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Reconfiguration of Sub-National Governance:
Responses to Violence and State Collapse in the North Caucasus

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Abstract

Reconfiguration of Sub-National Governance:
Responses to Violence and State Collapse in the North Caucasus

This dissertation explains the heterogeneous effects of armed conflict on sub-national governance in the North Caucasus. While acknowledging the role of inherited institutions, my multimethod investigation shows how they were strategically transformed during the breakup of the Soviet Union, creating unintended consequences and the basis for governance today.

My main argument is that divergent patterns of violence changed civilian preferences, collective action capacities, and the pattern of integration of local and ostensibly informal authorities, altering which domains became the purview of state control and which remained governed by non-state authorities. Comparing goods provision, dispute resolution, and symbolic practices alongside conventionally studied governance dimensions like coercion and extraction reveals that communities consistently rely on state institutions for coercion and extraction but exhibit significant variation in how they regulate disputes, provide public welfare goods, and enforce social order. Tracing the interaction between government policies and civilian demands, I identify three governance trajectories: centralized (Chechnya), polycentric (Dagestan), and mediated (Ingushetia).

The project provides several contributions. First, instead of privileging the state as the provider of governance, my research analyzes what communities are able to provide locally and where states interject. Second, the project moves beyond conventional proxies of state-building like extraction or coercion and the post-conflict focus on power-sharing institutions, to examine the reconstitution of goods provision, dispute resolution, and symbolic governance, contributing

to recent scholarship that disaggregates governance and statehood. Third, by examining different patterns of violence in a case of civil war, a case of collective violence, and a case of fragmented criminal violence, my research adds to ongoing conversations about the legacies of violence. Finally, the project provides original empirical qualitative and quantitative data on violence and governance in the North Caucasus based on 9 months of fieldwork.

While most studies of governance focus on periods of conflict or areas of "limited statehood," this project suggests such a framework also captures variation in societies emerging from conflict. I demonstrate that a framework centered on post-conflict governance most accurately captures variation in who governs, over which dimensions, and where, offering a way to trace the way in which conflict does and does not impact governance. The dissertation provides more general insights into the processes of rebuilding authority after the collapse of previously entrenched regimes. The reconstruction of governance in the North Caucasus shows, for example, how highly bureaucratized authoritarian regimes can give way to new strategies of governance that rely much more extensively on informal societally-based authority structures to monitor and regulate citizens. Since these post-collapse modes of governance relies more extensively on informal and indirect means of rule, my work also locates the heretofore hidden mechanisms of control and the different points at which individuals and communities are able to insulate and assert their own distinct interests.

Acknowledgements

During our comparative politics seminar my first year at Northwestern a colleague, who has become a dear friend, pointed out that the acknowledgements section of a book can reveal as much about the work as the rest of the book. If that is so, I hope to do justice to the community, here in Chicago, in the North Caucasus, and beyond who made this research possible, stimulating, and not feel like a lonesome venture.

My committee at Northwestern provided not only constructive criticism, but also unwavering support as this project went through many ups and downs. Will Reno, my Chair, did not blink twice went I told him I was going to go to Chechnya for my first fieldwork trip. Since that day, he read and marked up each part of this dissertation, skyped with me when I ran into trouble in the field, and talked through its contributions, sharing his immense knowledge of the literature on armed conflict, governance, and authoritarian rule. Ana Arjona's class on microfoundations of civil war helped me formulate the research questions in this project, after which she provided meticulous feedback with an admirable detail to attention. She has also welcomed me into the academic community of scholars working on wartime institutions and been a model of engaged scholarship. Rachel Riedl sat with me repeatedly as we mapped out my argument, pushing me to trace the connections between processes and helping me see the big picture beyond the specific case details. Numerous times when people learned who I had on my committee, they told me how lucky I was. This committee has been a model of mentorship and I am deeply thankful to each one of them for the chance to learn from them and work with them.

Northwestern has overall been an amazing place to study conflict, state-building, and institutional change. Numerous professors, including Wendy Pearlman, Jordan Gans-Morse,

to me for interviews, and my dedicated survey supervisors and enumerators. I have thought extensively about how to acknowledge you given the constantly shifting political environment in the Caucasus. Though it is nearly impossible to fully provide anonymity, formal association permanently marked in this document can have unforeseen consequences. In the context of arrests that have swept the region in the last months, I am choosing not to formally name each of you. It is not an attempt to erase your immense knowledge, contributions, or support, without which this dissertation would not be possible. I deeply hope it is an unnecessary precaution and that by the time this turns into a book, I will be able to publicly acknowledge your contributions.

Finally, to my support system, who has patiently accepted my fieldwork trips and supported them even when they did not approve or understand my decisions. My parents, Anna Klyachkina and Gregory Klyachkin, who moved our family from St. Petersburg when I was six. Thank you for your unwavering support, patience, and encouragement even when you thought my decisions were putting me in the exact situations you sought to protect me from. My grandfather, who helped raise me and my brother as my parents sought to restart their lives in the States. You have been a model of resilience, constant desire to learn, and ability to adapt to any situation. Finally, my partner, Erik Norman. Thank you for granting me both independence and support; this would be an infinitely lonelier journey without you.

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Chapter 1
Post-Conflict Governance: Introduction and Theory

Imams retain their authority and people continue to go to them to solve problems – family disputes, even settling blood feuds. But, they have also become representatives of the state, enacting its rules and decisions. – Interview in Grozny, Chechnya, 2018

Imams accepted the role that was previously filled by courts and government institutions. Of course, not everyone appealed to them because there were people far from Islam and those that fear it to this day - but then [in the 1990s]... the weaker the state, the stronger the ethnic movements and mafias, but also Islam and its representatives - mullahs and imams. And they resolved everything - not just mahr and divorces but land disputes, questions about business - they resolved everything faster and more efficiently than the state. - Interview in Makhachkala, Dagestan, 2017.

The representatives of the teip [clan] gathered and decided to expel the deputy of the National Assembly from its ranks. It was not an easy decision but his stance regarding the land conflict was too much a betrayal. This means that his relatives will no longer uphold contact with him and he will no longer receive assistance or support from the teip. - Correspondence with individual in Nazran, Ingushetia, 2018.

How, and to what extent, does armed conflict reshape governance? What alternatives to the state exist after conflict and when do citizens rely on them instead of, or alongside, relying on the state? I analyze these questions by assessing the reconfiguration of sub-national governance in three post-conflict territories in Russia's North Caucasus - Chechnya, Dagestan, and Ingushetia. Despite similar historical legacies, structural antecedents, and formal institutional arrangements, the republics' *de facto* governance trajectories diverged in the post-Soviet period. While goods provision is fairly consistent across the republics, reminiscent of the Soviet era, dispute resolution and social order institutions exhibit significant variation.

The state[1] appears omnipresent in Chechnya, directly through bureaucrats but also indirectly through the incorporation of ostensibly non-state authorities, as evident in the

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[1] Unless noted otherwise, when I reference the state, I focus on the republic-level.

introductory quote. In neighboring Ingushetia, a republic to the West of Chechnya that split from it in 1992, informal authorities retain autonomy and serve as a check on state power, a proposition tested most recently in the fall of 2018 when state and non-state actors came to a direct confrontation in a land dispute. On the other side of Chechnya, in Dagestan, local village administrators retain authority and navigate a complex web of clan networks and informal relationships to govern; republic state presence is rarely felt as elites shirk their responsibilities. How did these divergent governance trajectories, defined as "institutionalized modes of social coordination to produce and implement collectively binding rules, or to provide collective goods" (Risse 2011: 9) develop? To what extent do the arrangements replicate their Soviet counterparts and where have they been reshaped by violent conflict and state collapse?

To-date, research has focused on explaining the impact of armed conflict on specific consequences - predominantly state-building or peacebuilding. Governance, instead, is typically studied in areas of "limited statehood" or during periods of armed conflict where state sovereignty is assumed to be fragmented. I utilize a multimethod research design that draws on interviews, oral histories, local newspapers, and original survey data to expand repertoire of violence under consideration and study its heterogeneous impact on governance in a historically strong state. I find that even where antecedent conditions favored institutional continuity and the same formal institutions regulate governance, subnational republics exhibit significant de facto variation based on the timing and pattern of violence during state collapse.

This chapter starts by laying out the puzzle of post-conflict governance. Next, I provide background on the cases of study in Russia's North Caucasus - Chechnya, Dagestan, and

Ingushetia. I then present my theoretical framework and discuss how it builds upon existing literature.[2] The chapter concludes by laying out the plan for the remainder of the dissertation.

I.   **The Puzzle: Post-Conflict Governance in the North Caucasus**

The North Caucasus have a bipolar image in popular imagination and scholarship, depicted as informal, clan-based societies with strong religious organizational networks that have repeatedly rebuffed state advances or as sites of subjugation and deep state penetration.

On the one hand, the republics historically had strong horizontal networks that helped allocate scarce resources and regulate social order. During Imam Shamil's rule (1840-1856), local naibs had executive and military power. They collected taxes, implemented decisions of shari'a courts, monitored compliance with Shamil's orders, and prevented internal conflicts and blood feuds (Gammer 1994: 306).[3] Tariqas and virds – Sufi Muslim brotherhoods – spread to the Northeast Caucasus during and after the Caucasian war, layering atop of earlier traditional organizations like *tukhums* – military – political units connected through kinship, and *djamaats* - community councils (Sokirianskaia 2009: 74-75). At the collapse of the Soviet Union, predictions about the North Caucasus mirrored those in Central Asia, favoring a "resurrection" of pre-Soviet identities in the form of tribal divisions and Islamic fundamentalism, throwing off legacies of Soviet rule (Jones Luong 2002: 51). This suggests authority rests in non-state actors.

On the other hand, beginning with the Caucasian Wars (1818-1864), the Russian Empire, and then the Soviet State, disrupted informal authority structures it perceived to be a threat. Through collectivization, resettlements, deportations, and targeted killing of religious authorities

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[2] I discuss alternative explanations in the chapter's appendix and in the next chapter's section on case selection.
[3] See Bobrovnikov (2002) and (Sokirianskaia 2009) for detailed accounts of informal authority and religious governance before and during Soviet rule.

in the 1920s, the state sought to "make society legible" (Scott 1998) and restructure it. While the Bolsheviks initially used bribery, intimidation, and assurances of religious autonomy, promising to keep the shari'a and not to interfere with the role of sheikhs Bobrovnikov (2002: 218-219), in 1924 they began a widespread repression. Vatchagaev (2014: 27) describes,

No one was spared, not even former allies of the Bolsheviks. Islamic heritage was destroyed; the Shariah was eliminated, the Arabic script abrogated, and all who could read the Quran were registered as politically disloyal. Mass arrests and shootings of the sheikhs, their successors, and their loyal murids and turkhs (local leaders) soon followed. The terror was aimed at depriving religious support to any forces that might in the future resist the Bolsheviks.

This reversal and broken promises by state officials were commonly mentioned in interviews as an example of why state promises for autonomy cannot be trusted. Further disrupting informal networks and authority hierarchies, Soviet leadership deported the entirety of the population of Chechnya and Ingushetia in 1944, as well as relocating highland communities in Dagestan. Though some villages in the mountains preserved their traditions and governance systems (Karpov 2010), resettlement and mass migration to the plains between the 1920s and 1980s further uprooted most people's lives. Between 200,000 to 300,000 people were resettled and seventy-six new population centers organized, sometimes in existing villages (ibid. 6: 37). As King (2001: 551) summarized, "the supply of stateness in the Soviet system was there even before the demand." After decades of strong Soviet rule, the strength of informal authorities, their linkages to the population, and ability to substitute for state institutions or threaten the state cannot be assumed.

Soviet collapse in the 1990s undermined state regulation and domination across Russia. The armed conflicts that broke out in the North Caucasus further eroded what remained of state institutions. This opened an opportunity for the reassertion of informal networks and authorities,

armed and unarmed. Yet, by the early 2000s, elites in Moscow sought to redeploy historically-entrenched governance strategies, "buying off provincial officials and deploying the state's substantial repressive apparatus to sweep up suspected subversives" (King and Menon 2010: 22). Reflecting on the states that emerged from post-Soviet conflicts 2001, Charles King wrote "the territorial separatists of the early 1990s have become the state builders of the early 2000s, creating de facto countries whose ability to field armed forces, control their own territory, educate their children, and maintain local economies is about as well developed as that of the recognized states of which they are still notionally a part" (2001: 525). This echoes descriptions of Russia more broadly as a "hegemonic state" where "elites are virtually unrestrained by the population over which they seek to rule because there exists no other countervailing sources of authority" (Grzymala-Busse and Jones Luong 2002: 18). Writing fifteen years later, Gans-Morse (2017) affirms that by the mid-1990s significant institutional development had occurred to restore state capacity, followed by Putin's ascent to power, which further expanded government agencies' authority. Across Central Asia, where non-state authorities have historically been strong as in the North Caucasus, "state structures and centers of power inherited from Soviet rule have remained largely intact" (Jones Luong 2004: 21) and "leaders deliberately continue to govern based on their experiences under Soviet rule" (ibid. 22). This suggests that Soviet legacies continues to structure the logic of governance and authority rests in the state.

Did the North Caucasus emerge from the period of state collapse and armed conflict in the 1990s with institutional configurations that reproduced their Soviet counterparts? Or did conflicts restructure the architecture of governance? Are the legacies of armed conflict consistent across dimensions of governance? Given that existing scholarship on post-conflict settings

prioritizes peacebuilding (Paris 2004; Fortna 2008; Autesserre 2010; Hoddie and Hartzell 2010; Cheng and Zaum 2011), and state-building from the state's perspective (Tilly 1985; Spruyt 1994; Slater 2010; Cheng 2018), we lack the theoretical framework and empirical evidence to fully answer these questions and understand how armed conflict changed not just state presence, but the roles of non-armed, non-state authorities.

Applying conventional frameworks misrepresents governance. Analyzing extractive institutions, the dominant proxy for state-building, depicts three republics where most residents' fiscal contributions go to the state, as evident in Figure 1.[4] Though residents also contribute to community projects and religious institutions, a point I explore further in chapter 3, measures of resource mobilization suggest the state has deeply and fairly evenly penetrated society.

Figure 1: Responsibility for extraction

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
[4] This question asked respondents, "who is primarily responsible for collecting taxes and fees in your community?" The data comes from an original survey I conducted between June and October 2018. I provide details on the survey methodology in the next chapter as well as a more detailed comparison of how much individuals spend on "taxes and fees" collected by the state vis-a-vis their informal contributions to religious authorities, traditions, and community projects.

While state authorities dominate extraction, examining this domain alone misses other ways civilians interact with authorities and organize to meet their needs. Incorporating a wider range of material and symbolic domains reveals that a diverse set of actors with various relationships to the state govern locally. Analyzing dispute resolution, as in Figure 2 below, shows that while state authorities play an important role in Dagestan, in most communities in Chechnya and Ingushetia civilians do not rely on state authorities to resolve everyday disputes. Further, the choices are not always dichotomous, with 27.66% of survey respondents in Ingushetia, 30.23% in Dagestan, and 32.32% in Chechnya stating that disputes are resolved jointly by state and non-state authorities in their community. Given that controlling dispute institutions offers one of the most effective ways to consolidate power (Arjona 2016), it is particularly surprising to see such variation in this domain. The regulation of disputes challenges the perception of governance which emerges by analyzing states as constructions of "fiscal contracts" (Slater 2010: 36).

Figure 2: Responsibility for dispute resolution

The distinction between state and non-state is not only problematic because these authorities sometimes co-produce governance, but also because the non-state category in Chechnya needs to be interpreted differently from Ingushetia and Dagestan. In Chechnya, the strategic incorporation of religious authorities has extended state control, as evident in the introductory quote. The renegotiation of the state's relationship with religious authorities changes the interpretation of the survey findings; in going to religious authorities in Chechnya, civilians are turning to indirect agents of the state, unlike in neighboring Ingushetia.

This hints at the broader ways in which Chechnya has become a case of **centralized governance**, with power shifting both horizontally from non-state authorities to the state and vertically from the local to the republic level. In neighboring Dagestan, state collapse initially led to a similar mobilization of informal actors vying for power and seeking to fill the gap created by failures of law enforcement, government agencies, and economic crisis. However, while some of the early leaders became part of state bureaucracies, unlike in Chechnya, a significant amount of autonomous authorities and networks remain, making decisions independently and at times in opposition to the state. Dagestan is thus best characterized as a case of **polycentric governance**, where the centers of power are independent of one another (Ostrom 2005; Murtazashvili 2016). Ingushetia, Chechnya's neighbor to the West, represents a case of **mediated governance**, a system in "which the government relies on partnership (or at least coexistence) with a diverse range of local intermediaries and rival sources of authority to provide core functions" (Menkhaus 2007: 78). Similar to Dagestan there are a number of informal and local authorities, but here we see greater coordination, accommodation, and bargaining between them.[5] As the introductory

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[5] This echoes Kasfir et al. (2017) depiction of "mediated stateness" among armed actors.

quote demonstrates, this greater engagement has made informal authorities, like heads of kinship networks and imams, vital arbitrators of disputes, capable of censoring state elites. In each of these cases, the end of conflict did not create a bureaucratic Weberian state. Each of these arrangements is a form of multi-layered governance (Kasfir et al. 2017) produced by a multiplicity of actors. However, the hierarchies between them and relationships to civilians differ, resulting in divergent governance trajectories and counters of the state. I suggest that these governance arrangements are best understood by mapping the architecture of governance through three key questions: (1) Who governs? (2) Over which dimensions? and (3) Where?

This dissertation develops a theoretical framework and empirical account of post-conflict governance. Most studies of *governance* focus on areas of "limited statehood" where "state institutions...are neither strong nor functioning" (Themner and Utas 2016: 261)[6] or areas fractured by civil war (Arjona et al 2015; Kasfir et al 2017) or criminal violence (Lessing 2018). Yet, present-day Russia fits neither of these conditions. Instead, it is a case where non-state governance should be least likely given the state's historic penetration of society and the current authoritarian mode of governance under which scholars argue elites will attempt to monopolize power. The renegotiation of governance in a case where state authorities historically had asymmetric control over coercion and capital (Tilly 2005) may follow a different trajectory than in cases where state control was always limited, particularly in resource-dependent domains like welfare provision (McMann 2014). Thus, this dissertation extends knowledge of governance by studying the reconfiguration of post-conflict governance in a historically strong state where violence may be least likely to alter long-standing institutional trajectories.

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6 In fact, the majority of these studies focus on sub-Saharan Africa specifically. I discuss them more closely later in this chapter.

While the specific actors involved in governance are unique to the Caucasus, the methods of analyzing post-conflict governance are broadly applicable. Moreover, given that authoritarianism is the most common mode of governance in post-conflict states, (Lewis et al 2018), this study provides an important contribution by empirically assessing and theorizing three possible governance trajectories that are relevant beyond the region. In doing so, it lays out a research agenda for studying post-conflict *governance*, as opposed to state-building or peacebuilding, breaking down both the actors and dimensions of governance.

I show that despite historical and structural commonalities, Chechnya, Ingushetia, and Dagestan developed distinct trajectories of governance have persisted through attempts by the federal government to reassert control. The variation is particularly unlikely in an authoritarian state, which, despite de jure federalism, politicians, scholars, and citizens describe Russia as being organized through a "power vertical." All three republics rely on Moscow for the majority of their budgets, republic leadership is appointed, and most state administrators I interviewed described their job as implementing decrees from Moscow. This minimizes the likelihood of sub-national variation and points to factors outside the North Caucasus in explaining patterns of governance. Yet, I find that even under circumstances where a strong federal center seemingly controls decision-making and the same formal institutions regulate governance, non-state authorities retain a role in and subnational republics exhibit significant de facto variation.

Assessing the relationship between armed conflict and governance, I argue that though the preferences and capacities of state elites, informal authorities, and civilians are historically conditioned, they can be redirected and reshaped by conflict, shifting institutional configurations and creating divergent post-conflict governance arrangements. Armed conflict can reconfigure

governance by impacting the interaction between these actors through three causal mechanisms, altering: (1) civilian preferences for governance (2) collective action capacity and (3) the pattern of integration of local and informal authorities into the state.

II. Theoretical Approach and Argument

The descriptions of the North Caucasus above draw attention to the shifting configuration of governance over the last century and in the post-Soviet decades. As the autonomy and public presence of non-state authorities repeatedly changed so did the governance alternatives available to civilians, their dependence on the state, and ability to organize without it. The re-assertion of non-state authorities and networks despite decades of significant state control and periods of armed conflict problematizes assumptions about a linear trajectory to state-building,[7] demonstrating the potential for de-bureaucratization of the state. However, both Soviet rule and armed conflict left a mark, raising questions about the dichotomy and relationships between state and ostensibly non-state authorities, which domains of governance each regulates, and in turn, how civilians encounter and choose between them. I build on the literature on armed conflict, state-building, and non-state governance to theoretically and empirically explore post-conflict governance.

Relevant Literature

Armed Conflict and Governance

Internal conflicts fragment territorial control and authority within states. While destructive in many aspects, conflicts also open space for the redeployment and development of

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7 This echoes previous studies which point out that traditional authorities have not disappeared despite "modernity" such as Baldwin 2015; Murtazashvili 2016; Comaroff and Comaroff (2018) and others that I discuss further in the section on non-state governance.

alternative authorities structures, orders, and institutions (Staniland 2012; Bateson 2013; Mukhopadhyay 2014; Arjona 2015; Sweet 2017). As a result, during wars from Syria to Congo and Colombia, a range of actors, from religious and customary authorities (Murtazashvili 2016) to NGOs and business elites (Raeymaekers et. al. 2008) and armed actors (Reno 1998; Mampilly 2011; Marten 2012; Driscoll 2014; Arjona 2016; Kasfir et al 2018) shape civilians' daily affairs and decision-making.

These actors take on many of the governance functions associated with the state, from extraction and regulation to protection and social service provision, whether offering it selectively or broadly (Stewart 2018). This wartime rift in hierarchies and proliferation of governance practices is exacerbated when conflict occurs during rapid institutional change, such as democratization and economic collapse in Peru (Soifer and Vergara 2019) or the withdrawal of historically strong state institutions (Reno 2002; Heathershaw and Schatz 2017). Recent research on civil wars further shows that many of the transformations that occur during conflict take place locally (Kalyvas 2006; Arjona 2016), resulting in sub-national variation as to who governs and how.

When conflict formally ends, the fragmentation of sovereignty, polarization, and proliferation of governance authorities does not automatically disappear. Yet, rooted in Tilly's question of whether war builds states, the majority of scholars examine post-conflict order and governance from the state's perspective.[8] Blattman and Miguel (2010: 42) pointed out that, "[t]he social and institutional legacies of conflict are arguably the most important but least understood of all war impacts." A wealth of studies since explored post-conflict transformations

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8 This echoes Lust and Rakner (2018: 278) critique of the literature on taxation and social extraction.

in warlords' roles (Driscoll 2014; Mukhopadhyay 2014), rebel-to-party transitions (Ishiyama 2016; Lyons 2016) and post-conflict regimes (Huang 2016; Lewis et al 2018).

However, whether and how conflict impacts governance, and the roles of *non-armed* actors like religious authorities, elders, and business-elites, remains understudied, despite these authorities' abilities to constrain or enable order. Some accounts suggest that the post-conflict period can be "virtually indistinguishable from the civil war which preceded it" (Raeymaekers et al 2008: 11), pointing to institutional continuity despite armed conflict, whereas others show that conflict can reshape institutions (Arjona 2015; 2016) and transform local norms and practices (Wood 2008). This points to discontinuities in the impact of armed conflict on governance, but leaves open questions as to which conditions favor institutional ruptures and which favor continuity, as well as if the impact is consistent across governance domains. Moreover, beyond specific case studies, the literature does not offer a systematic theory of how different types of armed conflict, and pattern of violence within them, can impact governance.

I investigate the impact of violence in three types of armed conflicts: a case of collective violence in Ingushetia; two civil wars in Chechnya (the first featuring indiscriminate violence and the second featuring both indiscriminate and selective violence); a case of fragmented, localized violence in Dagestan. Violence is selective where targets are chosen on the basis of individual behaviors, like partisan affiliation with an insurgent group and individuals can thus predictably act in a manner that helps them to avoid victimization (Kalyvas 2006); violence is collective where targets are chosen on group attributes such as ethnicity, religious affiliation, or location (Steele 2017); violence is indiscriminate when targets are chosen "at random" and

individuals are unable to alter their behavior to avoid it (Kalyvas 2006). I delve further into the literature on each of these types of conflicts in the case chapters.

The Post-Conflict State

Despite the extensive literature on non-state governance (Menkhaus 2007; Raeymaekers et al. 2008; Hagmann and Péclard 2010; Cammett and MacLean 2014; Arjona 2016; Post et al 2017; Kasfir et al 2018), agreement that conflict can broadly reshape institutions (Arjona 2015, 2016; Raeymaekers et al 2008) and transform local norms and practices (Wood 2008), the conventional approaches and policymaker interventions into *post-conflict* spaces, prioritize three outcomes: state-building (Tilly 1975; Centeno 2002; Sisk 2013; Soifer and Vierra 2019), war-recurrence (Toft 2010; Matanock and Lichtenheld 2017; Walter 2015) or peace-building (Autesserre 2010).[9]

Conventional accounts of post-conflict governance focus on the reconstitution of the state, specifically power-sharing institutions (Hoodie and Hartzell 2003; Wolff 2011; Cammett and Malesky 2012) within international relations or its extractive (Levi 1989; Centeno 2002; Thies 2005; Slater 2010) and coercive (Levitsky and Way 2010; Soifer and Vergara 2019) institutions in comparative politics. Understanding power-sharing arrangements provides insight into the likelihood of conflict recurrence and peace-building strategies, but is less useful to understand whether residents in a territory can meet their basic needs and establish order. The emphasis on extraction and coercion dates to classical accounts of state-building in Europe, which suggested elites invest in state institutions either as an unintended consequence of seeking capital for warfare (Tilly 1985) or an instrumental means for bandits to access revenue (Olson

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9 I discuss notable examples that prioritize non-state authorities below.

2000). However, the resulting states in such studies are often measured against their ability to meet the criteria of a Weberian "monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory" (Owen and Strong 2004: 33).

Yet, under the current international order, an increasing number of states possess juridical statehood but exhibit significant variation in their empirical capacities (Jackson and Rosberg 1982). While conflict may not always create Weberian bureaucratic states, armed conflict restructures coalitions and opens space for the development of alternative institutions (Staniland 2012; Kasfir et al 2017; Arjona 2016), necessitating study of how conflict reshapes governance arrangements. Given that an estimated 36% of the population lives under traditional political institutions[10] (Baldwin and Holzinger 2019: 6), understanding governance requires studying the mechanisms of non-state governance as well. As Lust (2018: 333) eloquently summarized, non-state authorities "are not stopgap measures or substitutes in the absence of a strong state, but rather arenas of authority and sites of politics in and of themselves." Only through explicit comparison of what communities can accomplish themselves, where non-state and state authorities intervene, and how the multiple power sources converge can understand the question at the root of politics: "who gets what, when, how?" (Laswell 1936). Accounts that limit their analyses within a state-centric perspective, focusing on the reconstruction of state institutions and the extent to which non-state authorities effect statebuilding, provide important insight into variation in state presence and capacity, but only a partial account of the rules regulating civilians' behavior and their ability to provide collective goods.

Non-state Actors: Beyond Spoilers and Brokers to State-Building

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10 Baldwin and Holzinger (2019: 2) define traditional institutions as "institutions whose legitimacy is based in part on their association with customary modes of governing a community."

Though a burgeoning research program on non-state governance exists, it rarely explicitly and comprehensively compares the role of non-state leaders, most commonly focusing either on narrow set of actors or dimensions of governance. Most commonly scholars of conflict and post-conflict have focused on the role of *armed* non-state actors, like rebels, warlords, and more recently criminals, in governance (Reno 1999; Marten 2012; Mukhopadhyay 2014; Driscoll 2015; Arjona et al 2015; Arjona 2016; Kasfir et al 2017; Duran-Martinez 2018; Lessing 2018). This work has demonstrated the broad impact that armed actors can have on civilians, governing alongside and beyond the state. Other literature, particularly focused on sub-Saharan Africa, has focused on *non-armed non-state actors.*[11] This has produced invaluable insight into the roles of traditional chiefs (Lund 2003; Fanthorpe 2005; Baldwin 2015; Comaroff and Comaroff 2018) but also business leaders (Raeymaekers et al 2008; Sweet 2017), religious authorities (Nagata 2006; Jones Luong 2017), communities and family networks (Singerman 1995; Collins 2004; Schatz 2004; Tsai 2007).[12]

Other studies incorporate a range of authorities, but in turn most commonly focus on a single dimension of governance. These accounts provide powerful insights on arenas ranging from extraction and economic regulation (Walraet 2008; van Den Boogaard et al 2018; Lust and Rakner 2018; Cheng 2018), security (Avant 2005; Raeymakers et al 2008), welfare (Cammett 2014; Cammett and MacLean 2014; Post et al. 2017), to dispute resolution (Mamdani 1996; Starodubrovskaya and Sokolov 2013; Kazenin 2014, 2017; Varshaver and Kruglova 2015; Lake 2017; de Juan 2017; Lazarev 2018). To be sure, focusing on a single authority or a single

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11 I only present a small fraction of the literature as there are a myriad of case studies on non-state authorities.
12 There is also a broad literature on global governance in international relations on transnational actors that I do not review here.

dimension of governance provides a depth and detail that is impossible to attain when zooming out. Moreover, these studies invaluably demonstrate the ability of communities to not only inhibit development (Mamdani 1996), but to also coordinate collective action.

However, while governance is sometimes characterized by high economies of scale, such that the authorities regulating one dimension also govern broadly (Tilly 1992; Alesina and Spolaore 2003), other studies have challenged this assumption (Soifer 2008; Centeno et al 2013; Arjona 2016; Murtazashvili 2016; Morgan and Orloff 2017; Centeno et al 2017), suggesting an explicit comparison of different dimensions of governance is necessary to understand it broadly. In fact, as this dissertation will show, it is possible for different actors to dominate different dimensions of governance. Thus, relying on narrow proxies can be misleading, overlooking the heterogeneity *within* governance arrangements and failing to explain the diverse and potentially contradictory logics through which power is deployed. In prioritizing breadth over depth, I therefore build on existing studies of non-state governance, particularly drawing inspiration from several studies (Lund 2006; Menkhaus 2007; Murtazashvili 2016) and edited volumes (Bellagamba and Klute 2008; Raeymakers et al 2008; and Hagmann and Peclard 2011)[13] that provide a more comprehensive picture of governance that captures the interaction between actors across domains.

