¹⁵ In the B-deduction, Kant argues that, in experience, the sensible content that is given to us is organized or structured; “experience is cognition through connected perceptions” (B161). The Second Analogy specifies one way in which perceptions are connected in order to constitute experience. In order for us to appreciate ‘objective succession’ – the order in which things occur, rather than just the order in which we perceive things (‘subjective succession’) – we must draw on the concept of cause. Rather than suggesting that the concept of cause is in any wise required for *perception*, Kant takes it for granted that we have perceptions (sensible content) in the course of this argument – momentary, self-contained perceptions of, say, a house (its roof, its basement) or a ship (upstream, downstream). The question is how we order these perceptions to appreciate an event. Kant answers this question by saying that the concept of cause allows us to order our perceptions irreversibly. In so doing, the concept of cause makes experience possible, where we appreciate an objective time order in distinction from the mere subjective course of perception.

However, Kant does not have a naïve view of perception, where we have some access to sense data prior to conceptualization; he argues against the empiricist view that sense data alone would provide the building blocks for conceptualization, such that we perceive first and understand second. Indeed, the outcome of Kant’s argument in the Transcendental Deduction, discussed in Chapter 2 above, is that even our having a single, self-contained perception (i.e. in the synthesis of apprehension) requires prior conceptual

¹¹⁵ This interpretation continues to fit that of Allison, who says that the Second Analogy “endeavors to show that the category functions as a condition of experience rather than mere apprehension or perception” (Allison 2004: 199).

resources (i.e. the synthesis of recognition). There is no ‘bare perception’, but rather perception is always informed in advance by a priori categories. Heidegger, of course, concurs with this view of perception, though he expands on it to suggest that the temporal structure of human cognition, which takes up prior categories (not necessarily those of Kant), informs our perception.¹¹⁶ Regardless, the Second Analogy is not an argument aimed at showing what is required for us to have single perceptions of individual states; it shows, rather, what is required for experience, where perceptions are connected.

Though Kant makes it clear that it is experience, and not perception, that is at stake in the Second Analogy argument, the sort of experience he describes is tied closely to perception; he is concerned with an experience where our perceptions are irreversibly ordered by way of the concept of cause. I will argue that Heidegger shows us a different way in which we structure or order what we sense such that we appreciate an alteration – arguing, therefore, that a different sort of experience of events from the one Kant describes is possible.

However, one might think that, in offering a new, alternate account of our perceptual experience of events, I stretch Heidegger too far. Heidegger took the single-minded focus on perceptual experience – the experience of perceiving objects before us – to lead to an ontology of the present-at-hand. Heidegger, by contrast, wanted to expand this focus and capture *other sorts* of experience. For example, when he provides his analysis of ready-to-hand equipment, he suggests that “the kind of dealing which is close to us is as we have shown not a *bare perceptual cognition*, but rather that kind of concern

¹¹⁶ “All sight is grounded primarily in understanding” (BT 147); “When we have to do with anything, the mere seeing of the Things which are closest to us bears in itself the structure of interpretation...” (BT 149).

which manipulates things and puts them to use” (BT 67, italics mine). Heidegger does not privilege perception as a way of accessing beings. If this is the case, wouldn’t Heidegger be happy to leave the characterization of perceptual experience to Kant, allowing that Kant did in fact offer the ontological concepts for such an experience? Does Heidegger really have an alternate ontology to offer in the limited case of organizing what we perceive?

Though Heidegger surely wishes to move away from privileging perceptual experience, his expansion of experience beyond the domain of the present-at-hand to include the ontologies of the ready-to-hand and Dasein has implications for perceptual experience. His alternate ontologies suggest an alternate way to organize what we perceive – an alternate way to order sensible content. For the sake of simplicity, I will confine my discussion to the ‘ready-to-hand’ equipment that we make use of in our everyday lives.

First, I argue that our engagement with the ready-to-hand has some sensory element. This commonsense point is, indeed, already suggested when Heidegger argues that we have a different kind of sight for the ready-to-hand, which he calls ‘circumspection’ (BT 69). Heidegger’s claim is not that we do not perceive the ready-to-hand entities, but rather that we do not merely perceive them (in a naïve empiricist sense); we bring prior understanding to our perception such that “we never perceive equipment that is ready-to-hand without already understanding and interpreting it” (BT 149).

Second, as is clear in Heidegger’s discussion of ‘breakdown’ cases – cases where our engagement with the ready-to-hand is interrupted for some reason or another, say an

equipment malfunction – we do not appreciate objects as present-at-hand (using present-at-hand categories) while engaging fully with the ready-to-hand. Heidegger claims that objects become ‘conspicuous’ in a breakdown; we come to notice the present-at-hand properties of equipment, for example that the equipment “looks so and so” (BT 73). In such a case, Heidegger suggests, “pure presence-at-hand announces itself in such equipment, but only to withdraw to the readiness-to-hand of something with which one concerns oneself—that is to say, of the sort of thing we find when we put it back to repair” (BT 73). Once the equipment is repaired, in other words, we no longer attend to the present-at-hand properties, and instead appreciate the equipment as ready-to-hand. Of course, present-at-hand understanding is always at our disposal and we can make use of it at a moment’s notice (the malfunction, for example, immediately draws our attention to physical properties). However, there is not a dual awareness of entities when we are engaging fully with the ready-to-hand. In ready-to-hand engagement, the present-at-hand ‘withdraws’.

Third, changes happen in and among the ready-to-hand; the hammer swings, the sails fill with wind, a clock ticks. When Heidegger describes our engagement with the ready-to-hand, he describes a dynamic engagement – “hammering,” “using,” “manipulating” (BT 69) – where we respond to the changes in our environment – changes in weather and daylight, vehicles ‘giving way’ and ‘stopping’ (BT 78), etc. Our ready-to-hand environment is not static and our appreciation of the ready-to-hand does not take it as such. We appreciate events or changes in equipment.

Fourth, Heidegger suggests that Kant’s categories, like causality, only offer an ontology of ‘present-at-hand Nature’ (PIK 30, EHF 20-21, etc.) and that the ready-to-

hand has its own “kind of Being” (BT 71) where “we understand in advance the tool-character” (PIK 16). If this is so, then we should not expect the ontology of the ready-to-hand to contain the concept of cause; there would be no reason to distinguish these ontologies if they contained the same concepts.

Therefore, I argue that Heidegger’s position suggests that there is an alternate way of perceptually experiencing ready-to-hand events (and those initiated by other Dasein) – alternate, that is, to the experience of events that Kant describes.¹¹⁷ The ontology of the ready-to-hand must offer an alternate way to organize what we sense such that we are aware of changes among the ready-to-hand. Indeed, I will suggest that Heidegger’s ontology of the ready-to-hand and Dasein can be developed to show what that alternate awareness of events looks like.

The question, then, is how we structure or organize what we sense, such that we appreciate a change, in the different domains of experience that Heidegger identifies in his early phenomenology.¹¹⁸

¹¹⁷ The same sort of argument can be made for the ontology of Dasein, which I do here in abbreviated form: (1) we sense other Dasein (cf. BT 118); (2) when we appreciate Dasein as Dasein, we do not draw on present-at-hand categories (cf. BT 118); (3) when we appreciate Dasein as Dasein, we are aware of changes in and among Dasein (cf. the reference to encountering others’ activity at BT 288); (4) as a present-at-hand category, the concept of cause does not belong to the ontology of Dasein (Heidegger explicitly rejects it as a way to understand Dasein, cf. BT 190, 246, 282-284); (5) therefore, our awareness of change in Dasein is not secured by the concept of cause.

¹¹⁸ An objection in the neighborhood of the one just considered is that seeking out an alternative to the concept of cause that can objectively order our perceptions is a fool’s errand, given that perception is itself causal. In particular, outer objects cause the perceptions we have; the concept of cause, then, cannot be eliminated from any good account of how we perceive. However, it must be noted that Kant’s argument in the Second Analogy, and my Heideggerian objection to it, is not about how we come to have perceptions – it is rather about how change is appreciated from the perspective of the perceiver. We need not be aware of the processes governing perception as we perceive.

4. Structure of the Argument for the Heideggerian Reading

In the chapters that remain, I will proceed as follows: I begin by reviewing Heidegger's interpretation of experience. We will see that Heidegger contrasts 'scientific experience' with not one, but two other kinds of experience (splitting 'commonsensical experience' into two): first, our experience of everyday objects and, second, our experience of other humans. Heidegger argues that Kantian experience does not capture either of the latter two domains. Therefore, beginning with Heidegger's trifold distinction between scientific experience, everyday experience (of the ready-to-hand), and social experience (of humans), provides a framework for testing Heidegger's claim that categories like causality do not constitute every region of experience.

I will first consider Heidegger's suggestion that Kant captures scientific experience in the Second Analogy. I will suggest that Heidegger can outsource the depiction of scientific experience to Kant when it comes to experiencing events. Kant provides a plausible depiction of what the experience of events looks like within a scientific context; Heidegger's contribution is to work on the edges of Kant's account, showing the contexts where the initially plausible account does not apply. Accordingly, I will next review offer an argument, based on Heidegger's discussion of history, that Kant fails to capture our experience of human events in the Second Analogy. I will then draw on his remarks to develop an alternate account of experiencing human events. From there, we will be prepared to see why Kant's account of experiencing events does not apply to the everyday (ready-to-hand) objects of our commonsensical experience. I will build on

Whatever mechanism is behind our ability to perceive, this need not play a role in our first-personal recognition that an event is happening.

my alternate account of experiencing human events to treat the domain where we experience ready-to-hand events.

We will see that Heidegger's argument limiting the scope of categories like causality suggests that these alternate domains are not mechanically structured, but teleologically structured. Human beings, oriented toward the future, understand themselves, other humans, and the ready-to-hand objects that they put to use, in terms of future projects. Because Kant offers his treatment of teleology in the Critique of Judgment, we must consider how this treatment might be able to supplement the Second Analogy argument, and whether it can shield Kant from Heidegger's suggestion that Kant does not capture our experience of human and ready-to-hand events. However, I will argue that, even considering Kant's critical works more broadly, Heidegger offers a more attractive depiction of what it is like to experience events in ready-to-hand equipment and human Dasein.

Chapter 5: An Alternate Ontology of Events

In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant discusses a stove warming a room as an example of a causal relationship. Kant states, “there is warmth in a room that is not to be encountered in the outside air. I look around for the cause, and find a heated stove” (A202/B247-8). Kant introduces the stove example because the simultaneity of the cause (heated stove) and the effect (warm room) might appear to be a counterexample to the theory of causality that he has just espoused. Kant has suggested that an effect follows a cause in time necessarily, according to a rule. However, the stove example is one where both cause and effect are simultaneous in the present moment. Kant maintains that “here there is no succession in time between cause and effect, rather they are simultaneous, yet the law still holds” (A202-203/B248). He explains that, even when there is temporal overlap between the cause and effect, we take it that the cause must have preceded the effect in time – the stove was heated, prior to the room warming – though the time between the coming about of the cause and the coming about of effect may indeed be “vanishing” in length. The room could not have been warmed prior to the heating of the stove; the heating of the stove must have come first.

This clinical depiction of a stove warming a room, where an observer perceives the room and ferrets out the causal relationships among its contents, stands in stark contrast to a parallel discussion of warm stoves offered by Heidegger. Though Heidegger’s invocation of warm stoves is offered for different purposes, his discussion reveals a different sensibility concerning how we approach everyday objects.

In Heidegger’s discussion, the heated stove appears when Heidegger fondly recollects an anecdote about one of his favorite philosophers, Heraclitus. In the “Letter on

Humanism” (1947), Heidegger recounts a story where visitors of Heraclitus expect to find the great thinker in “profound meditation”:

Instead of this the sightseers find Heraclitus by a stove. That is surely a common and insignificant place. True enough, bread is baked here. But Heraclitus is not even busy baking at the stove. He stands there merely to warm himself (LH 257). Inadvertently, Heidegger places a human – engaged in humble, everyday activity – right into the center of Kant’s example. In contrast to Kant, he emphasizes the stove in terms of its significance to human life. The stove is where bread is baked, and where people stand to warm themselves.

These two competing approaches to the objects and events we encounter in our everyday lives – understanding them in terms of mechanical relationships or understanding them in terms of practical significance – is the subject of the present chapter. In particular, I will consider whether Kant, in trying to provide a depiction of causality that applies to all events (or changes), fails to capture the common events that were right under his nose – the changes that we encounter and appreciate within a network of everyday, practical significance rather than clinically observing them from afar. I will inquire into two sorts of events: events that are brought about by humans (human events), and events that we encounter as we deal with everyday equipment (ready-to-hand events).

In probing the scope of Kant’s analysis of event perception, I test a consequence of Heidegger’s interpretation of Kant that was developed in the first half of the dissertation: namely, Heidegger’s suggestion that Kant’s categories do not apply universally to our experience, but rather they capture a single domain of experience. This

reading challenges the consensus interpretation of Kant, where categories like causality are taken to apply universally. For example, Longuenesse, Allison, and Strawson suggest (against Friedman) that Kant's analysis of experiencing events, where the concept of cause allows us to be aware of events, applies widely to everyday events, rather than narrowly to a class of scientific events. However, I motivate Heidegger's reading by showing the limits of Kant's analysis of experiencing events in the Second Analogy, arguing that Kant's analysis does not apply to human events or ready-to-hand events. If we construe the scope of the categories universally, then the Second Analogy is open to these two counterexamples. Construed narrowly, the Second Analogy argument works – but only when construed narrowly. Thus, while the consensus interpretation might be right about the intended scope of Kant's argument, I argue that this counterexample pushes us to see the scope of Kant's argument more narrowly. In effect, Kant's claims about experience in the Second Analogy refer only to a subset of our encounters with events, rather than every single encounter.

In Section 1, I specify Heidegger's reading of the scope of Kant's categories, introducing Heidegger's ontological distinction between present-at-hand, ready-to-hand, and Dasein to elucidate his reading. In the second section, I argue that human events are a counterexample to Kant's Second Analogy argument. I go on to provide a more robust account of this alternate form of experiencing events. In the third section, I argue that this alternate form of experiencing events also captures ready-to-hand events, arguing that the ready-to-hand is another counterexample to Kant's account of experiencing events. This critical reading of the Second Analogy suggests that Heidegger correctly identified the

bounds of Kant's account of experience, offering a consideration in favor of Heidegger's reading of Kant.

1. Heidegger's Interpretation of Kantian Experience

In Chapter 3, I reviewed Heidegger's claim that Kant's categories are narrow in scope, constituting only one 'region of beings'. While we saw that Heidegger denies that the categories, as Kant specifies them, apply to the human being, I did not identify the exact spread of the categories – that is, which region they do capture. Inquiring into Heidegger's interpretation of Kant's term 'experience' will bring out the exact scope of the categories. Attending to his claims about 'experience' leads to Heidegger's ontological distinction between the Dasein, the ready-to-hand, and the present-at-hand, allowing us to specify the spread of the categories (as Heidegger construes it) more precisely.

