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Consciousness or Co-optation:
Ethnic Political Power and
Movement Outcomes in Ecuador and Australia

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ABSTRACT

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How can political challengers avoid co-optation and other forms of moderation? This dissertation illuminates how institutional participation led to the co-optation of the Indigenous Australian movement and the factors which equipped the Ecuadorian Indígena movement to elude a similar fate. Most contestants in political struggles must at some point consider participation or co-operation with an opponent. This dissertation's findings suggest how activists might evaluate such arrangements, and, if they select engagement, how to proceed with full awareness of the advantages and disadvantages.

Unlike many other scholars, I differentiate productive and counterproductive institutional participation: *productive* participation results in concessions without unduly weakening the movement whereas *counterproductive* participation jeopardizes challenger influence in exchange for paltry gains. Based on meticulous research—including interviews and archival data—and using process tracing methodology, my analyses suggest that the Indígena movement resisted counterproductive participation, thereby avoiding co-optation, because numerous activists had developed an advanced consciousness: a cognizance of the mechanisms underlying elite domination and an awareness of the need for countervailing movement autonomy and

safeguards. By maintaining a powerful organization, they could also constrain potentially deleterious participation by less aware activists. In contrast, the Indigenous Australian movement's lack of widespread consciousness and weak organizational capacity contributed to its co-optation and demobilization. In addition to suggesting how activists can avoid co-optation and benefit from participation, my research explores how they may acquire an advanced consciousness.

This study also has implications for the agency-structure debate: Is challenger behavior shaped by the challengers themselves or the external environment? Critics of the political process theory synthesis—an amalgamation of resource mobilization theory, the political opportunity structures perspective, and framing analysis—claim that it privileges structural over ideational factors. In assessing the synthesis' ability to explain the cases, I find it elucidates why one movement succumbed to structural impulses, but cannot explain the other's resistance: the synthesis model indeed fails to account for agency, consciousness, and related phenomena. Although recent scholarship has attempted to "bring culture back in," the underlying theorizing is often narrow and empirically weak. This dissertation overcomes such shortcomings by offering theoretical insights grounded in real-world data.

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Because of my distance from Northwestern, my graduate career sometimes presented administrative challenges. I thus extend sincerest thanks to several Northwestern staff members for their "can do" attitudes, enthusiasm, and humor, especially: Chris Bray of the political science department and Stephen Scott of the graduate school. In addition to supporting me when I needed an advocate, Mary Pat Doyle of the graduate school also shepherded me through the scholarship application process, which resulted in my being awarded a Fulbright. I was greatly honored to be selected by the Fulbright Commission and am grateful for its year of financial support.

At its heart, this dissertation is about aggrieved groups seeking justice and I could not have written it without the co-operation of my interviewees, many of whom were members of such groups or activists working on their behalf. I am indebted to them for their time and trust. I would also like to acknowledge two regional experts who reviewed my case study chapters: Gary Foley, one of the few surviving Indigenous Australian Black Power activists and now a historian; and the historian Marc Becker, who generously provided access to his forthcoming book on Ecuadorian Indígena political history. Michael Saward also deserves thanks for providing me a copy of his 1990 book on co-optation.

Without a doubt, I could not have persevered through the demanding dissertation process without the encouragement, patience, and support of my friends and family. Two sources of my support are sadly no longer with us: Professor Doug Nigh who wrote one of my letters of recommendation for Northwestern; and Jon Bay, my closest friend from the political science program, whose memory has served as an ongoing source of inspiration. Stateside, I am beholden to my friends in the Chicago area for their immeasurable support and for hosting me on various visits. I would also like to thank my siblings, Suzanne Smith and Anthony Smith, for the comfort and assistance they gave me, particularly the humorous interludes my sister provided and my brother's writing advice. My father, Bernie Smith, deserves special appreciation: I am grateful for his encouragement, for teaching me from a young age the value of perseverance, and for removing many potential obstacles from the lives of his children by wholeheartedly supporting our educational endeavors.

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I end by acknowledging two of the most significant sources of inspiration for both my dissertation and my life: my mother, Jacqueline Smith, who introduced me to activism at an early

age and who I so wish could see my achievement; and my daughter Annika Stegen, who

through her very presence inspired me to finish and thereby set a positive example, and whose

laughter and company give me great joy.

CONTENTS

ABBREVIATIONS

AAL	Australian Aboriginal League
AAPA	Australian Aboriginal Progressive Association
APG	Aboriginal Provisional Government
ATC	Australian Treaty Committee
ATSIC	Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission
CAA	Council for Aboriginal Affairs
CERD	Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination
CMS	Co-ordination of Social Movements
CONACNIE	Co-ordinating Council of Indígena Nationalities of Ecuador
CONAIE	Confederation of Indígena Nationalities of Ecuador
CONFENAIE	Confederation of Amazonian Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador
CPA	Communist Party of Australia
CTE	Confederation of Ecuadorian Workers
DAA	Department of Aboriginal Affairs
ECUARUNARI	The Awakening of the Ecuadorian Indígenas
FCAATSI	Federal Council for Advancement of Aborigines and Torres Strait Islanders
FEI	Ecuadorian Federation of Indígenas
FENOC	National Federation of Peasant Organizations
FICI	Indígena and Peasant Federation of Imbabura
IMF	International Monetary Fund
NAC	National Aboriginal Conference
NACC	National Aboriginal Consultative Committee
NGO	Non Governmental Organization
OPIP	Organization of Indígena Peoples of Pastaza
POS	Political opportunity structures perspective
PPT	Political process theory
RMT	Resource mobilization theory
SMO	Social movement Organization
TVA	Tennessee Valley Authority
UN	United Nations
UNIA	Universal Negro Improvement Association
VAAL	Victoria Aborigines Advancement League

CHAPTER 1

Introduction

Never doubt that a small group of thoughtful citizens can change the world.

—Margaret Mead

This dissertation examines the trajectories and divergent outcomes of two social movement case studies to illuminate neglected areas of politics and protest: agency, consciousness, and the capacity of activists to surmount government moderation strategies. Recent scholarship has lamented the lack of attention given to such ideational phenomena by the prevalent social movement theories.[1] Some scholars attribute this lacuna to the "ephemeral, amorphous nature of the subject matter," stating that it is "inherently easier" to study concrete factors.[2] And yet, some of the most interesting questions pertain to the more amorphous phenomena: for example, why are some challengers more adept than others at recognizing and responding to potentially hazardous political arrangements? What types of experiences and backgrounds facilitate the development of keen judgment? Although it may be considered difficult to address such questions, I endeavor to undertake exactly this task by systematically

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1. Aldon Morris, "Reflections on Social Movement Theory: Criticisms and Proposals," *Contemporary Sociology* 29, no. 3 (2000): 445-54. Sidney Tarrow, "Silence and Voice in the Study of Contentious Politics: Introduction," in *Silence and Voice in the Study of Contentious Politics*, ed. Ronald R. Aminzade et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).
2. Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy, and Mayer N. Zald, "Introduction: Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Framing Processes—Toward a Synthetic, Comparative Perspective on Social Movements," in *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings*, ed. Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy and Mayer N. Zald (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 6.

analyzing the contrasting examples of agency and consciousness provided by the two case studies—the Indígenas of Ecuador and the Indigenous peoples of Australia.[3]

Because the case studies cover a significant portion of the life spans of both movements, they provide a rich pool of data, which affords me the opportunity to contribute to different areas of social movement study and political protest. I have therefore divided the dissertation into two distinct parts: in the first section, I furnish proprietary, empirical data to the theoretical debate over how well various social movement approaches explain agency-driven dynamics. In the second section, I examine government control strategies and analyze why and how the Indigenous Australian movement succumbed to moderating structural impulses while the Ecuadorian Indígena movement—empowered by its political consciousness—was able to navigate around them. Scholarship documenting such activist consciousness and agency is rare. My research provides me with a unique perspective for demonstrating how activists avoided co-optation because they were not only aware of the subjugating mechanisms underlying some forms of government engagement, but also of the movement's need for countervailing autonomy. Furthermore, they possessed the means to influence the behavior of their less enlightened cohort.

The two case studies, the Indígenas of Ecuador and the Indigenous Australians of Australia, are well suited for the topics at hand as they initially followed strikingly similar trajectories, but differed later in how they reacted to government social control strategies. In both cases, activism prior to the 1900s consisted of isolated events—for example, revenge killings (Indigenous Australian) and local uprisings (Indígena). In the early 1900s, however, both groups

3. The terminology used to describe both groups is widely contested. For lack of better alternatives and to clearly distinguish the two case studies, I use the terms Indígenas for the indigenous peoples of Ecuador and Indigenous Australians or Indigenous peoples for those of Australia. For a more comprehensive discussion, please see the Appendix.

began creating or joining organizations and pursuing sustainable forms of protest. These early organizations had limited success in effecting policy changes, but helped raise the general public's awareness. During the 1930s and 1940s, activism in both countries lulled, as the attention of almost all parties was trained on recovering from the worldwide economic slump and World War II. Protest activity picked up again in the 1950s and 1960s; and new, more radical elements appeared in both movements, leading to significant intramovement upheaval. In both cases the radicals assumed the movement's vanguard and shifted the demands from equal rights to indigenous rights.

To manage the challengers, the Ecuadorian and Australian governments implemented various control strategies, including attempts at co-optation. During the 1970s, the paths of the two movements sharply diverged. Although a few members of the Indigenous Australian movement were aware of the hazards of government engagement, they were unable to halt other members from joining the government. Within a few years the movement had been, for all intents and purposes, co-opted and demobilized. In contrast, many Ecuadorian Indígena activists realized the risks of government engagement and were instrumental in creating and leading a powerful organization through which they could exert influence over those other activists who, unaware of the potential hazards, preferred institutional participation.

<div align="center">The Neglect of "Soft" Variables</div>

In addition to the difficulties presented by their intangible nature, agency—defined as the "active choices and efforts of movement actors"[4]—and related phenomena have also been

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4. Jeff Goodwin and James M. Jasper, "Caught in a Winding, Snarling Vine: The Structural Bias of Political Process Theory," *Sociological Forum* 14, No. 1 (1999): 29.

neglected for historical reasons. In the post-World War II period, collective behavior theory

viewed collective action as a spontaneous, explosive, irrational, and emotional response by the

backward and weak to an external stimulus. Protest was considered abnormal and few theorists

addressed the political dimensions of such behavior. How could protest be so misread? Charles

Tilly considered the collective behavior theories to be "pernicious postulates:" errors wrought

from misunderstandings of earlier revolutions and upheavals.[5] Claus Offe was equally scathing,

arguing that such theorizing was politically motivated: its aim was not to elucidate protest but to

discourage it through denigration.[6]

As collective behavior theory's flaws became apparent, it was repudiated to such an

extent that subsequent theorists, to avoid tainting their work, tended toward "hard" variables at

the expense of "soft" variables.[7] Agency, culture, ideology, consciousness, and other concepts

that might be associated in any way with the collective behavior paradigm were cast aside. In

simple terms, *the scholarly neglect of ideational factors is a consequence of an earlier political*

project to misrepresent and discredit protest and activists. Thus, for the past several decades, the

study of politics and protest has been dominated by theories that deal primarily with tangible and

structural factors, such as the resource mobilization theory (RMT), the political opportunity

structures (POS) perspective, and the related political process theory (PPT).

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5. Charles Tilly, "Social Movements and National Politics," in *Statemaking and Social Movements*, eds. Charles Bright and Susan Harding, (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1984), 11.
6. Claus Offe, "New Social Movements: Challenging the Boundaries of Institutional Politics," *Social Research* 52, no. 4 (Winter 1985), 817-868.
7. For more on this topic, please see Jeff Goodwin, James M. Jasper, and Francesca Polletta, "The Return of the Repressed: The Fall and Rise of Emotions in Social Movement Theory," *Mobilization: An International Journal* 50, no.1, 2000: 65-84; and James M. Jasper, "The Emotions of Protest: Affective and Reactive Emotions in and Around Social Movements," *Sociological Forum* 13, no. 3 (1998): 397-424. Zald also touched upon the relationship between collective behavior analysis and later theorizing; see Mayer N. Zald, "Culture, Ideology, and Strategic Framing," in McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald, *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements*, 264.

The Study of Politics and Protest

The founders of RMT were forthright about their objective to counter certain tenets of collective behavior theory.[8] They disputed, for example, collective behavior theory's claim that collective action was unorganized, and argued that collective action required sufficient resources, such as money and labor, and some minimal form of organization to mobilize those resources. RMT spawned a plethora of new scholarship and dominated the social movement field for decades; by the early 1980s, RMT was used in 75 percent of the main journal articles.[9] Over time, however, scholars became discontented with RMT's neglect of the macrostructural level, and, just as RMT developed as a remedy to earlier approaches, later perspectives—POS and PPT—grew out of dissatisfaction with RMT's narrow focus.[10]

Whereas RMT scholars assert that collective action requires the "coordinating, directing offices of organization, formal or informal," structuralists posit that collective action is prompted by external impetuses, which they term opportunities: these are "specific configurations of resources, institutional arrangements and historical precedents for social mobilization, which facilitate the development of protest movements in some instances and constrain them in others."[11] Structural explanations of collective action, therefore, look to factors such as open or

8. John McCarthy and Mayer Zald, "Resource Mobilization and Social Movements: A Partial Theory," *American Journal of Sociology*, 82:6, 1212-41.
9. Carol McClurg Mueller, "Building Social Movement Theory," in *Frontiers in Social Movement Theory*, ed. Aldon Morris and Carol McClurg Mueller (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992), 3.
10. See Doug McAdam, Sidney Tarrow, and Charles Tilly, *Dynamics of Contention* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). See also Sidney Tarrow, *Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics*, Second Edition (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1998), 16.
11. First quote from Rod Aya, "Popular Intervention in Revolutionary Situations," in *State Making and Social Movements: Essays in History and Theory*, ed. Charles Bright and Susan Harding (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1984), 332; second quote from Herbert P. Kitschelt, "Political Opportunity Structures and Political Protest: Anti-Nuclear Movements in Four Democracies," *British Journal of Political Science* 16 (1986): 58.

closed government structures, and state repression or facilitation.[12] In the early 1980s, scholars

melded the opportunity structure approach with elements of RMT to create the first generation of

PPT, which then rivaled RMT for dominance.[13]

In the 1980s, the stigma of using "soft" factors lessened somewhat, and a cultural

approach—framing—was introduced. Framing stems from psychology, and, as it was originally

conceived, "refers to an interpretive schemata that simplifies and condenses the 'world out there'

by selectively punctuating and encoding objects, situations, events, experiences, and sequences

of actions within one's present or past environment."[14] In Snow, Rochford, Worden, and

Benford's (1986) adaptation of the concept for political analysis, the "world out there" became

the political environment, while activists' interpretations became collective action frames. These

interpretations, or framing of the political environment, thus shape activist strategies, as well as

if, and how, they mobilize their resources.

In the 1990s, several notable scholars published works advocating a "synthetic" approach

combining elements of RMT, POS/PPT, and framing analysis. One of the most well known is

Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy, and Mayer N. Zald's (1996) coedited *Comparative*

Perspectives on Social Movements. In this volume, McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald pared the

three approaches down to their essential factors—mobilizing structures, opportunities, and

framing processes—and exhorted scholars to apply all three in analysis. In terms of scope, the

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12. Eisinger and Kitschelt examined the impact of open or closed structures; Tilly examined repression and facilitation. Peter K. Eisinger, "The Conditions of Protest Behavior in American Cities," *American political Science Review* 67, (1973): 11-28; Kitschelt, "Political Opportunity and Political Protest"; Charles Tilly, *From Mobilization to Revolution* (Reading: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1978).

13. According to Goodwin and Jasper, PPT became "the hegemonic paradigm among social movement analysts." "Caught in a Winding, Snarling Vine," 28.

14. David Snow and Robert Benford, "Master Frames and Cycles of Protest," in *Frontiers in Social Movement Theory*, ed. A. Morris and C. McClurg Mueller (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992), 137.

three scholars maintained that the synthesis would illuminate the *emergence*, *development*, and *decline* of social movements. By including framing processes as a cultural, ideational component, they hoped, it seems, to compensate for the structural bias of earlier approaches, particularly the prevalent political process model. Other scholars, however, quickly objected to the implicit and explicit claims of synthesis advocates, arguing that the synthetic approach still neglected agency, as had the theories before it.[15] The debate between synthesis opponents and advocates has at times bordered on rancor. One reason for this intensity, I believe, is a concern by agency-oriented scholars that the assertions of synthesis advocates may mislead some scholars, particularly the "younger generation," into erroneously believing that the synthesis provides tools for explaining agency-driven dynamics.[16] The question of whether the synthesis accounts for agency or not thus takes on greater importance than a mere spat between scholars. With its potential for lasting influence, *does the synthetic approach lead the social movement field down yet another structurally bound theoretical path?* One of the key issues this dissertation addresses is: Does the synthesis provide a "fuller understanding" of movement emergence, development, and decline, as argued by its founders? Or, as its detractors claim, has it "left key determinants of collective action in theoretical darkness"?[17]

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15. See Goodwin and Jasper, "Caught in a Winding, Snarling Vine," and Aldon Morris, "Reflections on Social Movement Theory: Criticisms and Proposals," *Contemporary Sociology* 29, no.3 (2000), 445-454.
16. Goodwin and Jasper, "Caught in a Winding, Snarling Vine," 28.
17. First quote from McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald, "Introduction," 7; second quotation from Morris, "Reflections on Social Movement Theory," 447.

The Power of Awareness

A critical difference between the responses of the Indigenous Australians and the Indígenas of Ecuador to government overtures was that many activists in the Indígena movement, even in the 1930s, perceived such attempts as duplicitous and ultimately serving the interests of the government. These "aware" Indígenas recognized that the government sought to control Indígena communities and hinder their political development and autonomy. Given that this awareness, or consciousness, falls into the historically neglected "ephemeral, amorphous" category of movement dynamics, it is not surprising that pertinent scholarship is scarce.

One oft-cited consciousness scholar is Paulo Freire, who studied third world education and literacy. Freire observed that the process of learning to read could also be a process of learning to think and reflect about one's sociocultural reality, its injustices, and one's ability to change and transform that reality. In other words, the ability to read opens and reveals not only words, but the truth of the world itself. Freire posited that this deepening awareness occurred in stages, from initial submission to intransitive to the "maximum of potential consciousness," which Freire termed "conscientization."[18]

McAdam, a key social movement scholar (and one of the founders of the synthetic approach), averred that people undergo a process of cognitive liberation as they become challengers. Cognitive liberation bears a resemblance to Freire's conscientization, but whereas Freire located the seed for awareness with the challengers and their newfound literacy, McAdam believed the impetus of cognitive liberation was external to the movement. Thus, the cognitions

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18. Paulo Freire, "Cultural Action and Conscientization," *Harvard Educational Review* 40, no. 3 (August 1970b), 477.

do not originate with the oppressed group; rather, they are initiated by cues from the political system that signify the system "is becoming increasingly vulnerable to challenge."[19]

Both conscientization and cognitive liberation describe some degree of consciousness and part of the Indígena experience: recognition of injustice, desire for change, belief in the possibility of change, and a perception that the system has lost its legitimacy. But the aware Indígenas did not just doubt the system's validity; they also recognized its duplicity. This level of awareness suggests an even more advanced consciousness, one that is better captured by scholars informed by Antonio Gramsci's work. Gramsci theorized that dominant groups exert hegemony not only with brute force, but also by imbuing society with a pervasive sense that their privilege is the natural state of affairs. Power is therefore not only direct, but is wielded and reinforced in subtler ways. Activists must thus recognize how the system works, and challenge dominant groups on both levels. This counterhegemonic challenge, as Michael Hanchard describes in his analysis of Brazilian race relations, is "the process by which dominant meanings become undermined to the extent that they lose their commonsense value, and new meanings . . . emerge with new values of their own."[20]

Gramscian concepts also underlie Morris and Braine's (2001), and Mansbridge's (2001), notions of an oppositional consciousness and a mature oppositional consciousness. An oppositional consciousness is similar to Freire's and McAdam's conceptualization of consciousness, but the more advanced mature oppositional consciousness takes an oppressed group one step further. A challenging group with this advanced consciousness sees the "systemic

19. Doug McAdam, *Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930-1970,* 2nd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999), 49.
20. Michael George Hanchard, *Orpheus and Power: The Movimento Negro of Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo, Brazil, 1945-1988* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 23.

quality of the oppression:" in other words, they perceive "some actions of the dominant group as forming in some way a 'system'—that is linked and roughly functional for advancing the interests of the dominant group."[21] In this dissertation I argue that, more than doubting the legitimacy of the system or dominant meanings, the aware activists of both cases *became cognizant that certain government overtures and programs ultimately sought to advance the interests of the dominant group*. This system bias is implicit in the approaches of Freire and McAdam, and is more evident in Hanchard's use of Gramsci's work, but is made explicit by Morris and Braine and by Mansbridge. Thus, of these conceptualizations, I argue that the mindset and awareness of the aware activists is best described as a mature oppositional consciousness. While oppositional consciousness is well explored in Morris and Mansbridge's coedited 2001 volume, the concept of a mature oppositional consciousness deserves further investigation. How does it arise? How are activists with such a consciousness able to steer their movements away from potentially hazardous situations and engagements? And, how do such activists contend with cohort activists who lack such awarenesses? These are a few of the intriguing questions this dissertation addresses.

Data Collection

The data for this dissertation were gathered using a combination of primary and secondary interviews, along with archival and library research. I conducted field research in February and March 2001 in Quito and Otavalo, Ecuador; in June and July 2001 in Alice

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21. Aldon Morris and Naomi Braine, "Social Movements and Oppositional Consciousness," in *Oppositional Consciousness: The Subjective Roots of Social Protest*, ed. Jane Mansbridge and Aldon Morris (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001), 26.

Springs, Canberra, Sydney, and Cairns, Australia; and in July 2001 in London, England.

Background information was gathered prior to visits, and interviewees were recruited either

through phone calls or e-mail.

I conducted a total of thirty-six primary interviews: thirty-one in person, five per

telephone. Interviewees included movement activists, nongovernmental organization activists,

country experts, and government officials. Sixty percent of the interviewees were male; 40

percent were female. About 40 percent of interviewees identified themselves as Indígena or

Indigenous Australian; this percentage may be higher, but in Australia I was counseled not to

enquire if the information was not volunteered. I conducted interviews in Ecuador with the

assistance of Spanish-language translators; all interviews for the Australian case were conducted

in English. Interviews typically lasted one to two hours, with a few occurring over the course of

several days. As new information sometimes prompted follow-up questions, I recontacted a few

interviewees several years after the initial interviews. The locations for interviews were offices,

coffee shops, hotels, and the home of one activist. Each interview ended with a request for

suggestions as to who else might be an expert or involved in the subject matter (the "snowball

technique"). The interviews were not tape recorded and, as the topics often touched on

"sensitive" areas, each interviewee was promised confidentiality to ensure his or her safety.

Additional country-specific data were accumulated through archival and library research,

particularly at the Otavalo Anthropological Institute in Otavalo, Ecuador, and the Australian

Institute of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Studies in Canberra, Australia. These facilities

were a treasure trove of academic and quasi-academic journals, newspaper and magazine

articles, books, pamphlets, annual reports, newsletters, position papers, interview transcripts, and

other documents. In addition to these resources, activists provided me with movement artifacts

such as poetry, essays, and cartoons. With this primary and secondary data, I was able to

construct the movement histories from their inchoate periods to the year 2000.

Overview

In chapter 2, I lay the foundation for the later assessment of the synthesis by examining,

in greater detail, the RMT, POS/PPT, and framing analysis perspectives. To assess the ability of

the synthesis to explain movement emergence, development, and decline (the synthesis' scope)

necessitates an understanding of the component theories' expectations for each phase. This

theoretical legwork, unfortunately, has not been supplied by any of the synthesis' advocates. For

example, although McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald endeavored, in individual essays, to "refine

and sharpen our understanding" of the component theories, other scholars have found their

portrayals lacking.[22] Perhaps this weakness can be attributed to the attempts of the three

synthesis scholars not just to present the component theories, but to establish the relationships

between them. Regardless of the reasons, the essays neither provide a well-rounded review of the

theories nor outline the dynamics we should expect to see in each phase. To accomplish my

assessment systematically, this matching of expectation and scope is precisely the task I

undertake in chapter 2.

I also present the general contours of the agency-structure debate, particularly with regard

to the synthesis. The crux of this debate revolves around the causal factor of political behavior:

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22. McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald, "Introduction," 6. For more on problems with McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald's portrayals, see Goodwin and Jasper, "Caught in a Winding, Snarling Vine," 47; and Morris, "Reflections on Social Movement Theory."

are activists more influenced by structural openings, or by their own will and volition? The more structurally minded POS and PPT theorists place the impetus for behavior external to the challenging group, whereas agency-oriented scholars emphasize internal dynamics, such as activist cognition. Whether the synthesis adopts the former or latter approach is one of the topics the assessment in chapter 5 seeks to address.

The Indígena and Indigenous Australian cases will be presented in detail in chapters 3 and 4. Both chapters are purposely rendered as neutral accounts (free of theoretical discussion) of each social movement's trajectory because of the ongoing *History Wars* in Australia. The *History Wars* are a scholarly as well as public debate about the European conquest of the Australian continent and its aftermath. On one side are white conservatives, who argue that there was no genocide and that colonization benefited Indigenous Australians; on the other side are those who believe that much of Australia's history has been eurocentrically portrayed, and that the Indigenous Australian experience has been "whitewashed."

My historical reviews result from a combination of interviews, field research, and comprehensive literature reviews, and are a "straight" portrayal of the data I gathered; my rendering of the Indigenous Australian case also happens to support those who believe that history has, for the most part, been whitewashed. After observing Australian politics for a number of years, I believe it is important that as many non-whitewashed accounts of Australian history as possible enter the public record. To enable interested parties to make use of the Australian case data, both case study chapters appear as stand-alone historical reviews. This emphasis on history as opposed to theory means, however, that the dynamics comprising the

emergence, development, and decline phases are not singled out in these chapters. This task is undertaken in the assessment of chapter 5.

Perhaps scholars have shied away from assessing the synthesis because its component theories are methodologically unwieldy: they are not "scientific" theories with concrete variables and specified causal mechanisms and, as such, do not lend themselves well to "testing" with conventional methodologies. But, in my mind at least, this seems a poor reason to retreat from evaluating the theories. Thus, in chapter 5, I approximate the "assessment" approach—comprised of comparing theoretical expectations with case data—that a preeminent scholar used to examine comparably awkward theories.

I conduct the assessment in chapter 5 by stepping into the analytic shoes of each theory and examining how well it explains the emergence, development, and decline of the two case studies. By separating out the individual theories (as opposed to a "synthetic" approach), I gain an understanding of the synthesis' particular weaknesses and strengths. By analyzing two data-rich case studies, I believe my assessment addresses several heretofore unanswered questions within the social movement field: how well do the theories explain various movement dynamics, including agency-driven phenomena? What types of dynamics can they not explain? One of my conclusions in chapter 5 is that the decades-long Indígena resistance to government incorporation efforts provides the greatest challenge to current scholarship, and merits further investigation.

In the 1970s, both governments made overtures to their challenging movements, including the establishment of official representative bodies that offered activists employment, power, prestige, and greater political participation within the institutional arena. This type of incorporation is a strategy governments particularly favor for their ethnic minority social

movements. While government authorities and some observers argue that such incorporation provides such groups with a much-needed "voice," others argue that it moderates challengers and results in "capture." Addressing this puzzle—whether institutional participation, through incorporation or other means, is beneficial or deleterious for challengers and their movements—is one of my objectives in chapter 6. By combining the insights gleaned from my case data and other scholarship, I find that incorporation may be helpful for a small category of groups, but is problematic for many others. Not only does incorporation often result in co-optation, which I define as counterproductive institutional participation; it also, in some circumstances, is a method for governments and elites to moderate, and thereby maintain the subjugation of, oppressed groups.

Although co-optation is a common hazard for social movements of all stripes—including ethnic minorities, environmentalists, and human rights advocates—as well as groups such as non-governmental organizations (NGOs), surprisingly little scholarly research and analysis has been conducted. Activist how-to and self-help manuals touch on the subject of co-optation, and provide some guidelines on how to avoid it, but even their coverage is sketchy rather than detailed. In chapter 6, along with my case data, I present a comprehensive review of the incorporation and co-optation literature; I also identify and collate the measures challenging groups should undertake to benefit from incorporation while simultaneously protecting themselves from co-optation. As such a summary exists nowhere else, chapter 6 is a stand-alone chapter that could potentially be useful for activists. One of the key findings of chapter 6 is that challenging groups have a better chance of avoiding co-optation if they prioritize their autonomy. A large number of Indígena activists, I argue, understood the importance of preserving their

movement's autonomy because they were aware of the mechanisms of dominance and subjugation underlying incorporation and co-optation.

Whereas Indigenous Australian activists accepted jobs and staffed government agencies, aware Indígena leaders rejected many government offers, accused the government of trying to disrupt the movement, and harshly rebuked activists who strayed. In chapter 7, I argue that the awarenesses underlying these behaviors are a form of consciousness—specifically, a mature oppositional consciousness. Among this dissertation's contributions is an examination of how the Indígena mature oppositional consciousness was created and diffused. By closely examining three different examples of the development of the Indígena consciousness, I achieve an understanding of the facilitative as well as obstructive factors and conditions. Certain learning experiences, for example, create a fertile environment for the adoption and development of a mature oppositional consciousness; activists who undergo these tend to eschew government engagement and to prioritize the movement's autonomy. In contrast, activists without these formative experiences are more likely to be unaware of the danger of certain types of participation, and to believe in the efficacy of government engagement.

By analyzing the data for both cases, I find that both social movements contained a mix of activists, some with a mature oppositional consciousness and some without. The crucial difference between the two movements was, therefore, not the existence of a mature oppositional consciousness per se, but whether aware activists were numerous or dominant enough to control their social movements and had the means to prevent unaware activists from engaging in counterproductive participation. In the Indígena case, activists were able to steer their movements because they controlled a powerful national-level organization through which they

could levy, or threaten, sanctions against both unaware activists and the government. Because of the significant differences between the two cases, one cannot make direct comparisons, but it is nonetheless interesting to note that aware Indigenous Australian activists lacked exactly the type of organizational capacity and control that Indígena activists possessed.

Chapter 8 is a summary of my arguments, as well as the implications my findings might hold for movements and governments. Movement activists, I argue, would do well to take the Indígena movement as a model and avoid the disastrous experience of the Indigenous Australian movement: they should become aware of the mechanisms underlying government strategies and develop a powerful organization (led by aware activists). My findings also suggest the shortcomings of government incorporation tactics. Governments may claim to seek stability, but often undertake measures, such as the symbolic incorporation of challengers, which provide short-term superficial control at the expense of lasting solutions and, ultimately, societal harmony.

CHAPTER 2

Social Movement Theory Synthesis and Agency

The study of contentious politics has not proceeded as a unified field. Instead, specialists in different kinds of political contention have created sui generis models of their subject matter, often ignoring powerful analogies or continuities with neighboring phenomena.

—Sidney Tarrow, "Social Movements in Contentious Politics"

Introduction

In the same year of Sidney Tarrow's lament, three renowned social movement scholars—Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy, and Mayer N. Zald—edited a volume dedicated to synthesizing key elements of several predominant theories: *mobilizing structures* from resource mobilization theory, *opportunities* from the political opportunity structures perspective, and *framing processes* from the framing perspective. McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald encouraged—indeed, implored—scholars to avail themselves of all three factors in analysis, for not only would this synthesis steer social movement analysts beyond their sui generis tendencies, it would also provide "a fuller understanding of social movement dynamics."[23] They further identified three movement phases for which the synthesis should be used: *emergence*, *development*, and *decline*. However, McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald were not alone in embracing a synthetic approach; Tarrow himself, in *Power in Movement*, pursued a similar approach employing essentially the same factors.[24] Indeed, so many scholars have adopted the synthetic approach that it "dominates

23. McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald, "Introduction," 7.
24. McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald, and Tarrow are not the only scholars who have adopted a synthetic approach incorporating these three factors. They have been singled out, however, because their work is emblematic of the synthetic approach and has received enormous scholarly attention.

the field of social movement research by powerfully shaping its conceptual landscape,

theoretical discourse, and research agenda."[25] But the approach has not been without its critics.

Shortly after the publication of McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald's, and Tarrow's volumes,

a vigorous exchange arose between advocates and opponents of the synthesis. A complaint

common to the various critics is that, despite the inclusion of framing analysis, the synthesis is

simply a reformulation of the political process model, perpetuating that model's structural bias

and neglect of the role of human agency.[26] At its essence, the agency-structure debate is over the

causal factor of social phenomena and is considered by some as "the most important theoretical

issue within the human sciences."[27] In the realm of politics and protest, the issue is: which

factors carry greater weight in shaping collective action—the structural context in which

challengers find themselves, or challenger agency and efficacy? For the synthesis' critics, a

compilation of RMT, POS and framing too heavily emphasizes structural factors and is

insufficient to account for agency.

In a 1999 *Sociological Forum* minisymposium devoted to a debate over the synthesis, the

dialog between advocates and critics of the synthesis assumed a certain degree of intensity and

even animosity. Underlying the vigor of this debate—I believe—is a concern that scholars,

particularly the "younger generation," would assume that, in addition to providing structural

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25. Goodwin and Jasper, "Caught in a Winding, Snarling Vine," 28.
26. For criticisms of the PPT synthesis approach, see Goodwin and Jasper, "Caught in a Winding, Snarling Vine;" James M. Jasper and Jeff Goodwin, "Trouble in Paradigms," *Sociological Forum* 14, no. 1 (March 1999); and Aldon Morris, "Reflections on Social Movement Theory."
27. Stuart McAnnulla, "Structure and Agency," in *Theory and Methods in Political Science*, 2nd ed., ed. David Marsh and Gerry Stoker (Hampshire, U.K.: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002): 271.

explanations, the synthesis also contains the long-awaited "tools for analysis" for understanding culture and ideology.[28]

Despite the intensity of the debate, no one has yet used case studies to purposefully assess the synthesis' explanatory power or how well it elucidates agency-driven phenomena. Indeed, no one, including McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald (despite their introductory remarks), has delineated specifically how the synthesis' component theories can be applied to the movement phases that the synthesis approach supposedly illuminates. As part of a response to these gaps, this chapter serves a multifold purpose: it examines the various complaints levied against the synthesis, outlines the debate over agency and structure as it pertains to the synthesis, and provides a detailed review of how the component theories could be applied to explain movement emergence, development, and decline. This review is important because, by delineating these essential features and expectations of the component theories, it sets the stage for their application to the Indígena and Indigenous Australian cases in chapter 5. By assessing how well the synthesis' component theories fit the case data in chapter 5, we will gain a sense of its strengths and weaknesses, as well as an understanding of whether the synthesis sufficiently accounts for human agency or, as its critics claim, leaves "key determinants of collective action in theoretical darkness."[29]

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28. Goodwin and Jasper mentioned the younger generation in "Caught in a Winding, Snarling Vine," 28. Mayer N. Zald discussed how culture and ideology were neglected because earlier scholars had "few tools for analysis," in "Culture, Ideology, and Strategic Framing," 263.
29. Morris, "Reflections on Social Movement Theory," 447.

Political Process Theory Redux?

In many ways, the synthesis closely resembles McAdam's political process model, which identified "three sets of factors that are believed to be crucial in the generation of social insurgency."[30] As with the synthesis, two of the factors are drawn from RMT and POS: organizational strength and readiness, and new opportunities within the political structure. According to McAdam, these factors provide insurgents with the "structural potential" for political action.[31] In almost the exact phrasing used in 1996 by McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald to describe framing, McAdam wrote that a third factor—cognitive liberation—is necessary, because "mediating between opportunity and action are people and the subjective meanings they attach to their situations."[32] McAdam defined cognitive liberation as "the collective assessment of the prospects for successful insurgency," and averred that action is more likely when prospects for success are perceived as favorable.[33] This assessment, however, was not driven by the group but by signals—which McAdam labeled cognitive cues—derived from structural changes.[34] Although the concept of cognitive liberation was later referenced by other scholars, it never achieved the same level of interest that framing analysis generated. Thus, in their 1996 synthesis, one of McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald's apparent tasks was to "update" political process theory by replacing the ideational component with framing, which by 1996 was a more richly developed concept than cognitive liberation and less explicitly connected to structural factors.

As noted above, other scholars have also adopted a synthetic approach. Tarrow (1998),

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30. McAdam, *Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930-1970*, 40.
31. Ibid., 48.
32. McAdam, *Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency,* 48. The sentence used by McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald on framing is: "Mediating between opportunity, organization, and action are the shared meanings and definitions that people bring to their situation." *Comparative Perspectives*, 5.
33. McAdam, *Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency*, 40.
34. Ibid., 48-49.

for example, also used the term *synthesis* to describe his approach, which relies on factors very

similar to those offered by McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald: opportunities, mobilizing structures,

an ideational component that relies heavily on framing analysis, and a fourth concept—

"repertoires of contention"—which has not been adopted by others as an essential element of the

synthesis approach.

In sum, the main components of a synthetic approach are RMT, POS, and framing. These

are the factors common to both McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald's and Tarrow's

conceptualizations and the factors that other scholars recognize as the key elements of the

synthesis.[35] By all intents and purposes, the synthesis bears sufficient resemblance to political

process theory (PPT) to be considered its continuation, which seems to have been accepted by

both PPT and non-PPT scholars alike.[36] Thus, the terms *synthesis* and *PPT synthesis* are used

here to denote the combination of RMT, POS, and framing, with the understanding that it is also

an updated version of earlier PPT.

The Question of Agency

Critics of the PPT synthesis model have interrelated complaints: that by overemphasizing

structure and underemphasizing human agency as the causal factors of political action, the

synthesis—despite its framing component—reinforces and encourages an invariant and

determinant understanding of structure's effect on political action.[37] This concern echoes

35. As Morris noted, "Formulators of the political process model have reached a consensus on its basic theoretical components: the concepts of mobilizing structures, political opportunity structure, and cultural framing." *Reflections on Social Movement Theory*, 446.

36. This acceptance is evident in the 1999 *Sociological Forum* issue devoted to the debate over the PPT synthesis model.

37. See Goodwin and Jasper, "Caught in a Winding, Snarling Vine;" Jasper and Goodwin, "Trouble in Paradigms;" and Morris, "Reflections on Social Movement Theory."

William Sewell's observation that "the most fundamental problem is that structural or structuralist arguments tend to assume a far too rigid causal determination in social life," which risks reducing actors to "cleverly programmed automatons."[38] Considering the PPT synthesis' influence as a prevalent social movement theory, agency-oriented scholars have been vocal about their concerns that the PPT synthesis neglects agency. PPT scholars have, for the most part, been dismissive of such worries. No PPT-based scholarship exists that explicitly examines whether PPT neglects agency or how PPT accounts for agency. The closest we come to attaining such answers is from the *Sociological Forum* minisymposium.

In the minisymposium, Jeff Goodwin and James M. Jasper were the PPT opponents, and the respondents were David Meyer, Ruud Koopmans, Francesca Polletta, Sidney Tarrow, and Charles Tilly. Among myriad other complaints and the opening salvo that the PPT synthesis most influential strands are "tautological, trivial, inadequate, or just plain wrong," Goodwin and Jasper charged that PPT is structurally biased and that PPT scholars "wash the meaning and fluidity out of strategy, agency and culture."[39] Tarrow and Tilly each mounted vigorous counterattacks: both chided Goodwin and Jasper for exaggerating PPT's structural bias and criticized the logic of their arguments, but neither fully engaged in a response to the substance of Goodwin and Jasper's critique. Koopmans and Meyer, however, addressed many of Goodwin and Jasper's points and Polletta proposed an alternative conceptualization of the agency-structure dichotomy.

Ruud Koopmans, the respondent most closely associated with the more purely structural

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38. William Sewell, "A Theory of Structure: Duality, Agency, and Transformation," *American Journal of Sociology* 98, no. 1 (July 1992): 2.
39. Goodwin and Jasper, "Caught in a Winding, Snarling Vine," first quote from 28, the second quote from 29.

POS perspective, was the only one who readily acknowledged that the POS component of the synthesis indeed contains a structural bias: "The core idea uniting the approach is that opportunities are the most important determinant of variations in levels and forms of protest behavior among social groups, spatial units, and historical periods, and not grievances (motivations), resources (capacities), or something else."[40] In contrast, Meyer argued that PPT does not privilege opportunities and that opportunities are not determinant: they do not "force the decisions and choices and claims, so much as frame those decisions."[41] Both Koopmans and Meyer, however, offered softer "context-sensitive" versions in which opportunities are conceived as options. Agency, which both Koopmans and Meyer viewed as activist choice, thus plays a greater role, but neither scholar asserted how agency should be theoretically explained within the parameters of PPT. As Meyer noted, more research is needed in general and "we should not hesitate to try to build broader theories and larger generalizations."[42]

Polletta's piece was completely different than that of the other respondents. Rather than address the specific issues raised by Goodwin and Jasper, Polletta argued against a strict agency-structure dichotomy, which she viewed as an erroneous and problematic division that bedevils sociological analysis in general. According to Polletta, structure is shaped by culture and thus differs from context to context.[43] With this approach, Polletta stepped somewhat away from the

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40. Ruud Koopmans, "Political. Opportunity. Structure. Some Splitting to Balance the Lumping," *Sociological Forum* 14, no. 1 (March 1999): 96.

41. David S. Meyer, "Tending the Vineyard: Cultivating Political Process Research," *Sociological Forum* 14, no. 1 (March 1999): 88.

42. Ibid., 89.

43. As an example, Polletta cited the differences between the German and Italian police forces. German police are interested in crime control, but the Italian police, because of their heritage, view themselves as an extension of the executive branch and prioritize law and order before crime control. These differing stances, according to Polletta, influence "the opportunities for different forms of protest." "Snarls, Quacks, and Quarrels: Culture and Structure in Political Process Theory," *Sociological Forum* 14, no. 1 (March 1999): 68.

PPT agency-structure debate and towards the realm of sociological theoreticians such as

Sewell, Stephen Fuchs, and Sharon Hays. These scholars also sought to overcome the division

between structure and agency by demonstrating their interconnectedness.[44] If Polletta and others

would do away with the agency-structure dichotomy, I would ask, which concepts do they

propose as replacements? Theoreticians are correct in pointing out that the agency-structure

dichotomy is problematic, for agency at some level does create and reproduce structure and is in

turn shaped by structure. I would interject, however, that the agency and structure concepts in the

social movement field are useful analytical tools, despite their shortcomings, for describing the

relationship between social movement challengers (and their efficacy) and their opponents or

opposing forces. Perhaps for this reason, the concepts have been widely accepted by most social

movement scholars.[45]

In sum, PPT's various opponents criticized the theory for privileging structure and

neglecting agency. PPT's proponents, at least in the minisymposium, either accused PPT's critics

of exaggerating the structural bias, from which one can infer they deny the existence of such a

bias, or reformulated the structure-mobilization links to soften the bias, but were silent about

how, with this reformulation, PPT accounts for agency. Thus, the question of how or even if the

PPT synthesis can explain agency-driven dynamics is still open. By assessing how well the

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44. Stephan Fuchs, "Beyond Agency," *Sociological Theory* 19, no. 1 (March 2001): 24-40. Fuchs argued that agency and structure are on a micro-macro continuum, and should be viewed dimensionally: as an organization becomes larger, it moves toward macro (structure) status. Sharon Hays, argued, similar to Polletta, that structure and agency contain elements of each other; for example, capitalism (structure) is composed of and "could not endure without the purposive actions of entrepreneurs, corporate leaders, bureaucrats, and workers." "Structure and Agency and the Sticky Problem of Culture," *Sociological Theory* 12, no. 1 (March 1994): 61.
45. Polletta provided a list of how structure and agency have been conceptualized in the political process literature. Structure has been viewed as objective, durable, determinist, and under the control of the powerful. Culture, in contrast, has been viewed as subjective, malleable, voluntarist, and used to challenge structure. It should be noted, however, that Polletta finds some of the conceptualizations problematic. "Snarls, Quacks, and Quarrels," 65.

synthesis can explain the Indígena and Indigenous Australian cases, I endeavor to fill this gap. Before the synthesis can be assessed, however, at least three tasks must be undertaken: clarifying the phases that comprise the synthesis' scope, selecting "which" version of the synthesis should be assessed, and delineating the factors we should expect to see in each phase per the tenets of the synthesis' component theories. This theoretical review is necessary to establish a framework for the assessment in chapter 5.

<div align="center">The Scope of the Synthesis</div>

A useful discussion of the synthesis and its component theories first requires an elaboration of the phenomena the synthesis supposedly explains. Unfortunately, synthesis scholars have not provided clear-cut parameters. Indeed, the general sense is that the synthesis' scope is too broad to be pinned down to specific phenomena. For example, in response to their own rhetorical question, "What can a perspective stressing the role of opportunities, mobilizing structures, and framing processes tell us about the dynamics of movement development?" McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald answered, "A great deal, we think."[46] Despite this vagueness, however, in their coedited volume these three scholars came closer than any others to delineating the synthesis' scope.

Rather than specifying dynamics to which the synthesis can be applied, McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald identified three movement phases: *emergence*, *development*, and *decline*. The authors, however, did not clearly define the phases, so one must closely examine their text to infer their intentions. Movement emergence, for example, could connote many things. Is

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46. McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald, "Introduction," 12.

emergence understood as politicization, the development of an awareness of a political issue by some individuals or group? Is it the coalescing of a group of people unified by their interest in political change? Or is it mobilization, the marshalling of resources for, and actual undertaking of, some form of action, such as a demonstration? Throughout their discussion of the phases, McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald referred to the emergence phase with the terms "action," "mobilization," and the "onset of protest activity."[47] From these clues, it appears that McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald conceptualized emergence closer to action and mobilization than to politicization or group formation.

Development and decline are interrelated: once a movement stops developing, it declines. In McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald's vague conceptualization, it appears that movement development is contingent upon collective action successes. McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald emphasized that an insurgent group has a better chance of success (and thus survival) if it creates a professional organization. Genuflecting to insights from William Gamson's (1975) *The Strategy of Social Protest*, the three scholars posited that a professional organization has a higher chance of success if it fulfills certain conditions, such as using disruptive tactics, employing a mix of radical and moderate activists, and not pursuing multiple goals and/or seeking to replace the government.

In sum, although PPT scholars have provided paltry guidance as to how the synthesis should or can be used, the general outlines of its scope can be gleaned from McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald's 1996 volume: a synthesis of the three predominant social movement perspectives provides scholars with the tools to explain the emergence of action (mobilization),

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47. McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald, "Introduction." The first two quotes are from page 8, the third quote from 13.

movement development, and decline. Thus, the literature review of the component theories

will focus not on how the theories explain specific dynamics, but rather on their application to

the three phases. But before the component theories are introduced, it would be prudent to

examine the complaints critics have made about how synthesis scholars have presented the

component theories. In addition to the synthesis' neglect of agency, critics have faulted the

synthesis scholars for skewing the component theories.[48] Indeed, the supposed

misrepresentations of the component theories is one more reason Goodwin and Jasper (1999)

would happily see the entire synthesis project scuppered. The questions I address in the next

section include: do the critics' complaints have a basis? And, which versions of the component

theories should be evaluated in an assessment?

Which Synthesis?

In the minisymposium debate, Goodwin and Jasper charged that the synthesis'

component theories, in the hands of PPT scholars, are skewed and presented lopsidedly.

McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald's model seems to be the primary target of Goodwin and Jasper's

criticisms and will thus be the synthesis model examined here. As the three authors are closely

associated with, if not given credit for, introducing PPT (McAdam) and RMT (McCarthy and

Zald), it is no surprise that their understanding of the synthesis contains a richer and more well-

developed presentation of the opportunities and organizational factors and favors their use. Thus,

McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald unhesitatingly stated that opportunities, mobilizing structures,

and framing are not equal at explaining the various phases.

48. See Goodwin and Jasper, "Caught in a Winding, Snarling Vine;" and Morris, "Reflections on Social Movement Theory."

In the emergence phase, McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald placed mobilizing structures and framing below opportunities: "Our starting point . . . reflects the underlying assumption of the political process model. We share with proponents of that perspective the conviction that most political movements and revolutions are set in motion by social changes that render the established political order more vulnerable or receptive to change."[49] In the development phase, however, the resource mobilization perspective, specifically its organizational component, gains in importance. Framing is not portrayed as a critical factor of this stage, but opportunities continue to play a highly influential role. Indeed, changes in a movement's leverage are considered a result of the institutional environment: a movement's strength or weakness waxes and wanes in correspondence with that of its allies and foes. In their review of movement decline, McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald did not specify one particular theory as predominant, but their examples perhaps reveal their preferences. Framing is not mentioned at all in connection with decline, but both mobilizing structures and opportunities received attention: decline results when groups either do not undertake or fail at their organizational tasks or when the opportunity structure changes in ways detrimental to the movement.

In sum, Goodwin and Jasper charged that the synthesis' component theories are skewed and weighted in favor of structural factors, complaints that appear fairly accurate. I submit, however, that this skewing does not matter. It is not relevant for evaluating the synthesis' worthiness for at least two possible reasons.

First, it is not clear that McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald were presenting their own idiosyncratic version of the synthesis as *the* synthesis. Perhaps the best evidence that McAdam,

49. McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald, "Introduction," 7-8.

McCarthy, and Zald's application was not prescriptive, and not intended as the "be-all and end-all" of the synthesis, is provided by the other scholars in the volume, who do not hew to the three editors' suggestions. Hanspeter Kriesi, for example, devoted considerable attention to resources. Even McAdam's chapter contains a well-rounded presentation of framing, augmented by his insights that a movement's messages and frames are manifested by their actions, which most scholars overlook, as well as by their words. Surely, if McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald meant their application as *the* synthesis, rather than *a* version of the synthesis, they would have brought more influence to bear as editors of such an influential volume. Thus, I argue that McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald's proposal that scholars should use all three perspectives in analysis is prescriptive, and therefore merits discussion and assessment; but that their own application is not prescriptive, and can be discarded, or not, as one "suggestion" of a synthesis approach.

Second, for heuristic reasons, let us assume that my reading is wrong and that McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald's own version of the synthesis was indeed intended as prescriptive. But should idiosyncratic renderings of the synthesis' component theories be cause to condemn the synthesis project *writ large*? At its essence, the synthesis is an amalgamation of the RMT, POS and framing theories and should not be dismissed because its various progenitors tweaked the theories to suit their backgrounds, interests, and bias. In other words, a grand synthesis of predominant theories needs to be assessed on its own merits, and not be damned because various scholars have presented their own versions, flawed or not. The more critical question scholars should address is: What can or cannot a synthesis of these predominant social movement theories explain?

To achieve a fair assessment of the synthesis, and an assessment that cannot be faulted for using "skewed" theories, I will consider in my assessment how well the three component theories, in their original forms, explain each of the three phases. As preparation for assessing the synthesis, the next section presents the model's component theories with particular emphasis on how each has been used to explain movement emergence, development, and decline. These three phases are often not delineated in single works, thus, a broad literature search was conducted. Rather than present an exhaustive survey of the scholarship that pertains to each phase, I have selected works that speak most directly to each phase and, when possible, are based on empirical studies.[50]

Resource Mobilization Theory

As mentioned in the introductory chapter, RMT's creators were, in part, rebutting theories that categorized collective behavior as unorganized. The RMT scholars also sought to refute the grievance perspective. According to McCarthy and Zald (1977), collective action (which corresponds to the emergence phase) is not undertaken by an irrational, aggrieved and disorganized crowd, but by a group of rational actors that aggregate sufficient resources, such as money and labor, and some minimal form of organization to mobilize those resources. For resource-poor challengers, McCarthy and Zald emphasized the importance of involvement and help from external sources.

Since RMT's inception, McCarthy and Zald's choice of resources—money and labor— has held up well to empirical testing. For example, in a large survey of voluntarism in the United

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50. Scholarship considered but not used in this section is included in the bibliography.