The theoretical framework in this dissertation brings together studies of armed conflict, state-building, and non-state governance to develop a comprehensive approach to post-conflict *governance*. I argue a research agenda centered on post-conflict governance more accurately

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13 The edited volumes are notable exceptions that offer a comprehensive framework for studying governance. However, since the empirical chapters each tackle a different case with a different focus, the reader cannot explicitly compare how the different dimensions of governance or actors interact.

captures important variation in actors and institutions which structure civilian decision-making, while allowing an explicit comparison of who governs, over which dimensions, and where. This framework opens space to trace whether and how changes that occur during armed conflict persist into the post-conflict period or if institutional configurations are reconstructed similarly to their pre-conflict logics.

Post-Soviet Institutional Change: Beyond Areas of Limited Governance

Studying the impact of armed conflict in the post-Soviet space, where pre-existing institutional arrangements were particularly entrenched and new institutional configurations demonstrated the enduring strength of the Soviet system (Jones Luong 2002; McMann 2014) means the context highly favors institutional continuity.[14] Previous studies of regime change (Jones Luong 2002), corruption and patronage (McGlinchey 2011; McMann 2014), and property rights (Allina-Pisano 2007), show that state elites have repurposed and reimagined Soviet-era rules such that status quo power relationships generally continue to structure governance. Beyond the de jure rules, the North Caucasus also had relatively similar de facto institutional configurations prior to Soviet collapse, a point I delve into further in the next chapter. Though there were differences, most notably in the ethnic heterogeneity of the republics, almost all structural and historic factors favored a reproduction of the pre-existing governance configurations, minimizing the likelihood of divergence in the republics' governance trajectories.

III. Theoretical Framework

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14 A large body of scholarship, nevertheless, is devoted to explaining divergences in post-Communist societies, particularly in economic policies (Bunce 1999; Herrera 2005; McMann 2014) and political party systems (Grzymala-Busse 2002; Jones Luong 2002).

I show that, in fact, the preferences and capacities of state leaders, non-state authorities, and civilians are historically conditioned, particularly in resource-dependent domains of governance. However, even in this least likely context, they can be redirected and reshaped by armed conflict, shifting institutional configurations and creating divergent post-conflict governance trajectories. I argue that whether and how armed conflict impacts governance depends on the timing and form of violence. Together these two variables can reconfigure governance by shaping three mechanisms: (1) civilian preferences for governance (2) collective action capacity and (3) the pattern of integration of local and informal authorities into the state. I address each of these three mechanisms, and how the timing and form of armed conflict are likely to impact them below.

1. Civilian Preferences

First, armed conflict can alter civilian preferences for governance.[15] Individuals have historically-conditioned expectations and preferences for governance that, I show, are actor and domain-specific. People do not just want security or education, for example, but care who provides it.[16] Moreover, individuals' preferences may differ across domains of governance (Bakke 2015); the actor whom individuals prefer provide education may not be perceived as a legitimate provider of security. Individuals' preferences can shape if they make demands, who

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15 Most studies of preferences in the context of state-building focus on the preferences of civil servants (see Centeno et al 2017 for example) rather than civilian preferences. Where civilians are discussed it is most often in whether they comply with directives (Levi 1988; Migdal 1988). However, if civilians can make demands, strike bargains, and resist armed rebels (Lubkemann 2008; Arjona 2015; Kaplan 2017), impacting the trajectory of governance during conflict (Arjona 2016), we can expect civilians preferences may also impact post-conflict governance.

16 In his critique of the protection-racket model of state-building, Spruyt (2017: 92-97) highlighted that the model assumes individuals are indifferent about who provides protection but some actors have advantages in acquiring popular support for their efforts at centralization compared to their rivals.

demands target, and the overall institutional configuration they pursue (Arjona 2015, 2016; Soifer 2015; Osorio et al 2018; Kruks-Wisner 2018).

I argue that armed conflict can impact *who* civilians perceive to be the legitimate providers *of what.* How an actor deploys violence, and how victims experience it, can provide powerful and salient signal about the actor's relationship to the population. The actor's use of violence can be an indicator of the likely outcomes of engaging the authority or ignoring its directives, shifting citizens' sense of efficacy and governance preferences. The manner in which this happens likely depends on the type of violence - whether it is indiscriminate, collective, or selective - and may impact certain domains more than others.

Hypothesis 1: Where an actor is perceived to use violence indiscriminately or collectively, I expect it to have a particularly challenging time re-establishing authority due to a loss of trust and creation of lasting grievances.

This prediction follows existing findings that violence and coercion can shift civilian preferences, evident in whether individuals' turn to the state for help resolving issues (Dyrstad, Binningsbo, Bakke, Eide 2016; Lazarev 2018), vote for parties associated with the actor responsible for violence (Rozenas, Schutte, Zhukov 2017), and maintain local institutions instead instead of returning to the state-run systems after conflict ends (Bateson 2013). Wang (forthcoming) similarly finds that individuals who grew up in localities that were exposed to more state-sponsored violence are less trusting of national political leaders and more critical of the country's political system today, further supporting an alienation hypothesis.

Hypothesis 1a: Legacies of armed conflict may be uneven across dimensions of governance. I expect the legacies of collective and indiscriminate violence to be particularly

acute for dispute resolution and social order, in comparison to material dimensions like goods

provision. Though individuals may be willing to accept goods from an actor they perceive to be

responsible for violence, they may not prefer the actor provide justice and socialization into

society, spheres where we may expect legitimacy to be of particular importance.

    Hypothesis 1b: Collective violence specifically is likely to increase the salience of

domains related to the group's identity, increasing preferences for self-rule in dispute resolution

and social order.

    Most studies assessing the impact of violence on civilian preferences do not disaggregate

across dimensions, instead broadly assessing if it is easier or more challenging to consolidate

control. Osorio et al (2018), to my knowledge the only article to systematically assess the impact

of violence across domains, find that repression has heterogeneous effects, increasing extractive

and regulatory capacities while undermining provision of security and welfare-related public

goods.[17] While they do not explore the mechanisms in depth, they suggest that disappearances

undermined trust in the state and ability to organize.

    2. Collective Action Capacity

    While conflict may shape civilian preferences, they alone are insufficient to explain

institutional trajectories, particularly if civilians are unable or unwilling to act on their

preferences. Doing so requires understanding whether and how the preferences are mobilized

(Arjona 2016; Kruks-Wisner 2018). To understand this I examine civilian's capacity for

collective action, which is the result of two characteristics: (1) the cohesion of community[18]

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17 This study was published after the initial writing of this chapter. I come back to it in the conclusion.
18 Community here is not limited to a territorial community but can also be a kinship network that is territorially
dispersed, for example (Singerman 1996) or a different type of subnational community (Singh 2011).

networks (Pearlman 2011; Thatchil 2014; Arjona 2016; Kaplan 2017) and (2) the presence of skilled leaders (Pearlman 2011; Finkel 2015; Krause 2018). Cohesive networks mobilize participation, support effective social sanctions that promote discipline and minimize descent, and coordinate behavior in a way that enables collective action (Pearlman 2011; Lu 2015).[19] As Singh (2011: 282) argues, a cohesive political community "generates a web of mutual obligations, which makes people more willing to work toward common ends." Such coordination, mutual obligation, and sanctioning is necessary for non-state governance (Ellicskon 1991; Reeves 2013; Bateson 2013; Murtazashvili 2016), particularly after a period of breakdown in the social order. While cohesion makes collective action possible, leaders help clarify goals and coordinate individuals for their achievement, creating consensus where it may not otherwise exist (Pearlman 2011; Krause 2018).

Collective action capacity determines if civilians can organize their own governance arrangements, coordinate to make demands on authorities, or resist state, and non-state, efforts at control. While individuals can and do act in a non-collective manner, few are able to make demands, organize resistance, or coordinate self-governance unless they are part of a network capable of mobilizing others, especially when discussing larger-scale public goods like schools or informal resolution of disputes that rely on community sanctions.[20]

Leaders embeddedness within communities' connective tissue and ability to mobilize networks for collective action is what grants informal and state elites bargaining power vis-a-vis each other. As Boone (2003: 21) argued in her account of peasant collective action, "control over

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[19] Lu (2015) finds that out-migration of villages in China disrupted these mechanisms, decreasing the overall quality of goods provision.

[20] One exception would be if individuals control significant amounts of capital (Tilly 2003), a point I discuss further when talking about the role of business leaders in the chapters.

persons, resources, and access to markets are *political assets*." Mukhopadhyay (2014)

demonstrated that these assets can make informal authorities, warlords in her study of

Afghanistan, valuable partners in expanding state power. Thus, cohesive networks with skilled

leadership are necessary for organizing community governance but also helping understand the

relationships forged between elites, a point I come back to in the next mechanism.

Depending on the form of violence, it can both enhance or undermine collective action.

If violence disrupts community networks and leadership hierarchies through counterinsurgency

tactics, widespread displacement, forced disappearances, or by removing community leaders, it

can create social ruptures and result in a loss of vital social and political capital, diminishing

collective action and breaking links between civilians and leaders. While new leaders can

emerge, finding leaders with necessary social and material endowments is challenging (Zurcher

2007: 62-63). Moreover, if selective targeting is used alongside widespread, indiscriminate

violence, causing fear and atomization, finding new leaders for high-risk action may prove

particularly challenging, causing the network or organization to collapse when critically

important members are eliminated (Pearlman 2011; Davenport 2015). Thus, the inability to

organize collective action can override civilian preferences, preventing their actualization.

Hypothesis 2a: Counterinsurgency and targeted killings of leaders can disrupt social

cohesion and leadership hierarchies undergirding community networks, decreasing collective

action capacity.

Not all forms of collective action should dissipate simultaneously. Since it should be

easier to mobilize civilians for self-governance than riskier and more outward-facing actions like

demand-making or resistance, self-governance is likely to be the last form of collective action to

dissipate. In such a situation, community "trust-networks" (Tilly 2004) may not be mobilized for resistance, but may remain insulated from external authorities, continuing to organize governance beyond the reach of the state.

Hypothesis 2b: Collective capacity for resistance is likely to dissipate prior to capacity for self-organization of governance.

Conflict is not only destructive. Joint experiences of violence can also strengthen community networks (Cheng 2013; Della Porta 2013; Krause 2017), especially if violence triggers shared threat perceptions (Bateson 2013; Shesterina 2016). Further, violence can increase social cohesion (de Waal 2005; Villarreal and Silva 2006) and identification with the in-group (Wood 2003; Sambanis and Shayo 2013). Bellows and Miguel (2009) and Gilligan, Pasquale, and Samii (2011) find that communities which are most affected by conflict have the highest levels of post-conflict social capital and goods provision. In Peru, Guatemala, and Nigeria, conflict spurred communities to establish new mechanisms and organizations for providing security (Fumerton 2001; Bateson 2013; Krause 2017), making such communities sites of stronger collective action. A strong communal structure is well-established in macro- and micro- literature on state-formation and social movements as necessary for coordinated political engagement and bargaining with the state (Moore 1966; Scott 1976; Boone 2003; Tsai 2007; Kruks-Wisner 2018), making this an important factor for understanding the overall governance trajectory.

Hypothesis 2c: Collective targeting can trigger shared threat perception, increasing social cohesion and post-conflict collective action.

Hypothesis 2d. Violence that is fragmented or not perceived as joint threat is not likely to significantly alter capacity for collective action, allowing it to persist relatively unchanged into the post-conflict period.

Thus, conflict can have divergent implications for collective action, resulting in one pathway in which societal actors are demobilized or limited to self-governance, and another where individuals reassert or maintain their capacities for collective action. As conflict restructures community networks and collective action capacities, it has the potential to displace and restructure centers of authority and decision-making, impacting not just the ability to mobilize demands but the formation of coalitions. Understanding the ends to which the collective capacities are channeled, then, necessitates looking at the broader patterns of integration between informal and local authorities and state institutions.

3. Pattern of Integration

Civilian preferences and collective action are mobilized in the context of a specific political order (McMann 2014; Kruks-Wisner 2018). The pattern of integration within the state and between state administrators and ostensibly non-state authorities (Reno 1998; Boone 2003; Staniland 2012; 2015) shapes the realm of alternatives are available to civilians and which governance domains elites prioritize (Bates 1981; Charrad 2001; Slater 2010; Saylor 2014; Hussin 2016). The manner in which armed conflict unfolds impacts the organizational resources authorities can deploy for political mobilization and the extent to which they have bargaining power. Thus, knowing the pattern of integration is telling of the range of civilian choices, as well as which leaders can shape institutions, regulations, and discourses.[21]

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21 Examples in the literature abound. For example, Charrad (2001) demonstrates how alliances between the newly decolonized nation states and tribal kin groupings in North Africa prompted divergent family law policies, creating

Recent research on wartime and post-war political order has moved beyond dichotomous options of collusion or defection to document a broader range of relationships between authorities (Driscoll 2012; Staniland 2012; Mukhopadhyay 2014; Lake 2017; Sweet 2017). In the North Caucasus and Central Asia, the complicated relationship between supposed rivals is perhaps best summarized by the story of Imam Shamil's sons: after the Caucasus were conquered, one of Shamil's sons became an Ottoman General, one continued his father's legacy leading resistance in Dagestan, and the third became a Russian General (Gammer 1994: 294). Allegiances of religious, traditional, and other non-state authorities cannot be presumed. If "the engine of institutional change is a shift in asymmetrical power relations" (Jones Luong 2002: 49), understanding how conflict impacts the relations between state and ostensibly non-state elites is key to explaining institutional continuities and ruptures. This brings us to the final hypotheses:

Hypothesis 3a: Armed conflict can alter who is perceived as a necessary bargaining partner and who is viewed as a threat to the newly established order, shaping the integration of informal and local authorities into the state. State elites will attempt to strategically incorporate, displace, or substitute[22] those that maintain organizational resources at the end of conflict.

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the blueprint for social order and setting the boundaries for state intervention. Saylor (2014) shows how changes in the balance of power in economic coalitions incentivized state-building in Latin America. Driscoll (2015), Berdal and Zaum's (2013) edited volume, and Albertus et al (2018) all detail how changes in economic engagement and coalitions impacted the political economy of statebuilding. Soifer and Vierra III (2019) trace the impact of counterinsurgency policies within the Peruvian conflict on the relationships between the different coercive state agencies, resulting in a temporary expansion of the coercive apparatus and changes to state-society relations. Looking at the North Caucasus specifically, Sokirianskaia (2009) argues that state relations with "trust networks" helps understand state-building outcomes. Lazarev (2018) examines Chechnya specifically, arguing that war increased the salience of religion and gender relations as points of contention, leading to changes in the legal institutions.

22 Riedl (2014) outlines a similar set of strategies available to authoritarian elites during the transition to multi-party rule.

Hypothesis 3b: Localized conflicts that do not present broad threats to the political order are unlikely to shift the patterns of integration. While they may reshuffle individuals or groups within the governance system, they are unlikely to change the institutions of governance.[23]

Hypothesis 3c: Collective violence can result in prioritization of governance domains associated with the identity being targeted, empowering authorities deemed the legitimate providers of these domains.

Assessing the pattern of integration helps explain to what end collective action capacity is deployed - whether that be for self-governance, compliance, or resistance.[24] When informal authorities maintain linkages to strong community networks after conflict, they can channel the resources differently depending on the pattern of integration. Similarly state elites can grant them autonomy, as under polycentric rule, engage them in bargaining to negotiate a relationship in which each maintain some control, as under mediated rule, or strategically incorporate them as an extension of state rule, as under the centralized governance.

Unlike the emphasis on social power and connective resources here, the most common explanation for the coalitions undergirding state-building places the state's need for extraction at the center (Tilly 1985; Rueschemeyer and Evans 1985; Boone 2003), suggesting that this shapes willingness to collaborate and bargaining power. This in turn emphasizes the role of economic elites in state-building. While the need for extraction and economic actors matter, particularly for redistributive capacity, in the North Caucasus all the republics heavily rely on Moscow for subsidies instead of collecting revenue locally. Moreover, other non-state authorities like

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23 This follows Slater (2010) who argued that only specific internal threats incentivize state-building.

[24] This is not to say actors who have lost their linkages to society should be ignored. In fact, they may be prime candidates for trying to change their position and restructure the political order down the line.

religious actors are more relevant for governance domains like dispute resolution. Thus, examining the need for resources is necessary, but insufficient to explain overall governance trajectories.

This highlights the important point that elites' behavior and the resulting governance trajectories can vary across domains. The extent to which state agents are willing to forgo control, where, and from whom they encounter resistance varies. In examining a range of governance domains, and incorporating goods provision, dispute resolution, and symbolic practices alongside conventionally studied domains like extraction and coercion, I place the heterogeneous logic of governance at the heart of my dissertation. Rather than choosing dichotomously between rebelling against state penetration or complying with its directives, informal and local authorities - and the community collective action networks in which they are embedded - can opt for a mix of strategies, creating competing governance logics and outcomes within a single territory.

While civilian preferences explain governance demands, collective action capacity helps explain if demands are channeled into action, and the pattern of integration helps understand what action they are mobilized for.[25] Acknowledging the role of inherited institutions, which limited the possible array of governance trajectories, my multimethod investigation demonstrates how they were reshaped by internal armed conflicts that occurred after Soviet collapse.

Specifically, I examine the impact of two irregular wars in Chechnya, collective violence triggered by a territorial dispute between Ingushetia and North Ossetia, and fragmented localized violence, with elements of religious radicalism in Dagestan. Each armed conflict entailed

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[25] I address alternative explanations in the chapter's appendix.

multiple forms of violence within the broader conflict, dynamics I parse out in the case chapters. In order to grasp the impact of these complex conflicts, I unpack the concept of governance into its different dimensions, evaluating which governance domains were reshaped by armed conflict and which pre-existing institutional arrangements proved to be "stickier." As Soifer and Vergara (2019: 313) point out, "the political legacies of violence are constructed, contested, and constantly reshaped by political actors," making it challenging to discern the legacies of conflict from other simultaneous changes. Unpacking governance helps trace the impact of conflict across dimensions and which changes are maintained or disrupted in the post-conflict context.

IV. Plan of the dissertation

This chapter has outlined the puzzle and offered a theory of post-conflict governance. Rooted in Tilly's classical question of whether war makes the state, I have suggested that changes in warfare and states require the question to be updated in three ways. First, given the empirical variation evident in states, it is necessary to move beyond focusing on coercion, extraction, and power-sharing electoral institutions that are prioritized in the post-conflict literature. Second, the literature on non-state governance has convincingly demonstrated that understanding how civilians meet their needs and organize requires incorporating the broad range of non-state authorities involved in governance, ranging from religious to customary elites and networks of community self-organization. Finally, given the changes in the technology of violence in the post-Cold War era, studying the legacy of violence requires disaggregating the pattern of violence and paying attention to its institutional context. Thus, understanding post-conflict governance requires asking three questions: Who governs? Over which dimensions? And where? Theoretically, I have argued that the impact of armed conflict on post-conflict

governance can be understood by focusing on three mechanisms: civilians' perceptions, capacity for collective action, and the pattern of incorporation.

In the next chapter, I discuss the integrative multi-method research design and the process of conducting fieldwork in an authoritarian post-conflict state. My fieldwork guided the selection of my research question, data collection, and write-up of the data. As Knott (2019) makes clear, when one works in a "politically dynamic context," the research process does not end when a scholar leaves the physical research field. Chapter 3 lays out a typology of governance and the outcomes of interest at the republic level. Making a call to disaggregate governance across its material and symbolic dimensions, with attention to goods provision, dispute resolution and symbolic practices along conventionally studied dimensions like extraction and coercion, it maps who the relevant actors for governance are in the Caucasus, what the relationships are between them, and what implications this has for governance trajectories. It presents the overall outcomes of interest based on original survey and interview data from three republics in the North Caucasus mapping the variation in governance locally.

Chapters 4, 5, and 6 present case studies of Dagestan, Chechnya, and Ingushetia, tracing the development of governance within the republics. Chapter 4 relies on 71 interviews in **Dagestan**, an original dataset on forms of violence in the republic, newspaper accounts from several independent local newspapers, and original survey data to trace polycentric governance. It demonstrates that violence in Dagestan was largely contained within rival clan networks developed in the 1990s and geographically concentrated in several locations. As a result, though impacting contained locations within the republic, it did not change the overall political order, instead shifting around the players within it. By not removing sources of alternate non-state

authority or creating a fear amongst civilians as evident in Chechnya, in Dagestan there remain significant sources of non-state and local authority capable of organizing governance and mobilizing resistance to state centralization. This has meant that authority remains concentrated at the local village level, where self-governance with input from numerous authorities dominates. Nevertheless, the lack of state penetration and lack of coordination between the fragmented authority networks has left gaps in several governance domains, most strikingly goods provision, creating desire for greater state input.

Chapter 5 details the initial development of disorder after the First Chechen War and then the development of centralized governance in **Chechnya** that followed the Second War. Relying on 89 interviews in Chechnya, 25 oral histories from a local personal archive in Chechnya and video interview footage with 1270 individuals recorded in the North Caucasus between 1994 and 2006 from an archive in Switzerland, as well as survey data on exposure to violence, this chapter traces the impact of governance through two wars in Chechnya, locating the necessary condition for centralization in the joint use of indiscriminate and targeted violence of the Second Chechen War. It demonstrates that while violence had alienating effects on the population, these were counteracted by the disruption of networks and informal authorities capable of organizing resistance to state centralization and the co-optation of religious authorities and elders, which have helped ensure compliance among the population. This chapter also shows that alienating effects of violence are more relevant for dispute resolution and symbolic practices than for goods provision.

Chapter 6 relies on 32 interviews in **Ingushetia**, newspaper accounts from a government

newspaper as well as independent bloggers (used do to the lack of any independent newspapers) and original survey data to trace how collective violence resulted in a jointly perceived threat and greater cohesion, raising the collective action capacity and leadership of non-state elites and networks. This has set Ingushetia down the opposite trajectory of Chechnya, particularly of interest since the two republics were a single administrative unit until 1992. Though non-state networks were slightly disrupted due to spillover from the Chechen wars and influx of refugees as well as local terrorism in the early 2010s, the recent land conflict is used to demonstrate that non-state authorities remain a counter to state authority, particularly in dispute resolution.

Chapter 7 presents a conclusion. This chapter drawing out the consequences of these three cases for post-conflict governance and state-building more broadly. The three cases selected highlight the institutional similarities, as well as heterogeneity, of contemporary governance arrangements. They provide insight as to the mechanisms through which alternative forms of governance developed during state collapse may persist or be incorporated into the post-conflict state. The chapter concludes that though all of the cases exhibit a decrease in violence, the different coalitions and institutional arrangements through which governance is now enacted make them differentially inclusive and stable. In exploring these various pathways from state collapse to violence and non-state governance to stable institutional arrangements, the project suggests that "governance--building" is not be the same as "state-building" or "peacebuilding." Moreover, it demonstrates how state elites seek to both regulate society and shirk their responsibilities under current authoritarian systems and what allows civilians and non-state authorities to resist state interventions, make demands when they seek greater involvement, and insulate practices of self-governance.

Chapter 2: Research Design and Fieldwork Methods

As they say, the devil is in the details, it's all positive on the surface, and all the negative you will not see. In order to understand and learn what is happening, why, and how, to catch this system, you need to come and stay here for a long time, to live, and to understand, to feel where there is fear, where there is real subversion, and where there is patriotism. (Interview 5 Chechnya 2014)

The research questions guiding this dissertation originated from a comment by one of my colleagues in Dagestan. I came to the North Caucasus, starting my fieldwork in Chechnya in June 2014, to focus on the legacies of state collapse and violence. Inspired by the last decade of literature which unpacked civil war dynamics, I sought to understand how two brutal wars reshaped local institutions and state-society relations and what that meant for the authoritarian post-conflict order. Then, during my second trip to Chechnya's neighboring republic, Dagestan, my colleague challenged the premise of my research question as we discussed the villages I wanted to visit. He asked why everyone that comes to the North Caucasus studies one of three things - violence, terrorism, or religion, making clear that there is much more to life in Dagestan than captured in these topics. His comments reflected a frustration that outside researchers, both "from Russia" and beyond its borders, often came to focus narrowly either on places that underwent conflict or those that were infamous for shari'a law, overlooking many of the processes and institutions he perceived to be relevant to daily life and governance.

This echoed a conversation I had with a colleague when I was planning to conduct focus groups, who complained that during her focus groups on terrorism everyone wanted to talk about their economic insecurities and the failure of the state to provide infrastructure and jobs. On the one hand, her experience may stem from the sensitivity of discussing terrorism, though a day in Dagestan or opening one of the local newspapers, *Chernovik* or *Novoe Delo,* makes clear people have no shortage of comments about terrorism as well. Instead, it became clear that individuals

had different questions, beyond terrorism, coercion, and violence, at the forefront of their minds when asked to reflect on their interactions with authorities and the state. These processes were certainly influential and present. Discussing the region as though they do not exist would be erroneous and play into state-constructed narratives. However, my colleague's frustration, and that of many others, was that this was *the only way* the North Caucasus had come to be discussed in the literature.

Though maintaining my focus on the impact of conflict and state collapse, particularly the emphasis on the way conflict reshapes networks, coalitions, and institutions in society, I have aimed to take his critique to heart. I too had come expecting violence and coercion to structure much of my fieldwork. There was a clear presence of coercive institutions, particularly in Chechnya, but they were only a part of people's lives. At first I thought individuals' descriptions of the positive ways they interacted with the state - the construction of schools and mosques, for example - was them reciting regime propaganda, acting "as if" they supported the state (Wedeen 1999). However, it soon became clear that these components of governance were equally relevant to people's daily lives. As I re-evaluated my prior assumptions, I realized that reconciling these seeming contradictions necessitated a broadening of my outcome to allow for an understanding of the numerous and varied ways in which citizens experience and see the state - the ways in which the state is both present as well as absent from people's lives.

Instead of deciding ex-ante which dimensions of governance were relevant, I wanted my research agenda to address the question empirically, bringing local voices more directly into research process to capture the variation, interactions, and contradictions in how civilians interacted with authorities.

I also realized my initial focus on state-building, driven by the post-conflict literature, would miss the ways customary, religious, and business authorities structured civilian life in their own light, as something other than the negation of the state. Despite persistent comments in interviews that Moscow decides everything, numerous local actors structured civilian life. Talking to an elderly woman in Sorgratl', a mountain village in Dagestan, I asked how her life changed when the Soviet Union collapsed; she smiled and said it didn't, they got by without it before and they get by without it now. Though other conversations in the village suggested this was an overstatement since the collapse of the Soviet-organized kolhoz, or collective farm, left a clear mark on the village economy and demographics, the discussion revealed that for her the djamaat, or village community, has consistently been the main source of governance. While the state always extracted, it was the djamaat that regulated behavior and resolved conflicts, and it was community members with jobs outside the village that mainly developed its infrastructure.

Moreover, while there seemed to be a more cohesive "state" and "non-state" in one of my cases, Ingushetia, in Dagestan, neither of these categories made sense. This was made evident by my interviewees repeated corrections when I asked about "the state," commenting that there is no state in Dagestan, just clans and individuals. The fragmentation of authority in Dagestan was physically manifested on the page when I looked at my field notes, where I rushed to scribble down the names of individual leaders mentioned - people never talked about a unified bureaucratic apparatus but about Amirov, Abdulatipov, Mahach. This was also a change from conducting interviews in Chechnya, where people largely talked of Ramzan Akhmadovich, the republic's President, reflecting the concentration of authority. None of the republics current governance systems reconstructed the institutions of the Soviet system or met the benchmark of a

depersonalized Weberian state. Yet, knowing that was insufficient to understand their different governance logics.

In order to try and understand the governance trajectories, I designed a project that relies on an integrative multi-method research design (Seawright 2016) and data collection in three republics in the North Caucasus: Chechnya, Dagestan, and Ingushetia. I discuss the case selection, research design, fieldwork and data collection below.

I. Case selection: The post-Soviet North Caucasus

The dissertation takes advantage of the variation in the North Caucasus on the key independent variables to mitigate the impact of alternative explanations, providing an opportunity for a structured comparison at the sub-national level. Rooted in the comparative historical approach, I focus on a smaller set of cases for two reasons. First, limiting the number of cases helps ensure the quality of my measurement. This is a particularly acute concern given the challenge in acquiring accurate data in a region that is both recently post-conflict and authoritarian. Second, focusing on a smaller number of cases helps to disaggregate my variables of interest - violence and governance. As Sofier (2015: 16) convincingly argues in his disaggregation of state-building, "a multi-faceted conceptualization and measurement scheme...in addition to better description, increases the analytical power of explanations." The disaggregation, however, required analyzing a limited number of cases since I need to gather original data on each over time.

The North Caucasus is a region in the south of Russia that borders Georgia and Azerbaijan (see map below from O'Loughlin 2007). This dissertation focuses on the three

republics in the East: Chechnya, Dagestan, and Ingushetia, which not only have similar formal institutions but also a shared history and similar pattern of religious organization.

Figure 3: Map of the North Caucasus (from O'Loughlin 2007)

Analyzing governance in the post-Soviet North Caucasus primarily provides an opportunity to account for key alternative explanations by comparing jurisdictional sub-national units. This serves as a set of controls, helping mitigate the role of factors that operate at the state level. The three republics under study exhibit similarities in several structural and historical factors associated with state-building:[26] an institutional legacy of the Soviet Union, and Russia specifically; a shared history of independent customary authorities and Islamic influence (Shaafi school of Sunni Islam) that empowered religious authorities; similar methods of formal administration and legal status within the Russian Federation; comparable mountainous terrain on Russia's periphery; similarities in socioeconomic conditions with high levels of poverty and

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[26] I discuss the potentially relevant differences between the cases in the appendix to this chapter.

unemployment and a heavy reliance on federal subsidies instead of local extraction; and state-formation under the same global order, shaped by simultaneous international developments.[27] In fact, Chechnya and Ingushetia were a single administrative unit until 1992 when Ingushetia split off and became its own republic within the Russian Federation, making these two cases particularly similar. While borders are not always exogenously determined, in this situation elites in Moscow overwhelmingly acted as the decision-makers, minimizing concerns about their exogeneity (Soifer 2019: 99-101).

Studying governance at the sub-national level, with attention to the national and the village-level, also allows me to examine the interactions that occur across levels of analysis. First, examining sub-national cases helps see how republic-level elites respond to similar national changes, such as the centralization of authority that began under Putin in the early 2000s. The national-level context shaped the realm of possibilities for each republic (Riedl 2017). This allows me to test the extent to which republic-level variation developed in the 1990s mattered for the present-day governance outcomes. Second, examining within-republic variation at the village-level as well helps uncover how much control republic-level elites have in practice throughout the republic's territory. In the cases, I attempt to chart which level of analysis should matter most, as this is an observable implication of both, the manner at which violence occurred and the contemporary governance arrangement.