Due to the centrality of the Second Analogy for my argument, I will concretize Heidegger's interpretation of Kantian 'experience' using this argument. Therefore, I take the opportunity here to remind the reader of the basic outline of Kant's argument in this chapter. In general, the Analogies of Experience provide *a priori* principles that apply to all of experience. The Second Analogy argues in particular for the principle that every event has a cause.¹¹⁹ Kant argues that we must draw on the concept of cause to distinguish between the arbitrarily changing perceptions we have of stable objects (for example, when we see the roof of a house, and then its basement) and the changing perceptions we have of changing objects (for example, when we see a ship at point A, and then further downstream at point B). In the latter case, we take our changing

¹¹⁹ Cf. B232.

perceptions to be in an irreversible order, representing an objective change in the world, by positing a causal relationship between the first state perceived and the second (for example, the first state is the cause of the second).¹²⁰ The concept of cause – our concept of one thing following another in time necessarily, according to a rule – allows us to objectively order our perceptions. Because the concept of cause is our point of entry into the objective time order, it is the condition for the possibility of experience. The principle “every event has a cause” applies to all of experience, because we only experience an event – appreciate an event’s happening – by way of the concept of cause.

The scope of the term ‘experience’ is linked with the scope of Kant’s categories. According to Kant, the categories are ‘conditions for the possibility of experience.’ In other words, Kant suggests that we require the categories in order to have experience; without the categories ordering our perceptions, experience would not be possible. In this way, the categories constitute our experience. We saw in the introduction to Part II that the consensus interpretation of Kant takes experience to include our everyday, commonsensical experience. For example, according to the interpretation of the Second Analogy offered by Longuenesse, Allison, Strawson, and others, we employ the concept of cause to perceive changes or events in our everyday lives. Further, interpreters like Watkins and Ameriks argue for an even wider spread to the argument, where the concept of cause constitutes our experience of events in both everyday and scientific contexts. Call these interpretations of experience, where experience encompasses (at least) our day-to-day experience of the world around us, the *wide interpretation of experience*. In

¹²⁰ As Guyer emphasizes, the concept of cause can also enable one to objectively order perceptions if one takes it that the first thing perceived is simultaneous with the cause of the second (so it is not itself the cause) (see Guyer 1999; Guyer 1987: 240).

contrast to the wide interpretation, we will see that Heidegger offers a *narrow interpretation of experience*. Heidegger argues, in the same vein as Friedman, that Kant's categories only constitute a specific kind of scientific experience.

In The Essence of Human Freedom (EHF), Heidegger defines “all experience” (in Kant's sense) as “all theoretical knowledge of what is present-at-hand before us as nature [*vorhandenen Natur*]” (EHF 20-21).¹²¹ Likewise, Heidegger suggests that “Experience is the way present-at-hand-beings [*das Seiende selbst im Zusammenhang seines Vorhandenseins*] become accessible to man” (EHF 108; cf. EHF 20-21). The language that Heidegger uses in this passage – present-at-hand – recalls the distinction that Heidegger famously draws in Being and Time (BT) between the present-at-hand (*Vorhandensein*), the ready-to-hand (*Zuhandensein*), and the human being (*Dasein*). Heidegger's distinction between the present-at-hand, ready-to-hand, and Dasein is obviously external to Kant's text. However, inquiring into this distinction can shed light on the scope of Kant's account of experience – and more specifically, the scope of his account of experiencing events. First, the distinction points us to the class of beings that Heidegger takes Kant to capture in his account of experience – namely, the present-at-hand – as well as the classes of beings that might escape Kant's analysis of events – that is, the ready-to-hand and Dasein. Second, Heidegger's account of the distinction indicates why these beings do not conform to Kant's analysis. Finally, Heidegger's account points toward an alternate analysis of events available for these beings. Let us consider, then, this distinction that is external to Kant's text.

¹²¹ I modify this and following quotations to reflect the typical English translation of *Vorhandensein* and related terms (cf. EHF 108).

Heidegger's definition of experience as 'present-at-hand Nature' in EHF suggests that Kant captured our experience of the present-at-hand, but not that of the ready-to-hand or Dasein. This claim is also implied by Heidegger's statement that "Kant did not see the phenomenon of world" (BT 368). Heidegger develops this claim further in the Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason (PIK). His discussion suggests that missing the phenomenon of world has two nodes: missing the kind of being of Dasein, who *has* a world, and missing the being of the ready-to-hand, which are *innerworldly*.¹²² However, Heidegger does not demonstrate that this claim is true of Kant in this section (e.g. by examining Kant's arguments); indeed, a glance at the original manuscript (*1927-1928 Handschrift*: 3a) shows that this claim was inserted into the margin of the lecture course, rather than being incorporated into Heidegger's first pass at the section.¹²³ The present chapter will piece together Heidegger's reasoning for suggesting that Kant only offers an ontology of the present-at-hand.

¹²² Heidegger also makes it clear in his critique of Descartes that 'passing over the phenomenon of world' goes hand in hand with passing over "the Being of those entities within-the-world which are proximally ready-to-hand." Descartes passes over "both" (BT 95).

¹²³ Since the insertion is written in the same pen and handwriting, this suggests that Heidegger added this remark soon after writing the original section. Though one can piece together Heidegger's argument for this claim, Heidegger does not explicitly defend the claim that Kant misses the phenomenon of world elsewhere in the text. Heidegger's only other reference to Kant in this section – that Kant "wanders among these problems without seeing them as such" (3b) – was also added in the margin. A pencil marking rather than the original black pen, this note would seem to have been added even later, at a different sitting. Heidegger's initial intention in this section, it would seem, was to provide the phenomenological underpinnings necessary to his interpretation without reference to Kant, arriving upon the precise connections to Kant only after his first pass writing the lecture. The ways in which these phenomenological categories relate to Kant are not developed organically in the discussion.

My discussion will follow the distinctions between Dasein, the ready-to-hand, and the present-at-hand as they are developed in PIK, though I will draw on BT when necessary.¹²⁴ While PIK offers the components of Heidegger's early phenomenology that Heidegger deemed relevant for the Kant course, the section in PIK implicitly refers to larger discussions that Heidegger offers in BT, background knowledge with which Heidegger could expect his students to be familiar. In these discussions, Heidegger distinguishes between the being we encounter – Dasein, the ready-to-hand (or equipment), and the present-at-hand (or material things) – and their “mode of being” or “kind of being.” The kind of being is the basic ontological structure of those beings: Existence, readiness-to-hand, and presence-at-hand, respectively. Though offering a critical take on the scope of Kant's categories, Heidegger's elaboration of the different kinds of beings follows the basic Kantian insight that our experience of something is enabled and structured by an a priori understanding.

¹²⁴ It should be noted that the distinction between present-at-hand, ready-to-hand, and Dasein is not exhaustive; it does not capture every way that something could be. As Heidegger notes in the Kant lectures, animals and plants do not fit comfortably into any of these three categories: “Animals are not present-at-hand like rocks, but they also do not exist in comporting themselves to a world. Nevertheless in plants we find a kind of orientation toward other beings which in a certain way surround them” (PIK 14). We require different ontological categorizations to make sense of plants and animals.

Heidegger's lecture notes reveal uncertainty about where to situate plants and animals in relation to Heidegger's leading concept of world. A leaflet inserted alongside this section in the manuscript (*1927-1928 Handschrift*: note 3a(b)) lists various kinds of beings as they relate to the world, reading in part:

m. Dasein	: Existenz	: In d. W. s.
Pflanz und Tiere	: Leben	: —?
materi. Dinge	: Vorhandensein	: Weltlos

While Dasein is Being-in-the-world and material things are worldless, the relationship of animals and plants to the world is left as an open question. Heidegger partially resolves this question in his 1929-30 course, Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, arguing that animals are “world poor” (GA29/30: 263f.).

Heidegger begins his discussion with Dasein: “Human Dasein is a being which has a world...the mode of being of Dasein, existence, is essentially determined by being-in-the-world” (PIK 13-14).¹²⁵ To shed light on Dasein’s kind of being, then, Heidegger defines the ‘world’ that Dasein has. Namely, he defines the world as “that particular whole toward which we comport ourselves at all times” (PIK 14). As Heidegger explains in BT, the world, as he conceptualizes it, is not a mere aggregate of objects, but a unified whole (BT 64). In particular, its parts are unified by a ‘for-the-sake-of-which’ – a “possibility of Dasein’s Being” – that is to say, an identity that Dasein takes up (BT 84). The philosopher’s world, for example, is populated by pencils, papers, desks, and books. These entities are interrelated or “involved” with one another – one writes on the paper, atop the desk – on the basis of the everyday ways that philosophers use the entities to pursue their philosophical work (to realize their identities, as philosophers). The gardener, by contrast, has a world populated by gardening gloves (to grip) shovels (to dig into) soil, and the carpenter has a world populated by hammers (to drive) nails (into) boards. Moreover, due to the particularity of our identities, the definiteness of our projects, our world is a ‘particular’ whole.

The final component of Heidegger’s definition of world is that Dasein ‘comports itself to the world at all times’. Heidegger explains that “all comportment toward beings carries within it an understanding of the manner and constitution of the being of the beings in question” (PIK 16). That is to say, when we comport ourselves, we draw on past understanding of what things are like. In line with the previous analysis, we take up

¹²⁵ Referencing Kantian terminology, Heidegger suggests in BT that Being-in-the-world is “a state of Dasein which is necessary a priori” (BT 53).

this understanding to pursue the activities aligned with our identity. The philosopher, gardener, and carpenter all pursue their work in standard ways, drawing on past traditions to make sense of the world around them.¹²⁶

Heidegger's discussion of Being-in-the-world in PIK exhibits the ontological, temporal structure of Dasein that Heidegger identifies in BT: "ahead-of-itself-in-already-being-in-a-world" (BT 192).¹²⁷ Dasein is ahead-of-itself, primarily oriented toward the future; it is oriented toward a global identity (a for-the-sake-of-which) that it is trying to be (e.g. being a philosopher), and the more local activities that are tied to that identity (e.g. completing this manuscript). However, Dasein is also already-in-the-world, drawing on past traditions and standard ways of interpreting in its pursuit of future projects. Oriented toward the future and taking up the past in service of that future, Dasein is "alongside" entities in the present (BT 192). The entities that immediately surround us are revealed in light of the past and future.

Heidegger suggests that Dasein is able to encounter beings of a certain kind – whether other Dasein, the ready-to-hand, or the present-at-hand – by taking up a certain comportment. In the lecture series, he portrays a comportment as taking up a specific end (e.g. employing, knowing), which, in turn, calls upon a prior understanding that is in service to that end. All access to entities is enabled by a comportment. This means that we always see the entities around us *as* something; "when we have to do with anything,

¹²⁶ Heidegger's discussion of Dasein in PIK also highlights Dasein's freedom – that the world toward which we comport ourselves is one that we choose; "only a being which can be resolved and has resolved itself in such and such a way can have a world" (PIK 15). Dasein takes up a way of understanding, determining the world that it occupies.

¹²⁷ Heidegger names this structure 'care' and indeed suggests that "Being-in-the-world is essentially care" (BT 193).

the mere seeing of the Things which are closest to us bears in itself the structure of interpretation” (BT 149). We see entities in light of the identities that we pursue, and in light of the prior understanding that we take up. Heidegger does mention a limit case: ‘merely staring,’ a stupefied gaze where no background understanding is in play. However, he argues that this case represents “a failure to understand” (BT 149); ‘merely staring’ does not provide any sort of privileged access to entities (despite empiricist accounts suggesting otherwise). Whenever we make sense of something, we bring a prior understanding.

Heidegger suggests that one sort of entity that we make sense of – i.e. an entity that is revealed to us in light of a prior understanding – is Dasein itself. Indeed, Heidegger suggests that we encounter other Dasein ‘within-the-world,’ arguing that the kind of Being which belongs to the Dasein of others, as we encounter it within-the-world, differs from readiness-to-hand or presence-at-hand. Thus Dasein’s world frees entities which not only are quite distinct from equipment and Things, but which also – in accordance with their being as Dasein – are ‘in’ the world in which they are at the same time encountered within-the-world and are ‘in’ it by Being-in-the-world (BT 118).

In this passage, Heidegger suggests that when we appreciate Dasein as Dasein, we do not instrumentalize Dasein as ready-to-hand or objectify Dasein as present-at-hand. Rather, we appreciate the distinctiveness of Dasein – that is, that they organize the world, understanding the entities around themselves and even themselves in terms of future projects and past traditions. For this reason, “Dasein” is not on par with the ready-to-hand or present-at-hand; rather, Dasein’s special temporal structure is the condition for the

other two kinds of being, allowing entities to be taken as ready-to-hand or present-at-hand.

Heidegger next discusses “innerworldly beings,” arguing that “the predominant comportment whereby we generally discover innerworldly beings is application, employment of things for use, dealing with tools of transportation, tools of sewing, tools for writing, tools for working—tools in the broadest sense” (PIK 15). When we aim to employ or use things, we find the innerworldly; that is, we appreciate the entities around us *as equipment*. In order for us to do so, Heidegger suggests, “we must already understand ahead of time something like tool and tool-character” (PIK 16). To encounter a piece of equipment, we make use of a prior understanding of what it means to be equipment.

Heidegger’s discussion of readiness-to-hand in BT brings out the ontological structures that define equipment; after all, he argues that “the kind of being which equipment possesses—in which it manifests itself in its own right – we call readiness-to-hand [*Zuhandenheit*]” (BT 69). Heidegger’s discussion of equipment (*Zeug*) in PIK obviously references this discussion, though Heidegger does not adopt the theoretical language of readiness-to-hand. Perhaps calling this area of beings the “innerworldly” helped Heidegger to better indicate the dual way in which Kant misses the phenomenon of world (‘Being-in-the-world’ being one node and the ‘innerworldly’ being the other); or, perhaps he was reluctant to import more of his own vocabulary into an interpretation of

Kant.¹²⁸ Regardless, I will use the language of the ready-to-hand (the being we encounter) and readiness-to-hand (its kind of being) to fit with scholarly discussions about Heidegger's analysis of equipment.

In BT, Heidegger suggests that we understand ready-to-hand beings as “for” and “with” (BT 75). We understand equipment as being *for* something – as having a certain use. The hammer is *for* hammering; Heidegger also refers to this as its “in-order-to” (BT 68). Because of this general use we can put it toward specific tasks, like building a table; the hammer, then, is involved in a particular “towards-this” (BT 74). Further, we understand tools not individually, but *with* other equipment: “To the Being of any equipment there always belongs a totality of equipment, in which it can be the equipment that it is” (BT 68). The way that one piece of equipment is *with* other pieces is determined by its *for*. The hammer belongs to the nail and board because that is how one makes a table; further, it belongs to them as a “totality” rather than a collection, because they are involved with another in determinate ways (the hammer *drives* the nail *into* the board). Our prior understanding of the tool-character is the understanding that tools are used for certain ends, in concert with other tools.