States, scholars found that the critical resources were money, time, and civic skills (defined as

"organizational and communications capacities"). When these three resources were combined,

political actors "become not only more likely to participate but also more likely to be effective

when they do."[51]

But resources alone will not fuel collective action; some minimum level of organization

is also required.[52] Indeed, although McCarthy and Zald emphasized both resources and

organization, much of the empirical and theoretical work that followed their 1977 article has

focused on organization. A classic example is Ian Lustick's analysis of the Palestinian Intifada.

Lustick examined the roots of the Intifada's emergence and found that, although the Palestinians

were aggrieved for decades, the first Intifada began after external support was cut off and

Palestinians were forced to develop their own indigenous organizational networks within the

territories.[53] As one scholar surmised, "Individuals are not magically mobilized for action, no

matter how aggrieved, hostile or angry they feel. Their anger must first be set to collective ends

by the coordinating, directing offices of organization, formal or informal."[54]

McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald's discussion of RMT and a social movement's

development or decline phase was primarily informed by insights from studies of social

movement success. In other words, McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald assumed that successful

outcomes portend well for a movement's survival. I question this assumption, as other scholars

have argued that decline can occur after failure or success. Deborah Balser (1997) found that

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51. Both quotes from Sidney Verba, Kay Lehman Scholozman, and Henry E. Brady, *Voice and Equality: Civic Voluntarism in American Politics* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995): 271.
52. Morris highlights this point in *The Origins of the Civil Rights Movement*, 282-283.
53. Ian Lustick, "Writing the Intifada: Collective Action in the Occupied Territories," *World Politics* 45, no. 4 (1993): 560-594.
54. Rod Aya, "Popular Intervention in Revolutionary Situations," in *Statemaking and Social Movements: Essays in History and Theory*, ed. Charles Bright and Susan Harding (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1984): 332.

success, similar to failure, can trigger the intramovement conflict that precipitates

disintegration and decline. Dennis Chong (1991) posited a variety of reasons for why either

collective action success or failure can lead to demobilization: after success, for example,

activists may feel that no further action is required or may be fatigued. I would argue, therefore,

that success is not the only measure for understanding movement development. Intramovement

conflicts and other obstacles may be just as important as successful collective action outcomes in

shaping movement development and whether a movement survives or declines. Perhaps for this

reason, most RMT scholarship on decline has focused on organizational issues rather than on

collective action success or failure. Thus, in their analysis of Gamson's work, Frey, Dietz, and

Kalof stated: "Students of social movements would be well advised to direct more attention to

organizational problems of internal movement politics and factionalism."[55]

Within RMT-influenced works, decline and the conflicts that precipitate it have been

attributed to a variety of causes. Steven E. Barkan (1979), for example, attributed conflicts to

disagreements over decision-making processes (democratic vs. centralized) and goals and

whether a movement should pursue radical (unruly and extreme) or moderate means. Steve

Bruce (1985) found that an organization is more fissile when a loose leadership structure allows

for competing claims to authority. Mayer N. Zald and Roberta Ash (1966) observed that decline

occurs when members no longer believe the organization can achieve their goals or because they

perceive the organization's tactics as illegitimate. Factionalization, another cause of decline, has

been attributed to strife between different ideological camps and/or a loss of faith in the

leadership's ideological purity. Anthony Oberschall examined the overall decline of the 1960s-

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55. R. Scott Frey, Thomas Dietz, and Linda Kalof, "Characteristics of Successful American Protest Groups: Another Look at Gamson's *Strategy of Social Protest*," *American Journal of Sociology* 98, no. 2 (September 1992): 384.

era social movements in the United States and attributed demobilization to internal

weaknesses, such as intragroup factionalism and weak organization, rather than repression.

Oberschall wrote that the organizational problems stemmed from the reliance of these groups—

with their ability to garner unprecedented media coverage—on the media to perform certain

functions, such as "recruitment, communication and political education," rather than develop

their own organizational capabilities. The media became "an effective substitute for movement

organizational structure."[56] In sum, movement decline and failure have been associated with

conflicts over a wide variety of issues, including tactics, goals, leadership, and organizational

weakness.

In sum, this literature review provides the contours of the phenomena we should expect to

see in each of the synthesis' phases per RMT's tenets. The emergence phase, for example, should

be marked by the advent of an insurgent group's organizational capacity and its acquisition of

financial and personnel resources. For an impoverished group, these resources may be supplied

or supplemented by external benefactors. For the development phase, McAdam, McCarthy, and

Zald emphasized a group's ability to generate collective action successes. Thus, in this phase we

should expect to see the types of goals and strategies associated with successes. In addition, as I

argued, we should also anticipate that a group has developed some mechanisms for overcoming

internal strife. Conversely, collective action failure, deficient organizational capacity, or the

inability to overcome factionalism are the hallmarks of the decline phase.

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56. Anthony Oberschall, "The Decline of the 1960s Social Movements," *Research in Social Movements, Conflicts and Change* 1 (1978): 271.

Political Opportunity Structures

The RMT perspective provided a necessary corrective to earlier misconceptions of challengers; but by emphasizing resources and organization, RMT, in turn, neglected other important aspects of collective action, including consideration of the broader political environment. This lacuna grew more apparent as empirical scholarship found links between protest activity and structural change, which Peter Eisinger, in his 1973 examination of riot likelihood in relation to open or closed government structures, termed political opportunity structure. As understood by most POS theorists, opportunities are the "specific configurations of resources, institutional arrangements and historical precedents for social mobilization, which facilitate the development of protest movements in some instances and constrain them in others."[57] Because POS became the "central tenet" of the political process model, the fields overlap each other.[58] To distinguish POS and PPT, one can say, in general, that POS scholars focus primarily on institutional structural configurations and changes, whereas PPT scholars consider additional factors.[59]

For POS scholars, the emergence phase begins when structural signals indicate to a challenging group that the external environment is facilitative of, or receptive to, mobilization. Specifically, actors respond "to opportunities that lower the costs of collective action, reveal potential allies, show where elites and authorities are most vulnerable, and trigger social

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57. Many definitions of a political opportunity structure exist; I selected Kitschelt's for its succinct elegance. Herbert P. Kitschelt, "Political Opportunity Structures and Political Protest: Anti-Nuclear Movements in Four Democracies," *British Journal of Political Science* 16 (1986): 58.
58. McAdam refers to POS as the "central tenet" of the political process model. "Conceptual Origins, Current Problems, Future Directions," in McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald, *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements*, 23.
59. Because of the overlaps between the two fields, literature from both will be used in this survey.

networks and collective identities into action around common themes."[60] Once a movement

has emerged, its further development is also shaped by its environment, which in much POS/PPT

literature is the government. A work cited frequently by both POS and PPT scholars on

development is Tilly's *From Mobilization to Revolution*. Tilly argued that collective action

varies in response to a state's use of repression or facilitation. A detailed description of the

"feedback" relationship between government and challengers and movement decline, in a more

purely POS form than Tilly's, is provided by Hanspeter Kriesi, Ruud Koopmans, Jan Willem

Dyvendak, and Marco G. Giugni. In their multicountry study, these scholars posited an inverse

relationship between the activity levels of authorities and challengers. Challengers typically

begin with a frenzy of activity that catches authorities off guard. Over time, however, the

authorities learn how to respond, which moderates challengers' activities. Authorities have two

response options—repression or facilitation—and often employ both: radical activists are

repressed and moderate activists are encouraged, via facilitation and integration. "Thus, different

wings of social movements receive different strategic cues," and all cues ultimately lead to the

quiescence of protest.[61] Radicals lose momentum and support, and moderates pursue institutional

means. In Kriesi et al.'s discussion of facilitation, authorities appear to be acting purposefully,

but, as David Meyer (1993) argued, facilitation, moderation, and decline may be a product of the

system's structure itself, without any purposeful intervention by government authorities.

In the Federalist Papers, James Madison argued that governments could diffuse and

moderate dissent by fragmenting political power into multiple venues. According to Meyer, U.S.

60. Tarrow, *Power in Movement*, 20.
61. Hanspeter Kriesi, Ruud Koopmans, Jan Willem Dyvendak, and Marco G. Giugni, *New Social Movements in Western Europe: a Comparative Analysis* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1995): 124.

political institutions still manifest a Madisonian structure, which indeed leads to social

movement decline. Meyer examined the nuclear freeze movement's trajectory and argued that in

the United States, "Frequent elections and relatively open access to institutions allow dissident

politics to be absorbed, diffusing dissent and political analysis in the process. Within political

institutions, a politics of expedience rather than ideology quickly dominates. Insurgents face

conflicting demands for success in different venues. . . . Paradoxically, by legitimating and

institutionalizing dissent, the Madisonian political opportunity structure enhances stability and

forestalls change."[62] As further proof Meyer cited several movements, including the feminist and

civil rights movements, that became either accommodative or factionalized after gaining political

access.

In sum, the POS perspective places the impetus for all three phases with structural

impulses. Movements emerge in response to structural cues; their ongoing development and

choice of strategy and tactics are guided by structural changes; and their moderation and decline

are prompted by either the purposeful actions of authorities or by the system's structure.

Collective Action Framing

Critics of the McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald's synthesis model charge that its framing

component is inadequately theorized.[63] Indeed, McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald seem on less sure

footing when discussing framing and ideational rather than structural concepts. At one point, the

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62. David S. Meyer, "Institutionalizing Dissent: The United States Structure of Political Opportunity and the End of the Nuclear Freeze Movement," *Sociological Forum* 8, no. 2 (1993): 163.
63. See Goodwin and Jasper, "Caught in a Winding, Snarling Vine;" Jasper and Goodwin, "Trouble in Paradigms;" and Morris, "Reflections on Social Movement Theory."

three scholars lamented a "lack of conceptual precision" in the framing process field.[64]

Perhaps part of the problem is that framing theorists use a different "language" than their more

structurally minded colleagues and emphasize other features of protest activity. Much of the

framing literature, for example, deals with social movement organization (SMO) recruitment;

scholarship which fits awkwardly into McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald's emergence,

development, or decline phases. However, a careful examination of the core framing literature

reveals that such references do indeed obtain.

For "people to take action"—the emergence phase—framing scholars aver that three

kinds of framing tasks are necessary: diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational.[65] Diagnostic

framing has two parts: grievance identification and blame attribution. First, grievances must be

identified through frames that "serve as accenting devices that either underscore and embellish

the seriousness and injustice of a social condition or redefine as unjust and immoral what was

previously seen as unfortunate but perhaps tolerable."[66] Second, diagnostic framing must

attribute blame to whom or what is causing the injustice. The next step is prognostic framing,

which "outlines a plan for redress, specifying what should be done by whom, including an

elaboration of specific targets, strategies and tactics."[67] Achieving consensus on the first two

framing processes, diagnosis and prognosis, are necessary but not sufficient for the actual

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64. McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald, "Introduction," 6.
65. Scott A. Hunt, Robert D. Benford, and David A. Snow, "Identity Fields: Framing Processes and the Social Construction of Movement Identities," *New Social Movements: From Ideology to Identity*, ed. Enrique Larana, Hank Johnston and Joseph R. Gusfield (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1994): 191. See also David A. Snow and Robert D. Benford, "Ideology, Frame Resonance, and Participant Mobilization," *International Social Movement Research* 1 (Greenwhich: JAI Press, 1988), 197-217.
66. Snow and Benford, "Master Frames and Cycles of Protest," 137.
67. Hunt, Benford, and Snow, "Identity Fields," 191.

performance of action. A "call to arms" through a third process, motivational framing, is required.[68]

In motivational framing, persuasive reasons must be developed for why action should be undertaken. In a study of peace groups, Snow and Benford (1988) found that potential participants were exhorted to action through a moral imperative: they must act or the earth and future generations would suffer dire consequences. Other possible motivational framing rationales could include solidarity, status, or material incentives. Once mobilization has emerged, its development depends on how well the movement accomplishes its ongoing diagnosis, prognosis, and motivational framing. In a separate work, Snow and Benford theorized that, "the more the three tasks are robust or richly developed and interconnected, the more successful the mobilization effort."[69] Specific details on what constitutes a robust frame are provided by a frame analysis of two demonstrations by Jürgen Gerhards and Dieter Rucht.

Benford, in an "insider's critique" of framing analysis, acknowledged that "the lion's share of the empirical work associated with movement framing has been descriptive." [70] Gerhards and Rucht's work has been selected for this section because it steps beyond mere description of the frames used by a movement. By comparing the framing tasks of two similar demonstrations, Gerhards and Rucht were able to pinpoint the factors that made one movement's framing work more compelling (and thus successful). Through an analysis of the literature—pamphlets, flyers, and so forth—and each demonstration's success, Gerhards and Rucht found that diagnostic framing was most compelling—in terms of mobilizing potential—when its

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68. Snow and Benford, "Ideology, Frame Resonance, and Participant Mobilization," 199.
69. Ibid., 199.
70. Robert D. Benford, "An Insider's Critique of the Social Movement Framing Perspective," *Sociological Inquiry* 67, no. 4 (November 1997): 414.

grievance identification covered a large but manageable number of well-defined individual

problems, as opposed to a small number of poorly defined, general complaints. This link

between specificity and mobilizing potential was also evident with the blame attribution task: a

frame was more successful if it identified "concrete persons" as the culprits.[71] Likewise,

prognostic framing was more persuasive if it provided the means and methods for solving

problems. Although the demonstration literature did not contain explicit motivational framing,

the implicit moralizing nature of the literature led Gerhards and Rucht to aver that "the

mobilizing capacity of a frame increases to the extent that it contains explicit or at least implicit

motivating elements, such as appeals to generally recognized moral norms."[72] In sum, Gerhards

and Rucht's posited a relationship between framing specificity and mobilizing potential as well

as an implied reverse linkage of vague frames with weak mobilizing potential. Like Snow and

Benford (1988), Gerhards and Rucht also averred that mobilizing capacity increases the more the

framing tasks are interrelated.

Mobilization cannot occur without participants, and one of the key issues addressed by

framing scholars is recruitment: exactly how does an organization convince potential members to

join and undertake collective action? In their seminal 1986 article, Snow et al. argued that

organizations must align their "activities, goals, and ideology" and the "interests, values and

beliefs" of potential participants. The diagnosis, prognosis and motivational framing must,

therefore, be linked to the interests and beliefs of potential participants. This alignment can be

accomplished in five ways: seeking out people whose beliefs are already congruent with those of

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71. Jürgen Gerhards and Dieter Rucht, "Mesomobilization: Organizing and Framing in Two Protest Campaigns in West Germany," *American Journal of Sociology* 98, no. 3 (November 1992): 582.
72. Ibid, 583.

an existing frame (frame bridging); making a frame more salient to potential adherents by

emphasizing certain values or beliefs (frame amplification); developing a frame that aligns with

the belief system of potential participants (frame alignment); or broadening a frame to enlarge

the potential participant pool (frame extension).[73] Frames may also be created by "lifting"

embedded beliefs out of a group of potential activists (frame lifting).[74] The importance of

alignment was substantiated by Gerhard and Rucht's empirical study, which found that

organizations—to encourage their members to attend the demonstrations—did indeed emphasize

the reasons for participating that were most pertinent to their organization's concerns, for

example, women's groups accentuated women's issues.

Framing scholars have also investigated how frames may change over time. According to

Snow et al., during frame transformations, "the objective contours of the situation do not change

so much as the way the situation is defined and thus experienced."[75] In other words, activists'

reformulations may occur independent of any structural changes; for example, activists may re-

evaluate an unjust but tolerable condition as intolerable. In a later work, however, Snow and

Benford (1992) posited that external changes and events can indeed negate a frame's relevance:

frames change when they are proven wrong. William Gamson also addressed frame change, but

emphasized the competition that may occur between divergent interpretations. Gamson

compared frame contests to Thomas Kuhn's paradigms: frames, like paradigms, are "overthrown

not by negative evidence but by rival paradigms that win the allegiance of a new generation. . . .

It is not events that overcome frames but rival frames that do better at getting their interpretations

73. David E. Snow; E. Burke Rochford, Jr.; Steven K. Worden; and Robert D. Benford. "Frame Alignment
Processes, Micromobilization, and Movement Participation," *American Sociological Review* 51 (August 1986): 464.
74. Morris, "Reflections on Social Movement Theory," 449.
75. Snow et al., "Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and Movement Participation," 474.

to stick."[76] It would seem that both perspectives are correct. New events, such as the Holocaust or the bombing of Pearl Harbor, can surely challenge a frame's relevance, such as the pre-World War II peace movement; or, an extant frame may come to be seen as deficient, not because of new events, but because of the emergence of a more persuasive frame.

The disputes that occur during frame changes may either strengthen or debilitate a movement. Benford (1993) studied the U.S. peace movement and found most disputes occur between radicals, who were more likely to pursue confrontational and extrainstitutional means, and moderates, who preferred legal and less unruly means. Benson found that rival frames could, in some instances, actually benefit a movement. By appealing to different constituencies and accomplishing disparate tasks, SMOs following moderate or radical frames may complement each other. Disputes, up to a certain point, may even force groups to clarify and strengthen their frames. But Benford also observed that lengthy, unresolved disputes can destroy movements. Public fights "reveal a movement's weaknesses and thereby provide opponents with a blueprint for launching attacks. A movement comprised of opposing factions is particularly vulnerable to 'divide and conquer' tactics."[77] Benford noted that diagnosis, prognosis, and resonance (how an SMO presents its interpretations) were the three areas that elicited most disagreements.

In sum, framing processes are the interpretive tasks conducted by organizations and movement leaders to summon and prepare potential participants and compel them to action. Movement emergence and development are shaped by how well an SMO provides compelling diagnoses, prognoses, and motivation for action. Although Gerhards and Rucht did not

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76. William A. Gamson, "The Social Psychology of Collective Action," in Morris and McClurg Mueller, *Frontiers in Social Movement Theory*, 70.
77. Robert D. Benford, "Frame Disputes within the Nuclear Disarmament Movement," *Social Forces* 71, no. 3 (March 1993): 696.

specifically address decline, they found that a movement with vague rather than specific framing was less successful at attracting participants. Benford did address decline, which he attributed to unresolved framing conflicts.

Conclusion

In the course of its history, the study of politics and protest has been dominated by various theoretical perspectives. In their heydays, each perspective has influenced how scholars and other interested parties understood political protest and the activists who undertake it. For example, protest could be easily dismissed by elites and decision makers when activists were rendered, by collective behavior theorists, as irrational trouble-makers. For this and other reasons, scholars care greatly about the direction in which dominant theories propel the field. While the earlier POS/PPT models helped broaden scholarly vantage points to include external impulses, these models also shifted focus away from activist agency and capabilities. The PPT synthesis, which has assumed PPT's mantle and has been advocated by some of the field's lions, has received particular attention because of the implication that, with the inclusion of the framing perspective, it offers tools for understanding agency-driven dynamics.

Various detractors of the PPT synthesis have charged, on theoretical grounds, that the perspective *does not* account for agency. As of yet, no one has actually assessed the synthesis' capabilities with empirical data. This chapter has set the stage for an assessment by evaluating the main complaints levied against the synthesis (to determine which charges merit examination), delineating the phases that constitute the synthesis' scope, and reviewing the principal expectations of the synthesis' component theories for the various phases.

Before proceeding with the assessment, the Indígenas of Ecuador and the Indigenous peoples of Australia case studies will be presented in the next two chapters. Because of the Australian *History Wars* referred to in the last chapter, the case data will be presented in a neutral fashion, free from theoretical observations. This theory-free format offers an additional advantage; it facilitates the application of the data to several different theoretical discussions: the assessment in chapter 5, the incorporation and co-optation discussion in chapter 6, and the consciousness analysis in chapter 7.

CHAPTER 3

The Political Development of the Indígenas of Ecuador

There is no greater sorrow on earth than the loss of one's native land.

—Euripides

Unlike the landowners, who see land as an instrument of production like any other, indigenous people see land as an essential foundation for our cultural, political, organizational and economic development, and of life itself.

—Nina Pacari, "Taking on the Neoliberal Agenda"

Introduction

The Indígenas of Ecuador case sketches the rise of what many scholars consider as the most powerful political movement in Latin America. By tracing its development from the Spanish conquest onwards, we gain a sense of the abuses inflicted on the Indígena peoples for five centuries and of the measures they have undertaken to mitigate those injustices. Despite the subjugation efforts of myriad governments, the Indígenas of Ecuador have managed, in the past century, to become politically mobilized. That, by itself, is not extraordinary in Latin America; what is extraordinary is the form that mobilization has taken. A major portion of this chapter is dedicated to this twentieth-century activism and to examining in detail the trial-and-error steps that led to an inspiring and powerful movement.

Historical Review

According to scholars of the region, the population of pre-Incan and pre-Spanish Ecuador was approximately a half million, comprised of numerous small groups, each with its own language and culture. Politically, the Andean Highlands were divided into small chieftain-states led by powerful families. Culturally, the Indígena inhabitants had "developed advanced cultures and a high level of civilization . . . . Pottery and ceramics, elaborate and beautiful textiles, the working of precious metals, complex irrigation systems, long-distance roads, and a state postal system were all known."[78]

In the mid-fifteenth century, the Incas conquered what is now present-day Ecuador. Incan rule had a homogenizing effect, particularly in the Sierra Highlands, where the Incas unified various Indígena groups and introduced Quichua as a common language. Although the Incan conquest was brutal, the Incas did not seek to destroy the Indígena culture. With the Spanish conquest of 1534, however, came changes that over time resulted in wide-scale Indígena deaths, enslavement, and the disruption of traditional practices and culture.[79] By the end of the sixteenth century, the Spanish conquest had decimated the Indígena population—through starvation, forced labor, and disease—to less than a quarter of a million, a drop of 60 percent.[80]

Spanish ownership of Indígena land occurred through outright takeover. The Spanish Crown seized Indígena lands and "issued land-grants throughout the sierra to prominent conquistador families. The Spaniards then forcibly settled indigenous farmers in colonial towns

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78. David Corkill and David Cubitt, *Ecuador: Fragile Democracy* (London: Latin America Bureau, 1988), 5. For further information, see Nina Serafino, "Latin American Indigenous Peoples and Considerations for U.S. Assistance," *Congressional Research Service Report for Congress*, August 30, 1991; and Les Field, "Ecuador's Pan-Indian Uprising," *NACLA Report on the Americas*, Vol. 25, no. 3 (December 1991): 39-44.
79. Serafino, "Latin American Indigenous Peoples and Considerations for U.S. Assistance."
80. Corkill and Cubitt. *Ecuador*, 6.

and instituted a labor-draft . . . to create a workforce for the haciendas they established on confiscated land."[81] Regardless of whether the Indígena were segregated or in the hacienda system, they were required to pay taxes, the main source of the Crown's income.[82]

The hacienda system was one of total exploitation. Peasant families were forced to provide their labor in exchange for subsistence plots and paltry wages. All members of a dependent family were expected to service the hacienda, even if only the adult males received wages. The laborers were indebted to the hacienda, and the debt was passed from generation to generation. The land provided to the peasant communities was the least desirable and accessible. Despite the poor soil and irrigation difficulties, the Indígena peasants provided foodstuffs for themselves, the hacienda, and any neighboring markets. The absurdity of the land division is still visible to this day. As relayed by Meisch, "A German friend of mine once commented that Ecuador was the only place he had ever been where the cows grazed in the valleys and the crops were planted on the mountainsides."[83]

The hacienda system was carefully constructed to restrict the movements and opportunities of its laborers.[84] By keeping the laborers uneducated and isolated, and by threatening to evict them from their remaining land, hacienda owners were able to maintain a high degree of control. This control was facilitated further by the sheer distance between haciendas and between haciendas and any major population areas.[85] Because of the isolation, any

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81. Field, "Ecuador's Pan-Indian Uprising," 40.
82. Corkill and Cubitt. *Ecuador*, 8.
83. Lynn Meisch, "'We will not dance on the tomb of our grandparents': '500 years of resistance' in Ecuador," *The Latin American Anthropology Review* 4, no. 2 (Winter 1992): 56.
84. Interview with CONAIE leader, Otavalo, February 12, 2001.
85. For further information on control, see Muriel Crespi, "St. John the Baptist: The Ritual Looking Glass of Hacienda Indian Ethnic and Power Relations," in *Cultural Transformation and Ethnicity in Modern Ecuador*, ed. Norman E. Whitten, Jr. (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1981), 477-505; and Marc Becker, *Indians and Leftists in the Making of Ecuador's Modern Indigenous Movements* (Durham: Duke University Press, forthcoming 2008).

Indígena uprisings or protests were restricted to the immediate vicinity.

To survive in the hacienda system, Indígenas learned to play the "'good' Indian." Subservience meant they had to be unobtrusive, polite, and "remove their hats when addressing whites, yield their seats to whites on public conveyances, and use rear seats, or the floor, of the town church."[86] The social and economic hierarchy established during the colonial period remained unchanged from the sixteenth through the twentieth centuries. One's status on this scale determined where one could work and one's access to economic goods and power. The white Spanish elite controlled the land and economy. Below them were the *mestizos* (Spanish-Indígena), who "predominated in skilled trades, artisan occupations, small-scale commerce and retailing, and services."[87] One step lower on the hierarchy were the majority of the population, the Indígena laborers. At the bottom of the hierarchy were the people of African descent, who labored in the coastal areas.[88]

The usurpation of land and enforced servitude were obvious manifestations of Spanish domination and destruction. Less obvious, but nonetheless still culturally disruptive, was the dismissal of Indígena religious practices and the introduction of Catholicism. In 1869, the constitution was revised to require that all citizens become Catholics. Despite Spanish and Republican attempts to obliterate Indígena culture and religion, religion in the Highlands is Roman Catholic interspersed with traditional beliefs and practices. At a social gathering, for

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86. Muriel Crespi, "When Indios Become Cholos: Some Consequences of the Changing Ecuadorian Hacienda," chapter 10 in *The New Ethnicity: Perspectives from Ethnology*, ed. John W. Bennett (St. Paul: West Publishing, American Ethnological Society Proceedings, 1975). First quote from 155, second quote from 156.
87. Corkill and Cubitt, *Ecuador: Fragile Democracy*, 7-8.
88. Corkill and Cubitt estimate that at the end of the 18th century, this population was composed of "about 8,000 slaves and 42,000 free persons of colour." *Ecuador*, 8.

example, it is common practice to make an offering to the *Pachamama* by spilling a little of one's drink on the earth (*Pacha*).[89]

Indígena resistance during the centuries of tight restrictions and isolation ranged from outright revolts (which were always quashed) to hidden resistance. As control mechanisms became more entrenched, violent resistance became less feasible and gave way to covert resistance. Such resistance consisted of small acts of defiance, such as "trespassing, unauthorized utilization of privately owned land, and, generally speaking, a refusal to recognize large landowners' property rights."[90] For many generations, lower-scale resistance was all that could be pursued.

Ecuador Independence in 1830

The struggle for independence took roughly over a decade to achieve and occurred in a piecemeal fashion—region by region. Although Indígena soldiers fought for independence, the Indígena population of the new republic initially lost more than it gained. As the Crown's authority disappeared, so did many of its paternalistic protections of the Indígena population. The elites who wrote the first legislation used the opportunity to solidify and legalize their hegemony,[91] thus reinforcing the racial hierarchies of the colonial era.

Politics in early Ecuador were dominated by two political parties. The Conservative

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89. I observed this myself in 2000.
90. Tanya Korovkin, "Weak Weapons, Strong Weapons? Hidden Resistance and Political Protest in Rural Ecuador," *The Journal of Peasant Studies* 27, no. 3 (April 2000): 2. See also Barry Lyons, "Religion, Authority, and Identity: Intergenerational Politics, Ethnic Resurgence, and Respect in Chimborazo, Ecuador," in *Latin American Research Review* 36, no. 1 (2001): 7-48.
91. Donna Lee Van Cott, "Indigenous Peoples and Democracy: Issues for Policymakers," chapter 1 in *Indigenous Peoples and Democracy in Latin America*, ed. Donna Lee Van Cott (New York: St. Martin's Press in association with the Inter-American Dialogue, 1994), 4.

Party, which was in power from 1830 to 1895, represented the interests of the landed elite of

the Andean Highlands and the Catholic Church. The Liberal Party represented the anticlerical

commerce-oriented elites of the coast. The two parties had very distinct policies towards

Ecuador's Indígena denizens. The Conservative Party favored continuing the system of forced

labor and Indígena tribute. The Liberals, however, sought to modernize and follow a capitalist

model that would require free trade and labor. Major impediments to their plans for economic

development were land monopolization and Indígena servitude. As long as Indígenas were tied

to the haciendas, they would remain "backwards." To achieve a free labor market, the Liberals

advocated the assimilation of the Indígena population and the dissolution of their communal

lands.[92]

The "Indian Problem" and Social Reform

Following a military coup, the Liberal Party held power from 1895 to 1925. The Liberal

attempts to assimilate the Indígenas and cut their ties to traditional lands, however, were

unsuccessful; they were opposed by landed elites, the Catholic Church, and many Indígena

communities, who did not want to lose their remaining lands.[93] While the Liberals were

frustrated in their attempts to rid Ecuador of feudal labor arrangements, they were successful in

other areas of their assimilation project, namely the promotion of social reforms. The reforms

themselves were minor and did little to substantially alter the structures that kept Indígena

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92. For a survey of early Ecuadorian politics and policies, see Mary Crain "The Social Construction of National Identity in Highland Ecuador," *Anthropological Quarterly* 63, no. 1 (January 1990): 43-59.

93. Although the Liberal Party couched their arguments in the discourse of freedom and liberalism, Crain notes that the Party members "were more interested in ending church monopolies of land and acquiring that land themselves than in ending all forms of servile bondage." "The Social Construction of National Identity in Highland Ecuador," 45.

peoples subjugated; however, the rhetoric and discourse introduced by the Liberals opened

Ecuador to progressive impulses. The Liberals helped create a political environment receptive to

socialist ideals and mobilization, which later would be of critical importance for Indígena

mobilization.

The Liberals also improved Ecuador's infrastructure, particularly the building of roads.

While the roads made it easier for the government to penetrate rural areas, it also mitigated the

isolation of many Indígena communities. Connecting the outlying areas to the center would later

allow troops to enter the haciendas, but it also facilitated contacts between socialist activists and

Indígena protestors.

Support for improving the lot of the Indígenas also came from intellectuals and even the

public. During the 1920s, several essayists and writers brought the plight of Ecuador's Indígena

population—for example, their horrendous living conditions—to the public's attention. The

Indígena population was excluded from the political arena, both formally—not having the right

to vote—and informally—by discrimination and official disdain for the Quichua language. As

one scholar states, "Indians were unable to represent their own interests. . . . [T]heir interests

were often expressed by other social groups, such as urban intellectuals, the middle class, or,

occasionally, members of the power elite, who spoke for the Indian and wrote him, or her, into

history."[94]

The Politicization of Indígena Workers: 1920s-1960s

For the Indígenas, one of the most important developments of the 1920s was the

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94. Ibid., 46.

establishment of the Socialist Party.[95] Indígena leaders were present at the inaugural session, and the new party unanimously agreed to work on behalf of Indígena workers. The Socialists focused on the Sierra, and from the Sierra later arose a majority of the significant organizations and leaders of the Indígena protest movement.

With the support of urban leftists, Indígena socialists and communists hit the ground running.[96] In the late 1920s and early 1930s, Indígena workers in the Sierra formed several small unions. These unions (with names like The Inca, a Free Land, and Bread and Land) emphasized the struggle for a fair agricultural wage, shorter hours, and improved working conditions. With Socialist support, Indígena activists began planning for pan-Indígena activities, including the First Congress of Peasant Organizations, in February 1931. The Congress was prohibited by the Government, but nonetheless attracted thousands of Indígenas from the Highlands and coast. In 1934, Indígena leaders from various regions gathered for the purpose of creating a national Indígena organization. This meeting laid the groundwork for a later 1944 national organization; however, the immediate results were support for local organizational efforts.

The government reaction to Indígena agitation during the 1920s and 1930s was three-pronged. First, the government consistently sided with landowners during labor disputes and strikes, and readily sent in troops to quell revolt, particularly during the harvest seasons. Violence quite often erupted during confrontations between troops and protestors, with troops, on numerous occasions, killing unarmed protestors. Second, in an attempt to counter union mobilization the government tried to establish a committee that would investigate and mediate

95. Interview with CONAIE leader, Otavalo, February 12, 2001; and interview with Pachakutik leader, Otavalo, March 13, 2001.
96. In 1931, the Socialist Party became the Communist Party; in 1933 socialists created a new Socialist Party.

landlord-worker disputes. The Indígenas interpreted this program as "an attempt to spy on their organizational efforts. Under the control of the government, this committee would act against the interests of the Indians. Naturally, the Indians rejected such attempts to subvert their organizational efforts. Without their support, the committees were a failure. Over the following decades, Indian organizations would similarly and consistently reject such government initiatives as fundamentally in conflict with their own interests."[97] Third, the government continued to produce social reform legislation. One of the most significant was the 1937 *Ley de Comunas* (the Communes Law).

The government promulgated the *Ley de Comunas* to help "transform the communities into cooperatives for production."[98] Under the law, the government would provide assistance to communities if they underwent a legalization process, registered with the government, and submitted annual information. Through their comuna status, communities were able to access funds and deal directly with government agencies, which allowed them to bypass intransigent local officials. According to one scholar, the comuna program facilitated the reconstruction of political institutions that had been lost as a result of the Spanish conquest.[99] Several hundred communities formed comunas; however, the concept was resisted in areas with a strong union presence.[100]

Although the law provided some advantages, it also facilitated government scrutiny and

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97. Becker, *Indians and Leftists in the Making of Ecuador's Modern Indigenous Movements*, 67. For more on the history of socialist mobilization, see also Crain, "The Social Construction of National Identity in Highland Ecuador."
98. José Antonio Lucero, "Locating the 'Indian Problem': Community, Nationality, and Contradiction in Ecuadorian Indigenous Politics," *Latin American Perspectives* 30, no. 1 (January 2003): 29.
99. Tanya Korovkin, "Reinventing the Communal Tradition: Indigenous Peoples, Civil Society, and Democratization in Andean Ecuador," *Latin American Research Review* 36, no 3 (2001): 45-49, and 58.
100. Marc Becker, "Comunas and Indigenous Protest in Cayambe, Ecuador," *The Americas* 55, no. 4 (April 1999): 531-559.

intrusion. The government had veto power over a comuna's choice of leaders and bylaws, particularly those it deemed activist or that interfered with monied interests, such as haciendas or industries. For example, the government opposed a clause that called for the "leadership of the comuna [to] cultivate relations with other comunas throughout the country in order to work for the cultural advance of the people." The government also rejected a bylaw to restrict alcohol because it might hurt the alcohol industry; likewise, proposals to lease hacienda land that whites might want to use were struck down. Over time, many communities stopped participating in the comuna program; and by 1972, less than half were still submitting the required annual information.[101]

A Regional Indígena Organization

In July 1944, a national leftist labor confederation—the Confederation of Ecuadorian Workers (CTE)—was founded. The CTE encouraged the idea of a national peasant and Indígena federation; and in August 1944, Indígena leaders founded the Ecuadorian Federation of Indians (FEI).[102] For the next twenty years, the FEI was the focal point of Indígena mobilization. FEI's goals were:

(1) Gain the economic emancipation of Ecuadorian Indians;

(2) Raise the Indians' cultural and moral level while conserving whatever is good in their native customs;

(3) Contribute to national unity;

101. Ibid., 548.
102. Interview with Pachakutik leader, Otavalo, March 13, 2001.

(4) Establish links of solidarity with all American Indians.[103]

Following FEI's creation, hacienda workers increased their agitation for better wages and working conditions and often were able to achieve landlord concessions (although such concessions were sometimes paltry or quickly forgotten). Despite FEI's success as the first Indígena organization, many contemporary activists criticize FEI because it failed to "take into account the totality of our problems, that is both class exploitation and ethnic discrimination."[104]

The Push for Agrarian Reform

During the 1950s, pressure began to build for the Ecuadorian government to remedy the land disparity between hacienda owners and hacienda laborers. Scholars have traced the impetus for agrarian reform to the Communist Party, which in the 1950s began emphasizing land claims alongside the more traditional leftist demands. The focus on land was immediately embraced by Indígena activists, and "rural protests . . . underwent a noticeable shift from an emphasis on salaries and work conditions to land reform."[105] Other organizations, such as the Federation of Catholic Workers, added their support for land claims. In 1961, twelve thousand Indígenas marched on Quito for social reform and agrarian reform—at that time the largest protest in Ecuador's history—in a demonstration organized by FEI and CTE.

Support for more equitable distribution of land came also from surprising sources, namely the Ecuadorian military and the U.S. government (which has not been known for its

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103. Becker, *Indians and Leftists in the Making of Ecuador's Modern Indigenous Movements*, 87.
104. CONAIE publication cited in Field, "Ecuador's Pan-Indian Uprising," 42.
105. Becker, *Indians and Leftists in the Making of Ecuador's Modern Indigenous Movements*, 121.

support of Latin American grassroots causes).[106] From the 1950s onward, "Ecuador's

nationalist political elites, civilian and military, began to talk about the need to 'develop' and

'modernize' their country."[107] With echoes of earlier Liberal Party ideology, the military

believed that the feudal-style labor arrangements and the intransigence of the landed elite were

hindering Ecuador's economic development. The U.S. government's support for land reform was

based on fears of a wave of Fidel Castro-inspired revolutions.[108] During the late 1950s and early

1960s, Indígena activists throughout Latin America openly supported Castro and the Cuban

Revolution. This support was mutual, as Castro also helped the various Indígena movements.

Indeed, one of the interviewees for this dissertation was trained in Cuba and reported that

activists, to bypass government obstacles to networking, would travel to Cuba to meet.[109] As a

result of the internal and external pressures, eleven Latin American countries instituted agrarian

reforms between 1960 and 1964. In 1964, the Ecuadorian military staged a coup and introduced

land reform.[110]

　　　Despite high expectations and promises, the 1964 Agrarian Reform and Colonization

Law was, for most Indígenas, a disappointment. The law required that haciendas over a certain

size grant their workers legal title to their subsistence plots and redistribute unutilized or

underutilized land.[111] In practice, however, relatively little land actually exchanged hands and

the land disparity in the Andes persisted: in 1994, for example, 2 percent of the farms in the

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106. Field, "Ecuador's Pan-Indian Uprising," 42. The U.S. government's support came through the Alliance for Progress, a U.S. aid program for Latin America.

107. Scott H. Beck and Kenneth J. Mijeski, "Indigena Self-Identity in Ecuador and the Rejection of Mestizaje," *Latin American Research Review* 35, no. 1 (2000): 121.

108. Meisch, "'We will not dance on the tomb of our grandparents'," 56.

109. Interview with CONAIE leader, Otavalo, February 12, 2001.

110. For additional information on this era, see Meisch "'We will not dance on the tomb of our grandparents'."

111. For more on land reform, see Crespi, "St. John the Baptist."

Sierra owned 43 percent of the land.[112] The Agrarian Reform nonetheless yielded two significant outcomes: (1) the size of haciendas decreased, and (2) workers were paid in cash wages. These changes had repercussions for Ecuador's overall social structure relations and power relations between the government and landowners.

By making Indígenas wage earners and abolishing the centuries-old system of indebted servitude, the agrarian reforms altered the hacienda social structure.[113] No longer would Indígenas have to kowtow to hacienda bosses to stay in favor. With their land secured, Indígenas could seek employment elsewhere. In many areas this was not possible, but in others, such as Otavalo, Indígenas redirected their time and energy into other businesses. The increase in wealth and autonomy, and the formal end to asymmetrical power relations, resulted in a more positive ethnic identity.[114]

By reducing the size of the haciendas and forcing the landowners to pay wages, the military regime accomplished what the Liberals before could not: the landowning class had finally been weakened to the point that the government became the country's economic driver. During the 1960s and 1970s, Ecuador also experienced two economic booms: first the banana boom and then the oil boom. Oil monies accrued directly to the government, which used its new wealth and new economic dominance to pursue massive development projects. Between 1952 and 1972, the government increased public spending eightfold; for Indígena communities, funds went to programs such as bilingual education and water and sanitation projects.[115]

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112. Kintto Lucas, *We Will Not Dance On Our Grandparents' Tombs: Indigenous Uprisings in Ecuador*, translated by Dinah Livingstone. (London: Catholic Institute for International Relations, 2000), 3.
113. For more information on the restructuring of power relations, see Crespi, "St. John the Baptist."
114. Rudi Colloredo-Mansfeld, "'Dirty Indians', Radical *Indígenas*, and the Political Economy of Social Difference. in Modern Ecuador," *Bulletin of Latin American Research* 17, no. 2 (1998): 186.
115. Tanya Korovkin, "Reinventing the Communal Tradition," 48.

The shift in power from the landowning class to the state combined with the government's spending projects contributed toward an increase in the size and power of the middle class. The middle class tended toward progressive ideas and new political parties were formed. One of the key changes sought by these new forces was a broadening of Ecuador's suffrage.[116]

Another major repercussion of the 1964 Agrarian Reform Law was the colonization of the Amazon. Rather than give Sierra Indígenas more hacienda land, the government encouraged them to colonize the rainforest areas. "Homesteaders by the thousands moved to the low lands and cleared previously untitled forest land that, according to the 1964 law, was the patrimony of the state—*tierra baldía*, 'no-man's land'."[117] The government overlooked the fact that these areas were the territory of Oriente Indígenas. With the influx of Sierra colonizers, the Oriente population increased fivefold between 1950 and 1982.[118] As will be discussed shortly, many scholars link the political mobilization of the Oriente Indígena communities to this colonization. For the Sierra Indígena movement, perhaps the most significant repercussion of Agrarian reform was its transformative effect on their mobilization and ideology.

From Workers' Rights to Indigenous Rights

The Agrarian Reform galvanized the Sierra Indígena movement and precipitated an ideological shift away from workers' rights and Marxism, and toward land and indigenous

116. Crain, "The Social Construction of National Identity in Highland Ecuador," 47.
117. Suzana Sawyer, "The 1992 Indian Mobilization in Lowland Ecuador," *Latin American Perspectives* 24, no. 3 (May 1997): 68.
118. Serafino, "Latin American Indigenous Peoples and Considerations for U.S. Assistance."

rights.[119] This shift occurred in communities that had gained land as well as communities that had been disappointed by agrarian reform.[120] The failure of the reforms to provide sweeping changes in land ownership demonstrated to Indígena activists the shortcomings of a class-based approach for issues such as land, culture, language, and education. As one interviewee relayed, the leftist parties saw the Indígenas only as farmers, so they imposed European concepts of farmers, Marxian concepts.[121] In a similar vein, another interviewee maintained that the communists and socialists didn't always address their issues as Indígena people, more as workers.[122] Concomitant with this disenchantment emerged a generational rift. Many new and young activists lost respect for the older generation, which they considered to have been too obedient and quiescent under the hacienda system.[123]

An additional push for land and indigenous rights came from a new generation of leaders. The indigenous rights movement of the 1970s was sorely in need of leaders. According to Korovkin, "by the first half of the twentieth century . . . ethnic leadership had virtually disappeared while most of the indigenous population had been transformed into bonded labourers."[124] Some Indígena activists who had been in leadership positions with FEI were able to continue,[125] but a new generation of leaders was needed, and many came from Otavalo.[126] Otavalo had long been a bastion of Indígena autonomy, thanks to its textile industry, which had

119. The term "indigenous rights" encapsulates the special concerns—such as land, language, culture, and bilingual education—of the Indígena people as the original, indigenous inhabitants of the land. This term will be used for the same purpose in the Indigenous Australian case chapter.
120. Leon Zamosc, "Agrarian Protest and the Indian Movement in the Ecuadorian Highlands," *Latin American Research Review* 29, no. 3 (1994): 48.
121. Interview with CONAIE leader, Otavalo, February 12, 2001.
122. Interview with Pachakutik leader, Otavalo, March 13, 2001.
123. See Lyons, "Religion, Authority, and Identity."
124. Korovkin, "Weak Weapons, Strong Weapons?" 6.
125. Field, "Ecuador's Pan-Indian Uprising," 42.
126. For a discussion of the political importance of Otavalo, see Korovkin, "Reinventing the Communal Tradition."

existed prior to the Spanish conquest and was one of the few native industries that the Spanish

supported rather than destroyed.[127] Because the textile industry provided many Otavaleños with

income independent of the haciendas, Otavaleños considered themselves politically autonomous;

they pursued self-sufficiency and opposed integration. For the successful autonomous weavers,

their experience as Indígenas had been fundamentally different from those of hacienda

dependents whose families had for generations played the subservient "good Indian." The sense

of autonomy and pride coupled with new wealth contributed to Otavalo's rise as a center of

Sierra activism.[128] The autonomy mindset of Otavaleños dovetailed well with the movement's

need of leaders as it was shifting from a class-based to indigenous rights ideology.

The Catholic Church also played a role in the ideological shift. The Catholic Church had

traditionally supported Indígena causes for humanitarian reasons, but had advocated Indígena

advancement through assimilation. The timbre of Catholic support changed after Vatican II

(1962-65), and the Church began taking Indígena issues into account.[129] "The church shifted

from a socially conservative, otherworldly theological orientation focused on salvation of the

soul through the sacraments to a discourse first of development and then of liberation." This new

philosophy, known as liberation theology, viewed "the Bible as a message of liberation

addressed above all to the poor and oppressed. . . . The Word of God is an active force that helps

the oppressed to understand oppression as a consequence of sinful social structures and moves

them to act as historical subjects to transform the world in accordance with God's plan."[130]

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127. The Spanish expanded the Otavalo textile industry to supply Spanish holdings in Ecuador, Bolivia and Peru. See Field, "Ecuador's Pan-Indian Uprising," 41.
128. Colloredo-Mansfeld, "'Dirty Indians', Radical *Indígenas*, and the Political Economy of Social Difference in Modern Ecuador."
129. Interview with Pachakutik leader, Otavalo, March 13, 2001.
130. Lyons, "Religion, Authority, and Identity," 31-32.

Whereas the Church had earlier advocated assimilation, it now viewed itself as liberator and celebrated ethnicity and cultural integrity. Activist clergy—both Catholic and Evangelical—began contributing to the creation of organizations oriented toward indigenous rights.

The Rise of Indigenous Rights Organizations in the Sierra

Rather than explore the entire spectrum of Indígena organizations in the Sierra, an undertaking that by itself could fill a book, this section will cover the organizations that led to the creation in 1986 of the Confederation of Indígena Nationalities of Ecuador (CONAIE). CONAIE is considered the most powerful social movement organization in Ecuador, if not in all of Latin America.[131]

The 1960s mobilization around indigenous rights did not immediately produce new organizations. Rather, there was a period of competition between and radicalization of various class-based organizations, followed by the creation of new organizations. In the 1960s, a new socialist and "liberation theology" Catholic organization was formed, the National Federation of Peasant Organizations (FENOC).[132] A few years later, another class-based organization affiliated with the Catholic Church and liberation theology clergy, Ecuador Indígenas Awaken (ECUARUNARI), emerged.[133] As the Indígena members of FENOC and ECAURUNARI

131. Scholars who have made this claim include Raul Zibechi, "Dangerous Liaisons: Center-Left Governments and the Grassroots," *Center for International Policy: Americas Program*, (December 7, 2004), http://americas.irc-online.org/am/965 (accessed April 12, 2008); Robert Andolina, "The Sovereign and its Shadow: Constituent Assembly and Indigenous Movement in Ecuador," *Journal of Latin American Studies* 35, no. 4 (November 2003): 721-751; Amalia Pallares, *From Peasant Struggles to Indian Resistance: The Ecuadorian Andes in the Late Twentieth Century* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2002); and Lucero, "Locating the 'Indian Problem'."
132. In 1998 FENOC changed its name to the National Federation of Rural, Indigenous and Black Organizations (FENOCIN), see www.fenocin.org.
133. According to Meisch, Ecuarunari in Quichua means "Ecuador Indígenas Awaken." "'We will not dance on the tomb of our grandparents'," 58.

became more indigenous rights-oriented, both organizations shifted their focus. In 1975,

socialists assumed FENOC's leadership and the organization's tactics became more radical, for

example, land seizures became a negotiating tool. Despite its attempts at radicalization, FENOC

stayed closer to its class–based roots than ECUARUNARI and, although it is still to this day a

significant organization, lost momentum and members. ECUARUNARI, however, geared itself

toward indigenous rights.[134] True to its name, ECUARUNARI religious activists used the

"teachings of the Brazilian liberation theologist Paulo Freire. . . . to 'awaken' indigenous

people." Freire's techniques included teaching Indígenas to question the unjust power

relationships to which they were subjected, and recognize discrimination as a legitimate

grievance for mobilization.[135] As a result of these types of activities, ECUARUNARI continued

to prosper and grow. In 1974, Indígena intellectuals from Otavalo formed the Indígena and

Peasant Federation of Imbabura (FICI), a small, provincial organization that nonetheless played a

key role in national Indígena organizational efforts.[136] FICI's focus, from the beginning, was on

land and cultural rights; and, as its president in 2001 stated, encourages efforts to claim what is

ours in all areas.[137]

Organizing in the Oriente

Because of the rainforest's inhospitableness and its distance from other inhabited areas,

Oriente Indígenas had been, up until the 1960s, relatively free of external interference. The main

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134. Zamosc, "Agrarian Protest and the Indian Movement in the Ecuadorian Highlands," 46-48.
135. Pallares, *From Peasant Struggles to Indian* Resistance, 151.
136. Korovkin, "Weak Weapons, Strong Weapons?" 15; and interview with local Pachakutik president, Otavalo, February 10, 2001.
137. Interview with local Pachakutik president, Otavalo, February 10, 2001.

outsiders were missionaries and members of the Ecuadorian military, which had maintained a

presence in the Oriente after a loss of land to Peru during a 1940s war.[138] In the 1960s, however,

the Oriente was suddenly inundated with Indígena colonizers from the Sierra (as part of the 1964

Agrarian Reform and Colonization Law) and oil industry-related workers. The influx of

foreigners had a devastating impact on the environment and on local Indígena culture.[139]

As outsiders threatened the traditions and livelihood of the Shuar, the Salesian

missionaries assisted the Shuar in organizing the Federation of Shuar Centers, which will be

hereafter referred to as the Shuar Federation. The focus of the Shuar Federation was on

reclaiming and maintaining Shuar land and culture. The Shuar Federation initiated many new

projects, including bilingual education and the radio broadcast of educational programs, health

services, and a publishing outfit that produced almost seventy books on Oriente culture and

heritage.

In 1978, a federation of the Quichua, Achuar, Shuar, and Zaparo peoples in the Pastaza

province created the Organization of Indígena Peoples of Pastaza (OPIP). Similar to the Shuar

Federation, the OPIP sought to protect land rights and the environment, but the OPIP also

emphasized unifying the various Pastaza groups. In 1980, the organizations representing the

Quichua-speakers and the Shuar decided "to combat the open conspiracies against their land and

cultures" by joining forces and founding an organization that would represent all of the Oriente,

the Confederation of Indígena Nationalities of the Ecuadorian Amazon (CONFENAIE).[140] Thus,

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138. Border skirmishes between Ecuador and Peru occurred as recently as 1995 when 100 soldiers were killed in southern Ecuador. In 1998, the presidents of both countries finally established a permanent border and reached an agreement on river rights. See Lucas, *We Will Not Dance On Our Grandparents' Tombs*."
139. Corkill and Cubitt, *Ecuador*, 74.
140. Field, "Ecuador's Pan-Indian Uprising," 43; Nina Pacari also discussed CONFENAIE's formation, "Taking on the Neoliberal Agenda;" *NACLA Report on the Americas* 29, no. 5 (March 1996-April 1996): 23-32.

around the same time that ECUARUNARI was becoming the largest organization in the Sierra, CONFENAIE became the peak-level organization of the Oriente. As will be discussed shortly, it was primarily the coordination of these two top organizations that produced CONAIE.

Government Approach to the "Indian Problem"

In 1979, a new government was inaugurated that expressed interest in correcting social inequities and including marginalized groups in politics. While the new government dismantled several programs unpopular with Indígena communities, it did not take the "risky" step of transferring management of Indígena-related programs to Indígena representatives. Similar to previous governments, the new government recognized that improving the economy and creating a stronger Ecuadorian national identity would entail greater involvement of the underclasses. Unlike earlier governments, however, the new government's tack was not to denigrate the Indígena identity but to create a national identity that would include an Indígena identity, albeit a new and more positive identity. Thus, the government sought to change the national image of Indígenas through the promotion of Indígena music, dance, arts, and crafts.