One important point that I discuss in detail in the next chapter is that most of the theories utilize narrow proxies as measures of state capacity. As a result, even if they are able to explain a

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[27] I summarize how these factors help account of existing alternative explanations and theories in the table in the Appendix.

single dimension of governance like extraction, they fall short in explaining the overall governance configuration.

Given the historical similarities and current overlap in the formal modes of governing, the three republics represent a least-likely case for variation. Local variation is particularly unlikely in territories with decades of strong state institutional development that are now part of a politically centralized authoritarian state, which, politicians and scholars describe as being organized through a "power vertical." This is not just scholarly wisdom but words often encountered amongst local citizens - that Moscow decides everything and the state is so centralized and rulers heavy-handed that we should not expect to see regional differences. Moreover, within Russia, the North Caucasus are grouped in the same federal district, which should make governance between them even more similar. Thus, if there is significant variation between the cases, despite scholarly, political, and citizen expectations, which point to factors outside the North Caucasus in explaining their governance arrangements and predict similar trajectories, there is particularly strong support for the theory. In other words, this set of cases should be a particularly hard test for the theory vis-a-vis alternative accounts (George and Bennett 2005: 29-30; Gerring and Cojocaru 2006: 405). Despite the similarities, I demonstrate the republics developed distinct trajectories of governance and institutional configurations that have persisted through attempts by the central state authorities to reassert control.

II. Integrative Multi-method Research Design

I adopted an integrative multi-method approach (Seawright 2016) to build and test a theory of post-conflict governance, combining qualitative evidence from interviews, oral histories, local newspapers, and archival material with original quantitative survey data. I

gathered the data over repeated fieldwork trips, totaling nine months between 2014 and 2018, conducting 34 interviews across Ingushetia, 71 interviews across Dagestan, and 91 interviews across Chechnya. I maintained communication with several key contacts after physically leaving the field, allowing me to ask follow-up or clarifying questions. This was particularly useful for understanding the context and potential biases of newspaper articles I was only able to analyze after coming back to the university.

Fieldwork and Data Collection

In each republic, I began interviews in the capitals, often with individuals more used to interviews such as journalists, scholars, NGO workers, and public figures. All interviews took place on the condition of anonymity. I used snowball sampling with multiple entry points to increase the diversity of individuals with whom I could talk and geographic locations that I could visit. I sought to speak to individuals who were knowledgeable about their community, talking to school directors, teachers, small businessmen, librarians, as well as informal authorities like elders and religious authorities though they were harder to access. Some of my interviews were also random, as I tried to talk to anyone who was willing. Many of my interviewees wore multiple hats, such that a journalist could also be a lawyer and an oppositional blogger could have previously been a state bureaucrat. The culture of hospitality and rather dense social networks in the Caucasus greatly facilitated my research and access, helping find contacts in most of the districts or villages I sought to visit. Chatting with people on the *marshrutkas*, minibuses, that I most commonly used to travel, helped gain overviews of the villages I visited from local residents. It also greatly helped calm anxieties about traveling to places for the first time and often led to additional invitations to people's homes.

Within each republic, I selected villages through a diverse case logic, capturing variation on the independent variables, which research has shown to be a strong method for identifying causal processes (Seawright 2016). Further, I sought to ensure I include extreme cases on my independent variable, violence, to help build hypotheses about causal pathways and check the quality of my measurements (Seawright 2016: 85-92). To account for the non-randomness of violence, I worked to include neighboring villages that experienced differences in violence and authority structures despite similarities in geography, strategic location, and proximity to the main highways, which have been suggested as variables driving violence in these cases (Zhukov 2014). This mirrors the logic of matching, though I do not claim to meet the rigorous assumptions that the cases are indistinguishable or treatment as-if random as necessary. Moreover, when villages neighbor each other it is hard to account for spillover effects of violence even if one of the villages did not directly experience it. Rather, selecting similar neighboring villages helped address some of the alternative explanations regarding geography, which were key in driving the violence.

During my first two trips in 2014 and 2015, I worked to understand what topics were relevant to individuals there, what was feasible to study, and importantly what individuals were interested in discussing. During the interviews, I talked to individuals about the types of problems that arose in the community, whether and how they were solved, and how this has changed across time. Tracing how events unfolded, I sought to find out how people understood their own actions and circumstances and which factors they identified as important to the dynamics in their village and republic. Early on, I knew I wanted to understand the impact of state collapse and violence. Through interviews and observations, I became increasingly

interested in how individuals and communities responded to crises and solved their everyday problems - in a region known for its dense networks and organized resistance to brutal state penetration, had conflict impacted the ability to organize and mobilize?

I initially framed my question as understanding how conflict impacted whether individuals turned toward or away from the state. Yet, through repeated discussions, it became clear that communities and networks were not always looking to someone external, but sought to solve some of their problems *internally*. Though making demands for state involvement in some arenas, they were equally trying to preserve their own cultures, traditions, and create spaces of autonomy. Discussing the different ways in which individuals and communities solved their problems and how they changed over time was also much more inviting and less threatening to the people who I interviewed rather than jumping straight into discussions of conflict. Though seemingly obvious, success in interviews depended on individuals being interested and open to my topic and question; this took time to figure out. Thus, my first two years were focused on exploratory fieldwork and starting to build my theory.

During the trips that followed, I started focusing my interviews more narrowly, though I still strongly believe that letting individuals continue talking a bit after *you think* they have gone off-topic offers chances to learn things you would never think about asking. These later interviews helped understand how governance was enacted, the mechanisms connecting conflict to governance, and allowed me to ask about alternative explanations and think through scope conditions. They also challenged my thinking that violence was the main thing impacting governance, highlighting the continuities in governance as well as the disjunctures that have emerged. This pushed me to broaden the scope of my measures of the dependent variable,

governance, to capture the continuities as well. During the last trip, I conducted a household survey in each of the republics to test the theory systematically. I delve into each of these components below.

III. Qualitative Data: Interviews, Newspaper Data, Oral Histories and Positionality

In order to develop an understanding of the Caucasus, I began my research with interviews. Working in a context that is both authoritarian and post-conflict requires developing networks of trust, particularly if one hopes to move beyond well-rehearsed narratives individuals have become accustomed to telling outsiders and easier-to-access individuals that are used to being interviewed (Cohen and Arieli 2011; Wood 2006; Bayard de Volo and Schatz 2004).

One of the main empirical goals of my project is documenting the interpretations and perceptions of violence, tracing the extent to which civilians believe the violence happening in their communities actually impacted their life and how. Given that violence is "not a singular phenomenon whose meaning was pre-established by larger forces and brought unaltered into local social contexts" (Lubkemann 2005: 504), explaining how it alters perceptions and behaviors requires understanding how it is processed and interpreted. Though likely impacted by problems with memory recall and preferences not to reveal some components of a sensitive subject, studying narratives and civilian understandings of violence shows how "individuals make sense of themselves and their world by situating themselves in stories" (Pearlman 2016: 22). However, I also rely on secondary sources where possible, such as the recorded interviews to which I gained access in the ChechenArchive to minimize picking apart the intimate details of my interviewees lives beyond what they offered to share. Given that violence and governance are intrinsically important topics, getting the "mere description" right and avoiding stereotypes is an

important goal of this study (Gerring 2012). Additionally, since "it is hard to develop [causal] explanations before we know...what needs to be explained on the basis of what characteristics" (King, Keohane and Verba 1994: 34) mapping the governance outcomes was necessary to provide a causal account of their development.

Standard ways of measuring state power and governance, relying on government statistics produced by the state itself, were highly problematic and politicized since they were often gathered with the aim of getting more subsidies from Moscow instead of accurately documenting information (Herrera and Kapur 2007; Luna and Soifer 2017). As Bayard de Volo and Schatz (2004: 269) point out, "where government statistics are suspect, media outlets are controlled by political interests, and poverty, lack of infrastructure, illiteracy, or political violence impede survey research, ethnographic approaches are often the most reliable and practical means of collecting data." Given these considerations, a more ethnographically-oriented approach was necessary to ensure the internal validity of the information I gathered. Until my last trip I was unsure if it would be possible to systematically and ethically gather trustworthy quantitative data. Nevertheless, developing what Thachil (2018: 283) calls an "ethnographic survey," or survey that " develop[s] context-sensitive sampling protocols and questionnaires through sustained pre-survey qualitative fieldwork carried out by the researcher directly," became possible after four trips.

I discuss each type of data (1) interviews, (2) secondary qualitative data composed of newspapers, oral histories, and recorded interviews, (3) quantitative violence dataset based on newspapers and (4) an original survey - below.

1. Interviews and Observations

Conducting what Driscoll and Schuster (2017) call "extreme fieldwork," requires navigating the usual issues of access, bias, and need to triangulate information, but also introduces concerns regarding being monitored by the security apparatus, constantly renegotiating and navigating one own's identity vis-a-vis contacts, and re-evaluating what one can and cannot ask as amidst shifting circumstances on the ground. Most people I encountered met me with hospitality, generosity, and patience as I learned to navigate both the customs and the republics. One woman in her late 50s or 60s insisted on staying with me when I arrived in Chechnya on my last trip to ensure my friends picked me up and I got to my destination safely. She gave me her number in case I ran into any problems or wanted to come visit her as well.

Introductions from trusted contacts, mostly journalists, academics, and NGO members, were essential to building rapport, as was letting my interviewees guide the conversation. I often asked individuals to tell me about themselves first, moving into how the end of Soviet Union impacted their life and their community, and how they and the community responded. We discussed how the issues their community faced, as well as the responses, changed over time through the present period, establishing who makes most of the decisions across spheres and why. Given the centrality of civil war to the time period, it often came up without me having to force it into the conversation, allowing me to ask follow-up questions with attention to the comfort level of my interviewee. Interviews lasted between thirty minutes to several hours. Many were over meals and involved further informal discussions.

The selection of interviewees was not random but targeted individuals who would be knowledgeable about the community. I relied on existing trusted contacts to gain initial access to a community and then typically visited several houses during the visit, aiming to conduct

interviews with people knowledgeable about the village such as the local librarian, teachers, small business owners, previous village administrators, elders and religious figures - though the latter two were harder to access as a young woman. When traveling to villages further from the center, I often stayed overnight in homes, continuing the discussion and getting a first-hand account of daily life.

The most informative interviews were with individuals I met with repeatedly over the course of several years, gradually building trust. My ability to establish rapport, sense the respondents' level of comfort, and ability to tell if the interview would lead to useful knowledge increased over the course of trips as I learned how to navigate the context and pay attention to what initially seemed mundane. Additionally, the contacts made with my interlocutors in the first trips were essential to conduct the survey and help recruit effective enumerators.

There were several exceptions, however, both in access and in how I was welcomed. Most of the locations I was unable to access were those that had persistent counterterrorism operations. Going to these locations, even if I was able to get access, would put myself and anyone that hosted me under greater surveillance and scrutiny, regardless of what questions I asked. This provided good ethical reasons to exclude them from study. Luckily, as my friend in Dagestan pointed out, these were the villages most commonly written about by previous researchers, allowing me to more easily rely on secondary literature and newspaper accounts to understand them.

There were three additional constraints with interviews. The first is that given the culture of hospitality, people rarely declined interviews even if they did not necessarily want to meet with me. This meant that some interviews were completely off topic. It took time and practice to

figure out how to turn drinking tea into useful information, it took additional time to differentiate between politeness and a willingness to engage. The second constraint was encountering explicit accusations of being a spy and, much less commonly, threats to take me to the security services. Though born in St. Petersburg and in possession of a Russian passport, I had never been to the Caucasus before starting fieldwork. My dual identity, as an American researcher on the one hand but as someone that identifies as Russian on the other hand, created regular questions about my identity and who "sent me." The accusations initially startled me and I responded by trying to explain why I was not a spy; this failed to convince my interviewees. I became accustomed to these comments - which were more commonly perplexed rather than threatening - and found better ways to address them. Often this came in the form of jokes that I couldn't be working for the Russian, American, and Israeli security forces simultaneously. As a contact, who became a good friend, joked with me during my last trip, when we initially met several years ago he was convinced I was a spy because of how cautious I was in asking questions. I was simply trying to follow IRB to the letter but to him - a person being interviewed but also having a conversation - the bureaucracy and degree of caution created unease.

It was really only after I opened myself to questions and made myself vulnerable in interviews such that they were really a conversation that interviews became more genuine and useful. My presence and characteristics inevitably impacted the responses I received. I did my best not to provide assessments of the questions I was asking - partially not to bias the respondents but also because I genuinely felt I was still learning and did not have fully formulated answers. However, I discussed how I grew up, my family, my studies, my previous experience teaching high school in the States, and other details that allowed me to build

relationships and have genuine conversations. Given that I was asking people intimate details about their lives it was through opening myself in a similar manner that I could learn and alleviate my interviewees concerns about my identity and the goals of my research. There is a trade-off for the replicability of my research. However, I believe it helped me come closer to unrehearsed answers and people's genuine reflections, which I prioritized. The challenge of attaining this cannot be overstated. For example, there is a family with whom I spent time consistently over four years of trips. At a dinner during my last trip, they began discussing a family dispute, initially in Chechen. It was when one of them switched to Russian and looked at me and said something along the lines of it's okay, she's now one of us, that it struck me just how much of an outsider I still was and that I am likely still skimming the surface. I am deeply grateful that those I met with have let me into their lives enough to do this.

The final constraints stemmed from my gender. There were clear benefits to being a young woman as well; I was perceived as less threatening and had a much easier time meeting with women. Because I was a foreign woman, many of the traditions and limitations on young women's behavior did not apply to me. This point was made clear to me in several interviews where the person I was meeting with - once in a public cafe, once sitting outside on a public village street - explicitly stated that though it was inappropriate for them to be conversing with a young woman they do not know alone, they were making an exception since I was "a guest." Norms of hospitality prevailed. Most often, the challenges included navigating questions about traveling alone as a young woman and determining how and where to set up meetings that were sufficiently public but allowed for private discussion. It was hard to strike a balance between worries that I was being paranoid and real security concerns. Several times I miscalculated but I

became better as time went on. When a trusted friend commented that she thought I was not

nieve in traversing the research setting compared to others she had seen, I felt comfortable that I

was close to striking the right balance.

Repeated trips back and forth helped demonstrate that I actually interested in finding out

something more than what can be seen at the surface but also that I was not going to write

something upon leaving that would put my contacts in jeopardy. As Knott (2019) points out,

working in "politically dynamic contexts" means many ethical issues can arise after one leaves

the physical field since "research has the potential to affect the field after we have left, while the

field has the potential to change in significant ways" (142). While verbal consent procedures are

meant to protect the people we work and interact with, they are rarely trusted until they are

tested. I likely pose the greatest threat to my "subjects" after I write something. In fact, numerous

people told me stories about how they were assured anonymity only to have their name show up

publicly in journalists' reports or people being detained after human rights workers revealed too

much in seeking to accurately cover events. Not all stories were so stark. In one situation, a

journalist conducted a formal interview that was recorded and then, when the interview was

formally over, continued to have a conversation with the respondent over tea. Almost the entire

published article focused on the latter discussion instead of the formal interview. Although no

sensitive information was revealed, my contact told me how surprised they were; it was clear this

broke the person's trust in the journalist. Situations like this made me continuously reflect on my

research practices, particularly as I become further embedded and close to my research networks.

During my last several trips, I began living with local friends. This was invaluable in

seeing governance on a day-to-day basis, from mundane discussions about why the road was not

paved in their street but was in the neighboring community or why the electricity was shut off yet again to seeing how they responded to bigger political events, such as the death of Usup Termirkhanov, a Chechen young man convicted of killing a Russian General after the general raped and tortured a Chechen girl during the Second Chechen War. The case was one of few prosecutions of Russians from the wars. Though convicted, he was released after serving five years. Temirkhanov maintained his innocence until his death but became upheld as a symbol of reclaiming dignity for Russia's army unpunished human rights abuses. When he died, tens of thousands of individuals from across the republic, and from neighboring republics, came to pay their respects to the family. Seeing how the narratives around the event developed provided an invaluable insight into current understandings of the Chechen wars, perceptions of the judicial system, and strength of the connective tissue in Chechen society, something I had thought was far more broken down than it actually was as the event made visible. A woman's comment that everyone says we're all scared and under Ramzan's thumb as she watched videos of the funeral services provided a glimpse into how individuals were processing not just the event but the response to it. She looked at the outpouring of support with pride. The instance highlighted the inconsistencies with which outsiders saw Chechen society and the way people within it saw themselves (Bayard de Volo and Schatz 2004).

However, in addition to providing me with invaluable insight into "meta-data," helping make sense of rumors, inventions, denials, evasions, and silences (Fujii 2010), the proximity and embeddedness into contacts, and now friends, everyday lives also raised serious ethical considerations and anxieties. The lines between interviews when individuals knew our discussions were for research and conversations between friends blurred. I remember calling a

friend in Dagestan the next day after we chatted for several hours about his village to ask if I could use what he told me in my research. I had not planned to make it an interview, but his insights provided important context that I realized would be valuable in interpreting events. Yet, I wanted to ensure I avoided the missteps that I heard about. Though my friend agreed with a laugh, saying he had not told me anything secret, the moment demonstrated the challenges that come with increased embeddedness and informality. In a context where it is not always clear what can put someone in jeopardy, and when the same thing that is safe today may create problems tomorrow, I had to use caution to make sure my attempt to capture people's own accounts of how they understood and experienced conflict and governance, even if anonymized and only describing patterns and observations not individuals, did not cause harm. Following Wood (2006: 379), I take this to mean "that potential research subjects made their own informed decision to participate."

This has meant carefully considering what I include in this dissertation to portray the situation accurately without disclosing information that can bring harm. Working in a small research context means that even if I anonymize interviews, I cannot realistically guarantee anonymity. As a result, I often discuss data in a more aggregate way, referencing common themes and whether there is a consensus or disagreement about processes, rather than using specific identification characteristics of participants (Knott 2019: 146). Ultimately, I believe, and was several times reminded through incidents in the field, that most of the people I met have a better sense of risk than I do. They certainly have more experience navigating their local institutions and power dynamics.[28] The main experience that seemed to deviate from this was in

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[28] See Malejacq and Mukhopadhyay (2014) for an extended discussion of the power relations between positionality and power dynamics between researchers and gate-keepers in the field.

working with my team of survey enumerators in Dagestan; I address this point when discussing the survey.

2. Secondary Data: Oral Histories and Archived Interviews

In addition to the interviews, I also use 25 oral histories from a local personal archive in Chechnya[29] and video interview footage with 1270 individuals recorded in the North Caucasus between 1994 and 2006 from an archive in Switzerland. Conducted throughout the conflict, these interviews shed light on the dynamics as they occurred, helping account for problems with recall that likely arise in interviews done now, despite my best efforts to utilize landmark events to improve accuracy of time periods. Moreover, these help gain a window into how people understood the conflict dynamics prior to the congealment of a regime narrative around them and help triangulate information about demonstrations, negotiations, elite statements, and wartime institutions. I was also given access to archival documents, including executive orders and oppositional statements made in the 1990s by a local contact privy to the information. I have verified their accuracy with other local contacts. Given that most of the documents and archives in Chechnya from this period have been destroyed, these helped provide insight into the elite goals and priorities and allowed me to ask more specific questions about the extent to which these directives were implemented.

Throughout the trips, I collected state and non-state newspapers covering the period since Soviet collapse in each of the republics. The data collection was more systematic in Dagestan and Ingushetia since there are few newspapers from the 1990s available in Chechnya. In Dagestan, I was given access to the newspaper archives of *Novoe Delo,* a local newspaper with

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[29] These come from a trusted source who provided them to me on account that their name is not revealed for security reasons. I met with several of the individuals interviewed to ensure the validity of the oral histories.

an oppositional lean[30] and use the online archive of *Chernovik,* another oppositional newspaper, as well as *DagPravda* and *Molodesh Dagestana,* both of which are government-sponsored newspapers. Interviews with the journalists and Elena Rodina's (2019) dissertation, which focuses on journalism in Dagestan and Chechnya, help to contextualize the newspaper coverage and the process through which stories were written to understand what may have been included and excluded at different time periods.

In Ingushetia, I mostly use the government newspaper *Serdalo* but also rely on local independent journalist and blogs. Ingushetia had an oppositional newspaper with an online presence, Ingushetia.ru, but the website was blocked in 2007 and formally closed when its editor, Magomed Yevloyev was killed in 2008. Though I tried to find archives of the newspaper, I have been unable to do so. The government newspapers often reprinted state documents, laws, and statistics, which are difficult or impossible to access otherwise, providing a valuable addition for triangulation of information. However, similarly to Dagestan, I do not attempt to use the journalistic accounts in the newspapers as a source of unbiased information but to understand certain points of view. As Brass (1997) depicts in his *Theft of an Idol,* behind each incident and fact is a set of power relations and narrative frameworks that alter how an act is both understood and recorded. Using newspapers for analysis requires being attuned to these processes, the positionality of the journalists, and the reader base as much as possible.

I use qualitative data from interviews, newspapers, oral histories, and secondary sources to conduct structured comparison, process-tracing how existing state institutions collapsed, whether and how communities adapted and what happened to these arrangements when the state

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[30] In collecting the information, I also created a very primitive, but now existing digitized archive for the newspaper so that it can have access to the information outside of the hard copies.

elites attempted to regain control across domains. Paying attention to the sequence, particularly points at which violence broke out, and how widespread the violence was, helps situate the likelihood that conflict plays the theorized role in altering citizen preferences, communal structures, and the patterns of incorporation. As Seawright (2016: 57) writes, "causation in the social world tends to involve a long sequence of decisions, actions, institutional patterns, and so forth that connect treatment to the outcome." I use the qualitative data to gain insight on the "records and evidentiary traces" of these events and choices, focusing on the causal process observations to suggest that the links could plausibly account for the relationship between conflict and governance. The case studies also help me to address alternative explanations, assumptions about the interaction between civilians, informal authorities, and state elites, and address potential confounders.

For example, one of the key concern is that community structure impacts both violence and governance. In fact, this is something recent literature has suggested (Kaplan 2017; Krause 2018). Existing evidence suggests a lot of the violence in the Caucasus had less to do with community structure than either indiscriminate targeting by the Russian state (Lyall 2009), blood revenge (Souleimanov and Aliyev 2015), characteristics of generals (Lazarev 2018), or retribution against the Russian state (Souleimanov and Siroky 2016). Further, the lack of socialization or institutions of political education to regulate combatant behavior within Russian army, particularly in the First Chechen War, likely impacted the disparate character of violence (Hoover Green 2016). This suggests that causal inference is less threatened by a direct link between community structure and violence in these conflicts. However, I attempt to address this

by checking if the causes of violence are themselves part of the causal process shaping governance.

Thus, while the qualitative evidence provides evidence about the causal process pathways and creates rich narratives about how communities were governed and responded to violence, helping trace the development of the current trajectories, the surveys, which I conducted with the help of local enumerators between June and October 2018, gathered additional fine-grained individual and community level descriptive data and sought to establish the association between violence and governance systematically across villages in the three republics, bringing me closer to testing the theory .

IV. Quantitative Data: Dataset and Survey Design and Implementation

1. Violence Datasets

While several scholars have systematically studied violence in the North Caucasus (Zhukov 2006; O'Loughlin and Witmer 2010), their datasets stop in 2010 or before, missing the period when violence reached its peak in Dagestan. For Chechnya and Ingushetia, therefore, I worked off an existing dataset which Professor Yuri Zhukov generously shared with me in 2016. He compiled the data from detailed accounts of violence collected by the NGO Memorial, which worked in the region in the 1990s and 2000s, and Grodnenskiy (2004). I also cross-checked this with dataset compiled by John O'Loughlin and Michael Ward (2010). This helped ensure there were no major discrepancies. Finally, I incorporated information about known targeted killings and assassinations, which were not present in that data and cross-checked it with a day-to-day account of events in Chechnya and Ingushetia compiled by a local Chechen academic, Abbaz Osmayev (2008).

Since the existing datasets were not useful for Dagestan, I created used event reports

from Kavkaz-Uzel to compile a dataset about the forms and locations of violent events between

2005 and 2018 in Dagestan at lowest unit of analysis identified.[31] I initially used text analysis to

identify the events and then went through each of the events to identify miscodings. The dataset

includes counterinsurgency operations, shootings, arrests, explosions, assassinations of religious

authorities, assassinations of administrators, and assassinations of security personnel. Given that

assassinations are rare events, I cross-checked them with local newspapers like Chernovik and

Novoe Delo.[32] Though it can be problematic to draw mostly on a single source for studying

violent events, most of my local contacts suggested KavkazUzel is the most accurate source of

information. I ran the data by several local contacts in academia, journalism, and law to ensure

its quality - the consensus was that it accurately represents patterns of violence to the best of

their knowledge.

2. Survey Design and Implementation

Starting by gathering qualitative data was essential to set up the survey instrument and

develop connections necessary for the survey's implementation. Spending 7 months conducting

fieldwork and interviews prior to starting the survey helped ensure construct[33] and ecological[34]

validity such that the measures closely operationalized the concepts of interest and resembled

respondents' actual environment.[35] For example, interviews helped to create dispute resolution

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[31] While reporting starts in 1996, coverage does not become comprehensive until 2005.

[32] While the reporting technically starts earlier in 1996 it is scarce and irregular until 2005. Therefore, I while I include events dating to 1996, the dataset most accurately captures events from 2005.

[33] Morton and Williams (2010: 260–261) define *construct validity* as relating to how valid the inferences of the data are for the theory the researcher is evaluating.

[34] Morton and Williams (2010: 265) define *ecological validity* as whether the environment constructed in the research is similar to that in the target environment.

[35] See Thachil (2018) for a compelling argument about the benefits of "ethnographic surveys."

vignettes that reflected actual conflicts individuals may encounter. This helps validate the measurement and minimizes measurement error in the survey (Seawright 2016: 53). Contacts also helped verify which types of violent events should be included in the survey to comprehensively capture historical variation and incorporate the language with which the events are described in everyday discussions. This was particularly important in selecting how to break up the time periods during which violence occurred in a way that made sense. While the distinctions are clearer in Chechnya, selecting "landmark events" around which to situate violence in Ingushetia and Dagestan was less obvious so receiving feedback from numerous individuals was very beneficial. I then drafted the survey instrument with several rounds of feedback from trusted contacts in each of the republics developed during the qualitative stage of my fieldwork. I used their feedback to change the flow of the survey, add and delete questions and answer choices, and alter the wording of questions.

For example, I wanted to a question to assess individual's financial contributions to the state vis-a-vis alternative financial payments. Though I initially had a general question about who collected taxes, payments, and fees in the respondent's community a contact suggested I add an additional question that asked roughly what percentage of their salary individuals' spent on (1) community projects (like road construction or fixing part of the school); 2) traditions (like weddings and funerals); religious contributions (mosque construction, zakaat); and (4) taxes and fees collected by the state (formal and informal). This question, the results of which I discuss further in the next chapters provided information about individual priorities and obligations not captured in the community-level question and allows me to compare roughly how individuals split their finances. Receiving this type of feedback proved invaluable in ensuring my survey was

interesting, relevant, and accessible to respondents. I ran a small pilot of the survey in the Spring of 2018 to further refine the instrument.

In addition to helping develop the survey instrument, having an established network helped recruit survey enumerators throughout the republic, improving access to a broader range of communities since many enumerators only felt comfortable conducting the surveys in their own districts or even villages. Though challenges of access are typically discussed in terms of survey respondents, researchers working with research assistants and research teams may also face similar challenges in "accessing" or recruiting qualified assistants, particularly in less commonly studied geographic areas. Having a broad network with multiple access points helped me recruit students but also journalists, bloggers, teachers, and community workers as enumerators.

I partnered with local academic institutions in Chechnya and Dagestan to help recruit survey enumerators and provide a local affiliation that would help ensure the security of enumerators and gain access to communities. Upon arriving, I still had to do a lot of recruitment to create a team large enough to conduct surveys throughout the republic and find enumerators qualified and comfortable conducting the surveys. Though I had a survey supervisor in each place I also conducted daily check-ins with the enumerators myself, which proved essential to keeping the survey on track since weddings, summer constructions, and other family responsibilities otherwise regularly delayed enumerators work. In Ingushetia, I was lucky enough to work with a small existing survey firm that had experience running surveys previously and already had a team in place.

In addition to the logistical considerations, a big part of the survey design focused on sampling. The census information in the republics is inaccurate, posing a challenge to survey design.[36] The first concern is that all of the republics inflate their population counts to receive greater subsidies from Moscow, meaning the population is likely lower than presented in formal statistics. However, most local experts I spoke with believed the estimates within the republic are relatively proportional and that it was okay to use the official data to estimate the number of surveys that should be conducted in each location.

However, the second issue is specific to Dagestan. The census information in the republic overestimates the rural and highland population while also completely missing numerous villages on the lowlands. Despite fairly rapid urbanization, many of those that have moved to the cities remain formally registered in their village such that the census shows they still live there. Additionally, there are numerous lowland villages that are not formally registered anywhere. Their existence dates back to Soviet land policies and they vary in size from ten-fifteen people to several thousand. Moreover, many of the residents are still registered in their mountain villages (Kazenin 2011). To account for these problems, I consulted with local sociologists, economists, lawyers, activists, and politicians to estimate the extent of the discrepancy and adjust my sampling accordingly in favor of urban areas. However, there were still several times we ended up arriving in mountain villages with a supposed population of three to four thousand to find ourselves in a village where the population could not be over a thousand. We then decreased the number of surveys and a couple times substituted the location with a similar nearby village due to the resources and time spent going out to the district. I did not include any of the unrecognized

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[36] This also provides some information about the state's infrastructural power in the region since it is unable to accurately conduct a census, one of the key features of state capacity (Soifer 2015).

villages in my survey due to the challenges of finding out any additional information about them. There were also several villages in the south of Dagestan that had to be excluded from the study due to a heavy security presence and inability to access these districts. As a result, the survey in Dagestan under-represents the Lezgin population and over-represents the Kumyk population.

After accounting for these considerations to the extent possible, I worked to build a sampling frame from which to select villages. I stratified the villages by population size, lowland/highland status, ethnicity in Dagestan,[37] and the type and intensity of violence. I included the latter to ensure I captured the relevant variation in exposure to violence.