Accordingly, Heidegger suggests that when we perceive the ready-to-hand, we tend to overlook the individual tools that we are utilizing; the tool ‘withdraws’ (BT 69). This is because our everyday seeing does not focus on discrete objects, but the task at hand, and the network of equipment required for that task. The carpenter does not stare at his hammer, nail or board individually, but focuses, rather, on the items coming together

¹²⁸ Heidegger does continue to use this vocabulary during this period. For example, in his 1929-1930 lecture course, he references *Zuhandensein* (GA 29/30: 329) and *zu handen* (GA 29/30: 476).

in such a way that the final outcome is produced (ensuring, say, that the nail is driven into the board properly). Heidegger emphasizes, further, that our engagement with the ready-to-hand is preontological (PIK 17). Though a theorist can formulate the basic structures of understanding underlying readiness-to-hand – that is, spell out the ontology of the ready-to-hand – such a formulation is neither necessary nor useful as we attempt to employ the innerworldly beings around us. We discover ready-to-hand equipment by using it – toward its end, and within the network that is organized by that end. This behavior reflects a basic understanding of equipment, without that understanding becoming explicit.

By contrast, Heidegger suggests that when we take a “scientific comportment” (PIK 19) or a “knowing comportment” (PIK 15) to our surrounding environment, we find not equipment but “material things” (PIK 14).¹²⁹ These material things have presence-at-hand as their kind of being.¹³⁰ Heidegger suggests that we discover present-at-hand

¹²⁹ In the Kant course, Heidegger discusses the present-at-hand only as it is discovered in a scientific context, avoiding the complex, intermediary cases considered in BT. In BT, for example, we might come to appreciate the materiality of beings as we go about practical activity, and, say, our equipment breaks (cf. BT 73). Because Heidegger did not deem these details relevant for his interpretation of Kant, I will not dwell on them here, though I will touch on them later in the chapter.

¹³⁰ As many commentators have noted, Heidegger uses the term ‘present-at-hand’ in several different ways in *Being and Time*, a practice that continues in his interpretive works on Kant. Therefore, I would like to briefly justify my claim that we determine present-at-hand beings in respect to their materiality or physical properties. Heidegger sometimes uses “present-at-hand” to refer to beings that are not Dasein (i.e. beings whose ontological makeup is captured by categories rather than existentials); this usage ranges over both ready-to-hand equipment and beings considered in terms of their materiality (BT 45). In PIK, these are the “merely present-at-hand” (PIK 14). He also uses the term to refer to individual beings that we aim to know in terms of their essential properties (BT 158). Here, we could aim to know a rock (in terms of its materiality), as well as an abstract mathematical entity or “psychic” beings like mental states (PIK 46). In PIK, these beings are the “present-at-hand in general” (PIK 30, 46). Finally, the term refers to

beings when we aim to know what objects are like independently of practical contexts of equipment, absent holistic relationships with other equipment and practical goals – when we want to know what those beings are like ‘for themselves’ rather than ‘for us’. Seeking out the “context-free” properties of our objects of inquiry (to borrow a term from Dreyfus 1993: 84), “all those purposes of comportment are omitted which aim at employment of what is uncovered and known” (PIK 19). Therefore, as Taylor Carman puts it, we take the present-at-hand to be a “mere spatiotemporal presence” (Carman 2007: 135). When we seek to know in a scientific sense, we attempt to determine facts about discrete beings – ‘thematically ascertaining’ (BT 75) them, say, in terms of “a definite location-relationship” (BT 54) (e.g. ‘rock A is three centimeters from rock B’) or

those specific beings that are determined by the “mathematical natural sciences” – bodies that occupy a spatio-temporal location (taking up space over a period of time).

Heidegger suggests that “Being concerned with an ontology of the present-at-hand in general, a certain realm of the present-at-hand, namely the physical material nature, showed itself for Kant as an explicit basis” (PIK 46). He refers to “Kant’s basic aim at a universal ontology of what is present-at-hand in general” and suggests that “...what Kant wants to examine is the fundamental problem of the possibility of a science of beings and not a so-called epistemology of the mathematical natural sciences...But because Kant considers as unshaken and self-evident the traditional science of beings as the science of what is present-at-hand, because in a way beings are taken to be identical with the beings that belong to present-at-hand nature, therefore natural science is inevitably given a priority in the fundamental discussion of the possibility of a science of beings in general. However, because Kant, following the tradition, identifies beings with what is present-at-hand – as we shall see in our interpretation of the Critique – his posing of the problem suffers from a significant contraction” (PIK 30). These passages suggest that, while Kant intended to provide a more general (indeed, universal) ontology, capturing the basic structures required for us to know anything at all, he unwittingly (due to traditional prejudices concerning what it means to be) restricts himself to the ontology that structures mathematical natural science – the science of material things. The concept of cause belongs to that ontology, and the experience that Kant describes is our experience of material things.

“bodily properties” (BT 60) (e.g. the hammer “has the ‘property’ of heaviness,” BT 361).¹³¹

Heidegger describes scientific comportment as a “mere looking at and observing” (PIK 18). However, Heidegger is insistent that ‘mere looking’ in this case does not involve coming to the objects of one’s study with no preconceptions.¹³² As with the ready-to-hand, Heidegger suggests that our encounter with the present-at-hand is enabled by a prior understanding. For example, the “modern mathematical sciences of nature” (PIK 20-21), the science from which Kant took his cue (PIK 30), conceive nature “in advance” “as a closed system of locomotion of material bodies in time” (PIK 22). In advance, the present-at-hand are taken to be discrete, causally-interacting substances; they have just the sort of ontological properties that Kant identifies with his categories in the Critique of Pure Reason.

¹³¹ In line with the previous footnote, Heidegger suggests that a knowing comportment need not ‘uncover’ material beings; “many and entirely different areas of beings can become an object for scientific investigation. Depending on the factual nature of each being, the access to it, its thorough investigation, and correspondingly its conceptualization and mode of proof differ” (PIK 19). For example, while the natural sciences uncover present-at-hand nature, “biological inquiry” uncovers “life” (PIK 20). This discussion also references Heidegger’s 1927 lecture, “Phenomenology and Theology” (PIK 13), which suggests that theology ought to draw its concepts from “the basic constitution of human existence” (PT 19). In BT, Heidegger further identifies “historiological biography” and the “science of economics” as sciences that might objectify ready-to-hand equipment (BT 361).

These areas of beings do not have the same ‘factual nature,’ and Kant’s categories do not capture them. This is one place where one could develop an objection to Guyer’s reading of the Second Analogy, which suggests that the concept of cause is the only way for one to justify or explain events. In the next chapter, we will see, further, that Heidegger singles out history as one discipline where Kant’s concept of cause does not apply.

¹³² Therefore, it is to be contrasted with the ‘mere staring’ described above, where one fails to understand the object before oneself.

Heidegger suggests that, when we take the entities around us as present-at-hand, “this manner of knowing them has the character of depriving the world of its worldhood” (BT 65). When we experience the present-at-hand, we encounter an individual, in isolation from contextual involvements or the practical goals of the observer. However, experiencing the present-at-hand is also enabled by Being-in-the-world. We encounter the present-at-hand when we take up a future goal, the goal of knowing – when our for-the-sake-of-which becomes ‘uncovering beings’ (PIK 18). Further, as we have already seen in Heidegger’s interpretation of the synthesis of recognition,¹³³ determining any individual (i.e. picking it out and specifying its properties) requires a background familiarity with a larger context – for example, that the individual is a part of “a closed system of locomotion of material bodies in time” (PIK 21). This familiarity allows us to identify the individual (in this context, a distinct, material body), and determine it according to the basic presuppositions of the science (rather than making up one’s own rules, which would not amount to knowing). In this way, experiencing something present-at-hand relies upon our prior familiarity with a holistic context of beings – which, in turn, relies upon the structure of Dasein, whose projections toward goals bring us into a familiar context.¹³⁴

¹³³ See Section 2.3.3.

¹³⁴ The important difference between a scientific context and a practical context is that the relationships unifying the former context (e.g. causal relationships) are not relative to Dasein’s practical goal. This context is *selected* by Dasein’s practical goal (e.g. one takes up this ontological understanding because one wants to discover nature), but the entities are not related to each other in terms of that goal – as unified means for bringing the end about. Heidegger does say that “the absence of *praxis*, i.e., of technical dealing with things, is not at all characteristic of science” (PIK 18). For example, tools relate to one another in “the arrangement of an experiment” (PIK 18). However, one aims to uncover entities (using these tools) absent their use-relationships (rather as they are ‘in

Ontologically distinguishing between these three kinds of beings, Heidegger suggests that understanding each kind requires different conceptual resources; the prior understanding that makes sense of Dasein is distinct from the prior understanding that makes sense of the ready-to-hand or the present-at-hand. Further, we can alternate between these ontologies even as we consider a single entity. We can understand the person before us, for example, first in terms of their for-the-sake-of-which, and then in terms of their physical properties. However, when we move to objectify them, we are no longer appreciating them as Dasein. We are no longer appreciating the kind of being that belongs to humans; rather, we are appreciating them as a material being. As Heidegger puts this point, Dasein “can with some right and within certain limits be taken as merely present-at-hand. To do this, one must completely disregard or just not see the existential state of Being-in” (BT 55).

We now have Heidegger’s ontological distinctions between three kinds of beings before us: Dasein, the ready-to-hand, and the present-at-hand. Returning to Heidegger’s interpretation of Kantian ‘experience,’ what does it mean to say that experience for Kant is of ‘present-at-hand Nature’? Heidegger’s interpretation suggests that Kant’s account of experience only manages to capture our experience of one kind of being – the present-at-hand – missing beings that are ready-to-hand, and missing Dasein. As Heidegger puts it in PIK,

the Kantian ontology does not prove to be the ontology which ought to be equated with *metaphysica generalis*. This equation is legitimate only insofar as and as

themselves’): “the struggle is solely aimed at beings themselves, in order to tear the beings from concealment and thereby to assist beings unto their own, i.e., of letting them be what they are” (PIK 19).

long as ‘being’ is equated with ‘being present-at-hand’ and its concomitant determinations – an equation which has remained self-evident for the whole philosophical tradition up to now, but fundamentally without justification (PIK 136).¹³⁵

In other words, Kant sought to capture the basic a priori categories that structure our experience of any being whatsoever; he sought to construct an overarching ontology, a *metaphysica generalis*. However, Heidegger suggests that the ontology that Kant provides could only be ‘equated’ with *metaphysica generalis* if the present-at-hand are the only sorts of beings that are – that is, if “‘being’ is equated with ‘being present-at-hand.’” Heidegger’s early phenomenology seeks to undermine this assumption, arguing that the ready-to-hand and Dasein are different kinds of beings, structured by different ontologies. If Heidegger is right, this means that Kant offers only a ‘regional ontology’ (PIK 136). Kant captures our experience of the present-at-hand alone.

Heidegger’s interpretation reduces the scope of Kant’s claims about experience. For example, Heidegger’s interpretation has the following outcome when applied to the Second Analogy: The Second Analogy does not establish that we must use the concept of cause to experience any change whatsoever. Rather, it argues that we must use it to appreciate change in present-at-hand objects – objects that are theoretically considered (by a knowing, scientific comportment) in terms of their individual properties. For

¹³⁵ Heidegger’s own analyses in BT are supposed to rectify this shortcoming in the philosophical tradition, “ascertaining the a priori conditions not only for the possibility of the sciences which examine entities as entities of such and such a type, and in so doing, already operate with an understanding of Being, but also for the possibility of those ontologies themselves which are prior to the ontical sciences and provide their foundations” (BT 11).

Heidegger, then, the Second Analogy makes no claims about the changes we experience in equipment, and the changes we experience when encountering human activity. Of course, this reading is in the background of Heidegger's discussion of the Second Analogy in EHF, which is riddled with references to the present-at-hand. For example, he says that Kant's question in the Second Analogy – "how experience of occurrences as such (i.e. processes) is possible" – inquires into "the fundamental character of presence-at-hand as a context [*Vorhandenseins als eines Zusammenhang*]" (EHF 124/GA 31: 176). Kant's inquiry into our experience of events gets as far as a present-at-hand ontology, and no further.

Heidegger's interpretation of Kantian experience (and of the Second Analogy) is a departure from the consensus view, wherein experience is construed widely to include our everyday experience. In what follows, I will suggest that Heidegger is correct about the effective scope of Kant's Second Analogy argument (even if Kant intended a wider scope). I will do this by further developing Heidegger's account of perceiving Dasein (in the next section) and the ready-to-hand (in the third section), offering an alternate account of event perception for these classes of beings.

2. Human Events¹³⁶

Heidegger offers a brief but illuminating discussion of Kant's account of events in the Essence of Human Freedom (EHF); this discussion, along with his ontology of Dasein, suggests that our experience of events that are brought about by humans do not conform to Kant's account of experiencing events in the Second Analogy. I will argue that human events do not fit Kant's Second Analogy account, first, by expanding on

¹³⁶ This section is developed from Lambeth 2017.

Heidegger's claim in EHF that Kant's analysis of events does not capture our understanding of historical events. Drawing on Heidegger's ontology of Dasein, I will argue that the understanding of historical events mirrors our experience of contemporaneous (not-yet-historical) human-initiated events. The counterexample of human-initiated events, then, provides motivation to interpret the effective scope of Kant's claims in the Second Analogy more narrowly, as only applying to present-at-hand events.

In The Essence of Human Freedom, Heidegger briefly discusses a shortcoming of Kant's analysis of events, namely that it does not apply to historical events. Heidegger mentions this shortcoming in the context of discussing Kant's Third Antinomy claim that human cognizers are driven to search for complete grounds for an event – seeking out all the causes that preceded it – but not for completeness in its consequences. According to Kant, then, human cognition demands full information about the past, but not the future. Heidegger notes:

Incidentally, while this applies to the processes of corporeal nature, it does not apply in history [*Geschichte*], for historical occurrence is understood essentially from its consequences. The consequences of a historical event cannot be understood merely as following on in time. This is because the historical past is not defined through its position in the bygone, but through its future [*durch Möglichkeiten ihrer Zukunft*] (EHF 147).

In this passage, Heidegger indicates an understanding of historical events that differs from the understanding of events that Kant offers in the Second Analogy. In the Second Analogy, Kant suggests that we become aware of events by employing the concept of

cause, namely the concept that the present state follows necessarily from a past state; the ship moves from point A to B according to a law such that any ship in similar circumstances will move this way. When we identify an event, in other words, we take the present state we perceive to follow from a past state, according to a rule. Heidegger argues, though, that we do not define a historical event this way, “through its position in the bygone” – that is, in relation to the past from which it follows. Rather, the historical is a “differently constituted dimension of beings” (as Heidegger goes on to put it), wherein an event is defined “through its future.”¹³⁷ Heidegger goes on to suggest that Kant’s failure to capture historical events is one reason to accept his claim about the scope of Kantian experience: “Kant’s lack of attention to (and at bottom, his ignorance of) this differently constituted dimension of beings is indirect evidence for his taking the domain of appearances simply as the domain of present-at-hand things [*Bezirk des Vorhandenen*], i.e. nature in the broad sense” (EHF 147).