While some members of the Indígena community appreciated the elevation of native music, most rejected both the homogenization of their local identities into a national Indígena identity and the project of amalgamating an Indígena identity into an Ecuadorian national identity. Among the government's promotion tactics were festivals and contests for monetary awards, which Indígena organizations found objectionable because the competition instilled by contests divided Indígena communities. This conflict between the government's identity efforts and Indígena resistance reached a head in 1983 when the government sponsored a traditional

festival featuring activities such as a beauty queen pageant and sporting contests. The response

of Indígena organizations was to boycott the festival and organize an alternative one that

emphasized native traditions, myths, and history.[141]

Unifying the Indígena Movement

Over time, it became apparent to the various Indígena groups throughout Ecuador that

land claims were an issue common to all of them and that they could be best pursued with a

united front. According to the Indígena movement leader Nina Pacari, the issue of land was a

"key rallying point for indigenous groups across the country, and has helped unify the

struggle."[142] Moreover, during this same period, as one of my interviewees relayed, Indígenas

began to have an appreciation for the importance of their own culture.[143] Thus, in 1980,

ECUARUNARI and CONFENIAE organized a congress to discuss how to unify all of Ecuador's

Indígena organizations under one umbrella. As CONAIE chronicled this early unity drive,

"Although each organization has achieved its own success, we are aware that the unity of all the

indigenous people is indispensable for our movement to have the necessary force to achieve

economic, social, cultural, and political objectives."[144] With the help of FICI, the 1980 meeting

was a success, and its participants produced a national body, the Coordinating Council of

Indígena Nationalities of Ecuador (CONACNIE), to coordinate the activities of Indígena

organizations.[145] Among the early objectives agreed upon at the meeting were the prioritization

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141. See Crain, "The Social Construction of National Identity in Highland Ecuador."
142. Pacari, "Taking on the Neoliberal Agenda," 25.
143. Interview with CONAIE leader, Otavalo, February 12, 2001.
144. CONAIE citation from Melina Selverston-Scher, *Ethnopolitics in Ecuador: Indigenous Rights and the Strengthening of Democracy* (Coral Gables: North-South Center Press at the University of Miami, 2001), 38.
145. Interview with local Pachakutik president, Otavalo, February 10, 2001. For the role of FICI, see Korovkin, "Weak Weapons, Strong Weapons?"

of autonomy and the rejection of external influences, including political parties.

To become a true pan-Indígena organization, the Council's leaders realized they would also need the participation of Indígenas from the coast. Mobilization along the coastal regions was minimal and in some areas nonexistent; thus, the Council not only contacted existing organizations, but helped create new ones. Within six years, Indígena activists decided that a coordinating body was insufficient; a more substantial umbrella organization was required, and they turned the executive council into CONAIE.

From the very beginning CONAIE proved itself to be different from other organizations. "Rather than insisting on traditional themes like the struggle for land and economic improvements, CONAIE concentrated on an ethnic agenda ranging from the vindication of cultural rights to more ambitious programmatic demand such as redefinition of Ecuador as a plurinational country." By CONAIE's second congress in 1988, CONAIE had formulated an ambitious action plan to achieve its goals, which was to exert "pressure from outside the system" and "negotiate demands with incumbent governments, take the initiative in national mobilizations to pressure the state, have a permanent public presence by taking stands on all relevant issues, combine forms of struggle, and put CONAIE at the center of a broad front of all exploited and marginalized sectors."[146]

Although CONAIE was a federation of organizations, it did not completely displace all other large organizations. It developed a supportive-competitive relationship with several of the former powerhouses, namely FEI and FENOC, but trumped them in its ambitions and

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146. Zamosc, "Agrarian Protest and the Indian Movement in the Ecuadorian Highlands," first quote from 48, second quote from 147, and third quote from 145. The strategy prescriptions are from a 1988 CONAIE publication, Memorias del Segundo congreso de la CONAIE.

achievements. CONAIE's popularity and quick ascendancy over other organizations was

facilitated by three factors: first, the new "national" leaders were accepted by all communities, an

issue of utmost importance for a national federation.[147] These leaders were accepted by

communities other than their own, "because many impoverished Indigenous peasants associated

them with a promise of regained ethnic pride and new social success."[148] Second, CONAIE was

able to quickly produce a meaningful victory by successfully negotiating with the government to

take over Ecuador's bilingual education program, which had previously been managed by the

government and staffed by mestizos. Because of its government-mestizo management, it had

never been fully accepted by some Indígena organizations. Indeed, "ECUARUNARI [had]

criticized the indigenous people who worked there as 'selling out,' since they were being paid by

the government."[149] Third, CONAIE was quickly able to coordinate massive national protests—

the most disruptive ones in Ecuador's history—which will be the topic of the next section.

Pan-Indígena Protests

The 1990s were a decade of mass nationwide Indígena protests. The first protest, in 1990,

was called the Levantamiento Nacional Indígenas (National Indígena Uprising). More than one

million Indígenas participated in the Levantamiento, with the heaviest turnout in the

Highlands.[150] The protest lasted a week and both shocked and paralyzed the country: Indígena

protestors blocked highways, stopped food deliveries to the cities, marched in cities, picketed

roadsides, took over government offices, took hostages, and claimants in some land disputes

147. Korovkin, "Weak Weapons, Strong Weapons?" 15.
148. E-mail correspondence with Tanja Korovkin, November 10, 2006.
149. Selverston-Scher, *Ethnopolitics in Ecuador*, 88.
150. See Zamosc, "Agrarian Protest and the Indian Movement in the Ecuadorian Highlands."

clashed.[151]

The 1990 protest had several goals and at least two audiences. One audience was clearly the government: activists wanted to signify their grievances about economic hardship, wealth disparity, and land claims. The second audience was the Indígena population itself. CONAIE went to pains to state that the Levantamiento was the 145th insurrection of the past five hundred years; in other words, the protestors were part of a long heritage. As one Indígena movement leader captured the dual purposes of the Levantamiento, "A central element was recovering the lands that had been stolen from indigenous people. The uprising also reflected the fruition of a long-term process in which the indigenous people recognized the importance of developing our own identity, constructing an indigenous perspective on national politics, and defining our role in the broader struggle for civil, political, economic and cultural rights."[152] With the protest, Indígenas began to discuss the possibilities of a multicultural society.[153] Thus, the Levantamiento was part protest and part self-definition.

Two significant protests occurred in 1992. First, in April, the Oriente Indígenas marched to Quito to demand land rights. Second, in October CONAIE organized a nationwide demonstration against the five hundredth anniversary of Columbus' "discovery" of the Americas.[154] CONAIE and the other participating organizations were on a learning curve and with each protest implemented new tactics and strategies.[155] For example, protestors in 1992 made demands similar to those of 1990 but used more palatable language.

151. Ibid.; see also Field, "Ecuador's Pan-Indian Uprising."
152. Pacari, "Taking on the Neoliberal Agenda," 28.
153. Interview with CONAIE leader, Otavalo, February 12, 2001.
154. Interview with local Pachakutik president, Otavalo, February 10, 2001.
155. According to a technology expert for the Indígena movement, CONAIE also became more sophisticated in its technology usage, Quito, March 12, 2001.

In 1993, the government began working on a new Agrarian Development Law, which would replace the 1964 Agrarian Reform. In 1993, the government, industrialists, landowners, and CONAIE all made proposals for the new law to the Ecuadorian Parliament. CONAIE's proposals were ignored and the new law, presented in 1994, reflected the interests and wishes of the industrialists and landowners.[156] In response, CONAIE planned a massive protest; and to generate a large turnout, it widened the scope of the protest to attract groups not necessarily impacted by the new law. The uprising was called "Mobilization for Life" and protested a range of issues from the environment to injustice, issues that attracted domestic and international attention. Just as the 1992 protests were more sophisticated than the 1990 Levantamiento, the widening of CONAIE's circle of allies indicates that the Indígena leaders were continually expanding their tactical repertoires.

Government Social Control Tactics: Carrots and Sticks

The Ecuadorian government pursued three main approaches to the newly invigorated Indígena mobilization: repression, limited concessions, and co-optation. In response to the various uprisings of the 1990s, the government harassed, jailed, and was even implicated in an assassination attempt on an Indígena leader. During the 1990 Levantamiento, for example, protestors clashed with the police and armed forces, and Indígena lands were occupied by the military. Protests were also handled with tear gas and billy clubs; and in 1993, the beating of CONAIE's president during a demonstration was captured by television crews. The degree of

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156. For more information, see "Interview with Jose Maria Cabascango," *Abya Yala News*, Spring 1996.

violence used against activists has varied depending on the each administration's whims, with

some presidents reacting harshly and others more conciliatory.[157]

The government response to the uprisings developed a pattern: repression followed by

limited concessions. In 1990, the government agreed to negotiate with protestors, which was the

first time it had dialogued with its Indígena citizens. In 1992, the president met with the

movement's leaders and entered into three weeks of negotiations, resulting in some concessions.

In 1994, the government entered negotiations, and under international press scrutiny, made

several changes to the agrarian law.

The third government approach was to "integrate" (the government perspective) or "co-

opt" (the movement's perspective) the Indígena organizations into the government

establishment, for example, by attempting to hire activists or establish official representative

bodies.[158] Indígena activists and scholars of the movement as well as journalists have accused

the government of using divide-and-conquer tactics as some of the government's maneuvers

tried to exploit cleavages within the movement.[159]

During the 1990s, two different governments attempted to create official representative

bodies, both of which CONAIE criticized and rejected. In October 1992, Ecuadorian President

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157. See Melina Selverston, "The Politics of Culture: Indigenous Peoples and the State in Ecuador," in Van Cott, *Indigenous Peoples and Democracy in Latin America*; and Norman E. Whitten Jr., Dorothea Scott Whitten and Alfonso Chango, "Return of the Yumbo: The Indigenous Caminata from Amazonia to Andean Quito," *American Ethnologist* 24, no. 2 (1997): 355-391.

158. Several scholars have reported such activities, see Jennifer N. Collins, "A Sense of Possibility: Ecuador's Indigenous Movement Takes Center Stage," *NACLA Report on the Americas* 33, no. 5 (March/April 2000): 40-49; Mario Gonzalez, "Ecuador: Ministry Fractures Indigenous Movement," *InterPress Third World News Agency*, November 1, 1996. http://ecuador.nativeweb.org/96elect/ind_min1.html (accessed April 12, 2008); and Meisch, "'We will not dance on the tomb of our grandparents'."

159. See Scott H. Beck and Kenneth J. Mijeski, "The Indigenous Vote in Ecuador's 2002 Presidential Election," *Latin American and Caribbean Ethnic Studies* 1, no. 2 (September 2006): 165-184; Collins, "A Sense of Possibility;" and Gonzalez, "Ecuador: Ministry Fractures Indigenous Movement."

Durán Ballén opened an Indígena Affairs office and appointed an Indígena intellectual from

Otavalo as its director. CONAIE, which had not been consulted about the office, protested

vociferously and accused Durán Ballén of insincerity and of trying to divide the Indígena

movement. CONAIE's suspicions that the office was merely a tool of the presidency were

confirmed when it kept silent during the violent suppression of a 1993 march; indeed, the office

never spoke out on behalf of Indígenas during the entirety of its existence.[160]

In 1996, President Abdalá Bucaram created a Ministry of Ethnic Development and

appointed two Indígena Oriente leaders as directors. Some reports indicate that the leaders—who

were also CONAIE members—had encouraged Bucaram to establish the Ministry, albeit without

CONAIE's knowledge or blessing. "CONAIE leadership strongly opposed the creation of the

ministry, seeing it as a move by Bucaram to consolidate his popularity and divide the indigenous

movement."[161] CONAIE's President Miguel Cabascango said, "Once again, we are going back

to decisions made without consultation. . . . Once again, indigenous leaders are offered

government posts in exchange for support and submission."[162] Two other movement leaders,

Pacari and Luis Macas, were also quite vocal and public in their criticisms of both the

government and the two Oriente leaders. CONAIE and the other organizations typically kept the

movement's "dirty laundry" out of the public realm; but an exception was made, and movement

leaders accused the Oriente leaders of being traitors and of "following their own personal

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160. For more details on the 1992 office, see Selverston-Scher, *Ethnopolitics in Ecuador*; Selverston, "The Politics of Culture: Indigenous Peoples and the State in Ecuador;" and Meisch, "'We will not dance on the tomb of our grandparents'."
161. Scott H. Beck and Kenneth J. Mijeski, "Barricades and Ballots: Ecuador's Indians and the Pachakutik Political Movement," *Ecuadorian Studies*, no. 1 (September 2001): 9.
162. Cabascango quoted in Gonzalez, "Ecuador: Ministry Fractures Indigenous Movement," 1.

interests."[163] Without the support of the Indígena movement, the Ministry dissolved when the president's term ended.

Shortly after the demise of the 1996 ministry, Ecuador's interim president proposed a new agency—a planning council to co-ordinate and implement development projects funded by the World Bank and others—that would have equal representation from six different indigenous organizations. CONAIE opposed sharing equal representation with smaller organizations and rejected the new agency, claiming that the other organizations involved "do not necessarily represent indigenous people."[164] According to José Antonio Lucero, as an election was approaching (and presumably, the contestants wished to avoid a pre-election showdown with CONAIE), CONAIE had extra leverage with which to press for changes in the planning council's structure. In 1998, Ecuador's newly elected president introduced a new developmental agency, the Council for Development, which would represent Indígenas *not* according to government-selected organizations, but according to nationality. Considering that CONAIE's members were predominantly Quichua—the most numerous nationality—this arrangement provided CONAIE with substantial power and excluded other organizations.[165]

In sum, the Indígena movement has reacted very negatively to "the various governmental institutions that since the momentous 1990 uprising had been created to deal with indigenous affairs." Attempts by presidents to create Indígena-related institutions "were heavily criticized by COANIE for being governmental attempts to divide the movement by co-opting certain

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163. See Collins for the movement's norm of not airing its "dirty laundry" in public, "A Sense of Possibility," 46. Nina Pacari was quoted in Gonzalez, "Ecuador: Ministry Fractures Indigenous Movement," 2. Additional information provided through personal correspondence with Kenneth J. Mijeski, May 27, 2004.
164. CONAIE's response cited by Lucero, "Locating the 'Indian Problem'," 36.
165. Ibid., 36.

sectors."[166] The one agency CONAIE accepted was the only one in which it played a major

role in creating and in which it carried great weight.

The Dilemma of Participatory Politics

As discussed earlier, the new middle class of the 1960s pushed for certain social reforms,

including Indígena voting rights, which were granted in 1979. Thus, as one interviewee blankly

stated, "Democracy started in 1979 in Ecuador."[167] This statement might seem odd to other

Ecuadorians, who have had democracy off and on since 1830; but for Indígena Ecuadorians,

democracy only began with suffrage. The Indígena movement, however, did not embrace

electoral politics.

CONAIE initially advocated that Indígenas boycott electoral politics.[168] It urged its

members to hand in blank ballots, forbade its leaders from running for office, and eschewed

electoral alliances.[169] CONAIE rejected the electoral process for several reasons. First,

CONAIE's stance was a political statement; by rejecting elections, CONAIE was rejecting the

state's legitimacy, expressing its distrust of the system. To convey its skepticism, CONAIE used

slogans such as, "We don't want elections—we want progress."[170] Second, CONAIE feared that

electoral politics would divide the Indígena communities and exacerbate cleavages.[171] Third,

CONAIE also feared that electoral participation might divert the Indígena movement away from

its original goals.[172]

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166. Ibid., 35.
167. Interview with Pachakutik co-ordinator, Otavalo, February 12, 2001.
168. Ibid.
169. Interview with Pachakutik leader, Otavalo, March 13, 2001; see also Collins, "A Sense of Possibility."
170. Interview with Pachakutik leader, Otavalo, March 13, 2001.
171. Korovkin, "Reinventing the Communal Tradition," 56.
172. Lucas, *We Will Not Dance On Our Grandparents' Tombs*, 4.

Despite CONAIE's official reservations, grassroots pressure mounted for participation. In 1993, CONAIE activists debated whether uprisings and demonstrations were sufficient for attaining social change.[173] The "moderates" viewed participation as just another way to advance the Indígena cause and looked to the recent election of an Indígena to the vice presidency in Bolivia as proof. The "radicals," on the other hand, were concerned about (1) the potential manipulation and co-optation of Indígena delegates, and (2) maintaining control over Indígena representatives. The final decision was to create local, provincial, and national-level political councils—to develop democracy from the roots—and begin participation at the local level only.[174] Because of concerns about joining a flawed national-level system, in 1994, CONAIE attempted to change the system.

In 1994, CONAIE formally proposed that Ecuador change its constitution and adopt a consociationalist form of representation.[175] Among CONAIE's proposals were requests for Indígena representation in government agencies, autonomous regions, veto power over Indígena policies, and the dedication of 30 percent of all congressional seats for Indígena delegates. The proposals were supported by two non-Indígena movement organizations, but were rejected by the government.

In 1995, a confluence of factors changed CONAIE's perspective on national participation. First, CONAIE had success in defeating a government initiative, which, according to an interviewee who is an Indígena activist and lawyer, caused a fundamental shift in

173. Interview with Pachakutik leader, Otavalo, March 13, 2001.
174. Robert James Andolina, "Colonial Legacies and Plurinational Imaginaries: Indigenous Movement Politics in Ecuador and Bolivia" (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Minnesota, 1999), 220. Details on the decision to participate locally were also provided by the Pachakutik leader interviewee, Quito, March 13, 2001.
175. For more on consociationalism, see Arend Lijphart, *Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977).

CONAIE's thinking about wider electoral participation.[176] Second, grassroots pressure for

participation at the national-level increased. Indeed, it seems that Amazon leaders, supported by

a few Highlanders, had secretly created an electoral movement—which they called *Movimiento*

Pachakutik—as an alternative to CONAIE's political councils.[177] Third, a potential partner

movement—the Coordinadora de Movimientos Sociales (CMS)—emerged. The CMS shared the

same concerns as CONAIE and was comprised of left-leaning members: unions, women's

groups, youth and student groups, and human rights groups. CMS and CONAIE both resisted the

government's neoliberal structural adjustment policies, and this mutual opposition became the

basis for Indígena—CONAIE—and non-Indígena—CMS—cooperation.

Under intense pressure, CONAIE accepted the formation of Pachakutik, but attempted to

assert some control over it by stipulating some "rules" and changing its name (although most

people refer to it as Pachakutik). Although Pachakutik is closely tied to the Indígena movement,

it also portrays itself as the voice of the poor and disenfranchised, regardless of whether they are

Indígena, white, African, or mestizo. As one activist stated, Pachakutik "was born to represent

the social movements without the protection of any political party."[178] This author can attest that

Pachakutik, at the elite level at least, is indeed a multicultural party: the Pachakutik coordinator

in Otavalo, a stronghold of Indígena activism, is, as he describes himself, not an Indígena.

In May 1996, Pachakutik made its debut in national elections and won 10 percent of the

national legislature (eight seats), which made it the fourth largest party. In the 1998 elections,

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176. Interview with Pachakutik leader, Otavalo, March 13, 2001.
177. Andolina, "Colonial Legacies and Plurinational Imaginaries," 220.According to Korovkin, the word "Pachakutik" in Quichua "means reversal, revolution, or profound change," in "Reinventing The Communal Tradition," 57.
178. Miguel Lluco, interview by Lucas, *We Will Not Dance on Our Grandparents' Tombs*, 112.

however, Pachakutik lost several seats. Many rank-and-file members of the Sierra region cast

blank ballots to express their dissatisfaction with Pachakutik's choice of a presidential candidate,

who had been proposed and pushed by CONAIE's Oriente wing. This "revolt" revealed the

regional divisions within CONAIE; thus, just as CONAIE feared, electoral participation

heightened the movement's internal conflicts. Other problems also emerged. Leaders appointed

to political office left some Indígena organizations with a power vacuum. Perhaps even more

ominous, and also as CONAIE feared, Indígena delegates, endowed with power independent of

CONAIE, sometimes pursued their own objectives.[179] Delegates from the Oriente, in particular,

seemed particularly vulnerable to clientelistic pressures and were likely to disaffiliate from

Pachakutik.[180]

      CONAIE control over Indígena delegates—and, at times, CONAIE's relationship with

Pachakutik—has been an issue fraught with tension. CONAIE forbids Pachakutik delegates to be

members of CONAIE, but yet expects that the delegates fulfill CONAIE's mandates. How the

delegates operate is also scrutinized; indeed, delegates are required to rotate their office staff. On

the legislative front, any compromises or vote trading made by Pachakutik deputies are perceived

by radical activists as selling out. With their legislative experience, Pachakutik delegates most

likely consider such practices as part of "normal" political maneuvering; but for the more

radically minded, such compromises smack of co-optation. As one former CONAIE president

declared, "Our legislators should be much more closely linked to the indigenous movement and

to society in general, but often they are absorbed by the system."[181] Nina Pacari, one of the first

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179. Selverston-Scher, *Ethnopolitics in Ecuador*, 48-50.
180. Jennifer Noelle Collins, "Democratizing Formal Politics: Indigenous and Social Movement Political Parties in Ecuador and Bolivia, 1978-2000" (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of California, San Diego, 2006), see 255-262.
181. Antonio Vargas, interview by Lucas, *We Will Not Dance On Our Grandparents' Tombs*, 103.

Indígena representatives and the first Indígena foreign minister, insists that the Indígena

movement must make sure that Indígena representatives do not become bureaucrats. "Although

members of parliament cannot be in the indigenous organisation, they must not lose their link

and coordination with it. On the one hand, they must constantly visit the communities and on the

other they must create mechanisms to express their wishes."[182]

CONAIE and Constitutional Reform

In January 1997, the Ecuadorian Congress removed the president after it became clear he

had lost the support of government elites, the general public, and the army. The congressional

president was installed as interim president, and new general elections were called for 1998. The

interim government announced that a constitutional assembly, elected by popular vote, would be

convened to rewrite the constitution. CONAIE was still hopeful of attaining the changes it had

proposed in 1994, so CONAIE and other SMOs created an alternative assembly. On the first day

of the alternative assembly, protestors challenged the government's overall legitimacy by

demanding the dissolution of the Congress and the resignation of the president. Amidst great

public debate about which assembly had more legitimacy, the two assemblies produced their

proposals: the official assembly reaffirmed that Ecuador was a majority rule democracy with one

nationality—Ecuadorian—and the alternative assembly advocated a plurinational state with

greater grassroots representation. In the end, the official assembly was forced to consider and

include many of the alternative proposals, making the Ecuadorian constitution one of the most

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182. Nina Pacari, interview by Lucas, *We Will Not Dance On Our Grandparents' Tombs*, 109.

progressive in Latin America.[183]

From Social Movement to Political Actor

At the end of 1999, the combination of economic hardship, dollarization, privatization, and flagrant corruption had created an economic and political situation untenable to a broad swath of Ecuador's citizens. The president had lost the support of the public; and, even more significantly, had lost the backing of key members of the military. Thus, in January 2000, CONAIE's leader, Antonio Vargas, in alliance with some elements of the military, called for the total dissolution of the executive, judicial, and legislative branches, including the Pachakutik delegates. CONAIE and the military may seem strange bedfellows, but according to a 1999 newspaper poll, the three most trusted institutions in Ecuador were the Church, the military and CONAIE. Indeed, CONAIE placed well ahead of government, parliament, and long-established political parties.[184]

To increase pressure on the government to step down, CONAIE threatened to paralyze the country with a massive uprising and set up alternative parliaments in the provinces and Quito. The government refused to dissolve itself; and in late January, an uprising ensued. Protestors took over several official buildings and installed a Junta of National Salvation, comprised of a military officer—Colonel Lucio Gutiérrez Borbúa—Vargas, and a former president of the Supreme Court. For a few hours on January 22, it appeared that CONAIE and its allies had successfully taken over the government. The victory was short-lived as, within 24

183. For a detailed discussion of the constitutional assembly, see Andolina, "The Sovereign and its Shadow." Some details were also provided from an interview with a CONAIE leader, Otavalo, February 12, 2001.
184. Andolina, "The Sovereign and its Shadow," 731.

hours, the junta was betrayed by secret negotiations between members of the military and the government. As part of these negotiations, the president was removed and replaced by his vice president. Much to the consternation of the Indígena participants, the vice president then proceeded with the same economic policies that had led to the confrontation.

Although many protestors, particularly from the military, were arrested, the government's backlash was surprisingly mild, perhaps out of fear of international condemnation or that harsh punishments would prompt a full-scale civil war. Indígena activists were concerned that the attempted takeover would tarnish their reputation, both in Ecuador and abroad, but the takeover had minimal effect. The leaders of several Latin American countries, the United States, and the European Union protested the unconstitutional challenge to a democratically elected government. The Venezuelan president and Bolivian Indígena leaders, however, applauded the takeover attempt. The coup also did not frighten off the movement's international allies. On the domestic front, the attempted coup actually strengthened alliances between opposition groups; and Pachakutik did well in the May 2000 national elections, obtaining almost 15 percent of the national vote.

<div align="center">CONAIE Internal Dissension and the 2002 Elections</div>

Perhaps if Vargas and his allies had successfully assumed power, Vargas would have maintained CONAIE's support; but, in the debacle's aftermath, it became known that Vargas had participated in the coup without consulting CONAIE's other leaders.[185] Thus, although some elements of CONAIE supported Vargas during the coup, grassroots members were ultimately

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185. Beck and Mijeski, "The Indigenous Vote in Ecuador's 2002 Presidential Election," 168.

displeased about being involved in a coup for which they had neither been consulted nor had given their consent.

For the 2002 presidential elections, Vargas announced he would run for President with or without CONAIE and Pachakutik's support. The Indígena movement decided against Vargas, and instead supported Colonel Gutiérrez, who had been part of the 2000 coup attempt. Perhaps as revenge for his breakaway activities, voters snubbed Vargas, and he received less than 1 percent of the national vote and even lost in his own province. Against many expectations, the Pachakutik-Gutiérrez alliance won the elections; and in August 2002, Indígena leaders became the ministers of agriculture and foreign affairs.

An Uneasy Alliance

As representatives of an opposition movement that eschewed compromise, the two Indígena ministers were faced with a conundrum: how to fulfill their official duties and advance the Indígena movement's interests. Difficulties began almost immediately. Shortly after the elections, the government passed economic measures unpopular with the Indígena communities, such as fuel gas and bus fare price increases. Although the Indígena cabinet members were able to make some minor changes—such as halting the cooking gas price increase—they had to accept the other measures. These compromises placed the ministers and the movement itself in a delicate situation. On the one hand, the Indígena leaders' "decisions could lose the movement legitimacy and the respect it has gained from years of hard, principled struggle," but their presence "is an historic opportunity to make a change in favor of all of Latin America's poor and

marginalized peoples."[186] Another problem was Gutiérrez himself, who backed away from many of his pre-election promises.

Over the next several months of the alliance, the Indígena movement tried to balance the roles of insider and outsider. CONAIE continued to challenge government policies, and the Indígena cabinet ministers attempted to balance their two roles, a task that became increasingly difficult. For example, the agriculture minister proposed import tariffs that the foreign minister supported, although she knew the tariffs contradicted the government's International Monetary Fund (IMF) agreements. Indeed, the government's ongoing IMF negotiations and CONAIE's opposition to the IMF proposals placed the Indígena Ministers in constant conflict: they either opposed their own administration or CONAIE. The situation was untenable and threatened to fractionalize the Indígena movement. The movement's leaders became aware that the cost of institutional power would be the "taming of the movement" and acceptance of the neoliberal reforms.[187] After less than one year in office, the alliance fell apart and both ministers resigned. As one observer noted, "The decision to withdraw from the government was the only way to avoid the complete dissolution of the movement."[188]

Scholars have analyzed CONAIE/Pachakutik's participation in the government and have attributed the Indígena movement's decisions to strategic error. As one team of scholars stated: the Ecuadorian state apparatus,

by CONAIE's own analysis, is corrupt and controlled by self-serving political elites

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186. Saavedra, "Growing from the Grassroots," *New Internationalist*, no. 356 (May 2003): 28, http://www.newint.org/issue356/growing.htm (accessed April 12, 2008).

187. Leon Zamosc, "The Indian Movement in Ecuador: From Politics of Influence to Politics of Power," in *The Struggle for Indigenous Rights in Latin America*, ed. By Nancy Grey Postero and Leon Zamosc (Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 2004), 152.

188. Zibechi, "Dangerous Liaisons", 3.

whose agenda is antithetical to the interests of the vast majority of the Ecuadorians,

indigenous and non-indigenous alike. In choosing a course of action that tries to transform

the country from within its political institutions, CONAIE and Pachakutik made a

political assessment that Pablo Dávalos, a social scientist who advises the Indian

movement, sees as a miscalculation. Dávalos argues that the indigenous leaders made the

strategic error of believing "that the Pachakutik political movement was by itself

sufficient to confront . . . the political system."[189]

Thus, at the beginning of the new millennium, the Indígena movement found itself trying to

mend the fractures sustained by its experience with national-level institutional politics.

Looking Back-Looking Forward

For many years, the Indígena movement seemed able to recognize certain forms of

"participation" as more harmful than helpful to Indígena interests. "Most activists," as Pallares

noted, "kept a healthy distance" from the various government agencies. Activists instead

"preferred an autonomous political space from which they could negotiate with the state instead

of becoming part of it." But between these two comments, she included a note in which she

observed that, since the 1990s, more indigenous leaders were being incorporated into

government agencies.[190] As the 2002 electoral debacle indicates, the Indígena movement is not

completely immune to the siren song of institutional participation. This raises the question of

whether their much heralded strength and autonomy were the result of an extended moment of

clarity. One can only hope that the Indígena movement's foray into less-than-desirable

189. Beck and Mijeski, "The Indigenous Vote in Ecuador's 2002 Presidential Election," 179-180.
190. Pallares, *From Peasant Struggles to Indian Resistance*. The quotes are from 193; the note is on 246.

participation and the employment of leaders in the government are not the harbingers of worse things to come. Because it works on solving the problem at its core, the movement's more recent focus on constitutional change, however, provides a touch of optimism for their future scenario.

CHAPTER 4

The Political Development of the Indigenous Peoples of Australia

The Flowering…

When the white man took his bloodied boot
From the neck of the buggared black
Did you expect some gratitude
His smile 'Good on you Jack?'
When your psalmist sang
Of a suffering Christ
While you practised genocide
Did you expect his hate would fade
Out of sight with the ebbing tide?
In another time, another age
If fate had reversed the play
And a hard black boot pressed on your white
 throat
When released—what would you say
Friends and pals forever together in a new fair
 dawn
Or meet like you and I shall meet
With flames and with daggers drawn.

—Kevin Gilbert, *Because a White Man'll Never Do It*

Introduction

The case of the Indigenous peoples of Australia traces the political path of an

impoverished and repressed minority and their resistance efforts, first against colonization, and

later against various government social control strategies. Particular attention is paid to the

Indigenous Australian movement's three mobilizations: the politicization of the early 1900s; a

post-World War II surge, partly inspired by widespread anti-Nazi and anti-racism sentiments;

and a "radical" mobilization during the 1960s. This history allows us to follow the movement's development and provides context for the choices made by activists during the 1960s and 1970s, which, combined with the government's tactics, set the stage for the movement's ultimate co-optation and decline.

This chapter also has a secondary purpose. As the current *History Wars* in Australia indicate, many scholars and other observers deem the history of Indigenous Australians to have been grossly misrepresented. By incorporating events, perspectives, and literature overlooked by other analysts, this chapter offers a more well-balanced rendering of Indigenous Australians' political mobilization and their struggle for civil and indigenous rights.

<center>Historical Review: Invasion to Australian Independence</center>

In 1788, British ships, containing 717 convicts and 290 civilians, arrived in waters off of what is today Sydney.[191] On the land were approximately one million Indigenous peoples, grouped into about five hundred to seven hundred tribes. They spoke five hundred different languages from thirty-one language groups and were largely nomadic.[192] While some of the original explorers, such as the Dutch, considered the continent as populated, others viewed it as terra nullius, unoccupied by civilized peoples and therefore available for conquest. Thus, "by the mid-1700s, the rights of indigenous peoples to 'sovereignty' and self-government depended on European assessments of whether their patterns of political and social organization and land use

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191. Richard Broome, *Aboriginal Australians: Black Responses to White Dominance 1788-1994*, 2nd ed. (New South Wales: Allen & Unwin, 1994), 22.
192. *World Directory of Minorities*, 2nd ed. (London: Minority Rights Group International, 1997), 361.

were those of 'civilised' or 'backward' peoples."[193] Over time, the advantages to the settlers,

and the British Crown, of perceiving the Indigenous peoples as uncivilized preceded all other

considerations.[194]

      Until the 1820s, the settlers remained mostly in their colonized areas; nonetheless, initial

relations between the settlers and the Indigenous peoples were fraught with misunderstandings

that quickly turned to ill-will and violence. Historians have attributed the violent outcomes of

interactions partly to the fact that the first settlement was a penal colony, populated by

"embittered convicts" and "second-rate and predatory" civilians.[195] As contact between settlers

and Indigenous peoples increased, the Indigenous peoples were accorded protections that would

be rendered to British subjects.[196] These protections, however, did not diminish the ever-

increasing violence between the two groups.

      During the 1820s and 1830s, international demand for Australian wool grew, and the

European colonizers appropriated land as quickly as they could. As the colonies became more

independent of Britain, the Indigenous peoples lost their small margin of British "protection";

European massacre parties hunted Indigenous persons, and the frontier areas became

battlefields.[197] As colonizers entered new lands, the local tribes resisted their encroachment.

Because resistance was small and localized, many non-Indigenous Australians erroneously

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193. Catherine J. Iorns Magallanes, "International Human Rights and their Impact on Domestic Law on Indigenous Peoples' Rights in Australia, Canada and New Zealand," in *Indigenous Peoples' Rights in Australia, Canada, and New Zealand*, ed. Paul Havemann (Auckland: Oxford University Press, 1999), 236.

194. For a thorough discussion, see Henry Reynolds, *Aboriginal Sovereignty: Reflections on race, state and nation*, (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1996).

195. Richard Broome, *Aboriginal Australians: Black Responses to White Dominance 1788-1994*, 2nd ed. (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1994), 25.

196. Nicolas Peterson and Will Sanders, introduction to *Citizenship and Indigenous Australians: Changing Conceptions and Possibilities*, ed. Nicolas Peterson and Will Sanders (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 4.

197. Ibid, 6.

assumed that the Indigenous peoples did not oppose colonization.[198] Sustained mass resistance

did not occur for several reasons: first, as with other hunter-gatherer societies, food was

customarily not stored, meaning that it could not be amassed to feed large groups for extended

periods. Second, the superior weaponry of the Europeans rendered large engagements futile for

the Indigenous peoples.[199] Third, an Indigenous leader's authority was tied to his specific

traditional lands, which limited the ability of multiple leaders to combine forces and mount

coordinated attacks. Thus, resistance was fought country by country and primarily took the form

of guerilla warfare.[200]

Despite the colonizers' military advantages, Indigenous "resistance was often surprisingly

effective and unexpectedly prolonged."[201] Because of their more advanced weaponry, the

Europeans suffered far fewer deaths; an estimated 1,000-1,500 compared to an estimated 20,000

or more Indigenous deaths.[202] Indigenous resistance may have been more effective if the

population was not also being drastically reduced from exposure to European diseases. Near

Sydney, for example, 50 percent of the Gamaraigal people died in one year from one disease

epidemic.[203] As the European population grew and more and more land was taken from the

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198. Gary Foley, "Teaching Whites a Lesson," in *Staining the Wattle (A People's History of Australia since 1788)*, ed. Verity Burgmann (Victoria: McPhee Gribble Publishers, 1988), 203.
199. Henry Reynolds, *The Other Side of the Frontier: Aboriginal Resistance to the European Invasion of Australia*, 2nd ed. (Victoria: Penguin Books, 1995), 97-100.
200. Heather Goodall, *Invasion to Embassy: Land in Aboriginal Politics in New South Wales, 1770-197*2 (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1996), 14. See also page 30.
201. Reynolds, *Other Side of the Frontier*, 110.
202. Broome, *Aboriginal Australians*, 51. For more on indigenous resistance, see Heather Goodall, "New South Wales," in *Contested Ground: Australian Aborigines under the British Crown*, ed. Ann McGrath (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1995).
203. Broome, *Aboriginal Australians*, 61.

Indigenous peoples, traditional food sources became scarce; and by the 1840s, the destitution

of the Indigenous peoples was obvious.[204]

From the 1850s onwards, more and more Indigenous peoples were moved onto reserves,

missions, and stations, leaving the rest of the land free for European colonization. Grouping the

Indigenous peoples onto settlements and reserves solved numerous problems for the Europeans:

the Indigenous peoples would be easier to control, "protect," and Europeanize. By this time,

settlers had divided the continent into separate colonies, each of which promulgated its own

Aborigine Act to legislate control of the Indigenous population. Despite regional differences, the

Aborigine Acts were all based on the same model, and legally made Indigenous peoples wards of

the state. Indigenous peoples on missions and stations were treated as inmates, and were

subjected to the destruction of their culture and language. Every aspect of their life was

controlled, from diet to clothing. Indigenous peoples not detained on reserves were similarly

controlled.[205]

During the second half of the nineteenth century, a marked division in non-Indigenous

attitudes toward Indigenous peoples emerged. Many saw the Indigenous peoples as subhuman—

a race of "tail-less monkeys"—that was on the losing side of modernity and progress.[206] This

view was convenient "for colonists who claimed that killing Aborigines was no worse than

destroying wild dogs."[207] For these white supremacists, further proof of Indigenous inferiority

was supplied by their dwindling numbers. Due to genocide, disease, and the disruption of their

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204. Reynolds, *Other Side of the Frontier*, 113.
205. For more information on the Aborigine Acts, see Broome*, Aboriginal Australians*.
206. Henry Reynolds, 'Racial Thought in Early Colonial Australia,' *Australian Journal of Politics and History* 20, no. 1 (April 1974): 48.
207. Broome, *Aboriginal Australians*, 91.

traditional subsistence patterns, by the mid-1800s the Indigenous population was only

30,000.[208] Not all Europeans viewed Indigenous peoples as inherently inferior: "The

humanitarians and many Christians believed that the indigenous peoples were fellow children of

God who had unfortunately fallen into paganism and immorality. With the correct help they

could become the equal of Europeans."[209] As a consequence of these dual attitudes, the

Indigenous peoples were subjected to both genocide and restrictive "protectionist" policies.

<div align="center">Early Government Policies: Assimilation and Dispossession</div>

In 1901, the colonies became federated into the Australian Commonwealth.[210] The new

Commonwealth constitution contained only two references to the Indigenous peoples (both

discriminatory), and the individual states retained the power to regulate their Indigenous

populations. While state-to-state differences existed, the overall status and suffering of the

Indigenous peoples across the continent were similar enough that most researchers, including

this author, do not provide state-by-state accounts.

As the Indigenous population rapidly declined, the turn-of-the-century Australian

governments initially assumed that the Indigenous problem would solve itself: the Indigenous

peoples would die out, and those of "mixed descent" would merge with the white population.[211]

Within a few years, however, it became apparent that the earlier assumptions were wrong.

Although the number of "full-blood" Indigenous people was dropping, the number of "mixed

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208. *World Directory of Minorities*, 360. Their population is now estimated to be between 250,000 to 300,000.
209. Broome, *Aboriginal Australians*, 91.
210. Present-day Australia is comprised of states and territories. For the ease of language, this dissertation will not distinguish between states and territories but will refer to all as "the states."
211. John Chesterman and Brian Galligan, *Citizens without Rights: Aborigines and Australian citizenship* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 19. See also Broome, *Aboriginal Australians*, 82.

descent" people was rising. In response, the states felt that assimilation would require regulation, primarily by controlling interactions between the races and "whites," and "mixed bloods," and by removing mixed-blood children from their families.[212] The removal of children was "supposedly to 'train' them as 'apprentices,' but really to lower the birth rate by removing young women from the communities."[213] Children were placed in orphanages and foster homes where they were purposely not taught their tribal language, history, and culture, and were instead trained "to be white."[214] From 1910 through 1970, an estimated 100,000 Indigenous children were removed from their families. These children are today referred to as the Stolen Generation.

By the 1930s, it once again became clear to policy-makers that earlier racial controls were ineffective: the mixed-race population was still increasing. "This fact revived the old white Australian fears for the purity of the white race and focused the attention of policy-makers on the Aborigines of mixed descent." Racial purists spoke openly against any further mixing of the races, and Queensland policy-makers even considered the sterilization of Indigenous women. The racial extremists did not prevail, and during the 1930s federal and state administrators reached a consensus that the mixed bloods must be absorbed into the white race. Throughout Australia, the restrictions of the turn-of-century Aborigine Acts were extended. The new controls regulated the familial, sexual, and marital choices of Indigenous peoples, and the removal of mixed children increased apace. "Claimed as being in the interests of the children," as one

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212. Chesterman and Galligan, *Citizens without Rights*, see 18-21.
213. Heather Goodall, "Cryin' Out for Land Rights," in Burgmann, *Staining the Wattle,* 187.
214. Gatjil Djerrkura, "60 Years On, Another 10 Point Plan," January 26, 1998, http://www.teachingheritage.nsw.edu.au/c_building/wc2_60yearson.html (accessed April 12, 2008).

scholar noted, "this was an attempt to eradicate Aboriginal culture. It was seen by some as a

means of ending the Aboriginal race as such."[215]

The official destruction of Indigenous culture mainly occurred on two fronts: assimilation

and dispossession. Following World War I, many Indigenous communities, which had already

been forced from their traditional lands to reserve lands, were displaced from their reserve lands.

In New South Wales, for example, reserve lands dropped from 26,000 acres in 1910 to 13,000 in

1928.[216] Rather than being given new land to farm and inhabit, most Indigenous people were

moved to ghettos outside of towns and cities. "Aboriginal farmers were dragged off their land by

police, sometimes in mid crop, always under protest." It was from these families—which lost

their last land holdings—that a generation of Indigenous activists arose.[217]

Mobilization for and by the Indigenous Peoples

As the historical review indicates, from 1788 to the 1900s the Indigenous peoples

suffered greatly under non-Indigenous oppression and did not receive any significant assistance.

The Indigenous communities themselves were unable to stop the oppression, and humanitarian

and other groups offered little effective intervention. Beginning with the new century, however,

public interest in the plight of the Indigenous peoples heightened. In 1901, the New South Wales

Aborigine's Mission, whose slogan was "Christ for the Aborigines, and the Aborigines for

Christ," began publishing a sympathetic newspaper that relayed indigenous claims. Concomitant

with this interest was the development of assistance organizations. Humanitarian and religious

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215. Broome, *Aboriginal Australians*. First quote from 160, second quote from 162.
216. Goodall, "Cryin' Out for Land Rights," 188.
217. Ibid., 188.

groups—such as the Association for the Protection of Native Races, the Anglican Australian Board of Missions, and the National Missionary Council—began lobbying the state and Commonwealth governments to improve the situation of Indigenous peoples.

Throughout the 1920s and 1930s, new sources of non-Indigenous support and assistance continued to emerge. In 1920, the Communist Party of Australia (CPA) was formed, and although it never became the ruling party, was one of the most vocal promoters of indigenous rights for several decades. [218] During the late 1920s, a popular novel was published that depicted how pastoral stations exploited the Indigenous workers. In the 1930s, anthropologists began to view and portray Indigenous culture in a positive light, which challenged common derogatory perceptions. The media began to take interest, and concern by some elements of the general public rose after reports of injustice were published in London and Australia. In response to reports of abuse, several state governments commissioned inquiries. These inquiries verified the deplorable situation of the Indigenous peoples, but stimulated no significant government remedies. [219]

In the early 1920s, the first Indigenous organization, the Australian Aboriginal Progressive Association (AAPA), was created in New South Wales. Many of its members were from families that had lost land; and its leader, Fred Maynard, had been a union member during World War I. [220] Maynard and other AAPA leaders were inspired by the Coloured Progressive Association, which operated in Sydney from 1903-1908 and whose members consisted mostly of

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218. For a thorough discussion, see Bob Boughton, "The Communist Party of Australia's Involvement in the Struggle for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Peoples' Rights 1920-1970," in *Labour and Community: Historical Essays*, ed. R. Markey (Wollongong: University of Wollongong Press, 2001).
219. Broome, *Aboriginal Australians*, 165.
220. Goodall, *Invasion to Embassy*, 19.

African American, West Indian, and South African seamen; and by Marcus Garvey and the

Universal Negro Improvement Association (UNIA). Although direct links between the UNIA

and AAPA's leaders have not been established, AAPA's leaders had "studied and analyzed

Garvey's writing. They had shaped and re-modelled this material to their own immediate needs,

demands and political agenda." Although the AAPA received assistance from at least two non-

Indigenous people, a newsman who printed their letters and a woman who promoted their cause,

the AAPA was an Indigenous creation.[221]

        The issues of utmost importance to the AAPA were land ownership, self-determination,

and the removal of children from their families. According to the historian John Maynard, Fred

Maynard's grandson, "Fred Maynard and the other Aboriginal leaders of the AAPA were quick

to realize that the ideological, institutionalized framework set in place by governments and their

agencies was an orchestrated sinister mechanism which held horrific implications for Aboriginal

Australia. The whole process was about the complete disintegration of Aboriginal culture and its

total absorption."[222] The AAPA attempted unsuccessfully to persuade both the state agency

responsible for "controlling" Indigenous peoples as well as missionaries that Indigenous peoples

were capable of running their own affairs and should have their own land. Goodall noted,

however, that meetings between Indigenous Australians and missionaries did "not appear to have

shaken the fundamental assumptions the missionaries held about Aborigines."[223]

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221. John Maynard, "Vision, Voice and Influence: The Rise of the Australian Aboriginal Progressive Association," *Australian Historical Studies*, no. 121 (April 2003): 104. For more information on the linkages between early Indigenous Australian mobilization and the UNIA, see also John Maynard, "For Liberty and Freedom: Fred Maynard and the Australian Aboriginal Progressive Association," seminar paper for the History Council of New South Wales, November 18, 2004; and John Maynard, 2005, "'Be the change that you want to see': The awakening of cultural nationalism—Gandhi, Garvey and the AAPA," *Borderlands* 4, no. 3, http://www.borderlands.net.au/vol4no3_2005/maynard_aapa.htm (accessed April 12, 2008).
222. Maynard, "For Liberty and Freedom," 15-16.
223. Goodall, *Invasion to Embassy*, 167-8.

The AAPA was enthusiastically received by Indigenous communities and news of it "spread like a brush fire through Aboriginal communities."[224] Maynard was known as a powerful orator and his protestations against the maltreatment of Indigenous Australians were imbued with appeals to morality and justice. By 1925, the AAPA had eleven branches with over 500 members, and by 1926 had established links between the north and south coasts.[225] In 1927, however, the AAPA disbanded. Scholars are unsure as to why the AAPA folded: Goodall claimed that no explanation has been found, and Maynard put forth several, including factionalism, but noted that one of his sources remembered that the AAPA "had been hounded out of existence by the police."[226]

In the 1930s, the CPA was still one of the most active supporters of the Indigenous cause; and in 1931, promulgated an influential policy statement. The statement included "a call for the abolition of all forms of forced labour; equal wages; abolition of the Aboriginal Protection Boards—'capitalism's slave recruiting agencies and terror organizations'; release of all Aboriginal prisoners and empanelment of Aboriginal juries to hear cases involving Aborigines; the restoration of Central, Northern, and N-W Australia to form independent Aboriginal republics; and the development of Aboriginal culture."[227] Thus, in opposition to government policies to eradicate Indigenous culture by dissolving it into white society, the CPA promoted Indigenous autonomy. During the early 1930s, the CPA helped organize several protests and strikes on behalf of Indigenous peoples. In 1935, a number of Indigenous activists joined the

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224. Maynard, "Fred Maynard and the Australian Aboriginal Progressive Association (AAPA)," 6.
225. Maynard, "Vision, Voice and Influence," 94.
226. Goodall, *Invasion to Embassy*; and Maynard, "For Liberty and Freedom," 4.
227. Boughton, "The Communist Party of Australia's Involvement in the Struggle for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Peoples' Rights 1920-1970," 4.

CPA and became the forefront of CPA Indigenous activism. These Indigenous communists

joined existing Indigenous organizations and also helped create new ones.

In 1932, the mostly Indigenous Australian Aboriginal League (AAL) was created in

Melbourne by an Indigenous man whose personal activism started in 1887 when he petitioned

the state government for land. The AAL's first members were "exiles" from government-

appropriated reserves—people who had fought bitterly to keep their land in the 1920s.[228] The

AAL had links to other organizations, including humanitarian and peace groups, and the CPA.

The only non-Indigenous member of the AAL formed a non-Indigenous support group, the

Aborigines' Uplift Society. Whereas the AAPA had focused on local issues, the AAL, from the

beginning, set its sights on the national level. The first campaign was a petition to England's

King George V requesting assistance and federal parliamentary representation for Indigenous

Australians. The AAPA gathered 1,800-2,000 signatures for the petition, despite the prime

minister's refusal to allow signatures to be collected from the Northern Territory "on the grounds

that Aborigines there were neither able to understand or sign such a document."[229] The petition

was submitted to the Commonwealth government in 1937 with the request that it be forwarded to

the king. The Commonwealth government refused on the grounds that the petition was futile; the

Commonwealth had no authority to grant Indigenous parliamentary representation.

Despite the marked 1930s increase in pro-Indigenous organizations and activities, the

Commonwealth and state governments remained disinterested in helping Indigenous peoples.

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228. Goodall, "Cryin' Out for Land Rights," 187.
229. VAAL, *Victims or Victors? The Story of the Victorian Aborigines Advancement League* (Melbourne: Hyland House, 1985), 32.

Several political parties had held commonwealth power from 1901 onwards, and none seemed

particularly concerned about the welfare of Indigenous Australians. Indeed,

> the political parties remained unaffected, seeing no need for thoroughgoing policies on
>
> Aboriginal affairs. . . . There seemed to be no electoral advantage in pushing for
>
> Aboriginal betterment. On the other hand, the interests regarded as central to the economy
>
> were accorded full recognition and support, so that employers holding out against
>
> Aboriginal wage demands were usually supported by governments, to the extent that
>
> organizers of protests were likely to be harshly treated by the authorities. . . . Even when a
>
> few politicians indicated some interest in the plight of Aborigines, their attitude could best
>
> be described as benign neglect.[230]

In 1938, however, several Indigenous organizations staged a protest that attracted sufficient

media attention to compel a government response.

During the 1938 celebrations for Australia's sesquicentenary, about one hundred

Indigenous men, women, and children from various organizations held a conference and issued a

"call for citizen's rights." They labeled the anniversary a "Day of Mourning and Protest." The

event was documented by the media, and under intense public pressure the prime minister agreed

to hear the protestors' demands. At the promised meeting with government officials, the activists

presented a 10-point plan for change, which had been drafted with the CPA's help.[231] Many of

the 10-point plan's proposals were for shifting responsibility for Indigenous policy making from

the individual states to the Commonwealth. Because of Australia's federal structure, each state

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230 Bennett, *Aborigines and Political Power* (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1989), 6.
231. Boughton, "The Communist Party of Australia's Involvement in the Struggle for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Peoples' Rights 1920-1970."

set its own policies; and activist efforts achieved, at best, piecemeal results. One state might change a discriminatory law, while a similar law remained valid in other states. Another key proposal was for the creation of a grassroots Indigenous Australian advisory board.[232] Although the actual protest itself was innovative, the 10-point plan's proposals were fairly moderate. They were the result of contentious behind-the-scenes disagreements.