In all three republics, I then stratified the villages across five categories (1) areas with no or minimal violence (2) areas with indiscriminate violence (shelling, bombing, terrorism attacks) (3) areas with assassinations of political leaders and state officials (4) areas with assassinations of local informal authorities (imams, elders, school directors) and (5) counterterrorism operations. I checked to see that the selection also represented variation in violence according to a simple count of violent events measure. Finally, I showed my lists with cities and villages in ranked order by forms of violence to trusted local contacts with expertise on the topic to check their accuracy given the well-documented difficulties of documenting violence. Once I selected locations, I further worked with local contacts and my survey supervisors to ensure we would be able to get access to the selected villages. We replaced several villages in Dagestan that remain or have come under close state surveillance due to the security and ethical considerations of

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[37] Despite efforts to mimic the ethnic diversity in Dagestan, the survey overrepresented the Kumyk population which in the 2010 census was shown to be roughly 14.9% of the population but make up 23.9% of the survey respondents versus the Lezgin population which was estimated to be 13.3% of the republic and are 7.88% of the survey. This is largely due to challenges in accessing the southern districts of Dagestan due to greater security agency surveillance of the region after the war in Syria.

conducting a survey there. Moreover, local contacts suggested we would be unlikely to have people agree to participate in the survey even if we were able to get access.

Thus, the survey sampling has two stages. In the first stage, villages were stratified according to the criteria mentioned above: lowland/highland, ethnicity, population, violence. This resulted in the selection of relevant villages. In the second stage, within each village, respondents were chosen by starting at the beginning of a central street and going to every fifth household. Enumerators selected the respondent based on quota criteria premised on age and gender to try and reflect the republic's breakdown. I include descriptive statistics in Appendix 2.

The survey initially included 1400 respondents in Dagestan, 1200 in Chechnya, and 620 in Ingushetia. However, I had to fire several survey enumerators after finding irregularities in their results. This happened for two main reasons. In one case, the enumerator did not follow the methodology but completed the survey among family and friends in their village. This data was removed from the survey. In the other cases, enumerators completed the survey properly but then wanted to increase their number of surveys so filled in several surveys themselves, evident in the time it took them to complete the survey and the similarity of the answers. After talking with enumerators at the end of the survey and going through the meta-data and survey results, I cut surveys that lasted less than seven minutes since enumerators consistently said that it would have been very unlikely that the survey was actually completed properly in that short amount of time even if the respondent refused to answer some of the questions. My own experience conducting the survey is in agreement with their consensus.

As a result, in Dagestan the survey included 1333 respondents in the eight major cities as well as 29 villages in twenty of the forty-one districts in the republic. In Chechnya, the survey

included 1148 respondents from four of the five main cities and 49 villages from 13 of the 14

districts in the republic. In Ingushetia, the survey had 611 respondents from the five main cities

and eight villages from three of the republic's four districts. The sampling is displayed in the

map below with locations demonstrated proportional to the number of respondents.

Figure 4: Map of Survey Sampling Locations by Size of Sample

The household survey gathered data on independent and dependent variables and

mechanisms of interest:

I. Governance: (1) Governance index; followed by more in-depth questions about (2) Infrastructure (3) Dispute resolution (4) Finances (5) Symbolic practices. I discuss the conceptualization and measurement of governance further in the next chapter.

II. Community: (1) Series of questions about the community and community leader characteristics (2) Identity and network information (3) How family and community networks impact their life [open-ended] (4) How government impacts their life [open-ended]

III. Violence: (1) Events that Occurred in Community (2) Time period when they occurred (3) How often they occurred (4) How they impacted individual personally (5) If respondent lost any close family members as a result of violence (6) How much violence in the Post-Soviet North Caucasus impacted their life overall (7) If lost any family members in deportations in the 1940s.

The more fine-grained approach to violence here helps disaggregate the repertoire of violence, providing respondents' assessment of the violent events that occurred in their community and whether and how this impacted the individual respondent. Separating these two levels out allows for the possibility, for example, that an explosion in an individual's village did not actually significantly impact the individual.

IV. Participation and Society: (1) How community formal and informal organizations exist; and if they exist, does the individual participate (2) Potential one-time actions individuals could take with question of "have done / may do / would never do"; (3) Three questions about how they would characterize their community - access to goods, rule of law, ability to impact decision-making

V. Demographic Information: Age, gender (not asked); education, sources of information used, employment, sphere of employment, household size, length of time living in location, if anyone in the household lives elsewhere more than 30 days out of the year, language used at home, attendance of Friday prayer, household income, teip (Chechnya and Ingushetia).

Since I aim to compare the causal processes across the three republics and in the villages within them, the quantitative survey data helps provide comparable measurements of the variables across the cases (Adcock and Collier 2001), which is harder to do with information gathered through semi-structured narratives and narratives. Moreover, given the central role of civilian preferences, community characteristics, and the pattern of integration of informal and local elites, I use data from the survey to create consistent measures of these key steps in the causal pathway in the survey as well. The survey offered a way to assess these steps about mass behavior and decision-making and ensure my descriptive claims are representative of the population (Seawright 2016: 178-179).

In addition to providing useful descriptive information about the population in the three republics, I also use the survey data to see if the expected associations between violence and governance are present at the republic and community levels. To create community-level data, I look at the proportion of respondents in each community that identified different forms of violence and proportion of respondents who identify different authorities as responsible for governance in their community.

The qualitative methods and in-depth case knowledge proved essential to interpret the findings of the survey. It allowed me to understand the context and relationships between relevant actors when drawing conclusions about respondents' answer choices. For example,

knowing that religious authorities in Chechnya have a much closer link to the state than religious authorities in Dagestan and Ingushetia helps interpret civilians' choices in navigating governance options.

Conclusion

My multi-method research design relies on original data collected through interviews, newspapers, and surveys, as well as secondary data sources from local and international archives. Dense networks developed through fieldwork helped at each step of the research process, from the construction of the research question, to data collection, to interpretation of the findings. The qualitative component of the research helped to formulate the theory, ensure variables were measured accurately, and to provide causal process observations linking the forms of violence to the governance trajectories. The accounts of how violence unfolded help address concerns that the same factors that drove violence are also driving governance. Further, the gathered narratives help incorporate the voices of the individuals on the ground, showing how they understand the processes to have unfolded. The quantitative data helps understand the prevalence of opinions and descriptions in my interviews, ensure governance is measured accurately and comparably across cases, provide additional evidence for several of the key causal steps in the argument, and establish the hypothesized associations between violence, the relevant mechanisms, and governance. In the next chapter, I use both the qualitative and quantitative data to establish the outcomes of interest, presenting a case for studying post-conflict governance sub-nationally.

Chapter 3: Post-Conflict Governance Trajectories

In the mountain village of Kadar in Dagestan nearly all disputes are discussed with the imam after Friday prayer. Kadar is one of six villages making up the "Kadar territories," infamous for the implementation of shari'a and declaration of autonomy in the late 1990s after a split between the Salafi and Sufi populations within the village. The conflict came to a head June 21, 1996 with the murder of the village head of Kadar and escalated further, resulting with the expulsion of the Salafi population. When I discussed the current process to resolve disputes with residents in July 2018, villagers said that individuals who appeal directly to state administrators are judged for having been raised without proper values and an understanding of village tradition. Residents explained that appeals to the state would likely impact interactions with the individual going forward and whether they are willing to include them in business, highlighting the community-imposed social costs of relying on the state to resolve disputes. If individuals do go to the administration, most common if questions pertain to land, the imam typically acts as a broker and remains involved; the question is decided jointly.

Consistently sites of dispute resolution, mosques can also be spaces of economic assistance and self-organization. For example, in Kvanada, a village close to Chechnya's border, fines are collected at the mosque for violations of village rules, such as smoking in public, and are then spent on village needs. Zakat, residents' contribution of roughly ten percent of their income, is distributed primarily among young students for studies (Karpov 2010: 62). In New Kostek, villagers similarly self-organize collections at the mosque to facilitate maintenance of infrastructure and assistance to families that fall on hard times. Yet, mosques do not always become sites of economic assistance as evident in neighboring Kostek, where the death of a local

administrator that procured funds for the village halted most infrastructural development; no one

stepping in to fill his role. In Richa, a few hours to the south, the young imam, a previous

freestyle wrestler, similarly does not actively participate in decisions regarding the village's

economic affairs: "The people listen to the imam, but they need him especially for weddings,

funerals, or other rites" (Quoted in Karpov 2010: 60). Religious authorities role in economic

affairs is much more variable than their involvement in resolving conflicts.

In some villages, even dispute resolution, historically the purview of religious authorities,

has frayed. In Karata, about an hour from Kvanada, the pre-existing systems of dispute

resolution have fragmented. As one resident describes:

To put it bluntly, there is no unanimity in our jamaat. They [villagers] criticize each other
behind their backs. Because of this lack of agreement, they do not appoint our own alim
[the imam of the mosque—Yu.K.]; they invited someone from outside. . . . Although they
say that we do not have scholars for this office, we have guys, very good guys, but it
doesn't work out—each group wants one of its own" (Quoted in Karpov 2010: 46-47).

As the accounts of the different villages demonstrate, which alternatives exist to state institutions

and what domains of governance they regulate greatly differ. As the comparison between

neighboring Kostek and New Kostek demonstrates, while religious authorities like imams

effectively coordinate all governance domains in some villages, their authority is more

constrained in others.

This chapter starts by presenting a typology of post-conflict governance to provide a way

to study the processes above systematically. I then develop the framework for theorizing and

operationalizing governance as a multidimensional concept that incorporates both its material

and symbolic components. Next, I map the relationship between state and ostensibly non-state

authorities in each of the three republics in the North Caucasus based on interviews and work in

newspaper archives over nine months of fieldwork. Finally, I present survey data from each republic, contextualized with my interviews and participant observations, empirically documenting variation across governance domains in the three republics. Applying the framework reveals differences in what communities can accomplish through self-governance and how citizens interact with authorities. Following Morgan and Orloff (2017: 6), who argue that "to understand states, we must both disaggregate and re-aggregate, being attentive to the variable and shifting components of states without losing sight of that which binds them together," I conclude by examining the interaction between the different dimensions. Highlighting points of contradictions and congruence, I return to the overall governance trajectories, making the case for Chechnya as a case of centralized governance, Dagestan as a case of polycentric governance, and Ingushetia as a case of mediated governance.

I. Governance trajectories

At the republic level, I identify four aggregate governance trajectories,[38] three of which are the main focus of the study. Each of these arrangements, shaded in grey background in the table below, is a form of multi-layered governance (Kasfir et al 2017) produced by a multiplicity of actors. However, the relationships between them and to civilians differ, with implications for how and whether civilians meet their needs. We may also imagine situations where authority rests solely and directly in the grip of state or non-state actors that would be the edges of this spectrum. The conceptualization classifies possible arrangements based on (1) the extent of embeddedness into local communities, and (2) the degree of formalization, which identifies the relationship between informal and state authorities. While the former dimension captures the

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[38] I use trajectories instead of outcomes to signal that these are pathways that are rarely fully fixed, even if institutionalized. See Mahoney and Thelen (1999) for a comprehensive discussion of institutional change.

hierarchical structure of authority, allowing for upward centralization of power from the village to the republic center, the latter dimension captures the extent to which actors are part of the state.

Figure 5: Typology of Governance

		Formalization: Relationship Between Informal and State Authorities		
		Disengagement / Autonomy from State	Engagement with State	Incorporation/ Dependence on State
Embeddedness of Authorities	**Localized (high)**	Polycentric	Mediated	Decentralized
	Concentrated (low)			Centralized

Non-state rule ---⇒ *Direct State Rule*

When state elites do not monopolize governance, forgoing direct control and letting informal authorities maintain autonomy two outcomes are possible.[39] In **polycentric governance**, centers of power are autonomous from one another (Ostrom 2005; Murtazashvili 2016). This suggests that there is not one organization or authority governing others with a clear hierarchy but that different actors, whose authority is independent from each other, are involved

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[39] The possibility that states do not seek to monopolize rule contradicts the Weberian definition of the state and conventional wisdom on state-building, yet is supported by several studies (Boone 2003; Nasseemullah and Staniland 2014). I explore this decision further below.

in governance. Unlike decentralized governance, which refers to tiers of governance, polycentric refers to how power is dispersed among several authorities, including informal actors. Unlike conceptualizations rooted in Ostroms' original vision,[40] I do not assume what the interactions between these actors looks like as part of the definition - they may include cooperation but may also be tacit coexistence or conflict. The state's abdication of authority can also result in **disorder** if informal authorities and institutions do not substitute for the state. Since disorder is likely to be a short-lived,[41] I do not include it as a trajectory. However, it may occur if there is widespread fragmentation and disagreement between informal authorities to preclude the creation of institutions or goods.[42] Incorporating this allows for the possibility that civilian demands go unmet and neither state or non-state actors create institutions to order daily affairs and govern. This is often a temporary outcome, since individuals will either exit, exercise their voice, or seek alternative channels of governance (Singerman 1995; Kruks-Wisner 2018) but an important reality to incorporate particularly for understanding periods of institutional change.

If there is engagement between state and non-state actors, it can take three forms depending on the degree of incorporation and degree of actors' embeddedness into the local community. If authority has shifted horizontally from informal authorities such that it is vested in state agents or those accountable to the state, but remains organized at the local level, it is

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[40] See Aligica (2012) for a summary of the literature rooted in both Elinor Ostrom and Vincent Ostrom's approaches.

[41] Following Kalyvas (2006) who emphasizes territorial control as a precondition for order, Arjona (2016) suggests that disorder is also likely when actors have short time horizons. Though not the main outcome of interest, I address disorder in the case chapters as it is particularly prevalent immediately following state collapse before informal authorities have an ability to negotiate new institutions of rule.

[42] This echoes Staniland's (2012) "guerrilla disorder" category but I suggest it can also exist outside of civil war.

decentralized.[43] Numerous post-conflict states like Iraq, Ireland, and Indonesia have adopted "peace-preserving" decentralized arrangements with power-sharing along tiers of government, including federalism and regional autonomy, in hopes of mitigating or ending conflicts (Bermeo 2002; Bakke 2014). We may expect to see decentralization in cases where informal authorities are not as significant as they are in the cases at hand.

If authority is embedded in the state but also shifts vertically from the local level,[44] I classify it as **centralized** governance, where authority is concentrated in the state and actors outside it have little autonomy. Less "ideal types" can includes situations in which ostensibly non-state actors are dependent on state authority and carry out state initiatives, even if they lack formal bureaucratic titles.

Finally, under a **mediated** governance**,** "government relies on partnership (or at least coexistence) with a diverse range of local intermediaries and rival sources of authority to provide core functions" Menkhaus (2007: 78). This mirrors a system of indirect rule but *without* subsuming informal authorities hierarchically under the state; the two may instead be bargaining or power-sharing partners.[45] Unlike polycentric governance, where state elites are less engaged in a domain or territory, here state elites negotiate their rule and bargain with informal authorities, potentially co-producing governance. This can happen locally within each village or

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[43] While decentralization is sometimes treated synonymously to dispersion of authority I find it useful to separate the vertical levels of power from their horizontal organization. See Treisman (2007) for a discussion of types of decentralization and Gerring et al (2011) for a review of theory of indirect/direct rule among asymmetric units.

[44] There are similar vertical shifts within informal authorities hierarchies as will be evident in the discussions of religious authority organization in the next chapter.

[45] I use a definition of mediated governance that points to negotiation between state and non-state authorities rather than one which in which non-state authorities only act as brokers that mediate access to the state (Kruks-Wisner 2018: 116).

may be evident at a higher tier of government if there is a hierarchy of informal authorities, with republic religious authorities, for example.

Given these overall governance trajectories, how can they be empirically assessed? As the literature review suggests, most existing studies examining the post-conflict context focus on a narrow set of proxies or on the *degree* of intervention. Yet, we may also expect differences as to the specific configurations of governance institutions. After all, increased penetration into civilian life does not have uniform effects; what are deemed the appropriate limits for economic intrusion may be quite different from cultural demands (Bakke 2015). I build on recent developments in the state-building literature which disaggregates the state (Soifer 2015; Osorio et al 2018) and governance (Arjona 2016; Murtazashvili 2016) to provide a multidimensional operationalization of governance and improve construct validity. This helps make precise claims about links between conflict and the different dimensions of governance, allowing scholars to theorize and empirically assess the potential that armed conflict has heterogeneous effects.

Authorities have numerous strategies through which they can shape behavior, establish political order and generally govern. Though all groups use a combination of strategies, which specific strategies or institutions they do or do not deploy can shape inequality, civilian notions of citizenship, and demands. The ambiguity in implementation and enforcement of different institutions is unequivocal, leaving more or less discretion and agency for civilian input and participation. Moreover, looking at the interaction between the institutions through which authorities wield and allocate power allows for a discussion of the relationship between them, such as whether they enhance or undermine each other, reinforcing control over civilians or creating spaces for civilian agency. Though institutional configurations are not determinative of

civilian choices, they create different vulnerabilities and drive civilians to seek change or continuity through different strategies (Mahoney and Thelen 2010). For example, authority wielded through coercive institutions may impact civilians differently than that undergirded by remunerative, ideological, symbolic power (Tilly 2005; Lerman and Weaver 2014).

Examining the "combined effects of institutions and processes rather than examining just one institution or process at a time" (Pierson and Skocpol 2002: 696) becomes particularly important for a citizen-centered approach to governance. Such an orientation asks how and where citizens see and experience the state vis-a-vis other authorities in their daily lives (Corbridge et al 2005), instead of centering how the state sees citizens (Scott 1998). I do not, however, take a normative stance about the benefits of self-governance versus governance by informal authorities or the state but attempt to document the variations, causes, and outcomes empirically.

II. Dimensions of Governance

Given that individuals are governed by numerous institutions, why incorporate goods provision, dispute resolution, and symbolic practices? These dimensions were chosen to capture the material but also social practices of governance. As Hagmann and Péclard (2011: 4) suggest, "states are not only the product and realm of bureaucrats, policies, and institutions, but also of imageries, symbols and discourse." In addition to highlighting points of convergence and contradiction, these dimensions represent the various arenas where authoritarian regimes may seek compliance and the indirect ways in which they may practice coercion that manifest outside the use of physical force (Albertus et al 2018). Along these lines, research on wartime governance demonstrates that conflict may reshape social processes and institutions broadly

(Wood 2008; Arjona et al 2015). Thus, incorporating a spectrum of practices is necessary not just for a more complete assessment of governance, but also to understand whether wartime changes are rejected or institutionalized in the post-conflict period.

Provision of goods such as infrastructure, education, and healthcare is one of the commonly studied dimensions of state-citizen relations, with dramatic variation in the institutions and actors involved. In fact, the pervading assumption is that legitimacy flows from goods provision, particularly during and after conflict, with actors competing to win the "heart and minds" of civilians. The emphasis on goods provision is not unique to studies of civil war, with scholars of authoritarianism similarly suggesting that distributive policies and displacement of rival service providers are key to regime endurance (Albertus et al 2018) and social contract models of state-building treating goods provision as necessary for local authorities to forgo part of their autonomy (Hechter 2001; Bakke et al. 2014). Thus, provision of goods and services is a key to understanding citizens' daily lives, how they meet their basic needs, and the relationship between state and non-state actors.

Dispute resolution institutions, and legal orders more broadly, have received less attention in research on post-conflict state-building.[46] Yet, understanding who citizens turn to in order to resolve disputes and who has final judgment over decision-making in a territory, especially in a context of multiple legal orders, is crucial for understanding who has the authority to make rules and regulate behavior (Helfand 2015). This closely echoes Mann's (1984: 188) conceptualization of infrastructural power as "a monopoly of authoritative binding rule-making." Moreover, as Arjona (2016) demonstrates, dispute resolution institutions influence civilians'

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[46] Lake (2017), Cheng (2018), and Lazarev (2018) are notable exceptions.

preferences for their current governance structure and capacity for collective action, particularly important for understanding the demand-side of state-building and governance.

Finally, this project focuses on the social order – the rules guiding social interaction - and symbolic practices. Though studies have drawn attention to symbolic state-building and symbolic processes (Wedeen 1999, 2008; Heathershaw and Schatz 2017), this dimension has received the least attention in the post-conflict literature. Yet, symbolic practices such as rhetorical strategies, symbols, and rituals can "reduce probability of resistance that coercion can engender, boost legitimacy and fosters civilian collaboration" (Mampilly 2015), rationalizing rules, instilling allegiance, and in turn serving as a powerful lever of control. Symbolic practices also offer a lever of social control, influencing citizens' lives and behaviors, even when a state may be weak according to extraction, coercion or patronage-based indicators. Even in territories authorities have not penetrated through material institutions, they may be present as a normative order evident in citizens' emotional attachments, language, expectations, and interactions.

I incorporate these three dimensions alongside conventionally studied coercion and extraction, used to capture the minimal definition of the state. The focus on coercion and extraction dates to classical accounts of state-building in Europe, which suggested elites invest in state institutions either as an unintended consequence of seeking capital for warfare (Tilly 1985) or an instrumental means for bandits to access revenue (Olson 2000). Extraction specifically has come to be treated as the ultimate measure of state-building, understood to be a necessary for revenue production and, in turn, a precondition for any goods provision. As Margaret Levi argued, "whatever the rulers ends, revenue is necessary to attain them" (1988: 2). The emphasis on linking extraction with state capacity is evident in scholars' commonplace use of it as the sole

proxy for the concept (Fearon and Laitin 2003; Thies 2005; Slater 2010). Given the centrality of coercion and extraction to understanding how citizens see the state vis-a-vis other authorities and how those authorities exercise power, I do not suggest ignoring them. Instead, I propose a framework that broadens the scope of governance measures beyond them to better capture the underlying dimensions of the concept.

III. Who Governs?

Given the multidimensional conceptualization above, what do the current governance trajectories look like in the cases at hand? The first step in assessing governance is understanding the actors involved and the relationship between them. Mapping where the actors fall on the dimensions of formalization and embeddedness described above minimizes misattribution for governance. It helps contextualize who should be considered a state actor and who is not, as well as the type of actor involvement in governance - whether direct or indirect.

While the literature on state-building and decentralization primarily focuses on which tier within government is responsible for decision-making (Treisman 2007; Lijphart 2012; Bakke 2015; Soifer 2015), a growing literature challenges the state's prominence in governance (Cammett and MacLean et al. 2014; Post et al 2017). In the North Caucasus, this is evident in the survey data. In all of the republics, when individuals were asked who is most likely to be obeyed in their community and who they trust to make decisions for their communities, the top two choices were religious authorities and elders.[47] However, these actors' autonomy from the state

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[47] Though the top choices in each republic, elders and religious authorities were selected significantly more in Ingushetia, followed by Chechnya and the least in Dagestan. Local and republic administrators in Chechnya and "no one" in Dagestan were also selected by more than 10% of respondents.

varies such that a state/non-state dichotomy is reductive.[48] In order to assess these relationships, I map relevant authorities on two dimensions – the level of embeddedness and the degree of formality, mirroring the categorization of governance trajectories above. However, while the trajectories focus on the relationship between authorities, here I simply seek to situate where different actors fall on the two dimensions.

Instead of assuming a dichotomous separation between state and non-state authorities, I separate "non-state" authorities into "autonomous" and "dependent" categories. When the state institutionally regulates or co-opts nonstate authorities I classify them as dependent. Empirically this is evident when authorities receive their appointment or salary from the state and enact state policies. Instead of informal institutions permeating the formal state, as typically discussed, in this scenario it is formal actors that expand their reach into the informal realm.[49] If, on the other hand, authorities are not accountable to the state, I classify them as autonomous. Classifying the relationship between authorities is key to understanding who exerts influence, where their power stems from, and who they are accountable to. Figure 6 mapping the possibilities can be found below. Analyzing the three republics reveals that there are more autonomous, non-state actors in Dagestan and Ingushetia while most "non-state" actors are dependent in Chechnya.

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[48] Post et al (2017) make a similar point in differentiating between direct and indirect state provision of goods but characterize the hybrid category on the basis how goods production occurs rather than on the relationship between the actors.

[49] This is reminiscent of "reciprocal assimilation of elites" coined by Bayart (2009)

Figure 6: Authority's Degree of Formality and Degree of Embeddedness

Religious authorities are the most important non-state actors in the North Caucasus. Each

of the republics has a formal Spiritual Board of Muslims (SBM), which has historically had a

mutually beneficial relationship with state elites. However, while in Chechnya, the SBM and

local imams are accountable to state elites—and unlikely to receive their position without state

approval—the relationship is more variable in Ingushetia and Dagestan. In Chechnya the Mufti,

the republic representative of the SBM, holds the title of Advisor to the Head of Chechen

Republic,[50] explicitly locating his source of authority and connection to the state. The chain of

accountability is also evident in the work of *qadis,* heads of the shari'a courts, who describe their

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[50] "Советник Главы ЧР, Муфтий ЧР Салах-Хаджи Межиев"

work as executing orders of the Head of Chechnya, Ramzan Kadyrov.[51] These presentations

highlight the tight linkages between religious authorities and the state in Chechnya, with power

resting in the latter. In Dagestan and Ingushetia, on the other hand, relationships between the

state and religious communities are varied though both state elites and opposition groups utilize

religion to different extents. In addition to confrontations between religious groups, both

republics had open conflicts between state officials and the Muftiat, with Muftiat-backed parties

challenging state officials in elections in 2016. Additionally, in both of the republics there are

autonomous mosques and Salafi imams that operate outside the SBM hierarchy. In several cases,

attempts by the state and the SBM to appoint loyal imams or close the mosques, such as the

Kotrov Street mosque in Makhachkala or "Northern" mosque in Khasavuyrt, have triggered

backlash. Members of Tangim Mosque in Makhachkala, which attracts around 2000 men for

Friday prayer, have complained about security service raids and harassment. The autonomous

actors include highly popular clerics who attract thousands at their services such as Khamzat

Chumakov and Isa Tsechoev. Thus, in Chechnya, most religious authorities are dependent on the

state, while in Ingushetia and Dagestan these alliances are situation-specific and fluctuating, at

times triggering open conflict.

A parallel dynamic exists with elders. While each republic formally created a Council of

Elders, its powers and the responses to its creation varied. Though "rule by elders" has declined

across all the republics, elders' ability to maintain autonomy varies. In Chechnya, as one woman

stated, detailing the arrest of her grandfather who was one of the most respected elders in the

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[51] This can easily be found on the Muftiat's Instagram page which regularly posts about its work. For example, the post on March 7th 2019 showed the qadi of Urus-Martan meeting with residents of Shalazhi on the order of President Kadyrov https://www.instagram.com/p/ButKX3kFBh3/.

region, the authority of elders has been overtaken by the authority of young men with guns,

reflecting the militarization of power (Interview, Chechnya, August 2017). There are rare

accounts of public autonomous acts, such as several elders from Kurchaloy testifying against the

arrest of human rights leader Oyub Titiyev in 2018. More often elders are mobilized to carry out

state decrees regarding blood feuds, divorces, and youth behavior. In Dagestan, elders rarely

hold authority in villages and, as a local ethnographer described, have minimal impact on

political decision-making (Interview, Dagestan, June 2018). In Ingushetia, when state officials

created a republic Council of Elders in 2009, a group of elders created a parallel, independent

council to maintain their autonomy (Interview, Ingushetia, July 2017). While people across the

republics insist that their traditions require respecting and listening to elders, empirically, elders'

authority and autonomy varies.

In addition to religious authorities and elders, other forms of non-state organization are

relevant. The first are business elites. There are numerous autonomous business elites in

Dagestan, such as Suleyman Kerimov and the Magomedov brothers, and to a lesser degree the

Gutseriyev brothers in Ingushetia that exercise considerable influence. The relationship between

business elites and the state in Chechnya is harder to delineate. There are many accounts of state

representatives coercing businessmen within and beyond the republic to contribute money to the

state-run humanitarian fund and specific state projects. This suggests that authority over business

elites rests with the state to some degree. Second, informal networks such as community and

kinship organizations participate in governance. Some of these, like djamaats in Dagestan, are

territorially limited and often include representatives of several kinship structures; others like

teips or tuhums are based on extended family relations and, thus, more likely to be dispersed

throughout the republic. Members of these diffuse networks come together at funerals and weddings or when larger conflicts arise. Given their diffuse nature and large size, while these networks may align with the state or opposition, they do not fall neatly into one camp. Table 1 below summarizes the authorities in each republic and their place along the formality dimension.

Table 1: Relevant Authorities

	Chechnya	Dagestan	Ingushetia
Formal Organizations	• Courts, police, administration • Religious authorities (Muftiat)	• Courts, police, administration	• Courts, police, administration
Semiformal / Dependent Organizations	• Religious authorities (imams, qadis) • Council of elders • Business elites	• Religious authorities (imams, qadis) • Council of elders	• Religious authorities (imams, qadis) • Council of elders
Autonomous Organizations	• Teips (extended kinship networks) • Community councils	• Tukhum (extended kinship networks) • Djamaat (community council) • Religious Authorities (imams, qadis) • Elders • Business elites	• Teips (extended kinship networks) • Community councils • Religious Authorities (imams, qadis) • Elders • Business elites

The same actor is listed in multiple places when it is split among multiple camps. For example, in Dagestan religious authorities are listed as both semi-formal and autonomous organizations because parts of the Muftiat are aligned with the state while other religious actors are autonomous.

The place of different authorities within each republic is important when assessing governance. Approaching an imam for assistance in Chechnya is approaching a state-backed actor, while in the other two republics these authorities are more likely accountable to their communities. As a middle-aged man in Chechnya pointed out, "Imams retain their authority and people continue to go to them to solve problems – family disputes, even settling blood feuds.

But, they have also become representatives of the state, enacting its rules and decisions."

(Interview, Chechnya, August 2018)

IV. From Concept to Empirics: The North Caucasus

Proceeding from this disaggregated approach, I use original interview and survey data to map governance across three post-conflict republics in the North Caucasus region of Russia. I demonstrate how a research agenda centered around post-conflict governance, rather than state-building, most accurately captures civilian life in post-conflict environments.

By the early 2000s, the central Russian state started seeing an inflow of oil revenue and regained its coercive capacity. Typically marked by the beginning of Putin's presidency, this period is associated with the centralization of power and building of the "power vertical." This section demonstrates that despite attempts to reassert control by the central state across the republics, the different local governance configurations that emerged from the conflicts persisted into the present. Though constrained by the overall state in which they operated, significant differences emerged across who governed and how. In the section below, I present the evidence for the republics by each domain and then conclude by discussing how they aggregate to coherent governance strategies and the implications for the configuration of state institutions. Of particular interest in the outcomes are the general differences in the roles of state and non-state authorities but also in the levels of the state involved to understand if governance remains organized at the local level or has shifted to the level of the republic, the unit of analysis for this study.

For each question, respondents were allowed to select multiple options to allow for the possibility that goods are co-produced or regulated by multiple actors. Therefore, percentages

represent the percent of respondents that selected each actor as one of the authorities involved in the particular domain in their community. Tables with exact figures and plots fully disaggregated across actor are in the Appendix.

4.1 Dispute Resolution

Assessing who solves conflicts sheds light on how order is preserved in a community (Arjona 2016: 68-70). The survey assessed dispute resolution in several ways. First, respondents were asked directly who is in charge of dispute resolution in their community.