Unfortunately, Heidegger does not further develop these claims about historical events.¹³⁸ However, we can motivate Heidegger’s account by drawing on some examples from Danto, who defends a similar claim about defining historical events. Danto ascribes a class of sentences to historians – he calls them “narrative sentences” – that define an earlier event in terms of some later event. For example, “Petrarch opened the Renaissance” defines Petrarch’s intellectual work in terms of the Renaissance that followed (Danto 1965: 157). Likewise, the claim that “Piero da Vinci begat a universal genius” defines Piero da Vinci’s begetting activities in terms of the genius that his son Leonardo later

¹³⁷ Cf. IM 34: “History as happening is determined from the future.”

¹³⁸ Indeed, a glance at the manuscript for this lecture course reveals that this claim was an aside, a marginal addition to the lecture as it was initially written (1930 *Handschrift*: 40).

displayed (Danto 1965: 157). Finally, identifying 1618 as the beginning of the Thirty Years War defines the year in terms of the thirty years of war that was to follow (Danto 1965: 152). Danto maintains that even if an “ideal chronicler” were to have perfect information about past events, and the current event as it is happening, this ideal chronicler would not be able to identify events in these ways, which draw on knowledge of future consequences. To put this idea back into contact with Kant, Danto’s account suggests that the approach to events outlined in the Second Analogy – where we take a present state to follow some past state according to a rule – would not amount to these so-called “narrative” identifications of the event. Danto, then, would seem to agree with Heidegger that historians offer an alternate way to define events – in regard to future consequences, rather than in regard to what they follow, according to a rule.

However, an alternate definition of events does not necessarily amount to an alternate experience of them. Further, the fact that Heidegger has provided an alternate definition of *historical* events detaches his claim from the perceptual experience we might have of an event. After all, a historical event is identified in retrospect; as Heidegger puts this point, “the history of the present is a contradiction in terms” (EHF 147). If this is so, it is possible that we require the concept of cause for any present experience of an event (where we currently experience a change in state), while the historical identification of an event is only done in retrospect. I will argue, though, that we can experience of events in light of future consequences contemporaneously with the event.

There are a few reasons to support this thesis. Indeed, two of Heidegger’s philosophical influences – Husserl and Dilthey – already suggest that our expectations of

the future can shape our present experience. Husserl, for example, suggests this about our experience of music (cf. Husserl 1964: 104-105.): the present moment is shaped, say, by our expectation of a crescendo. Dilthey, in turn, emphasizes how anticipation shapes our understanding of words in a sentence (Cf. Dilthey 2002: 254-255): we make sense of the presently spoken word in light of our expectation of where the sentence is going. In these cases, our experience of the present event is determined by future expectations, rather than past perceived states.

One way to appreciate these claims is to consider the phenomenon of failed expectations. Music and sentences can surprise us by going in a direction that we had not anticipated. What we thought was the start of an extended crescendo turns out to have preceded pianissimo music; when the end of the sentence is spoken, it forces us to revise the meaning of some homonym spoken earlier in the sentence. On occasion, then, we are forced to revise some contemporaneous identification of an event (and not just our predictions about the future), in light of what came to follow it. These cases point to an experience of present events that anticipates the future.

The phenomenon of failed expectations suggests that our experience of a contemporaneous event can be shaped by the (expected) future. Further, Heidegger's remarks on history point to the class of beings which we might situate in relation to the future as we perceive them: human beings, or *Dasein*. Even without inquiring into Heidegger's philosophy of history, it is reasonable to think that we might understand history in a similar way to the way we understand the humans before us, given that history is about humans (the development of cultures, the rise and fall of civilizations, etc.) and human-adjacent things (human implements, art, etc.). Indeed, in his BT

discussion of history, Heidegger links the ontology of history [*Geschichte*] – that is, the basic categories historians ought to draw on to explain the historical – with the ontology of Dasein. Heidegger claims that “what is primarily historical [*Geschichtliche*] is Dasein” (BT 381; cf. BPP 169). This clue leads us from historical definitions of events to the ontology of Dasein – an ontology that shapes our perceptual experience when we appreciate Dasein as Dasein.

I suggest, indeed, that we experience human-initiated events, in particular, in regard to the future. When we appreciate Dasein as Dasein, we appreciate them in terms of a possibility that they are pursuing – an end or a goal that they are attempting to bring about. This is, indeed, the structure of Dasein to which Heidegger directs us, as well as the depiction of human cognition that he takes to underlie Kant’s categories: we are oriented primarily toward the future, and we understand ourselves and the things around us in terms of future projects. If we, indeed, “encounter not only entities ready-to-hand but also entities with Dasein’s kind of Being” (BT 71), as Heidegger suggests, then our perceptual experience will be shaped by this understanding.¹³⁹ I argue that we experience human-initiated events in terms of the future, rather than experiencing such events as being causally necessitated by some past state.

A forward-looking experience of events plausibly describes our experience of human activity. Returning to the example of the carpenter, the carpenter does not take herself as engaging in an activity that follows (necessarily) from the past. Rather, she takes herself as being engaged in the construction of a table – or, even more locally,

¹³⁹ One might suggest that this objection is directed at the wrong Kantian text. For Kant’s understanding of the human being, one ought to look to his practical philosophy. I will consider this objection in the next chapter.

driving a nail into a board – orienting herself toward a future state that has not yet come about. Third-personally, we also experience the activity of the carpenter in terms of her future project; when we see her hammering in her workshop, we take this event to be work toward some future goal – her work on a table or, even more locally, her driving a nail into a board. Of course, we can make mistakes, perhaps taking her activity as work toward a canoe instead of a table. Regardless, seeing her activity as work toward some future goal shapes our experience of the carpenter's activity. To be sure, we are also able to provide a mechanical description of her work – she is swinging his arm up and down – but this does not appreciate the carpenter as *Dasein*, but as present-at-hand. Experiencing the carpenter as *Dasein* draws on the carpenter's projected aims to identify her activity, appreciating her as the sort of being who has aims.

To attempt to rescue Kant's account of experiencing events, one might suggest that, even if our contemporaneous experience of human-initiated events in some way incorporates considerations about the future, this need not contradict Kant's claim that the concept of cause allows us to become aware of these events; perhaps the concept of cause allows us to be aware of the brute fact that something has happened (that is, a present state followed necessarily from some past state), whereas, in some special cases, considerations of the future allow us to fill out which sort of event it was. However, this account overlooks the fact that approaching objects mechanically, as present-at-hand, results in a different individuation of events than when we approach objects as ready-to-hand equipment, or as *Dasein*. As Cristina Lafont points out, we individuate the ready-to-hand objects that we use for our practical projects in terms of their functions, as opposed to the merely physical individuations available to a present-at-hand approach; a

functional approach, for example, can appreciate the unity of a keyboard, computer screen, and mouse despite little physical continuity.¹⁴⁰ A present-at-hand approach and ready-to-hand approach will individuate objects differently.

I suggest that the same goes for human events; a present-at-hand approach has access to different events than an approach that individuates in terms of aims or goals. For example, imagine an overworked carpenter who is simultaneously building a table and a canoe, hammering nails into the tabletop at one instant, and driving nails into the canoe bottom at the next. A present-at-hand approach would not differentiate between these two actions; physically, the carpenter has been moving her arm up and down at more or less the same rate over this stretch of time. Not until we move to consider the carpenter in terms of her projected goals can we draw the necessary distinction. Thus, the suggestion that we identify events mechanically, and then fill out our understanding of them by drawing on future goals, fails to recognize that mechanics do not pick out the same events that a future-oriented approach does. A present-at-hand approach does not have access to events like building a table.

I have argued that Heidegger's brief discussion of historical events and his ontology of Dasein point to an experience of human events that evades Kant's account of experiencing events; in particular, these events are situated in relation to the future. Based on these arguments, I will develop an alternate account of experiencing human events in the next section.

¹⁴⁰ Cf. Lafont 2015: 288.

2.1 The Structure of Human Events

I will develop my Heideggerian account of experiencing human events by using Kant's own account as a foil. Let us start, then, by thinking about what a human event would look like from the perspective of Kant's Second Analogy argument (I'll consider whether Kant's other critical works have anything to add to this picture in the next chapter). Consider, then, the carpenter's hammering. According to the Kantian account, I am aware of the event of hammering by taking the second state I perceive (carpenter holding the hammer low) to follow necessarily from the first state that I perceive (carpenter holding the hammer high). The rule, presumably, governing the connection between these two states is related to the amount of force the carpenter exerts on the hammer, such that hammers in these circumstances move in this way. How does an alternate, Heideggerian account of experiencing human events differ from Kant's account?

In Kant's account, the observer becomes aware of an event by taking there to be a necessary connection between *a past state* (hammer high) and *a present state* (hammer low). However, I have suggested that we experience human events primarily in relation to the future. When we see the carpenter at work in the workshop, we take her to be building a table or, even more locally, driving a nail into the board. In other words, we experience the event in terms of the goal we take her to be directed toward. One way to fill out my account, then, would be to say that, in our experience of human events, we take there to be a connection between *a present state* (hammer low) and *a future state* (nail driven into board). However, this model is too simple for a couple of reasons.

First, the model does not answer Kant's challenge of explaining how our experience of stable states of affairs differs from our experience of changes. Taking there to be a connection between a present state and a future anticipated state does not provide enough information for us to take there to be an event. After all, any present state that we perceive could be either an event or a stable state of affairs. The carpenter, for example, could hold the hammer low as a component of a downswing (i.e. a dynamic downward movement), or she could hold the hammer low for an extended stretch of time (perhaps while pondering her next move). In order to be aware of a change, we must relate the present state to past states, as Kant suggests in his account.

Further, Heidegger's own model of cognition suggests that the past is an essential component of any present experience we have.¹⁴¹ As we have seen in previous chapters, Heidegger's account of Dasein's temporality suggests that our pursuit of future projects, informed by past experience, reveals the present to us (e.g. I understand the hammer as that which will help me make the table, based on my past experiences of table-making). This account suggests that an account of experiencing events that fails to incorporate the past will be incomplete. The past always informs our understanding of the world around us, according to Heidegger, and so it must play some role when we experience human events; further, appreciating the human we experience as a human (i.e. as Dasein), we must take them to relate to the past, as well.

Therefore, I argue that, in our experience of human events, a future anticipated state (say, completed table) mediates the relationship between the past and present states that we have perceived. The future orders the relationship between the present moment

¹⁴¹ I am indebted to Simon Truwant for raising this objection.

and the past; they do not, as in Kant's account, have an independent relationship with one another. While I have suggested that we primarily experience a human event by relating the present to a future state (e.g. the hammering of the carpenter is one step toward her building a table), this does not mean that the past completely falls out of view. Because human events are experienced in terms of the future toward which the initiating human is oriented, I suggest that the past, like the present, is subordinated to the future in our experience of human events.

In particular, I suggest that, when we experience a human event, we take the past and the present as a *series of conditions* that are organized by the anticipated future. Consider this suggestion at a larger scale, at the level of ordering events, again considering the construction of a table: First, both the carpenter's past sawing and his present hammering are steps in the series that constitutes her construction of the table. Both are conditions for bringing about the completed, future table. Further, the past sawing is a condition for the present hammering. It is not until the carpenter has sawed planks of the correct size, that she can engage in hammering them together. However, the relationship between the past sawing and the present hammering is not a discrete relationship that we can appreciate on its own. It is only in this larger project of building a table that we can appreciate that sawing is required prior to hammering. If the carpenter were, say, playing in the workshop, then sawing would not be required prior to hammering; she could proceed in a different order. The future mediates the relationship between the past and the present; we take the sawing to be a condition for the hammering because we take the carpenter to be building a table. On the larger scale, we take the

activities that go into building a table as a series of conditions; conditions for the next step in the series, as well as conditions for the finished product.

Next, consider my suggestion on a smaller scale, at the level of ordering states: driving a nail into a board. Here, we order the past state (hammer high), present state (hammer low), by way of a future state (nail driven into the board). I suggest that we take the past and present to be conditions for the future: in order to drive the nail into the board, the hammer must descend, first high and then low. Further, the past state is a condition for the present state: the hammer high must precede the hammer low, but only if the carpenter is engaged in the project of driving a nail into a board. If the carpenter were, say, extracting the nail from the board, the hammer held at a higher position would not be a condition for the hammer held at a lower position. On a smaller scale, at the level of relating the states that make up an event, we take the past and present state to be conditions for an anticipated future, and we take the past state to be a condition for the present state, as mediated by that anticipated future. In my Heideggerian account of experiencing human events, we differentiate an event from a stable state of affairs by taking the states perceived to make up a series of conditions directed toward an anticipated future.

Let us consider, again, a few objections to this (now more complex) model of experiencing human events. First, one might argue that some human events are oriented toward the past more so than the future; the person's current activities are driven by the past. However, I argue that we still experience such events as mediated by the future. Consider an example that Heidegger offers in his Zollikon Seminars: blushing from shame and embarrassment (ZS 81). Blushing is particularly oriented toward the past that

has shamed us; when we blush from shame, the event must be related to a past state to make full sense of it. However, a relationship to the past does not allow for a full appreciation of the event. Consider, for example, discrepancies in embarrassment from person to person. A carpenter might blush at having injured herself in a routine building procedure; a philosophy student, however, would likely feel no shame in failing to carry out the typical activities of the carpenter without injury (though the student might feel pain). On the other hand, the student might blush upon being upbraided by a renowned academic, while this would be unlikely to faze a carpenter, who is not invested in the academic's opinion. Experiencing an event as a blush from shame and embarrassment requires more than setting it against a past state, since conditions for blushing change from person to person. We require considerations of the future. I argue, then, that even in those cases where human events seem particularly oriented toward the past, our experience of the relationship between past and present states is mediated by a third factor: the future.

The second objection I will consider is the objection that I have not offered an account of experiencing events that is truly an alternative to Kant's own account, because I have failed to acknowledge that Kant builds the future into his account of experience, as well.¹⁴² In Kant's account of experiencing events, we experience an event by taking a present state to follow necessarily in time from a past state. That is, we take the present to follow the past according to some laws such that similar objects in similar physical

¹⁴² This becomes apparent when one takes a broader view of the Analogies; in particular, the Third Analogy suggests that we take objects to stand in causal community with one another (i.e. they could causally effect one another in the future). I thank Adrian Switzer for this point.

conditions will behave similarly. To return to Kant's example of the ship moving downstream, we take it that a floating object of around this size will always move this way when faced with this sort of river current. However, this does not mean that the future must fall out of view when we encounter events. Kant emphasizes that events occur in accordance with causal laws. Thus, one might predict that a current state will lead to some future state, which will be an effect of the current state (this moving billiard ball will hit another, causing it to move). In fact, one may even use a current event as evidence for the prediction (the object will continue floating down the river, just as it has been). Kant's account of experiencing events allows for future expectations.