Prior to the meeting with the prime minister, Indigenous leaders had been divided over their goals. Some wanted to request an Indigenous member of parliament and immediate equality. One important leader, however, "reflected white opinion" by stating that "The people cannot be thrown out of the reserves and expected to live like white men, when they have not had a white standard of education. . . . there must be some stepping stone from the jungle."[233] As one scholar notes, "The Aboriginal political leaders of the 1930s based their demands for human rights not on any concept of Aboriginality, but on an ideal of civilization." Thus, they believed that Indigenous "entitlement to full citizenship rights . . . followed inexorably from their status as a civilised people."[234]

Government Response to the Indigenous Peoples' New Tactics

The United Australian Party (a descendent organization of the Nationalist Party) was the ruling party and responded to the Indigenous proposals with the announcement of a "New Deal", which was effectively assimilation redux. Policy makers had given up on biological assimilation

232. Djerrkura, "60 Years On, Another 10 Point Plan," 2; see also Geoffrey G. Gray, "A Special Class of Citizen," paper presented at the Inaugural Conference of the Australian Key Centre for Cultural and Media Policy, 1996, 2; and Jack Horner and Marcia Langton, "The Day of Mourning," in *Australians 1938*, ed. Bill Gammage and Peter Spearritt (New South Wales: Fairfax, Syme and Weldon Associates), 29-35.
233. Horner and Langton, "The Day of Mourning," first quote from 32, second quote, by Jack Patten, from 31.
234. Russell McGregor, "Protest and Progress: Aboriginal Activism in the 1930s," *Australian Historical Studies*, no. 101 (1993), 568.

and now turned their efforts to cultural assimilation. According to one of the plan's architects, the New Deal would convert Indigenous peoples "from their traditional nomadic inclinations to a settled life. . . . [I]n any settled life there must be laws and property rights and penalties for those who break them. They should be shown that there are rewards for those who, by training, adapt themselves to a settled life."[235] In other words, Indigenous peoples would reap the benefits of white society if they adopted white ways. This message was imposed on Indigenous peoples from many fronts—the government as well as sympathetic non-Indigenous activist groups. Non-Indigenous feminist groups, for example, that had abhorred biological assimilation nonetheless advocated policies tantamount to cultural assimilation.[236]

Cultural assimilation became the policy throughout Australia for solving the "Aborigine problem." In 1944, for example, the state of Western Australia offered suffrage to Indigenous peoples if they severed all tribal ties, renounced their Indigenous identity, and spoke English.[237] Considering that it would take two more decades before unconditional suffrage was awarded to all Indigenous peoples, the 1944 offer was deemed progressive. By 1951, all the states had adopted an official assimilation policy. To enforce the policy, welfare officers would visit Indigenous homes and check whether families were living with Indigenous or European standards. "All these pressures upon Aboriginal families were more than a mere request for social conformity. In effect they represented an ultimatum: meet the ideal standards and be examined at any time, or your children will be taken away and made wards of the state."[238]

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235. Gray, "A Special Class of Citizen," 2.
236. Fiona Paisley, *Loving Protection? Australian Feminism and Aboriginal Women's Rights, 1919-1939* (Victoria: Melbourne University Press, 2000).
237. Gray, "A Special Class of Citizen," 3.
238. Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody National Report, Vol. 2. Reconciliation and Social Justice Library, Section 20.3.7.

Post-World War II Activism

The experience of World War II influenced the perspectives of both Indigenous and non-Indigenous activists. First, Indigenous people who had served in the army or in civilian positions were unwilling to accept a continuation of prewar inequalities.[239] Second, European refugees who fled to Australia brought a dim view of racial hygiene theories and practices.[240] A third postwar change, although not necessarily war-related, was the migration of many Indigenous persons to urban areas. As there was less control in the cities and more "opportunities for personal advancement . . . , a small Aboriginal elite began to emerge."[241] The combination of these different factors contributed to a postwar return to Indigenous activism. This resurgence thrived despite the lack of a strong political ally in the ruling party, which from 1949 until 1972 was the economically and socially conservative Liberal Party.

One of the most influential organizations of the postwar period was the Victoria Aborigines Advancement League (VAAL), which was formed in 1957 by non-Indigenous and Indigenous activists protesting against the government's displacement of an Indigenous group for a rocket range.[242] The VAAL was "a broad-based umbrella organization," and its "initial objectives were to achieve citizenship rights for Aborigines throughout the Commonwealth, to work towards the integration of Aboriginal people with the rest of the community while fully recognizing the unique contribution they were able to make, to attempt to co-ordinate the

239. Michael Howard, "Introduction" in *Aboriginal Power in Australian Society*, ed. Michael Howard (Queensland: University of Queensland Press, 1982), 6.
240. Goodall, *Invasion to Embassy*, 275.
241. Howard, "Introduction," 7.
242. As with the Indígenas of Ecuador case, a survey of all Indigenous Australian rights organizations would be beyond the scope of this dissertation. Rather, this dissertation will profile the organizations that carried the most influence at a national level and are cited most often in scholarship.

different Aboriginal welfare organizations operating in Victoria, and to establish a general

policy of advancement for Aboriginal people." Despite its activist stance, the VAAL's goals

mirrored the government's assimilation policy and were "devised and worded by a management

committee and membership dominated by whites."[243] In 1962, the AAL became the Indigenous

branch of the VAAL. Initially the AAL's activities were similar to those of other VAAL

branches, but within a few years the AAL began focusing on political goals rather than VAAL's

welfare goals.

The most influential organization of this era, the Federal Council for Advancement of

Aborigines and Torres Strait Islanders (FCAATSI), was created in 1958 by a coalition of nine

organizations, including three Indigenous organizations. The core organizations included the

CPA, "churches, trade unions, student bodies, Labor councils, and various committees and

councils for Aboriginal rights." The coalition's goals included creating a national level

organization and, in a continuation of the Day of Mourning proposals, attaining a constitutional

amendment endowing the Commonwealth government with legislative power for its Indigenous

citizens. FCAATSI also sought Commonwealth "legislation along the lines of rehabilitation

schemes to be enacted to assist the integration of the Aboriginal people."[244] While FCAATSI

activists worked towards other goals, such as equal wages, civil rights, and later land rights,

much of the organization's energy was dedicated to attaining a constitutional amendment.

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243. VAAL, *"Victims or Victors?"* both quotes from page 53.
244. Faith Bandler, *Turning the Tide: A Personal history of the Federal Council for the Advancement of Aborigines and Torres Strait Islanders* (Canberra: Aboriginal Studies Press, 1989). First quote from page 72, second quote from page 13.

The 1967 Referendum Campaign

The 1901 Constitution had left the states with responsibility for legislating policy for

their Indigenous populations, meaning that regulations and policies differed from state to state.

Many activists became convinced that significant social change could only occur if

Commonwealth policy superseded state laws. The campaign for a constitutional referendum

began in earnest in the mid-1950s when an Indigenous-communist group collected ten thousand

signatures for a petition.[245] Shortly after FCAATSI's inception, FCAATSI took over leadership

for the campaign, and a referendum was eventually set for 1967.

The referendum campaign borrowed heavily from the tactics employed by the U.S. civil

rights movement. In 1965, thirty university students, including two Indigenous students, traveled

by bus throughout Australia to draw attention to the discriminatory practices suffered by

Indigenous peoples. This "Freedom Ride" gained widespread media and public attention, and

many non-Indigenous Australians were supposedly shocked to discover that discrimination—

including segregated facilities—was not just a U.S. phenomenon.

To ensure an overwhelming yes vote for the referendum, both FCAATSI and

proreferendum members of the Commonwealth government overemphasized the benefits of a

referendum.[246] In May 1967, 90.77 percent of Australians voted yes for the referendum. Many

non-Indigenous and Indigenous Australians were under the mistaken impression that the

referendum would institute sweeping changes, but the referendum made only two changes. First,

it gave the Commonwealth government the power to pass legislation for all Indigenous

245. See Boughton, "The Communist Party of Australia's Involvement in the Struggle for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Peoples' Rights 1920-1970."
246. John Gardiner-Garden, "The Origin of Commonwealth Involvement in Indigenous Affairs and the 1967 Referendum," *Department of Parliament Library*, Background Paper 11 (1996-7): 12.

Australians; and second, it stipulated that Indigenous Australians must be counted in the Commonwealth-wide census. Contrary to expectations, the referendum did not specify that the Commonwealth government *must* make legislation and policy changes.

In the first five years after the referendum, the Commonwealth neither pushed states to dismantle their discriminatory regimes nor promoted new pro-civil rights policies. Indeed, the Commonwealth's only initiative was to establish the Council for Aboriginal Affairs (CAA), an advisory body staffed by three non-Indigenous men. If the Commonwealth was not interested in promoting civil rights, why then did it support the referendum? Several scholars have argued that the Commonwealth sought to protect Australia's reputation and quell growing international concern and interest in the status of Australia's Indigenous peoples.[247]

1960s Focus: Land Rights and Indigenous Rights

In the 1920s, the AAPA unsuccessfully tried to obtain land rights and self-determination. These goals were moderated in the 1930s, when activists accorded more energy to citizenship and civil rights. In the 1960s, however, land rights and later indigenous rights/self-determination once again became primary concerns. Two events, in particular, brought land rights to the fore.

In 1963, the Yolunga people submitted a bark petition to the government that protested mining on their traditional lands. A parliamentary inquiry was convened and recommended, for the first time in Australian history, that an Indigenous community be compensated for the use of

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247. Chesterman and Galligan, *Citizens without Rights*; Bain Attwood and Andrew Markus, "(The) 1967 (Referendum) and All That: Narrative and Myth, Aborigines and Australia," *Australian Historical Studies* 29, no. 11 (1998): 267-88.

their land. It is noteworthy, however, that the government did not cancel the mining

company's lease.

A second significant protest occurred in 1966 when the Gurindji people, with union and

FCAATSI support, struck against unequal wages at a cattle station. About 200 people walked off

the station and set up a strike camp. Negotiations were unproductive, and in March 1967, the

Gurindji packed up their camp and moved to their traditional lands. They petitioned the

governor-general to return about 500 square miles of their land and stayed on the land after their

request was rejected. According to one scholar, the Gurindji standoff "made a qualitative shift in

the struggle of the indigenous movement nationally, forcing the national debate about indigenous

peoples' rights beyond civil and political, i.e., citizenship rights, to issues of land rights and self-

determination. This was not, of course, a new demand. . . . But now this demand finally found

expression within mainstream national politics."[248]

Indigenous rights, as defined by one Indigenous leader, are "the collective rights that are

owed to us as distinct peoples and as the original occupiers of this land" and citizenship rights

encompass the "right to be treated the same as other Australians, to receive the same benefits, to

be provided with the same level of services."[249] The new emphasis on indigenous as opposed to

civil rights arose from the recognition that land rights, autonomy, sovereignty, and a separate,

nonwhite identity would not be guaranteed with civil rights. This awareness may have partly

come from disappointment over the Commonwealth government's passivity following the 1967

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248. Boughton, "The Communist Party of Australia's Involvement in the Struggle for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Peoples' Rights 1920-1970," 12-13.
249. Lois O'Donoghue, ATSIC chairperson, quoted in Chesterman and Galligan, *Citizens without Rights*, 193.

constitutional referendum and partly from insights garnered from the rights campaigns

occurring in the United States.

Indigenous activists were influenced by three U.S. movement models: the civil rights

movement under Martin Luther King Jr., the Black Power movement, and the Native American

movement. Toward the end of the 1960s, the latter two movements became more attractive to the

younger generation of Indigenous activists. As the original inhabitants of the continent, the

Indigenous Australians saw parallels to the Native American emphasis on separate rights. The

Native Americans strove not just for equality but also for

> self-government and a separate Indigenous identity. In the United States, Civil Rights and
>
> Indigenous Rights were two separate struggles. It seemed . . . that in Australia, where
>
> indigenous rights had been identified at all, the two issues were intertwined as if they
>
> were one. But they were not one but two: Civil Rights ran towards a homogenous,
>
> assimilated Australia. Indigenous rights ran away from it. . . . [T]he Civil Rights
>
> programme, embodied in organizations such as FCAATSI, might actually be stifling the
>
> growth of an Indigenous identity. Civil Rights did not need Aboriginal leadership.
>
> Indigenous rights, by definition, did.[250]

As this distinction became clear, the 1960s generation of Indigenous Australian activists moved

away from the U.S. civil rights model and, although influenced by the Native American

campaign, found the greatest resonance with the U.S. Black Power movement, whose goals were

"synonymous with Aboriginal self-determination."[251]

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250. Peter Read, "Cheeky, Insolent and Anti-white: The Split in the Federal Council for the Advancement of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders—Easter 1970," *Australian Journal of Politics and History* 36, no. 1 (1990): 76. Capitalizations and spelling appear as in the original.
251. VAAL, "*Victims or Victors?*" 90.

Black Power Ascends

The referendum campaign had raised expectations that the problems facing Indigenous

Australians would finally be addressed. The Commonwealth's subsequent passivity was a bitter

disappointment. For the younger activists, the failure of the referendum revealed the failure of

the conciliatory path taken by the older generation of activists.[252] Concomitant with the younger

generation's desire for a new direction, Black Power materials became available. Gary Foley, a

1960s Black Power activist and now a historian, traces the emergence of a Black Power

movement in Australia to Sydney in 1968. In the 1960s many Indigenous Australians moved to

urban areas, and a welfare/social center in Sydney became a congregation point for activists. "It

was at the social functions that most of the later Black Power movement met each other and

began to discuss the events of the day."[253]

In an ironic twist, the U.S. Department of Defense was indirectly responsible for

supplying some of the Black Power literature. African American troops on leave in Sydney

provided information on political developments in the United States and Black Power materials.

As one 1960s activist rendered the attractiveness of Black Power to the younger generation:

> They've probably heard the president of the Aboriginal Advancement Association back
>
> on the reserve trying to make himself and his listeners believe that, "If we just wait a bit
>
> longer, the whites *will* help us, things *will* get better.". . . So they come to the city and
>
> some black shows them what Malcolm X, an American black, said: "So don't you run

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252. Gary Foley, "Black Power in Redfern 1968-1972," 7, Essay from the Koori History website, 2001, http://www.kooriweb.org (accessed April 12, 2008).
253. Ibid, 6.

around trying to make friends with somebody who's depriving you of your rights.

They're not your friends, no, they're your enemies. Treat them like that and fight them,

and you'll get freedom; and after you get your freedom, your enemy will respect you."

They read it and it figures, it makes sense.[254]

Cross-continent exchanges among Black Power activists quickly extended beyond literature. In 1969, the VAAL invited a Caribbean academic, activist, and proponent of Black Power, Dr. Roosevelt Brown, to speak in Melbourne.[255] And in 1970, a delegation of Indigenous Australian activists spent several months with Black Power groups in the United States.[256]

One interviewee who was a core Black Power activist attributed Black Power's ascendancy to its innovative tactics and strategies and to the younger generation's familiarity with the mass media.[257] The Black Power activists had grown up with mass media and knew how to attract and use media attention. Moreover, the Black Power activists and their new tactics were able to quickly achieve results. For example, Black Power activists set up the New South Wales Legal Services so that Indigenous peoples could challenge "trumped up" police charges against them in court. The "old guard" activists had, in contrast, countered such charges with complaints to the commissioner, which had rarely achieved results. During this time period, activists, inspired by the new autonomy message, created new niche organizations, such as "elected councils, community housing associations, legal services and so on."[258]

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254. Kevin Gilbert, *Because a White Man'll Never Do It*, (Sydney: Angus and Robertson, 1994), 103.
255. Foley, "Black Power in Redfern 1968-1972," 2.
256. Goodall, *Invasion to Embassy*, 335.
257. Interview with Black Power activist, January 31, 2005.
258. Bennett, *Aborigines and Political Power*, 14.

With new tactics and goals, the Indigenous Australian movement entered the 1970s with unprecedented enthusiasm and power. In 1971, protestors expressed their condemnation of apartheid by harassing the visiting South African rugby team. In late 1971, the new generation of radical activists "began seriously linking up with like minded groups," which led to coordinated demonstrations in various cities.[259] By early 1972, the Commonwealth government faced continent-wide demonstrations and negative domestic and international publicity. In January 1972, Prime Minister William McMahon made a "major" policy statement and offered a few feeble concessions to Indigenous demands. The speech had an incendiary, rather than dampening, effect on protests. Shortly thereafter, a small group of activists drove from Sydney to Canberra, and during the night set up a camp—consisting of a beach umbrella and plastic sheeting—on the lawn of the Parliament house and proclaimed the site as the "Aboriginal Embassy."[260]

The Embassy protestors "declared that Prime Minister McMahon's statement the day before had effectively relegated Indigenous people to the status of 'aliens in our own land,' thus as aliens 'we would have an embassy of our own.'"[261] On the Parliament lawn, the protestors displayed placards that said: "LAND RIGHTS NOW OR ELSE"; "LEGALLY THIS LAND IS OUR LAND. WE SHALL TAKE IT IF NEED BE"; and "LAND NOW NOT LEASE TOMORROW."[262] The Embassy was a spontaneous idea, but nevertheless a brilliant maneuver that captured the attention of Indigenous and non-Indigenous Australians as well as the domestic and international media. The Embassy quickly came to symbolize both the land rights struggle

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259. Foley, "Black Power in Redfern 1968-1972," 13.
260. Goodall, *Invasion to Embassy*, 339.
261. Foley, "Black Power in Redfern 1968-1972," 14.
262. Goodall, *Invasion to Embassy*, 339.

and the quest for self-determination and sovereignty. Complaints about the shoddy appearance of the Embassy prompted the activist response that it approximated living conditions on government settlements; thus the Embassy also became a symbol for the low living standards that government control had forced on many Indigenous Australians.[263]

The Embassy was such a focal point that even Gough Whitlam, the leader of the opposition Labor Party, visited the Embassy and promised that, if elected, he would reverse discriminatory policies.[264] The McMahon government tried several times to remove the Embassy; and with each removal attempt, more activists arrived to support the Embassy's presence. By July 1972, the embassy had attracted thousands of supporters and worldwide media attention.

Despite their many activities, the Black Power activists never created a formal organization. As observed by the interviewee who was a Black Power activist, the activists never felt the need for an organization, because of the ease with which they could capture media attention. "For a moment in time we felt we had real political power," and therefore did not need a structure.[265] However, the more radical elements of the movement, including Black Power and other activists, did try to radicalize existing organizations as well as supplant non-Indigenous leadership and influence.

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263. Foley, "Black Power in Redfern 1968-1972," 15.
264. In 1912 the Australian Labour Party switched the spelling of Labour to the American spelling of Labor.
265. Interview with Black Power activist, January 31, 2005.

Intramovement Upheaval

After it became apparent that the 1967 Referendum was not going to impel the

government to take action, "the younger activists felt a strong sense of betrayal and cynicism at

the more non-confrontational methods and tactics of the older generation."[266] In retrospect, the

Black Power activist interviewee did not believe that many of the older Indigenous generation

were into assimilation, but operated under restrictive times. "I almost cringe now when I think

about some of the awful things we said to some people—Uncle Toms. I think we broke more

than one of their —— hearts; we were pretty harsh."[267]

The generational rift had serious implications for the movement's organizations as power

struggles surfaced between the younger generation and the "old guard" generation, and between

the younger Indigenous activists and the non-Indigenous activists. One of the most contentious

of these battles occurred at FCAATSI's 1970 General Meeting. FCAATSI had been dominated

by non-Indigenous Australians who strove for civil rights—statutory legal, economic, and social

equality—hence, their enthusiasm and belief in the 1967 Referendum.[268] Starting in 1967,

Indigenous members began moves to assume FCAATSI's leadership and shift the agenda toward

indigenous rights. Tensions between the Indigenous and non-Indigenous members reached a

head at the 1970 meeting, which one scholar describes as chaotic and fraught with bitter

emotions. The non-Indigenous members felt unfairly treated, and the younger Indigenous

members expressed puzzlement that "non-Aborigines still persisted in believing they knew what

was best for Blacks."[269] A group split off from FCAATSI and created the National Tribal

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266. Foley, "Black Power in Redfern 1968-1972," 7.
267. Interview with Black Power activist, January 31, 2005.
268. For a vivid description of tensions within and over FCAATSI, see Read, "Cheeky, Insolent and Anti-white."
269. Ibid, 79.

Council, an organization that never received financial or grassroots support and was moribund within a few years.[270] "While FCAATSI continued to function to co-ordinate union and other organizational support, its role as a unifying vehicle for Aboriginal demands was past."[271] In 1977, FCAATSI was finally disbanded.

The VAAL also became polarized between radicals and conservatives, particularly after Dr. Roosevelt Brown's visit.[272] Such power struggles and their destructive aftermaths were not confined to FCAATSI and VAAL—they occurred in organizations across the continent. As one scholar noted "By 1976 all the seventy organizations which had flourished a decade earlier for the benefit of Aborigines were either in Aboriginal hands or defunct."[273] The immediate effect of the takeovers was mixed. The new Indigenous-dominated VAAL lost financial as well as volunteer support and offices were closed. Despite these setbacks, however, the Indigenous-led VAAL achieved, according to a history of the organization, a "new validity and vigor."[274]

In sum, at the beginning of the 1970s the Indigenous movement was led primarily by Black Power activists. Although they did not form an organization, they inspired the creation of many smaller niche organizations as well as the Indigenous takeover and radicalization of older established organizations. They changed the timbre of protest; rather than working within the system, they brought people onto the streets. McMahon's clumsy handling of the demonstrations and Indigenous demands helped pave the way for his demise. In 1972, McMahon was voted out, and Whitlam and the Labor Party gained power.

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270. VAAL, "*Victims or Victors?*" 96. The Black Power interviewee also attributed the National Tribal Council's failure to its "old-guard" contingent. Interview on January 31, 2005.
271. Goodall, *Invasion to Embassy*, 330.
272. VAAL, "*Victims or Victors?*" 93-4.
273. Read, "Cheeky, Insolent and Anti-white," 80.
274. VAAL, "*Victims or Victors?*" 97.

Labor Party Initiatives

Whitlam immediately made several concessions to the Indigenous movement, including removing some discriminatory laws, such as international travel restrictions, dropping charges against the Aboriginal Embassy demonstrators, and halting Northern Territory uranium mining. To handle Indigenous issues, he replaced the CAA with the Department of Aboriginal Affairs (DAA) and created the National Aboriginal Consultative Committee (NACC) as an advisory body comprised of representatives elected by the Indigenous peoples. Whitlam also hired Indigenous people into the public service and, to manage land claims, established the Aboriginal Land Rights Commission. The most lasting of the Aboriginal Land Rights Commission's recommendations was the creation of land councils, statutory bodies tasked with promoting and representing Indigenous land claims. Under Whitlam, the DAA budget for Indigenous issues— for example, education, the arts, legal assistance, community development—increased substantially. In 1971-1972, the Commonwealth expended 23 million Australian dollars on Indigenous affairs, and by 1975-1976 this figure had reached 141 million Australian dollars.[275]

Despite his reformist intentions, Whitlam made several grave errors that set Commonwealth-Indigenous Australian cooperation off to a contentious start. The most egregious errors were Whitlam's choices for DAA minister. The first minister was a former member of FCAATSI who had opposed the Indigenous takeover attempt in 1970. His constituents were the new generation of activists he had opposed, and the two sides were unable to meet on common

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275. Broome, *Aboriginal Australians*, 181.

ground. Whitlam replaced him, but the second minister proved as inept as the first and later

acknowledged that under his management the DAA had been a disaster.

The Whitlam government lost the 1975 elections, before the Aboriginal Land Rights

Commission's proposals could be transformed into legislation. In 1976, the new government,

under the conservative Liberal Party, presented the 1976 Aboriginal Land Rights Act, a watered-

down version of the original proposals, and drastically reduced the budget for the DAA. This

setback to the Indigenous movement was one of many that occurred under the Liberal

government.

In sum, both Whitlam's Labor government and the successor conservative Liberal

government were, in their own ways, poisonous for grassroots mobilization. Whitlam created

and funded government initiatives, ostensibly to help Australia's Indigenous citizens, but shied

away from empowering Indigenous peoples with control over their affairs. The Liberal

government then repealed what it could of Whitlam's initiatives, which kept activists busy trying

to defend the few gains made under Whitlam.

The Struggle over the NACC and NAC

Even before the NACC officially began operations, its role and status were contested.

Senator Bonner, the only Indigenous Australian senator, warned that the NACC would be a form

of "apartheid": "There's a need for consultation on aboriginal affairs, as in all other areas. . . .

But where you have an electorate with only aborigines in it, this takes them out of the political

arena. They'd have less power than now because they'd tend to relate only to aboriginal affairs

instead of being part of the whole community."[276] In Bonner's view, Indigenous Australians

held "mistaken ideas" about the NACC's powers. Bonner also suspected that the government had

established the NACC to divert Indigenous Australians from seeking to place Indigenous

representatives in the Australian parliament.[277] In response, Stewart Murray, an Indigenous

leader with the Aborigines Advancement League, said that Senator Bonner was "quite wrong"

that the NACC would be apartheid and stated that Indigenous Australians need the NACC as a

forum for making their own decisions.[278] Murray, it seems, believed the NACC would

eventually have powers beyond its initial advisory role, a notion that prevailed in the media and

among Indigenous Australians. As several newspaper reports indicate, many Indigenous

Australians believed and hoped that the NACC would become an independent body, or would be

a step towards a "black parliament."[279]

   Unfortunately for the Indigenous peoples, Bonner's pessimism was more accurate than

Murray's optimism. Immediately upon its implementation in late 1973, the activists hired and

elected to staff the NACC encountered credibility problems with both the government and the

Indigenous peoples they were supposedly representing. The NACC was "handicapped from the

beginning by its lack of a clear charter and constitution, its members' problem of acceptance in

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276. "Aboriginal body called apartheid," *Sunday Mail*, July 15, 1973,
http://kooriweb.org/foley/images/history/news/nacc/nacca2.html (accessed April 13, 2008).
277. Ibid.
278. "Apartheid? Never, says Aboriginal," The Sun, July 17, 1973,
http://kooriweb.org/foley/images/history/news/nacc/nacca3.html (accessed April 13, 2008).
279. See "A parliament for blacks," *The Age*, September 12, 1973,
http://kooriweb.org/foley/images/history/news/nacc/nacc1.html; "Aboriginals to elect own national body," *Canberra Times*, October 5, 1973, http://kooriweb.org/foley/images/history/news/nacc/nacca4.html; and "Aboriginal governing council is planned," *The Sun*, May 16, 1973,
http://kooriweb.org/foley/images/history/news/nacc/nacca1.html (all accessed April 13, 2008).

hastily-drawn-up electorates, and by language problems, distance and communication."[280]

Moreover, already existing state-level advisory boards resisted being superseded by a distant

Canberra-based group. A report indicated that "few Aborigines had even heard of the NACC,

and those who knew of it felt themselves poorly represented, or objected to the idea of being

represented at all by people elected under this unfamiliar procedure and whom they might not

even know personally."[281] As Eddie Mabo, a prominent Indigenous activist, complained,

Indigenous people do not feel that the NACC represents "us because the people that we voted for

didn't get in."[282]

The NACC's proposals for its constitution and functions were repeatedly rejected by

DAA ministers: the government wanted to control the purse strings and restrict the NACC's

autonomy. In 1974, the NACC attempted to switch itself from a powerless consultative body to a

policy-making body. "Their demands included control of the Department of Aboriginal Affairs

and of the federal budget for Aborigines. The government's reaction was immediate. The

minister for aboriginal affairs threatened to withhold the delegate's salaries and to disband the

NACC." During this struggle, the government tried to weaken the hand of radical NACC

representatives by suggesting they were different from, that is not representative of, more

traditional Indigenous peoples.[283] In the end, the NACC activists retreated from their demands,

and the NACC remained a dependent and toothless organization. In 1977, the government

replaced the NACC with the National Aboriginal Conference (NAC). Although the NAC had a

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280. Judith Wright and H.C. Coombs, *We Call for a Treaty*, (Sydney: Collins/Fontana, 1985), 30,
http://www1.aiatsis.gov.au/exhibitions/treaty/atc/m0040285_a.htm (accessed April 13, 2008).
281. Ibid, 30.
282. Eddie Mabo, "A Treaty and the NAC," in *Black Australians: The Prospects for Change*, ed. Erik Olbrei
(Queensland: James Cook University Press, 1982), 66.
283. Howard, "Introduction," 9.

different structure than the NACC, it played the same advisory-only role and was plagued by the same limitations and contradictions.

The tension between the NAC's two roles—Indigenous representative body and enfeebled government agency—reached a head when the NAC became the government's lead group for formulating a treaty. No treaty had ever been signed between any Australian government and the Indigenous peoples; and in the late 1970s, momentum began to build within the Indigenous movement for a treaty. In 1979, two groups of activists—Indigenous activists working for the NAC and non-Indigenous activists from the independent Australian Treaty Committee (ATC)—began working simultaneously towards a treaty. After consulting with each other, the two parties decided to pursue separate campaigns. Regarding the NAC, one ATC activist later stated that "as a government funded advisory body with . . . few achievements, no statutory existence, and vulnerable to being abolished at any time by a hostile government, we did not see the NAC as yet having enough acceptance or independence for the task of negotiating a vital and long-term agreement with a Commonwealth government which had already proved its worthlessness and guile."[284]

Despite its best intentions, the NAC did prove vulnerable to government pressure. The first sign of trouble was when the NAC dropped the word "treaty" for a word that meant agreement in several aboriginal languages. The government had been against the word treaty as it signified that the Indigenous peoples were separate, that is, not Australian citizens under government sovereignty. Despite the NAC's own previously stated reservations about producing an agreement too quickly and without proper Indigenous input, the NAC presented the

284. Wright and Coombs, *We Call for a Treaty*, 102.

government with a draft agreement within a short time-span. The ATC sounded a warning

alarm, but the reaction from within the Indigenous grassroots movement was far harsher. The

Indigenous activist, writer, and poet Kevin Gilbert protested vehemently against

Commonwealth-NAC cooperation, called the NAC a quisling government, and stated that a

treaty should be signed between two sovereign parties.[285] In other words, until Indigenous

sovereignty was recognized, a treaty would be meaningless. Sovereignty became the new

rallying cry of many activists, and in 1985, the NAC was abolished. In 2001, the issues of

sovereignty and a treaty were still salient for grassroots activists, the government, and certain

industries. Each party, however, had different notions and hopes for what could be achieved.

Government Organizations and Jobs: Boon or Curse?

In the early 1970s, the Labor Party poured money into the development of Indigenous

programs and organizations and hired activists, practically en masse, into the public service. On

the surface, this support would seem advantageous for the Indigenous movement. But

government funding rarely went to autonomous organizations or individuals. Instead, the

government aided mainstream organizations and established programs and organizations that

competed with grassroots endeavors. This competition was deleterious to the Indigenous

movement for several reasons: first, because of their greater resources and preference for co-

operating with "acceptable organizations," the official programs and organizations "virtually

eliminated independent volunteerism."[286] Second, the staffing of government programs and

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285. Kevin Gilbert, "Makarrata: N.A.C. sellout," *Aboriginal Island Messenger*, no. 13 (1980): 5, 12-13.
286. Michael Howard, "Aboriginal Brokerage and Political Development" in Howard, *Aboriginal Power in Australian Society*, 166; interview with Black Power activist, January 31, 2005.

organizations with Indigenous activists drained the movement of much needed talent.[287]

Third, public service employees were restricted by the Public Service Act from "doing anything

useful with their communities."[288] Fourth, by controlling the financing, the government was able

to exert greater control over Indigenous activities.[289]

Before the government began its new financing and hiring drive, it had employed a small

number of Indigenous people. Among these was a well-known and well-respected activist,

Charlie Perkins, who had participated in the 1965 Freedom Ride. Perkins viewed government

employment as a way for Indigenous activists to infiltrate the government and encouraged

activist entry into the bureaucracy. Some Indigenous grassroots activists, however, "vehemently

criticized people taking jobs." [290] These opposing voices, however, were not powerful enough to

dissuade activists from government jobs, particularly when Perkins was encouraging

employment with the notion that activists could continue their activism, but from within the

government structure. Thus, by 1976, "not a single visible national-level Aboriginal leader was

discovered who did not occupy a position in, or connected with, government or who was not

connected with an organization funded by the government."[291] Perkins' infiltration assessment

proved false, and government employment hindered rather than furthered the Indigenous

movement's goals. Instead of giving its Indigenous public servants true responsibility and

policy-making capacity, the government kept them in low-level, advisory positions.[292]

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287. Bennett, *Aborigines and Political Power*, 14.
288. Gary Foley, "The Power of Whiteness," *Journal of Australian Indigenous Issues* 2, no. 4 (1999): 4.
289. For a thorough discussion, see Howard, "Aboriginal Brokerage and Political Development."
290. Interview with Black Power activist, January 31, 2005.
291. Delmos J. Jones and Jacquetta Hill-Burnett, "The Political Context of Ethnogenesis: An Australian Example," in Howard, *Aboriginal Power in Australian Society*, 224.
292. Wright and Coombs, *We Call for a Treaty*, 106. Foley also stated that activists were employed in junior positions without real power. "The Power of Whiteness," 4.

The sum effect of the Labor Party's 1970s funding and employment initiatives, ostensibly on behalf of Indigenous peoples, was to weaken the grassroots movement. As the Black Power activist interviewee stated, once the government saw the power of the Black Power movement, it became a battle between the movement and the government for the "hearts and minds of Black Australia." The government felt it had to re-establish control over the agenda and accomplished this by co-opting Indigenous people and destroying their effectiveness.[293] Indeed, several interviewees for this dissertation asserted that the government purposely hired activists who made "noise" in order to "quieten" them.[294] This control dynamic was already noted by several scholars in 1982, who stated that by incorporating Indigenous peoples into the very structure that controls them, the government "created a rather subtle structure of indirect rule."[295]

An Official Peak-Level Body

In 1988, Indigenous activists, partly to protest the government's bicentenary celebrations, held the largest political march in Australia's history with an estimated 15,000 to 20,000 participants. One of the government's appeasement offers was to replace the DAA with a new elective body that would allow greater Indigenous representation and advocacy, and facilitate Indigenous control over the delivery, monitoring, and administration of some Indigenous-related services and programs. This new body, the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission (ATSIC), had actually been discussed by government officials, behind closed doors and without Indigenous consultation, since at least 1987. When the proposal for ATSIC was presented by

293. Interview with Black Power activist, January 31, 2005.
294. Ibid. Interview with indigenous activist and senior ATSIC official, Canberra, July 10, 2001; Interview with University of Sydney professor, Sydney, July 4, 2001.
295. Howard, "Aboriginal Brokerage and Political Development," 159.

Gerry Hand, the DAA minister, in December 1987, it was already *fait accompli*. To sell it to

Indigenous Australians, Hand and Charlie Perkins (DAA's secretary at the time) spent the first

half of 1988 conducting "consultations" with Indigenous communities throughout Australia,

which resulted in numerous changes to the proposal but not the proposal's derailment.

Despite the consultations and any legitimacy they may have endowed on the ATSIC

proposal, the new body was greeted by many Indigenous activists with suspicion and skepticism.

Indigenous commissioners of the government development agency for Indigenous projects were

particularly critical. As a result of their criticisms, Hand dismissed eight of the ten Indigenous

commissioners.[296] To protest ATSIC, Indigenous activists organized a nationwide boycott of the

first ATSIC elections, held local protests, and applied for a federal court injunction. Although the

boycott had some effectiveness—only 30 percent of Indigenous Australians on the electoral roll

actually voted—ATSIC began operations in 1990. ATSIC's newly elected Indigenous

commissioners were called traitors by several well-known activists, but these criticisms, as with

the earlier protests, were ineffectual in either preventing or altering ATSIC's implementation.

Perhaps the only boon of ATSIC to the Indigenous movement was the creation of a grassroots

alternative, the Aboriginal Provisional Government (APG). The APG still exists and has become

a quasi think-tank committed to Indigenous autonomy.

ATSIC, as its opponents feared, created numerous problems for the Indigenous

movement. With its multimillion-dollar budget, it exacerbated the problems of grassroots

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296. The link between the dismissals of the Indigenous commissioners and their opposition to ATSIC is documented by Angela Pratt, "Make or Break? A Background to the ATSIC Changes and the ATSIC Review," *Parliamentary Library, Information and Research Services, Current Issues Brief*, no. 29 (2002-03); and Michael Dillon, "Institutional Structures in Indigenous Affairs: The Future of ATSIC," in *Shooting the Banker: Essays on ATSIC and self-determination*, ed. Patrick John Sullivan (Darwin: North Australia Research Unit, Australian National University, 1996).

activists that started with the influx of government monies in the early 1970s. ATSIC

perpetuated the government's replacement of grassroots organizations and constrained and

channeled protest into government structures.[297] Moreover, as the administrator of government

programs, ATSIC also functioned as the government's accountant and compliance watchdog,

required to scrutinize and investigate whether Indigenous communities were properly using their

funds. For these reasons, among others, ATSIC was reviled by many communities.

Both ATSIC's elected and appointed arms were perceived as compromised. Regarding

the appointed arm, one Indigenous activist interviewee stated, "it's a bunch of white people," and

the elected Indigenous arm are only there because their "mob elected them . . . people only vote

if a family member is running."[298] Another interviewee stated that some ATSIC bureaucrats had

been hired from South Africa, thus "the world's biggest racists are in ATSIC."[299]

Despite ATSIC's unpopularity, many of its employees-cum-erstwhile grassroots activists

tried to continue their activist work. ATSIC publications and statements often portrayed the

government in an unfavorable manner, and ATSIC activists criticized the government.[300] In

1999, a new chairman, Geoff Clark, was elected. Clark and his executive assistant, Les Malezer,

had previously worked for the APG. According to a senior ATSIC official and activist, Clark and

Malezer were furthering APG's agenda under ATSIC's aegis, for example, pushing for

government recognition of Indigenous sovereignty, restimulating grassroots mobilization, and

taking ATSIC out of the "driver's seat" as a signatory for any potential treaty.[301] In 2000,

297. Interview with ATSIC Deputy Regional Manager, Alice Springs, June 18, 2001; interview with University of Sydney professor, Sydney, July 4, 2001.
298. Interview with grassroots activist, Canberra, July 11, 2001.
299. Interview with grassroots and international activist, Canberra, July 9, 2001.
300. Interview with ATSIC national office employee, Canberra, July 6, 2001.
301. Interview with activist and senior ATSIC official, Canberra, July 10, 2001.

ATSIC, using government funds, as well as several autonomous grassroots organizations,

successfully lobbied the United Nation's (UN) Committee on the Elimination of Racial

Discrimination (CERD) to condemn Australia's land claim requirements and other

discriminatory practices. Thus, although ATSIC's activists were clearly compromised by their

dual activist-bureaucrat roles, they did attempt, à la Charlie Perkins, to infiltrate the government.

The government, of course, had long developed a system for moderating ATSIC activism.

The government attempted to control ATSIC in three ways: first, it used a "carrot-and-

stick" approach to funding. As a senior ATSIC official and activist relayed, funding depended on

government displeasure and the level of ATSIC agitation.[302] Second, the government used

misrepresentation and propaganda to question ATSIC's credibility and activities. For example,

following ATSIC's role in the CERD's negative findings toward Australia, the prime minister

made a television appearance in which he attacked ATSIC and misrepresented its budget.

Although the formal timeline for this dissertation's case studies extends until year 2000,

some events occurred after 2000 that merit mention. For example, in 2004 the Commonwealth

made a unilateral decision to dismantle ATSIC and mainstream Indigenous services into other

government agencies. According to the prime minister, ATSIC had failed the Indigenous

peoples, and they would be better served by the regular government agencies. Rather than

creating a new elected body, the Commonwealth would appoint an advisory council of

"distinguished" Indigenous people.[303] Activists have decried ATSIC's abolishment, but there

have also been calls for its replacement with an organic grassroots body.

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302. Ibid.
303. Angela Pratt and Scott Bennett, "The end of ATSIC and the Future Administration of Indigenous Affairs," *Parliamentary Library, Information and Research Services, Current Issues* Brief, no. 4 (2004-05), 22.

Whether the government's many initiatives and funds have helped its Indigenous citizens is a much-debated but unanswerable question—as is the question of whether government control of such initiatives was better or worse than if the government had allocated funds to Indigenous organizations. What one can ascertain, however, is that even after thirty years of government funding and control, health and quality of life standards of Indigenous Australians are still significantly below those of non-Indigenous Australians.[304] Grassroots activists believe that the government's activities have been misdirected, as do right-wing politicians, albeit for other reasons.

The Role of local Land Councils

Since the early 1970s, the Indigenous movement has primarily struggled for self-determination—power over decision- and policy-making—within the government's institutions. With the exception of several demonstrations, land rights have also been pursued per institutional means, either through the land councils or justice system.

Many Indigenous people considered ATSIC as a distant (and compromised) government agency, and instead turned to their local land councils—the statutory bodies created in the early 1970s to represent land claims—for representation on issues extending beyond land. As such, the land councils became involved "in the maintenance and development of a very wide spectrum of affairs affecting Aboriginal peoples' social and political lives. These range from national policy in relation to mining and national parks to many aspects of community decision-making and

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304. Ibid.

management, including conflict management and distribution of resources."[305] This

preference for a local body over the national-level ATSIC may be attributable to "the long-

established reality that Aboriginal people organized most effectively at regional level, rather than

with a centralized 'State-level' executive body."[306]

Despite the greater credibility land councils have with Indigenous peoples, they are still

government bodies that have to "operate and implement policies in a legislative framework that

is designed to serve non-Aboriginal interests."[307] Just as the government punished activism and

rewarded compliance within ATSIC, the government issued legislation, as part of the 1998

Native Title amendments, that established a carrot-and-stick regime for land councils. As one

interviewee noted, land councils that are "activist" have their funding revoked.[308]

The Lack of a Grassroots Peak-Level Organization

In 2001, many interviewees lamented that contemporary activism is weak; the days of

mass rallies and the pursuit of sweeping change seem bygone. One of the reasons given for this

dearth was the absence of organizations capable of "political mobilization."[309] The question then

becomes: why have activists not created such organizations? As the earlier sections detail, part of

the answer lies in the government's replication of grassroots organizations and recruitment of

activists, which have diverted and drained the movement. Several activists, however, cited a

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305. John Bern and Susan Dodds, "On the plurality of Interests: Aboriginality Self-government and Land Rights," in *Political Theory and the Rights of Indigenous Peoples*, ed. Duncan Ivison, Paul Patton, and Will Sanders (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 174.
306. Goodall, *Invasion to Embassy*, 356.
307. Bobbi Banerjee, "Whose Land is it Anyway?" *Chain Reaction* (Summer 2001): 13.
308. Interview with activist and senior ATSIC official, Canberra, July 10, 2001.
309. Ibid.

reason for the lack of a national protest organization that is completely unrelated to the

reasons one might expect, such as government repression.

As one scholar noted, in the nineteenth century Indigenous groups from different areas

did not unite and fight the colonizers because each leader's authority was limited to his region.

This reluctance to speak for members of a group other than one's own appears to still exist.

Thus, as one Indigenous activist in Sydney stated, no Australia-wide movement or even peak

bodies in regions exist because "Aboriginal people don't like to step on each other's toes."[310] An

interviewee in Canberra repeated almost the exact same words, stating that there is no centrally

organized Indigenous political movement in Australia partly because Indigenous groups do not

think they should speak for other Indigenous groups.[311]

An anthropologist based in Alice Springs averred that this prohibition against speaking

for others, or having others speak for you, was part of ATSIC's problem as a representative

body. The anthropologist stated that, traditionally, Indigenous people could only speak for

people from their country, which is why Sydney or east-coast activists are held in suspicion. The

problem is not that the east-coast Indigenous peoples are urban or "whitified"—a notion

promoted by the government to discredit radical activists—but that they come from a different

country.[312] This explanation sheds light on one Indigenous interviewee's doubt about ATSIC

elections, stating that Indigenous "people only vote if a family member is running."[313] Echoes of

the "not stepping on toes" sentiment were also evident in Eddie Mabo's 1982 statement that,

310. Interview with Koori Centre officer at the University of Sydney, Sydney, July 4, 2001.
311. Interview with ATSIC national office employee, Canberra, July 6, 2001.
312. Interview with senior anthropologist, Pitjantjatjara Council, Alice Springs, June 18, 2001.
313. Interview with grassroots activist, Canberra, July 11, 2001.

from an Indigenous group's perspective, the NACC does not represent "us because the people

that we voted for didn't get in."[314]

Looking Back-Looking Forward

Indigenous activists and non-activists, by engaging in large numbers in government

employment and accepting government representative bodies, have subjected the movement to

the moderating and controlling effects of institutional politics. The Australian government, for its

part, seems to seize every opportunity to thwart Indigenous self-determination and restrict land

claims. Considering that other Western governments, such as Canada's, have made significant

concessions and that even semi-third world Ecuador has allowed for land ownership and made

constitutional changes, one wonders why the Australian government has been so recalcitrant.

This author suggests that at least some elements of the Australian government perceive the

precariousness of the government's sovereignty. Without a treaty or other Indigenous concession

to foreign sovereignty, the Commonwealth government's claim to sovereignty and power rests

only on the tautology that it has assumed such sovereignty and power. Each concession to

Indigenous claims and demands chips away at the Commonwealth's existence myth.[315]

The Indigenous movement has futilely attempted for decades to reach its goals within the

government's framework. Perhaps ATSIC was the best compromise available to a small minority

group, or perhaps ATSIC's demise will force new grassroots mobilizations. Some activists have

called for the creation of an autonomous organization. One can only hope they succeed.

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314. Mabo, "A Treaty and the NAC," 66.
315. For a full discussion of the contradictions inherent in the Australian government's claim to sovereignty, see
Reynolds, *Aboriginal Sovereignty*.

CHAPTER 5

Assessing the Synthesis

We shall not cease from exploration
And the end of all our exploring
Will be to arrive where we started
And know the place for the first time.

—T.S. Eliot, *Little Gidding*

Introduction

McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald (1996) encouraged scholars to step outside of their

theoretical boxes and avail themselves of other tools, a challenge that was both timely and

necessary. But is a synthesis of RMT, POS and framing just another, albeit larger, theoretical

box? As presented in chapter 2, the critics of the synthesis take issue, in particular, with the

notion that it accounts for agency. What is lacking from the debate is an assessment of the

synthesis' explanatory power and scope. The case data from the past two chapters will provide

the foundation for evaluating the synthesis' capabilities.

Because the synthesis (and its component theories) is not a predictive theory, in the

scientific sense, it would be difficult to test (and falsify) with conventional methodologies. But

the synthesis has been presented by renowned scholars who have urged its adoption on fellow

scholars. They have asserted that it can tell us a "great deal" about movement development and

will yield "a fuller understanding of social movement dynamics."[316] If they can propound its

explanatory power, it must be possible for researchers to ask: What indeed can it explain? To

316. McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald, *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements*, 12 and 7.

address this question, I borrow the approach of other scholars who have posed similar queries about methodologically unwieldy theories and will "assess," rather than "test," the synthesis. The objective of such an assessment is scope delineation rather than falsification.

As the case studies of this dissertation follow a significant portion of the lifeline of two movements—from the cradle to, unfortunately in the case of the Indigenous Australian movement, almost the grave—they contain a wide range of movement dynamics. By examining how well the component theories explain certain phases and dynamics, we will gain an understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of the synthesis. Additionally: Are there social movement phenomena that none of the theories can adequately explain?

Methodology: Testing and Falsification versus Assessing and Scope Delineation

Most methodological approaches are geared towards presenting and scientifically testing causal theories with specified variables, a category into which the synthesis does not easily fit. Indeed, testing the synthesis with conventional methodologies would be exceedingly difficult. According to the political process methodologists, Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, theories range in their testability, depending on whether they posit simple or complex causality. The most difficult theories to test have "enigmatic" causality with "complex interactions among variables."[317] How does the open-ended and far-reaching synthesis, with vague causality and myriad variables and interactions, fit into George and Bennett's range? The answer is simple: it does not. The synthesis and its component perspectives are not scientific theories with specified variables that, like Aristotle's law of gravity, can be tested and falsified by a social science

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317. Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2004), 116.

version of Galileo's falling objects test. For this reason, I follow McAdam's (1999) example

and refer to my scrutiny of the synthesis as assessing rather than testing.

In his *Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930-1970*, McAdam

(1999) compared the ability of several theories, including RMT, to explain the U.S. civil rights

movement. As McAdam used a single case study and believed that the fit between data and

theory would sometimes be "merely suggestive," he recognized that he could only make an

"assessment" of the theories' explanatory power rather than "conduct a rigorous scientific

test."[318] My project contains methodological vulnerabilities similar to those encountered by

McAdam; therefore, I follow his distinction between assessing and testing. Although I do not

"test" the synthesis, I nonetheless rely on guidance from the methodologists. George and

Bennett's (2004) chapter 6—"Drawing the Implications of Case Findings for Theory"—offers

particularly helpful guidelines for testing theory with empirical data: guidelines it would also

behoove a researcher to follow when conducting an assessment.

At its core, scientific testing seeks to determine a theory's explanatory and predictive

power by comparing how well the theory's expectations match the empirical data. McAdam

approximated this approach by evaluating whether certain theoretical expectations were

supported by his case data. For example, McAdam analyzed the emergence of the civil rights

movement and found that an important role was played by indigenous rather than external help,

which suggested that one must question the RMT tenet that impoverished groups require external

assistance. The goal of McAdam's assessment, and the goal of my assessment, is not to falsify

the theories but to scrutinize their scope. This objective follows George and Bennett's general

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318. McAdam, *Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930-1970*, 63.

conceptualization of what the testing of a theory with empirical data should achieve: "Theory testing aims to strengthen or reduce support for a theory, narrow or extend the scope conditions of a theory, or determine which of two or more theories best explains a case, type, or general phenomenon."[319]

With the insights gained through his analysis, McAdam built the foundation for his own explanation. His main objective, therefore, was not to provide a definitive judgment on the conventional theories, but to clear the way for an alternative explanation. In this respect, my work once again parallels McAdam's. One purpose of this chapter, as discussed in chapter 2, is to examine whether the synthesis perpetuates PPT's structural bias and neglects agency. A second purpose is to "clear the way" for my own explanation of certain dynamics by ascertaining the weakness of other theoretical explanations.

The assessment of the synthesis will have two cross-cutting parts. To delineate the specific strengths and weaknesses of the synthesis, it will be informative to discern how well the separate component theories, on their own, explain the case studies. For this reason, I examine the case studies through the analytic lens of each component theory. Evaluative comments in this section will be few, except in instances where some explanation of the theory's capacity aids the narrative flow. Overall evaluation will be provided in the next section, in which I combine the insights from the first assessment to create a unified—or rather synthetic—picture of each phase. In that section, I will draw conclusions about the strengths and weaknesses of the component theories.

A key difference between my approach and McAdam's is that I present the two case

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319. George and Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*, 109.

studies in one uninterrupted narrative, whereas McAdam presented his single case study commingled with his theory assessment. This intertwining obliged him to repeatedly pause the narrative for theoretical discussion. As McAdam himself observed, this mode was "less than desirable stylistically"[320] and, in my opinion, it would be extremely cumbersome for two cases. I chose my approach because it is more manageable for two cases and provides an overview of the entire trajectory of each case, which allows me to quickly and efficiently focus on the data that would fit (or not) the synthesis' expectations. The disadvantage is that I must refer to people, events, and theories that were introduced in earlier chapters; for this reason, I occasionally provide helpful refresher details.

I conclude by echoing McAdam's caveat about his analysis: "The reader should be cautioned against misinterpreting the nature of this comparative analysis. In no way does it amount to a 'test' of the models in question."[321] Nonetheless, like McAdam, I will seek to expand our understanding of certain political phenomena by drawing attention to the strengths and shortcomings of present theoretical formulations and, in the case of the latter, providing alternative explanations.

Synthesis Expectations and Significant Case Moments

In conducting a test or assessment of a theory, a researcher must be mindful of staying within the theory's domain and selecting an appropriate measure by which a theory's adequacy can be determined. George and Bennett offer useful insights in delineating scope and urge researchers not to force a theory "into predictions beyond its scope; this leads to the creation of

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320. McAdam, *Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency*, 63.
321. Ibid., 63.

an easily discounted 'straw man' version of the theory."[322] As discussed earlier, advocates of

the synthesis foresaw a rather open-ended scope, but nonetheless, some boundaries can be

inferred. As gleaned from McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald's prescriptive work, it seems that the

scope begins only once identity has been created; in other words, the synthesis assumes the

presence of a group of ready and willing activists. We should therefore not expect the synthesis

to explain politicization or activist identity formation. But scope is only part of the straw man

pitfall. Researchers must also determine what level of explanation can be considered adequate, in

other words: How well must a theory explain phenomena? Since the synthesis is an

amalgamation, must *all* the expectations of *all* its component theories be present for it to have

successfully explained a particular phenomenon? Such a demand would seem unreasonable and

would surely create an easily toppled straw man. To avoid this hazard, I believe it is best to grant

the synthesis wide latitude. Thus, I will consider a phenomenon to be adequately explained by

the synthesis, as a whole, if *any* of the expectations of the component theories hold.