Figure 7: Responsibility for dispute resolution

In Chechnya and Ingushetia, elders, religious authorities, and local administrators are heavily involved in dispute resolution, though in Ingushetia families also play a strong role. Given that in Chechnya, elders and religious authorities are indirect representatives of the state while in Ingushetia they are autonomous, the state has the largest control over dispute resolution

in Chechnya and the least in Ingushetia. However, this control is indirectly achieved. This becomes evident after deconstructing the "non-state" category. In Dagestan local administrators are the dominant actors in dispute resolution, but the domain is highly fragmented, confirming information from interviews. Further, 6.87% of respondents in Dagestan said no one resolves disputes. This echoes interviews and newspaper stories that recount disputes, particularly land disputes, lasting for decades. This finding also suggests that in Dagestan, though more actors are involved, none are particularly effective.

Next, respondents were given seven vignettes with disputes that ranged from family issues to conflicts between villages to see if the role of authorities varied as conflicts became more public and political. Quotidian land conflicts, such as a property disputes with a neighbor, are the only conflicts consistently regulated by state authorities. As a local lawyer explained, this is because state authorities allocate land and these conflicts rely on formal documents that only the state can provide. Across all of the other conflicts, individuals in Dagestan were more likely to select state institutions as one of the channels they would pursue than in the other two republics, while those in Chechnya were most likely to approach the local imam and those in Ingushetia were more likely to approach relatives. In the vignette that described a hypothetical conflict between villagers and the head of the village administration, respondents in all the republics selected state administrators as their first choice. However, in Ingushetia 20.5% of respondents said they would also seek help from an imam or elder, nearly twice the percent in Dagestan or Chechnya, suggesting that informal authorities in Ingushetia maintain a role in resolving political disputes. This variation in informal authorities' ability to check state power is overlooked in a research design narrowly focused on state-building.

These results suggest that while the republics have become more reliant on religious authorities since the collapse of the Soviet Union and the state does not monopolize dispute resolution in any of the republics, the picture is incomplete. Their paths have diverged. Chechen and Ingush residents are more alienated from Russian law than those in Dagestan. However, the strategic incorporation of religious authorities into Chechen rule has helped overcome alienation from the state. In Ingushetia, on the other hand, respondents consistently rely on non-state authorities and networks. Finally, in Dagestan local state administrators have the strongest role in dispute resolution; however, the domain is fragmented.

4.2 Goods provision

Out of the three governance domains under consideration, goods provision is most likely to be controlled by the state in this context for several reasons. First, the legacy of the Soviet system means that informal authorities did not readily have significant material resources to substitute for the state when it withdrew from this space. Second, civilians, also accustomed to goods provision by the state, rarely made demands on non-state authorities to fill this space. There are two notable exceptions. The first is that when people were given the opportunity to openly practice Islam after the collapse of the Soviet Union, people from across the republics contributed whatever they could to construct mosques. The second exception is the recent development of Islamic medical centers, which typically operate under the purview of the Muftiat.

Goods distribution by non-state actors requires material resources but also for the state not to block provision, which it may perceive as a threat. Moreover, communities may be able to provide less capital-intensive goods but become constrained as fixed costs increase

(Murtazashvili 2016: 16-17). Therefore, the survey included a range of goods and a general question about who individuals turn to for assistance with infrastructure. Compared to dispute resolution, religious authorities and elders play a minimal role in goods provision with the exception of mosques. As a result, I aggregate the actors for this domain.

Figure 8: Infrastructure by type

Several general points emerge: There are significant differences between goods, though not according to the fixed costs. Instead, differences more closely reflect citizen perceptions of state responsibilities, with significantly greater involvement of non-state actors in construction and upkeep of mosques than other infrastructure, as evident in the top left plot. Mosques are of interest for goods provision but also for their symbolic role, serving as a visible manifestation of supporting Islam in a majority Muslim region where individuals were not allowed to openly practice religion for decades. Investing government funds in mosque construction, as evident in

Chechnya, is often used as a legitimation strategy to present state elites as defenders of Islam, though within clearly defined boundaries approved by the state. In comparison to Chechnya, where republic leaders' involvement is prominent, communities, religious authorities, and businessmen are the most prevalent actors in Dagestan and Ingushetia.

Examining roads shows that the local government is mainly responsible for their construction and upkeep. However, unpacking the roles of other authorities further shows that in Chechnya, the republic government is significantly more involved, whereas communities and businessmen retain a slightly larger role in Dagestan and Ingushetia.

With schools, we see a bigger difference between the republics. In Chechnya, state actors, both local and republic, are dominant in the construction and maintenance of schools. In Dagestan, however, communities play a significantly larger role in school infrastructure and Ingushetia represents an in-between case with nearly equal involvement of communities and local government officials, and a strong presence of republic elites.

Finally, respondents were asked, "If you have a problem with infrastructure, who do you go to?" to assess who individuals seek assistance from with infrastructure overall. Over 70% of respondents in each republic chose local authorities as one of the actors, with community members selected second by 26.1% to 34.3% of respondents. Despite other authorities and community members playing significant roles in goods provision, the results suggest that individuals continue to expect the state, and local government specifically, to provide goods. Though state elites remain dominant in this space, we again see a difference between Chechnya and the other two republics if we look further. First, communities self-organize to solve their infrastructure problems at a higher rate in Dagestan and Ingushetia. Second, in Chechnya, only

13.7% of respondents selected both a state and non-state actor, compared to 21.4% in Dagestan

and 28.2% in Ingushetia, pointing to greater co-production of goods in the latter two republics,

particularly in Ingushetia. Finally, the significantly lower selection of republic authorities in

Dagestan is notable, highlighting, as with the other goods, that infrastructure remains more

locally-organized in the republic.

Several overall patterns emerge in goods production: Other than state authorities,

community organizations and, less so, business elites are involved in constructing and

maintaining roads, schools, and mosques. While a strong majority of individuals still seek

assistance from local state authorities, confirming information from interviews, *republic* elites

play a significantly stronger role in Chechnya in every one of the goods. Non-state goods

production is stronger in Dagestan and Ingushetia while in Chechnya, the state dominates goods

production with no other actor being selected as involved in goods production more than a

quarter of the time. Thus, not only has goods production in Chechnya become centralized in

shifting toward the state, but it has undergone a vertical shift toward republic elites. Despite this

variation, individuals' consistent appeals to local government officials for assistance with

infrastructure suggests that responsibility for this domain has not been displaced from the state in

any of the republics, even where communities more successfully supplement state institutions.

Using the governance framework also allows us to see that unlike in the Sahel or the

Middle East, religious and customary authorities raise funds for mosques but remain minor

actors in public goods provision broadly. Moreover, the fact that state actors remain dominant in

goods provision but were not selected by more than 25% of respondents in any of the republics

as the most trustworthy or fair actors raises questions about the link from goods provision to legitimacy.

4.3 Symbolic Practices and Social Order

The final domain I examine is symbolic governance. Though it is unusual to assess through a survey, I pair this with interview and participant observation to try and get around citizens in an authoritarian regime acting "as if" they support certain symbols (Wedeen 1999). The difference between symbolic governance in the three republics is evident as soon as one arrives in their territory. Chechnya is overcome with portraits of the Chechen President, Ramzan Kadyrov, and his father, Akhmad Kadyrov; additionally, the main street in nearly every village in the republic is Kadyrov. Moreover, several streets are also named in honor of Russian generals, and the main boulevard is named after President Putin such that the state seems omnipresent. Nevertheless, elites regularly appeal to Chechen traditions and Islam in their rhetoric to justify their policies. Similar to state reliance on imams to regulate disputes, state elites co-opt traditions and religious practices to regulate dress, beard-length, and social interactions; one should be religious, but only within the confines predetermined by the state. Chechen republic elites also regulate discourse more than its neighbors, such as by bringing in individuals that make dishonorable remarks for public apologies.

State regulations of symbolic practices in Chechnya contrasts with the degree of interjection by state elites in Dagestan and Ingushetia. The fractured symbolic sphere in the latter two republics allows for a proliferation of symbols, discourses, and social orders. In Dagestan, groups lobby to have streets named after their heroes, resulting in representation of different religious leaders like Akushinsky, ethnic leaders like Gabiev, and Soviet-era veterans like

Zhukov, all within the capital. Dress and behavioral norms across the republic are equally versatile with great variation between villages. In Ingushetia, interviews suggest that its monoethnic and hierarchical social order results in a more consistent set of practices to regulate dress and social behavior. The greater homogeneity results in more coherence than in Dagestan without the state regulation of Chechnya. To systematically examine penetration of state symbolic practices vis-à-vis other groups, I turn to the survey data.

The survey asked who makes decisions about dress and social interactions.

Figure 9: Responsibility for social order

These are primarily family affairs, with family members having a large say in younger members, particularly younger girls', dress and interactions. In Chechnya and Ingushetia, however, they also elicit state and religious regulation. Observation and interviews suggest that the survey responses underestimate the level of state involvement in Chechnya, since the state

enforces a strict code regarding dress in public spaces from schools to TV stations. These policies are not as widespread in Ingushetia or Dagestan.[52] A larger proportion of respondents in Ingushetia and significantly more in Dagestan said no one regulates this domain.

The survey also asked respondents who selects street names and public monuments to see if there is variation between regulation of social norms, evident in the previous question, and physical spaces.

Figure 10: Responsibility for Monuments and Street Names

State elites regulate this domain in all the cases. As in other domains, *republic* state elites are more heavily involved in Chechnya while authority remains localized in Dagestan, with Ingushetia falling in between the two republics. The minimal role of republic elites in Dagestan

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[52] Interviewees in Dagestan occasionally discussed discrimination against women who wear hijabs and security forces harassing and allegedly kidnapping men from certain mosques. There are also a few villages in Dagestan that have strict codes of behavior and dress.

matches participant observation and interviews. In Chechnya, as previously discussed, a consistent set of symbols permeates public spaces, with the same portraits of Kadyrov and Putin in the center of Grozny as in the previous rebel stronghold of Urus-Martan. In Ingushetia, symbolic displays are less prevalent, but streets are commonly named in honor of the main teip living there. While models of authoritarian conflict management assume that authoritarian leaders "aim to centralise and homogenise spatial politics," (Lewis et al 2018: 10) the evidence shows there is significant variation in state elites' control of spaces and symbols.

To see if these symbolic practices have been internalized and are reproduced by individuals, I asked respondents an open-ended question about who they would name a street after and to whom they would put up a monument. This assesses the extent to which any of the actors have achieved social control and hegemony over the symbolic space. The word clouds below show the results from Dagestan that were selected by more than two people. I also show the top ten choices in the frequency count.

Figure 11: Dagestan Street and Monument Choices

The most common answers for both questions were related to "war veterans," with a majority mentioning World War II, or the Great Patriotic War, specifically, and a small minority referencing the Caucasian War when Russia annexed the Caucasus. World War II is often deployed by federal elites as symbol of Russian unity. Its prevalence in survey responses suggests that in Dagestan, this symbolism elicits emotional resonance and is salient within society. Respondents also commonly listed religious and village leaders, athletes, and family members, as well as specific religious leaders like Said Afandi and Imam Shamil, and political leaders like Stalin. Many respondents also said "no one," typically commenting that government

officials use the renaming of streets and putting up monuments to steal money. Roughly three percent of respondents also said monuments are not allowed in accordance with Islam, and are therefore, forbidden. The survey responses confirm that the symbolic space in Dagestan is fragmented with numerous, at times contradictory, heroes and discourses.

Before discussing the results from Chechnya, it is necessary to contextualize the survey. In the middle of implementation, Usup Temirhkhanov died in prison. Temirkhanov was a young Chechen man convicted of killing a Russian General. The general raped and tortured a Chechen girl during the Second Chechen War. The general's case was one of few prosecutions of Russians from the wars. Though convicted, the general was released after serving five years. Temirkhanov maintained his innocence in the general's murder until his own death but became upheld as a symbol of reclaiming dignity for the Russian army's unpunished human rights abuses. However, publicly supporting Temirkhanov could be dangerous since he also represents violent resistance. When he died, tens of thousands of individuals from across the republic came to pay their respects. Thus, the survey occurred in a time when a crack opened in the regime's public hegemony over symbolic practices. This was evident in the survey responses, featured below.

Figure 12: Chechnya Street and Monument Choices

The prevalence of Temirkhanov, featuring prominently alongside Kadyrov, shows that state spending and inundation of public spaces has not fully precluded symbolic contestation. This is evident in two other prominent choices, Sheikh Mansur, a Chechen religious and military leader and Zelimkhan, known as the "Chechen Robin Hood." The main selection for monuments was no one, again reflecting the religious nature of society, but Temirkhanov and Kadyrov feature prominently as well. Despite general compliance with state symbolic practices and widespread participation in parades and organizations, there are ruptures in civilian compliance.

Overall, the answers suggest a duality in the Chechen symbolic sphere and underscore the gap between public dissimulation of loyalty and real beliefs.

Finally, I turn to Ingushetia. Ingush elites exhibit a high tolerance for oppositional symbols and disseminate few of their own, more closely resembling Dagestan than Chechnya in symbolic production. For example, while Chechen leaders tried to ban discussions of the 1940s deportations, Ingushetia has a large public memorial to those who died. Thus, the guidelines for what is considered appropriate speech and behavior are broad.

Figure 13: Ingushetia Street and Monument Choices

The results indicate reverence for several individuals, specifically, Ingushetia's first President, Ruslan Aushev, as well as Ingush writers like Idris Bazorkin, Issa Kodzoev, and Ali Hashagulova. Similar to Chechnya, "heroes" were mostly national Ingush heroes. Additionally, numerous respondents referenced 1992, the year of the conflict with North Ossetia, and Stalin's deportations in 1944, highlighting that both conflicts remain defining features of Ingush society. Similar to Chechnya, the number one answer for monuments is "no one."

Though these were the most prominent answers, no answer elicited more than 12% of responses; instead, most respondents selected someone in their own family. Except for the first President Aushev, these results suggest that symbolic authority in Ingushetia is rooted in kinship ties. This contrasts with Dagestan, where symbolic authority, though fragmented, is held by public figures that cross kinship lines to unite larger ethnic, religious, or ideological groups and with Chechnya, where there are several key individuals that draw respect across the republic.

Several general patterns emerge. First, there is a more cohesive and consolidated symbolic sphere in Chechnya, upheld by state control and regulation. Many of the "heroes" selected were described as Chechen heroes versus local actors in Dagestan or extended kinship members in Ingushetia. Second, while the dominant answers in Dagestan related to World War II, in Chechnya and Ingushetia answers referencing war were either broader, such as "victims of violence," or specifically referenced "deportation victims." While in Dagestan "victim" links to a common Russian loss and identity, in Chechnya and Ingushetia it more often relates to being victims at the hands of the Soviet and the Russian state.[53]

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[53] People in both republics, however, generally exhibit a lot of pride for Chechens and Ingush individuals who fought in World War II, and many have grievances that their WWII heroes were not honored as other Soviet heroes, instead returning from the war to find out their communities were deported.

V. Implications for Governance

Assessing the institutional configurations of dispute resolution, goods provision, and symbolic practices, alongside extraction and coercion, demonstrates the importance of moving beyond state-centric accounts of post-conflict governance. Unpacking post-conflict governance across its dimensions reveals divergent governance trajectories across the republics, uneven state penetration, and discontinuities in the exercise of authority. Central state elites' priority is that these republics remain compliant. Although coercion and patronage are central to Moscow's governance arrangement for the North Caucasus, this paper demonstrated that locally, civilians are governed through a broader range of practices and actors that are overlooked by a narrow focus on post-conflict state-building.[54] This is not to deny the prevalence of violence and coercive institutions in civilians lives, evident in the armed actors, block posts, arbitrary detentions, and human rights violations in the region. Indeed, this has been the focus of much scholarship (Lyall 2010; Toft and Zhukov 2015; Souleimanov 2015). Rather, it is to show that this narrow focus misses the wider array of strategies state and ostensibly non-state authorities deploy to gain control and how citizens interact with the authorities. A governance framework, instead, reveals that each of the republic constitutes a different form of multi-layered governance (Kasfir et al. 2017). Specifically, I categorize Dagestan as a case of polycentric governance, Chechnya as a case of centralized governance, and Ingushetia as mediated governance.

In polycentric governance, centers of power are formally independent of one another (Ostrom 2005; Murtazashvili 2016). This suggests that there is not one authority governing others with a clear hierarchy but that different actors, whose authority is autonomous from each

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[54] This echoes Lewis et. al. (2018) who map different practices of authoritarian conflict management.

other, make decisions regarding governance in the community. While decentralized would also be a fitting this term is typically used to describe tiers of government without incorporating relations between formal and informal authorities. Therefore, polycentric better captures that, even at the local village level in Dagestan, numerous authorities govern civilians.

Despite state involvement in dispute resolution and contributions to infrastructure, most goods provision and decisions over symbolic practices remain organized within communities. This demonstrates that community governance institutions, though weakened and reshaped, have outlasted the collapse of the Soviet Union and violence that followed. However, while individuals support having autonomy over their own symbols, languages, and cultural policies, the absence and inefficiency of the state leaves citizens with many unfulfilled demands, particularly in goods provision. Both interviews and the survey responses highlight that the republic and central state has not penetrated locally. Respondents often highlighted that the state in Dagestan is felt more through its absence, through what it fails to deliver, than its presence. This is evident in citizens' open-ended survey responses when they were asked how government impacts their lives: 17.8 % said that it does not impact their lives or that its presence is not felt. The top positive comments related to provision of education and pensions. The trends in the open-ended responses suggest that, despite the stronger direct state presence in dispute resolution in Dagestan compared to the other republics, this is less at the forefront of respondents' minds than the lack of goods provision. The paradox between individuals' answers regarding how government impacts their lives and their continued identification with the state highlights that even though the state is relatively weak and failing in performing some of its core functions,

traces of the state are prominent in people's allegiances. This affective attachment coexists with deep cynicism about the state's capacity.

With the failure of the state to provide goods, infrastructure quality is determined by the ability of the community to serve as a substitute. Interviews suggest this occurs most commonly if an individual from the village prospers or receives a government position and then uses funds to provide for the village, legally or not. For example, in one village where I conducted interviews, people fondly remembered a district administrator from the 1990s that would illegally funnel finances to the village and was the reason they had a paved road and sports complex. Though the individual is infamous for his criminal dealings, his economic support earned villagers' respect, while further underscoring the failure of the state. The role of informal community networks is also echoed in the survey responses regarding how the djamaat, or community, affects people's lives, with one of the most common responses being "offers financial help" and "economic support."

Chechnya, at the other extreme, is a case of centralized governance, with authority consolidated with republic elites. Compared to Dagestan, the center of authority has both shifted vertically and, given the dependent position of informal authorities, horizontally toward the state. The state's role is most prominent in goods provision and its strict regulation of public symbolic spaces and practices. However, its control over dispute resolution is predicated on enactment of religious norms and the compliance of religious authorities suggesting that examining state direct control underestimates state power. Under the current equilibrium, a plurality of civilians view religious authorities as the legitimate providers of dispute resolution, but those authorities operate under the umbrella of the state and rely on it for their positions. This is not the

reassertion of traditional rule but the state's strategic recreation of tradition for its own purposes. Dispute resolution does not have to be territorially constrained. In fact, individuals can seek out well-respected religious scholars in neighboring republics as well as local individuals that are not formally recognized but received a theological education in the Middle East in the 1990s. However, the latter are blocked from formal religious positions and most commonplace disputes are resolved locally. Therefore, unless goods provision is sufficient to maintain their power, republic elites require incorporation and continued compliance of religious authorities to maintain the centralized governance arrangement.

This is not merely a top-down process since there is significant demand for religious order, evident in the nearly 40% of respondents that said they believe shari'a should be followed over Russian law. Republic elites are highly aware of this and strategically incorporate religious symbols and practices into their governance repertoire, keeping tight control over "nonstate" authorities. This, in conjunction with prominent displays of economic reconstruction, such as school and mosque openings, forms the basis of Chechen governance. Examining post-conflict governance reveals this broader repertoire of state presence and control.

Governance in Ingushetia is organized through a mediated model. Menkhaus (2007: 78) describes this as, a system in "which the government relies on partnership (or at least coexistence) with a diverse range of local intermediaries and rival sources of authority to provide core functions of public security, justice, and conflict management in much of the country." In Ingushetia, public goods like roads, schools, and mosques are more often co-produced with involvement from both state and community leaders. More so than in the other two republics, dense kinship networks continue to play a key role in citizens' lives, assisting economically and

with dispute resolution. In their open-ended survey responses, individuals listed a variety of situations where teips become relevant, ranging from resolving blood feuds to helping in financially strenuous times. Business elites also commonly help provide for economic needs of their communities individually and through organizations like the Fund Tesham, which provides food assistance and other supplies to low income families.

The tight horizontal linkages are not only viewed in a beneficial light, however, with respondents also mentioning that their teip prevented them from marrying who they wanted, limited individuality, and regulated dress and religious expression. The role of the state is equally mixed, with respondents mentioning provision of pensions and education but also that the state is a threat to safety and a hindrance to doing business. More than in the other republics, informal actors have a prevalent role as a check on state authorities in political decision-making, evident in the number of respondents that said they would seek help from an elder or imam in a conflict with the village head. Unlike Dagestan, where state presence leaves much wanting, in Ingushetia state agents actively bargain and negotiate with informal authorities to govern, sometimes delegating responsibility to elders, imams, or kinship networks, sometimes co-producing governance.

VI. Connecting to the Conventional Proxies: Extraction and Coercion

How do they dynamics above map onto the conventionally studied dimensions of coercion and extraction? As mentioned in the introduction both of these realms are dominated by state authorities. However, we do see some variation at the margins and variation within the levels of the state that I discuss next.

Extraction

The republics ranked 83rd, 84th, and 85th in terms of contributions of tax revenue into Russia's federal budget, demonstrating similar and low rates of revenue extraction.[55] To get beyond formal statistics I examined extraction in two ways. First, similar to the other dimensions, I asked in the survey who was responsible for organizing the collection of taxes and fees in their community. I included "fees" in the question to both try to capture payments like zakat that individuals would not associate with taxes and to capture informal payments to state officials. Examining this question with the actors fully disaggregated reveals perceived differences in the role of the republic administration. While republic elites were selected as responsible for extraction by 56.96% in Ingushetia and 35.81% in Chechnya, only 15.23% selected them in Dagestan such that we again see authority localized in the case. We also see community members playing a small but larger role for collecting taxes and fees in Dagestan, selected by 5.03% in the republic while picked by less than 1% in the other two cases. Given that only 3% or less of the respondents selected religious authorities, this question seems to be a better test for comparing levels of the state than the role of informal authorities.

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[55] http://www.gks.ru/free_doc/doc_2018/region/reg-pok18.pdf pg 32

Figure 14: Responsibility for Extraction

To try and capture contributions to religious organizations and other informal payments, I also asked individuals roughly what percentage of their household income they spent on (1) community projects, (2) religious collections and donations like zakat, (3) traditions like weddings and funerals, and (4) taxes. The means are in the table below.

Table 2: State and Non-State Extraction

	Chechnya	**Dagestan**	**Ingushetia**
Community projects	4.60	3.98	4.54
Traditions (wedding, funerals)	16.33	23.39	17.62
Religion (zakaat, mosque construction)	16.02	13.31	17.56
Taxes / Government Fees	20.83	11.95	18.87

The largest difference actually shows up in the taxes and government fees between Dagestan and Chechnya. This closely reflects elite statements and interviews that Dagestan continues to face significant hurdles to overcoming informal economic practices and evasion of paying taxes by business owners who, having paid bribes to open and run their business, do not want to then also pay taxes (Chernovik 20 November 2017). State agents in Chechnya do not face such difficulties since noncompliance results in the confiscation of the business, at the least; instead, individuals pay formal taxes and a informal tax into the Kadyrov Fund (Interview August 2018). Given that all the economic indicators of Ingushetia are worse than the other republics and it formally contributes the least to the federal budget,[56] it is surprising to see individuals spending a higher percent of their income on taxes. Yet, it shows the state has slightly stronger economic penetration and compliance in Ingushetia than in Dagestan.

Figure 15: Percent income spent on taxes and gov fees

Coercion

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[56] http://www.gks.ru/free_doc/doc_2018/region/reg-pok18.pdf

Studying coercion in the region directly is problematic in terms of access and ethics, since asking in-depth questions about security services will quickly bring the researcher and researcher's contacts under scrutiny. Therefore, I sought to investigate coercion indirectly in three ways. First, I asked the consistent question about who controls and provides security. This should not be particularly sensitive when asked in a battery of questions about other governance functions. I did not follow up about the quality and nature of security-provision. The answers, below, show that while state elites dominate, there is some variation. State elites are again the top selected authorities, but significant percentage of respondents chose non-state actors in Dagestan, evident in the 9.60% selecting community members, 11.25% selecting family members, and 15.90% selecting no one.

Figure 16: Responsibility for security

Indeed, driving through Dagestan, one runs into security services much less than in Chechnya, though they are present at specific checkpoints such as those entering Levashinsky

District that leads to the mountain regions, in Khasavuyrt, which borders Chechnya, and in several locations throughout the capital Makhachkala. More surprising are the several villages I visited that discussed having their own "informal security force," typically made up of a group of young men in the village that create a post to check who comes and goes. In fact, state officials encouraged the creation of local self-defense militias in the early 2010s, when the state proved unable to effectively combat local armed actors itself, abdicating itself of the minimal functions associated with state-building.[57] This differs from Chechnya where security personnel were on every other corner during my first trip in 2014 and remain omnipresent currently, regularly stopping cars to do searches and document checks. I also asked respondents who, if anyone, regulates movement throughout the republic. These questions were in different parts of the survey to minimize respondents' concerns in discussing security forces.

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[57] https://jamestown.org/program/dagestan-remains-the-deadliest-republic-of-the-north-caucasus/

Figure 17: Regulation of movement

Here the differences, as expected from observations and interviews, are stark. Though several of my enumerators in Chechnya pointed out that things have drastically changed from the wartime period, when movement for young men was entirely unsafe, over 40% of respondents still said movement is regulated by local administrators and 24.65% said republic elites regulate mobility. As previously, Chechnya and Dagestan represent two extremes while Ingushetia is the middle case. Interestingly though, when I asked individuals how far they live from a police station,[58] there were no significant differences across republics, with respondents saying just over twenty minutes walking in each case.

Conclusion

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[58] This was also included in a battery of questions about distance from hospital, mosque, school, and police station.

This chapter presented a disaggregated, civilian-oriented perspective of post-conflict governance to establish that three neighboring republics that started with similar arrangements emerged from conflicts and state collapse with divergent governance trajectories. Despite being part of a vertically-organized authoritarian state, civilians encounter different arms of the state and turn to it with different demands. This variation is masked in assessments of state-building extraction and coercion that depict all three republics as cases of successful state penetration. Moreover, state actors are not the only ones with significant regulatory control; across the republics non-state authorities and communities play broad roles in structuring civilians' lives, particularly in non-material governance domains.

State presence is felt the least in Dagestan, though it is similarly authoritarian in limiting civilian's ability to elect decision-makers. Despite having the strongest direct state penetration in dispute resolution of the three republics, respondents consistently discussed the ways in which the state is absent from their lives other than "getting in the way" as numerous respondents cynically joked. In much of Dagestan the state has withdrawn from what citizens perceive to be its responsibilities. This is not only in rural areas but evident in the capital's regular electricity and water outages and its unregulated construction. It is exemplified by the numerous "kutan" or informal settlements on the lowlands that are not registered or recognized in any census. The lack of state infrastructural power strains scarce local resources destabilizes ethnic relations, and leaves citizens without adequate services. For example, the village of Tsadah existed for almost twenty years before the construction of a local school. This echoes survey respondents' comments that even when they turn to the state, it is rarely effective. While an array of local networks and informal authorities step in to supplement state institutions, the lack of a

coordinated political order that bridges across the republic has allowed authorities to shirk their responsibilities, conflicts to persist unaddressed, and neighboring villages to drastically differ in their governance arrangements. Polycentric governance with input from numerous autonomous authorities has not been an adequate substitute for effective state institutions.

Demonstrating the opposite pole of governance, state presence is the broadest in Chechnya, even in previously autonomous spaces like mosques, which republic elites now help construct and then fill with loyal imams. Thus, the state is experienced both directly through bureaucrats and indirectly through semiformal authorities that have become extensions of the state. This has created a nesting doll arrangement where republic elites rely on Moscow for economic resources to provide goods, but on informal authorities' obedience to prevent and resolve conflicts, creating three layers of vertical rule each of which is necessary for the current governance arrangement to last. This suggests the state is not omnipotent as often depicted. A breakdown of either of these linkages could shift the existing order.

In Ingushetia, with its mediated governance model, state presence has not crowded out non-state authorities and community self-governance institutions like in Chechnya. Simultaneously, in comparison to Dagestan, Ingushetia has a more cohesive network of non-state authorities bridged through kinship networks. Additionally, the stronger and more unified non-state space, overcoming potential religious sect and teip divisions, has provided state authorities with a clearer negotiating partner and challenge than in Dagestan. This has given civilians added leverage since they have a viable alternative to the state for many aspects of governance but also helped in mobilizing demands on the state. Moreover, due to the strength of kinship networks,

bureaucrats, who are also embedded in these informal relationships, are held more to account than state authorities in Dagestan or Chechnya.

For scholars of state-building, this chapter demonstrates the need to be cautious in selecting narrow dimensions of governance for study if they hope to make broader generalizations about authority and state capacity since states exhibit significant variation in their presence in civilian life and relationships with non-state authorities across domains. However, by demonstrating the persistence of non-state rule, I suggest that post-conflict governance offers a more fruitful agenda than post-conflict state-building, allowing for a discussion of *who* governs and *how*. This reveals differences in state presence but also in what communities are able to achieve without state involvement. Scholars have been asking for decades if war makes the state, focusing narrowly on the relationship between these two phenomena. However, as both the technology of violence and nature of states have changed to include a broader array of authorities and practices, so must our questions.

Given that the republics emerged relatively similar at the end of the Soviet Union, and mobilization initially followed parallel trajectories, what explains the differences? In the next chapter, I turn to the case of Dagestan to understand how its current polycentric governance trajectory took root.

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Chapter 4: Dagestan: Polycentric Governance in a Shadow State

In a 2007 interview, Sheikh Sirashudin Hirukskiy Israilov, one of the prominent religious authorities in southern Dagestan, described how he viewed religious and state authorities' role in governance: "Everything should only be decided together. In every village, the imam and head of the administration should raise questions about mosques, clinics, schools, water...When they run out of resources they can appeal to the district and the republic. Administrators should provide funds and we should help" (Chernovik, 09/21/2007). In his account, governance should be co-produced with responsibilities shared among local state and non-state authorities. Governance in Dagestan is polycentric, involving numerous, autonomous local and republic state and non-state actors. Nevertheless, my interviews and observations also suggest that the fragmentation of authority does not consistently result in cooperation and better outcomes as Sheikh Hirukskiy envisioned.