However, the future does not play an essential role in Kant's account. One can identify an event by attending to a past state and a present state, without any consideration of the future state. Consideration of the future is possible on Kant's account of event identification, but not necessary. This differs from my account. I suggest that we order human events by situating the past and present state in relation to an anticipated future. Without considering the future toward which the human is aiming, we cannot appreciate that the past state is a condition for the present state, making up an event.

A further, significant difference between Kant's account of experiencing events and my Heideggerian account concerns the role of necessity in Kant's account. Kant suggests that, when we identify an event, we take the present to follow necessarily from the past. I suggest, however, that the notion of necessity does not play this role when we experience a human event. As Steven Crowell has emphasized, the possibility of failure

is a crucial feature of being human.¹⁴³ Having completed the task of sawing is not a guarantee that one will move on to the task of hammering, or that one will complete the final table. After all, the carpenter could give up on the table altogether once she finishes sawing. Likewise, holding the hammer high is not a guarantee that one will successfully bring it low (the hammer could slip and fly backward) or drive the nail into the board (the carpenter could miss the mark). I argue that, when we experience human events, we do not take any state, present or future, to follow necessarily from the past.

Rather, I suggest that we experience human events using the concept of condition – that is, the concept of *necessary preceding*, rather than the concept of *necessary following*. According to this concept, one state must precede another in time. This concept is well suited for ordering perceptions to experience a human event because it points forward toward the future, the dimension of time to which Dasein is primarily oriented; the first state is necessary in light of the anticipated future. Further, the concept of condition is open-ended, allowing for the possibility of failure; though some state may be required for a later one to come about, this is not a guarantee that the later state will, in fact, come about. The concept of condition allows us to order the states that make up an event in a way that appreciates Dasein's ontology.

¹⁴³ “What I encounter in the world can be held up to norms and standards only because in my very being I must hold myself to standards, that is, understand myself as something that can succeed or fail... To try is not merely to act in accordance with norms (mechanically, as it were) but to be responsive to the normative, to the possibility of living up to the demands of what it is to be a writer or failing to do so” (Crowell 2013: 28).

3. Ready-to-hand Events

In this section, I will argue that our experience of ready-to-hand events matches our experience of those brought about by other Dasein. I will first address why these two classes of events are closely related. Then, I will argue that the model of event perception that I have provided above – where we order states as a series of conditions for the anticipated future – applies to ready-to-hand events.

In moving from considering our experience of Dasein to our experience of the ready-to-hand, we transition from what it is like to experience third-personal projects – to appreciate someone else’s future-oriented activity – to what it is like to experience our own purposeful activity. After all, when I engage with the ready-to-hand, I am engaged in the pursuit of my own projects. Given that when I encounter other Dasein, I encounter something with my ‘kind of Being’ (BT 71), it should not surprise us that our experience of others’ activity should reflect our experience of our own activity. Further, Heidegger suggests that when we are engaged in purposeful activity, we identify with the world of our concern. As Heidegger puts this point in PIK:

Dasein exists: It is in a world within which it encounters beings and to which the existing Dasein comports itself. However, these innerworldly beings toward which Dasein comports itself are revealed in, through, and for this comportment. But at the same time the comporting Dasein is also revealed to itself; the one who exists, Dasein, is manifest to itself, without being the object of a penetrating observation (PIK 15).

In comporting itself – orienting itself toward a future identity and drawing on a past understanding to pursue that identity – Dasein reveals innerworldly beings, but also itself.

Rather than discovering itself in navel-gazing ('penetrating observation'), Dasein's identity is grounded in the world with which it concerns itself. As the analysis of world already suggested, a human identity is not a detached state; one is not a carpenter by thinking of themselves as a carpenter, having never picked up a hammer (likewise, one is not a philosopher because one just decides to be, having never read, written or spoken a word of philosophy). Rather, we pursue identities by engaging in a world and acting in that world. In this activity, we work out our for-the-sake-of-which, interpreting our identity in concrete terms. My interpretation of what it is like to engage with the ready-to-hand – and particularly, to experience events as one engages with the ready-to-hand – is built upon Heidegger's claim that, when we engage in the world, we reveal ourselves to ourselves.

I argue that Heidegger's phenomenological account of 'seeing' ready-to-hand equipment (i.e. his account of 'circumspection') points toward the experience of events that I described above. When Heidegger describes our engagement with ready-to-hand equipment (hammer, nail, and so forth), he suggests that we do not 'just look' at the individual tool that we are using (e.g. the hammer); when we appreciate equipment as equipment, the tool "withdraws" (BT 69). Rather than the individual tool, Heidegger suggests that "that with which we concern ourselves primarily is the work" (BT 69). Heidegger clarifies that the work with which we concern ourselves is 'the work to be produced' – i.e. the state of affairs that we are attempting to bring about. Heidegger argues that "the work bears with it that referential totality within which the equipment is encountered" (BT 70). In other words, when we orient ourselves to some determinate sort of work (a 'towards-this') to be produced, we likewise orient ourselves to the

equipmental totality that is required to bring that end about (rather than any one item of equipment).¹⁴⁴ I take Heidegger to be suggesting that, when we engage with equipment, we pay attention to our tools coming together such that we bring about our end. We pay attention, for example, to the hammer, nail, and board coming together so that the nail is properly driven into the board (so that the table can be built).

I argue, then, that when we engage with the ready-to-hand – attending to the work to be produced – our experience of the present is mediated by the anticipated future. However, we do not experience the present as necessitating that future. Our engagement in activity, our vigilance, our ongoing concern with what we do reveals, again, that the possibility of failure remains open. In our engagement with ready-to-hand equipment, we experience events like hammering in relation to the anticipated future – the steps in our activity, indeed, being conditions for that anticipated future. Further, the relationship between the past and present is ordered conditionally, as mediated by the future. When we ourselves engage in practical activity, we follow an arc that is set by the end goal. The earlier steps of the project are conditions for later steps of the project, as organized by our practical goal.

Thus, I argue that our experience of ready-to-hand events has the same structure that I have indicated above: our experience of them is mediated by the future, yet we do not experience them as necessitating that future (causes of that future). For this reason, I suggest that we also experience events in and among the ready-to-hand as a series of

¹⁴⁴ William Blattner offers a similar account of circumspection: “While shopping, Dasein is focused on the task at hand, say, buying milk, bread, and bananas. Dasein is not focused on the paraphernalia it uses” (Blattner 1999: 57).

conditions for the anticipated future. We organize our perceptions of the ready-to-hand using the concept of condition, and not the concept of cause.

I will consider one objection to this account. Heidegger often refers to the “inconveniences, obstacles” (PIK 15) that we encounter in our engagement with the ready-to-hand. Indeed, Heidegger emphasizes these experiences as ones that can bring the world to light: “it is precisely here that the worldly character of the ready-to-hand shows itself” (BT 104). The arising of an obstacle or an inconvenience – something breaking, for example – can be an event.¹⁴⁵ Further, one might think that such an event would not be experienced as a *condition* for our end goal. After all, as an obstacle, it *hinders* that end goal.

An easy way to deal with this case would be to suggest that such events promote a jump to theorizing – to appreciating the materiality of the equipment that hinders me. If this were the case, then one would not encounter hindrances when engaging with the ready-to-hand, but only when we take equipment as present-at-hand. This solution, then, could appeal to Kant’s depiction of experiencing events (by way of the concept of cause) to account for our experience of obstacles, while maintaining that we experience ready-to-hand events by way of the concept of condition.

Indeed, some of Heidegger’s comments suggest such a solution. For example, Heidegger suggests that

when [the tool’s] unusability is thus discovered, equipment becomes conspicuous.

This conspicuousness presents the ready-to-hand equipment in a certain un-

¹⁴⁵ Sometimes, however, a stable state of affairs hinders us, as when something is missing or already broken (BT 73).

readiness-to-hand....it shows itself as an equipmental Thing which looks so
and so, which, in its readiness-to-hand as looking that way, has constantly been
present-at-hand, too (BT 73)

When we discover that something does not work, we start to notice it as an individual (rather than within an equipmental totality), and notice its properties as an individual. We notice, for example, what it looks like, which is not something to which we pay attention when we are employing it. Discovering a hindrance, we begin to notice the materiality of the equipment that hinders us.

However, a closer reading of this passage shows that Heidegger does not delegate the experience of hindrances solely to the ontology of the present-at-hand. Heidegger suggests that, in the first place, “we discover [the tool’s] unusability...not by looking at it and establishing its properties, but rather by the circumspection of the dealings in which we use it” (BT 73). We encounter the obstacle as we employ the equipment, with the kind of sight that Heidegger allots to ready-to-hand engagement: circumspection. Only then – “when its unusability is *thus* discovered” (BT 73, my emphasis) – does ‘equipment become conspicuous.’ Further, the experience of equipment as conspicuous (in its materiality) is not one of experiencing a change – the unusable equipment “just lies there” (BT 73).¹⁴⁶

¹⁴⁶ Heidegger also suggests that, even as we notice the equipment as conspicuous, our evaluation of a change will not be governed solely by present-at-hand categories. This is an intermediary case, where we continue to draw on a ready-to-hand individuation of equipment, but appreciate its materiality (presence-at-hand); “this presence-at-hand of something which cannot be used is still not devoid of all readiness-to-hand whatsoever” (BT 73). Therefore, “the damage to the equipment is still not a mere alteration of a Thing [*Dingveränderung*]—not a change of properties [*Wechsel von Eigenschaften*] which just occurs in something present-at-hand” (BT 73; GA 2: 73). Kant also uses the terms

A closer look at Heidegger's discussion suggests that the ontology of the ready-to-hand must allow for an experience of hindrances. Indeed, I argue that the concept of condition can do the work of structuring our perceptions such that we experience an event even in the case of hindering events. First, let us consider the relationship between the past and the present in such experiences. The experience of a hindrance (as an event) must order a past state where the project is 'in the works' and a present state where it is disrupted. The concept of condition orders these two states irreversibly because the project going well (whatever form this takes) is a necessary condition for the project being disrupted. It is not possible to disrupt a process that is not yet underway. Second, the relationship between the past and present is mediated by the future. The past state is one where the project is going well because of its relationship to the end that is being pursued. The present state, further, is a hindrance in relation to that end. The relationship between past and present is mediated by the future, as the past is the condition of the present on the basis of their mutual relationships to the future.

Further, I argue that, even in the case of hindrances, we continue to take them as conditions for the future. Insofar as we continue to be engaged in the future project, the hindrance is folded in as a condition for the goal that we pursue. The hindrance is something to which we must adjust or respond in our pursuit of an end. Though perhaps annoying or unfortunate, the hindrance joins the arc of activity toward an end; the hindrance becomes the condition for the next step in the pursuit of the end (likely, a step that adjusts or responds to the hindrance, so one's pursuit of the end stays on track). This

Veränderung and *Wechsel* to discuss changes in the Second Analogy (cf. B232, B33), and Heidegger echoes them in his discussion of the Second Analogy (cf. GA 31: 175).

arc will be completed, finally, in the accomplishment of that end. Therefore, I argue that, even in the case of hindrances, we experience events by employing the concept of condition – taking the states we perceive to be a series of conditions for some future goal.

I have argued, on the basis of Heidegger's discussion of world and a consideration of the phenomenology of changes among the ready-to-hand, that when we engage with the ready-to-hand, we experience events by ordering our perceptions with the concept of condition. Therefore, I suggest that the ready-to-hand is another class of beings, with Dasein, that do not conform to Kant's account of perceiving events. I suggest that the concept of condition belongs to an ontology of worldhood that is distinct from Kant's categories.

Conclusion

Let us return to the two interpretations of experience. If we interpret experience widely (with Allison, Longuenesse, Strawson, and so on), then Kant's claim in the Second Analogy that the concept of cause is the condition of the possibility of experience faces the counterexamples of human events and technical-practical events. Because Kant's account of event identification does not apply to these two classes of events, I suggest that we should regard the effective scope of the Second Analogy to be our encounters with the present-at-hand – entities considered theoretically in terms of their individual properties. Construed narrowly, Kant's argument works. This argument provides independent grounds to opt for Heidegger's interpretation of Kant, where categories like causality do not hold universally.

Chapter 6: A Heideggerian Reading of the Critical Works

Renewed attention has recently been provided to Kant and Heidegger's differing depictions of our understanding of everyday, practical entities. In particular, Hubert Dreyfus and John McDowell have engaged in a debate concerning the character of expert activity.¹⁴⁷ Dreyfus and McDowell consider how the expert understands the world around her when she engages in familiar, habitual activity, like the professional baseball player catching a ball at first base, or the seasoned carpenter constructing a table in her workshop. In their debate, Dreyfus offers himself as a Heideggerian, suggesting that our technical-practical understanding of equipment differs fundamentally from the contemplative understanding of usable objects we might offer from an armchair or an ivory tower. McDowell, by contrast, offers himself as a Kantian, asserting commonalities between our technical-practical understanding on the one hand and our removed, theoretical understanding on the other.

Unfortunately, the debate between Dreyfus and McDowell is not satisfactorily resolved. While the debate brings out many of the important and interesting issues that are involved in this question, much of the debate revolves around a terminological dispute concerning how to define the word 'concept'. Dreyfus prefers to spell out the difference between the technical-practical and the theoretical in terms of concepts: while McDowell asserts all of our modes of understanding are conceptual, Dreyfus claims that we do not draw on concepts in technical-practical know-how, as we do when we theoretically consider objects from afar. However, each time that Dreyfus enumerates

¹⁴⁷ This debate consists in Dreyfus 2005, McDowell 2007a, Dreyfus 2007, McDowell 2007b, Dreyfus 2013, and McDowell 2013.

why technical-practical know-how does not involve concepts, McDowell responds that his own depiction of concepts can accommodate Dreyfus' suggestion. For example, when Dreyfus suggests that concepts are too general to capture the expert's concrete, situation-specific understanding (Dreyfus 2005: 51), McDowell replies that he takes concepts to be situation-specific, so we need not go so far as suggesting that concepts are completely absent from know-how (McDowell 2007a: 342). After several such exchanges, the debate ends at a standstill. If there are helpful differences to work out between a Kantian and a Heideggerian account of technical-practical experience, focusing on the issue of conceptuality does not seem to afford much traction.

In order to advance this debate concerning the specific character of technical-practical experience, and whether Heidegger offers a compelling revision to Kant, we should refocus our attention, moving away from the question of concepts.¹⁴⁸ Using our experience of events as a concrete point of reference, what are the actual differences between Heidegger and Kant's understanding of the everyday objects with which we fluidly engage, and can the accounts be reconciled? Based on my account of experiencing technical-practical (i.e. ready-to-hand) events in the previous chapter, I will argue that Heidegger offers the following revision to Kant's account of the technical-practical: in Critique of the Power of Judgment, Kant suggests that theoretical categories like causality are constitutive of our experience of the technical-practical; this experience,

¹⁴⁸ However, I agree with Sacha Golob that the term 'concept' can be defined in a way that is compatible with Heidegger's depiction of human understanding – even everyday, fluid, engaged understanding (Golob 2014: 30).

further, can be supplemented by teleological concepts.¹⁴⁹ By contrast, the Heideggerian account suggests that teleology offers an *alternate* set of constitutive categories to Kant's theoretical categories, and it is these categories that we draw upon in our experience of the technical-practical. I use Heidegger to suggest that we immediately appreciate that certain entities we perceive are future-oriented, bypassing an experience of those entities that is structured by theoretical (present-at-hand) categories like the concept of cause. Teleology does not *supplement* our experience of the technical-practical, but instead *constitutes* it.