It would be unrealistic to attempt an assessment of all possible dynamics that occur in the

two case studies, but they do share several significant "moments" that fit into McAdam,

McCarthy, and Zald's emergence and development/decline phases. Both the Ecuadorian

Indígena and Indigenous Australian movements, for example, experienced an initial 1920s

mobilization and a subsequent indigenous rights mobilization around the 1960s. To assess the

synthesis' explanatory power, these moments will be analyzed to detect any of the synthesis'

expectations, including: facilitative structural change(s), new movement resources (money and

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322. George and Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*, 116.

labor), sufficient organizational strength, external help, and well-developed diagnostic, prognostic and motivational framing.

For both cases, the historical record is richer for the 1960s and onwards, during which the development and outcomes of both movements were significantly shaped by intramovement upheaval and interactions with the government. Although the two cases share certain similarities, the outcomes differ; and the decline of the Indigenous Australian movement affords an opportunity to assess how the synthesis explains decline.

A key difference between the outcomes of the two cases—decline versus survival—is that the Indigenous Australian movement was co-opted and became demobilized, whereas the Indígena movement successfully resisted co-optation. Co-optation, as will be discussed in greater detail in the next chapter, is defined as counterproductive institutional participation. The difference between incorporation and co-optation is that the former may provide some measure of real power whereas the latter is an exchange of symbolic power for movement efficacy. Thus, co-opted movement has lost more than it has gained. In both case studies, the potential for co-optation was present as both governments extended overtures for compromised institutional participation and proffered jobs to activists. In other words, neither government offered real power sharing. However, whereas numerous Indigenous Australian activists accepted government institutions and jobs, Indígena activists were more adept at recognizing and resisting counterproductive participation. And, when Indígena movement leaders did engage in institutional politics, they attempted to "manage" the participation. By manage, I refer to the measures to control participating activists, such as CONAIE's restrictions on Indígena legislators.

This argument does not imply that radical elements of the Indígena movement have always succeeded in curtailing government involvement, but that they have been more successful than not. Moreover, they are continually vigilant against co-optation, which could not be said for the Indigenous Australian movement. Another important difference between the cases is that the Indigenous Australian movement has become fractured. I use the term "fractured" rather than "factionalized" because the civil rights and Black Power activists did not create opposing factions; rather, one group became dominant and members of the other either supported the new movement or faded into the background. While this splintering might explain why disenfranchised activists may have joined the government, it does not explain how the government was able to easily assimilate members of the dominant group. This latter issue is crucial, because it was by co-opting Black Power and other indigenous rights activists that the government was able to moderate the movement.

In both cases, government overtures were not perceived uniformly by all movement elements. Within the Indígena and Indigenous Australian movements, there were activists who were suspicious of government engagement and who prioritized movement autonomy as well as activists who were more tolerant of government engagement. For the sake of clarity, *radical* will denote the first group of activists and *moderate* will stand for the second group: in this sense representing different ideological camps. As many scholars have found, including Barkan (1979) and Zald and Ash (1966), strife between different ideological camps—whether categorized as left versus right or radical versus moderate—is a significant problem for movements.[323] Indeed,

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323. See also Enrique Larana, "Continuity and Unity in New Forms of Collective Action: A Comparative Analysis of Student Movements," chapter 9 in Larana, Johnston, and Gusfield, *New Social Movements*; for a discussion of intramovement conflict involving one group's suspected government engagement, see Scot Ngozi-Brown, "The US

Benford (1993) concluded that *most* intramovement conflicts occur between radical

(advocating extrainstitutional and confrontational means) and moderate (advocating institutional

and more accommodative means) activists, and the Indígena and Indigenous Australian

movements were not exempt from this.

The radicals and the moderates in both cases struggled over how to participate politically.

But Indigenous Australian activists who sought autonomy were unable either to stop moderate

activists from engaging with the government or to influence that engagement. In contrast, the

Indígena radicals have been able to persuade and, to a remarkable degree, constrain their

moderate cohorts. Moreover, the awareness of the potential negative effects of government

interaction appears to have been more widespread and profound in the Indígena than in the

Indigenous Australian movement. Thus, to explain the decline or survival of the two case

studies, the synthesis must help us better understand this awareness and why (or why not) one

movement element could control the other. As these dynamics occur within the phases delineated

by McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald, and as contributors to their volume analyzed similarly

complex phenomena, such as Kim Voss' study of the collapse of the Knights of Labor,

explaining the decline and survival of this project's two cases falls comfortably within the scope

of the synthesis.[324]

In sum, this chapter will assess the ability of the synthesis to explain each case study's

emergence—the mobilizations of the 1920s and 1960s—and development, such as

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Organization, Maulana Karenga, and Conflict with the Black Panther Party: A Critique of Sectarian Influences on Historical Discourse," *Journal of Black Studies* 28, no. 2 (November 1997): 157-170.

324. Kim Voss, "The Collapse of a Social Movement: The Interplay of Mobilizing Structures, Framing, and Political Opportunities in the Knights of Labor," in McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald, *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements*.

intramovement upheaval; as well as the two divergent outcomes: co-optation and decline versus resistance to co-optation and survival.

Resource Mobilization Theory-Australia

To explain the 1920s mobilization of Indigenous Australians, an RMT analysis would look for new organizational skills and resources, such as money and labor. The first Indigenous Australian activist organization, the AAPA, appeared in the early 1920s. Unfortunately only a few details about the AAPA's origins and history have survived; indeed, scholars disagree as to why it folded in 1927. It is known, however, that the organization was created by Indigenous Australians whose families had resisted losing their lands and were forcibly displaced to urban areas. At least one of the leaders had been an active union member during World War I, but the direct organizational involvement of the CPA has not been documented. During the 1920s several non-Indigenous external actors—such as humanitarian and feminist groups, activist anthropologists, and the CPA—began agitating on behalf of the Indigenous Australians, although the feminist groups did not give them resources and it is not known what resources, if any, the other groups may have provided. Indeed, as argued by the scholar John Maynard, grandson of the AAPA's founder, the AAPA was not created with external help but was formed and managed solely by Indigenous Australians.[325] While the data is too weak to suggest a strong RMT argument, the presence of at least one activist with union experience indicates that mobilization coincided with new organizational skills but with little or no external assistance.

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325. Maynard, "Vision, Voice and Influence," 91.

How would RMT explain the mobilization around indigenous rights and movement upheaval that occurred in the 1960s? Between the 1930s and the 1960s, Indigenous Australian organizations strove for equal rights. In the late 1960s, however, a mobilization focused on indigenous rights emerged.[326] This mobilization was driven by a new generation of activists who were highly influenced by the Black and Indian Power movements of the United States. The Black Power books and materials introduced by American GIs were clearly a new resource and enriched the knowledge and skills of Indigenous Australian activists.

Zald and Ash (1996) argued that an organization fails when members no longer believe it can achieve their goals or when its legitimacy has been discredited. The failure of the 1967 Referendum to produce meaningful change demonstrated for a new generation of activists the inefficacy of organizations that worked within the system and the shortcomings of their underlying ideologies. As Barkan (1979) and Bruce (1985) would predict, one of the key struggles between civil rights and Black Power activists centered on leadership issues. The bitter fight between the two wings at the 1970 FCAATSI General Meeting was the beginning of the end for FCAATSI. Many other civil rights organizations suffered a similar fate: they were either disbanded or given new leadership. In sum, the 1960s mobilization appears to have occurred with the acquisition of new resources, and the later upheaval was over the types of organizational issues that scholars have identified as flashpoints.

Although Black Power activists prevailed over civil rights activists and achieved some initial success in collective action—such as organizing mass demonstrations—the Black Power movement failed: activism waned during the 1970s and by the decade's end, the movement had

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326. As mentioned in chapters 3 and 4, for both cases *indigenous rights* can be encapsulated as equal rights plus special language, cultural, and political rights stemming from original ownership of the land.

entirely lost momentum. Using Oberschall's (1978) work on the decline of the United States

civil rights movement as a model, one could attribute the failure of the Indigenous Australian

movement to organizational weakness. The Black Power activists never developed a formal

organization; they used the Tent Embassy as their organizational focal point and communicated

primarily through the media. As Oberschall observed about the 1960s movements in the United

States, the substitution of media coverage for organizational structure ultimately weakens a

movement, and the lack of an organizational structure restricts career opportunities for activists.

Thus, when the Australian government began offering jobs and instituting programs that

replicated grassroots initiatives, the movement was unable to meaningfully or cohesively

counteract. Some activists perceived these government initiatives as detrimental to the movement

and chastised those who accepted government employment, but they had limited means of

persuasion. Without an organization substantial enough to effectively sanction "betrayers" or to

offer attractive alternatives, the autonomy-minded activists were powerless. By the late 1970s the

grassroots movement was bereft both of strong organizations and of strong activists.

Political Opportunity Structures-Australia

To explain the first Indigenous Australian mobilization, a POS argument would

emphasize changes in the political system that provided new opportunities. Aside from the

founding of the CPA in 1920, no other structural changes had occurred prior to or during the

decade. This period, however, was replete with cultural changes. Before the 1920s, most non-

Indigenous Australians were unaware of the plight of Indigenous Australians. However, within a

ten-to-twenty year time span, missionaries, communists, humanitarians, and feminist groups

began publicizing the mistreatment of Indigenous Australians and agitating for recourse. For example, missionaries published a pro-Indigenous Australian newspaper and Australian and international media reported stories of abuse. According to McAdam's (1996) criteria, cultural openings qualify as POS structural openings when they dramatize discrepancies between cultural values and social practices. During the 1920s non-Indigenous Australia was split between those who advocated White Australia policies and others who valued democratic ideals and saw Australia as a member of the enlightened West. For the latter group, the new knowledge regarding the abuse of Indigenous Australians may have revealed discrepancies between their values and their society's practices. Thus, a POS analysis with McAdam's criteria would aver that cultural changes facilitated the creation of an indigenous rights organization. It should be noted that this would be an unconventional POS argument, which would surely raise the hackles of POS purists.

In the late 1960s a new generation of activists interested in self-determination emerged and ascended over those pursuing an equal rights and more accommodative approach. Although the conservative Liberal Party ruled the commonwealth government, at least three structural changes which could be construed as facilitative occurred in the mid-1960s. In 1964 Indigenous Australians gained suffrage; in 1965 the Freedom Ride revealed widespread discrimination and segregation (which would be considered a cultural opening similar to the 1920s' revelations); and in 1967 the constitutional Referendum was approved. POS cannot explain, however, why these openings were facilitative to a new generation rather than the older generation of activists. Indeed, the government actions during the mid-1960s tilted towards facilitation of moderates, so Kriesi et al. (1995), for example, would have great difficulty explaining why facilitation did not

lead to movement moderation. Nor does POS have the tools to explain the intramovement upheaval that occurred between the civil rights and indigenous rights activists. But POS does appear to provide insights into the movement's later decline.

By the end of the 1970s, the Indigenous Australian movement had become demobilized. This decline was precipitated by several structural changes. The Whitlam government, which during the late 1960s had been a relative ally to the Indigenous Australian movement, lost the 1975 elections to the conservative Liberal party, which was unsympathetic to Indigenous concerns. Concomitant with the change of government, the state greatly increased its repression of the Indigenous Australian movement, and many activists were harassed and jailed. The damage to the movement from unfavorable structural changes is only part of the demobilization story: In the 1970s, many Indigenous Australian activists were employed and co-opted by the government.

According to Kriesi et al. (1995), a government's facilitative overtures to cooperative activists and repression of unruly activists should result in the moderation of the overall movement. Meyer (1993) presented a two-pronged argument for moderation. First, multiple government venues for participation are likely to splinter protest organizations. Second, participation in institutionalized politics has a moderating effect on organizations. As Kriesi et al. would predict, the repression of some activists combined with the facilitation (employment) of others contributed to the movement's moderation. By the mid-to-late 1970s, the Australian political system offered activists myriad venues for participation, including state governments, courts, parliament, and land councils. As Meyer argued, such venues diluted the movement's strength. The government also created Indigenous Australian-oriented programs and high-profile

official inquiries into Indigenous Australian grievances, which siphoned activist leaders away

from grassroots activities. The government would render these activities as progressive but

scholars and activists have noted that Indigenous Australian government employees were kept in

junior positions with advisory rather than executive authority.[327] Moreover, as the government

often neglected to implement the recommendations of its own enquiries, these projects were seen

as busywork to occupy activists' time and the public's attention.

The movement—as a national-level force—was moribund by the end of the 1970s.

During the next decade, activism continued on a small and local scale. In 1990, the government

created ATSIC, which doomed any chance for the revival of a large-scale grassroots movement.

Indeed, ATSIC's peculiar nature meant it produced moderation even greater than the institutions

to which Meyer referred. Unlike political parties and other venues, ATSIC's activities and

budget were strictly controlled by the government and, as public service employees, the

extrainstitutional political activities of activists who joined ATSIC were statutorily

circumscribed.

Framing-Australia

Framing theorists argue that resources and opportunities alone are insufficient for

generating collective action. Activists must first endow resources and opportunities with

meaning, otherwise "an opportunity unrecognized is no opportunity at all."[328] As discussed in

chapter 2, the three core framing tasks are diagnostic (grievance and blame attribution),

327. Interview with Black Power activist, January 31, 2005.
328. William A. Gamson and David S. Meyer, "Framing Political Opportunity," in McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald, *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements*, 283.

prognostic (solutions, methods, and means/tactics) and motivational framing. As Benford

(1997) noted, framing analysis leans towards description; but, as Gerhards and Rucht (1992)

demonstrated, one can determine whether the core framing tasks were completed and judge how

well they were accomplished. Gerhards and Rucht found, for example, that richly developed

frames, with concrete and tangible grievances, targets, and means, correlate with successful

mobilization. Successful frames supply a large but manageable number of well-defined problems

and identify specific culprits. Conversely, we would expect that frames seeking to solve myriad

problems and possessing vague attributions and solutions would correlate with weak

mobilization. Thus, in this section, we will examine whether activist framing included the three

types of tasks and how concretely they were defined.

The first Indigenous Australian SMO, the AAPA, was created in the 1920s and focused

on halting the removal of children from their families (the "apprenticeship" program) and the

dispossession of land. The AAPA identified the state agency that oversaw Indigenous Australian

affairs as the culprit and proposed as solutions: self-determination, the return of land, and the

cessation of the apprenticeship practice. These appeals were targeted to local missionaries and

the state. AAPA leaders imbued their speeches and writings with moralistic and justice-oriented

appeals, which Gerhards and Rucht (1992) and Snow and Benford (1988) found were often the

basis of motivational framing. As Maynard noted, information is scant about the AAPA, but it

appears that its leadership had indeed formulated concrete diagnostic, prognostic, and

motivational frames.[329] Thus, the data suggests that emergence correlated with the factors that

framing scholars would anticipate.

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329. Maynard, "Vision, Voice and Influence," 91-92.

The dominant organization of the 1950s and early 1960s, FCAATSI, furthered the rather accommodative equal rights frame that had become dominant in the 1930s. One of this frame's solutions was a constitutional referendum, which, according to Indigenous activist Faith Bandler, was inspired by the hope that Commonwealth-promulgated legislation would facilitate the "integration of the Aboriginal people."[330] Despite disagreements in the early 1960s about the wisdom of a referendum, a competing frame did not emerge. Enough activists believed in the referendum-oriented collective action frame to propel the movement in that direction. Around the same time that FCAATSI activists achieved their goal, the 1967 referendum, a new indigenous rights frame emerged, inspired by the U.S. Black Power movement.

Although neither recruited nor initially approached by U.S. Black Power activists, the Black Power movement in Australia nevertheless adopted much of the framing of the U.S. Black Power movement. This form of frame transfer has not yet been captured in frame analysis scholarship. Thus, in addition to the frame alignment methods delineated by Snow et al. (1986) and Morris (2000), I would add *frame adoption*: a group of challengers may seek out and adopt extant frames that express their "interests, values and beliefs."[331]

Whereas civil rights advocates saw themselves as part of the Australian system, which was reflected in their equal/civil rights frame, the Black Power movement rejected the system's legitimacy. According to Gamson (1992), frames are not falsified; rather, like paradigms, they lose out to more compelling rivals. Snow and Benford (1992), however, assert that frames can indeed be falsified. One might assume that the Black Power frame prevailed because it was more

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330. Bandler, "Turning the Tide," 13.
331. "Interests, values and beliefs" are the individual orientations that Snow et al. argue must be aligned with SMO "activities, goals, and ideology." "Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and Movement Participation," 464.

persuasive and captured the zeitgeist of the 1960s worldwide. But an examination of the Indigenous Australian Black Power frame indicates that, at least for the Black Power activists, the civil rights frame had been falsified.

The Black Power frame initially focused on indigenous rights and self-determination and later on the more radical goal of Indigenous Australian sovereignty, which was emblemized by the Tent Embassy's placards: "LEGALLY THIS LAND IS OUR LAND. WE SHALL TAKE IT IF NEED BE." In framing parlance, the Black Power frame's grievance was the lack of Indigenous Australian self-determination, and the prognosticated solution was sovereignty, which would be achieved by protesting the non-Indigenous power structure and other symbols of racism, such as the South African Rugby team. Blame was attributed to the dominant elite's power structure *and* the extant Indigenous civil rights organizations and their underlying ideology. In the eyes of the Black Power activists, the inside-the-system approach of both Indigenous and non-Indigenous civil rights activists was part of the problem. Thus the Black Power activists sought to change the overall Indigenous Australian movement by challenging Indigenous and non-Indigenous activists and organizations that followed the more accommodative civil rights frame. It would therefore appear that Black Power activists considered the meager collective action gains and overall poor state of Indigenous Australian affairs as refuting the civil rights frame.

Framing theorists offer several possible outcomes for movements with frame competition. As Benford (1993) would predict, the prolonged and unresolved struggle between Black Power and other activists was destructive for both organizations and individuals. While remembering how the Black Power movement treated the older equal rights generation, one

Black Power interviewee remarked, "I think we broke more than one of their ——

hearts…we were pretty harsh."[332] The Black Power frame finally prevailed, but not through

persuasion so much as through intimidation. Its advocates took over or disbanded civil rights

organizations. While some civil rights activists supported the Black Power movement, others

attempted to develop new organizations, but none achieved the stature of FCAATSI and most of

these groups eventually withered away.

As argued earlier, a core reason for the decline of the Indigenous Australian movement

was its co-optation by the Australian government, which can in large part be attributed to the

readiness of Indigenous activists to join the government or support its programs. Two possible

framing explanations exist. First, one could consider the government initiatives as a competing

frame, the diagnosis of which would be similar to that of the Black Power's frame, but the

prognosis would be Charlie Perkins' (the well-known Indigenous public servant) notion of

"infiltration"—changing the system from within the system. If activists believed they could still

pursue their pre-employment objectives, they might indeed select the frame that at least provided

much-needed income. Second, a frame analysis would look for problems with the Black Power

frame. Why was it unable to successfully compete against a "government employment" frame?

In their arguments about the relationship between concrete frames and mobilizing

potential, Gerhards and Rucht (1992) strongly imply the reverse relationship: that is, frames with

less mobilizing potential possess an unmanageable number of grievances and offer imprecise and

incongruent prognoses. Over time the Black Power movement attempted to address a growing

number of grievances, from land rights to health issues, and one could argue that the sheer

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332. Interview with Black Power activist, January 31, 2005.

number of grievances diluted the frame's mobilizing potency. The Black Power movement was adept at creating attention-getting demonstrations and raising public awareness, but the actual "means and methods" for remedying the wide variety of problems were weak. Thus, a frame analysis could link the movement's powerlessness to its failure to produce strong and cohesive frames.

Resource Mobilization Theory-Ecuador

At the turn of the twentieth century, many Sierra Indígenas were hacienda-bound indentured servants who lacked financial and organizational resources. The external resources provided by leftists in the 1920s were therefore a paramount factor in early Indígena mobilization. As the history shows, Indígenas responded enthusiastically to the new support: they joined the Socialist Party, created Indígena unions, and adopted Leftist ideology and rhetoric. This external backing fits McCarthy and Zald's (1977) observation that impoverished groups—in this case extremely impoverished—may be in particular need of external help. RMT advocates propound that RMT is useful to answer the *why now?* question of collective action and this first mobilization provides a classic example: mobilization occurred with new resources and organization.

The indigenous rights mobilization of the 1960s-1970s was a move towards land, cultural, language, and political rights *and* simultaneously a move away from class concerns, Leftist patronage, and the goal of equal and civil rights. During this period, new resources appeared and new organizations were created: the government increased its spending on development projects, many of which were Indígena community-oriented, by 800 percent; the

1964 Agrarian Reform forced larger haciendas to distribute some land to workers and pay

their workers wages; the Catholic Church, on the heels of Vatican II, changed its perspective and

helped create new Indígena organizations, one of which later helped spawn CONAIE; and the

1970s Otavalo textile boom increased Indígena wealth and independence. As a result, Otavalo

became an activism hub and the source of a new generation of leaders. An additional resource

typically overlooked by many scholars was the new government in Cuba. According to an

interviewee, Cuba provided support for Indígena organizing and some activists even received

training in Cuba. Thus, this era was replete with new financial and labor resources and

organizational capacity, which RMT would correctly predict were used to undergird

mobilization.

In 1986 CONAIE, the pan-Indígena umbrella organization, was created. Although many

other significant organizations still exist, CONAIE is the lead organization and has come to

represent, for many activists and scholars, the Indígena movement as a whole. Because

CONAIE's constituents cover a wide spectrum of activists, CONAIE must maintain discipline

between various camps, including autonomy-minded radicals and moderates. Many of the

internal conflicts between these camps have been over whether the movement should participate

institutionally or extrainstitutionally. This question has become particularly relevant in recent

years as more opportunities for institutional participation have either emerged or been directly

offered to activists.

Judging from their writings, statements, and actions, many Indígena activists are highly

distrustful of government engagement and suspect that government influence may have adverse

repercussions on their autonomy and grassroots efficacy. These suspicions have persisted for

many decades, particularly in the Sierra region, and activists have carried these misgivings with them to CONAIE. But not all Indígenas share such beliefs, indeed, some view institutional participation as pragmatic and useful. The government has repeatedly sought to incorporate activists and the main challenge for CONAIE's leaders who wish to discourage government engagement has been to keep control over those who do not share their same suspicions. The primary tools of the anti-government leaders have been persuasion and punishment; when all else fails, they have negotiated for "managed" political participation, meaning they retain some measure of influence over the interactions, for example, by implementing control tactics over Indígena delegates. Activists who have engaged with the government, outside of CONAIE's purview, have been publicly sanctioned as traitors, which carries an implicit ostracism threat.

While the Indígena movement's resistance was achieved under the aegis of a powerful organization, can one attribute resistance to the presence of such an organization? If a strong, pan-group organization is the factor that enables a movement to resist co-optation, then why was pre-fracture FCAATSI a relatively accomodationist organization? The critical element in the Indígena case seems to be internal policing and its effectiveness. But do these dynamics fit within RMT's parameters? RMT scholars have focused on organizational problems as culpable for demobilization and factionalization, but explanations as to how an organization or movement actually overcomes dissension with sanctions are not a conventional feature of RMT. As will be discussed in the next chapter, the use of sanctions has been examined by rational choice and game theory scholars—such as Michael Hechter and his *Principles of Group Solidarity*—rather than McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald and peers. And what about the Indígena awareness of the

effects of government engagement? Such an awareness, or consciousness, is clearly beyond

RMT's parameters.

<div align="center">Political Opportunity Structures-Ecuador</div>

From a POS viewpoint, a precursor to Indígena mobilization would be the Liberal Party's

dominance from1895 to 1925. First, the Party's rhetoric and social reform policies helped pave

the way for a socialist mobilization. Second, the Liberal Party advocated economic

modernization and, concomitantly, the liberation of Indígenas from feudal work arrangements.

The combination of these factors created openings for the Socialist Party's rise—and

subsequently for Indígena mobilization. As a POS argument would predict, the Indígenas

mobilized in the 1920s because the political system had opened under the Liberal Party and, for

the first time, they had allies within the system. In line with POS expectations, the first Indígena

mobilization within the institutional system took the form of unions and Socialist Party

membership.

The Indígenas' 1960s-1970s mobilization for autonomy and indigenous rights (and away

from Marxism) coincided with several openings. Structural openings included the Army's 1964

coup and drive for modernization and development. The Army viewed the hacienda system and

its quasi-enslavement of Indígena workers as an impediment to Ecuador's economic

development. Through the 1964 Agrarian Reform, the Army weakened the hacienda system,

meaning that at least some Indígenas gained land and proper wages. Around the same time, the

Army significantly increased government spending on Indígena-related projects. This era also

saw the development of a progressive middle class, which viewed Indígenas in a relatively more

positive light and created progressive political parties. In the late 1970s these progressive

elements encouraged the military junta to extend suffrage to Indígenas, which was accomplished

in 1979. In sum, the case details suggest that structural changes resulting in new allies and the

yielding of old foes (the hacienda system) contributed to the Indígena mobilization.

As with the Indigenous Australian case, POS does not provide a framework for

understanding the conflicts, or the resolution thereof, that occurred between civil and indigenous

rights activists. But Kriesi et al. (1995) and Meyer (1993) do speak to government efforts,

intentional or otherwise, to moderate and demobilize challengers. Both approaches, however,

appear to fall short in explaining the Indígena case.

For many decades, Indígena activists have rejected government overtures. In the 1930s,

for example, Indígenas rejected a committee designed to resolve landlord disputes because they

perceived it as a government ploy to spy on, control, and subvert their organizational efforts.[333]

And in some areas, Indígena villages rejected becoming official *comunas*, which would have

provided their communities with assistance funds, because of misgivings over government

intentions. In more recent times, activists who eschew government participation have been able

to stymie government moderation efforts by constraining activists who would engage the

government, an outcome that would not be anticipated by POS scholars, such as Kriesi et al.

Moreover, radical "control" over activists who would prefer working within the system as well

as radical suspicion of government engagement has also mitigated the moderating effect of the

Ecuadorian government's Madisonian venues. While Ecuador's structure is less "Madisonian"

than a country such as the United States, it does offer many opportunities for participation, some

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333. Becker, *Indians and Leftists in the Making of Ecuador's Modern Indigenous Movements*, 67.

of which are either new or only recently accessible to Indígenas: for example, the ballot box

through the advent of universal suffrage in 1979 and political party participation through the

opening of the legislative system in the mid-1990s. These new venues have created challenges

for the Indígena movement and have been the source of some of the movement's greatest

blunders and internal struggles. But the radical elements have kept the upper hand by instituting

control measures, particularly over legislators. Two examples of rejecting "attractive" offers of

participation are one leader's refusal of the vice presidential candidacy by a mainstream party

and the resignation of two Indígena cabinet ministers who relinquished their posts because they

recognized the moderating effect of their institutional positions. Perhaps the various facilitation

efforts and myriad venues will eventually have a moderating effect, but the Indígena movement's

resistance appears to provide, for the moment, a deviant case.

Framing-Ecuador

From the perspective of a framing analysis, Indígena peasants were initially mobilized by

Leftists with a class-oriented collective action frame. Snow et al. (1986) and Morris (2000)

described various methods of recruitment and it appears that socialists most likely used some

combination of frame bridging, amplification, extension, and lifting. With these methods,

socialists were able to persuade Indígenas that their "interests, values and beliefs" aligned with

socialist "activities, goals, and ideology."[334] Thus, Indígenas learned to perceive their grievances

as class difference and economic exploitation. Blame was attributed to landowners and the

solutions included wage parity and better working conditions, which were pursued with tactics

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334. Snow et al., "Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and Movement Participation," 464.

such as union organizing and strikes. As with the Indigenous Australian case, scholars know little about this early mobilization, but it seems likely, based on what is known about socialist ideology, that motivational framing relied on appeals to justice. Given that the dominant group owned the means of production, the frame's diagnosis and prognosis resonated with Indígenas for several decades.

The 1960s shift from a Marxist, class-based frame to an indigenous rights frame would be described by framing theorists as a frame change. But which explanation of frame change— falsification or quasi-paradigm shift—best fits the Indígena case? According to several Indígena activist interviewees, a class-based approach was rejected primarily because it failed to address a sufficient number of grievances, such as language and culture. Moreover, the shortcoming and disappointments of the Agrarian Reforms, which were partly achieved through the class frame, demonstrated to some Indígenas that such an approach was insufficient for garnering meaningful change. The class-based frame, therefore, was found by some of its adherents to be insufficient and erroneous; in other words, the frame was falsified. These disenchanted activists then switched to an indigenous rights frame, which competed with the class-based frame. But not all class-oriented activists perceived the frame as falsified; some maintained their loyalty to class-based issues and solutions.

Class-based organizations tried to retain their indigenous rights-minded members by espousing indigenous rights aims, but these activists eventually created their own organizations. This competition between the two ideologies and the generation of new organizations lasted several years, and there was no abrupt switch from one frame to another. Some indigenous rights activists continued to pursue class issues and demands but gave them less priority than land and

other rights. While some activists progressed slowly from one frame to the next, others—who

had never fully embraced a class-based frame, such as the weavers of Otavalo—quickly

embraced an indigenous rights frame. Because of their weaving industry, many Otavaleños had

not been part of the hacienda system and had never fully adopted the class-based frame. Their

concerns were about culture and land and as Otavaleños became active on a regional and

national level they promoted their interpretations.

As Gamson (1992) would predict, the old frame and new frame rivaled each other and

organizations competed for members. This rivalry never became acrimonious to the point that

permanent splits were created; rather, the indigenous rights organizations became dominant and

the class-based organizations assumed a supporting role. For example, when CONAIE organized

protests in the 1990s, it received support from leftist organizations and unions. Thus, both Snow

and Benford (1992) and Gamson (1992) are correct: as Snow and Benford posited, frames can be

falsified, at least for some movement members; and, as Gamson argued, the prevailing frame

wins through rivalry, as different camps promote their interpretations.

An examination of the indigenous rights frame indicates that it possesses the factors

associated with success, but is not as narrow or specific as the class-based frame. Indeed, the

broad frames of the indigenous rights movement could indicate potential problem areas for the

movement. The grievances cover a wider range of complaints, from land to language to culture

to politics; and various government policies have been targeted as the culprits. The prognosis—a

solution and its attendant methods and means, i.e. tactics—has shifted over time. Proposed

solutions have ranged from garnering change in government policies to the rejection of economic

globalization. The means for achieving the movement's goals have varied widely over the past

decades and have been perhaps the greatest area of intramovement contention. Some within

the movement, particularly Amazonian Indígenas, have at times advocated working within the

system while others, mainly Sierra Indígenas, have argued for maintaining the movement's

autonomy either by pursuing extrainstitutional means or by strictly managing any participation.

How would framing theory explain Indígena resistance to co-optation? As indicated

earlier, the Indígena movement's eschewal of government co-optation efforts is inspired by an

awareness of the attendant dangers and a belief in the necessity for movement autonomy. Refusal

or control of government participation has been achieved by internal policing mechanisms, such

restricting delegates or punishing "betrayal" with implied threats of ostracism. The problem for

framing theory would be capturing these dynamics within the categories of diagnosis, prognosis,

or motivational framing.

Perhaps one would argue that the rejection of institutional participation falls in the

prognosis category, as in "autonomy (the solution to address grievances) is achieved by rejecting

government involvement (the means for the solution)." In a similar vein, the framing for

controlling participation could be rendered as "autonomy is maintained (the solution) and any

negative repercussions of government involvement are minimized (also part of the solution) by

controlling participation and sanctioning strayers (means)." But the question is: while these may

be autonomy-preserving strategies, are they truly collective action frames? I argue that they are

not. Collective action framing has conventionally been depicted as interpreting the outside world

and motivating a movement toward the undertaking of collective action against an external

target, which precludes "internal" goals such as fundraising quotas or protecting the movement's

autonomy. Moreover, ideology—which Snow and Benford portray as "values, beliefs,

meanings" and thus would include the Indígena awareness and perceptions that spur their

autonomy—is a resource that can facilitate or constrain framing, but is *not* a product of the

framing process. According to Snow and Benford, ideology may be clarified during the framing

process, but is created elsewhere.[335] Thus, to explain the Indígenas' awareness, one must look to

other theories such as Mansbridge and Morris' work on oppositional consciousness, which will

be discussed in the following chapter.

Assessing the Synthesis' Strengths and Weaknesses

In this section we will examine how well the emergence, development/decline phases

would be explained by a synthesis of the component theories.

The 1920s emergence of mobilization in both cases appeared to occur simultaneously

with new favorable structural/cultural changes and with new resources and/or organizational

skills. In Australia, mobilization coincided with new organizational skills (union experience) and

cultural changes (raised public awareness). In Ecuador, the Liberal Party created structural

openings and the Socialists provided skills, resources, and a powerful ally. The Indígena case

bolsters McCarthy and Zald's observation that impoverished groups need external help; whereas

the Indigenous Australian case indicates that McAdam and Morris are also correct: not all groups

require external assistance. To reconcile the differences between these arguments, I would

suggest that the need for external assistance depends on the level of impoverishment. For the

Indígenas trapped in feudal-style indenture, external assistance provided the resources for, or at

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335. Snow and Benford, "Ideology, Frame Resonance, and Participant Mobilization," 197.

least hastened the tempo of, political mobilization.[336] For both cases, the frames of the 1920s

mobilizations were, as far as the limited evidence indicates or allows us to infer, propelled by

well developed and specific diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational framing. Frame analysis is

also helpful for understanding how the Ecuadorian socialists may have recruited Indígenas: they

aligned socialist beliefs with Indígena beliefs.

As with the mobilizations of the 1920s, new resources and organizations also appeared to

coincide, for the most part, with the 1960s mobilizations. The indigenous rights mobilization in

Ecuador occurred concomitantly with new resources and organizational assistance. The question

that RMT cannot answer, however, is why many Indígenas rejected their earlier class-based

ideology and used the resources to undergird a new mobilization. In the Australian case, the

Black Power books empowered and informed the labor resource, but no new financial resources

appeared to bolster the Black Power movement. Indeed, most of the protests, such as the Tent

Embassy, were done on a shoestring budget and were achieved through sheer activist ingenuity.

Both of the indigenous rights mobilizations also occurred subsequent to favorable

structural or cultural changes. The Army in Ecuador reconfigured the political and economic

arenas in ways that were advantageous to Indígenas. In Australia, the advent of Indigenous

Australian suffrage and even the 1967 Referendum could be construed as favorable structural

changes (though interviewees reported being more inspired by the Freedom Ride). Although

RMT and POS can explain the *why now?* of these mobilizations, neither theory illuminates why

the new resources and openings of the 1960s fuelled new rather than extant mobilizations. As

McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald propound, an ideational component is needed. With the addition

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336. It is interesting to note that external organizational help was not necessary during the 1960s mobilizations, when both the Indígenas and the Indigenous Australians were relatively better off than in the 1920s.

of framing analysis to RMT and POS, one has a tool for understanding the shift from one mobilization to another: for many activists, the civil rights frames were falsified. The failures of the 1967 referendum in Australia and the Agrarian Reforms in Ecuador to instigate real change demonstrated the shortcomings of the civil rights diagnoses and prognoses.

In sum, it appears that McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald were well-founded in their confidence about the synthesis' ability to explain social movement emergence. With regard to the Indígena and Indigenous Australian case studies, the findings suggest that RMT, POS, and framing do provide the tools for understanding mobilization.

During each case study's development phase, struggles occurred between different wings (and generations). While RMT scholars would have accurately predicted the issues that triggered conflict—tactics, goals, and leadership—RMT would have difficulty explaining why the Indígenas were able to resolve such disputes or why Indigenous Australians could not. With its emphasis on external structural changes, POS offers little insight into movement conflicts. As the case data indicates, movement upheavals were driven by dynamics internal rather than external to each collectivity and thus both RMT and POS, with their emphasis on tangible influences, fall short.

Various framing scholars have recognized that movement elements with different frames may come into conflict with each other. In the case of the Indigenous Australians, this rivalry was particularly apparent as civil rights and Black Power activists struggled over diagnoses and prognoses. Moreover, the Black Power diagnosis attributed blame for their grievances partly to the earlier civil rights activists. This attribution most likely limited the chances for reconciliation

between the two camps. As Benford would predict, unresolved disputes rendered the Indigenous Australian movement vulnerable to fracture.

In sum, the synthesis almost falters when applied to intra-movement upheaval. POS provides no tools for understanding upheaval; and RMT is, at best, merely descriptive. Framing analysis, however, does illuminate the problems between different movement wings. While the ability (or not) to overcome internal upheaval played a large role in the development of both movements, how they conducted their relationship with the government, and how they responded to government overtures, had a greater influence on their ultimate outcomes—decline or survival.

A key difference between the two cases' outcomes was their response to government overtures. Whereas Indigenous Australian activists accepted government representative institutions and jobs, Indígena activists either repelled government overtures or "managed" the participation. The synthesis seems to provide an adequate explanation of the Indigenous Australian co-optation and demobilization. With insights from RMT, we know that the absence of a strong organization weakened the movement's ability to respond to government overtures or offer alternatives to activists. As Kriesi et al. would predict in a POS argument, greater government repression during the 1970s combined with employment offers had a moderating effect. Likewise, the many Madisonian venues for participation diluted the movement's energies. Framing theory also illuminates the co-optation. The "government employment" frame, buttressed by Charlie Perkins' avowal, was more attractive to activists than the competing Black Power frame. And, in line with Meyer's Madisonian argument, the more venues the movement entered, the more stretched and thin its frames became.

While the synthesis sheds light on the Indigenous Australian case, the data from the Indígena case suggests that the synthesis is insufficient at explaining Indígena resistance to co-optation. Of all the synthesis's component theories, the POS perspective speaks most directly to government efforts to co-opt and moderate social movements. Contrary to POS expectations that activists succumb to government moderation efforts, Indígena activists had a decades-long history of rejecting government overtures and other opportunities for participation and co-operation. Meyer, in his 1993 article on moderation and Madisonian structures, provides a hint as to how these rejections may have been inspired. Regarding the nuclear freeze movement, Meyer wrote: "The movement's rapid movement from the margins of political legitimacy to the halls of Congress presented both opportunities and problems. It faced the rigors of legislative compromise very early in its life, as policymakers genuinely seemed to be responsive. As a result, *movement leaders were not as wary as they might have been if they had been forced to spend a longer period of time in the political netherworld*."[337] In this last sentence, Meyer is suggesting that, had they had an awareness of the dangers of government engagement, movement leaders might have reacted differently. Indígena leaders, however, seem to possess such awareness, and that awareness has informed their strategies and actions.

It appears that RMT, POS, and framing can offer no insights into why or how the Indígenas were acutely aware of the potential dangers of government engagement. This consciousness is a belief and beyond the purview of RMT and POS. And, although beliefs inform frame creation, they are, as Snow and Benford (1988) acknowledged, not created during the framing process. In other words, we need another theory to explain where and how this

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337. Meyer, "Institutionalizing Dissent," 175 (my emphasis).

consciousness arose. In addition to the difficulty the synthesis seems to encounter at explaining why many Indígenas were so apprehensive, it appears that the synthesis cannot explain how they actually resisted government overtures. Indeed, the Indígena case appears to be a deviant case for POS: whereas Madisonian venues and government facilitation/repression moderated the Indigenous Australian movement, they had little effect on the Indígena movement. In the Indígena movement, the ability of autonomy-minded activists to rein in their less dogmatic cohort curtailed structural moderation impulses. The sanctions and controls used by the autonomy-minded activists are beyond the synthesis' capabilities. Thus, as with activist cognizance of the negative consequences of government interference, the sanctions and controls will require another theoretical explanation.

In sum, for both cases the synthesis appears to explain mobilization and, to some extent, intramovement upheaval and internal dissension. The synthesis also appears to illuminate rather well the co-optation and demobilization of the Indigenous Australian case. Indeed, the Indigenous Australian case demonstrates the power of structural explanations. The stumbling point for the synthesis, however, seems to be explaining the beliefs and actions of the Indígena activists. I would argue that this weakness confirms the suspicions of agency-minded theorists, such as Goodwin, Jasper, and Morris, that the synthesis contains a structural bias.

Conclusion: Returning to the Agency-Structure Question

The issue on which structure- and agency-minded scholars disagree is not so much whether activists have agency, but rather to what extent structure determines or constrains

agency.[338] Thus, a "structural bias" means that more weight is given to the ability of

structural factors to constrain agency, so structural influences become the greater causal factor.

When Goodwin, Jasper, and Morris assert that the synthesis has a structural bias, they are

charging the synthesis with ascribing the cause of activist behavior to the environmental

constraints in which activists are embedded, as opposed to the drive and efficacy of the activists

themselves. In short, these scholars reject the reduction of activists to "cleverly programmed

automatons."[339] As my assessment suggests, however, structural influences can indeed be a

powerful causal factor in social movement emergence, development, and decline. But my

assessment also indicates that activist agency can transcend structural forces. Rather than

presenting a contradiction, these findings tell us something about the cases for which the

synthesis—in its current formulation—is most likely to be useful, and pinpoints the areas where

it could profit from a broadening of its theoretical purview.

The respondents in the *Sociological Forum*'s minisymposium reacted to Goodwin and

Jasper's criticisms by ignoring or denying the structural bias, or by offering a more "context-

sensitive" version of the synthesis. Not one of the respondents, however, attempted to

demonstrate how the synthesis accounts for agency. After assessing its ability to explain just two

cases, and finding significant shortcomings, I can understand why the respondents chose their

tacks. The synthesis has limited tools for explaining why and how activist agency can prevail

over structural forces. In other words, the synthesis is geared towards explaining cases in which

structure overwhelms agency, but not the reverse.

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338. James Mahoney and Richard Snyder, "Rethinking Agency and Structure in the Study of Regime Change," in *Studies in Comparative International Development* 34, no. 2 (June 1999): 3-32.
339. This is how Sewell described actors in a structural argument in "A Theory of Structure," 2.

Because of its bias towards structural factors, the synthesis is deficient at illuminating why or how the Indígenas possess a consciousness of the negative repercussions of government engagement, and therefore cannot explain the unusual—from a synthesis theoretical standpoint—choices and behavior of Indígena activists. Under the synthesis' expectations, an Indígena leader should have accepted rather than repeatedly rejected the chance to become a vice presidential candidate; Indígena leaders should have kept their cabinet posts; the movement leaders should have immediately embraced national elections, instead of boycotting them until they felt the movement was strong enough to overcome any attendant co-optation. In these and other similar examples, the causal factor was not structure.

Even the more "context-sensitive" versions of the synthesis, presented by Koopmans and to some extent also by Meyer, do not overcome its flaws. Even Tilly's assertion, and reminder to Goodwin and Jasper, that political process scholars consider factors other than structure does not save the synthesis from its structural bias trap. These correctives and arguments fail because the synthesis, even with framing as its ideational component, cannot account for activist ideology and beliefs.

In various works, Snow and Benford have attempted to clarify what framing analysis can achieve and permeating these works is a tacit frustration with the claims by non-framing scholars that ideology is a framing product.[340] Indeed, in one article titled "Clarifying the Relationship between Framing and Ideology in the Study of Social Movements: A Comment on Oliver and Johnston," Snow and Benford state they have never asserted that ideology and framing are

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340. Snow and Benford, "Ideology, Frame Resonance, and Participant Mobilization," 197.

interchangeable.[341] Perhaps part of the confusion for erring scholars is that movements may crystallize their ideology during the framing process. In other words, ideology is pre-existing, but can become more concrete during activist discussions of diagnosis, prognosis, and motivational framing.

In sum, activist agency, which in the Indígena case manifested as the ability of activists to reflect upon and choose their course of action—independent of structural impulses—is a phenomenon beyond the explanatory capacity of the synthesis. "Indeed," as Jasper and Goodwin noted, "some of the questions that interest us cannot be posed in the first place within the conceptual framework of PPT."[342]

A key difference between the activists of the two cases was their divergent perceptions of incorporation and the hazard of co-optation. Although co-optation is a risk for challengers of all stripes—including ethnic minorities, women's groups, environmentalists, and human rights advocates—it has received surprisingly little attention from either social science scholars or activists themselves. In the next chapter, we will explore incorporation and co-optation in detail.

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341. David A. Snow and Robert D. Benford, "Clarifying the Relationship between Framing and Ideology in the Study of Social Movements: A comment on Oliver and Johnston," *Mobilization: An International Journal* 5 (2000): 55-60. See also Snow and Benford, "Ideology, Frame Resonance, and Participant Mobilization."
342. Jasper and Goodwin, "Trouble in Paradigms," 108.

CHAPTER 6

Exploring Incorporation and Co-optation

Why bite into a rotten apple?

—An Indígena leader on the movement's eschewal of electoral participation.[343]

Introduction

States employ a number of strategies, including institutional incorporation, to moderate

and neutralize challengers. In this chapter I examine institutional incorporation (as opposed to

societal incorporation) and its impact on social movements, and delineate how incorporation may

lead to co-optation. My discussions here are informed by data from the Indigenous Australian

case and by scholarship on incorporation and co-optation. The overall goal in this and the next

chapter—in which I analyze how the Indígena movement avoided co-optation—is not to

illuminate how social movements can succeed with collective action or best win concessions, but

rather to understand how social movements may overcome the potential negative consequences

of institutional participation. Also, as my perspective is primarily social movement-centric,

meaning that I approach these topics from the viewpoint of a movement as opposed to that of a

state or of society, I only barely touch on the intrinsic value (or lack thereof) of moderating

social movements.

I begin this chapter with a discussion of how states attempt to control movements and pay

particular attention to the social control strategy of inclusion, that is, the incorporation of

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343. In Melina H. Selverston, "Pachakutik: Indigenous People and Democracy in Ecuador," *Native Americas* 15, no. 2 (June 30, 1998): 12.

challengers into state structures. I focus on incorporation for three reasons: first, scholarship

on co-optation, which I explore in detail, deals almost exclusively with incorporation—indeed;

some scholars conflate the two concepts. This scholarly emphasis on incorporation and co-

optation necessitates that much of my discussion also centers on incorporation. But whereas

scholars view co-optation as resulting from corporatist or corporatist-like arrangements, many

Indígena activists perceived that co-optation—and the possibility of dependency and

subjugation—could occur through just about any form of government engagement or

institutional participation (including electoral). Thus, although I primarily address incorporation,

I concur with these Indígena activists; implicit in my discussion is the understanding that co-

optation can occur in myriad ways. The second reason I concentrate on incorporation is that this

tactic was common, albeit implemented in different ways, to both of my case studies. Thirdly, I

personally find incorporation and its effects a topic of great interest because many states, beyond

Australia and Ecuador, apply such strategies to their ethnic minority groups, often with dismal

results. Insights into why incorporation fails to address minority concerns may contribute to an

understanding of what might work better for them.

      Many states, and even some scholars as well as activists, view incorporation into the

official political system as providing challengers with "voice;" others, however, consider it

"capture." Indeed, many scholars and activists argue that incorporation leads unavoidably to co-

optation. I review the various perspectives in this chapter as well as examine the possible

pathways from inclusion to co-optation. Two scholars of co-optation, Patrick G. Coy and

Timothy Hedeen have suggested that if activists want to achieve benefits from government

engagement without becoming co-opted, they should gain "as full an understanding of the

processes of co-optation as possible. . . . an accurate description of a social problem is a prerequisite to an adequate prescription."[344] One of this chapter's goals is to contribute to this "understanding" by delineating the factors associated with capture.

In addition to a review of the literature on incorporation and co-optation, I analyze the experiences of the Indigenous Australian movement. As demonstrated in chapter 5, the incorporation of Indigenous Australian activists into government institutions resulted in co-optation and contributed greatly to the movement's demobilization. For example, as commissioners in the Australian government's NACC, activists were unable to effect meaningful changes from within the government and their official positions curtailed their extra-institutional efforts. Moreover, the presence of a new official representative body staffed by respected activists discombobulated the movement and diverted the energies of grassroots activists. Based on the literature review and insights from the Indigenous Australian case, I argue that activists, if they seek to heed Coy and Hedeen's advice, should consider five categories of factors when weighing participation: (1) the impact of inclusion on movement representatives and leaders, (2) the movement's strength and weaknesses, (3) the government's propensity toward either neutrality or bias, and (4) the trade off of possible gains against possible costs. Underlying several of these categories is a fifth factor, (5) the movement's autonomy and whether activists can preserve it.

In sum, this chapter has three main goals: first, a review of the scholarship on incorporation and co-optation and their impact on movements; second, a proposal for new

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344. Patrick G. Coy and Timothy Hedeen, "A Stage Model of Social Movement Co-optation: Community Meditation in the United States," *The Sociological Quarterly* 46 (2005): 427-428.

conceptualizations of incorporation and co-optation; and third, the formulation of hypotheses about the factors and conditions that tilt incorporation toward co-optation.

State Moderation of Challengers

Social movements may be moderated by governments in three ways: through Madisonian venues, concessions, and social control.[345] First, as Meyer demonstrated in his Madisonian structure argument, the sheer number of participatory venues offered by a government may have a moderating effect.[346] Each foray into institutional politics dilutes the movement's capabilities; even the most powerful movement would be stretched if it attempted to launch candidates, ally with political parties, lobby legislators, appeal to the executive branch, utilize the court system, or pursue any of the other means of remonstrance. Moreover, efforts would have to be redoubled if the country's political configuration necessitated challengers to press for concessions on the national and local/provincial levels. Challengers unaware of the danger of dilution might very well, as Meyer would predict, find themselves pursuing less and less ambitious objectives. Whereas a Madisonian governmental structure, beyond its initial construction, requires little or no intentional behavior on the authorities' part, the next two methods of moderation do require their active involvement.

A second means of moderation is the granting of concessions. If challengers have a relatively high degree of influence, then quelling their demands may require, as Gamson termed

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345. William A. Gamson specified only two methods of government moderation: concessions and social control. *Power and Discontent* (Homewood, Illinois: The Dorsey Press, 1968). I believe, however, Meyer was correct: the structure of the political system itself has a moderating effect. "Institutionalizing Dissent."
346. Meyer, "Institutionalizing Dissent."

it, "yielding ground" from the side of the authorities.[347] The government strategy may be to

provide minimal yet sufficient concessions so that challengers are appeased. The risk for

government authorities is that the quiescence may be short lived, or that concessions may whet

the challengers' appetite for more. From the authorities' perspective, the best outcome, however,

is not to provide concessions at all but to reduce challenger influence and power, which is

accomplished through social control.[348]

Social control, the third method of moderation, refers to the various tactics authorities

pursue to neutralize or reduce the power of challengers. Such methods may be either overt or

covert, and may include sabotage, infiltration with agents, the encouragement of internal and

external conflict, negative press coverage, de-recruitment campaigns, harassment, imprisonment,

assassination, violent suppression of demonstrations, land occupations, and resource and facility

interference.[349] These brutal methods of control, however, can backfire and produce unintended

consequences; they may also rupture the social compact between a state and its citizens.[350]

Social compacts are the "mutual expectations" of states and citizens: tacit understandings of

what the state provides in exchange for citizen support.[351] Although not included in the original

347. Gamson, *Power and Discontent*, 113.
348. Ibid., 113-143.
349. This list is compiled from several sources of social control scholarship, see Deborah B. Balser, "The Impact of Environmental Factors on Factionalism and Schism in Social Movement Organizations," *Social Forces* 76, no. 1 (September 1997): 199-228; Charles D. Brockett, "The Structure of Political Opportunities and Peasant Mobilization in Central America," *Comparative Politics* 23, no. 3 (April 1991): 253-274.; Atul Kohli, "Can Democracies Accommodate Ethnic Nationalism? Rise and Decline of Self-Determination Movements in India," *The Journal of Asian Studies* 56, no. 2 (May 1997): 325-344; Gary T. Marx, "Thoughts on a Neglected Category of Social Movement Participant: The Agent Provocateur and the Informant," *American Journal of Sociology* 80, no. 2 (September 1974): 402-442; and Karl-Dieter Opp and Wolfgang Roehl, "Repression, Micromobilization, and Political Protest," *Social Forces* 69, no. 2 (December 1990): 521-547.
350. Scholars have shown that social control tactics can produce unintended consequences, see, for example, Opp and Roehl, "Repression, Micromobilization, and Political Protest," and William A. Gamson, "Commitment and Agency in Social Movements," *Sociological Forum* 6, no. 1 (1991): 27-50.
351. Alex Pravda described social compacts as the "mutual expectations" of states and citizens in Eastern Europe. See "East-West Interdependence and the Social Compact in Eastern Europe," in *East-West Relations and the Future*

conceptualization, I would conjecture that social compacts also reflect citizen expectations

about state behavior. To avoid endangering the social compact and raising citizen questions

about state legitimacy, authorities also employ more conciliatory means such as toleration and

institutional channeling: for example, encouraging mutual aid societies instead of unions.[352]

Offers of incorporation are also often used for social control; indeed, research indicates this

approach is more effective than threats at quelling revolutionary tendencies.[353] While corporatist

arrangements are a type of institutional venue, akin to the Madisonian venues, I differentiate the

two based on the intentionality manifested by government authorities. Meyer's (1993) argument,

in contrast, dealt with the government's structure rather than intentional social control efforts.