Civilians who turn to state authorities often express that they shirk their responsibilities, particularly in goods provision. Some communities, like Noviy Kostek, rely on religious authorities, community djamaats, and extended kinship networks to fill gaps, providing basic goods, regulating disputes, and enforcing social order. However, not all communities have sufficient resources, leadership, or capacity for collective action to govern locally or to organize collective across communities to demand larger-scale goods, leaving them reliant on clan networks that control state institutions.

This chapter traces how the polycentric architecture of governance developed, with particular attention to whether and how internal armed conflict in Dagestan impacted the governance trajectory. I argue that polycentric governance in Dagestan can be traced back to

state elites' selective incorporation of informal authorities in the 1990s, adopted as a strategy for mitigating large-scale violence amidst state collapse. While the polycentric governance arrangement prevented war, once institutionalized it proved resilient to both localized armed conflict and elite attempts to reconfigure it and centralize authority.

Literature

Scholars dating to Tilly (1990) have examined the role of warfare on state-building. With internal warfare becoming more prominent in the international community, attention turned to internal armed conflict. The impact of internal armed conflict on state-building, and governance more broadly, is undetermined though. Besley and Persson (2008) argue that in contrast to external wars, internal conflicts fail to generate a common interest in strengthening fiscal state capacity and Centeno (2002) shows that lower-level conflicts are unlikely to result in state-building. Cammett (2014; 2016) similarly finds that civil war can undercut efforts at state-building but also shows that civil war can allow for the development of alternate institutions of goods provision. Slater (2010) and Eck (2018) both argue that internal conflict can result in institutional reform and state-building. Moreover, Kier and Krebs (2010) demonstrates that "limited wars," if framed as such by elites, can be transformative and create pressure for institutional reforms. Taken together these studies are inconclusive as to whether or under what conditions armed conflict restructures institutions, state-building, and governance.

Focusing on violence specifically rather than armed conflict broadly, Osorio et al (2018) provide a step forward in making sense of the divergent results. Narrowing the scope to forced disappearances, the authors show that violence can have heterogeneous effects on different aspects of state capacity. In addition to variation based on the level and type of conflict, the

impact of violence on state-building may depend on the dimension of state-building under study. Moreover, as Cammett's work suggests, and the broader literature on non-state (Cammett and MacLean 2014; Menkhaus 2007; Hagmann and Peclard 2010) and armed actor governance (Arjona 2016; Arjona et al 2016; Kasfir et al 2018) shows, even when armed conflict fails to build state institutions, it can alter informal institutions and governance more broadly.

Yet, the existing literature leaves underspecified whether and how governance changes caused by internal conflict are maintained or disrupted in the post-conflict period. Not all forms of armed conflict leave lasting institutional effects, even if they impact micro-level outcomes like civilian preferences and participation.[59] Using the case of Dagestan, I show that understanding whether and how violence impacts governance requires attention to the (1) sequence between violence and the integration of local and informal authorities and (2) the type of violence.

Argument

I argue that where the pattern of incorporation is institutionalized prior to violence and armed conflict is localized, it is unlikely to shift the republic-wide "architecture of governance." I show that in the case of Dagestan, polycentric governance persists, though violence had heterogeneous effects across domains of governance.

The case of Dagestan makes three contributions to scholarly understanding of the relationship between armed conflict and governance. First, it demonstrates that selectively incorporating informal elites to establish polycentric governance can minimize the intensity of armed conflict. Second, Dagestan demonstrates that the *timing* and *type* of armed conflict shapes

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[59] See Bauer et al 2016 for a review of the literature on the implications of exposure to violence on micro-level outcomes like trust and civilian participation.

how armed conflict impacts governance. Unlike Chechnya and Ingushetia, in Dagestan violence broke out *after* the incorporation of informal authorities. This combined with the *localized* nature of violence proved insufficient to reconfigure the architecture of governance. Finally, Dagestan demonstrates the need to disaggregate governance across its dimensions. While governance in the republic remains fragmented across authorities, counterinsurgency sweeps and assassinations in the late 2000s shifted dispute resolution toward stronger state control, though having negligible impact on the other dimensions of governance.

This chapter is organized in three parts. First, I trace the formation of polycentric governance in Dagestan beginning with the collapse of Soviet institutions the 1990s.[60] Unlike in neighboring republics, the collapse of Soviet institutions did not trigger violence in Dagestan.[61] As a result, the pattern of elite incorporation and resulting polycentric governance became institutionalized prior to violence. This shows how communities in Dagestan responded to state collapse and how governance would likely be structured in Dagestan without violence.

After explaining the formation of polycentric governance in the 1990s and describing its implications for civilians, I assess whether and how violence impacted governance when it did break out. I demonstrate that violence, escalating in the late 2000s and peaking in 2011, was relatively clustered geographically. Moreover, it was mostly driven by criminal and local motivations rather than a cohesive macro-conflict as in the other republics. Due to its relatively contained and fragmented nature, it did not aggregate to significantly impact the *republic-level*

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[60] Many of my interviewees would push me to start earlier with the Caucasian Wars. While it is true that the present governance arrangements cannot be viewed in a historical vacuum, I would assert that Soviet collapse represented a sufficiently radical break that we can begin the story there. Moreover, numerous excellent accounts of historical Dagestan exist (Gammer 1994; Ware and Kisriev 2010).

[61] See Derluguian (2005) and Zurcher (2007) for detailed accounts on the factors that helped prevent the immediate breakdown of violence in the republic and how they fit with existing literature on causes of war.

architecture of governance, which remains polycentric. Though assassinations removed individuals in key positions and counterinsurgency sweeps shifted dispute resolution toward state control, the overall institutional configuration of governance has not changed. Dagestan has retained a system of polycentric governance where centers of decision-making are independent yet overlapping (Murtazashvili 2016: 3). However, unlike in Ingushetia, these actors rarely negotiate or collectively organize to make joint demands for governance. *The sequence, combined with the more geographically contained organization of violence, resulted in the persistence of polycentric governance*.

Finally, given that the theory predicts the sequence and type of violence resulted in polycentric governance, in the last section I check if the observable implications at the village-level are consistent with the theory's expectations. Since both violence and governance were more localized and contained within geographical boundaries, we should expect to see greater variation among governance in villages in Dagestan than in the other cases. Thus, in the last part of the chapter I examine the spatial variation in governance in Dagestan.

Clan Networks and Development of Polycentric Governance in a Shadow State

"Everything was decided by three or four people with massive influence. They could gather a meeting of two hundred, three hundred thousand people if they wanted - people did not ask questions - if they were needed they mobilized" -Interview 1 2016

"Now, as you know, practically everyone in government, in the People's Assembly, in municipal organs, they are all people that came to power in the 1990s after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Then everyone that was tough, with broken ears and noses, became administrators and took power." - Interview with Sagidpashsa Umahanov in Chernovik 03/22/2013

The career trajectory of Abdusamad Gamidov, the Prime Minister of Dagestan until 2018, reveals the inner workings of Dagestan's governance system. Abdusamad Gamidov is the brother of Gamid Gamidov, a champion wrestler and founder one of the first commercial banks

in Dagestan in the 1990s. In 1996, Gamid Gamidov was appointed Finance Minister of Dagestan. After his assassination a few months later, Abdusamad effectively inherited his post, as well as the informal role as head of the "Mekiginski" clan, named for the village Mekegi where the brothers were born. What could have been a major disruption was instead a replacement of individuals with minimal implications for the architecture of governance. Several other key state officials in Dagestan emerged from the Mekeginski clan, including the heads of two of Dagestan's major cities, Izberbash and Kaspiysk, and a previous mayor of the capital.[62] Clans like Mekiginski gained power in the post-Soviet period, similar to the violent entrepreneurs that arose across Russia broadly but with a resource base beyond organized force (Volkov 1999). Through the 1990s, Dagestan's state administrators integrated clan leaders into the state bureaucracy with the goal of preventing large-scale violence. They form the backbone of Dagestan's state to-date.

By the end of the 1990s, Dagestan became a "shadow state" with "informal commercially oriented networks" operating through and alongside government bureaucracies (Reno 2000: 434-35). Republic state administrators outsourced sovereignty to clan leaders, similar to how foreign or central state elites outsource rule to warlords in exchange for "a measure of influence and stability" (Marten 2012: 29). When a member member of a clan received a Ministry or government post, they employed their family and co-villagers, distributing jobs accordingly.[63] This, in turn, created a loyalist base and ensured the head of the clan had a group ready to

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[62] Sirashudin Gamidor, Abdusamad's brother was a Deputy in the City Council in Kaspiysk, Magomed Suleimanov was the previous head of Makhachaka, Abdulmejid Suleimanov was the head of Izberbash and cousin of the Gamidovs and Jamal Omarov was the previous head of Kaspiysk.

[63] As Dagestan expert and senior research fellow at the Gaidar Institute in Moscow Konstantin Kozenin describes, it has been almost impossible to become a government official or a businessman in the republic without alignment with one of these clans (Kazenin 2018).

mobilize, sometimes with violence, if his[64] position or status is threatened. As a result, economic

resources "came to be dominated by approximately two hundred powerful families, or six to

seven thousand people (of 2.5 million), who disposed of nearly 85 per cent of the local wealth"

(Derluguian 1999: 12).[65] In addition to the fragmentation of authority within the state, an array of

independent authorities beyond the state were involved in governance, from oligarchs and small

businessmen that helped with goods provision, to religious authorities, kinship networks, and

djamaats (informal community organizations) that were more involved in dispute resolution and

regulation of social order. The architecture of governance was highly fragmented. In this section,

I show how this polycentric governance system developed through the selective incorporation of

informal and local elites in beginning in the 1990s.

Emergence of Post-Soviet Governance: Responding to Collapse and Initial Mobilization

When the Soviet Union collapsed, Dagestan's ethnic heterogeneity, mountainous terrain,

natural resources, and low economic development all made the republic a likely case for the

outbreak of violence. Moreover, several ethnic groups, like Lezgins in south Dagestan, found

themselves separated by new borders from co-ethnics in neighboring states, causing them to

challenge the physical integrity of the republic itself. Suppressed territorial disputes rose to the

surface, as they did in Ingushetia. Responding to these demands shaped the initial priorities of

state and non-state elites. This section compares how state and non-state elites navigated civilian

demands and governed amidst the ensuing crisis. I show that state elites, focused on maintaining

power and preventing large-scale violence, shirked broader governance responsibilities to

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[64] In all of the cases in Dagestan known to the author, the heads of clan are male.

[65] Derluguian (1999) writes that these estimates are made by Dagestani sociologist Enver Kisriyev and verified by several surveys.

civilians. Non-state authorities, on the other hand, coordinated demands but prioritized representation and symbolic politics. Amidst institutional ambiguity, neither state or non-state elites delivered effective order, security, dispute resolution, or goods provision, though nascent institutions slowly developed. With elites focused on horizontal bargains, civilians were left to meet their collective goals as they could, better equipped to regulate disputes than to provide material goods given the historic distribution of resources. Examining this initial period lays the basis for who governed and how before the onset of violence.

Prior to Soviet collapse, Dagestan's elites established an informal, yet institutionalized way to balance among among the largest of the 14 ethnic groups within the state.[66] From 1948 onwards, Dagestan's top three positions - the first secretary of the Communist Party, chairman of the Sovmin, and chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet - were split across the three main ethnic groups - Avar, Dargin and Kumyk. Soviet collapse not only undermined state institutions, but brought the existing power balance and groups' access to resources into question. Establishing a new framework for distributing power became the main priority.

With Moscow no longer determining who held leadership positions, Dagestan's Soviet-era leaders sought ways to remain in office. Groups previously excluded from formal power, on the other hand, including religious authorities and representatives of ethnic groups, saw an opening to renegotiate their access to the state and their groups' broader control over resources, particularly land, as in the other republics.[67] Focused on gaining or holding access to offices,

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[66] The Soviet state formally recognized 14 but many of these were composed of smaller groups joined together that speak distinct languages and have since been split creating roughly 40 ethnic groups in modern-day Dagestan.

[67] As in all the cases at hand, land conflicts date back to Soviet era policies which resettled groups from the highland to the lowlands and into neighboring territories. Urbanization escalated these tensions as groups considering the lowland territories historically theirs saw their rights further threatened.

elites prioritized their short-term interests.[68] Even those focused on longer-term policies, mostly

cultural autonomy and establishing private property rights, believed that access to state offices

was the best way to ensure these objectives were met. As a result, state and non-state elites

focused on gaining a seat within the state, competing to divide state resources.

Beginning in the late 1980s, National Fronts, or ethnically-based movements, started

organizing, perceiving a chance to alter their power within Dagestan and redress long-standing

land disputes. While conflicts over land had broken out during the Soviet period as well, they

now took new form and scale.[69] Tenglik formed first, organized by the Kumyk population and

led by Salav Aliev. The group mobilized around claims to the lowland territory in Dagestan and

greater autonomy. National Front of Imam Shamil, the Avar movement, formed in response. A

contact involved in the mobilization described how "the legendary mafioso," Gadzhi

Makhachev, assumed leadership of the National Front of Imam Shamil (Interview 1 2016).

Indeed, Makhachev had two prison convictions, one for rape and robbery and the other for

intentional serious bodily injury, intentional minor injury, and illegal weapons possession

(Vatchagaev 2013). Perceiving their resources and power threatened, other ethnic movements

mobilized as well.[70] Two Lezgin movements - Sadval under Olympic wrestling champion Ruslan

Ashuraliev and the Lezgin National Council under financier Marat Ramazanov, Lak People's

Movement Tsubarz headed by Magomed Khachilaev, Nogai's Birlik under Kildasov, and

[68] Numerous theories dating to Mancur Olson's model of stationary banditry (1993) demonstrate that when groups have short time horizons their behaviors are likely to become more predatory and opportunistic (Arjona 2016; Cheng 2018).
[69] Conflicts broke out between Chechens and Avaras in Novoluki in 1964, in Chipaevo in 1976 and 1985 and in Novolak in 1989 for example (Adiev 2009: 71).
[70] See Adiev (2009) for a detailed local account of the land conflicts and inter-related ethnic mobilization in the 1990s and Bruce and Ware (2010) for an English-language account of the National Fronts.

Dargin's Tsadesh, without a clear leadership, formed by the early 1990s. Initially organized by ethnicity, the movements quickly fragmented further. My interviewee described how in this environment, everyone split according to "one of ours or not."

The movements' leaders became key figures in raising questions about distribution and ownership of land and economic resources, as well as both fomenting and regulating large-scale conflicts. My interviewee proceeded to describe one particularly tense situation that began over a local land conflict in Kazbekovsky district in 1991. As the conflict escalated, the Kumyk movement blocked the Baku-Rostov federal highway, triggering a direct confrontation between thousands of Avar and Kumyk civilians. After Chechens started joining the Kumyk side, united over similar territorial disputes they had with Avar residents of Novolak district, Avars from rural districts mobilized in mass on Makhachakala's central square. Makhachev egged on the members of the National Front of Imam Shamil, causing thousands of cars to head toward Khasavuyrt where the blockade was mobilized. The direct interjection of republic leaders, local and republic religious authorities, and Kumyk and Avar leaders with pre-existing ties to each other diffused the situation; they were able to convince the movements' leaders that once blood spilled, all out war would break out and they would lose control entirely; this was the closest Dagestan came to war (Interview 1 2016). This episode demonstrates the central role of the newly powerful National Front leaders in mobilizing collective action. These linkages made them powerful actors for regulating conflicts and distributing resources - particularly political offices - in the early 1990s. However, National Fronts' leaders, without a joint threat as emerged due to collective violence in Ingushetia, could not mobilize a *cohesive* set of demands. Instead, though seemingly representing the interests of entire ethnic groups that transcended kinship

lines, as groups' leaders were incorporated into the state it became increasingly clear they represented much narrower clan interests, as will be discussed below.

Though beginning slightly later, a parallel and intertwined contestation was beginning over the republic's religious institutions. The removal of restrictions on religious practice led to widespread religious mobilization as in the other republics. Religious authorities were perceived as potential sources of unity with the ability to unite across ethnic divisions. And in fact, there are numerous local disputes where imams become mediators, such as in land conflicts in Kalininaul and Leninaul (Novoe Delo 03/06/1992). However, conflicts of control of religious institutions and control of mosques, not seen in the other republics until the late 1990s, began in Dagestan even before Soviet collapse, such as the 1989 conflicts in Buynaksk and Tarki (Ware and Kisriev 2010: 89-90). Disputes over control of religious institutions exacerbated interethnic cleavages and further fragmented elites. In 1990, the First Congress of Muslims of Dagestan founded the Spiritual Directorate of the Muslims of Dagestan (DUMD) and elected Bagautdin Isaev, a Kumyk, as mufti. In 1992, however, a group of Avar Islamic leaders overthrew Isaev, putting Said-Akhmed Darbishgadjiev in place instead (Ware and Kisriev 2010: 58). Kumyk and Dargin movements refused to participate or send representatives to new Committee of Alims (Novoe Delo 03/06/1992), creating separate religious organizations instead. Unlike in Ingushetia and Chechnya, the religious organization in Dagestan was fragmented from its establishment. Though Avar tariqatists, specifically followers of Said Afandi Cherkeyevsky, dominated the Muftiat and Dagestan's formally recognized religious positions since 1992, the other groups' religious authorities operated relatively unhindered.

The President of Dagestan from 1994 to 2006 and leader of the Levashi clan, Magomedali Magomedov, is widely credited with navigating both the ethnic and religious divisions to contain instability between the different groups during this tumultuous period, similar to Aushev in Ingushetia. Recognizing the weakness of state institutions and diffuse power spread among informal leaders, "Ded," or grandfather as he is called by Dagestan's residents, selectively intervened into the disputes to remove challengers to his rule but also to balance competing interests and demands between clans and religious groups. In the 1994 constitution, he formally institutionalized inter-ethnic balancing within the political system, accommodating the largest nationalities in the executive and legislative branches. He made similar concessions to control over the Muftiat. Many of my interviewees credited Magomedov with avoiding political destabilization.

Yet, Magomedov's political maneuvering prioritized distributing power among key clan and religious leaders that could mobilize collective action, rather than resolving the social, political, and economic issues within the republic. Magomedov, and therefore the state administration, was preoccupied with establishing formal electoral institutions and preventing the outbreak of large-scale violence. Seeking to formally guarantee representation of the republic's constituent nationalities and avoid interethnic confrontations, Magomedov pursued constitutional reform, passing a law "On Elections to the People's Assembly of Dagestan." The law designated sixty-six of the 121 single-mandate districts with multinational populations as "national electoral districts," such that candidates of a single predetermined nationality could run for office (Ware and Kisriev 2010: 66). This pushed for competition from between to within ethnic groups. Magomedov sought to identify the key informal leaders that could ensure the

loyalty, or at least demobilization, of the groups following them. A contact deeply familiar with

the processes described,

Once the National Fronts formed, their leaders started trying to transform their
mobilization capacity into access to administrative positions and the economic resources.
Magomedov, whose clan was in power at the time, handed out administrative offices to
pacify informal leaders' demands. For example, by 1995 Gadzhi Makhachev - leader of
the Avar movement - was made the head of Dagneft', the Dagestan affiliate of Russia's
oil company, Rosneft. By 1998, Makhachev was the Prime Minister of Dagestan. Of
course the different leaders started vying for power and primarily relied on their clans and
djamaats for support. One of the only multiethnic clans was Amirov's since he was able
to buy off many of the other leaders and create a strict hierarchy among them underneath
himself. (Interview 71 2019).

State officials explicitly acknowledged the possibility that incorporating informal leaders

into the state could have negative consequences for governance outcomes. However, their

response was to create "professional" districts to also set aside offices for candidates with higher

education (Ware and Kisriev 2010: 67). State administrators prioritized demobilization over

governance outcomes for Dagestan's residents or the potential long-term consequences of

incorporating clan leaders into the state.

A local scholar echoed the observation above that being a leader of an ethnic movement

was insufficient to receive a government office. Instead, Magomedov identified leaders that were

willing to become part of the state bureaucracy and willing to compromise on their groups'

demands (Interview 54 2018). Several Chechen and Kumyk leaders were not incorporated for

this reason. When Magomedov could not directly replace a leader, he used the guise of ethnic

balancing to appoint loyal officials to high positions in those administrations. For example,

Magomedov appointed Said Amirov as a deputy prime minister under Prime Minister Abdurazak

Mirzabekov, ensuring he had someone loyal high in Mirzabekov's ranks. Said Amirov, of Dargin

ethnicity like Magomedov, headed the clan from Djangamahi, a village in the same district as

Magomedov's Levashi. Magomedov ensured that while Dargin's controlled the top political post, Kumyks and Lezgins - the third and fourth largest ethnic groups - maintained key posts in the new government. His balancing extended beyond just state offices, helping Avars maintain control of the DUMD when they ousted the Kumyk Mufti.

By the end of the 1990s, state offices were distributed across the main clans, who were using their newly gained administrative control to allocate resources. By 1998, Amirov became the mayor of Makhachkala, aligning his extensive clan networks with Magomedov. Amirov's sons were installed in high posts in the judiciary and legislature. His brothers and nephews also received prominent positions and business contracts throughout the republic while Amirov himself gained control over the city's transportation network. Along the clans making headway into the capital were those controlling individual districts and cities. Avar Saidpasha Umahanov became the head of Khasavuyrt, while Kumyk Alimosaltan Alhamatov controlled the surrounding district. Sagid Murtazaliev, though away from the republic for his sports career in the 1990s, joined the ranks of clan leaders as the head of Kizlyar district in 2003 and went on to be the head of the Pension Fund. Magomed Khachilaev, transformed his position as leader of the Lak movement and his criminal connections to become a deputy in Dagestan's National Assembly. By 1995, he was appointed head of the republic's fisheries committee, gaining control of one of the most lucrative branches of government. The following year, his brother, Nadir Khachilaev, who was also closely involved in the Lak movement and became a key figure in Dagestan's religious community leading the Russian Union of Muslims, also received a position in the State Duma. State offices were effectively divided among the major informal authorities in the republic. Instead of creating a system of extraction by the state, Dagestan became a case of

state capture, exemplifying "extraction from the state … the capture of resources that have already been accumulated by the state" (Grzymala-Busse 2008: 640). The incorporation of clan leaders into the state effectively dismantled what remained of the Soviet-era bureaucracy.

Unlike Chechnya, where post-war state-building violently consolidated non-state actors, and Ingushetia, where elites negotiated with each other, clan leaders turned bureaucrats actively competed against each other even after incorporation. One of the rare instances of cooperation was the formation of the "Northern Alliance," when Umahanov, Mahachev, and Murtazaliev joined forces to oppose President Magomedali Magomedov and Said Amirov. Yet, this alliance was fragile. As several journalists that covered it described, as soon as Magomedov was removed from office, the alliance fell apart (Interview 2 2016; Interview 36 2017). Clan leaders incorporated into the state did not pivot to prioritize state interests but segmented the republic's territory, each establishing their own spheres of influence.[71] Similar to the rhizomatic nature of the state described by Bayart (2009), in Dagestan clan networks stretched from the state horizontally through society, managing economic resources and the security institutions necessary to maintain them.

Few of the new state bureaucrats cut their ties to criminal networks, informal business ventures, and for some armed militias. This is best exemplified by the Khachilaev brothers. In 1997 Magomed Khachilaev's paramilitary militias and police clashed in an armed standoff. A year later, the Khachilaev brothers organized an armed occupation of government buildings in Makhachkala. That year, 1998, the federal center sent Colonel Kolesnikov to Dagestan in an attempt to break up the clan networks that penetrated the state; it was the first of many attempts.

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[71] This echoes the "spheres of influence" political order Staniland describes that can form between states and insurgents where there is passive cooperation and segmented territorial control (Staniland 2012: 248).

However, by that point in time the shadow state was institutionalized. As my interviewees repeatedly reminded me when I asked them about "the state," there were only individuals and their networks.

Beyond the state, authority was also fragmented across numerous non-state networks and actors, the most prominent being religious authorities. Magomedov aligned with and supported Sheikh Said Afandi Cherkeyevsky, the most well-respected religious authority in the republic, and his followers in the DUMD. Tenuous cooperation between DUMD and state officials, driven largely by the perceived threat of Salafism, did not prevent critique and open conflict between the DUMD and state officials, as the Mufti, Ahmad Abdulaev himself stated in a 2004 interview (Chernovik 05/14/2004). Further, numerous religious authorities, Sufi and Salafi, operated autonomously from Said Afandi and the DUMD, such as Muhammad-Mukhtar Babatov, particularly respected among the Kumyk population, and Sirazhudin Khurikskiy, who had vast authority in southern Dagestanis, primarily Lezgins and Tabasarans. Estimates suggest that in 2003, out of more than 2000 mosques in Dagestan and only half were registered with the state; out of the 17 Islamic universities, only 8 were registered and certified (Chernovik 10/02/2003). There were splits within Salafism as well, such as between Akhmed-Kadji Akhtaev, a moderate advocating non-violent preaching of pure Islam, and those like Kebedov and Rasul Makasharipov who advocated violence (Ratelle-Francois 2013: 117-120). The organization of religious authorities was highly fragmented, paralleling divisions within the state.

In addition to religious authorities, authority in Dagestan was historically grounded in djamaats and elders. Through the early 1990s, djamaats served as a place for raising and coordinating civilian demands around allocation of land, infrastructure, security considerations

and other local concerns (DagPravda 16 February 1991; DagPravda 19 October 1991). My interviewees consistently stated that the authority of elders within djamaats has waned, though they disagreed as to how and why this occurred. Many explain it as a generational conflict exacerbated by the "foreign" religious beliefs of young men who studied overseas in the 90s, while others point to money overtaking elders' authority. Despite the reason, elders, "expected to debate among themselves and articulate opinions on all public matters," (Derluguian 1999: 11) shifted from being leaders of their community djamaats in the early 1990s to having authority in name only in Dagestan. The community djamaats and kinship networks they led, though also weakened by migration, continued to be centers of collective action and governance.

This fragmentation of authority across numerous actors *within* and *beyond* the state, and in turn the polycentric system of governance, was institutionalized by the late 1990s. Multiple centers of authority co-existed, shifting between competition, co-existence, and tenuous alliances. Neither state nor non-state authorities were able to coalesce sufficiently to form a cohesive organization or framework of governance. When violence broke out, therefore, it was in a highly fragmented political context.

An alternative account for the development of polycentric governance could focus on ethnic heterogeneity in Dagestan, which makes fragmentation in governance more likely and polycentric governance overdetermined. Nevertheless, two reasons suggest ethnic heterogeneity was not determinative of polycentrism. First, as mentioned, clan leaders were not representatives of ethnic groups, mobilizing more narrow interests and some clans, like Said Amirovs, were multiethnic. Clan did not operate strictly on the basis of ethnicity, though their decisions often exacerbated ethnic tensions. Second, with the exception of Chechens who make up just over 3

percent of the population, for most of Dagestan's residents, ethnicity was not their prime

identity; instead, they identified more with being a part of Dagestan or Russia (Ware and Kisriev

2010: 130). Similarly, members of every ethnic group except Chechens selected Russian federal

leadership as the actor they would trust most in the case of an acute crisis (ibid 136). My 2018

survey affirms this finding from Ware and Kisriev's 2003 survey, suggesting that identities in

Dagestan are relatively stable across time. Many ethnic groups, like the largest Avar group, were

created during Soviet rule by merging together smaller groups. It should not be assumed that

ethnicity is sufficiently internalized to be the primary determinant of governance.

Governance outcomes for civilians

How did the incorporation of informal authorities and polycentric governance impact

governance outcomes? Remembering the period, interviewees consistently emphasize that, as in

the other republics, the state could not provide basic functions that civilians had come to expect

such as goods, security, or effective dispute resolution. Though clan leaders - now republic or

district elites - occasionally provided resources outside their clan, creating a sports complex or

paving a road, these initiatives were inconsistent and unsustainable. As one interviewee

described of a district head,

it was a typical scheme, he went around all the Kumyk villages and built sports
complexes and said everyone will train now. It raised the community pride but they [him
and the city mayor] were constantly competing and trying to undermine each other. They
realized they had to distribute the territories (Interview 34 2017).

Throughout the republic, clans divided the territory, establishing small dynasties.

Derbent, for example, the biggest city in the South of Dagestan became firmly rooted in the

hands of the Kurbanov family, which ruled it since Soviet times. Clans, like Kurbanov's, that

gained or maintained access to republic level resources provided symbolic shows of support

through big acts like the aforementioned sports complexes. Yet, numerous districts like

Tsuntintsky and Tsumadinsky remained without paved roads and others remained without stable

electricity (Aduiev 2009: 60-61). Infrastructure was not distributed as a public good but tool for

patronage. This was not just in mountain districts. On the lowlands in multi-ethnic districts,

distribution of scarce resources stirred further ethnic tensions. For example, within

Karabudakhent district, residents of Gubden sought to break away from the district because the

village remained without necessary infrastructure like consistent drinking water, gas, electricity,

and an adequate kindergarten. The residents argued this was because they did not have someone

actively lobbying their needs with the administration, which was the way to solve problems

around goods provision (Novoe Delo 04/06/2007). Their mobilization led to tensions with a

neighboring village, resulting in joint efforts by republic administrators, elders, and religious

authorities, along with OMON and district police to resolve the conflict (Memorial

06/19/2009).[72] This incidence is not unique. Summarizing the economic impact of the clan

system on Dagestan, Ware and Kisriev (2010: 44-45) write:

This highest elite was supported by another 5-7 percent of the population who had
significantly improved their financial situation. Another 20-25 percent managed, often by
means of extraordinary effort, to raise their income two to five times above the living
ware. Approximately, 70 percent of the population lived in deep, and deepening
poverty...Even in the capitol, the overwhelming majority lived in crumbling apartment
blocks where electricity and running water were at best unreliable.

State provision of social services, an expectation from the Soviet system, decreased.[73]

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[72] http://old.memo.ru/hr/hotpoints/caucas1/msg/2009/06/m182482.htm

[73] In an April 1992 interview, the Minister of Healthcare stated there was no funding to pay for anything beyond the minimum salaries for healthcare workers and treatment of emergency patients - the state can no longer afford to provide a minimum level of care for free (Novoe Delo 04/03/1992). By August, healthcare workers in Kaspyisk went on strike after not receiving a salary for three months (Novoe Delo 08/14/1992). Even when salaries were paid, overall in Dagestan they were 2.9 lower than the Russian average (Novoe Delo 01/29/1993).