However, my discussion of this dispute gestures toward a new reading of the relationship between Kant's critical works: while departing from some of Kant's claims (e.g. about which principles are constitutive), we can read Kant's three Critiques as offering the constitutive principles for three different domains of our experience.¹⁵⁰ These domains are, in Heidegger's terms: the present-at-hand or the domain of removed, theoretical observation (first Critique); Dasein or the domain of humans (second Critique); and the ready-to-hand or the domain of usable objects put toward some technical-practical end (third Critique). By engaging with Kant's depiction of the technical-practical in the third Critique, I offer a preliminary view of this reconstructive, Heideggerian reading. The benefits of this interpretation are threefold: First, it circumscribes Kant's Second Analogy account of experiencing events, making Kant's argument more compelling in light of the phenomenology of experiencing human and

¹⁴⁹ Kant also discusses teleology in his philosophy of history, where he says that human history is teleologically oriented toward a "perfect state constitution" (Kant 2006, 8:27). I will not address these texts here.

¹⁵⁰ I thank Umut Eldem and Carlos Pereira Di Salvo for helpful discussion of these issues.

technical-practical events (as developed in the last chapter). Second, it affords Kant a more complete account of experience, where, rather than overlooking other domains of experience, Kant treated them in his later critical works. Third, it follows through on a major ambition of Kant: to suggest that there is a vast gulf separating human and non-human entities. On this reading of Kant, the gulf between humanity and nature informs even our perceptual experience of humans, which is constituted by different categories than perception of the present-at-hand.

In considering Kant's other critical works, I address a hole in my previous argument challenging Kant's account of experiencing events. I suggested in the last chapter that Kant offers an incomplete account of our experience of events because he does not capture what it is like to experience human events or ready-to-hand events. In particular, I argued we experience both sorts of events in terms of a practical end, and the context created and united by that end. As my alternate account of experiencing events is teleological, one might argue that Kant can accommodate this account; I do not offer a real alternative to Kant's depiction of experience. In particular, my Heideggerian account only looks like an alternative if we ignore Kant's discussion of teleology in the third *Critique*.¹⁵¹ Likewise, as my account concerns our experience of humans, one could argue that Kant's account only looks incomplete if we ignore his extended treatment of humans

¹⁵¹ Sacha Golob has criticized Heidegger for ignoring the teleological aspects of Kant's critical philosophy as a means of getting his criticism of Kant off the ground. For example, "in SZ: 61, Heidegger briefly explores the alternative proposal that cognition is derivative because it implies a suspension of practical concerns in favor of a mere staring. But this is a strawman. There is no sense in which Kantian cognition, say, is a mere 'tarrying alongside the world': on the contrary, it is an active process, necessarily orientated toward a teleological pursuit of the demands of reason" (Golob 2014: 39). While Golob cites A521/B549 in the first *Critique* to support his reading of Kant, this is a depiction of cognition that obviously draws on the second and third *Critiques*.

in his practical philosophy. In brief, my argument fails to be compelling since it ignores developments in Kant's critical philosophy that followed the first Critique.¹⁵² I address this issue by considering in detail what the third Critique has to offer Kant's theory of experience, and developing, indeed, how this work can be read to afford Kant a more developed and compelling account of experience.¹⁵³

In what follows, I inquire into Kant's account of the technical-practical in the third Critique (Section 1). In particular, I inquire into his account of technical-practical propositions (Section 1.1) and his account of the categories that constitute our experience of the technical-practical (Section 1.2), bringing out the contrast with Heidegger's account of the technical-practical. I then offer a preliminary, Heideggerian reading of the relationship between Kant's three Critiques, suggesting that each offers categories that constitute a particular domain of experience (Section 3).

1. Kant's Account of the Technical-Practical

The previous chapter used Heidegger's ontological vocabulary and attendant account of experience to argue that Kant's Second Analogy argument only captures our experience of 'present-at-hand' events, and does not capture those that are 'ready-to-hand.' In other words, Kant considers our experience of change in a material object whose individual properties are being theoretically considered, but Kant fails to consider what it is like to experience change when we are practically engaged in the world,

¹⁵² I thank Dieter Schönecker, Diego D'Angelo, and Simon Truwant for helpful discussion of these issues.

¹⁵³ The third Critique is the most promising area to begin investigating this issue because the discussion of teleology in the third Critique seems to closely resemble Heidegger's own understanding of world. However, I will address briefly the second Critique in my final section.

experiencing changing entities within a context of equipment that is oriented toward some practical goal. For this reason, I argued, we should read the scope of the Second Analogy more narrowly, following Heidegger's interpretation of Kant's categories as region-specific (i.e. only constituting the present-at-hand). In this section, I will consider the possibility that Kant's other critical works could fill in Kant's account of event perception such that it accounts for the ready-to-hand.

In particular, I inquire into the Critique of the Power of Judgment. The third Critique reveals two things: first, Kant did consider technical-practical beings that are put to use toward some end, rather than confining his inquiry to the objects studied by the natural sciences (the latter being Kant's "primary" understanding of being in the first Critique, according to Heidegger); second, Kant offers a depiction of experience that complicates the one offered in the first Critique, a depiction that is intended to apply to the technical-practical. I will consider each of these discussions in turn, and argue that Kant's new account of experience, though more complex, does not cohere with the Heideggerian account of experience I defended in the last chapter.

1.1 Technical-Practical Propositions

Kant appears to make room in his system for what Heidegger calls the ready-to-hand when he discusses the '*technisch-praktisch*'. Though this term is typically translated as 'technical,' Kant's original hyphenation shows a close connection with the term Heidegger selects for this domain. In Being and Time, Heidegger uses the term

‘*praktisch*’, usually translated as ‘practical’ (cf. BT 69).¹⁵⁴ To compare their discussions, I will use the term ‘technical-practical’.

In the unpublished introduction to the third Critique, Kant suggests that technical-practical knowledge (i.e. knowledge of the ready-to-hand) is simply an implementation of theoretical knowledge (i.e. knowledge of the present-at-hand). Kant begins,

it is very important to determine the parts of philosophy precisely and to that end not to include among the members of the division of philosophy, as a system, that which is merely a consequence of an application of it to given cases, requiring no special principles (20: 197).

In other words, Kant seeks to determine the parts of philosophy; if some area of philosophy simply applies principles from another area ‘to given cases’, it will not be considered its own distinct part. The distinct parts of philosophy must each have their own ‘special principles.’ Kant indicates that skill-based propositions – technical-practical propositions that determine “the constitution of the object” and “the way in which to produce it” (20: 201) – are merely the consequence of applying theoretical philosophy ‘to given cases.’ Therefore, technical-practical propositions “do not constitute a special part of the science, but belong to the theoretical parts, as a special kind of its consequences” (20: 197). In this way, technical-practical propositions are to be distinguished from moral propositions that rely on different principles from theoretical philosophy. Moral propositions, like “I ought not lie,” are based on ideas about what we ought to do, rather

¹⁵⁴ In his Kant lectures, Heidegger corrects his use of ‘*praktisch*’ – “practical or, put more aptly technical” [*praktischen, besser: technischen*]” (PIK 18; GA 25: 25) – likely to avoid confusion with Kant’s practical philosophy.

than ideas about how things are. In contrast to moral propositions, Kant suggests that technical-practical propositions

belong to the art of bringing about what one wishes should exist, which in the case of a complete theory is always a mere consequence and not a self-subsistent part of any kind of instruction. In this way, all precepts of skill belong to technique and hence to the theoretical knowledge of nature as its consequences (CPJ 20: 200).

According to Kant, technical-practical activity involves drawing on theoretical knowledge to bring about some desired end. Thus, the carpenter draws on her theoretical knowledge of objects when carrying out her wishes; for example, if she wishes to build a table, she may draw on her theoretical knowledge about what a table is – that it has four legs, a flat top, etc. – in order to carry out the wish.

To better understand how practice is a mere implementation of theory for Kant, consider what constitutes theory for him. Theoretical knowledge is knowledge of what is, knowledge that can be either a priori – what objects are like in general, as delimited by the constitution of human understanding – or a posteriori – what specific objects that we experience are like. The Critique of Pure Reason outlines our a priori knowledge of what objects are like: based on the constraints of human understanding (the concepts that we must cognize the world with), we can conclude, for example, that all objects are self-identical substances persisting over time, in causal community with one another (i.e. in relations of potential cause and effect). By contrast, compiling a posteriori theoretical knowledge is the task of the empirical sciences, which will inquire into specific empirical objects and their properties. To these areas of what we might call *non-applied theoretical*

knowledge, Kant adds another branch of theoretical knowledge: technical-practical propositions, or *applied theoretical knowledge*.

Based on this depiction of non-applied theoretical knowledge, we might envision the technical-practical application of it in a number of different ways. The complete novice might draw on the concept alone of some object to be produced; not knowing how a table is typically constructed, the novice might begin with its known physical properties – four legs, flat top – and proceed from there. A technical-practical proposition for such a builder might be “In order to make a table, I have to produce something with four legs.” The tutored novice, by contrast, might draw both on the concept of the table and some instructions provided by the expert, or even a memory (empirical knowledge) about the expert’s way of producing the table; first the expert retrieved a piece of wood, then measured it, etc. Finally, the expert might draw both on the concept of the table and a memory (empirical knowledge) of her past procedure making tables; first she retrieves the piece of wood and so forth. In both of these cases, the builders might rely on the technical-practical proposition, “In order to make a table, I first have to retrieve a piece of wood.”

The account that is supplied here may seem to give Kant what he needs to account for our experience of the technical-practical. The last chapter argued that appreciating contextual relationships is an essential part of appreciating the technical-practical or ready-to-hand entities we use as we go about our projects; namely, we relate the piece of equipment we are using to an end and the other equipment bound up with that end. Kant’s depiction of the technical-practical as an implementation of the theoretical could be developed to make up a Kantian appreciation of contextual relationships. I argued that

a theoretical approach like the one outlined in the first Critique finds individual objects instead of contextual relationships. However, the third Critique offers a bridge between the theoretical and the technical-practical; the technical-practical implements the theoretical. Indeed, the appreciation of the context essential to the technical-practical may seem easy to compile from theoretical knowledge about the separate objects in the workshop (say) garnered from past experience. Past experience informs the carpenter of the individual properties of different tools in the workshop, including causal relationships that exist among them; swinging the hammer causes the nail to be driven into the board. Likewise, past experience provides empirical information about what sort of ends are usually pursued with the help of these tools, and how these ends are pursued. Perhaps with technical-practical pursuits like the building of a table, this (non-applied) theoretical knowledge is gathered together and put to use.

However, I argue that Kant supports a thesis that is at odds with Heidegger's depiction of the technical-practical. In particular, Kant supports a *homogeneity thesis*: technical-practical knowledge (applied theoretical knowledge) is homogenous with the remainder of theoretical knowledge (non-applied theoretical knowledge) in the way the object is understood, including the concepts and principles that are employed. This homogeneity in principles is precisely the reason that Kant offers for placing technical-practical propositions under the heading of theoretical knowledge. Because we can infer from the non-applied areas of theoretical knowledge to the technical-practical, no unique consideration of the technical-practical is required when accounting for our basic categories. The same concepts we draw upon in theoretical contemplation are used for

technical-practical skill. The way we experience objects – and events – will be consistent across the theoretical and the technical-practical.¹⁵⁵

Heidegger denies Kant's homogeneity thesis. Heidegger suggests that "the ready-to-hand is not grasped theoretically at all" (BT 69). In his classic discussion introducing the ready-to-hand in Being and Time, Heidegger denies that technical-practical activity implements theoretical knowledge. In particular, he denies that our understanding of the world when we act might be seen as a more complicated version of our understanding of the world when we contemplate it (more complicated, say, because it requires consideration of a number of objects and how oneself relates to them causally). The difference between theoretical and technical-practical understanding, Heidegger suggests, is not a difference in quantity but a difference in kind:

the way [technical-practical] behavior differs from theoretical behavior does not lie simply in the in the fact that in theoretical behavior one observes, while in practical behavior one *acts*, and that action must employ theoretical cognition if it

¹⁵⁵ This homogeneity thesis is supported by a further thesis, namely a *priority thesis*: Non-applied theoretical knowledge has priority over applied theoretical knowledge, since non-applied theoretical knowledge is required for applied theoretical knowledge. Without theoretical concepts and knowledge derived from experience, we would not be able to carry out technical-practical projects. Due to the one-sided reliance of applied theoretical knowledge upon non-applied theoretical knowledge, non-applied theoretical knowledge has priority over applied theoretical knowledge for Kant. Relating the two theses, because applied theoretical knowledge is developed from non-applied theoretical knowledge, the two areas are homogenous in their concepts and principles.

As we saw in the previous chapter, Heidegger would deny this priority thesis. He suggests that taking up a knowing comportment (taking on the project of developing knowledge) and drawing on a holistic understanding of a field of knowledge are both necessary conditions for natural scientific knowledge about the present-at-hand. Since this point will not be important for comparing Heidegger and Kant's account of experiencing events in this chapter, I leave it aside here.

is not to remain blind; for the fact that observation is a kind of concern is just as primordial as the fact that action has *its own* kind of sight (BT 69).

In this passage, Heidegger explores a minimal sort of differentiation between the technical-practical and the theoretical, where theoretical cognition does not figure oneself into the causal chain, while practical behavior puts oneself in as a link; in practical behavior ‘one acts’. Heidegger denies this way of differentiation, suggesting that ‘theoretical’ and ‘practical’ sight *differ in kind*; “observation is its own kind of concern” and “action has *its own* kind of sight.” The technical-practical, Heidegger argues, is not homogenous with the theoretical.

Heidegger’s rejection of the homogeneity thesis is born out by the Heideggerian account of experiencing events that I offered in the last chapter. I argued that we do not identify human events and technical-practical events as following on necessarily from the past. Rather, based on the phenomenology of human and technical-practical event perception, we identify such events in relation to the future end that is being pursued. For these events, we do not experience the past and present states comprising the event in direct, mechanical relation with each other; rather, the past and present states are in a mediated relationship, by way of the future that they both condition. This account of experiencing events reflects Heidegger’s denial of the homogeneity thesis, because it provides two heterogeneous conceptual paths to experiencing events, rather than one path that is homogenous across domains of perception. We identify theoretically considered ‘present-at-hand’ beings by way of the concept of cause; we identify technical-practical, ‘ready-to-hand’ beings by way of the concept of condition.