　　With incorporation, a state attempts to create a putative "win-win" outcome by providing

challengers with voice by assimilating their concerns, organizations, or representatives into

either existing or new state structures. This absorption may occur in myriad ways—for example,

by employing members of the challenger groups as advisors, by creating full-scale representative

bodies or by endowing extant grassroots organizations with funding and statutory

responsibilities—but common to all incorporation methods is the sluicing of protest momentum

into official and often administrative channels. While incorporation means the enveloping of

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of Eastern Europe: Politics and Economics, ed. Morris Bornstein, Zvi Gitelman, and William Zimmerman (London: Allen and Unwin, 1981), 163. For an examination of how ruptured social compacts led to the downfall of the East European communist regimes, see Valerie Bunce and Dennis Chong, "The Party's Over: Mass Protest and the End of Communist Rule in Eastern Europe," paper for the annual meeting of the APSA, San Francisco, California, 1990.

352. See Balser, "The Impact of Environmental Factors on Factionalism and Schism in Social Movement Organizations;" Amrita Basu, "Reflections on Community Conflicts and the State in India," *The Journal of Asian Studies* 56, no. 2 (May 1997): 391-397; Narendra Subramanian, "Ethnicity and Pluralism: An Exploration with Reference to Indian Cases," *Canadian Journal of Political Science* 32, no. 4 (December 1999): 715-744; Gary T. Marx, "Thoughts on a Neglected Category of Social Movement Participant," 1979; and Charles Tilly, *From Mobilization to Revolution* (Reading: Addison-Wesley, 1978).

353. See Edward J. Lawler, "Cooptation and Threats as 'Divide and Rule' Tactics," *Social Psychology Quarterly* 46, no. 2 (1983): 89-98.

challengers into some form of institutional participation, the location of such participation usually differs from the conventional Madisonian venues. In other words, rather than directing challengers toward electoral politics or the court system, authorities often create some new form of institutional participation explicitly to manage challenger demands. As intended, by the authorities at least, activist engagement with authorities and in official structures often has a moderating effect. Moreover, many activists, and their movements, become co-opted. But what does co-optation actually mean? Because incorporation and co-optation are interrelated, many researchers conflate the two concepts, which results in an unfortunate muddling of the discourse. Before we venture further in our discussion, in the next section we will examine ways to provide greater definitional and conceptual clarity.

<div style="text-align:center">Inclusion, Incorporation, and Co-optation: Conceptual Clarity</div>

As one might expect, "co-optation" often has a negative connotation in the literature whereas "incorporation" is treated more neutrally. But some scholars, including several of the field's most renowned, such as Philip Selznick, William Gamson, and Michael Saward, use the terms interchangeably, which means they must refer to both terms as neutral or both as negative or, worse yet, toggle back and forth between negative and neutral uses within the same work.[354] A prime example is from one of the few books on co-optation, Saward's 1991 *Co-optive Politics and State Legitimacy*. Saward defined co-optation as the "cases where a notionally private

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354. See Michael Saward, *Co-optive Politics and State Legitimacy* (Aldershot: Dartmouth Publishing, 1991), 6-7. David W. Murphree, Stuart A. Wright, and Helen Rose Ebaugh make a similar conflation. They define co-optation as "attempts to influence the opposition and dilute its resistance by incorporating its members into the legitimate structure of the negotiating process, thereby focusing and channeling opposition into a more easily controllable environment." "Toxic Waste Siting and Community Resistance: How Cooptation of Local Citizen Opposition Failed," *Sociological Perspectives* 39, no. 4 (Winter 1996): 451. Gamson also conflates incorporation and co-optation in *Power and Discontent*.

individual, group, or group representative is formally incorporated into state decision-making as an advisor, informant, or colleague."[355] By conflating the two concepts, Saward and other scholars create a conundrum for themselves; and their discussion suffers as they sometimes struggle to separate the negative effects associated with co-optation from the neutral or even advantageous one of incorporation.[356]

To avoid similar confusion in this dissertation, I define incorporation as activist engagement in corporatist structures that would tend to provide greater benefits than costs to the movement. In other words, the engagement results in some degree of real rather than symbolic power and furthers the movement's goals; the costs to the movement—that is, the reduction of its influence or capacity to wield power extrainstitutionally—are offset by gains. Whereas I consider incorporation as neutral or productive participation, co-optation refers to the reverse outcome: *counterproductive* institutional participation in which a movement gains empty, symbolic power while compromising its ability to press extrainstitutionally for concessions: the movement loses influence and has little or nothing to show for it. Not only does this conceptualization allow one to distinguish advantageous from disadvantageous outcomes, it does not restrict co-optation to corporatist arrangements; co-optation may be a consequence of other types of participation. These conceptualizations of incorporation and co-optation are often implicit in the works I reviewed and therefore are not a dramatic departure from convention. All I have done is to make explicit differences that have been unnecessarily implicit.

Underlying my conceptualizations is the understanding that co-opted challengers would have been better off without incorporation. However, as Gamson commented, we "cannot know

355. Michael Saward, *Co-optive Politics and State Legitimacy*, 6-7.
356. Ibid., see in particular his discussion on page 21.

what would have happened if [incorporation] had not been used."[357] In other words, perhaps the outcome I perceive as co-optation, that is, as disadvantageous to a challenging group is still better than if they had never been incorporated. This uncertainty poses a problem for analysts, which may be why no one has offered clear (and operational) indicators to assess when co-optation has occurred. Indeed, most scholars assume that co-optation—counterproductive participation—is self-evident. While no easy answers obtain for those seeking a more rigorous method of evaluation, I suggest two ways of at least surmising whether incorporation has been sum-positive or sum-negative for challengers.

First, one could compare the movement's initial goals with the actual outcomes. In the Indigenous Australian case, the inclusion of Indigenous activists into state structures moderated the movement and *almost none* of the movement's original goals have been achieved; for example, a treaty has never materialized; and land rights legislation is to the detriment of the traditional Indigenous owners and to the benefit of the government, mining, and pastoral industries. Indeed, the land rights legislation is so despicable even the United Nations has condemned it as racist.

Regarding the notion that Indigenous Australian incorporation was harmful, a devil's advocate might counter-argue—après Gamson's observation that we "cannot know what would have happened"—that the movement nonetheless achieved more from inside the government than it could have from the outside. Or a devil's advocate could argue that the failed goals were not due to inclusion but to the impracticality of the movement's goals. If the lack of concessions and poor policy outcomes are not sufficient evidence to convince a doubter that Indigenous

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357. Gamson, *Power and Discontent*, 38. In the original sentence Gamson used co-optation instead of incorporation, but as he meant co-optation in the sense that I use incorporation, I changed the sentence to keep the terms uniform.

Australian participation was counterproductive, then let us leave the realm of goals and policy

concessions behind and consider socioeconomic indicators.[358]

Because many factors affect socioeconomic indicators, including the health of the overall

economy, I do not think they can be used to *determine* whether co-optation has occurred, but

they nonetheless provide insight into the fruitfulness of institutional participation. After all, if

such participation has produced gains for the group, should these not be reflected in improved

quality of life and other socioeconomic standards? After more than thirty years of institutional

participation, the answer for Indigenous Australians is no. The Australian government only

began keeping separate socioeconomic statistics on its Indigenous peoples in 1997, so one cannot

compare 1960-era standards to 2008. But the most recent statistics demonstrate that Indigenous

Australian standards are still significantly below those of non-Indigenous Australians. Life

expectancy for Indigenous males is 21 years less than non-Indigenous males, and 17 years less

for Indigenous females. Indigenous people are twice as likely to be hospitalized as non-

Indigenous people and are four times more likely to suffer from diabetes. Only 18 percent of

Indigenous adults over the age of 18 have a year 12 education, compared to 44 percent of non-

Indigenous adults. Indigenous unemployment is 13 percent, compared to non-Indigenous

unemployment of 5 percent. And, even when they are employed, Indigenous people earn only 59

percent of what non-Indigenous people earn ($394 Australian dollars/week compared with

$665/week).[359]

In sum, unlike other analysts, I think it is helpful to understand that incorporation and co-

optation convey two distinct concepts. Incorporation connotes that activists are engaged in

358. I would like to thank Dennis Chong for this suggestion.
359. Statistics available from the Australian Bureau of Statistics, www.abs.gov.au (accessed April 13, 2008).

institutional participation that produces concrete gains or at least does not harm the group. If

participation produces detrimental effects for the challengers whereby challengers compromise

their ability to pressure the government in exchange for meaningless positions and symbolic

power, then it considered co-optation. Scholars may have shied away from such distinctions

because, as Gamson asserted, one cannot determine if participation was (or will be) harmful or

helpful.[360] As will be discussed in a later section, research has progressed in the forty years since

Gamson made his observation; and, based on a literature review and the data from this

dissertation's case studies, I believe one can hypothesize that certain factors and conditions

increase or decrease the likelihood of co-optation.

Inclusion: Voice or Capture?

Some scholars and even activists perceive that incorporation may deliver positive effects

for challengers. Others, however, are pessimistic about the putative benefits of incorporation, and

some hold what I call a "mixed outcome" view. In this section I review the various perspectives

on incorporation and assess whether it is more likely to result in "voice" or "capture."

Is inclusion necessarily problematic for social movements? Could it not, perhaps, be a

form of political participation, providing "the right to be heard in policy deliberations" or "a

stake in the government"?[361] Inclusion in twentieth century Britain, for example, has been

viewed by some "as a means of attaining representation for key economic groupings."[362]

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360. Gamson, *Power and Discontent*, 137. In the original sentence, Gamson uses the word co-optation rather than incorporation, which exemplifies my argument that many scholars make an unfortunate conflation of the two. By co-optation, Gamson clearly means activist engagement in corporatist structures.

361. William Safran, "Non-separatist Policies Regarding Ethnic Minorities: Positive Approaches and Ambiguous Consequences," *International Political Science Review* 15, no. 1 (1994): 61-80.

362. Mark Neocleous, *Administering Civil Society: Towards a Theory of State Power* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1996), 152. Neocleous refers to this viewpoint; it is, however, not his own.

According to Tilly, there are clear advantages for movements and individuals in joining the government: "Membership in the polity gives important advantages to a group. . . . Concretely, recognition pays off in collective access to jobs, exceptions from taxation, availability of privileged information, and so on."[363] Conveying the viewpoint of a challenger who has entered the system, Hirschman wrote: "Considering the enormous power for good and particularly for evil that he sees constantly displayed around him, even the tiniest influence seems to him worth exerting."[364] Perhaps this explains the sentiments of Mapuche Indígenas employed by the Chilean state who believe that if they do not perform the work, the "winkas" will. "For many Mapuche, this is a powerful argument; to not take advantage of the spaces that exist, no matter how limited and restraining they might be, would be foolhardy."[365] In other words, inclusion offers a mix of advantages and disadvantages.

The "mixed outcome" view of inclusion is expressed in Gamson's (1968) work. According to Gamson, both challengers and authorities approach inclusion with fears and hopes and a great deal of uncertainty as no one can predict the outcome. The challengers fear losing influence and being accused of "selling out," and hope for concessions; authorities hope to moderate challengers and fear that inclusion will result in undue challenger influence and gains. Moreover, authorities may worry that inclusion "represents the 'nose of the camel' and be fearful of their ability to keep the rest of the camel out of the tent."[366] To support his "mixed outcome"

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363. Tilly, *From Mobilization to Revolution*, 125. Tilly also saw the dangers of inclusion; I include him in the more positive viewpoint category, however, because he was one of the few scholars to enumerate in any detail the advantages of inclusion.
364. Albert O. Hirschman, *Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to decline in firms, organizations, and states* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970), 116.
365. Yun-Joo Park and Patricia Richards, "Negotiating Neoliberal Multiculturalism: Mapuche Workers in the Chilean State, *Social Forces* 85, no. 3 (March 2007): 1333.
366. Gamson, *Power and Discontent*, 137.

notion, Gamson drew on Philip Selznick's (1953, 1960) study of the Tennessee Valley

Authority (TVA). Selznick documented that the TVA's inclusion of local power holders into a

quasi-power sharing arrangement resulted in authorities and challengers alike attaining a mixture

of gains and losses. The local power holders were able to influence TVA policy on some matters,

but had to compromise on others. The TVA, for its part, was able to reduce the opposition of

local power holders, but in exchange had to sacrifice some of its original character and policy

perspectives.[367] As Gamson concluded, any incorporation of "potential partisans by authorities is

likely to be a mixture" of concessions and influence reduction "and the balance of the mix is

problematic and of concern to both parties."[368]

Despite Gamson's view that the TVA represented a mixed outcome case, other scholars

have argued that Selznick held an overly pessimistic view of inclusion.[369] Selznick's own

description of the "appointment of opposition leaders to ministerial posts" for the purposes of

power sharing as well as enhancing the government's legitimacy is telling: "the opposition

leaders may become the prisoners of the government, exchanging the hope of future power. . .

for the present function of sharing responsibility for the acts of the administration."[370] Thus,

while the TVA case appears to substantiate Gamson's mixed outcome view—most likely

because challengers were given real power and could gain significant concessions—Selznick, as

it appears from his "prisoners" comment, was aware that other arrangements may produce

undesirable effects for challengers. Indeed, this dim view of inclusion dominates the literature.

367. Philip Selznick, *TVA and the Grass Roots* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1953); and Philip Selznick, "Coöptation: A Mechanism for Organizational Stability," in *Reader in Bureaucracy*, ed. Robert K. Merton, Alisa P. Gray, Barbara Hockey, and Hanan C. Sevlin (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1952 , second printing 1960), 135-139. Citations are to the 1960 edition.
368. Gamson, *Power and Discontent*, 138.
369. Michael Saward held this view in *Co-optive Politics and State Legitimacy.*
370. Selznick, "Coöptation," 136.

Many scholars either argue or imply that inclusion is a tool for governments to capture and co-opt challengers; in other words, the process of inclusion is more damaging than helpful to a movement. Many of these scholars do not examine the gains that inclusion may have garnered; rather, they view any moderation of or compromise made by activists as deleterious to the movement, thus, any goal displacement or softening of activist animosity is considered a sign of co-optation. For example, Piven and Cloward argued that channeling a social movement's struggle into an institutional apparatus—shifting it from direct action to discussion and negotiation—has an unfortunate moderating effect, not only on the tactics but also on the movement's goals and on the general public's receptivity to challengers' claims. By creating a sense that the government "answers grievances and solves problems. . . . whatever support might have existed among the larger population dwindles."[371] Mark Neocleous made a similar argument: the transformation of a social movement versus government struggle into an administrative matter "appropriates and nullifies the struggle" because, within its own apparatus, the state has greater leeway in promulgating control and the challenging group has less recourse to challenge undesirable policies.[372] The channeling of extrainstitutional protest into an administrative apparatus is the hallmark of "official" representative bodies, a specific form of inclusion that governments seem to reserve for ethnic minorities.

As argued earlier, the Australian government's official representative bodies—the NAC, NACC, and ATSIC—were conduits for co-optation. Empirical data about similar bodies in other countries also indicates that they have a emasculating rather than empowering effect and produce

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371. Frances Fox Piven and Richard A. Cloward, *Poor People's Movements: Why They Succeed, How They Fail* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1977; New York: Vintage Books, 1979), 34. Citations are to the Vintage Books edition. Neocleous in *Administering Civil Society* presents a similar view.
372. Neocleous, *Administering Civil Society*, 107

primarily counterproductive participation. In a review of state-sponsored Roma organizations

in Eastern Europe, for example, Zoltan Barany found that "the task of these bodies was not to

safeguard or represent the Roma's interests. . . but to shape Romani cultural and social activities

into a manageable and controllable institutional form."[373] Quintan Wiktorowicz looked at several

countries that had state-sanctioned civil society organizations and found that they were

corporatist arrangements that were "more an instrument of state social control than a mechanism

of collective empowerment."[374] Through these organizations, states were able to undertake

surveillance and control the organizations' membership and agendas. In Germany, the official

representative body for the Roma is supposed to host cultural events and serve as an official

watchdog for negative media depictions and slurs. But the organization has also been used by the

government to rubberstamp policies that many grassroots Roma organizations strongly

oppose.[375]

        In brief, this section reviewed the viewpoints and opinions of various scholars toward

inclusion. While inclusion may offer benefits, it may also ultimately result in counterproductive

participation. But how does inclusion lead to co-optation? In the next section I consider

scholarship based on either experimental or case data that assesses how and why inclusion may

precipitate co-optation.

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373. Zoltan Barany, "Ethnic mobilization and the state: the Roma in Eastern Europe," *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 21, no. 2 (March 1998): 314.
374. Quintan Wiktorowicz, "Civil Society as Social Control: State Power in Jordan," *Comparative Politics* 33, no. 1 (October 2000): 43.
375. Interviews with Roma National Congress representatives, Hamburg, February 21-22, 1999.

Taming the Social Movement Tiger?

Although no scholar has provided a definitive answer as to why incorporation seems to

lead to capture rather than voice, the literature provides some tantalizing clues and insights. In

general, the literature is divided into either theorizing about how inclusion alters the perspective

of individual activists or assessing the effect of power imbalances. First, studies of individual

activists have found that their sentiments soften as they engage with authorities or receive

conciliatory offers. In a social psychology experiment comparing the impact of "conciliatory"

offers of inclusion versus threats on the formation of revolutionary coalitions, Lawler found that

inclusion offers—which he defined as "attempts to 'absorb' the opposition by providing a

position with attendant rewards"—made to one subordinate but not to another were more

effective than threats at "preventing revolutionary coalitions."[376] By seeming to favor one

subordinate over the other, the authority could disrupt co-operation. But the even more

interesting finding for the purpose of the present discussion was the effect that the inclusion

tactic had on the targeted subordinate. Lawler found that a conciliatory offer changed the

subordinate's perception of the relative benefits of revolting: after a conciliatory offer, revolting

offered less benefits and became less attractive than not revolting. An offer also weakened the

"normative justification" of a revolt by making the authority figure "appear more conciliatory"

and invoking "a reciprocity norm suggesting to the target, 'Don't hurt those who help you,' or

'Help those who help you'."[377] Such a norm may explain Murphree, Wright, and Ebaugh's

observation that "Even individuals who have been clearly resistant to encroaching outside

376. Lawler, "Cooptation and Threats as 'Divide and Rule' Tactics." First quote from page 89, second quote from page 96. Lawler used the term "co-optation" as opposed to "inclusion." I changed the terms to keep terminology as consistent as possible throughout the dissertation; however, this change does not alter Lawler's original meaning.
377. Ibid., 97.

interests may, in the process of negotiation, undergo sentiment swings which influence them to become less vigilant or critical of their adversaries."[378]

In their case study of the co-optation of environmentalists, Murphree, Wright, and Ebaugh found that close contacts over an extended period of time between movement leaders and industry representatives resulted in activists sympathizing with and even defending industry representatives at public meetings. Because of the public nature of the co-optation, grassroots activists recognized that their leaders had been co-opted and abandoned them. The independence the grassroots activists had from their leaders could be construed as a crude "accountability mechanism," which, according to a how-to-protest guidebook, movements should implement to protect themselves from wayward leaders and representatives.[379] As Brass noted, authorities deal not "with solidary groups, but with particular leaders and elites." It is with a group's leaders that authorities attempt to curry favor and it is the leaders whom authorities attempt to use to the state's advantage.[380] Thus, leaders are potentially both a movement's source of strength as well as greatest vulnerability.

The second approach to explaining co-optation emphasized the power differences between authorities and challengers. As one experienced negotiations mediator remarked, "in relationships marked by power imbalances, cooperation and co-optation are nearly indistinguishable."[381] According to the how-to-protest guidebook just mentioned, challengers

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378. Murphree, Wright, and Ebaugh, "Toxic Waste Siting and Community Resistance," 454. Based on an analysis of student-administrator relationships, Gamson also found that the closer the personal relationship between authorities and subordinates, the less influence subordinates could wield. *Power and Discontent*, 116.
379. John O'Connor, "Organizing to Win," in *Fighting Toxics: A Manual for Protecting your Family, Community, and Workplace*, ed. Gary Cohen and John O'Connor (Washington, D.C.: Island Press, 1990), 56.
380. Paul Brass, "Ethnic Groups and the State," in *Ethnic Groups and the State*, ed. Paul Brass (Kent, U.K.: Croom Helm, 1985), 33.
381. The mediator is David Brubaker, quoted in Coy and Hedeen, "A Stage Model of Social Movement Co-optation," 428.

should follow the maxim "Do not surrender your power" and strengthen their position during negotiations by maintaining direct action pressure tactics.[382] Moreover, negotiations should be avoided if the challengers can be "outmaneuvered or when it is too costly to [the] organization (if it means an end to action, for example, or if the negotiated benefits go to the leaders and not to the general membership)."[383] These insights, from the world of activists and actual negotiations, are supported by Saward's (1990, 1991) examination of the factors associated with whether a challenger gains or loses from incorporation.

Saward found that a challenger can gain if the power balance does not favor the government, for example, if the government needs the group for decision-making, stability, effectiveness, or to help the government's appearance of legitimacy. Thus, challengers can exploit co-optation if they are "'autonomous' rather than 'dependent' in such arrangements."[384] The type of challenger that can benefit from incorporation possesses the following resources: authority derived from reputation or status ("perceived skills, expertise, status or competence"), large group size, strong group cohesiveness, and the espousal of values salient to the public.[385] For groups lacking such resources—which comprises most challengers—Saward found that incorporation generally works to the benefit of the government. Indeed, Saward concluded that "existing inequalities between different types of group tend to be reproduced and exacerbated in a variety of ways by the government use of the strategy of [incorporation]."[386]

382. Sanford Lewis, "Local Campaigns and the Law," chapter 9 in Cohen and O'Connor, *Fighting Toxics*, 244.
383. O'Connor, "Organizing to Win," 56.
384. Michael Saward, "Cooption and Power: Who Gets What from Formal Incorporation," *Political Studies* 38 (1990), 602.
385. Ibid., 590.
386. Ibid., 602. In the original, Saward used the term "cooption" rather than "incorporation."

Other studies also indicate that the fine line between incorporation and co-optation is maintained when challengers are not dependent on government resources. According to Aili Mari Tripp, the women's movement in Uganda has assiduously avoided the types of arrangements that its leaders perceived would make the movement dependent on the government. Tripp noted that, by maintaining its autonomy, the movement was able to select its own leaders, set its own agenda and goals, and press for change. Moreover, with a strong and autonomous grassroots organization, activists could better utilize their allies within the government.[387]

In a study of the co-optation of community mediation centers, Coy and Hedeen noted that in British Columbia the restorative justice system has avoided co-optation by obtaining and maintaining a semi-autonomous status and occupying an "oscillating space," neither inside nor outside of the system. In their conclusion, Coy and Hedeen considered how activists might simultaneously attain what they want from a system and maintain autonomy: "While we do not pretend to know the answers, we are quite sure that for movement activists to have as full an understanding of the processes of co-optation as possible is an important part of the answer. . . . an accurate description of a social problem is a prerequisite to an adequate prescription."[388] Coy and Hedeen, in other words, exhort activists to learn about and become aware of the mechanisms underlying co-optation; such an awareness would then form the basis for any countervailing strategy.

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387. Aili Mari Tripp, "The politics of Autonomy and Cooptation in Africa: The Case of the Ugandan Women's Movement," *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 39, no. 1 (2001): 101-128. In a study of social movement coalitions, as opposed to incorporation, Linda Brewster Stearns and Paul D. Almeida also suggested that insider "institutional activists" might be helpful allies for grassroots activists. "The Formation of State Actor-Social Movement Coalitions and Favorable Policy Outcomes," *Social Problems* 54, no.4 (2004): 479.

388. Coy and Hedeen, "A Stage Model of Social Movement Co-optation," 427-428.

In sum, scholars who have analyzed how co-optation occurs have focused on the effect of engagement on activists or on the hazards of dependence and conversely on the importance of autonomy to avoid co-optation. One aspect of co-optation that scholars seem not to have considered is whether the state itself is biased or neutral towards the challengers. It would follow that a corporatist arrangement offered by a state seeking to subjugate challengers would probably lead to a less than optimal outcome for the challengers. In contrast, corporatist arrangements offered by a neutral state would be more likely to provide challengers with voice. Whether states can achieve neutrality toward challengers is, as will be explored in the next section, considered dubious by many scholars.

The State: Partial or Neutral?

To address the question of state bias, Paul Brass reviewed theories of the state by renowned scholars and identified three main categories: pluralist and interest group, Marxist, and Neo-Marxist. As might be expected, Brass found that pluralist and interest group theorists view the state as neutral, whereas Marxists and Neo-Marxists argue that the state represents the interests of some dominant group: the dominant class (Marxism), or the dominant social/ethnic group (Neo-Marxism), or the state managers themselves (Neo-Marxism).[389] Brass dismissed the neutrality assumption of the pluralist and interest group approach by concluding that states are inherently biased, because even a state that attempts to be unbiased cannot succeed: "it must choose. . . between various types of 'egalitarian' policies that invariably favor some groups or

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389. The scholars Brass reviewed were Marx, Wallerstein, Hechter, Furnivall, M.G. Smith, Althusser, Habermas, Poulantzas, and O'Connor. "Ethnic Groups and the State."

categories in the population and discriminate against others."[390] Thus, even state neutrality is

"support for the status quo."[391] Brass based his conclusion on Douglas Rae's work, in which Rae

demonstrated how even the policies of "ostentatiously egalitarian" states, such as affirmative

action, have negative repercussions for the non-recipient groups.[392]

Scholars of the state not included in Brass' review have also found the state to be a biased

rather than neutral arena. Giddens maintained that state administrators inevitably support the

dominant class because administrators are "chronically involved in seeking to 'manage' the

economy."[393] Alain Touraine viewed the state as so completely biased that he conceptualized the

economic and political leaders who dominate the state as a separate social movement, for they,

like "minority" social movements, assert their version of society. By viewing power holders as a

social movement, Touraine sought to strip them of their claim to represent the mainstream or

commonsense values and norms. When conceptualized as a social movement, the state is a

contestant, just like the challenging social movement.[394]

Scholars who specifically referred to democracies or the social movements of democratic

states (including ethnic minority movements) were also convinced of the state's vulnerability to

elite capture and bias. In their discussion of multicultural democracies, Haggard and Kaufman

found that "where one group is dominant, it will be tempted to exploit its position to monopolize

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390. Brass, "Ethnic Groups and the State," 7.
391. Ibid., 9.
392. Douglas Rae, "The Egalitarian State: Notes on a System of Contradictory Ideals," *Daedalus* 108, no. 4 (Fall 1979): 37.
393. Anthony Giddens, *Sociology: A Brief but Critical Introduction* (London: Macmillan Publishers, 1982), 84.
394. Alain Touraine, "An Introduction to the Study of Social Movements," *Social Research* 52, no. 4 (Winter 1985): 774-5.

the political gains of office."[395] Neocleous found that when democracies extend suffrage, they

attempt nonetheless to preserve their control over challengers by shifting power away from

legislative bodies and into administration.[396] David Maybury-Lewis argued that even when

protections for indigenous minority groups are legislated in democracies, "the elites and their

political allies find ways to circumvent the laws and seize or otherwise use tribal lands. This is

often done with the aid or connivance of courts and the military."[397] Thus, democracies, like

other types of states, are not immune to power imbalances and elite bias.

In summary, it appears that scholars who have examined the question of state bias or

neutrality have come down on the side of state bias. States, it seems, are highly vulnerable to

capture by a dominant group. As J.R. Hay argued, a state represents the interests of the ruling

class "if members of the ruling class and the state are drawn from the same social groups in

society, are subject to the same socialization and educational process (and derive their incomes

from similar sources) . . . ."[398] And, as Brass and Rae posited, even states that attempt to be

"ostentatiously egalitarian" must still make decisions that confer benefits on some groups at the

expense of others. Brass intended his conclusion to be fairly damning, but it seems that in an

ostentatiously egalitarian state, slights and reversals may be random and not by design. Social

movement engagement with such a state, it would seem, might be more productive than similar

participation with a biased state. And, if a state can convince challengers "that the overall system

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395. Stephan Haggard and Robert R. Kaufman, *The Political Economy of Democratic Transitions* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), 358. In this section Haggard and Kaufman were commenting on consociationalist arrangements.
396. Neocleous, *Administering Civil Society,* 114-5.
397. David Maybury-Lewis, *Indigenous Peoples, Ethnic Groups, and the State* (Needham Heights, Mass.: Allyn and Bacon, 1997), 47.
398. J.R. Hay, "Employers' Attitudes to Social Policy and the Concept of Social Control, 1900-1920," in *The Origins of British Social Policy*, ed. Pat Thane (Totowa, New Jersey: Rowman and Littlefield, 1978), 112.

is unbiased, they will be more willing to accept temporary setbacks in the belief that 'things

will even out in the long run'."[399] However, if challengers notice that setbacks only occur to their

interests, then they might begin to question the state's trustworthiness as a partner.

By adding the insights from the scholarship on the state to the earlier reviews, we can

hypothesize that certain factors—such as small challenger group size, extended negotiations with

close contact between challengers and authorities, lack of accountability mechanisms,

dependency, and unhampered state bias—would seem to tilt inclusion toward a negative

outcome for the social movement participants. Before I begin to draw any conclusions, however,

I will analyze the two exemplary instances of co-optation from the Indigenous Australian case.

<center>The Indigenous Australian Case</center>

The two most obvious examples of incorporation that culminated in co-optation from the

Indigenous Australian case are the government's establishment of the NACC/NAC and ATSIC.

The histories of these two bodies were presented in chapter 4; the following review highlights

their "problematic" aspects.

In its proposal for the NACC, the government emphasized that the Indigenous

commissioners would be elected by the Indigenous peoples. By making the NACC an elective

body whose constitution would be formulated by the elected commissioners, once they took

office, the government provided the NACC with a veneer of legitimacy and, whether intentional

or not, obscured the fact that it was to be an advisory and not a policy-making body. Indeed,

some journalists and Indigenous persons seemed to have misunderstood the NACC's purpose

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399. Gamson, *Power and Discontent*, 125. Gamson did not discuss, however, whether such states were truly unbiased or were only using persuasion as a tool to moderate challengers.

and referred to it as the "Black Parliament." The most vocal opponent of the NACC was Senator Bonner, the only Indigenous representative in the commonwealth Parliament. Bonner warned that the NACC would be a form of apartheid and was a government attempt to divert Indigenous interest in having representatives in the commonwealth Parliament. This view was countered by at least one notable Indigenous leader, who asserted that the senator was wrong and that the NACC would become a forum for Indigenous decision making. After the NACC commenced operations in 1973, Bonner's dim view was validated.

The Department of Aboriginal Affairs rejected the constitutions proposed by the NACC's elected commissioners and obstructed the commissioners from achieving any significant concessions on behalf of Indigenous peoples. The NACC's role, from the government's perspective, was to advise the government. The commissioners, and their Indigenous constituents, were completely dependent on the government to implement their suggestions. In 1974 the NACC's commissioners attempted to transform it into a policy-making agency. In retaliation, the government threatened to withhold their salaries and disband the NACC; even more nefariously, some government authorities tried to discredit the commissioners by suggesting that they did not represent traditional Indigenous peoples (in other words, suggesting they were "urban" and not "tribal" Indigenous persons). In the end, the commissioners retreated from their demands. In 1977 the government replaced the NACC with the NAC, which, other than some administrative and structural changes, was essentially the same body as the NACC and played the same advisory role. In 1979 the NAC began work on a treaty between the government and the Indigenous peoples. The government had opposed the word "treaty" because it suggested that the Indigenous peoples were autonomous. When the NAC changed the word

treaty to another word that meant "agreement" in several Indigenous languages, grassroots activists realized that the NAC was not to be trusted. The NAC's treaty work stalled after harsh criticisms were levied by the ATC, the non-Indigenous grassroots group that had also been working on formulating a treaty, and by Kevin Gilbert, the famous Indigenous activist, poet, and writer, who called the NAC a "quisling" government. In 1985 the government disbanded the NAC.

In 1988 the government presented ATSIC as a new elective body to represent the Indigenous peoples. Many Indigenous people were suspicious and opposed the idea; criticisms were levied, a boycott of the elections was organized, and various local and regional organizations held symbolic, but not mass, protests. Indigenous commissioners of the government's development agency for Indigenous projects were particularly critical, and, in retaliation, the government dismissed eight out of ten of them. But Charlie Perkins, the well-known Indigenous civil servant who had credibility with activists because of his earlier grassroots activism (he had participated in the famous 1965 Freedom Ride protest), promoted ATSIC. Perkins and the non-Indigenous Minister of the Department of Aboriginal Affairs traveled together throughout Australia, presenting ATSIC and holding "consultations" with Indigenous communities. Although the boycott kept many Indigenous people from voting, the elections proceeded as planned, Indigenous commissioners were selected, and in 1990 ATSIC began operations.

ATSIC suffered from flaws to similar those of the NACC/NAC. While ATSIC had more power than the NACC/NAC—ATSIC, for example, was significantly larger and could dispense funds to Indigenous communities and projects—it was completely dependent on the government

for funding. Indeed, the government sometimes withheld funding as a tool to punish ATSIC,

and ATSIC's clients, for "wayward" activities and views. Because ATSIC was a government

agency, the government was also able to moor its Indigenous civil servants in layers upon layers

of bureaucratic obligations. Indeed, one could half-seriously argue that the government

moderated the movement by hiring umpteen activists and binding them with red tape. When

activists did finally learn how to exploit ATSIC to their advantage, for example, by being part of

the lobby that successfully wrought a condemnation of Australia from the UN's CERD

committee in 2000, the Australian government unilaterally dissolved ATSIC in 2004.

In semi-chronological order, there are at least five "lessons" that one might garner from

the NACC/NAC and ATSIC examples. First, the lack of one or more *strong* grassroots

organizations that could offer alternative employment meant, in addition to other problems such

a dearth posed, that activists readily accepted government positions (which further weakened

grassroots organizations). Second, criticism by lone figures—even those with Bonner's stature—

or by local or regional organizations appears, in many instances, to be insufficient (1) for

tempering the momentum of others to participate, particularly in a national project; and (2) for

neutralizing the government's ability to exploit a corporatist arrangement. Third, entering a

vaguely defined corporatist arrangement with the hope of using it to one's advantage may

backfire. Once the NACC's commissioners took office, they lost all power to insist the

government accept their formulation of the NACC's purpose, either in the initial phase—when

the government had supposedly planned for the commissioners to finalize the NACC's role—or

later in 1974 when the commissioners tried to force the government's hand. Fourth, the actions

of the NACC/NAC's commissioners reinforces the need for accountability mechanisms. What if

the commissioners had been obstructed by the grassroots from capitulating in 1974? Or if

they had been forced to keep the word "treaty"? Finally, both the NACC/NAC and the ATSIC

examples demonstrate the hazards of dependency. In both examples, Indigenous civil servants,

whether they were "elected" officials or not, were overwhelmingly dependent on the

government's resources and subject to the government's whims.

It would have been difficult for the Indigenous movement to have addressed many of

these problems because most resolutions would have required a focal point or central articulator

of Indigenous activism, such as the role CONAIE serves for the Indígena movement. After

FCAATSI's dethronement, no other national-level organization emerged. Indeed, government

officials claimed that the NACC was an attempt to create a national Indigenous voice. This

assertion, however, is dubious: to locate activists who had demonstrated their ability to rally

thousands of supporters, government officials needed to step no further than the Parliament's

front lawn. But government authorities probably loathed the idea of engaging with the Tent

Embassy activists. Indeed, part of the government's motivation to establish the NACC may have

been to create a competitor to the Tent Embassy. Or, perhaps government authorities viewed the

Tent Embassy activists as isolated extremists to be ignored and not rewarded with government

attention. I would argue that the government fails even the most generous scenario: that because

they did not view the Tent Embassy activists, or any others, as properly representing the

Indigenous peoples, the NACC was indeed an honest attempt to create a legitimate representative

"partner." If this was true, then why did the government attempt to discredit the elected NACC's

commissioners by suggesting they were not representative of "traditional" Indigenous peoples?

Indigenous representatives were only credible, from the government's perspective it seems, if they were toeing the government's line.

The role of Charlie Perkins, who "campaigned" in support of ATSIC, also complicated matters. Perkins advocated government employment as a way to infiltrate the power structure. If the grassroots movement had maintained its power and autonomy, a strategy of infiltrating the government with high-level activists, such as Perkins, may indeed have had its merits (similar to the co-operation, described by Tripp (2001), between government allies and grassroots activists in Uganda). But the employment of Indigenous Australian activists in low-level jobs drained the grassroots movement. Without an awareness of the risks and almost insurmountable restrictions the government could place on institutional activism, activists were vulnerable. Perhaps the experiences of NAC/NACC and ATSIC will provide contemporary Indigenous activists with the equivalent of the political netherworld's learning curve. In other words, because of their negative experiences, Indigenous activists may be on their way to developing an awareness of the risks of certain types of participation.

In the next section, I draw together the various theoretical and empirical strands to construct some general hypotheses about the factors and conditions that might tilt inclusion towards or away from co-optation.

Gaining "an understanding of the processes of co-optation"

If a group is weighing institutional participation, or is quasi-forced to participate, and would like to achieve the most benefit—which, in Gamson's (1968) terms, means acquiring concessions while sacrificing as little influence as possible—then such a group would do well to

heed Coy and Hedeen's advice: gain "an understanding of the processes of co-optation"[400]

One of the first steps towards this objective might include becoming aware of the factors that scholars and activists have associated with incorporation evolving (or rather, devolving) into co-optation. These factors can be grouped into five categories: (1) the impact of participation on movement representatives and leaders, (2) the strength and weaknesses of the movement, (3) the government's propensity toward neutrality or bias, (4) the corporatist arrangement as such, and (5) the movement's autonomy.

First, as Murphree, Wright, and Ebaugh's (1996) research on environmentalist activists demonstrated, close contact and extended negotiations may influence activist—particularly movement leaders and representatives—sentiments. The most obvious prescriptions one might glean from these insights is that movement participants, whether in negotiations or in corporatist arrangements, should minimize "fraternization," that is, their contact, social or otherwise, with authorities. If negotiations are involved, they should proceed according to a pre-determined time plan and not stretch on indefinitely. The rank-and-file members of the movement should have some way of influencing representatives, that is, accountability mechanisms should be in place in case representatives or leaders lose their challenger perspective. But a devil's advocate might ask: what if the leaders or representatives, through their contacts, acquire new information or viewpoints that might reveal misunderstandings or erroneous thinking on the part of the movement? Would it not be better for society as a whole if the movement saw its opponent's point of view and was subsequently becalmed? An accountability mechanism might operate optimally if seemingly co-opted movement representatives had a chance to present their findings

400. Coy and Hedeen, "A Stage Model of Social Movement Co-optation," 427-428.

before they lost their positions or were sanctioned. For this reason, I referred earlier to the abandonment of the co-opted environmental leaders as a "crude" form of an accountability mechanism.

Second, activists might want to consider the strength and weaknesses of their movement before they enter institutional participation. In their consideration of whether to participate electorally, Indígena activists, represented by CONAIE, chose not to participate partly because they feared (1) their movement was not yet strong enough to withstand the divisiveness associated with electoral politics; and (2) that participation might divert activists away from the movement's original goals. The value of such a self-appraisal is substantiated by Saward's (1990, 1991) finding that the movements that do best in corporatist arrangements are large, cohesive, have some measure of authority independent of the government, and espouse values salient to the public. Saward emphasized that because of these resources, states might need the movement's cooperation, which would tilt the balance of power to the movement. It might, therefore, behoove a movement anticipating institutional participation to strengthen itself, for example, by affiliating with other movements and groups, by framing its values in ways that generate public acceptance and sympathy, and/or accentuating to the government what it "brings to the table."

Third, because governments may indeed be biased against the interests of challengers, activists might want to assess both whether the ruling class and the state are comprised from the same groups and if the state has a history of bias. If the state is biased, then activists may want to take extra precautions to protect their interests or outright reject institutional participation. If the state has attempted to be unbiased or has implemented checks (such as legislation) on the

wielding of bias, such that decisions favoring different groups are arbitrary rather than by design, then participation may indeed be fruitful for challengers.

The fourth factor activists may want to consider is the costs and benefits of the proposed participation. What do challengers receive in exchange for the moderating effect participation is sure to have on their movement (and, as Piven and Cloward (1979) argued, the effect on the public's perceptions and support)? Indeed, activists may be well advised to consider the worst-case scenario for both the costs and the benefits, that is, they should anticipate that they will surrender more and receive less than their initial expectations. Additional questions activists might want to consider include: what level of authority will the participation afford them? Are they offered an advisory role or could they execute decisions and retain veto power over salient policies? Can policy changes be easily rolled back by the next regime? If yes, then sacrifices for potentially reversible decisions should be carefully weighed against investing movement resources in more lasting measures. In the past several years the Indígena movement, for example, has focused its energies on constitutional change. In the Indígena case, it may be that changing the actual structure of the government—through the country's highest legal code—may be the only way to overcome the system's bias.

Although the fifth issue, the movement's autonomy, underlies the other categories, activists should perhaps consider it separately because of its great importance in staving off co-optation. As my cases and data from other groups—such as the Ugandan women's movement and the restorative justice system in British Columbia—strongly suggests, activists should not place themselves in subordinate positions. The more dependent a challenger is on the government, the less leeway and power the challenger has to exert pressure. Thus, if a challenger

is "invited" into an arrangement in which decisions about the movement—for example, budget, goals, leadership choices—are subject to change by authorities, then co-optation is more likely than if challengers preserve autonomy over such domains.

Perhaps the assessments I suggest in this chapter seem a great deal to ask of challengers, and I acknowledge that only in an ideal situation could a movement address all these factors in weighing participation, but more awareness on the part of activists could help a movement avoid the worst-case scenario, which one could argue is exemplified by the Indigenous Australian movement's experience. And, as will be discussed more fully in the concluding chapter, today's challengers are often professional activists who receive NGO and UN guidance, who are in touch with a network of similar challenging groups, and who have access to the budding social movement self-help industry, which offers books and resources readily available via the internet if not the local book outlet. Not all challengers have attained such sophistication, but some have and many are catching up. Indeed, as I will argue in the next chapter, a group without sophisticated tools—such as the Indígenas—can nonetheless become aware of state bias, the hazards of participation, and the necessary mitigating measures they must undertake to counterbalance any bias and hazards.

<center>The State of Ecuador and Bias</center>

Before we proceed toward examining how Indígenas developed their awarenesses, it would seem prudent to assess whether the various governments of Ecuador have been biased. As Hay suggested, one should assess whether the state and the elite class are "drawn from the same

social groups in society."[401] And, indeed, for most of Ecuador's history, members of the ruling class—the Hispanics or as other scholars have more broadly described the elite class, the "dominant *blanco-mestizo* culture"—and the state originate from the same class.[402] That the Ecuadorian government has behaved hegemonically and promoted the interests of the elites is unquestionable to many observers of Ecuadorian politics. This hegemony began with the creation of the Ecuadorian state: "In a Gramscian perspective, the state is devoted to establishing political and social hegemony for the Hispanic Ecuadorian elite. Since Ecuador's independence, the political elite have strived to create a national identity and a set of institutions to support it."[403] This dominance persisted even after Ecuador's transformation into a democracy. "Although electoral 'democratic' political regimes have been frequent (albeit routinely interrupted by military coups, abdications and exile, and so on) in Ecuador in the 20th century, they have had little to do with empowering the majority or with equity concerns. Rather, electoral regimes primarily reflect rampant personal opportunism and persistent conflict in the interests and views of the dominant elites and classes. . . ."[404] As suggested earlier, I believe that the Indígenas, particularly from the Sierra region, have attained a widespread appreciation of the possibility of government bias and for the dangers of government engagement. In the next chapter, we will explore the various theories that might explain such awareness.

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401. Hay, "Employers' Attitudes to Social Policy and the Concept of Social Control, 1900-1920," 112.
402. Becker, "Comunas and Indigenous Protest in Cayambe, Ecuador," 535.
403. Selverston, "The Politics of Culture," 148.
404. Robert C. Dash, "Introduction," in "Ecuador, Part 1: Politics and Rural Issues," *Latin American Perspectives* 24, no. 3 (May 1997): 4. Zamosc also observed "Instead of acting as an impartial entity that protected the interests of the entire nation, the state appeared to the majority of Ecuadorians as an agent of the most powerful groups." "The Indian Movement in Ecuador," 143. For other scholarship on hegemonic states in Latin America, see Van Cott, "Indigenous Peoples and Democracy."

Conclusion

States employ a range of social control methods to reduce the influence of challengers, from violence and outright oppression to more conciliatory tactics. Among the "gentler" methods is incorporation, whereby states attempt to assimilate challengers into state structures. While states portray such arrangements as providing challengers with "voice," both scholars and activists alike have observed that incorporation can easily lead to dependency on the government, rendering movements vulnerable to government influence and manipulation ("capture"). As two scholars commented on the relationship between participation and autonomy: "The price of political inclusion for social movements is the loss of their autonomy— the very quality that provides them the space necessary for a creative re-imagining of the social world."[405] Some scholars use the term co-optation to refer to the dependency and disadvantages to a movement that may accrue through incorporation, while others use the terms incorporation and co-optation interchangeably to mean both the process of incorporation as well as its potentially negative outcome. I prefer to distinguish between incorporation and co-optation. Both involve engagement with the government, but I believe scholars could have more meaningful discussions if incorporation was viewed as participation that produces, from the movement's perspective, either a benign or sum positive outcome. Co-optation, on the other hand, is a counterproductive outcome, in that the challenging movement gains only symbolic or token power and, in exchange, compromises its ability to protest extrainstitutionally.

Perhaps scholars have shied away from making a strong distinction between the two concepts because, as Gamson (1968) wrote forty years ago, one cannot predict the result of

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405. Andrew Woolford and R.S. Ratner, "Nomadic Justice? Restorative Justice on the Margins of Law," *Social Justice* 30 (2003): 179.

incorporation. While no one can definitively prognosticate whether participation in

government institutions will result in incorporation (voice) or co-optation (capture), insights

from scholarship as well as my case data indicate that five categories of factors might be

important in assessing whether incorporation may lead to co-optation. For example, co-optation

seems more likely to occur if the challenging group is dependent on the government.

Dependency is more probable if the group does not possess unique knowledge, skills, or status

and has a small membership base, weak unity, and espouses values either uninteresting or

offensive to the general public. Based on the experiences of Indigenous Australians, I suggested

that co-optation is more likely to occur if the arrangement requires challengers to rely on

government financing; and if the inclusion provides for an advisory rather than policy making

capacity. I also suggested that, if they detect the government has a bias toward promoting the

interests of a dominant group, activists are right to be wary of joining corporatist arrangements:

when the political system provides few checks on the implementation of that bias, challengers

might be better served by pressing their demands in some other venue.

These insights were culled mainly from data and scholarship featuring government-social

movement dyads, but could also be applied to business-social movement/NGO relations. As an

activist formally with Amnesty International's Business Group related to me, co-optation is a

concern for every type of challenger.[406] For groups like Amnesty International or Greenpeace,

even the hint of co-optation may offend its members (and hinder donations). The theme of the

2008 World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland was "Collaborative Innovation." While

closer relations between industry or government and their opponents, or "collaborative

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406. Personal correspondence with James Farrar, January 26, 2008.

innovation," may indeed "hold the solution to many of the vexing problems facing our shrinking planet," they may conversely provide a fig leaf for superficial industry or government "concessions" in exchange for the legitimacy rendered by the appearance of cooperation.[407] As the experiences of the Indígena and Indigenous Australian movements indicate, activists can only benefit from being aware of any potential consequences of engagement. How this awareness is developed and how it informs activist choices are among the topics I address in the next chapter.

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407. Quote from Don Tapscott, Davos fellow and presenter, in "Ten Talking Points for Davos," *Business Week*, January 16, 2008. http://www.businessweek.com.

CHAPTER 7

Consciousness: How it is Generated, How it is Wielded

To think is to act.

—Ralph Waldo Emerson, "Spiritual Laws"

Introduction

In chapter 6 I argued that co-optation is counterproductive institutional participation. Not only does such participation compromise a movement's ability to exert pressure extrainstitutionally, it also incurs associated costs to a movement which are considerably higher than any realizable gains. This was the case of the Indigenous Australians, whose activists found themselves bound to external obligations through their institutional participation, reducing the movement to disarray. While the prevalent social movement theories can satisfactorily explain the co-optation of the Indigenous Australian movement, as indicated in chapter 5, it remains unclear how the Indígena movement eluded co-optation.

I submit that one crucial reason the Indígena movement for many years resisted incorporation and other forms of institutional participation was because numerous activists were aware of the risk of co-optation and the potential repercussions of certain types of participation. To explain these awarenesses, I review the salient models of awareness, or consciousness, that appear regularly in the social movement literature. Most conceptualizations of consciousness only consider, at least explicitly, the basic level of consciousness that activists must possess in

order to undertake collective action.[408] This consciousness entails "identifying with members

of a subordinate group, identifying injustices done to that group, opposing those injustices, and

seeing the group as having a shared interest in ending or diminishing those injustices."[409] I argue

that the Indígenas not only manifested this basic consciousness but also wielded more advanced

awarenesses: they appeared to have understood the processes of domination and subjugation

underlying some forms of institutional participation. This higher degree of consciousness extends

beyond the basic consciousness and, I argue, is best explained by Morris and Braine's (2001) and

Mansbridge's (2001) notion of a mature oppositional consciousness.

A mature oppositional consciousness connotes activists "seeing certain actions of the

dominant group as forming a 'system' of some kind that advances the interests of the dominant

group."[410] As discussed in chapter 6, if such a dominant group also holds or influences the reins

of government power, then the government may very well be the articulator of elite bias, which

would compromise the government's ability to be a fair and just partner for negotiations or

corporatist arrangements. In such biased circumstances, the government may seek to reduce the

influence and increase the dependence of challengers in order to reproduce elite dominance.

During the time period I cover, I believe that many Indígenas not only possessed a mature

oppositional consciousness and were aware of their government's bias, but they were also

cognizant of the importance of their movement's autonomy to counter bias and subjugation.

Thus, I refer to their form of a mature oppositional consciousness as an *autonomy consciousness*.

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408. Scholars use different terms to denote "consciousness": for example, some refer to it simply as consciousness, others as political consciousness. In their coedited volume, Mansbridge and Morris (2001) use the term oppositional consciousness.

409. Jane Mansbridge, "The Making of Oppositional Consciousness," in Mansbridge and Morris, *Oppositional Consciousness*, 5.

410. Aldon Morris and Naomi Braine, "Social Movements and Oppositional Consciousness," in Mansbridge and Morris, *Oppositional Consciousness,* 26.