The state's economic ineptitude extended to public goods. By October 1993, four or five transport routes had to be cancelled within the capital due to the poor quality of roads; when the administration allocated funding for infrastructure it was insufficient to cover costs, leaving about half the roads in poor condition (Novoe Delo 10/15/1993). Further, as the Minister of Transport pointed out, the crisis presented itself not just in the lack of goods but in an inability to track statistics on what is coming in and out of the republic (Novoe Delo 06/18/1993), a basic state function that none of the non-state actors sought to or could fill.

Some of the economic issues stemmed from lack of funds and noncompliance with laws, but problems were also caused by corruption and embezzlement. While all of Russia was going through an economic crisis, a point state officials emphasized to explain their ineffectiveness,[74] criminality and bureaucrats' shirking their responsibility further undermined delivery of goods and services in Dagestan. Pensions, one of the main sources of funding from the federal center, became a central source of corruption (Novoe Delo 06/17/1994). In an August 10, 1993 interview, the head of the MVD in charge of economic crime stated that the cases filed with the police showed 30 million rubles in theft (Novoe Delo 08/10/1993). The village of Gubden exemplifies how resources were distributed. A villager described how nearly 200m roubles destined to build a reservoir dam and sewage treatment plants disappeared,

Putin allocated 183m roubles to our village. We built the dam, and accounted for the grant. But then it sank by about half a metre! How could they have built it so that it couldn't take the pressure of the water? They obviously decided to cut corners. So the concrete cracked and the water seeped away. And there used to be a river there that was our main source of water.[75]

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[74] Such as in the Finance Minister in an interview for Novoe Delo 01/17/1992.

[75] https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/odr/gubden-dagestan-where-radicals-police-themselves/ Open Democracy 11/06/2015.

By the time money reached a village, each level preceding it had taken a cut. The Chair of the Economics Department at Dagestan Government University at the time published an opinion piece in Novoe Delo (03/12/1993) to explain what he perceived to be the cause of economic hardship. He wrote, "Everyone knows who the bandits are but the police do nothing - just like previously most people don't care about regular citizens who are barely getting by." The Chair highlighted not just the criminality but the unwillingness of police to interfere in economic crimes. The shadow state not only meant corruption at the top but created a logic that penetrated through the institutional ranks.

The state shirking its responsibility extended to other spheres. State elites were hesitant to resolve the numerous land disputes bubbling to the surface as well. For example, in 1994, roughly 200 residents of Kostek organized a protest and delivered 2000 signatures to republic administrators seeking a resolution to their conflict with neighboring New Kostek over the division of land. At that point the conflict had been dragging on for two years without resolution and threatened to evolve into a broader ethnic conflict between Dargin and Kumyk groups. Numerous similar conflicts sparked throughout the republic. Yet, fearing decisions that could anger either group or pursuing their personal interests, administrators chose to do nothing, passing the buck. While individuals and communities clearly identified resolving property disputes as the responsibility of state administrators and one of the most urgent priorities, evident by their repeated appeals to state officials, state administrators undermined their own authority by foregoing the control designated to them.

State ineffectiveness and fragmentation left an opportunity for non-state authorities to gain support by filling state functions. Numerous scholarly and empirical accounts suggest that

when state institutions fail, civilians develop alternate ways to govern and solve collective problems (Bellagamba and Klute 2008; Menkhaus 2007; Raeymaekers et al 2008; Scott 2010; Cheng 2018). The low bar for governance set by state bureaucrats meant that any actor capable of providing a minimum level of security, goods, or dispute resolution would likely deliver governance more effectively.

Civilians sought to find ways to organize themselves and solve problems collectively outside the sprawling, largely ineffective state institutions. Though there were major challenges with basic infrastructure, the first priority for many residents was for religious infrastructure, reflecting civilian expectations about the division of responsibility between state and non-state authorities. As one man described, "when communities started building mosques and gained the chance to take hajj people did not hold back. They sold their cows, gave away everything just to build the community mosque" (Interview 2 2016). Communities raised funds not only for mosques but also madrassas, Islamic education centers. As my interviewees consistently pointed out, this was not obligatory and people gave what they could, though social pressures played a role. How full funding for mosques was raised remains opaque, even for residents. Sometimes community funds remained in the hands of the local imam, sometimes they were handed over to the Muftiat (Interview 58 2018).

By 1998, there were 1,670 registered mosques in Dagestan, 9 Islamic universities, 25 madrassas, and 670 maktabs (Ware and Kisriev 2013: 90). By 2002, the number of madrassas grew to 131 and universities to 16 (Yarlikapov 2003: 21-22). Yet, given the economic crisis and corruption, which diverted money into elites' hands, even in areas that had a strong collective action capacity, average residents' self-governance efforts could not substitute for the state and

provide goods broadly. Estimates suggest that "the majority, 71 percent of Dagestan's population, lived with an income under subsistence level in 1998" (Hunter 2004: 99-100). Thus, in many communities civilians simply went without many public goods like schools with sufficient space and paved roads. This was not unique to Dagestan but the level of goods provision in the post-Soviet North Caucasus broadly.

While limited in their economic resources, community djamaats more easily organized collectively to regulate security. By May 1994, groups in Khasavuyrt, Babaurt, Kazbek, Novolak, Kizilurt, Kizlyar, Tarumovsk, and Nogay districts and in the cities of Khasavurt and Kizilyar sought permission from the Council of Ministers to create armed committees to secure order, fight crime, protect civilians, and their property from criminal border gangs (Novoe Delo 05/20/1994). These were typically organized locally through informal rotations of men within the villages. When large scale conflicts occurred, such as the 1998 invasion from Chechnya, these groups also mobilized as self-defense units.[76] However, they were rarely permanent organizations. Some of the larger militias had ties with major clan leaders, such as the militia in Novolak that was directly linked to the Khachilaev brothers. In fact, each of the clan leaders in the 1990s could mobilize three to four thousand young armed men when needed (Interview 1 2016).

For most civilians, however, state inability to provide security, and clans' selective provision of security, intensified disorder. One interviewee, in the "intelligentsia" camp at the time described who governed in the 90s: "we had read Dostoevsky but we did not have anything other than knowledge while those that had sat in prison had brute strength, which was the biggest

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[76] The Russian GosDuma formally granted the participants veteran status in July 2019 (Chernovik 18 July 2019).

resource to solve problems" (Interview 14 2016). Residents repeatedly called on the government

to take control. People with money turned to private security firms, which operated with

approval from security forces (Novoe Delo 12 March 1993). This further fragmented institutions

and highlighted the state's inability to provide basic functions as had come to be expected.

Turning to dispute resolution, despite the fragmentation of religious authorities and state

elites' uncertainty as to how to address them, religious institutions provided a prominent source

of dispute resolution in the republic. When asked to evaluate institutions in Ware and Kisriev's

survey, religious institutions ranked higher than all state institutions (Ware and Kisriev 2010:

132-133). As state institutions and courts became weak and corrupt, religious authorities came to

offer an alternative venue. As one respondent described,

Islam was fair - it took the place that was previously held by courts and state institutions
though of course not everyone used it. Some were far from Islam and that is still the case.
But then, the weaker the state, the stronger national movements and mafias but also Islam
and its representatives - mullas and imams. And they were involved not just with mahar
[marriage and divorces] but with land conflicts and questions about markets - they
resolved all questions more effectively than the state then (Interview 2 2016).

There was regional variation however, with religious authorities overall less prominent in

Southern Dagestan and more popular in the districts closer to Chechnya - Khasavuyrtsky,

Kazbekovsky, Buynaksky, and Untsukulsky districts and in Dargin regions (Interview 2 2016).

As one individual that worked with Sheik Said Afandi described, people came to him precisely

because he was not taking bribes and lived humbly unlike state authorities who flaunted their

corrupt proceeds (Interview 52 2018).[77] A report prepared for the Kremlin in 2005 showed that

65 percent of the population of Dagestan thought the courts worked poorly and 63 percent

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[77] They not only mediated conflicts but were at times the cause of their escalation. For example, in one village, the local imam told the residents the Quran says each nation has a right to their own land, which in turn exacerbated the conflict (Interview 22 2017).

viewed the activities of law enforcement negatively.[78] This can help explain why, particularly

outside of the city centers, civilians turned to religious authorities for rather than the state

administration, which residents experienced as ineffective and corrupt. Moreover, Islamic

institutions of dispute resolution provided faster answers; as long as both sides agreed to the

forum, you could have an answer within hours. However, given the fragmentation of religious

authorities, it was not always easy to find a party both sides agreed upon.

　　As the Muftiat's leadership allied more closely with state officials, the appeal of Salafism

intensified, especially among youth who studied in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Syria.[79] Conflicts

between Sufi and Salafi groups occurred over how to pray, burial customs, and symbolic

practices such as whether monuments to Imam Shamil could be erected (Novoe Delo

09/27/1991). In May 1998, a few villages within Buynaksk district - Karamakhi, Chabanmakhi,

and Kadar - declared themselves autonomous from Dagestan, announcing they would instead be

governed under shari'a law. In these and several other communities Salafism took on more

extremist elements, calling for an overhaul of the political system, and also offering an

organized, often well-armed, source of protection for its members (Ware and Kisriev 2010: 95).[80]

For months the state took a stance of non-interference until the assassination of Dagestan's

Mufti, Saidmagomed Abubakarov in August. On September 1, after a meeting between the

villages' representatives and republic leadership, the state agreed to allow the village leadership

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[78] https://kopomko.com/spravka-ob-obstanovke-v-respublike-dagestan-i-merah-po-eyo-stabilizatsii-polnyiy-tekst-2005-g/

[79] See Bobrovnikov (2015) for a detailed account of Soviet and post-Soviet Islamic education in the North Caucasus.

[80] Importantly, far from all residents in these villages wanted to live under shari'a law and the village administrator in Karamakhi, for example, sought assistance from republic elites about the increasing radicalization which was being imposed over residents.

to enforce order in their territory as long as the villages lived according to the constitution and cooperated with the restoration of order (ibid: 108-109). State officials were seemingly willing to forgo their control in the territories if it contained the conflict, only intervening in local affairs when it directly threatened them. The fragmentation of dispute resolution institutions left residents of Dagestan with numerous forums through which to seek governance. Yet, none that were particularly effective, resulting in conflicts simmering unresolved for years.

Finally, turning to social order, we see this domain similarly, and relatedly, fragmented to the more material dimensions of governance in Dagestan. Though residents demands centered around access to office and land rights, which have their own symbolic importance, both ethnic and religious groups also sought greater local autonomy over social order and recognition of their symbolic practices. For example, in February 1992 Lezgins from five districts[81] blocked the Rostov-Baku highway to demand a Judge of Lezgin ethnicity be appointed at the republic level, the creation of Lezgin National Guard to protect Lezgin interests, Dagestan University to be renamed to University Suleyman-Stalskiy, and several villages within Suleyman-Stalskiy and Magahamkentskiy districts to be renamed to their historic names (Novoe Delo 02/21/1992). Control over public spaces and monuments also became of concern to religious authorities, as the conflict over whether to put up a statue to Imam Shamil in Gimry demonstrates.

Nevertheless, when asked about their identification, most respondents chose "Dagestan" and "Russia," with only 14.5 percent choosing ethnicity and 10.5 percent selecting religion (Ware and Kisriev 2010: 130). Responses to questions about the preferred guiding principles for Dagestan state institutions echoed a similar sentiment; with the exception of Chechens, less than

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[81] Ahtinskiy, Hivskiy, Kurahcrkiy, Magahamkentskiy, Suleman-Stalksiy, and Derbentskiy districts.

15 percent of respondents across all other ethnic groups selected state institutions based on Islam. These findings suggest that while religious actors gained authority in post-Soviet Dagestan, this did not transfer to a widespread preference to live under an Islamic social order or surpass identification with the Russian state.

Unlike in Ingushetia and Chechnya, republic elites chose to minimize their involvement in these decisions, postponing creating a new hymn when an agreement could not be reached, and allowing local leaders to manage these decisions. Yet, as with other governance decisions, an economic logic prevailed. My interviewees consistently complained that things like the naming of streets went to the highest bidder, highlighting that state administrators were more concerned with material resources than symbolic governance. When residents, in turn, did not see themselves represented equally in the republic's symbolic institutions, they raised concerns about their groups' place within the state (Chernovik 06/07/2013). Administrators' indecision and noninterference resulted in groups establishing their own practices locally, creating a checkered symbolic and social order across the republic. Villages across the republic, and sometimes pockets within villages, celebrated their own holidays, worked to maintain their local languages, and, as communities, set their own publicly acceptable social norms, dress codes, and traditions.

Overall, the 1990s and early 2000s were a period of political struggle over the republic's institutions. Magomedali Magomedov, himself leader of a major clan, managed the contentious period by selectively incorporating informal religious and clan leaders into state institutions, establishing a polycentric architecture of governance with numerous independent authorities. Magomedov's decisions prioritized short-term stability over effective goods provision, dispute

resolution, or a cohesive social order. Many key issues, like land disputes, remained unsettled.

The competition between authorities was not entirely peaceful, as the next section will make

clear. Nevertheless, I argue, violence in Dagestan replaced individuals without overturning the

polycentric governance system institutionalized by the early 2000s. The governance institutions

set up have remained remarkably stable, outlasting both the violence and attempts to dismantle

clan systems that followed.

Violence in Dagestan: Localized, Criminal Violence Channeled through Existing Power Struggles

Classifying the Armed Conflict in Dagestan

Scholars describing Soviet collapse (Derlugiain 1999; Zurcher 2007) often contrast

Dagestan with Chechnya as a case that avoided violent conflict. Those writing at the end of the

2000s, on the other hand, describe Dagestan as part of a larger armed "Islamic insurgency" in the

North Caucasus (Ware and Kisriev 2010; O'Loughlin et al 2011; Toft and Zhukov 2012; Zhukov

2012; Bakke et al 2014). The discrepancy stems from the fact that while Dagestan avoided large-

scale violence in the early 1990s and did not join Chechnya's attempts at secession, violence

broke out later in Dagestan.

Armed conflict in Dagestan has been classified as spillover from neighboring Chechnya

(O'Loughlin and Witmer 2012), a mixture of "nationalist" and "Islamist" violence (Toft and

Zhukov 2014), "street warfare with 'jihadi violence'" (International Crisis Group 2008), and a

low-scale civil war (Malashenko 2014).[82] As Kalyvas (2003: 475) writes, "civil wars are not

binary conflicts but complex and ambiguous processes that foster an apparently massive, though

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[82] See Ratelle Francois (2013) for an extensive review of the literature on violence in the North Caucasus.

variable, mix of identities and actions." Even during conflicts with a clear macro cleavage, the public objectives of armed groups seldom match onto how and why violence is used on the ground, which reflects more parochial objectives (Scott 1979; Kalyvas 2006). As the political economy of war literature demonstrates, rebels and criminals can be the same actors (Nordstrom 2004; Andreas 2004; Reno 2011; Cheng 2018).

I suggest that in Dagestan, the discrepancies in classification are also indicative that the case is best understood as a series of *localized armed conflicts* rather than a single macro conflict due to both the causes and organization of violence. Unlike the literature that emphasizes the links between violence in Dagestan and the rest of the Caucasus, I argue it is crucial to consider the local context of violence (Kalyvas 2006; Scott 1979) to understand both it and its impact on governance. I address the classification of the conflict first and then turn to the organization of violence within it.

In the first decade after Soviet collapse, criminality and competition between elites, formal and informal, drove violence in Dagestan. Violence broke out when, finding themselves unable to remove their competitors through existing political institutions, state, ethnic, religious, and clan leaders instead sought to eliminate each other through violence. Despite using tactics more commonly associated with terrorist groups, like political assassinations and targeting of security officials, violence in Dagestan in the 1990s, more than Chechnya or Ingushetia, reflected "politics by other means" (Clausewitz 1918) or the extension of a political competition for power.

According official data, there were eighty-six terrorist acts and other crimes committed against representatives of power in Dagestan between 1990 and June 2001 (Kisriev 2003: 110),

resulting in 160 individuals killed and 300 injured (Novoe Delo 22 May 2001). By 1994, Novoe

Delo published that the republic had over fifty terrorist attacks, but many targeted "visible

representatives of government." Yet, the newspaper went on to point out two key points. First, it

was not uncommon for even a simple car accident to escalate to an ethnic conflict at the time,

suggesting that much of the violence was driven by parochial concerns. My interviews confirm

this. Second, the story went on to say that "given that all of the credit and financing coming into

Dagestan is split among bureaucrats, with billions going to nonexistent businesses, there is a

likelihood some of these murders are a result of disagreements regarding credit and money"

(Novoe Delo 03/25/1994). Many administrators seem not to have been targeted for their public

role but because of private conflicts over resources. The number of attacks on civilian

administrators slightly increased to 109 between 2005 and 2016, and in 2011, at the peak of

violence, there were seventeen documented attacks.

Said Amirov, himself the target of numerous assassination attempts, described the

"criminality and terrorism" in a 1994 interview as the result of a battle between old and new

elites, which often took on an ethnic or clan nature (Novoe Delo 01/14/1994). Several cases

support Amirov's interpretation of the violence. For example, the man sentenced for killing the

head of Kaiytagskiy district stated in his court testimony that the cause of the murder was that

the administrator did not support the assassin's father in the previous election (Chernovik

10/30/2003). While the underlying motivations seem to be parochial and criminal, groups often

instrumentally utilized ethnic and religious discourse, exacerbating those cleavages.

In 2007, when a group of fighters from Chechnya fled to Dagestan, the boundaries

between criminal and political violence further blurred. Though joining for a broad range of

reasons (Ratelle and Souleimanov 2017; Souleimanov and Aliyev 2016), local armed groups embraced extremist religious discourse which, over time, became the groups' prevailing public ideology (Souleimanov and Aliyev, 2014: 60–85). As local armed groups aligned with the newly declared Caucasus Emirate, which sought to create a cohesive insurgency across the Caucasus, they did not abandon their criminal motivations or tactics, however.

For example, the targeting of stores selling alcohol is often used to justify the coding of Dagestan as a religious conflict. Local journalists and those closely familiar with the groups consistently and confidently describe that many of the store owners were targeted because they refused to cooperate with extortion rackets not because they violated religious norms. Moreover, it was not just stores selling alcohol that were targeted. As sports figure turned politician Buvaisir Sutayev explained in 2012, "Now we are having a boom of flash drives and SMS from terrorists - they send them to everyone in a row, pay or have an explosion, be killed….my cousin's husband received one too, turned out it was a person that lived across the street from them" (Chernovik 09/11/2012). These were criminals demanding pay for protection rather than ideologically-driven believers offended by the sale of alcohol. This problematizes the religious macro-cleavage of the conflict.

Some of the clan leaders, now state administrators, used the armed groups for their own political purposes, to settle scores, or colluded with the groups to receive economic kickbacks (Interview 53 2018; Interview 68 2018). Others ignored the violence, as they did many of the republic's other issues. Federal and republic security forces responded with village or district-level counterinsurgency sweeps.[83] They introduced coercive policies like searches of individuals

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[83] Often, if an individual from a village was in charge of one of the bandit formations, the entire village will be placed on the list. For example, Novosasitli recently became famous for several of its young men going to fight in

attending Salafi mosques and the registration of individuals suspected of having ties with

terrorism or religious extremism on the "profuchet." One contact described how a political

candidate that refused to drop out of the race suddenly found himself on this list (Interview 67

2018). Similar to assassinations, coercive policies were often used to satisfy private and

parochial motivations. To better understand the organization and repertoire of state and non-state

violence, I turn to my dataset and survey evidence.

Organization and Repertoire of Violence

In Dagestan, it was not just the motivations driving the actors, but organization of

violence that was local, splitting power and settling conflicts within villages and districts rather

than the entire republic. I use two strategies to understand the organization and repertoire of

violence. First, I use an original dataset of violent events I composed using KavkazUzel

reporting between 2005 and 2018.[84] I primarily use this to assess the geographic distribution of

violence. Second, I use survey responses to map civilians' perceptions of violence, based on their

identification of violent events in their community and follow-up questions about how violence

impacted respondents' lives.

Violence, relatively contained within clan networks in the 1990s, increasingly drew in

regular civilians. Expansion of local crime networks, increased violence between religious

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Syria. Yet, previously, one of the main figures responsible for terrorism against police officers within the republic came from Novosasitli. Though he lived in the capital, as two different respondents described, the state's response was to harass and monitor all two and half thousand of the village residents and destroy infrastructure they built through community efforts (Interview 45 2018; Interview 68 2018). Both emphasized that this was previously one of the most cohesive communities in the republic, laying their own roads and solving all their problems jointly, mostly through the mosque. This story, however, highlights the challenge of categorizing the conflict according to any single macro-cleavage.

[84] The data extends back to 1996 but there are only a few observations in each of the following years. The data becomes reliable beginning in 2005 so I focus on this time period and use qualitative descriptions for the previous years. Given that existing accounts suggest violence in Dagestan did not peak until the late 2000s, this should not create significant data reliability concerns.

groups, and increased targeting of state officials led to greater exposure to violence amongst civilians by late 2000s; as did the state's counterinsurgency operations. In the context of a fragmented state apparatus and fragmented non-state armed groups, violence also became increasingly visible (Duran-Martinez 2015).

When violence peaked by 2011, it was, nevertheless, geographically concentrated. My dataset shows that four cities account for 48.31% of the violent events in the republic.[85] Violence, ranging from assassinations of bureaucrats, counterinsurgency sweeps, security agent assassinations, and shootings, was all particularly concentrated in the capital Makhachkala and Khasavurt, the city on the border with Chechnya. When violence broke out outside these cities, it was also concentrated within specific villages, while most others had one documented violent event over the course of several decades. Armed groups, even those aligned with the Caucasus Emirates, operated with vast autonomy in terms of command, recruitment, financing, and local support (Ratelle Francois 2013: 101; Soulemanov 2017: 441). Groups were named for the village where they organized, like Gimrisnkaya (Gimry), Novosasitlinskaya (Novosasitli), Gunibskiy (Gunib), Sogratlinksaya, (Sogratl), Buinakskaya (Buinaksk) and others. Souleimanov (2015: 441) reports based on an interview with an officer of the Dagestani Ministry of Interior that on average the groups "consist of 8–15 active and passive members, in some cases 20 members, while small jamaats may only have up to five members." Even where conflict was explicitly based on overturning the religious order, such as in Karamahi or Kadar, non-state mobilization and state counterinsurgency sweeps were most commonly geographically concentrated on the

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[85] I cross check this with Holland et al (2017) which draw upon wire reports and news stories available through Lexis-Nexis's academic search service covering events from Aug 1999 through Dec 2016 and find similarly that Makhachkala, Khasavurt, Buynaksk, and Derbent account for 49.26% of violent events. Their dataset shows they also account for 31.27% of all deaths from the events.

village, or sometimes district. While coercive policies like the profuchet targeted specific individuals, most violence was territorially concentrated.

While the Kavkaz Uzel data and secondary literature helps ascertain the geography of different types of violence, I also asked questions about violence in my 2018 survey to both triangulate the information in the dataset and capture civilians' perception of violence.[86] Individuals were first asked to select from list which, if any, types of violence occurred in their community.

Figure 18: Violence Experienced

The greatest percentage of respondents who stated some form of violence occurred selected counterinsurgency sweeps, suggesting that most people who experienced violence, did so at the hands of the state.[87] Crime, which the survey specified to be robbery, burglary, assault,

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[86] By design, the survey over-represents targeting of informal authorities to capture these rare events.
[87] Given that this is capturing individuals' *perception* of violence, this could also be showing the most memorable events.

or extortion, is the second most common form. A surprisingly low amount report terrorism given the media's focus on this repertoire and number of explosions from the Kavkaz Uzel dataset. My interviewees and newspapers highlight that for a couple of years after 2010 there were fairly consistent attacks in Makhachkala, yet only 19.57% of respondents in the capital selected terrorism compared to, for example, 74.46% that reported counterinsurgency sweeps. This could mean that terrorism was less memorable for respondents than expected or that they did not perceive most explosions as terrorism. Another possibility is that, as stated previously, many of the explosions and terrorist tactics targeted state bureaucrats and security services, and thus, though prevalent, less directly impacted civilians. After all, "more than half of the ...terrorist attacks [in 2004] were aimed against high-ranking officials, one-third of attacks targeted deputies of various levels and law enforcement officials, while some other attacks were staged against servicemen and their family members" (Jamestown Foundation).

To understand the impact of violence, the survey asked individuals follow-up questions about how the different forms of violence in their community impacted their lives.[88] Looking at the most common form of violence, counterinsurgency sweeps, 55.3% of respondents said it did not impact them personally, 37.3% said they witnessed it but were not affected otherwise, and 4.8% said they experienced physical or mental injuries. This differs fairly dramatically from the commonly told story of Gimry where individuals were harassed and property destroyed. The survey suggests these incidents were far less common. For those that responded that they had

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[88] If respondents selected that a form of violence happened in their community, they were asked a follow-up about how it impacted them personally, checking all that apply from the following list: it did not, witnessed it, theft or loss of personal belongings, destruction of property, destruction of work or residence, threatened with violence or death, kidnapping or arbitrary detainment, injuries that resulted in physical disability for themselves or a family member, forced displacement within the republic, forced displacement beyond the republic, experienced physical or mental injuries, death or disappearance of close family member.

crime in their community, again over half (53.0%) said it did not impact them, 21.9% said they witnessed it but were not otherwise impacted, 27.9% experienced loss of belongings as a result. The impact of having an authority figure killed in the community was reported to be even less (70% said no impact), whereas 50% of those that had terrorism in their community said it had no impact, 26.9% witnessed it, 12.8% report having physical or mental injuries as a result.

To account for the possibility that the categories selected may not fully capture the impact of violence and capture how people understood the impact of violence themselves, I asked them to assess how much violence in had impacted their life overall. The responses are shown below.

Figure 19: How much did violence after the collapse of the Soviet Union impact your life?

Overall Impact of Post-Soviet Violence on Life

Significantly
3.2%
Moderately
14.3%

Somewhat
27.9%

Not at all
54.6%

Together the data suggest that while Dagestan was described as one of the most dangerous places in the Europe in the late 2000s by media (Ash 2011), the categorization is a better descriptor of Makhachkala, Khasavuyrt, and select villages than the republic as a whole. Since the most heavily surveilled villages were inaccessible for the survey, the overall impact

may be more severe then presented above. Yet, even in Makhachkala where violence was heaviest, only 7.1% of respondents reported that violence significantly impacted their life. This suggests it is incorrect to draw republic-wide conclusions about the impact of violence based on extreme cases like Gimry, as my local contacts repeatedly reminded me. Instead, Dagestan's residents interpret violence as having less an impact on their life than external narratives suggest.

I do not seek to minimize the uncertainty and trauma violence caused for Dagestan's residents. The impact of several of events, like the 2002 explosion at a parade in Kaspiysk that killed over a dozen children, cannot be easily quantified and had an impact even on those that were not directly present. Moreover, attacks on police in the late 2000s created sufficient uncertainty that police officers refused to go outside in uniform. The deaths of several Islamic sheikhs, specifically Sirazhudin Khurikskiy in 2011 and Said Afandi Chirkeiskiy in 2012, also had a powerful impact on the republic's religious communities. As I show in the next section, this violence did have an impact, particularly on dispute resolution. Nevertheless, it was insufficient to dislodge the organization of governance in Dagestan. While violence eliminated numerous *actors*, it did not restructure republic-level governance *institutions*. Polycentric governance persisted.

Violence began slowing down by 2014.[89] According to my dataset, there have been 417 violent events between 2014 and April 2018, while there were 1235 in the four years prior. Therefore, to understand its impact I look at governance since 2014.

Post-Violence Governance: Continuation of Polycentric Governance

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[89] There was an initiative to crack down on non-state armed actors in the Caucasus prior to the Sochi Olympics.

Did violence reshape the polycentric governance arrangement and result in different governance outcomes for civilians? I turn to the architecture of governance, or its organization, first. My theory suggests that since violence broke out after the institutionalization of governance and was localized and fragmented when it did break out, this should be insufficient to reorganize republic-level governance. In the previous chapter, I demonstrated that compared to Chechnya and Ingushetia, governance remains polycentric with numerous, relatively autonomous authorities involved.

In accordance with the framework proposed in the outcomes chapter, I assess *who* controls *which domains.* Though using survey data captures individuals' perceptions of governance, it allows us to see beyond fraudulent state-produced statistics and provides systematic information on which institutions of control actually regulate and structure civilians' lives. Figure 2 below summarizes survey responses to the question, "who controls the following domains in your community?" Given that actors in Dagestan are autonomous from each other, we can interpret the answers directly.

Figure 20: Republic Governance Regime

As in the other republics and reminiscent of the Soviet period before state collapse, state authorities dominate the material dimensions of governance. This is reminiscent of the Soviet period before state collapse though now it is often clan leaders that redeployed their authority with state-backing and resources instead of Soviet party leaders. As established in the outcomes chapter, local administrators are the most prominent representatives of the state who respondents associate with the material dimensions of governance. This echoes interview statements that the republic government is separated from the population. Community and family members also play a significant role in security and infrastructure, being selected by just over 20% of the respondents. The forms of self-governance that developed during state collapse have not fully dissipated. Though there are not precise numbers from the pre-violence period for comparison, this suggests that violence did not fully disrupt communities' self-governance capacity even in

the spheres where state control is most prevalent and alternate source of governance can be perceived as particularly threatening.

Shifting away from strictly material spheres of governance, non-state authorities roles become more prominent. Dispute resolution is more fragmented than the material dimensions but local state administrators are still the most prevalent authorities in dispute resolution, more so than in regulation of social order. Despite occasional state harassment of Salafi individuals and communities, the survey suggests that state authorities less commonly regulate social order compared to neighboring republics.

While this provides information about each authority fully broken down, to understand if state and non-state actors compete or co-produce governance across these domains, I look if respondents selected only state actors, only non-state actors, both, or said no one regulates this domain. The responses are below.[90] More than 10% of respondents said security, infrastructure, dispute resolution, and education are co-produced. Yet, non-state authorities also have an independent role in governance, particularly in regulating disputes, education, and social order.

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[90] Table 2 in the Appendix provides the means and standard deviations.

Figure 21: Republic Governance Aggregated by Group

Overall, the evidence above highlights the asymmetry in authority across dimensions of governance. As detailed in the last chapter, governance is relatively decentralized in Dagestan, with local administrators being particularly relevant. Yet, particularly in the less material dimensions, governance is also fragmented across actors.

To understand the association between violence and polycentric governance in Dagestan, I examine each of the three theorized mechanisms in turn: civilian preferences, collective action capacities, and the pattern of informal and local authority integration. First, I look at civilian preferences, demonstrating that they diverge across dimensions of governance, but less so than in the other republics. Second, I examine how violence shaped the collective action capacity of non-state authorities vis-a-vis state elites. Finally, I turn to the pattern of integration, demonstrating that despite attempts to more closely control religious authorities specifically - as in the other republics - in Dagestan, non-state authorities remain autonomous from the state.