Due to Heidegger and Kant's divergences on the homogeneity thesis, we should expect their accounts of experiencing the technical-practical to diverge, as well. Indeed, in the section that follows, I will argue that the more complex account of experience that Kant offers in the third Critique likewise reflects his homogeneity thesis. It reflects, in other words, Kant's contention that the technical-practical is homogenous with the theoretical. Thus, I will suggest that Kant's third Critique account of experience is unable to answer the objection to the Second Analogy that I raised in the last chapter (namely, that it fails to capture our experience of human and technical-practical events). At first impression, Kant's claim that teleology can inform our experience appears to accommodate the Heideggerian account of experiencing events, where we experience them in relation to the future. However, we will see that Kant's account of experiencing events departs from the Heideggerian one, failing to do justice to the phenomenology of experiencing events.

1.2 Technical-Practical Experience

In the last chapter, I suggested that Kant's account of experiencing events does not apply to human and technical-practical events, since we experience these two classes of events in relation to a future end. For this reason, Kant's discussion of teleology in the third Critique may seem well suited to fill in the gaps of his first Critique account of experiencing events. However, we will see that Kant's more complex account of perceptual experience differs substantially from the account of experiencing the technical-practical that I defended in Chapter 4. Drawing on Rachel Zuckert's reconstruction of Kant's position on teleology, I show that his account of experiencing

the technical-practical reflects his adherence to the homogeneity thesis, distinguishing it from my Heideggerian account.

The third Critique offers a fuller repertoire of principles that inform our experience of the world around us, adding on to the principles offered by the first Critique. The principles offered in the first Critique describe mechanisms proceeding in accordance with efficient causation, where a state in the past causes a state in the present to come about (i.e. the sort of causality that is discussed in the Second Analogy). Following Zuckert, I'll call these "physical-mechanical principles" (cf. Zuckert 2007: 102-3). However, the third Critique offers a new sort of principle, distinct from physical-mechanical principles: the principle of purposiveness.

When we understand something purposively, we understand it in relation to a certain end – that is, as a means for that end. For example, the hammer is a means for driving nails; the axle is a means for the wheels to spin, and more globally, for the car to run (Zuckert 2007: 114); the liver is a means for the continued survival of the human organism (Zuckert 2007: 124-125). Kant argues that the principle of purposiveness offers a distinct, teleological sort of causality: final causality, in contrast to the efficient causality of physical mechanism.

First, when we understand things purposively, we understand a part in relation to a whole; the part is 'for' the larger whole, for carrying out the purpose of that whole. While the part causes the end to come about, it exists because it is for this end; for example, we would not construct an axle if we did not need a car to run. As Zuckert puts this point, "when an object is understood as purposive, its parts cause effects (what they do serves ends), and are 'there' precisely because they will have those effects" (Zuckert

2007: 117). In this way, there is a mutual dependency between the means and ends in a relation of final causality. By contrast, physical-mechanical explanation understands parts discretely, and builds up a picture of the whole as an ‘aggregate’ of those parts (Zuckert 2007: 103); we need not consider the larger whole, and its purpose, to make sense of the physical-mechanical properties of the part. In relations of efficient causality, one discrete element causes another, with only the latter depending upon the former.

Second, in purposive relations, the realization of an end requires the co-functioning of heterogeneous elements (on Zuckert’s reading, which I find convincing); for example, “precisely and only because the axles are made of different materials, shaped differently, and therefore function differently than the tires, can they serve as means to the tires’ functioning (and in turn to the purpose of the car)” (Zuckert 2007: 117). In this way, purposiveness allows for a “unity of the diverse” (ibid). This differs from physical-mechanical explanation, where homogenous elements are related; “on the physical-mechanical view, that is, matter is understood as thoroughly homogeneous. As composed of homogeneous parts (i.e. space-filling parts) related to one another in virtue of the same forces that render them material” (Zuckert 2007: 108). Final causality relates heterogeneous elements (the different elements required to carry out a final end), whereas efficient causality relates homogeneous elements (a series of states following one another necessarily in time).

Finally, when we understand something purposively, we understand it as “future-directed” (Zuckert 2007: 118), i.e. as related to a future end. We also understand that thing in relation to the past, a past intention to carry out that end; the intention causes the part to be produced (e.g. the axle), which in turn causes the future end (the car to run). As

Zuckert puts this in relation to the examples of artifacts, “the parts of the artifact are conditioned by the past (the concept according to which the artifact was constructed) but also, thereby, as directed toward the future” (Zuckert 2007: 118). By contrast, physical-mechanical understanding offers only relations of succession, where the present state is considered as following on necessarily from a past state. While “purposive relations comprise relations both of succession (past to present) and of future-directedness (present to future)” (Zuckert 2007: 117-118), efficient causality relates past and present alone.

At first impression, the principle of purposiveness may seem well suited to account for the perceptual experience I discussed in the last chapter. After all, Kant draws a contrast between the a priori, teleological principle of purposiveness and the a priori, physical-mechanical principles offered in the first Critique, and I suggested that the latter were not adequate to capture our experience of human and technical-practical events. Further, I argued that we experience technical-practical events primarily in relation to the future, and teleology offers the idea of ‘future-directedness’. However, I suggest that my account of event perception is not available to Kant, due to his depiction of the role of teleology in experiencing the technical-practical.

In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant suggests that principles like the principle that every event must have a cause, are constitutive of our experience. They are constitutive because they determine something about the objects in our world (e.g. their changes must be caused), and they relate to the necessary form of our experience (e.g. we must use the concept of cause to experience events). Kant suggests that, in the case of experiencing natural organisms, the principle of purposiveness is not constitutive; rather, it is merely regulative. In other words, we take the organisms *as if* they were created with some

purpose in mind, without actually determining that they are related to that end (Zuckert 2007: 135). For example, thinking of an object as containing internal means-end relationships among its parts (e.g. the tree with leaves and stems that mutually enrich one another, 5: 372) is a “merely regulative *a priori* principle” (5: 376); this concept of a natural end is “not constitutive of the understanding or of reason” (5: 375). Thinking of nature as purposive, determined by intentions that are directed toward certain ends, is just a “principle of the reflecting, not the determining, power of judgment” (5: 383).

Zuckert suggests that Kant takes the principle of purposiveness to be merely regulative for natural organisms for two reasons. First, we do not know that natural objects were created or produced by an intelligent being, i.e. God, with a certain end in mind. Determining natural objects as future-directed would require going beyond our experience and appealing to knowledge that we cannot have. Further, final causality “does not meet the minimum criteria of causality, i.e. necessary temporal succession” (Zuckert 2007: 133). In order to determine our experience – constitute the order of objective successions – causality must order two states necessarily in time. With efficient causality, we take the first state we perceive to necessitate the second, allowing us to order the second state after the first state in time. However, final causality is characterized by dependencies in both directions, between means and ends; the means is necessary for the end to come about, but the end is necessary for the means as well. Therefore, final causality cannot establish which state must come first in time, determining the objective order of appearances.

However, artifacts are a special case where the principle of purposiveness can determine the objects of our experience. This is because humans – intentional agents –

produce artifacts. Therefore, we need not go beyond what it is possible for us to know and posit an intentional God to determine that artifacts are related to an end. Further, “intentional activity provides Kant with a reductive account of purposive causality that is assimilable to the efficient causal time order of necessary, irreversible succession, of separable moments or events” (Zuckert 2007: 141). Rather than taking there to be mutual dependencies between the means and the end, one can differentiate the future end from the agent’s concept of that end, identifying the latter as the actual cause of the means. In this way, the timeline of intentional, purposive causality can be transposed onto the timeline of efficient causation, such that time is ordered irreversibly: the idea of the agent caused the means to come about, which in turn caused the end to come about. For example, “I have a concept or idea of the money I’ll earn by building and then renting out a house, then I build a house, then I receive the money from rent” (Zuckert 2007: 142). On Kant’s account, the purposiveness of the technical-practical is reduced to an efficient causal relation, where states follow upon one another according to rules.

Therefore, in the case of technical-practical artifacts, the principle of purposiveness does not offer an independent form of experience (i.e. one that is heterogeneous from the experience of physical-mechanical phenomena). Though Kant offers a treatment of the technical-practical in the third Critique, he does not offer a set of independent principles constituting this domain. In this way, Kant’s account of the technical-practical reflects his adherence to the homogeneity thesis. Technical-practical artifacts and events are homogenous with theoretical concepts and principles; they are be assimilated into an efficient-causal timeline. We can only determine the technical-

practical purposively insofar as it can be reduced to a mechanical-physical structure.

Teleology must be reduced to a physical-mechanical form to constitute our experience.

Kant's account of technical-practical purposiveness suggests an experience of technical-practical events that builds on, but does not displace, his Second Analogy account of experiencing events. The concept of cause (efficient, not final causality) remains constitutive of our experience of events. When we experience technical-practical events, we take the present state to follow from the past according to a rule. However, the third Critique does offer a more complex account of the states that could be ordered into an objective time order. In particular, it explains in detail Kant's claim that the intention of an agent can serve as a cause of a second state. The structure of the event, however, stays the same: the present follows from the past necessarily, according to a rule.

This differs from the account of event perception I defended in the last chapter, where I suggested that our experience of the technical-practical has a distinct set of constitutive concepts than our experience of objects that are theoretically considered. When we experience the technical-practical, I suggested, we draw on the former ontology, and that ontology alone. In particular, when we experience technical-practical events, we order our perceptions using the concept of condition; this is not identical with the concept of cause, and it cannot be reduced to it.¹⁵⁶

¹⁵⁶ There may be some cases where a condition/conditioned pair is identical with a cause/effect pair. For example, we might say that the ship's position at point A is a necessary condition for its position at point B (it could not have reached point B without passing through point A first). The ship's position at point B likewise follows from point A necessarily, according to a rule. However, this is not always the case. The early stages of table construction are conditions for the final product (i.e. the completed table), but the final product does not follow from them necessarily (the project could fail). Therefore, the concept of condition cannot be reduced to the concept of cause in a global sense.

Following my discussion in the last chapter, I suggest that my account is a more phenomenologically compelling account of experiencing the technical-practical than the (more complex) account offered by Kant in the third Critique. According to Kant's picture, in technical-practical action, an intention to bring about some end is “‘added to’ a series of discrete, mechanical causes” (Zuckert 2007: 120). Let me argue that Kant's picture is less compelling by considering what it is like to experience others' technical-practical action. First, I argue that, when we appreciate human behavior, we take there to be a certain unity or coherence ranging over a series of states. As with my example from the last chapter, we differentiate between the series associated with the carpenter building the canoe, and the series associated with the carpenter building the table. Likewise, we differentiate between the table-building series and the series related to taking a break. Even within a single series or arc of technical-practical action, we differentiate a beginning and an end. I suggest that taking what we perceive to be a causal series (i.e., structuring our perceptions with the concept of cause) fails to capture the unities we appreciate in others' action, even if we take a human intention to figure into that causal series. Reduced to a single link in a chain of causes – a chain with no identifiable beginning or end, as Kant emphasizes in the third antinomy – the human intention provides no impetus to separate this finite series of causes from another, or to identify its beginning and end. By contrast, my account of experiencing events, where that experience is always structured by an anticipated future end, does justice to the unity we experience among a finite set of states. These states, namely, make up the series of

Further, I suggest that taking something to be a condition, as opposed to taking it to be a cause, is a distinct phenomenological experience (we take it that it must precede a succeeding state, but not that the succeeding state must follow necessarily).

conditions for that end, which begins with the first condition, and ends with the completed product.

Further, I suggest that, when we experience technical-practical action in others, we appreciate their first-personal orientation toward a future end. We appreciate, that is, that they experience themselves as being directed toward the future. First personally, when one engages with equipment – appreciating it as equipment rather than as a material thing – the end of one’s action has a greater significance than as a single link in the chain among others. For example, one does not experience oneself as driven by a prior series; one sets one’s sights on a goal. Every step in the process is situated in relation to that end, such that one continually adjusts toward that end when inconveniences or new factors come into play. Further, the end organizes the network of equipment that we face at every moment of technical-practical activity. In particular, the network of equipment is mediately ordered by the end, by way of the particular step of the process in which we are currently engaged (the hammer, nail and board are involved in the attachment of legs to the table, but they are mostly irrelevant for the step where one sands the wood). I argue that, when we appreciate the technical practical activity in which we see others engaged, we empathize with their first-personal orientation toward the future. This is evidenced by the way that we describe their activity: “She is trying to build a table” or “she’s taking a shot on the net.” My account of experiencing events, as opposed to that of Kant, does justice to our experience of the technical-practical – where we experience the equipment with which we engage first and foremost in terms of ends. On my account, the future end is the organizing principle that structures our experience of events; on Kant’s account, it is one link in the chain.

In addition, I argue that my account can overcome the issues with ordering objective time that Kant faced with his account of purposiveness, such that the principle could only be classified as regulative. Though Kant's depiction of non-instrumental final causality could not 'meet the minimum requirements of causality,' my model of experiencing events allows us to order time irreversibly, without being reduced to efficient causality. To see this, consider the issues with using final causality to order time that Zuckert illustrates. First, purposive relationships can be simultaneous; for example, the functioning of the liver cell cannot clearly be differentiated temporally from the functioning of the liver. When Heidegger describes the totality of equipment, he also describes simultaneous relationships between different pieces of equipment like a hammer, nail, and board. However, in line with what I suggested about ready-to-hand events last chapter, I argue that when we engage with the technical-practical, we attend to the work; we ensure that our holistically related (simultaneous) equipment come together such that the end is produced. I suggest that the states that we order when experiencing a technical-practical event are temporally distinct steps toward the production of the work. We do not order individual tools that coincide in time, but the temporally distinct stages of a project. We do not order the totality of equipment, but the whole of activity that is organized around some end.

Second, in purposive relations, the means and the end are mutually dependent in relations of reciprocal causation. Depending on which end of the reciprocity that we focus upon, we could generate timelines 'forwards' and 'backwards,' in contradiction to Kant's contention that time is unidirectional. If causes precede their effect in time, relations of reciprocal causality mean that the end could precede the means, and the

means the end. However, my model of technical-practical event perception avoids ordering time bi-directionally. Indeed, this has to be an independent desideratum of any Heideggerian model of time, as he suggests that the future has priority; a model where the past and future could be flipped would not fit well with his theory of time. My model does not have this shortcoming because I suggest that, when identifying technical-practical events, we take the past and the present as a series of conditions that are organized by the anticipated future. As both the past and present state are related *to the future state*, and the past and present are related *by way of the future state*, the model of time is weighted toward the future. The state that constitutes relations between other states in the series can be identified as the later in the series – the future. Further, past and present states can be ordered in terms of which state conditions (necessarily precedes) the other state (as dictated by the future end). Thus, my model of purposive relations allows only for one, unidirectional ordering of time.

I have argued that Kant's account of teleology does not match the account of experiencing events that I defended in the previous chapter. In the case of technical-practical artifacts and events, Kant takes final causality to reduce to (be homogenous with) efficient causality. By contrast, my account of the technical-practical suggests that it has its own set of constitutive categories. These categories can function independently, ordering time unidirectionally on their own, without being reduced to the structure of efficient causality. Because my account more closely matches the phenomenology of technical-practical event perception, it offers an attractive alternative to the one that Kant offers.