While scholars have theorized as to how the basic level of consciousness is created, no one has yet offered a possible explanation as to the genesis of a more advanced level of consciousness. In my analysis of the Indígena case, I suggest that an autonomy consciousness was acquired directly through first- and second-hand learning and diffused beyond those initial learning opportunities through the mechanism of norm adoption. To support my arguments, I supply three instances which I believe demonstrate how exposure to certain "learning experiences" resulted in the development and manifestation of an autonomy consciousness.

Despite my emphasis on the importance of an autonomy consciousness, I do not, however, consider it alone as sufficient to avoid co-optation. The Indigenous Australian movement, for example, contained activists who possessed an autonomy consciousness (as mentioned earlier, because of their preference for extrainstitutional means, I refer to these activists as *radicals*). But they were unable to prevail over activists who preferred institutional participation (whom I call *moderates*). Indeed, research indicates that many movements contain both radical and moderate elements; that is, those who oppose and those who support institutional participation. The question is: how did Indígena radicals manage to overcome the inclinations of Indígena moderates? After all, as Kriesi et al. (1995) argued, governments are constantly appealing to moderates: to engage with the government is, in many ways, the path of least resistance.

I argue that radical Indígenas were able to surmount moderate tendencies through three interrelated "mechanisms." First, because they represented the region with the greatest number of Indígenas—the Sierra Highlands—the radicals within the Indígena movement were able to dominate the peak-level SMO, CONAIE. Second, because they controlled CONAIE, it was

radical norms, as opposed to the norms of moderates, that were spread to the rest of Ecuador. The third mechanism is closely related to the first two: because of radical dominance of CONAIE, it was the radicals who were able to levy sanctions. These sanctions, while directed at wayward moderate leaders, nonetheless had at least two additional target audiences: rank-and-file activists with moderate tendencies and the government. Thus, radical sanctions, by tarring some forms of institutional involvement as illegitimate and treacherous, tempered mass support for participation and neutralized the government's ability to exploit cooperation with moderates. To support these arguments, I present two examples that demonstrate the sanctioning of wayward participation and its effect, and one example in which sanctions were ineffective.

In simple terms, my core argument is that disadvantageous institutional participation can be resisted and co-optation avoided if a movement contains activists with an autonomy consciousness who perceive a form of participation as counterproductive and dominate a powerful, preferably peak-level organization, through which they can levy meaningful sanctions. Because of the vast differences between the Australian and Ecuadorian governments and the Indigenous Australian and Indígena movements, one cannot make direct comparisons between the two cases. However, it is interesting to note that the main factor—radical domination of a strong peak-level organization—that made sanctions effective in the Indígena case was indeed lacking in the Indigenous Australian case.

Models of Consciousness

The four conceptualizations of consciousness I will review are: Freire's (1970a, 1970b) "conscientization", McAdam's (1988, 1999) cognitive liberation, Mansbridge (2001) and Morris

and Braine's (2001) oppositional consciousness, and Hanchard's (1994) Gramscian analysis

of Brazilian race relations (although Gramscian tenets also underlie the Mansbridge and Morris

volume). Subtle variations exist among the different scholars' notions of consciousness, but all

assume that some basic level of consciousness is required for collective action. The scholars

diverge, however, in their understandings of what level of awareness activists can achieve; and,

as will be discussed later, of how consciousness develops.

Freire was a Brazilian-born educator, activist, and (briefly) Harvard professor who

published two articles in 1970 outlining his belief that the capacity for critical thinking one

develops while attaining literacy can be applied to far more than words on a page. The ability to

decode writing, according to Freire, is the same ability required to decode the world one lives in.

Thus, impoverished illiterates, by learning to read, also learn the skills for examining their life

situation and for assessing whether it is just. Rather than accepting things as they are, the newly

literate can reflect and, perhaps most importantly, imagine and take the actions necessary to

transform reality. Through this process, called *conscientization* by Freire, people move from

"submersion to semi-intransitiveness to full emergence:" that is, full awareness.[411] Freire's

notions coincided with Vatican II and were adopted by liberation theologists: in many Latin

American countries, religious activists relied on Freire's philosophy. In Ecuador, for example,

activists held Freire-inspired consciousness raising workshops and other tools to "awaken"

Indígenas by "helping them to become aware of their situation and supporting them in their

struggle for social change."[412]

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411. Freire, "Cultural Action and Conscientization," 477; and Paulo Freire, "The Adult Literacy Process as Cultural Action for Freedom," *Harvard Educational Review* 40, no. 2 (May 1970a): 205-225.
412. Pallares, *From Peasant Struggles to Indian Resistance*, 151.

Freire's theory arose from the educational field, but the roots of McAdam's (1988, 1999) notion of cognitive liberation lay in political process theory and the social movement field. Cognitive liberation, however, shares certain elements with Freire's work, particularly the notion that as the world opens to people, so does the truth of their circumstances. Whereas Freire found the source of an individual's liberation—or the opening of his or her world—in achieving literacy, McAdam emphasized integration in a group as the catalyzing environment for individual liberation. To become cognizant that the system, and not the individual him- or herself, is at fault, necessitates interpersonal relationships. The other catalysts for liberation are structural inputs—"shifting political conditions"—indicating the system's vulnerability.[413] With these two elements—structural cues and group integration—individuals are primed for cognitive liberation.

The various degrees of awareness that characterize the basic level of consciousness needed to undertake collective action were manifested by many Indígenas. But the Indígena awareness extended further; they recognized not only the system's illegitimacy but the hegemonic intentions of those who dominated the system. Thus, whereas a basic level of consciousness empowers challengers to take action, *the Indígena activists manifested an additional capacity for thinking critically about the state, elites, and their intentions*. With this greater awareness of the underlying mechanisms of domination, Indígenas resisted and rejected overtures and arrangements that they believed were counterproductive. In sum, the level of consciousness the Indígenas manifested entailed more than the basic consciousness that McAdam and Freire deemed necessary for collective action.

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413. McAdam, *Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency*, 1930-1970, 49.

This more advanced awareness may implicitly be part of Freire and McAdam's

theories, but is better captured by Gramsci-inspired works, such as those by Hanchard (1994),

Morris and Braine (2001), and Mansbridge (2001), which are more *explicit* about the presence of

state (and society) bias.[414] In his analysis of race relations in Brazil, Hanchard (1994)

emphasized the contradictory consciousness rampant throughout Brazilian society and the need

for challengers to form counterhegemonic organizations to undermine the meanings and values

of the dominant group. In their coedited volume, *Oppositional Consciousness*, Mansbridge

(2001) and Morris and Braine (2001) introduced the notion of a mature oppositional

consciousness, which incorporates the dimensions of a basic level of consciousness found in

earlier concepts—such as by Freire and by McAdam—with an even higher level of

consciousness.

According to Morris and Braine, a mature oppositional consciousness connotes that

activists can identify injustices—part of the basic consciousness required for collective action—

and, furthermore, can specify a "dominant group as causing and in some way benefiting from

those injustices. It also includes seeing certain actions of the dominant group as forming a

'system' of some kind that advances the interests of the dominant group."[415] And, according to

Mansbridge, it additionally includes "some set of strategies—historical, culturally derived, or

borrowed—for ending the system of domination."[416] In light of the statements, actions, and

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414. For a discussion of Gramsci and hegemony, see Aldon D. Morris, "Political Consciousness and Collective Action," in Morris and Mueller, *Frontiers in Social Movement Theory*, 351-373.
415. Morris and Braine, "Social Movements and Oppositional Consciousness," 26. By using the word "system" as opposed to "the state" in their conceptualization, Morris and Braine were likely referring to the Gramscian concept that elite dominance pervades a society in myriad subtle ways that extend beyond the obvious power of the state. In this chapter, however, I will focus on hegemony through the state; an examination of the more veiled means of domination will be reserved for later work.
416. Mansbridge, "The Making of Oppositional Consciousness," 15.

choices of many Indígena activists, I would argue that they manifest a version of a mature

oppositional consciousness. Thus, although I agree with Hanchard's assertion that a challenging

group is best served by counterhegemonic organizations and will return to this point later, I find

that the notion of a mature consciousness more aptly describes the Indígena mindset than the

conceptualizations provided by other scholars.

Manifestations of a Mature Oppositional Consciousness

The Indígena version of a mature oppositional consciousness, I submit, constitutes a set

of intertwined awarenesses: an understanding that (1) the state is biased toward favoring the

interests of the dominant group; *and* (2) elite dominance is secured through Indígena subjugation

and dependence; *and* (3) a crucial method by which elites forge dependence is the disruption of

Indígena autonomy; *and* (4) the best way to subvert elite bias is to maintain Indígena autonomy.

I see a direct link between the Indígena perception of bias and their cognizance that dependence

on the government works to fortify dominant elites whereas Indígena autonomy strengthens

activists' capacity to challenge the system. Thus, because of their understanding as to how the

system works, Indígenas valued the autonomy of their movement.

Several scholars have noted the Indígena movement's emphasis on autonomy.[417] The

prioritization of movement autonomy has been particularly apparent in CONAIE. As one scholar

conveyed, "Analysis of CONAIE's discourse (as expressed in its documents and in the

declarations of its leaders) indicates that its strategy from the beginning has been governed by

417. Collins referred to the "deeply entrenched autonomy within the political culture and practice of Ecuador's indigenous movement." "Democratizing Formal Politics," 199. Pallares observed that the organizations focused on indigenous rights "struggled to achieve unprecedented autonomy as political actors speaking for and representing themselves in exchanges and negotiations with state authorities." *From Peasant Struggles to Indian Resistance*, 22.

two basic principles: the conviction that the struggle must be focused entirely on the aspirations of Indians as Indians, and *preservation of the autonomy of the Indian peoples and the Indian movement at all costs*."[418] It should be noted that the argument that a mature oppositional consciousness led to an acute appreciation for autonomy is an extension of, but not part of, Morris and Braine's (2001) or Mansbridge's (2001) work. To distinguish my particular understanding of how a mature oppositional consciousness can manifest itself, I will refer, where appropriate, to the Indígena consciousness as an *autonomy consciousness*.

What does the possession of any of these consciousnesses provide to challengers? The most basic form of consciousness—a shared awareness of and opposition to injustice and a belief in the efficacy of collective action—is required for a group to undertake collective action. But if a government is biased and activists are insensible of that bias, activists may misperceive government intentions, embrace an unwarranted sanguine perspective, and invest their resources in less than productive goals (as did FCAATSI activists with the 1967 Referendum, which contained no mechanisms impelling the government to act; instead, activists trusted the government to act on their behalf, which it did not). Activists with a more advanced consciousness, however, have an understanding of systems of domination and how to subvert them and are therefore more distrusting of the government. In the next section, I hypothesize on how the more advanced consciousnesses arise.

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418. Zamosc, "Agrarian Protest and the Indian Movement in the Ecuadorian Highlands," 61 (my emphasis).

The Genesis of a Mature Oppositional Consciousness

While scholars have theorized as to how the basic level of consciousness emerges, no one

has yet offered an explanation as to the generation of a mature oppositional consciousness.

Regarding the basic level of consciousness, Freire (1970a, 1970b) believed that it could be

purposefully taught; McAdam (1988, 1999) emphasized the disadvantages of isolation and the

need for an individual to be embedded in a group, but his concept has been criticized for its

vagueness regarding how consciousness is actually acquired.[419] Other scholars have also found

teaching and connectedness to be important. Sharon Groch argued that in order to develop the

basic consciousness, activists require a "free space" in which they can communicate without

dominant group interference. Within these free spaces, activists can further their awareness of

group difference, inequality, and the injustice of the inequality.[420] Russell Hardin also focused

on communication and information sharing: "One of the most important ways information

affects groups is in giving group members an understanding of their common interests. . . .

Workers in a factory share so much time together that they begin to understand their common

fate much better, not least because each can benefit from the insights of all. Peasants scattered

across the countryside cannot spend enough time together to gain a comparable sense of class

identity."[421] Sharon Erickson Nepstad (1997) studied Central American peace activists and

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419. As Sharon Erickson Nepstad remarks: "The stages of cognitive liberation are useful, but how [McAdam's] transformation of consciousness occurs is not sufficiently explained." "The Process of Cognitive Liberation: Cultural Synapses, Links, and Frame Contradictions in the U.S.-Central America Peace Movement," *Sociological Inquiry* 67, no. 4 (November 1997): 471.

420. Groch noted that although segregation itself is necessary, "both the *degree* and the *nature* of the segregation influence the formation of oppositional consciousness;" thus, activists need segregation free from dominant group interference. "Free Spaces: Creating Oppositional Consciousness in the Disability Rights Movement," in Mansbridge and Morris, *Oppositional Consciousness*, 66. In the same volume, Morris and Braine also discussed the relationship between group segregation and consciousness development, see "Social Movements and Oppositional Consciousness."

421. Russell Hardin, *One for All: The Logic of Group Conflict* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), 55.

found that people obtained an awareness of injustice—a crucial element of developing an

oppositional consciousness—by witnessing injustice first-hand, hearing about an injustice, or

being directly challenged by activists to notice the injustice. My research indicates that learning,

either first- or second-hand, may also be crucial for the formation of a more advanced

consciousness.

To pinpoint the phenomena that may have contributed to an autonomy consciousness, I

compare the histories and past experiences of those who, I believe, possessed an autonomy

consciousness against those who lacked one.[422] As the Indígena case history only provides three

such "instances" my conclusions will be hypothetical rather than definitive. I have nonetheless

attempted to make my assessments systematically and in line with the process tracing

methodology advised by George and Bennett (2004). Charles Ragin's (1994) guidance on how to

isolate causal factors and variables has also informed my approach.

In each of the instances I examine, I search for the factors that may have contributed to

the development of the awarenesses—of the government's desire to subjugate Indígenas and

subvert their autonomy and of the need for autonomy—associated with an autonomy

consciousness; and assess whether the presence of the awarenesses resulted in behavioral

differences. The question I seek to answer is: did activists with an autonomy consciousness react

differently to government engagement than those without such a consciousness? One instance

will be examined using what George and Bennett termed a "before-after" analysis, in which I

compare the group's preferences before and after the development of an autonomy consciousness

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422. According to Mansbridge, "groups can be said to 'have' or 'gain' oppositional consciousness whenever most individuals in them develop an oppositional consciousness." "Complicating Oppositional Consciousness," 243. As I have no way of measuring if most individuals developed an autonomy consciousness or not, my assessment on a group's possession of one is based on their statements and actions.

and analyze the factors that changed.[423] In the other two instances, I compare the histories and experiences of relatively similar groups that manifest different levels of consciousness.

Through an analysis of these instances, I hypothesize that the Indígena autonomy consciousness was learned through first- and second-hand learning experiences. Because of interactions with the government, in which it became transparent that the government was promoting elite over Indígena interests, I would conjecture that Indígenas learned this awareness, first-hand, as the result of what Buskens and Raub (2002) call a *trust game*. Second-hand learning occurred through the consciousness-raising efforts of leftists, in the early part of the century, and by liberation theologists in the 1960s and 1970s. Although it may be unconventional to consider exposure to Marxism as consciousness-raising, leftist objectives were the same as those of liberation theologists and are encompassed by scholarly conceptualizations of consciousness-raising, which, according to Chong and Rogers, "refers to the diffusion of an ideology that bolsters group pride and identification, diagnoses group problems, offers prescriptive solutions, and encourages group members to act in solidarity to achieve common ends."[424]

First Instance: Divergent Reactions to the *Ley de Comunas*

The first indication of an autonomy consciousness was the reaction of many Indígena communities to the 1937 *Ley de Comunas*. This legislation provided Indígena communities with government aid if, in exchange, those communities would undergo a legalization process that

423. George and Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*, 166-167.
424. Dennis Chong and Reuel Rogers, "Racial Solidarity and Political Participation," Political Behavior 27, no. 4 (December 2005): 347.

entailed requirements such as registering with the government, submitting the comuna's

bylaws for approval, providing detailed information about the comuna's members and assets, and

allowing a non-Indígena overseer to participate in annual meetings. While many communities

did register, activists in areas with leftist political organization and unions, such as the

Highland[425] canton of Cayambe, "interpreted this legislation as a means for the elite to assimilate

rural Indian communities into the emerging dominant *blanco-mestizo* culture and to undermine

nascent leftist organizing efforts."[426] Between 1937 and 1964 only seven comunas were formed

in Cayambe, whereas hundreds were inaugurated elsewhere.

The connection between the presence of leftist political organization and Indígena

eschewal of government "assistance" and supervision hardly seems coincidental. The leaders

who rejected comunas were, in the words of historian Marc Becker, "politically astute." As

Becker implied in his analysis, this astuteness arose from their knowledge gained through their

leftist political experience.[427] As opposed to Indígenas in areas without leftist organization, the

Cayambe leaders had received leftist teachings and had learned about exploitation; thus, they

reacted to the government initiative with suspicion and "recognized the legislation for what it

was," which Becker described as "an assimilating force which worked against their own self

interests."[428] As we shall see shortly, this assessment unfortunately proved correct.

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425. Many analysts refer to the Sierra as the Highlands and to the Amazon region as the Lowlands. When discussing Indígenas from both regions, as I do later, analysts commonly use the terms Highlander and Lowlander rather than, for example, Sierra Indígenas. Also, Lowlanders refers to the peoples indigenous to the region as well as the Quichua-speakers who live there.

426. Becker, "Comunas and Indigenous Protest in Cayambe, Ecuador," 535.

427. Ibid., 535.

428. Ibid., first quote from 557, second from 558. Scholars hold different views on the comuna program, with some, such as Korovkin, noting both its positive and negative attributes; see her "Reinventing the Communal Tradition." Although Becker is critical of the comuna program, particularly in its early years, he acknowledged that many communities did eventually learn how to use it to their advantage. What neither Becker nor any other scholar demonstrates is whether the government, in later years, eased its manipulation and control of communities through

To summarize, in this first instance, Indígenas with many similarities—for example, from the Sierra Highlands and sharing the same poverty and oppression—reacted differently to the government's comuna program. The main difference between the groups was that the Indígenas from Cayambe had been exposed to leftist teachings. I argue that these teachings contributed to their awareness that this legislation would further the government's interests and counter Indígena interests. The second instance I present also deals with the comuna program, but demonstrates, via a before-after comparison, how first-hand learning functions.

<div align="center">Second Instance: Halting Participation in the Comuna Program</div>

Whereas many communities with leftist organization eschewed the comuna system, communities in cantons without a strong leftist presence accepted the system. Unfortunately for these communities, once the government had statutory influence, it exploited the comuna system as a way of controlling the communities. The government obstructed actions that conflicted with the interests of the dominant groups, for example, by rejecting a bylaw to restrict alcohol because of its impact on the alcohol industry; it also struck down proposals to lease hacienda land, in order to allow non-Indígena Ecuadorians to lease it.

The government also rejected bylaws and the elections of leaders that would have strengthened Indígena unity and political capacity. A bylaw was rejected, for example, which called for comuna leaders to "cultivate relations with other comunas throughout the country in order to work for the cultural advance of the people."[429] The government annulled the election of

the program. In other words, if, over time, the program became more of a pure assistance program and less a means of government control, then perhaps this difference explains how communities were later able to use it to their advantage.

429. Becker, "Comunas and Indigenous Protest in Cayambe, Ecuador," 548.

leaders known for their activism and appointed compliant leaders; such reallocations of power often roiled intra-community tensions. In sum, the government portrayed the comuna concept as helping the Indígena communities, but, over time, Indígenas became aware that the program was a conduit for the extension of government control and manipulation. "Without a sense that the comuna benefited the community, interest and participation in the comuna declined and sometimes comunas would disappear entirely. This was not because of reactionary, isolationist, or traditionalist attitudes, but the result of a government in which they had no voice or citizenship rights which now wanted to micro-manage their local affairs. From this recognition, it was one small step to reject entirely the comuna structure."[430] In many areas, participation and interest in the comuna scheme tapered off and by 1972, less than half of the communities registered as comunas were still submitting the required information.

I would argue that these contractual-like interactions with the government constitute what Buskens and Raub's conceptualized as a *trust game*. In a trust game, trust is based on two mechanisms, either on past experience with a partner (learning) or on the possibility that some third party will sanction the trustee for untrustworthiness (control). Because Indígenas, particularly in the 1930s, had not been able to rely on other parties to sanction government duplicity, our attention will focus on the learning mechanism. According to Buskens and Raub, "Learning refers to the possibility for actors to improve their choices in given interactions using experiences from *past* interactions."[431] Information about a trustee "can be obtained from the focal actor's past interactions with the trustee or from third parties who had interactions with the

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430. Ibid., 555.
431. Vincent Buskens and Werner Raub, "Embedded Trust: Control and Learning," in *Group Cohesion, Trust and Solidarity, Advances in Group Processes* 19 (2002), 170.

trustee."[432] Trust is placed when the trustor believes it will be honored and withheld when the experience of the trustor or other parties indicates untrustworthiness. The trustee will either abuse or honor trust based on which alternative offers the larger payoff.

If the comuna experience is depicted as a trust game, then we can hypothesize that the trustee, the Ecuadorian government, abused the trust of the Indígenas because the state gauged that a larger payoff would be gained by using the comuna arrangement not just as a development tool, but to control Indígenas and keep them from threatening elite interests. From the side of the Indígena communities—the trustor—once they realized that the government was untrustworthy and was exploiting the system, they rejected the arrangement "because the trustor is better off not placing trust than when she does place trust and trust is abused."[433] In trust game terms, one could say the experience taught the communities, on a local and personal level, that government initiatives were Trojan horses and that the government's priorities—even in programs designed putatively to aid Indígenas—were actually control, manipulation, and the preservation of the economic and political dominance of the elites. In other words, the government sought to reproduce and maintain Indígena subjugation, and hundreds of communities responded by eschewing government funds in favor of their autonomy.

In sum, Indígena communities accepted the comuna program when they believed it was purely an assistance program. After learning that the government would also use the program as a way to control them, many comunas exited the program. The before-after difference represents the knowledge gained of the government's untrustworthiness and the government's desire to subvert Indígena unity and autonomy.

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432. Ibid., 170-171.
433. Ibid., 169.

As the first two instances both took place in the Highlands, we should expect that an autonomy consciousness is more entrenched in the Highlands than in areas such as the Lowlands, where similar types of learning experiences did not occur. For the third instance, I examine differences between Highlanders and Lowlanders, particularly the behavior of Lowland leaders.

Third Instance: Different Degrees of Consciousness in the Highlands and Lowlands

Scholars note that, once Lowlanders became politically active at the national level, Highland and Lowland activists approached political participation differently. Whereas Highlanders were, as I have described, suspicious of government engagement, had a preference for extrainstitutional participation, and prioritized the movement's autonomy; Lowland leaders had what I would call a more "flexible" approach. They pursued institutional participation and seemed less concerned than Highlanders about preserving the movement's autonomy or unity. One scholar colorfully depicts the differences: "*Serranos*, lowland Indians will say, have been tainted and confused by the Western traditions of Marxism and union-style strikes. *Amazónicos*, respond highland Kichwas, are *gobiernistas* preferring to dialogue with the state and foreign corporations rather than to take to the streets."[434] Activists from the two regions also, initially, held divergent views on electoral politics. At CONAIE's 1988 assembly, for example, "two positions emerged. One (held largely though not exclusively by amazonian organizations) saw elections as a means to gain political space, advance the indigenous agenda, and obtain resources for indigenous community development projects. The other position (held largely though not

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434. Lucero, "Locating the 'Indian Problem'," 37-38.

exclusively by highland organizations), asserted that elections are a continuation of the

'system' and are to be approached with serious caution, if not avoided entirely."[435]

The more "flexible" approach is particularly apparent in the choices and actions of

Lowland leaders. Examples of their preferences for government engagement and institutional

participation, even in the face of CONAIE's implicit and to some extent explicit interdictions,

include: the acceptance, and perhaps even initiation, of the establishment of the ethnic-cultural

ministry in 1996 (unbeknownst to CONAIE even though the leaders were CONAIE members);

Antonio Vargas' participation in the 2000 coup, without first consulting CONAIE, and his later

decision to run for president without CONAIE's approval or support; Lowlanders' instrumental

role in creating Pachakutik without CONAIE's knowledge or involvement; Valerio Grefa's May

1996 endorsement of a mainstream presidential candidate not supported by CONAIE, though

supposedly speaking on behalf of Pachakutik; and, once in office, Lowland legislative delegates'

tendencies to be vulnerable to clientelistic pressures as well as to abandon their Pachakutik

affiliation.[436] From the Sierra side, the only prominent examples of institutional participation

were José Quimbo's acceptance of a controversial government post in 1992 and the assistance of

Highlanders in Pachakutik's creation.

I argue that the behavioral differences of Highland and Lowland leaders indicates that the

awarenesses comprising an autonomy consciousness—of state bias and the need for autonomy to

subvert the bias—were more strongly entrenched in the Sierra and weaker—particularly among

the leaders—in the Amazon. Because I did not interview Amazonian activists and directly

435. Andolina, "Colonial Legacies and Plurinational Imaginaries," 216.
436. Collins, "Democratizing Formal Politics," see chapter 5 for a thorough discussion of clientelistic pressures and party disaffiliation.

inquire as to their motivations, I limit my arguments to hypothetical conjectures and theorizing. However, my belief that the differences in behavior—and consciousness, as I argue—are real is substantiated by the fact that scholars, including those cited earlier, have documented such differences.[437]

To explain the differences between the Highland and Lowland leaders, particularly in the 1990s and later, I will explore how their backgrounds led to contrasting preferences. As the creation of CONAIE facilitated the exchange of influence between the two regions, primarily from the Highlands to the Lowlands, my explanation must also account for why Lowland leaders preferred institutional participation even after exposure to Highland norms. I will thus break my explanation down into a series of steps. First, I elaborate how the beginnings of an autonomy consciousness in the Sierra, wrought through the comuna "lessons" of the 1930s, were reinforced by other experiences. Second, I argue that the behavioral dictates ensuing from an autonomy consciousness—reacting to government initiatives with suspicion, eschewing potentially counterproductive participation, and prioritizing movement autonomy—can be understood as norms. Moreover, these norms have become institutionalized throughout the Sierra. Third, I argue that, through the Highlanders' dominance of CONAIE, their norms have become the central norms of the movement. Lowlanders, however, had developed a different, more flexible, approach to the government and consequently, Lowland leaders resisted adopting the new norms because they, of all activists, "would be worse off" by abhorring institutional participation.[438]

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437. Differences in behavior were reported by Collins, "Democratizing Formal Politics;" and by Beck and Mijeski, "Barricades and Ballots."

438. Chong provided four reasons ("mechanisms of defense") to explain why someone would not adopt a new norm. One reason is the belief that "one does better" under the old norm. According to Chong, either because of a lack of skills or entrenched identifications, "these people are made worse off by the new norm." *Rational Lives: Norms and Values in Politics and Society* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000), 76 and 78.

Finally, I also suggest that rank-and-file Lowlanders, in contrast to their leaders, may have either accepted the norms or chosen to respect them. This detail becomes important when I later examine how autonomy-minded activists have been able to overcome the participation preferences of more moderate activists.

First, in addition to the first- and second-hand experiences of the comuna program, the Highlanders underwent other experiences that brought awareness of government bias and the need for autonomy to the fore: namely, centuries of hacienda abuse and the consciousness-raising efforts of liberation theologists in the 1960s and 1970s.

I posit that one source of first-hand learning for the Indígenas was the abusive hacienda system. For centuries, the governments and elites of Ecuador condoned and benefited from the quasi-slavery of the Highland Indígenas in the hacienda system. Although the Agrarian Reforms, carried out by the military government, were supposedly intended to reform the economy by dismantling the hacienda system and freeing Indígena workers, the actual implementation revealed the government's persistent bias for elite over Indígena interests. Hacienda-owners were, of course, negatively affected by the reforms; but the government still protected their interests as much as possible by not completely abolishing the system and limiting the redistribution of land to Indígenas. Indeed, instead of crippling hacienda-owners by giving away too much of their land, the government instituted Highlander colonization of uninhabited parts of the Amazon. This perspective gives weight to the speculations of some scholars that the Agrarian Reforms were conducted not to help Indígenas, but rather to appease the U.S. government and reduce the risk of a Castro-style revolution.

An additional source of "learning" was provided by liberation theologists, who conducted consciousness-raising seminars in the Sierra. By 1975, more than a thousand Indígenas had been exposed to consciousness-raising courses and others had received similar training via other means.[439] An example, provided by Pallares, of how one liberation theology priest conducted his course illustrates how political consciousness was created. To show local Indígenas how one of their festivals might actually be a tool of oppression, the priest "began to promote the open discussion of [Indígenas'] needs in a religious context. [Indígena] participants analyzed their own socioeconomic subordination, focusing particularly on the unjust and un-Christian nature of the fiestas and on their abuse at the hands of the authorities. A common conclusion reported in the minutes of these meetings was that the fiestas were a form of exploitation and should be eliminated."[440] Thus, Indígenas, by learning to think critically about their own interests versus dominant interests and bias, developed an understanding of how their participation in the fiestas worked to their disadvantage.

Thus far I have focused on first- and second-hand learning to demonstrate how an autonomy consciousness took root in the Sierra. But for an autonomy consciousness to become widespread, it would have to be extended beyond those individuals who directly encountered either first- or second-hand learning.

The second part of my Highlander-Lowlander comparison requires an understanding that the behavioral dictates of an autonomy consciousness—reacting to government engagement with

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439. Pallares, *From Peasant Struggles to Indian Resistance*. Although not specific to Ecuador, Gamson also documented liberation theology consciousness-raising in Latin America, see "Commitment and Agency in Social Movements."

440. Pallares, *From Peasant Struggles to Indian Resistance*, 125. In the original, Pallares refers to the Indígenas by their local name, *Cacha*. To avoid confusion, I have changed her references to "Indígenas".

suspicion, eschewing institutional participation, and prioritizing autonomy—are norms. As such, we can understand their diffusion beyond those Indígenas who initially learned them as form of norm adoption.

According to the sociologist Peter Wagner, social institutions are "relatively durable sets of rules and resources, which human beings draw on in their actions. Institutions may pre-exist any actual living human being, but they are created by human action and only continue to exist by being continuously recreated. They are habitualized practices, the knowledge about them being transmitted in interaction, most strongly in socialization and education, but also in any other everyday practice."[441] Using Wagner's definition, we can conceptualize the behavioral dictates associated with an autonomy consciousness as a set of rules. As the dictates constitute "a standard or pattern of social behavior," they can also be considered norms.[442]

Using models of norm adoption and diffusion, one can explicate how an autonomy consciousness mindset spread throughout the Sierra. Wagner's approach relied on socialization as the mechanism for the diffusion and reproduction of norms, which, according to Michael Hechter, is a flaw common to most sociological theorizing on norms. Hechter argued that socialization alone does not explain differences in adherence, that is, why some people comply with norms and others do not.[443]

As both Hechter (1987) and Chong (2000) have argued, norm adoption and compliance require mechanisms beyond socialization, such as sanctions. Hechter's work had two main emphases: first, to argue that group solidarity—that is, compliance with a group's obligations

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441. Peter Wagner, *A Sociology of Modernity: Liberty and Discipline* (London: Routledge, 1994).
442. Definition of norm from the Oxford English Dictionary Online.
443. Michael Hechter, *Principles of Group Solidarity* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987), 29.

and norms—is achieved through monitoring and control mechanisms; and second, to issue an almost diatribe-like criticism of earlier socialization theories. His vehemence seems to have led to an unfortunate underestimation of the role of socialization. Chong, however, developed a model of norm adoption and diffusion that overcomes the weaknesses of conventional sociological theorizing yet accounts for socialization and past experience.

Chong argued that a preference for a norm or policy is "guided by both dispositions and incentives."[444] Dispositions are an individual's existing "values, identifications, and skills," which are informed by past experiences, such as childhood socialization and previous personal investments in certain beliefs. Incentives are the rewards, benefits, and reinforcement associated with a norm, such as a positive "role model or an argument defending" the norm.[445] For example, hearing an opinion leader espouse a norm reinforces the norm and serves as an incentive for compliance. Thus, in a simplification of Chong's argument, the norms to which people conform are a reflection of their dispositions as well as the reinforcements pervasive in their present environment: socialization plays a role, but so do costs/punishment and benefits/rewards. While Chong's arguments were geared toward explaining norm change and resistance to norms, a topic I will come to shortly, his insights can be applied to the diffusion of autonomy consciousness norms in the Sierra.

I argued earlier that the experiences of the comuna system contributed to the development of an autonomy consciousness. As some familiarity with this example has been established, I will use it to hypothesize how the autonomy consciousness norms were institutionalized.

444. Chong, *Rational Lives*, 74.
445. Ibid. The quotes, in order of appearance, are from 62 and 56. Chong defined incentives as the proportion of times that a norm is "rewarded by supportive responses from others or material benefits" and "are promoted by opinion leaders" and "the proportion of people who are observed to choose" the norm (all from page 54).

Dispositions, according to Chong, are shaped by past experiences. Thus, the first- and second-hand learning experiences—such as, leftist teachings, the government's bald attempts at manipulation, or the calculation that autonomy was more important than government aid—became part of the repertoire of knowledge that shaped Indígena dispositions.

Because the comuna program was one of the first attempts by an Ecuadorian government to "engage" the Indígenas, I would conjecture that no competing norms existed that prescribed how an Indígena should react to government engagement. The diffusion process in the Sierra, therefore, only required that Indígenas with these dispositions "share" their opinions, by deed or word. Thus, as community leaders rejected the comuna program during the ensuing years, they acted as *role models*, thereby providing incentives for others to also scrutinize the government's practices. In a similar vein, as Indígenas who underwent the comuna experiences shared with others their suspicions and preferences (for example, to eschew government engagement and strengthen Indígena autonomy), they provided incentives for the adoption of their viewpoint. Considering that the 1930s and 1940s were a period of intense Indígena political networking, there were numerous opportunities for such information exchanges. Furthermore, assuming the mistrustful Indígenas passed on the knowledge of their negative experiences to their children (through the process of socialization, which is part of disposition development), if those children were then exposed primarily to role models, arguments, and peers adhering to the norms of suspicion and rejection, adherence to those norms would be bolstered. Thus, with no competing norms to temper the process, the Sierra became a region in which preferences for suspicion, eschewal and autonomy prioritization were rife, reinforced, and institutionalized.

Because suspicion and eschewal became the norm throughout the Sierra, Highlanders

have reflexively rejected almost all government engagement, including "softer" forms of government influence. In the early 1980s the government began a push to incorporate Indígenas into the mainstream and create a national identity. The government pursued this project by promoting and sponsoring Indígena culture and music. While some Indígenas appreciated these efforts, others were wary of the homogenization intent behind the sponsorship; for example, in 1983 Otavaleño leaders boycotted one of their own festivals because of government sponsorship. Even a government job in the 1980s at the Catholic University teaching Indígena students was considered a form of co-optation: Indígena organizations "criticized the indigenous people who worked there as 'selling out,' since they were being paid by the government."[446]

The third facet of my comparison is an argument that the Highland norms became the central norms of the movement and were thus introduced to the Lowlands, but that they were resisted by Lowland leaders. I posit that, since the emergence of cooperation between Lowlanders and Highlanders, embodied by the formation of peak-level organizations—first CONACNIE in 1980 and later CONAIE in 1986—new channels for the exchange of influence were forged. As one of my interviewees related, Highlanders were positively influenced by at least one Lowland viewpoint: due to their limited experience with outsiders, Lowlanders saw themselves as equals in negotiations.[447] But I would assert that the influence went primarily in the reverse direction. CONAIE, as the peak organization of a pyramid of organizations, became, as its founders intended, the central coordinator of the movement. Consequently, whoever dominated CONAIE would be in the privileged position of being able to steer the movement, including setting the standards for acceptable behavior. Had the Lowlanders been more

446. Selverston, "The Politics of Culture," 144.
447. Interview with Pachakutik leader, Otavalo, March 13, 2001.

numerous in Ecuador, then they probably would have dominated CONAIE; but, as the Highlanders significantly outnumbered the Lowlanders, they had the margin of control. Thus, it was primarily Highland norms—particularly the preference for extrainstitutional protest over institutional participation—that became the central norms of the movement.

Compared to the diffusion of the autonomy consciousness norms throughout the Highlands, where no competing norms for political engagement existed, Lowlander adoption of Highland norms was not a straightforward process. In contrast to the many negative interactions with the state that the Highlanders experienced, scholars have documented that the Lowlands remained relatively untouched.[448] Lowlanders did not encounter the hacienda system or suffer a failed trust game; nor were they recipients of leftist or liberation theology consciousness-raising. As Meyer (1993) suggested with his "netherworld" comment, activists who have seen less of the bowels of the political system are less wary: Lowlanders had indeed spent limited time in Ecuador's political netherworld and thus developed less fearful and antagonistic dispositions than Highlanders did. That Lowlanders did not have the same level of consciousness as Highlanders also fits Morris and Braine's argument that variation in consciousness is affected by factors such as the group's exposure to repression.[449]

This argument does not presuppose that Lowlanders have escaped government intrusion. Since the 1960s, Lowlanders have certainly had their negative experiences with the government, but these seem to have contributed to the development of a widespread basic level of

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448. See Deborah J. Yashar, "Democracy, Indigenous Movements, and the Postliberal Challenge in Latin America," *World Politics* 52, no. 1 (1999): 76-104; and Selverston, "The Politics of Culture." Selverston related that Lowlanders were not subject to the same assimilation pressures that the government had placed on Highlanders. In addition, as one of my interviewees relayed, the Lowlanders differ from Highlanders because the Lowlanders did not experience hacienda exploitation. Interview with Pachakutik leader, Otavalo, March 13, 2001.
449. Morris and Braine, "Social Movements and Oppositional Consciousness," 28.

consciousness rather than the more advanced consciousnesses. And, although Salesian

missionaries helped Lowlanders form one of the first purely political organizations (as opposed

to a class-based organization), this external assistance was not of the same nature as the

consciousness-raising workshops religious activists conducted in the Highlands.[450] Thus, during

the 1960s, Lowland activists developed an oppositional consciousness, but acquired a lesser

degree of suspicion and appreciation for autonomy than Highland activists. I would by no means

assert that the Lowlanders had a norm of mindlessly cooperating with the government or of

always opting for institutional participation; rather, they were unfamiliar and inexperienced with

alternative, extrainstitutional means. The first mass Lowland protest, for example, occurred in

1992, after Lowlanders had been exposed to Highland influence.

The core observation here is that, whereas Highlanders were convinced that unfettered

state engagement may have negative repercussions for the movement and preferred

extrainstitutional participation, Lowlanders seem to have had a more flexible approach to state

engagement. This approach, however, was challenged when Highland norms, via CONAIE,

entered the Lowlands.

Norm adoption and change, as Chong posited, are guided by a combination of one's

dispositions and the incentives present in the surrounding environment. When a new norm is

introduced, the incentives change and one's ability to adopt the new norm is influenced by how

strongly one is disposed toward either the old or new norm. As Chong asserted, "a key element

of one's response to new norms is whether one has a vested interest in the existing norms."[451]

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450. Moreover, rather than the Catholic Church, the Protestant evangelical church was more active in the Amazon and was interested more in proselytizing and bible translation.
451. Chong, *Rational Lives*, 100.

Thus, those who had a vested interest in clientelistic relationships and institutional participation, such as Lowland leaders, had greater difficulty adopting the norms of suspicion and eschewal, which explains why those leaders more often shirked the norms. That Lowland leaders not only preferred institutional participation but were more likely to compromise CONAIE's autonomy and unity is aptly rendered by Collins: "The problem of low organizational loyalty among Amazonian leaders was visible not only in the arena of electoral politics, but also in social movement politics. While there were very committed Amazonian indigenous movement leaders, there were also numerous cases of Amazonian indigenous leaders who allowed themselves to be co-opted by the state; or when organizational decisions did not go their way, turned their back on the organizational process."[452] It is not clear, however, whether the Lowland rank-and-file had the same difficulties adapting to the new norms.

In discussing the political differences between the Highlanders and Lowlanders, scholars either lump the rank-and-file and leaders together, or, as Collins did, separate out the leaders. But no one has considered the rank-and-file separately from the leaders. In assessing whether the rank-and-file rejected, adopted, or at least grudgingly accepted the Highland norms, I would speculate that they opted for one of the latter two approaches. Whereas the leaders, as "higher-status individuals," may have derived "greater than average benefits from the status quo" and therefore could not easily adapt, the rank-and-file did not presumably derive greater benefits.[453] Indeed, they may have realized that their interests—for example, achieving land rights—would be better served by pursuing unified collective action with the Highlanders under CONAIE's

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452. Collins, "Democratizing Formal Politics," 255.
453. Chong, *Rational Lives*, 102.

aegis, which would entail coordinating around CONAIE/Highland norms.[454] Moreover, for

those Lowlanders who may have lacked a pre-existing preference for institutional participation,

the adoption of Highland norms would have been relatively easy. "When there is no inherent

attachment to one norm or the other—that is, when there is no underlying disposition that resists

change—the only hitch in making the transition from" one to the other "is in the efficiency with

which people recognize. . . the new norm; but this difficulty may be eased if there is some central

coordination provided by an opinion leader or a trend setter."[455] In this case, CONAIE would

have provided the central coordination. Had Lowlanders not adopted the norms, it could be

expected that they would support the leaders' actions. Instead, they "punished" one leader by not

voting him back in office, apparently did not rise in support of the contested 1996 Ministry, and

have shown a willingness to participate extrainstitutionally, through mass demonstrations and

protest marches to Quito. The data is too limited to assess if the Lowlanders adopted the norms

or just respected them for pragmatic reasons, but, according to Chong, the act of compliance

eventually leads to attitudinal change. Thus, Lowland rank-and-file may have superficially

adopted the norms, but later developed the associated beliefs and awarenesses.[456]

In summary, the third instance of my exploration for the factors that contribute to an

autonomy consciousness was a comparison of Highlanders and Lowlanders. In the Highlands,

first- and second-hand experience of government duplicity and beliefs about how best to react to

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454. Ibid., See pages 81, 170, and 194. Regarding the development of affinities between Lowland activists and those from other regions, Pallares noted that "Like highland organizations. . . lowland activists sought basic rights to education, economic welfare, and health. Also, as lowland activists became increasingly connected with state institutions and nonindigenous social sectors as well as with the national economy, they developed political identifications with other Indians outside their ethnic group, whom they viewed as sharing common oppression." *From Peasant Struggles to Indian Resistance*, 169.

455. Chong, *Rational Lives*, 193.

456. Ibid., see chapter 6, "Mass Adjustment to New Norms," 186-211.

government engagement were repeatedly reinforced and led to the entrenchment of a widespread autonomy consciousness. Conversely, Lowlanders, after centuries of isolation, had suffered relatively few negative interactions with the government and thus developed only a basic level of consciousness and a more open approach towards government engagement. Through CONAIE, Highland norms entered the Lowlands; and while the Lowland rank-and-file seem to have adopted or at least respected them, Lowland leaders adhered to their earlier practices. Hence, during the 1990s and after, as Lowlanders became increasingly politically active, more Lowlanders than Highlanders sought participation and undertook actions that could potentially compromise the movement.

Returning to my original hypothesis of how an autonomy consciousness is generated, I conclude that at least three factors play a role in heightening the awarenesses that comprise an autonomy consciousness. To reiterate, these awarenesses are: recognition of the state's bias toward promoting the interests of the dominant groups and subordinating minority groups; cognizance of the importance of rejecting any arrangements that entail dependence; and knowledge of the need for autonomy to counter the state's bias and moderation strategies. The three factors I identified as girding these awarenesses are (1) first-hand learning in the form of direct exposure to government duplicity and manipulation, particularly in which the government attempts to subvert autonomy. In the Indígena case, the government's violation of a quasi-contractual relationship served to catalyze the three awarenesses. (2) Second-hand learning, in which injustice, bias, and the need for autonomy are underscored, such as in consciousness-raising seminars. (3) The diffusion of the norms associated with an autonomy consciousness and, equally important, the acceptance of those norms. As the three comparisons demonstrated,

activists with exposure to first- and second-hand learning or norm diffusion were more likely

to be wary of and reject institutional participation than those without similar exposure, who were

more likely to pursue institutional participation which compromised the movement's autonomy.

Although the Indígena movement contained both groups—those who prioritized autonomy and

those who were more "flexible"—the movement was renowned for its unity and autonomy. In

the next sections, I will examine the radical-moderate divide and how autonomy-minded activists

have prevailed.

Radicals versus Moderates

Earlier I referred to radical and moderate movement elements and in this chapter I refine

these categories by specifying that I view radicals as those activists possessing an autonomy

consciousness, and thus more wary of institutional participation; and moderates as those who

possess only a basic level of consciousness and are not opposed to institutional participation. For

the remainder of this chapter, I will, for simplicity's sake, use the shorthand terms radicals and

moderates where appropriate. As I have argued in this chapter, I believe, as do other analysts,

that more radicals existed in the Sierra and more moderates in the Amazon; and I highlighted this

difference for the heuristic purpose of demonstrating the existence (or not) of an autonomy

consciousness. However, in a discussion of the overall movement, I do not think one can make a

radical-moderate dichotomy on a purely geographical basis. As Andolina stated, the divergent

positions toward political participation were "held largely though not exclusively" by activists of

the Sierra and Amazon; in other words, the ideologies I term radical and moderate exist in both

regions—albeit in different proportions.[457] This approach is also followed by other analysts:

in a discussion specific to Highlanders and Lowlanders, the ideological differences are

recognized; however, when discussing the overall movement, the convention is to refer instead

to general radical-moderate cleavages.[458]

As other analysts have noted, the movement is divided between those who prefer

extrainstitutional participation (radicals) and those who view it as one of several possible

approaches (moderates). Jorge Leon and Joanne Rappaport, for example, observed that "some

indigenous activists reason that it is necessary to achieve a presence and a degree of influence in

the traditional political system. Others, in contrast, assert that the task ahead is to build an

indigenous political system parallel to the official one, in preparation for the advent of a multi-

ethnic state."[459] Collins also referred to an "internal cleavage between those who wanted the

movement to stay clear of formal politics and those who wanted the chance to participate."[460]

Even the Indígena leader Luis Macas has remarked on the splits between the purists, the

ideólogos, and others who operate from either a pragmatic (and compromising) or self-interested

position.[461] In sum, the presence of a radical-moderate cleavage in the movement, in terms of

institutional participation, seems apparent to a preponderance of scholars. And many of these

same scholars have also highlighted the movement's autonomy and the fact that the movement,

457. Andolina, "Colonial Legacies and Plurinational Imaginaries," 216.
458. See Collins, "Democratizing Formal Politics."
459. Jorge Leon and Joanne Rappaport, "The View from Colombia and Ecuador," *Against the Current* (November/December 1995), 7.
460. Collins, "Democratizing Formal Politics," 191.
461. Macas' remarks relayed by Beck and Mijeski in "Barricades and Ballots," 11. Beck and Mijeski also noted a radical-moderate split within the Pachakutik political wing: "One, which we term the 'mainstream group,' has predominated in seeking coalitions, compromises, elected and appointed offices, and negotiations to achieve specific aims. The second, the 'radical purist' group, tends to eschew coalitions, compromises, and view as secondary the electoral strategy. The radical group seeks a more thoroughgoing transformation of civil society that will lead to a true participatory democracy of the masses." "Barricades and Ballots," 10.

for many years, eschewed institutional politics to maintain its autonomy.[462] But no scholar

has yet examined how the autonomy-minded radicals managed to prevail over their moderate

peers; they seem to overlook that the autonomy they herald was an outcome of radical-moderate

struggles.

The division in the Indígena movement, and the divided consciousness it represents,

appears to be a common feature of movements in general. Other researchers have noticed similar

differences of consciousness within other movements. Just as Leon and Rappaport (1995)

identified separatist (interested in a parallel system) and moderate viewpoints in Ecuador, Chong

and Rogers found, by analyzing U.S. survey data, similar forms of "solidarity" among African-

Americans, which were distinguished by either a preference for mainstream engagement or for

separatism and autonomy. "Although both forms of racial identity are conducive to direct action,

the more radical separatist identity is a much stronger predictor of participation in boycotts and

demonstrations and support for black political candidates, whereas the common fate

identification is more likely to promote conventional political activities such as contacting

government officials, signing petitions, and contributing money to political candidates."[463] Lori

G. Waite attributed tensions between northern and southern African-American leaders in

Chicago in the 1960s to disparate forms of oppositional consciousness. Waite found that "Jim

Crow laws had placed southern Blacks in similar structural positions, forging, ironically, a

relatively unified black consciousness. But in northern settings such as Chicago, where Jim Crow

laws and political disenfranchisement did not exist, Black consciousness could take many

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462. Collins, "Democratizing Formal Politics," 191. Collins stated that "maintaining movement autonomy was a central priority" in CONAIE's consideration of whether to pursue or eschew institutional participation.
463. Chong and Rogers, "Racial Solidarity and Political Participation," 366. By solidarity, Chong and Rogers refer to group identification and consciousness.

forms."[464] Some Chicago Black elites had "one foot in the polity and one in the challenging

group. . . . The structure of material and status rewards seems to have induced most of them to

adopt, with only slight modifications, the hegemonic consciousness that characterized the

machine."[465] The southern Black elites sought to challenge the Chicago political system whereas

some Chicago elites were members of and received benefits from the machine, a conflict that

was detrimental to the movement's mobilization.[466] The Indígena case, however, indicates that

the potential conflicts emanating from a "divided consciousness" can be managed.

How Autonomy-minded Activists Prevailed

Earlier I argued that activists with an autonomy consciousness react to government

engagement with suspicion and are more likely to reject institutional participation. I now add the

further detail that the presence of an autonomy consciousness is not necessarily sufficient for a

movement to resist participation and co-optation. As Hanchard averred, consciousness alone

cannot guarantee social movement success: "the development of a collective consciousness

amongst a particular group of people provides no guarantees of universal, absolute victory and

solidarity vis-à-vis their oppressors, just like the working-class deaths of World War I proved the

fantasy of an international proletariat. Marcus Garvey's characterization of Afro-Diasporic

peoples as a 'sleeping giant' neglects a key moral from Gulliver's Travels: even once a giant

464. Lori G. Waite, "Divided Consciousness: The Impact of Black Elite Consciousness on the 1966 Chicago Freedom Movement," in Mansbridge and Morris, *Oppositional Consciousness*, 172-3. In addition to Waite, Hanchard also found such differences: "The diversity of articulation by blacks about their experiences in the United States suggests that there is no single, definitive mode of racial consciousness that all blacks share or aspire to. Generational, class, urban/rural distinctions inform the ways in which people in the United States think about racial difference generally, and blacks are no exception." See "Racial Consciousness and Afro-Diasporic Experiences: Antonio Gramsci Reconsidered," *Socialism and Democracy*, no. 14 (Fall 1991): 90-91.
465. Waite, "Divided Consciousness," 200-201.
466. Ibid., 175.

awakens, there are countless impediments, however small, to keep him from standing up."[467]

As we saw in the Indigenous Australian case, some members of the Black Power movement did manifest an autonomy consciousness, but they were unable to avoid co-optation because they could not contain moderate activists who preferred institutional participation.

My preliminary argument is that the Indígena movement achieved its remarkable autonomy and successes because a significant number of its activists possessed an autonomy consciousness *and* those activists, who were mostly Highlanders and constituted the majority of Ecuador's Indígenas, dominated the movement's most powerful organization. Moreover, CONAIE was not only powerful, but its pyramid structure corresponded to the advantageous counterhegemonic structure prescribed by Hanchard (1994). Thus, it was not simply that a preponderance of activists understood the importance of autonomy, nor that the principal movement organization had a counterhegemonic structure, but it is the *two in combination* that enabled the Indígena movement to resist or avoid, in many instances, potentially counterproductive participation. I argue that control over a peak-level organization confers two sources of power to radicals: first, as discussed earlier, it facilitates the predominance of radical norms; and second, radicals are able, through the power of the organization, to levy *meaningful* sanctions. As we saw in chapter 6, the criticisms of radical Indigenous Australian activists, which, incidentally, were not backed by a powerful organization, were mostly ineffective.

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467. Hanchard, "Racial Consciousness and Afro-Diasporic Experiences," 99.