2. Toward A New Interpretation of Kant's Critical Works

So far, I have emphasized the ways in which Kant's depiction of the technical-practical departs from that of Heidegger, and I have offered some reasons to prefer Heidegger's depiction. I would like to conclude, however, by returning to Heidegger's interpretive method and considering how to charitably interpret Kant such that he provides a more satisfying response to the main question posed in the Second Analogy: how do we experience events?

Heidegger's method of interpretation pursues the major questions raised in Kant's text. If Kant's main line of argument answering a question proves unsatisfactory, Heidegger searches Kant's text for other possible, more satisfactory answers. We saw this method, for example, in Heidegger's interpretation of the Metaphysical Deduction. In the Metaphysical Deduction, Kant attempts to identify the source of the categories. However, Kant's main line of argument – that they are derived from the table of logical judgments – is unsatisfactory in light of further inquiry into the main concepts necessary for logical judgment. As Kant invokes the imagination in his discussion introducing the table of categories, Heidegger identifies the imagination as an alternate, more promising source of the categories.

Similarly, we can arrive at a broader reading of Kant's critical works by pursuing the major question Kant poses in the Second Analogy: how do we experience events? While Kant's main line of argument suggests that we must employ the concept of cause in order to experience events, I have argued that this suggestion is unsatisfactory if we consider the phenomenology of experiencing human events and technical-practical events. We experience these two classes of events, I have argued, primarily in relation to the

future. On its own, the Second Analogy provides an incomplete account of experiencing events; the account applies only to the present-at-hand. However, other parts of Kant's corpus may offer a fuller, more satisfying argument. Indeed, Kant's third Critique discussion of teleology seems much more apt for describing our experience of the technical-practical, as it offers, on Zuckert's interpretation, the idea of future-directedness.¹⁵⁷

Though Kant suggests that, in our experience of technical-practical artifacts, purposive causality reduces to efficient causality, I suggest that we will arrive at a more satisfying depiction of the technical-practical if we reconsider this claim. Departing from the main line of argument in Kant's text, we can read his discussion of teleology as providing the constitutive principles for the independent domain of the technical-practical (i.e. beings that are ready-to-hand). In this way, Kant's claims about teleology can be fruitfully developed to inform our account of technical-practical experience, an account that does justice to the phenomenology of experiencing events.

¹⁵⁷ Here, one might ask: what is the point of reinterpreting Kant, if Heidegger provides everything we need to understand the technical-practical correctly? Why not just turn to Heidegger's positive philosophy instead of undertaking a difficult reinterpretation of Kant? In fact, I think that a reinterpretation of Kant's third Critique has a few things to offer Heidegger. First, Kant emphasizes that teleological understanding has the capacity to unify the diverse. This is not a point of emphasis in Heidegger, though it matches closely with his account of the technical-practical, where a network of diverse equipment are unified around a certain end and present-at-hand understanding 'levels off' the technical-practical (one could read this as leveling off diversity and making uniform). Further, this could be developed to support Heidegger's suggestion that a purposive structure (i.e. the productive imagination) is needed to unify the faculties of understanding and sensibility (heterogeneous faculties). Further, as noted in the last chapter, Heidegger struggles to fit plants and animals into his ontology. Kant's own depiction of biology – and, indeed, its reliance on teleological understanding – could prove useful to Heidegger.

This line of revision gestures toward a Heideggerian reading of the critical works. The way Kant's three Critiques – the Critique of Pure Reason, the Critique of Practical Reason, and the Critique of the Power of Judgment – hang together is a fraught issue in Kant's scholarship. Following Heidegger's interpretation of Kant, as developed here, leads us to one way of conceiving their connection. Namely, each of Kant's three Critiques captures a different domain of our experience; each provides the basic categories ordering our perceptions of a different kind of being.¹⁵⁸ The first Critique provides the categories constituting the domain of the present-at-hand. As I have suggested here, the third Critique provides the categories constituting the (independent) domain of the ready-to-hand, or technical-practical. Further, the second Critique may be a promising source of the categories constituting the domain of humans. Indeed, the table of freedom that Kant offers in this work is presented as a counterpart to the table of categories offered in the first Critique. For example, the table of freedom, like the table of categories, is split into four subsections: Of Quantity, Of Quality, Of Relation, Of Modality (5:65-5:66). This table could be read as offering the categories constituting our perceptual experience of humans (when we appreciate them as humans, rather than material things or instruments).

This interpretation of Kant's critical works is a distinctly Heideggerian one. As we have seen, the interpretation follows Heidegger's method of pursuing the main

¹⁵⁸ This might be compared with Karl Ameriks suggestion that each of the three Critiques each capture a different part of our experience: "the Critique of Pure Reasons sets out the necessary (or a priori) conditions of theoretical experience; the Critique of Practical Reason sets out the conditions of 'pure practical', i.e. moral, experience; and the Critique of Judgment sets out the necessary conditions of pure 'purposive' experience" (Ameriks 2003: 4).

questions of Kant's text and identifying the most promising line of argument in the text. Further, the interpretation builds on Heidegger's claim that the categories in the first Critique capture only the domain of the present-at-hand. Finally, the interpretation appeals to parallels in Heidegger's account of the ready-to-hand and Kant's account of teleology to interpret the contribution of the third Critique.

Unfortunately, Heidegger's lecture course on the third Critique is not yet available, so I cannot yet determine whether this source confirms my interpretation. However, the interpretation does match Heidegger's remarks on Kant's practical philosophy in his 1930 lecture course, The Essence of Human Freedom. Heidegger is critical of the depiction of freedom that is offered in the Critique of Practical Reason, arguing that freedom is defined too closely in relation to causality, as "a kind of causality" (EHF 175); in this way, "what is possibly not-nature in the ontological constitution of human beings is also defined in the same way as nature, i.e. through causality" (EHF 168). However, when Heidegger considers Kant's depiction of freedom in his practical philosophy, he urges us to interpret Kant as describing a sort of experience:

Practical action is the way of being of the person. Experience of practical freedom is experience of the person as person... To be sure, Kant does not speak of the 'experience' of the person as such. Yet while Kant reserves the term 'experience' for the disclosure of natural things, the former way of speaking is entirely consonant with his general problematic (EHF 188-189).

Heidegger is critical of Kant's development of practical concepts even in the second Critique and seeks to disentangle the notion of freedom from that of causality. However, Heidegger uses these practical concepts as a point of departure for considering what it is

like to ‘experience the person as person,’ developing a more satisfying depiction of freedom (and the ontology of Dasein more broadly) through critical engagement with Kant.

In this concluding section, I have attempted to provide a preliminary account of a broader Heideggerian interpretation of Kant’s critical works, using our experience of events as a touchstone for considering how Kant’s first, second, and third Critiques hang together. This preliminary account can be further developed and put to the test by considering the extent to which the categories Kant offers in the second and third Critiques can inform a satisfying account of experiencing the technical-practical and experiencing the human.

Conclusion

In the preceding chapters, I suggested that Heidegger offers a new, distinct objection to Kant's argument in the Second Analogy chapter of the Critique of Pure Reason, wherein Kant attempts to respond to Hume's skepticism about causation by suggesting that the concept of cause is necessary for our perceptual experience of events. I argued that Heidegger directs us to an immanent critique of the Second Analogy, suggesting that, based on Kant's depiction of the categories and the imagination, we ought to regard the imagination (and not the understanding) as the source of the concept of cause. If this is so, I argued further, this points to internal grounds in Kant's text suggesting that the concept of cause need not apply to every context where we experience events. While the imagination, the structure of projecting an understanding onto the world ahead of time, *can* take up the concept of cause to conceptualize events, it *need* not; the imagination, the bare structure of projection, is underdetermined in that it is not bound to any single category.

Based on the findings of this argument, I provided a phenomenological reconstruction of the various contexts where we experience events. I found, indeed, that Kant's account of experiencing in the Second Analogy does not apply to every context; while it captures what it is like to take a theoretical or observational attitude to natural processes, it does not capture what it is like to experience events initiated by humans (human events), or what it is like to experience events as we go about our everyday, practical lives (technical-practical events). For these reasons, we ought to interpret the Second Analogy as being narrow (less than universal) in scope, even despite Kant's claims to the contrary.

While narrowing the scope of Kant's Second Analogy account of experiencing events, I suggested that Kant's other critical works might be used to supplement that account. Kant's second and third Critiques can be interpreted as addressing the contexts of experience that are overlooked by the first Critique. Of course, Kant does not explicitly offer up these works as providing regional ontologies. For example, Kant hesitates to dub the principle of purposiveness as a constitutive principle, suggesting that the categories and principles offered in the first Critique are, in his mind, constitutive of perceptual experience across the board. Nonetheless, this reconstructive interpretation of Kant's critical project adopts Heidegger's interpretive method. Following Kant's line of inquiry in the Second Analogy – how do we experience events? – the interpretation offers Kant a more plausible and wide-ranging line of response, capable of capturing our experience of humans and the technical-practical, and not limiting itself to the mechanistic.

In this conclusion, I return to some of the issues I discussed in the introduction. To be specific, I consider whether this argument helps to motivate Heidegger's (often hasty) rejections of causality as applied to understanding Dasein, and his suggestion that Kant does not adequately attend to what is human, for which Heidegger associates Kant with the instrumentalizing, 'technological' worldview that sees manmade objects (airliners), nature (the Rhine), and humans alike as mere resources to be optimized and made more efficient.

We have seen that, for Kant, the concept of cause is our concept of one thing following another necessarily in time (according to a rule). Kant suggests that, as an a priori concept of the understanding, the concept of cause allows us to identify events –

that is, order our perceptions such that they represent an objective change. When we do so, we take the present state that we perceive to follow necessarily from a past state.

Building on Heidegger's early phenomenology, I have suggested that this account of event perception does not capture our perception of human events. We do not, I have argued, identify human events as following on necessarily from the past. Rather, we identify human events as conditions for the anticipated future. This alternate account of event perception appreciates humans as beings who take up future projects, drawing on past traditions. In other words, the alternate account appreciates the humans we perceive as temporal – a truth that Heidegger argues is suggested already by Kant's treatment of the *a priori* categories that we use to anticipate the world around us. My argument shows specifically why Heidegger's analysis of Dasein is incompatible with the causal conceptualization that Kant describes.

Though Kant devotes several critical works to understanding humans – including his practical philosophy in the second Critique and Groundwork, and his philosophy of history – the categories have a special place in Kant's system. Kant suggests that they are universal. Further, as we saw in our treatment of the third Critique, in works that admit to an alternate manner of conceptualization to that encapsulated by the categories, Kant continues to afford the categories a primary, constitutive role, rendering teleological understanding secondary. These claims suggest that everything in our perceptual purview – which, of course, includes humans – is first experienced categorially. Indeed, Heidegger faults Kant for failing precisely to spell out how categories like possibility, actuality, and causality might transform when applied to humans. Heidegger's charge is not that Kant explicitly endorses a mechanistic understanding of humans, or that Kant

ignored the human altogether, but that Kant was too ambiguous in his analysis. Kant does not explicate the temporal structure that is distinctive of the human being and, in his quest to secure a universal status for the categories, does not make it clear that these categories do not constitute our understanding of the humans in our world.

Heidegger's reading of Kant as ambiguous shows the connection between the first Critique and the technological worldview. The first Critique offers a strand of argument proposing that the entire contents of the world ought to be analyzed by the categories. This paves the way for a worldview that attempts to optimize that mechanism, pushing for more efficiency and flexibility from artifacts, nature and humans alike – a worldview, in other words, that sees the entire contents of the world as a 'giant gasoline station' (DT 91). However, as we have seen, Heidegger's reading of Kant as ambiguous also offers a more charitable reading of the text. Peeling away the strand of argument that is implausible and promoting the strand that works, we can appreciate the limitations of categories like causality. Further, following Heidegger's lead, we can read Kant's second and third Critiques, taking on the human and the technical-practical, as capturing these alternate, differently constituted domains of experience. This broader basis of understanding, in turn, can be used to offer a richer account of human experience, and to reorient our sense of what it means to be human.

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Vita

Morganna F. Lambeth

Birthplace: Annapolis, Maryland, USA

Education

- 2011-2018 Northwestern University, Doctoral Program in Philosophy
 Ph.D. in Philosophy
 Dissertation: *Rethinking the Structure of Events: Heidegger on Kant and the Concept of Cause*
 Committee: Cristina Lafont (Chair), Rachel Zuckert, Mark Wrathall
- 2009-2011 University of California at Riverside, Doctoral Program in Philosophy
 M.A. in Philosophy
 Thesis: "Did Nietzsche Have a Will to Truth?"
 Committee: Maudemarie Clark (Chair), Mark Wrathall, Pierre Keller
- 2004-2008 University of Chicago
 B.A. in Philosophy (with General Honors and Honors in Philosophy)
 Thesis: "Our Waning Environment: A Modern Problem"
 Advisor: Robert Pippin

Publications

1. "Do We Identify Human Events with Kant's Concept of Cause? A Defense of Heidegger's Interpretation of Kant," in: *Perspektiven mit Heidegger*, ed. Gerhard Thonhauser, Verlag Karl Alber (2017), 267-282.
2. "An Objection to Kant's Second Analogy," in *Kant Yearbook* 7 (2015): Kant and Empiricism, 97-114.
3. "Heidegger's Last God" (with Mark Wrathall), in *Inquiry* 54.2 (2011), 160-182.

Select Presentations

- "Revising Kant's Categories with Heidegger"
- Georg Bertrams Forschungskolloquium, Freie Universität Berlin, April 2018
- "A Case for Heidegger's Interpretation of the Kantian Imagination"
- Critical Theory Cluster Dissertation Symposium, Northwestern University, February 2017 (presented as "Imagination and Causality in Hume, Kant and Heidegger") (refereed)
 - History of Philosophy Roundtable, Loyola University, October 2016

- Northwest Philosophy Conference, October 2016 (refereed)
- Philosophy Writing Group, Northwestern University, February 2016

“Do We Identify Human Events with Kant’s Concept of Cause? A Defense of Heidegger’s Interpretation of Kant”

- 55th Meeting of the Society for Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy, Salt Lake City, October 2016 (refereed)
- Perspectives with Heidegger: Conference for Graduate Students and Postdoctoral Scholars, University of Vienna, May 2016 (refereed)
- UK Kant Society Annual Meeting: Kant on Politics and Religion, Keele University, September 2015 (refereed)
- Dissertation Research Seminar, Northwestern University, May 2015

“Event Perception in Kant and Heidegger”

- Boston College Philosophy Graduate Conference: Phenomenology and Time, Boston College, March 2015 (refereed)
- Southern Study Group of the North American Kant Society, St. Mary’s University, March 2015 (refereed)
- Graduate Student Workshop in Traditional Metaphysics, National University of Ireland at Galway, April 2014 (refereed)
- Dissertation Research Seminar, Northwestern University, February 2014