A Counterhegemonic Organization

In his analysis of Brazilian race relations, Hanchard concluded that Afro-Brazilians require more than awareness to prevail; they should also create what Hanchard referred to as a counterhegemonic movement: a "supraparty organization whose purpose is to create a threshold civil rights-nationalist agenda, based upon a consensus among various groups regarding the basic needs of black Brazilians."[468] In many ways, CONAIE resembles Hanchard's prescription. And a further—almost uncanny— similarity lies in the meetings Hanchard suggests such an organization should hold: "local, regional, and national meetings could then be assembled to discuss strategies for addressing" the problems facing the movement.[469] As two of my interviewees related, the Indígena movement indeed holds meetings at similar geographical and administrative levels as advocated above.[470] These meetings, according to Hanchard, "would serve another purpose as well" by "lessening the chances of ideological discord between various factions within the [movement]."[471] Thus, not only is CONAIE the top of a pyramid of activist organizations, but it strongly resembles the panacean "supraparty organization" that movements need to challenge hegemony.

Sanctioning Power

Using several instances from the Indígena case, I argue in this section that radicals can avoid participation they deem potentially counterproductive only if they are able either to curtail

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468. Hanchard, *Orpheus and Power*, 159.
469. Ibid., 160.
470. Interview with Pachakutik co-ordinator, Otavalo, February 12, 2001; and interview with CONAIE leader, Otavalo, February 12, 2001. Selverston also documented that CONAIE held frequent assemblies and congresses at different locations around Ecuador, see "The Politics of Culture," 139.
471. Hanchard, *Orpheus and Power*, 160. Hanchard used the word "movimento," which, to avoid confusion, I replaced with "movement."

or control participation by moderate activists or to neutralize the government's ability to exploit cooperation with moderates. I assume that this struggle between radicals and moderates (and the government) is fairly constant, since "every regime has some legitimating frame that provides the citizenry with a reason to be quiescent;" in other words, governments are constantly seeking to appeal to moderates and sluice challenger activities into institutional channels.[472] This assumption harks back to Kriesi et al.'s assertion that governments attempt to moderate movements by repressing radicals and appealing to moderates. "Thus, different wings of social movements receive different strategic cues," and all cues seek to quell challenger influence. [473] In brief, without the interference of radicals, cooperation between governments and moderate activists would most likely occur, for such cooperation is the path of least resistance.

While many examples obtain of Indígena activists rejecting political participation—for example, Luis Macas turning down two offers, one in 1995 and another in 2006, to ally with a mainstream political party and become its vice presidential candidate; and the Indígena movement's rejection of the ruling alliance in 2003, which required two leaders to forego important cabinet posts—I focus on three examples in which radicals and moderates held different views or struggled over the issue of participation. As a contrast, I will also analyze one instance in which sanctions were ineffective.

First, in October 1992, President Durán Ballén opened a Special Office for Indígena Affairs and appointed as its director José Quimbo, an Indígena intellectual from Otavalo. Rather than support the office or attempt to use it to gain influence, "there were howls from CONAIE. . .

472. Gamson, "The Social Psychology of Collective Action," in Morris and McClurg Mueller, *Frontiers in Social Movement Theory*, 65.
473. Kriesi et al., *New Social Movements in Western Europe*, 124.

with accusations that Durán Ballén was attempting to divide *indígenas*"[474] and undermine

CONAIE.[475] The president's sincerity was questioned and CONAIE charged that "that if Durán

was serious about including indigenous representation in his government, he would allow them

to democratically choose their representative."[476]

Any concern that such an office would merely be a tool of the presidency was confirmed

in June 1993 when a CONAIE-FENOC march to Quito was met with tear gas and beatings.

Quimbo's office neither attempted to intervene nor did it comment on the incident. Indeed,

during the entirety of its existence, Quimbo's office never decried any repression inflicted on

Indígenas or spoke out about government abuses. However, other than this apparent

complacency, the president was unable to use the office as a divisive tool. Indeed, the office

gained neither prestige nor power and Quimbo later went on to become a shaman.

Second, in 1996 President Bucaram created a Ministry of Ethnic Development and

appointed two Indígena Amazonian leaders as directors, one of whom was CONAIE's vice

president at the time.[477] Scholars differ over whether the positions were offered to the Indígena

leaders or if it was the leaders who encouraged the government to establish the ministry. The

following statement by a member of the Shuar group indicates the latter possibility: "The

ministry is a creation of our organized movement. . . . It is part of the government structure and

on that basis we will be able to define policies to address our problems concerning health,

education, housing, development programs, and so on."[478] Although one of the new ministers

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474. Meisch, "'We will not dance on the tomb of our grandparents'," 60.
475. Selverston-Scher, *Ethnopolitics in Ecuador*, 46.
476. Selverston, "The Politics of Culture, 46.
477. This ministry is also sometimes referred to as the Ministry of Indígena (or Indigenous) Affairs.
478. Gonzalez, "Ecuador: Ministry Fractures Indigenous Movement," 1.

was CONAIE's vice president, the ministry and the appointments were made without CONAIE's input or formal acceptance.

In reaction, CONAIE strongly opposed the ministry and criticized the government for trying to "divide the movement by co-opting certain sectors."[479] CONAIE's President Miguel Cabascango said, "Once again, we are going back to decisions made without consultation. . . . Once again, indigenous leaders are offered government posts in exchange for support and submission. . . . the Ministry will be another bureaucratic institution that will absorb resources that should reach all the indigenous organizations."[480] Nina Pacari and Luis Macas, two high-profile Sierra activists, were very vocal and public in both their criticisms of the government and the Amazonian elites. The disagreement was aired in the newspapers and Pacari and Macas accused the Amazonian leaders of being traitors;[481] and of "following their own personal interests."[482] The ministry never evolved into a threat to the movement and dissolved in early 1997 when the president was forced out of office by a corruption scandal in which, incidentally, one of the Indígena ministers was also implicated.

Third, prior to the creation of the Pachakutik political wing in 1995, and even before CONAIE emerged in 1986, the Indígena movement in the Highlands eschewed electoral participation by discouraging Indígenas from running for office and encouraging them to boycott elections by handing in blank ballots.[483] This policy was continued by CONAIE until the mid-

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479. Lucero, "Locating the 'Indian Problem'," 35.
480. Gonzalez, "Ecuador: Ministry Fractures Indigenous Movement," 1.
481. Personal correspondence with Mijeski, May 27, 2004.
482. Gonzalez, "Ecuador: Ministry Fractures Indigenous Movement." According to Gonzalez, Nina Pacari accused the two leaders of following their own interests.
483. Interview with Pachakutik co-ordinator, Otavalo, February 12, 2001; see also Marc Becker, "President of CONAIE runs for Congress," *NACLA Report on the Americas* 29, no. 6 (May-June 1996), 45-46. Ecuador has compulsory voting so a boycott requires submitting blank ballots.

1990s. Considering that Indígena citizens constitute anywhere from 25 to 45 percent of Ecuador's population (estimates vary), one might be surprised by the initial non-involvement policy. Indeed, Korovkin described the combination of Indígena enthusiasm for self-government and rejection of national politics as "paradoxical."[484] The rejection makes sense, however, if viewed through an autonomy consciousness lens. Indeed, the reasons Indígenas themselves provided for their "paradoxical" stance substantiate my argument: they have asserted that their rejection was motivated by: (1) negative past experiences, in which Indígena alliances with political parties had ended in betrayal; (2) a desire to demonstrate the movement's rejection of the political system;[485] (3) and concern that participation "might blur the role of the indigenous movement and divert it from its central struggle."[486]

Not all Indígena activists, however, agreed with the policy and some wanted to run for office. At CONAIE's third congress, in December 1990, CONAIE's top leadership resolved the dissension by making non-participation its official policy and "asked indigenous candidates for the 1992 elections to renounce their candidacies or participate as individuals rather than in the name of indigenous organizations. This would enable CONAIE to maintain a clear position of opposition to the next government and clearly signal the inadequacy of the Ecuadorian democratic system."[487]

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484. Korovkin, "Reinventing the Communal Tradition," 55.
485. See Pallares, *From Peasant Struggles to Indian Resistance*, 96-97; Collins, "Democratizing Formal Politics," and Selverston, "The Politics of Culture."
486. Lucas, *We will not Dance on our Grandparents' Tomb*, 4.
487. Andolina, "Colonial Legacies and Plurinational Imaginaries," 218

Why Were Sanctions Meaningful?

I would argue that the vehement criticisms issued by CONAIE representatives in the 1992 and 1996 examples had several target audiences: the wayward activists, their direct supporters as well as other moderates, the government, the general public, and NGOs and any other interested groups. Pacari and Macas, by publicly labeling the wayward leaders as "traitors" in 1996, were invoking one of the most powerful sanctioning tools available to a solidarity group: the threat of "exclusion from the group."[488] Before the Amazonian organizations united with non-Amazonian organizations, and in the transition years, or the time it took for activists to adjust to the CONAIE regime, such a threat from distant Quito (where CONAIE's headquarters are based) may have had little meaning. But the formation of CONAIE reduced the independent political spaces of its member organizations. Moreover, CONAIE's pyramid structure has wrought a certain degree of periphery dependence on the center—a dependence which produces exit costs.[489] Exit costs are the "penalties" or "price" someone incurs when leaving a group, either voluntarily or involuntarily. Exit costs, according to Hirschman (1970), are most often associated with groups such as families, tribes, or political parties, because few alternatives exist: if an activist is thrown out of the CONAIE family, where are they to go? The options are rather limited. I would argue, however, that these costs did not appear the same to Highlanders and Lowlanders.

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488. Hechter, *Principles of Group Solidarity*, 50. Hardin also referred to "shunning and exclusion" as sanctions to reinforce norms in *One For All*, 96. Regarding recalcitrance towards new norms, Chong argued that "the only path to compliance is through increasing sanctions." *Rational Lives*, 194.

489. For more on dependency and exit costs, see Hirschman*, Exit, Voice and Loyalty*, 80-115; and Hechter, *Principles of Group Solidarity*, 50.

I suggest that difference between Highlanders' and Lowlanders' perceptions of exit

costs was one reason why Lowland leaders shirked CONAIE's norms in 1996 as well as in other

instances. Because CONAIE was dominated by Highlanders, they may have been more sensible

to CONAIE sanctions and attuned to the exit costs than Lowlanders, which would also explain

the almost complete norm compliance by Highlanders. Lowlanders, however, who were

accustomed to their independence and to whom the opinions of Highlanders may have seemed a

remote worry, may have either miscalculated or been less concerned about the risk of expulsion,

particularly in CONAIE's early years. To return to the earlier question, an ostracized Highland

activist may have been able to join other organizations (or turn to one of the remaining class-

based organizations), but might never have recovered his/her reputation or status after being

publicly labeled a traitor in his own "neighborhood" by a Highland leader. A Lowlander,

however, used to a different playing field and other networks, might have felt buffered against

CONAIE's threats. Antonio Vargas' experience, however, indicates the precariousness of any

protection a Lowland leader might have perceived from either the physical distance from Quito

or by his/her embedment in local networks: after Vargas defied CONAIE and ran as president, he

lost not only the presidency but also his local seat.

CONAIE's criticisms also targeted moderate activists and may have had a chilling effect

on the expression of mass support by moderates for institutional participation, such as the 1992

or 1996 government bodies. For example, the vitriol of Pacari and Macas against illicit

participation most likely served as a negative reinforcement for the autonomy consciousness

norms. In the earlier discussion of norm adoption and norm change, I suggested that the Lowland

rank-and-file may have been less attached to institutional participation than their leaders (who

had received greater benefits). In the case that their attachments were weak—or that they accepted the new norms on a trial, "wait and see" basis—then Pacari's and Macas' reactions would have been important references. As Chong argued, when dispositions are weak, then preferences are guided by incentives; thus, Pacari and Macas were reinforcing the Highland (and CONAIE) norms.

I also suggest that the third audience, in the 1992 and 1996 examples, was the government. In 1990, CONAIE organized its first mass protest with a million participants, which caused disruptions throughout Ecuador. By criticizing the government's role in forming the two corporatist bodies, CONAIE was putting the government on notice. CONAIE's power and status as the core organization of the movement also provided activists with a way to inform other audiences, such as the general public and NGOs, of its displeasure with the government.

In the example of the initial rejection of electoral participation, radicals did not use criticism to prevail. Prior to the 1990s, participation in the Highlands was discouraged and there is no evidence that sanctions were necessary—it seems the strong norms against participation were sufficient. In 1990, however, moderates pushed for participation and, in reaction, CONAIE officially resolved neither to participate itself nor to allow its members to present themselves as CONAIE candidates (although it allowed Indígenas to run as independents). These measures were not sanctions, per se, but by *officially* promulgating a rule of non-participation, CONAIE created an implicit threat of sanction. Indígena members would have to consider what would happen if they broke the pact and campaigned on their CONAIE affiliation. As I will explain shortly, this official decree restrained participation for about another half decade.

To summarize, in reaction to the 1992 Special Office and the 1996 Ministry, radical activists vehemently and publicly criticized the government and, with regard to the Ministry, the moderate activists who had accepted and perhaps even pursued its establishment. Both the Special Office and the Ministry never amounted to substantive tools for the government, and while it would be difficult to definitively link their infirmity to CONAIE's denunciations, one can speculate that CONAIE's sanctions reduced the credibility of the bodies, tempered any expressions of mass support, and thus hampered the government's ability to use them for its own means. In other words, a condemnation by the country's most powerful representative of the Indígena movement, CONAIE, neutralized the ability of both the government and moderates to capitalize on cooperation. In the electoral participation example, first norms and then the threat of sanctions thwarted participatory efforts.

The pattern that emerges from these three examples demonstrates the argument that potentially counterproductive participation can be neutralized or curtailed if autonomy-minded activists have the capacity—in the Indígena case, through a peak-level organization—either to issue official decrees, with a threat of sanctions, or to levy sanctions. But what of the examples where the movement decided to participate in politics? Were sanctions not issued or were they ineffective? To address these questions, let us examine the 1996 decision to participate in electoral politics.

Gulliver is Restrained

At CONAIE's congress in 1993, which took place in the Amazon, the issue of electoral participation re-emerged. According to Melina Selverston, the debate this time was different as

the hand of moderates had been strengthened by the recent election of an Indígena vice

president in Bolivia. "In neighboring Bolivia, an Aymara Indian leader, Victor Hugo Cardenas,

was elected Vice President of the Republic. His wife, herself an Aymara leader, had traveled

from Bolivia to encourage her brothers and sisters in Ecuador to follow their example. 'We

should no longer be ruled,' she exclaimed to the jubilant crowd, 'We should rule ourselves!'"[490]

CONAIE's decision at this time was to permit participation in local elections; and to form local,

provincial, and national "political councils" that would lay the groundwork for greater

participation. In the year prior to the 1996 national elections, however, the tension within

CONAIE over greater electoral participation reached a new peak.

First, in the autumn of 1995, CONAIE orchestrated a campaign against a president-

sponsored constitutional reform referendum that would benefit the president and neoliberal

interests. Despite a massive "vote yes" advertising campaign by businesses, in November 1995

all eleven of the referendum issues were voted down. This success in the political arena

"reinforced the position of the Indian activists who advocated for electoral participation."[491]

Second, it seems that Amazon leaders, together with a few Sierra leaders, had formed the

Pachakutik political movement separate from CONAIE's political councils.

At CONAIE's assembly in late 1995, Amazon organizations declared their intention to

support Pachakutik in the 1996 elections. According to Andolina, "highland indigenous activists

argued that this move threatened to divide the indigenous movement, yet had little choice but to

respect the decision made by the amazonian organizations; but they added the caveat that the

highlands organizations had not approved Pachakutik and as such it was a regional political

490. Selverston, "Pachacutik," 12.
491. Leon Zamosc, "The Indian Movement in Ecuador," 136.

movement and should integrate into the CONAIE political council."[492] However, despite the

objections of CONAIE's leaders, almost all delegates at the assembly, including presumably

those from the Highlands, were in favor of electoral participation. Ultimately, CONAIE

conceded but immediately began negotiating for rules that would allow it to retain as much

control as possible over electoral participation. In addition to changing the name of Pachakutik

(although most people still use "Pachakutik"), CONAIE instituted rules that formally distanced

CONAIE from Pachakutik but nonetheless provided CONAIE with some assurances that

Pachakutik, and indirectly CONAIE, would not become co-opted. One such control measure was

a stipulation that Pachakutik should not ally with existing political parties; through these fail-safe

measures, CONAIE was attempting to achieve what Andolina described as "autonomy in

participation."[493]

I suggest that CONAIE's threat of sanctions fell short not only because it was a group of

activists—and not isolated individuals, who would have been more wary of ostracism—that

countered CONAIE by forming Pachakutik, but because mass opinion on the issue, including

radical opinion, had changed. As Chong (2000) argued, the conditions under which norms

change include the presence of opinion leaders promoting an alternative norm, which introduces

new incentives. In the Pachakutik example, the presence of an Indígena vice president in

neighboring Bolivia—and a visit by his wife, in which she exhorted to jubilant crowds: "We

should no longer be ruled! We should rule ourselves!"—provided new incentives for electoral

participation. Moreover, CONAIE's, and the Indígena movement's, success at rejecting the 1995

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492. Andolina, "Colonial Legacies and Plurinational Imaginaries," 220.
493. Ibid., 221. The separation between CONAIE and Pachakutik was often blurred. For example, I am under the impression that activists move between the two groups; and, as one of my interviewees related, in some areas the two bodies, at least in 2001, shared offices. Interview with Pachakutik co-ordinator, Otavalo, February 12, 2001.

national referendum reportedly reinforced preferences for greater political participation. So, at the assembly in late 1995, support for electoral participation was expressed not only by Lowland leaders and rank-and-file members but also, as it appears, by the Highland rank-and-file—the radicals. In the next section, I discuss the import this example has for understanding how radicals may (or may not) curtail institutional participation.

Discussion

Earlier, I suggested that participation can be neutralized or curtailed if autonomy-minded activists have the capacity to issue or threaten meaningful sanctions. Briefly, one could say that radicals with sanctioning power can overcome moderate impulses. However, sanctions in the Pachakutik example, in which moderates united with radical rank-and-file and announced their intentions to proceed with electoral politics, were ineffective. Why? The new propulsion toward electoral participation was not so much a sign that moderates had gained strength as that the radical stance had weakened. I conjecture that the example of the Indígena Bolivian vice president and the success of the 1995 referendum campaign indicated to the radical rank-and-file that the benefits of electoral participation could outweigh any costs. In other words, they no longer viewed electoral involvement as strictly counterproductive; this suggests that my preliminary conceptualization for how participation can be curtailed must be modified. Stitching together the various pieces that have been identified, I propose that radical activists can prevail if activists *perceive* participation as counterproductive and can, through the auspices of a powerful organization, impose meaningful and consequential sanctions. As I suggested in chapter 6, not all participation is necessarily counterproductive and my conceptualization accounts for this nuance.

Coy and Hedeen, as related in chapter 6, advised movement activists to pursue "an understanding of the processes of co-optation."[494] I would argue that an autonomy consciousness comprises the awarenesses that facilitate such an understanding. Through their exposure to several first- and second-hand "learning experiences" in what Meyer (1993) described as the political netherworld, Highlanders developed an autonomy consciousness, manifested in their ability to discern, given the available information, counterproductive participation.

In chapter 6 I reviewed the co-optation literature and identified five categories of factors associated with institutional participation devolving into co-optation. Before entering a participatory arrangement, I suggested that activists, if they chose to heed Coy and Hedeen's advice, should assess the following: the impact of participation on movement representatives, the movement's strengths and weaknesses, the participatory arrangement as such, and the government's propensity toward fairness or bias. I also suggested that, should activists pinpoint weaknesses that increase their vulnerability to co-optation, they ought to implement fail-safe measures. The actions and choices of the autonomy-minded Highlanders, both before and after CONAIE'S formation, indicate that these were indeed the types of factors they instinctively understood as salient. For example, Highlanders initially judged that their movement was not strong enough to withstand the centrifugal forces of national-level electoral politics and therefore delayed participation. Once they began political participation, CONAIE's leaders negotiated for the types of accountability measures that protect movements from the co-optation of leaders and representatives. CONAIE's leaders also recognized that the way the 1992 and 1996 government bodies were created was not consistent with impartiality. Indeed, because the movement's

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494. Coy and Hedeen, "A Stage Model of Social Movement Co-optation," 427-428.

leaders have always considered the government, as an arena of politics, to be incorrigibly biased, they have in recent years focused on changing Ecuador's constitution. Despite CONAIE's wariness and commitment to autonomy, however, the movement has also committed significant blunders.

Beck and Mijeski declared the movement's entry into the disastrous 2002 ruling alliance a "miscalculation" and a "strategic error."[495] Pachakutik's leaders not only overestimated their ability to effect change from within a corrupt state apparatus, but placed their trust in an unreliable and duplicitous ally, Colonel Gutiérrez. But rather than cling to the "power" of their cabinet posts and their presence in the alliance, Indígena activists were vocal about their disappointment with Gutiérrez and continued to press for changes important to their movement's interests. Whether the leaders voluntarily exited the cabinet, or provoked the alliance's collapse through their obstreperousness, their defiance and relinquishment of their posts affirmed their recognition that some forms of institutional participation, even at the top, are counterproductive. It was this negative experience that reversed activists' perceptions of electoral politics and led to a re-direction of their energies into a push for constitutional change.

And what of the Indigenous Australian movement? I would argue that my formulation that *radical activists can prevail if they perceive participation as counterproductive and can impose effective sanctions* not only explains the Indígena case instances of rejection or acceptance of participation but also, with the certain caveats, the participation of Indigenous Australian activists.

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495. Beck and Mijeski, "The Indigenous Vote in Ecuador's 2002 Election," 180.

As reviewed in chapter 6, criticisms of institutional participation by either isolated Indigenous Australian activists or those backed by small or local organizations were mostly ineffective at halting or neutralizing participation. In contrast, criticisms by Indígena activists backed by CONAIE were effective. Because of the vast differences between the Indígena and Indigenous Australian cases, I am reluctant to draw definitive conclusions. Moreover, myriad alternative explanations exist for the differences in effectiveness of criticism (sanctions) in both cases. For example, it could be the case that sanctions by radical Indigenous Australians were inadequate because of the highly desirable type of participation that was offered—nation-wide elected representative bodies—or because of the government's publicity efforts. But if we look closely at the two movements, which had followed fairly similar trajectories up until the 1970s, including a similar radicalization in the 1960s from civil to indigenous rights, the most striking differences (aside from their demographics) are structural.

The Indígena movement, after the shift to indigenous rights, coalesced around forming organizations, leading ultimately to CONAIE. Not only is CONAIE a powerful organization, its structure resembles the counterhegemonic form advocated by Hanchard (1994). In contrast, the Indigenous Australian movement fell into a loose, insubstantial structure. When both governments attempted to include (and co-opt) activists, radicals in both movements protested. But in the Indígena movement, the criticisms carried greater weight. While government publicity or the type of venue may have made a difference, I submit that the organizational power (or lack thereof) of the movements themselves contributed significantly to the different outcomes. As Deborah Balser (1997) noted about movement schism: the impetus may come from outside, but ultimately it is the activists who sunder the movement. Thus, although forces external to the

movement may have increased the attractiveness of certain types of participation, it was ultimately moderate Indigenous Australian activists who ignored the warnings and criticisms of their more radical peers and facilitated participation. Without the backing of a powerful organization that could threaten ostracism, the Indigenous Australian moderates had little to fear from radical sanctions.

Conclusion

Numerous scholars have commented on the Indígena movement's remarkable autonomy and resistance to co-optation, but none has offered an in-depth analysis of how that autonomy was achieved or maintained. In this chapter I argued that the Indígenas prioritized their autonomy because they realized that the dominant group, which also ruled the government, was biased against their interests and benefited from Indígena subjugation. As a result, Indígenas became suspicious of the government's intentions and eschewed political participation that would provide the dominant group opportunities for exploitation. Intertwined with these awarenesses was the realization that the only way to avoid dependency was to maintain their autonomy. In short, they prioritized their autonomy when they became aware of the mechanisms underlying bias and subjugation. These awarenesses are a form of consciousness; after reviewing the theories of consciousness that appear regularly in the social movement literature, I concluded that Morris and Braine's (2001) and Mansbridge's (2001) concept of a mature consciousness most aptly conveys the Indígena mindset.

The other theories of consciousness, Hanchard's (1994) Gramscian analysis of Brazilian race relations, McAdam's (1988, 1999) cognitive liberation, and Freire's (1970a, 1970b)

conscientization, have all depicted a fairly similar conceptualization of the basic

consciousness required for collective action, which Morris and Braine (2001) and Mansbridge

(2001) also described under the name oppositional consciousness. This basic consciousness

encompasses at least four elements: "identifying with members of a subordinate group,

identifying injustices done to that group, opposing those injustices, and seeing the group as

having a shared interest in ending or diminishing those injustices."[496] A mature consciousness,

however, adds an additional and more advanced element: "identifying a specific dominant group

as causing and in some way benefiting from those injustices. It also includes seeing certain

actions of the dominant group as forming a 'system' of some kind that advances the interests of

the dominant group."[497] In other words, a mature consciousness entails activist cognizance of

state and societal bias against activists' interests. As the state is the primary purveyor of elite bias

in Ecuador and Australia, I focused my discussion on challenger attempts to subvert state bias.

Because I extrapolated the concept of a mature oppositional consciousness to include activist

awareness that a movement needs autonomy in order to undermine state bias, I differentiated my

conceptualization by referring to it as an autonomy consciousness.

Although scholars have theorized about how the basic level of consciousness is created,

no one has yet offered an explanation as to the development of a mature oppositional/autonomy

consciousness. By analyzing the history of Indígena political development, I hypothesized that

the awarenesses that comprise a mature consciousness were engendered through first-hand

encounters and second-hand learning: experiences in which the state's potential for bias and

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496. Mansbridge, "The Making of Oppositional Consciousness," 5.
497. Ibid.

duplicity, and desideration for Indígena subjugation to solidify extant power imbalances, were underscored.

To support my hypothesis, I examined whether Indígena groups who experienced first- and second-hand learning behaved differently from groups that lacked such experiences. I found two supporting examples in the Sierra: first, in the 1930s, communities in cantons with a leftist presence were more likely to reject the comuna program. I reasoned that by imparting Marxist ideology, leftists had taught Indígenas the mechanisms of hegemony and domination and thus apprised Indígenas that dominant elites furthered their own interests through Indígena subjugation and dependence. Thus, Indígenas exposed to the leftist school of thought were suspicious of government intentions in advance and rejected the comuna program altogether, whereas Indígenas from cantons with no leftist presence were more likely to accept the comuna program. Second, many communities that entered the comuna program later quit after their members realized the government would use the program to intervene in their affairs. This example constituted what George and Bennett (2004) called a "before-after" analysis because it allowed one to pinpoint the causal factor—in this case, knowledge of government duplicity.

An additional example was provided by a comparison of Highlanders and Lowlanders. For centuries, Lowlanders had been left generally undisturbed by the state and did not undergo first- and second-hand experiences similar to those of the Highlanders; consequently, no widespread autonomy consciousness developed in the Amazon. In contrast, during the last century, an autonomy consciousness became institutionalized in the Sierra. Because Highlanders dominated CONAIE, the Highland norms became the central norms of the movement and were introduced into the Amazon. Although Lowland rank-and-file activists seemed to at least respect

the new norms, several Lowland leaders publicly shirked the new norms and engaged in institutional participation not condoned by CONAIE. By using Chong's (2000) conceptualization of norm adoption and change, and resistance to change, I argued that these leaders refused the new norms because they had the most to lose from forgoing participation. Despite these tensions within the movement, CONAIE was able, for the most part, to eschew or neutralize unwelcome participation.

After analyzing three incidents in which autonomy-minded activists resisted participation and one incident in which it was accepted, I argued that institutional participation can be curtailed under the following conditions: some activists must possess an autonomy consciousness, perceive the participation as counterproductive, and have the power—through, for example, the control of a powerful organization—to issue meaningful sanctions. Although I do not believe the Indigenous Australian case can be used as a comparison, I nonetheless found it noteworthy that the hypothesis I generated from the Indígena case could also be applied to the Indigenous Australian case.

CHAPTER 8

Conclusion

Everywhere in these days men have, in their mockery, ceased to understand that the true security is to be found in social solidarity rather than in isolated individual effort. But this terrible individualism must inevitably have an end, and all will suddenly understand how unnaturally they are separated from one another. It will be the spirit of the time, and people will marvel that they have sat so long in darkness without seeing the light.

—F.M. Dostoevsky, *The Brothers Karamazov*

Agency and Consciousness

McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald observed that more social movement scholarship exists on tangible rather than ideational phenomena—which they described as "ephemeral" and "amorphous"—partly because "studying political systems and various kinds of organization is inherently easier than trying to observe the social construction and dissemination of new ideas."[498] A key objective of this dissertation was to help fill this lacuna by examining activist agency and consciousness and how social movements may overcome structural pressures. I approached these topics from two distinct vantage points: first, I assessed how well the prevalent social movement theories comprising the PPT synthesis approach explain the Indígena and Indigenous Australian cases and account for agency; second, I explored the mechanisms underlying incorporation and co-optation and analyzed how the Indígena movement managed to successfully steer clear of co-optation by eschewing some forms of institutional participation. In this chapter, I consider what the insights of my project imply for social movement theorizing, for political challenger-government relations, and for challengers themselves.

498. McAdam, McCarthy and Zald, *Comparative Perspective on Social Movements*, 6.

Critics of the PPT synthesis have claimed that the approach suffers from a structural bias and cannot account for agency-driven dynamics. In a debate with PPT synthesis advocates, Goodwin and Jasper (1999) seemed to express alarm that, despite its shortcomings, the synthesis project had acquired significant stature within the social movement field and was inspiring a new generation of scholars. Missing from the debate, however, was any kind of systematic assessment of the PPT synthesis' capabilities. One of my objectives in this dissertation was to evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of the PPT synthesis. Despite Goodwin and Jasper's assertion that "the most influential strands" of the synthesis are "tautological, trivial, inadequate, or just plain wrong," I found that the PPT synthesis could competently illuminate most of the key moments of both the Indígena and the Indigenous Australian cases, including the yielding of the Indigenous Australian movement to co-optive pressures.[499] The PPT synthesis fell short, however, in explaining how the Indígena movement resisted co-optive impulses.

Because its activists behaved in unexpected ways, the Indígena movement was a deviant case for the PPT synthesis. As such, it offered an opportunity to gain new insights about social movements. Through my analysis of the Indígena case, I found that some activists resisted institutional participation and thereby eluded co-optation because they had become aware of the mechanisms underlying elite bias and domination and understood the need for movement autonomy to subvert those forces and elude subjugation. Because of their preference for extrainstitutional means, I used the terms "radical" or "aware" to describe these activists; and "moderate" for those lacking the awarenesses. Based on my analysis, I hypothesized that the awarenesses were acquired through first-hand experience or second-hand learning

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499. Goodwin and Jasper, "Caught in a Winding, Snarling Vine," 28.

("consciousness-raising") that underscored the relationship between the reproduction of domination and Indígena subservience. I argued that this set of awarenesses is a form of what Mansbridge (2001) and Morris and Braine (2001) conceptualized as a mature oppositional consciousness. Such a consciousness encompasses the more basic level of consciousness required for collective action and "includes other elements, such as identifying some of the ways a dominant group systematically uses power to initiate and maintain its position, a moral condemnation of the forms of domination, and usually some set of strategies—historical, culturally derived, or borrowed—for ending the system of domination."[500] Because the Indígena awarenesses also include the precept that autonomy counters domination, I refer to them as an autonomy consciousness.

Using Chong's (2000) model of norm adoption, I found suggestive evidence that, in addition to first- and second-hand learning, an autonomy consciousness, or at least its attendant norms—such as eschewing government engagement and prioritizing autonomy—could be diffused from one group to another. Although the evidence was limited, it appeared that, for example, rank-and-file Lowlanders respected—even complied with—the autonomy consciousness norms. I had no basis, however, for assessing whether they also adopted the underlying beliefs. But, as Chong argued, doubters may initially comply with a new norm, but their very compliance eventually leads to attitudinal change. Thus, the Lowland rank-and-file may have adopted the norms for pragmatic reasons, only later to develop the associated beliefs and awarenesses. Several high-profile Lowland leaders, however, who had vested interests in and benefited from adhering to their old principles, resisted the new norms. As a result, Lowland

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500. Mansbridge, "The Making of Oppositional Consciousness," 15.

leaders were much more likely than Highland leaders to pursue and engage in institutional

participation and to undertake activities that aware activists would view as potentially

compromising the movement.

Coy and Hedeen asserted that "an accurate description of a social problem is a

prerequisite to an adequate prescription."[501] I assert that because moderates—such as the

Lowland leaders—are not aware of the mechanisms underlying domination, they may

unwittingly draw themselves and potentially their movements into arrangements that would

strengthen the hand of their opponents. In other words, actors without an autonomy

consciousness behave just as the PPT synthesis proponents, particularly the more structurally

minded scholars, would expect. As exemplified by the Indigenous Australian case, this lack of

knowledge makes moderate activists vulnerable to structural impulses. As I argued in chapter 6,

however, not all opportunities for co-operation or participation are necessarily deleterious.

Stalwart rejection of all co-operation or participation may be as imprudent as naive acceptance.

Indeed, at some point activists may have to co-operate in order to further their goals. Under such

circumstances, activists should acquire a full awareness as possible of the potential advantages

and disadvantages.

Agency, I submit, is more than a combination of will and efficacy; it also requires certain

intangible resources, the most crucial of which is knowledge. The awarenesses I have identified

as comprising an autonomy consciousness represent a particular kind of knowledge. When

cognizant that the system is biased and that elites reproduce their domination by subjugating

others, social movement actors are better equipped to act and react in ways that further their own

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501. Coy and Hedeen, "A Stage Model of Social Movement Co-optation," 427-428.

interests. Thus, aware activists—empowered by this knowledge—are more likely than moderates to recognize and overcome structural impediments. However, despite the great importance of such knowledge for activists, my case studies suggest that the possession of an autonomy consciousness is not always sufficient for radical activists to prevail.

Most conceptualizations of social movement struggles pit the movement against the state.[502] This may characterize the situation satisfactorily when the struggle involves only radical, autonomy-minded activists, but when moderate activists are present and assert their preferences, they become another factor with which radicals must contend. A particular contribution of my project, therefore, is the insight that activists who wield an autonomy consciousness do not content themselves with guarding against their external opponents, such as the state, but also develop mechanisms for reining in moderate activists and curtailing their inclinations for state engagement. In the Indígena case, radicals were able to influence moderates because radicals, thanks to their numeric superiority, dominated CONAIE.

Through CONAIE—which, happily, has a counterhegemonic structure similar to the type Hanchard (1994) recommended that challengers create—radicals had a conduit for spreading their conventions and norms throughout the movement, for dispensing information to the general public, NGOs, and any other interested parties, and for issuing threats and sanctions to both cohort activists and the government. Sanctions are only effective when they impose costs; and because CONAIE was the top organization of an organizational pyramid, threats of expulsion (directed at wayward activists) or of demonstrations (targeting the government) were, indeed, meaningful. CONAIE's high profile also gave radical activists a viable platform for informing

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502. Some conceptualizations also consider countermovements. As my subject is primarily the capacities of social movements and their actors, countermovements were beyond the scope of my study.

the general public when they considered an arrangement or situation unacceptable and therefore illegitimate. Thus, CONAIE, by publicly criticizing the government's 1992 and 1996 administrative bodies, was able to temper moderate activist support for such bodies and neutralize the government's ability to exploit the collaboration with Indígenas.

Although I do believe that institutional participation entails some costs to a movement, in terms of moderation, I do not categorize all participation as undesirable. Moreover, it may at times be unavoidable. When they do participate, activists should take measures to strengthen their hand. As Saward found, large, cohesive groups espousing values salient to the public and possessing unique skills, knowledge, or status may be able to benefit from incorporation.[503] Their attributes bestow on them a degree of power and make it more likely that the government may need their support, for example, to legitimate particular policies. Such groups are less likely than others to become dependent on the government. As such, their participation, in the terminology I proposed in chapter 6, is likely to be productive. Contrary to Saward and other analysts who conflate the terms incorporation and co-optation, I differentiate between the two concepts: in this work, incorporation denotes inclusion in government structures that results in more benefits than costs to the movement; conversely, co-optation refers to inclusion that costs the movement influence but delivers insufficient corresponding gains, in other words, co-optation is counterproductive participation.

Compiling the results of my review of incorporation and co-optation scholarship with data gleaned by analyzing the Indigenous Australian case, I developed a consensual list of issues and protective measures for activists to consider when weighing some kind of institutional

503. Saward, "Cooption and Power," 590.

participation. For example, (1) to address the vulnerability of a movement's leaders and representatives to co-optation, activists may want to implement accountability measures. (2) Activists should assess the movement's strength and weaknesses; a small group, for example, may benefit from aligning with others. (3) Activists may want to consider the government's propensity toward neutrality or bias: cooperation with a biased partner may indeed result in less than optimal results. (4) The costs and benefits of the participatory arrangement itself should be evaluated: for example, is the movement risking moderation for an advisory role or for power sharing? A concern underlying many of the other issues is (5) the movement's autonomy. Activists should consider their balance of power vis-à-vis opponents and remain vigilant in protecting the movement's independence.

With the insights gained from the analysis of my data and the various literature reviews, we can now return to the discussion of the PPT synthesis' inability to explain the Indígena case's outcome. I argue that the concept of an autonomy consciousness provides the missing explanation for why Indígenas rejected many "opportunities" that other social movements, peopled with activists lacking such a consciousness, might have embraced.[504] Under the tenets of various POS/PPT arguments, for example, we would have expected the Indígenas to yield to the moderating force of either the government's intentional social control tactics or participation in Madisonian venues (for example, the 2002-2003 cabinet posts). Instead, Indígenas almost always opted for preserving their movement's autonomy, even at the cost of some degree of political power and influence.

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504. An autonomy consciousness in this discussion should be understood as also encompassing radical perception of a political engagement's undesirability as well as sanctioning power. These factors were left out to simplify the discussion.

One could categorize the autonomy consciousness as a belief or, even, as part of Indígena ideology, which is why, as discussed in chapter 5, it would be beyond the scope of the framing perspective. As two founders of the perspective themselves stated, beliefs shape and inform the framing process, but are not a product of it.[505] Resource mobilization theory, which emphasizes that mobilization requires organization and resources, also fell short. Furthermore, just as with the other component theories, RMT offers no tools for understanding how different degrees of actor consciousness may affect the utilization of an organization's capacities. For example, the Indigenous Australian civil rights organization, FCAATSI, could potentially have been a powerful tool for the Indigenous movement. But the moderate mindset of its founders limited its prowess (one wonders what FCAATSI could have achieved, had its activists been radicals).

By applying the PPT synthesis to my two case studies, my objective was not to suggest how agency might be better incorporated into analysis, a task already undertaken by Morris, but to challenge the panacean implications of its supporters.[506] Perhaps part of the synthesis' attraction to a new generation of scholars (much to Goodwin and Jasper's chagrin) can be attributed to its progenitors' urgings that scholars step outside their theoretical boxes. While this was a laudable aim, one must question whether the larger theoretical space afforded by the PPT synthesis is still a bounded realm. To truly attain a "fuller understanding of social movement dynamics," scholars must cast a wider theoretical net.[507]

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505. See Snow and Benford, "Clarifying the Relationship between Framing and Ideology in the Study of Social Movements."
506. Morris, "Reflections on Social Movement Theory," 447-452.
507. McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald, *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements*, 7.

The insights my study has generated also have implications for social movements and for how governments "manage" their minority challengers. As I discussed in chapter 6, governments employ myriad methods to moderate movements, from violent repression to incorporation to concessions. Incorporation is a strategy that governments particularly favor for minority groups; but as the case studies of this dissertation indicate, corporatist arrangements are an unreliable tool. They can be resisted; and, even when implemented, rather than addressing minority concerns, they may repress grievances, leaving them to fester. In the course of the twentieth century, the Australian government wound through various approaches for dealing with its Indigenous denizens. Underlying all of these seemed to be a desire to quell Indigenous political activism and to achieve societal stability; that is, a stability which would include both Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoples. In spite of the millions upon millions of dollars invested in various programs and agencies over the decades, the government has repeatedly failed in these endeavors. The tangible signs of this failure include the fact that Indigenous Australians continue to have significantly lower health and other socioeconomic standards than non-Indigenous Australians and that they are still politically aggrieved and agitated. That the Australian government has somehow pursued the wrong course is substantiated by the UN CERD's condemnation of Australian land policies. How does it happen that a government, despite the application of vast resources, manages neither to combat discrimination nor to achieve the justice, equality and economic betterment demanded by its citizens?

A Government's Dilemma: The Stability Paradox

In a chapter aptly titled "Indigenous Peoples and Democracy: Issues for Policymakers," Donna Lee Van Cott remarked that democracy in Latin America has very different meanings for government authorities and indigenous peoples. "Through the eyes of the region's indigenous leaders, the 'democracy' touted by the Latin American nation-state is just a mirage of Western political institutions grafted onto a light-skinned controlled neocolonial society, because Indians have benefited less than the general population from democratization. In this view, only the satisfaction of Indian demands for greater political and economic participation, together with an embrace of the multiethnic reality of Latin America, will lead to real democracy and, ultimately, political stability."[508] Although her comments relate to Latin America, her insights can be applied to other regions. My research indicates that as long as minorities are shuttled into so-called representative arrangements and kept out of the real corridors of power, their concerns will not be addressed and true (and lasting) stability will remain elusive. I do not by any means claim to know what should be done— and such considerations are beyond the scope of my study— but after closely examining the Indígena and Indigenous Australian cases, I perhaps do have a sense for what does not seem to work and an inclination as to the approaches that might be more constructive.

Let us take, for example, the issue of land rights in Australia. Judging from the statements and actions of Indigenous Peoples over the past hundred and fifty years, it appears that land rights are a persistent demand. For the entirety of its history, however, the Australian government has favored industrial and pastoral over Indigenous interests. Indeed, the

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508. Van Cott, "Indigenous Peoples and Democracy," 2.

discrimination inherent in the Native Title legislation wrought UN condemnation. The Australian government, it seems, would rather invest millions in mostly symbolic programs such as the decade-long *Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation* than give up the monies and other benefits it accrues from favoring industrial and pastoral interests. Perhaps the government fears that relinquishing full land rights (including subsoil rights) to Indigenous Australians would cause wide-scale economic disruption? Or perhaps the Commonwealth government's own tenuous hold on sovereignty—for even Australia's courts have now recognized that the continent was not *terra nullius* in the 1700s—drives its reactionary stance?

The Germans have a saying that sometimes one must "bite into the sour apple," meaning that particular circumstances prevail requiring one to take a disagreeable action, hitherto resisted. Considering that all its myriad programs have failed, perhaps it is time the Australian government bit into its own sour apple, following the example of the Canadian government: return large tracts of land to the original Indigenous owners. Moreover, to provide greater political participation, the Australian government, rather than establishing yet another advisory or "representative" agency or allowing majoritarian democratic procedures to determine outcomes, may have to provide its Indigenous citizens with power sharing and veto rights over policies affecting their welfare.[509] Such approaches toward land rights and political participation would certainly seem more likely to provide equality, justice, and economic opportunity. And by ending its own discriminatory policies, the government may provide a role model for non-Indigenous Australians to adopt nondiscriminatory norms.[510]

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509. For discussions of the benefits of power sharing and other mechanisms for inducing stability, see Lijphart, *Democracy in Plural Societies*.
510. Although it is questionable whether Indigenous peoples want to be integrated into mainstream Australian society, a topic beyond the scope of my study, it is interesting to note that equality, justice, and economic

An additional disadvantage to governments, including those of Australia and Ecuador, of using social control methods to moderate challengers is that such approaches enjoy only short-lived efficacy. As both the Australian and Ecuadorian governments have experienced, challengers learn to adapt and overcome social control tactics. As Hay remarked, "Social control is not static but dynamic." Ruling and subordinate groups are constantly learning how to overcome the challenges posed by the other. Each implementation of new social controls alters "the basis of existing controls and create in so doing the potential for new challenges, as the subordinate groups come to experience, appreciate and transcend the new forms of control."[511] Thus, although the Indígena movement's development of an autonomy consciousness and subsequent eschewal of government engagement was unusual, it may not be so for long if other groups can acquire the Indígena mindset. This raises the question: Can other movements replicate the Indígena movement's approach? Or must each movement experience the political netherworld for itself in order to form an autonomy consciousness?

Must Political Challengers Weather the Netherworld?

How transferable are the awarenesses that undergird an autonomy consciousness? Could they be transmitted to groups in other regions or countries as movement tactics have been, or through similar networks?

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opportunity, in a non-discriminatory environment, are the attributes which, in the U.S., facilitate minority and immigrant group integration. See Dennis Chong and Dukhong Kim, "The Experiences and Effects of Economic Status Among Racial and Ethnic Minorities," *American Political Science Review* 100, no. 3 (August 2006): 335-351.

511. Hay, "Employers' Attitudes to Social Policy and the Concept of Social Control, 1900-1920," 109. Voss also discussed that challengers can learn from previous mistakes and adapt. See "The Collapse of a Social Movement," 255.

Over the past thirty to forty years, it has become apparent that tactics can be diffused

from group to group and around the world. Indeed, certain non-violent protest tactics have

become so pervasive that they have become part of activist common knowledge.[512] Moreover,

the modular character of many tactics, combined with the growing similarity of governments

(and social movements) around the world means that the same methods can be used in Canberra

as in Quito.[513] The cross-pollination of tactics and information among activists from different

movements has become so pervasive that I refer to it as the *activist self-help industry*. Diffusion

occurs primarily through seminars, websites and books. It can be either relational or entirely non-

relational: an activist can attend seminars at the Oxford Internet Institute at Oxford University or

exchange information with other activists at the Council of Europe-supported *Seminar against*

Fascism and Anti-Semitism or log on to *www.organizenow.net* or any number of activist how-to

Websites. And if international travel is too expensive, or if internet access is unavailable, an

activist can chose from a wide array of specialized how-to manuals and books: for example,

environmentalists can rely on guides, such as *Fighting Toxics*, which I referenced in chapter 6;

and Indigenous Australian activists who want practical tips on lobbying the United Nations can

turn to *Indigenous Peoples, the United Nations and Human Rights*.[514] But could these same

networks transmit something as complex and involved as an autonomy consciousness?

Some scholars have observed that, within the United States, the basic level of

consciousness can be extended (or appropriated) between dissimilar groups.[515] And, as the

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512. Bert Klandermans, *The Social Psychology of Protest* (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1997).
513. Sidney Tarrow discussed the modular nature of protest tactics, see "Modular Collective Action and the Rise of the Social Movement: Why the French Revolution Was Not Enough," *Politics and Society* 21, no. 1 (1993): 69-90. David Strang and John W. Meyer observed that governments and social movements are developing a uniform similarity, see "Institutional Conditions for Diffusion," *Theory and Society* 22, no. 4 (1993): 487-511.
514. Sarah Pritchard, *Indigenous Peoples, the United Nations and Human Rights* (London: Zed Books, 1998).
515. Sharon Groch, "Free Spaces," 91.

Indígena case suggests, an autonomy consciousness can be taught. But the first- and second-hand experiences I discussed (as well as the possible diffusion of Highland norms to some Lowlanders) all occurred within the same country and among challengers fighting the same opponent. Evidence that an autonomy consciousness may be able to cross international borders comes not from the Indígena case but from the Indigenous Australian case. Members of the Indigenous Australian Black Panther group acquired many of the awarenesses that I would consider as belonging to an autonomy consciousness by reading U.S. Black Power materials, some of which were provided, ironically, by U.S. soldiers on leave in Sydney. One could say that the Indigenous Australian Black Power movement sprang *almost* fully formed, like Athena, the Greek goddess of war and wisdom, from the head of the U.S. Black Power movement. Unlike their radical counterparts in Ecuador, however, the Indigenous Australian radicals neither created nor transformed any extant organizations into a strong, radical national-level organization. As one of my interviewees related, the movement was so successful at capturing national and international attention that activists did not feel the need to create a formal organization.[516] In other words, while they appreciated the need to be autonomous from the government and from moderate (assimilationist) influences, they did not link autonomy with organizational power.

McAdam warned of the dangers of large organizations: "the creation of formal organizations renders the movement increasingly vulnerable to the destructive forces of oligarchization, co-optation, and the dissolution of indigenous support."[517] Under certain conditions, this admonishment may indeed be accurate: if a movement's key organization is dominated by moderate activists, then such an organization may facilitate the movement's co-

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516. Interview with Black Power activist, January 31, 2005.
517. McAdam, *Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930-1970*, 56.

optation. But the contrasting experiences of the Indígena and Indigenous Australian movements indicate that the opposite is also true: the presence of formal organizations may help a movement avoid co-optation and the lack of such organizations can render a movement vulnerable to co-optation. As several scholars have observed, a movement needs structure; Oberschall, for example, attributed the demobilization of the 1960s-era movements in the United States to their lack of organizational capacity.[518]

In response to McAdam's observation, I would say that it is the radical activists in a movement who should make haste to establish a powerful organization, preferably with a counterhegemonic structure. Moreover, rather than relying on the media or any other outlet to convey their messages, they should develop their own communication capacity. As part of that capacity, they might consider conducting consciousness-raising seminars. The radical Highlanders, for example, may have fared better with the Lowland leaders had they attempted, from the very beginning, to persuade Lowlanders of the benefits of extrainstitutional participation and the dangers of some forms of institutional participation. By revealing the mechanisms underlying domination—through some form of consciousness-raising—radical Highlanders may have been able to accelerate Lowlander acquisition of the autonomy consciousness awarenesses, and thereby, in the terminology of Chong's (2000) model of norm change, influence Lowlander dispositions and ease the norm adoption process. Indeed, the recent problems encountered by the Indígena movement—such as the 2002 ruling alliance debacle—

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518. Oberschall, "The Decline of the 1960s Social Movements." See also Aldon D. Morris and Suzanne Staggenborg, "Leadership in Social Movements," in *The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements*, ed. David Snow, Sarah Soule, and Hans-Peter Kriesi (Malden, Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishing, 2004), 171-196.

indicate that activists might benefit from *ongoing* consciousness-raising and self-reflection at both the grassroots and elite levels.

A key advantage of radical activists developing strong organizational and communication capacities is that, by doing so, they are better able to share their awarenesses and understandings with other activists, the general public, NGOs, the United Nations, and other interested parties. As domination and subjugation are antithetical to equality, justice, and ultimately societal stability, they do not provide anyone, including the domineering elites, with lasting benefits. It is only by sharing their viewpoint with others that aware activists can hope to make a difference. For, as Sir Francis Bacon famously said in 1597—before the British ever sailed into Sydney Harbor and just after the Spaniards first entered Latin America—"Knowledge is power."

APPENDIX

As Alison Brysk noted, "terminology to describe Native Americans is currently in a state of flux." "Indian" has "pejorative connotations," and "indigenous" is confusing as it can refer to pre-Columbian groups. "Native American" is also problematic for Latin American groups, because it is primarily associated with North America.[519] In this dissertation, I follow the lead of Lynn A. Meisch and use the term Indígena, which is used by many Indígena organizations in Ecuador.[520] As a noun, Indígena is not capitalized in Spanish, but I capitalize it both to adhere to The Chicago Manual of Style's guidelines and to convey the same respect endowed when Indian is capitalized in English.

Terminology for Indigenous Australians is equally contested. The term "Indigenous Australian" is problematic as it homogenizes all groups into one category. "Aborigine" also connotes homogenization; moreover, its use by a non-Indigenous person is undesirable because of negative historical associations. As the Black Power activist and scholar Gary Foley noted, most Indigenous Australians reject Aborigine and use the name of their local tribal group. As general terms, Foley himself uses "indigenous people" and "Koori", even though Koori is associated with a specific region.[521] In the past several years custom has moved toward the general term Indigenous Australians, perhaps because Indigenous people(s) is sometimes grammatically awkward.

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519. Alison Brysk, "Turning Weakness into Strength: The Internationalization of Indian Rights," *Latin American Perspectives* 23, no.2 (1996), 54.
520. See Meisch, "'We will not Dance on the Tomb of our Grandparents': '500 Years of Resistance' in Ecuador."
521. Gary Foley, "Muddy Waters: Archie, Mudrooroo and Aboriginality," 1997. http://www.kooriweb.org/foley/essays/essay_10.html (accessed April 13, 2008).

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