Civilian Preferences

Interviews repeatedly referenced that republic state authorities continue to shirk their responsibilities, failing to live up to civilian preferences and demands. Quotes from two different communities below best summarize the continued lack of state control across domains like security and dispute resolution.

We organized village patrols here in the late 2000s and created a post at the village entrance where a young man would be overnight, controlling who was coming in and out of the village after 10PM. The community started a small fund to pay him, with approval of the administration. But of course we shouldn't have to do this. We should have an officer here that maintains security and we should know who he is in case something happens. There is supposed to be an uchastkoviy [officer] here but we have never seen him. There is a joint federal and republic [security] post a couple kilometers away but nothing in the village. So we created this group. - Interview 32 2017.

The community has always been very close-knit and has operated through reliance on local leaders to solve issues. The state has never been a serious contender for authority in comparison. It doesn't matter what the courts say or what state officials say. People will always listen to the informal authority, now it is someone in Leninkent. It doesn't matter that they are no longer living there, anyone from the village will still go to this person and listen to them - the thought of doing otherwise is impossible to imagine. -Interview 37 2018.

These two statements highlight that state authority in the republic appears tenuous, despite Moscow's recentralization policies and strengthening of Russia's overall state capacity. However, while the statements hint that residents are satisfied with some autonomy, particularly over social order, there is also a desire for stronger and more effective state involvement in provision of security and public goods. 15.9% of the population continues to feel that no one provides security, a significant finding given the seemingly strong and authoritarian nature of the central Russian state.

To understand civilians preferences and perceptions more systematically, I asked survey respondents a battery of four questions about who in the community is the most accessible, most

trustworthy, most fair, and whose decisions are most likely to be obeyed.[91] This can provide

insight as to why respondents make the choices they do in selecting between available

governance alternatives.

Figure 22: Authority Characteristics

Similar to the fragmentation of authority, there is a wide distribution across who

respondents selected across questions, suggesting it would be hard for any single authority to

consolidate control. Trust in authorities remains almost equally split and though religious

authorities are more commonly selected as the authorities obeyed, there is still a high degree of

fragmentation. Despite local administrators' control over the more material dimensions of

governance, less than 10 percent of respondents selected them for any of the characteristics.

Next, I utilize hierarchical models to see if there is an association between violence -

measured by respondents' reporting of how much violence impacted their lives - and their

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[91] The order of the questions was randomized.

perceptions of different authorities. I control for mobility,[92] religiosity,[93] language spoken at home - which I use as a proxy for ethnicity - and gender.[94] The main difference is that crime is associated with increased trust of religious authorities,[95] while counterinsurgency sweeps, assassinations of local leaders, and experiencing no violence in the community versus any form of violence are not associated with any changes. Thus, the results show minimal impact of violence on respondents' overall preferences for different authorities.

Do civilians' perceptions differ across dimensions of governance? I asked respondents who they would turn to if they have a problem with infrastructure to understand their preference for goods provision. Respondents were allowed to list multiple options if they are used jointly.

Table 3: If you have an infrastructure problem in your community, who would you turn to?

Central administrators	2.80
Republic administrators	6.23
Local administrators	78.13
Religious authorities	1.32
Elders	0.93
Community members	34.09
Businessmen	3.11

Most respondents turn to local administrators for assistance with infrastructure, though a significant amount also turns to community members. The percentage of respondents who selected local administrators as the responsible for provision of infrastructure is roughly equal

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[92] This comes from a survey question, which asked respondents if anyone in their household lives in a different village or city more than 30 days out of the year. It accounts for the likelihood that individuals' mobility changes their exposure to different authorities and embeddedness in local community networks (Lu 2014).

[93] This comes from a survey question as to whether the respondent selected religion as their primary identity. We may expect more religious individuals to more commonly select religious authorities.

[94] This comes from enumerator identification of respondents' gender.

[95] Coefficient = 0.12573   SE = 0.05421 p = 0.0208 *

(78.8%). Violence had no significant impact on the selection of local administrators as the authorities sought out for assistance with infrastructure. State administrators continue to be the primary targets of demands for goods provision.

To assess the impact of violence on civilian preferences for dispute resolution, the survey asked respondents which legal order *should* be followed in situations where Russian law, shari'a, and adat contradict. Importantly this assess civilian preferences for dispute resolution institutions rather than authorities, but still helps understand what type of governance system civilians prefer. The question had a high non-response rate (19.95), suggesting the question is highly sensitive. However, preferences for Russian law dominate among the responses that answered, selected by 60.5% of respondents, followed by 30.0% who selected shari'a, and only 9.6% who selected adat. This suggests that preferences have not drastically changed since the early 2000s when Robert Bruce Ware and Enver Kisriev conducted their survey and most respondents continue to prefer to live under Russian legal institutions. The preferences fall far short of a consensus, however. That a significant portion of the population now prefers Islamic dispute resolution presents a clear challenge to any cohesive system of dispute resolution. This fragmentation is echoed in civilians' actual behaviors, with 25.2% of respondents saying they would never go to an imam, 23.5% saying they would never go to an elder, and 22.6% saying they would never go to the police for assistance with a dispute.

Finally, though the survey did not directly assess preferences for social order, several events between 2017 and 2019 provide insights about how fragmented public sentiment is about both who and which rules should regulate public order. First, discussions of a federal law that would remove mandatory study of native languages sparked widespread and contentious

debate.[96] Unlike in Chechnya and Ingushetia, where state and non-state authorities emphasize regulation and maintenance of local languages and culture, the response to suggested deregulation in Dagestan has been mixed. While some argue that formal study of native languages is necessary to preserve local cultures, others prefer the allocation of this time and resources to Russian and foreign language study (Chernovik 08 June 2018). Though most of my interviewees in 2018 support language study and cultural traditions in theory, there was much stronger disagreement as to whether state resources and time should be allocated to it. A second set of events that similarly highlighted disagreement about who, if anyone, should regulate social order was the cancellation of several festivals, including a rock concert and an anime festival. Notably, the protests against the events did not simply urge people not to attend but sought a government ban, calling for greater state interjection into the spaces. Those calling for the ban said the events contradicted local culture and should not be allowed, reminiscent to existing regulation in Ingushetia and Chechnya, but until recently less common in Dagestan. Nevertheless, the events reveal there is strong disagreement about who should regulate social order and what rules should dictate the outcome in Dagestan than the other republics.

Comparing preferences across domains of governance, there is an overall stronger preference for state regulation, most strongly evident in goods provision but also prevalent in dispute resolution. While who residents trust, obey, perceive to be fair and accessible varies, there is a demand for governance and regulation by the state. Moreover, violence does not seem to have had a strong impact on civilian preferences.

Collective Action

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[96] Despite a 2006 republic law that made the study of native languages mandatory, in practice this does not always occur.

Civilian preferences alone are insufficient to explain institutional trajectories, particularly if civilians are unable or unwilling to act on their preferences. While small goods or disputes can be resolved without collective action,[97] most organization of self-governance or demand-making on state authorities requires joint efforts. I argue that armed conflict can impact collective action, and in turn governance, by shaping (1) the presence of skilled leaders (Pearlman 2011; Finkel 2015) and (2) the cohesion of community networks (Thachil 2015; Arjona 2016; Kaplan 2017). Communities lacking these characteristics should be less likely to organize self-governance, demand governance from state authorities, or resist state attempts at centralization.

Interviews and observation suggest while village-level collective action is high, evident in village-level protests for example, there are significant challenges for organizing collective action across localities. First, though there are well-respected village and even district authorities, there are very few individuals capable of organizing tens of thousands as in the 1990s. Even after the arrest of Said Amirov in 2013, which both residents and officials worried would result in a major uprising, only several dozen individuals turned out to protest (RiaDerbent 4 June 2013). Second, with few exceptions, issues that result in collective action are most commonly local. Many of the villages I visited across republics still organize community meetings, often after Friday prayer, where mostly male residents discuss infrastructure, disputes, and any other pressing questions but there are rarely broader forms of organization. However, though local problems can mobilize several thousands of villagers, most such forms of collective action focus on local issues such as ecological concerns created by a factory in Berikei or the potential closing of a local clinic in Gurbukah. Less common is collective action for issues that

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[97] Murtazashvili (2016) provides a theoretical framework to understand why different levels of collective action are necessary for different goods.

could be relevant across the republics such as demands to resolve land disputes or demands for self-governance. Yet, these are still mobilized by defining the issue in more narrow terms, such as the protests over land in Tarki-Tau which focused on the Kumyk population or those in Terekli-Makteb that focused on concerns of the Nogai population.

To understand the potential for collective action in Dagestan more systematically I turn to several questions from the survey. First, I examine the extent of cohesion by assessing respondents' trust. The survey reveals that Dagestan has a high degree of distrust, with 67.8% of survey respondents stating that one needs to be careful when interacting with others.[98] This suggests that overcoming republic-wide collective action problems and banding together is likely to be challenging.

The survey also asked individuals about their primary identity, which literature has identified as an explanation for how individuals can overcome collective action problems (Habyarimana et al. 2007; Singh 2010; Murtazashvili 2016). Though Dagestan is ethnically heterogeneous, surveys from the early 2000s suggested joint Dagestan's residents more commonly identify with a joint Dagestan or Russian identity, as discussed earlier. My survey demonstrates a similar result, with only 11.1% of respondents selecting ethnicity as their primary identity. Instead, 43.5% of respondents selected family, pointing to a more narrow master status. The next most commonly chosen primary identity was religion, selected by 17.4% of respondents. That most respondents identify with a rather narrow master identity suggests that organizing republic-wide collective actions would be challenging but not because of ethnic differences per se. Moreover, even religion, which serves as a source of potential collective

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[98] 53.5% of respondents in Ingushetia and 70.6% in Chechnya selected this option for comparison.

action in the other republics would be difficult to mobilize collectively across the republic in Dagestan.

Assessing actual behaviors is also useful to understand collective action. To do this I asked individuals about their participation in religious, kinship, and mutual assistance networks, as well as participation in community service events. The responses, presented in the table below, show that individuals are actually highly engaged particularly through financial assistance to each other and community service. Slightly less prevalent is attendance at religious gatherings[99] and extended kinship gatherings. Interestingly, in Dagestan respondents who stated violence had a significant impact on their lives were consistently more likely to say they have done all of the activities below, suggesting violence did not demobilize respondents.

Table 4: Forms of Collective Action (Dagestan)

	Have Done	*Might Do*	*Would never do*
Financial assistance	83.19	11.46	5.34
Community service	67.47	21.64	10.90
Attend religious gatherings	52.54	25.53	21.93
Attend kinship gatherings	35.92	39.72	24.37

Together the data show that while respondents are involved in their informal networks and local forms of collective action, they are rarely able to mobilize this for broader collective action that bridges across communities or close-knit relationships due to a lack of republic-wide leaders, high degree of distrust, and lack of a common identification that can mobilize beyond

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[99] Religious attendance is largely limited to males. When broken up by gender, 65.8% of males said they attend religious gatherings, compared to 32.7% of women.

the family or locality. While this does not foreclose the possibility of *local* self-governance, it does make mobilizing broader demand-making or resistance efforts challenging.

Pattern of Integration

Examining civilian preferences and collective action capacity helps understand whether society can mobilize bottom-up demands. However, it is also necessary to examine the pattern of integration - the relationship of local and informal elites to the state - to assess the range of alternatives civilians have (McMann 2014; Kruks-Wisner 2018). Violence did not restructure the prominence or fragmentation of clan networks within the state or give the state further control over non-state authorities.

Despite numerous assassination attempts and assassinations of major figures like the Khachilaev brothers, the shadow state created through incorporation of clans persists and authority within the state remains fragmented across clan networks. Most assassinations targeted security officials. Those that targeted political officials shifted the balance between the clans but did not disrupt their overall organization. Abdusamad Gamidov, who first came to office as Minister of Finance in 1996, rose through the ranks to Prime Minister until his arrest this year. Though President Magomedali Magomedov left office in 2006, his son became president in 2010. When the federal center put Ramazan Abdulatipov in office in three years later in 2013, with the explicit aim of disrupting the clan networks, his removal of several powerful figures like Said Amirov and Imam Yariliyev and reshuffling of administrators failed to change the broader fragmentation of governance. Several major clan leaders, like Sagidpasha Umahanov, who moved from Mayor of Khasavuyrt to Minister of Transportation, Energy, and Communication

remain in power themselves. The fragmented violence was insufficient to create a *joint* threat

that could force clans to overcome their private interests and centralize authority within the state.

Turning to the organization of non-state authorities, violence had the strongest impact on

religious authorities, increasing state collaboration with DUMD Sufi leadership. However,

conflicts between the two remain, evident in DUMD backing of alternative political candidates

in the 2016 election. Additionally, the alliance only exacerbated splits between Sufi and Salafi

communities and reified this cleavage. In the context of the neighboring war in Chechnya and

state interpretations of bureaucrat and religious authority assassinations as religiously-motivated,

state authorities increasingly perceived Salafi believers as a security threat, whether or not they

had any ties to violence. This led to greater state regulation of religious authorities through

increased surveillance of mosques and targeting of Salafi communities for counterinsurgency

operations.[100] This resulted in stricter regulation of dispute resolution and social orders, mostly

for Salafi communities and residents.[101]

However, despite attempts at state control and assassinations of at least fifty-five

religious authorities,[102] including several prominent sheiks like Said Afandi, religious authorities

remain fragmented and state control over them tenuous. The Muftiat's perceived Avar favoritism

has brought it under continued criticism, particularly from the younger generations. There have

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[100]Tensions between state bureaucrats, the DUMD, and the Salafi community eased between 2010 and 2012 after the state shifted to a more accommodationist approach that relied on dialogue. Yet, by 2014, state security forces resumed raids of mosques and introduced "profuchet," a watchlist of suspected extremists to control Salafi communities. See International Crisis Group's 2015 report "Invisible War: Russia's Abusive Response to the Dagestani Insurgency" and the 2018 report "Dagestan's Abandoned Counter-insurgency Experiment" for detailed accounts of the counterinsurgency practices.

[101] In some extreme cases, like Hadjalmakhi in Levashinski district, the tensions between Sufi and Salafi community members escalated without state involvement, leading to the murder of several young men accused of practicing Salafism by local residents who did not want any "Wahhabis" in their village (Chernovik 04/05/2013).

[102] This number comes from my count of reported assassinations based on KavkazUzel data.

been numerous cases, such as in Novoe Tube in 2014, where the DUMD has attempted to replace an imam elected by the community and has been met with active resistance (Chernovik 07/18/2014).[103] Numerous mosques continue to operate outside its hierarchy entirely, including within Makhachkala where we may expect DUMD control to be strongest. DUMD and state attempts to close down mosques have been unsuccessful. For example, when security forces closed a mosque in Khasavuyrt in 2016, nearly five thousand protesters marched through the city and the mosque reopened the next day. As one interviewee described, the battle within the republic's religious organizations is often as fierce as in politics because influence, money, and status are similarly at stake (Interview 2 2016). Thus, though religion has become more polarized and Salafi individuals more commonly encounter state coercive institutions, state administrators have been unable to bring the DUMD fully under their control, and the DUMD has been unable to fully control religious authorities, despite attempts by both to do so.

Violence had less of an impact on the organization of other non-state actors. Looking at business elites, oligarchs Suleyman Kerimov and the brothers Ziyavudin and Magomed Magomedov continued to influence republic-level decision-making after violence ended.[104] For example, Kerimov is widely believed to have helped put Magomedsalam Magomedov into office as President in 2010 while the Magomedov brothers had close ties with Abdulatipov. The role of community djamaats as centers of authority has decreased, though not disappeared instead

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[103] Some of these conflicts are caused by disagreements within the djamaat, while others are caused by confrontations between a cohesive local djamaat and the DUMD. If the imam refuses to cooperate with the DUMD, this has sometimes resulted in him being labeled a Wahhabist and called to speak with security services.

[104] For a summary of the role of business elites in Dagestan see https://chernovik.net/content/ekonomika/blesk-i-nishcheta-dagestanskih-biznesmenov.

altering the ties to make territorial proximity less relevant.[105] As Kapustina (2019: 114) writes,

"A person who has left his native Dagestan village, gone to work elsewhere and then moved, for

example, to Makhachkala, often continues his previous orientation towards the djaamat."

Kinship networks, beyond the major clans that control state administration, help mediate access

to state bureaucracies and provide a structure and context through which resources are

distributed, disputes are arbitrated, and behavior is monitored (Singerman 1995; MacLean 2014).

They also serve key roles in gaining access to jobs and financial opportunities and are drawn

upon when a conflict occurs to demonstrate mobilization capacity (Varshaver and Kruglova

2015).

While djamaats, religious authorities, elders, business actors, and family networks

represent different organizations and networks, they are united by the fact their organizational

origins and bases of authority remains outside of the state (Cammett and MacLean 2014). While

violence led to the politicization of religious authorities specifically, it did not lead to the

centralization of governance by displacing non-state sources of authority or fully incorporating

them into the state. Their bases of power remain independent and Dagestan's residents continue

encounter roughly the same "architecture of governance" as in the late 1990s.

Overall, while state administrators are highly involved in goods provision and dispute

resolution, civilians have a broader array of governance options within and beyond the state.

Governance is significantly more localized with religious authorities particularly playing a more

prominent and public role. Nevertheless, interviews and open-ended survey responses

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[105]In Dagestan this seems to have more to do with migration and urbanization than violence. 42.4 percent of survey respondents in Dagestan stated that someone in their household resides in a different village or city for more than 30 days out of the year.This is more than twice the rate found in Ingushetia and Chechnya.

demonstrate that the greater number of actors has not led to better outcomes for civilians. Though communities mobilize to regulate local disputes, provide small infrastructure projects, and even regulate security, they predominantly continue to perceive these as functions of the state. Therefore, the need to fill these roles is not viewed as a victory for well-desired autonomy but an inability of the state to fulfill its functions and a shirking of responsibilities, particularly by republic authorities.

Is there an association between violence and the configuration of governance? My interviews, observations, and analysis of local newspapers suggest that while state authorities used violence to frame Salafi communities and practitioners as a threat and more closely regulate their behaviors, much of the violence was the result of existing fragmentation and rivalries and thus, did not restructure governance. Even if there were slight shifts in dispute resolution and regulation of social order, control over these domains remains fragmented and contested with civilians relying upon both state and non-state authorities.

To see if there is an association between violence and governance, I turn to the quantitative data. I use hierarchical linear models,[106] accounting for the clustered nature of the sampling. I control for family-member migration[107] and religiosity.[108] The results, presented in

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[106] Right now I do not have additional community level variables to include that would make a hierarchical model more useful than using fixed effects, but I plan to try and collect more community-level variables.

[107] The question asked respondents if anyone in their household lives outside the village for more than 30 days a year. Migration has been shown to impact the individuals' ties to different governing authorities within and beyond the community and knowledge of how to navigate alternative governance institutions (Lu 2014; Kruks-Wisner 2019). Given the high rates of urbanization, migration, instead of violence, may fragment local community ties and decrease community governance while increasing reliance on the state.

[108] Measured by whether the respondent selected religion as their primary identity. I control for religiosity since qualitative evidence suggests it made individuals more likely to experience a counterinsurgency sweep or other coercive state policies. Though controlling for Salafism would be more accurate, I did not ask respondents to provide further details about their religious identity as this information is precisely what could make them targets for state surveillance. I wanted to avoid collecting this information for both ethical reasons and because this would have

Table 1 in the chapters' appendix, show that violence, self-reported or externally identified in the dataset, is associated with minimal differences in who respondents say governs. There are several notable exceptions that I discuss below, though they do not aggregate to a coherent shift in the architecture of governance.

Looking at the relationship between violence and infrastructure, respondents who reported that there was no violence in their communities were less likely to report both republic and community involvement in infrastructure than those that reported violence. This echoes the finding that individuals who reported that violence had a significant impact on their lives also reported greater republic elite involvement in infrastructure. This is not enough to shift the dominance of local administrators, but enough to make them relevant actors. Given that goods provision typically follows a patronage-based logic, this suggests that republic authorities may use infrastructure projects like road or school construction in an attempt to pacify places with violence. However, as numerous villages like Gimry, Sogratl', Kadar and Uchkent suggest, this is not a consistent practice. Local authorities remain dominant in regulating and providing infrastructure, with variation in the help they receive from community members and republic-level elites.

Turning to dispute resolution, only crime is associated with a change, specifically a decrease in the community's role in dispute resolution. The other forms of violence measured result in no significant changes in actors' roles in resolving disputes. Given that crime peaked in city centers with less cohesive communities, this association may be a reflection of crime being higher in areas that also had less community cohesion, and thus more disputes. This result needs

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likely increased by non-response rates. In small communities information that someone is collecting data on people's religious beliefs would travel very quickly and likely increase the rate of non-participation.

to be investigated further. Despite a decrease in community roles, there remain numerous autonomous authorities regulating dispute resolution; violence did not bring this sphere further under state or non-state control.

Finally, turning to regulation of social order, the only significant results are that crime is associated with an increase in religious authority control of social order, while self-reported counterinsurgency sweeps are associated with a decrease in religious authorities' regulation of social order.

Thus, the quantitative evidence generally supports the qualitative accounts that violence did not displace existing centers of non-state authority in Dagestan, even if it slightly shifted the political agenda and actors' involvement. Despite the overwhelming emphasis in scholarship on terrorism and counterinsurgency sweeps, most forms of violence had no impact on governance and the one that did most commonly is crime.

A part of the argument I made in this chapter is that both violence and governance in Dagestan are more localized than in the other two cases. An observable implication of this argument is that there should be more differences across villages in Dagestan, or greater spatial variation, than in the other two cases. If violence and governance are organized more locally, looking solely at the republic level may miss variation within it and misrepresent the village-level relationship.[109] While violence may not have reconfigured republic-wide governance trajectories, it may have impacted the locations where it occurred more substantially and altered actors' territorial reach into these communities. In the final part of this chapter, I turn to spatial variation in governance across Dagestan to see if I find evidence for the observable implications.

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[109] This would be making an ecological fallacy, assuming that the aggregate relationship also holds at the individual level.

Village-Level Variation in Governance

In 1957, Rabiat's family found themselves having to relocate. In March 1944, the Soviet state forced them to leave their mountain district to resettle in Chechnya. Thirteen years later, they found themselves again told to pack, this time to return to Dagestan. Rabiat described how in conjunction with community members, their elders received permission not to return to their challenging life in the mountains but settled within an hour of Makhachkala, in a territory that had fertile soil and was near a railroad. Rabiat went on to explain to me that at that time, elders made most of their community decisions - they helped resolve any disputes that arose between families, organize the harvest, and brought problems that could not be solved "internally" to the administration. When the Soviet Union collapsed, it was one of the elders that worked with the community to collect funds to restore the mosque. Yet, as Rabiat suggested and several other villagers confirmed, "there are not real elders now," not those with authority in the community who can resolve problems that arise. However, Rabiat and her neighbors remind me their village is relatively calm and they have not had major issues - she highlights, not like the village down the road.

About five kilometers down the federal highway is the village Rabiat and her neighbors mentioned. Unlike in Rabiat's village, informal authorities here still play a significant role in the village life. This does not appease all the local residents. In the 2000s, a small group of them complained about the imam's views, seeking to replace him as they did the previous imam. Despite the interjections of the Muftiat in the late 2000s, the majority of the village community and the elders mobilized to support the imam, allowing the him to maintain his position. This demonstrated the strength of the community and informal authorities ability to counter

interjections from republic-level elites. Until he was killed in 2014, the imam continued to lead Friday prayer at the main mosque. He also actively participated in meetings with administration deputies, the council of elders, and djamaat gatherings, which occurred more or less monthly to discuss community problems. While the imam was actively involved in regulating village disputes, more so than in Rabiat's village, other community questions like allocation of land and maintenance of infrastructure looked very similar in the two cases, remaining firmly in the hands of village administrators. Comparing the two villages, there appears to be significant variation in who resolves disputes and makes decisions about the communities' social order, while goods provision looks really similar.

The descriptions of the two villages, just down the road from each other, begs the question, what accounts for the variation in local governance between them and what role, if any, did violence play in shaping their governance arrangements?

Prior to looking at the relationship between violence and governance, I plot the outcomes for the proportion of individuals in each community that said state and non-state authorities regulate infrastructure, dispute resolution, and social order respectively, to see the extent of variation across communities. The plots are below with an index of state control (local, republic, and state central authorities) on the left and non-state control (religious authorities, elders, community members) on the right.

Figure 23: Variation in Governance by Community

Plot 1: Proportion Choosing State (L) and Nonstate (R) Authorities As Infrastructure Providers by Community

Plots 2: Proportion Choosing State (L) and Nonstate (R) Authorities As Regulating Dispute Resolution by Community

Plots 3: Proportion Choosing State (L) and Nonstate (R) Authorities As Regulating Social Order by Community

The results show that across communities, infrastructure is fairly dominated by state authorities, while social order remains regulated mostly by non-state authorities, while dispute resolution is fragmented across communities, slightly more commonly controlled by non-state authorities. The greatest variation between communities is in state authorities' involvement in infrastructure and non-state authorities regulation of disputes and social order. I explore the extent to which experiences of violence help us understand this community-level variation next.

My interviews and the survey suggest that communities in Dagestan experienced three main forms of violence: crime, assassinations, and counterinsurgency sweeps. I focus on these three forms of violence.

Interviews suggest that crime most often occurred in more fragmented communities that lacked social cohesion to prevent and punish it. Therefore, I expect crime to be a reflection of the lack of a community's collective action capacity rather than a cause. I do not expect crime to significantly alter any of the governance outcomes.

Assassinations of local leaders, though also potentially a result of pre-existing fragmentation, can further impact governance by removing individuals with skills and mobilization capacity. Therefore, I expect assassinations of informal authorities to decrease non-state governance, specifically for dispute resolution and social order, the spheres most heavily regulated by non-state authorities.

Finally, interviews suggest counterinsurgency sweeps mostly targeted communities with large Salafi populations. I suggest, counterinsurgency sweeps, though less severe than in Chechnya, may nevertheless have shifted governance by decreasing civilians' willingness to turn to the state for governance, particularly dispute resolution and social order.

I measure violence within communities through two methods. First, I use the KavkazUzel data as before, dichotomously coding communities 1 if they did experience that form of violence and 0 if they did not. Second, to aggregate the individual survey responses to community level measure of violence, I code the proportion of respondents in the community who stated their community experienced that form of violence. This avoids false precision and arbitrarily selecting a threshold, instead capturing that community members may disagree about whether a violent event occurred depending on their memories and exposure to it. I similarly use the proportion of respondents in the community to code the outcomes, using, for example, the proportion of respondents that said state authorities regulate infrastructure in their community.

I use the same two controls as in the republic-wide analysis, migration and religiosity, and also control for a measure of ethnic heterogeneity in the community. To create this variable I used respondents' answers about what language they speak at home most regularly. I coded communities as ethnically heterogeneous if less than 70% of respondents in the community selected the same language. Though scholars have criticized using language as a measure of ethnic heterogeneity (Posner 2004), this measure overcomes several of the critiques since it is current, allows for respondents to self-identify how they are grouped, and is measured at the village level rather than national making concerns about geographic distribution less problematic. I use these controls for all of the linear models below. I do not have an exogenous way of measuring if the relationship is causal so do not claim that the associations demonstrate a causal relationship between violence and the governance outcomes but provide an idea if a relationship exists in the first place.

Violence and Goods Provision

Looking at the relationship between crime and goods provision, a greater proportion of community members reporting that their community experienced crime is associated with a decrease in non-state, specifically elder and family, control over infrastructure.[110] Though this may just be a reflection of crime in urban areas, where state authorities are particularly prevalent, another possible explanation is that crime decreased economic resources in a community.[111] However, there is no significant difference in how much of their income respondents report contributing to community projects between those that did and did not report crime in their communities.[112] There is similarly no difference in their contributions to religious affairs, traditional ceremonies, or taxes, suggesting a need to further prod the association between crime and decrease in non-state actors' contributions to goods provision and likelihood that this is a reflection of an urban-rural divide rather than outcome of crime.

Looking at the relationship between counterinsurgency sweeps and infrastructure, sweeps are associated with a significant increase in the proportion of respondents in the community reporting that family members are involved in provision of infrastructure.[113] The results hold with the survey and the external data. This suggests that counterinsurgency have the opposite impact of crime.

Finally, turning to the association between assassinations and infrastructure, neither assassination of bureaucrats or assassinations of religious authorities has a significant

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[110] Coefficient -0.12976   SE 0.05849 p = 0.033733 *
[111] This would be in line with previous research, which has shown that political instability, including crime, can decrease economic growth (Alesina et al 1996) and negatively impact economic performance (Detotto and Otranto 2010).
[112] Coefficient 0.2113   SE 0.5317 p= 0.6912
[113] Coefficient 0.137114   SE 0.055382 p= 0.0188 *

relationship with who provides goods in communities. This suggests that even if individuals in specific positions are removed, there is little impact on the broader distribution of responsibility for goods provision and infrastructure decisions in the community.

The results are generally consistent with the theory that violence should have minimal impact on goods provision, with the two notable exceptions above. Material goods, specifically infrastructure, have historically been provided by state authorities across the republic. This remains rooted in residents' expectations and demand-making across communities. Violence in Dagestan did not overturn state authorities' historical dominance over goods production.

Violence and Dispute Resolution

While violence had limited impact on goods provision, my theory suggests that it should more significantly impact dispute resolution within communities, particularly through assassinations and counterinsurgency sweeps. While the former could remove key individuals within a community with the skills and social capital to resolve disputes the latter could fragment the community, delegitimize the state, and politicize dispute resolution. Nevertheless, since counterinsurgency sweeps were generally less invasive in Dagestan than in Chechnya and were accompanied by less human rights abuses, the impact of sweeps in Dagestan may be less severe even within the villages where they occurred. Finally, I do not expect crime to alter dispute resolution. While crime may be a signal of weak state capacity or state collaboration with criminals, it is more likely an outcome of these factors than a cause that would alter who resolves disputes.

As expected, there is no significant relationship between the proportion of respondents in a community reporting crime and who they report regulates disputes in their community. There are two significant associations between violence and who regulates disputes in a community.

First, communities with a higher proportion of respondents reporting counterinsurgency sweeps are associated with a higher proportion of respondents reporting co-regulation of disputes between state and non-state authorities[114] and a slight decrease in overall non-state control over disputes.[115] Though individuals in communities that experience counterinsurgency sweeps maintain access to both state and non-state authorities to resolve disputes, the two are more likely to work jointly. This could be a reflection of greater overall state interjections into the communities they perceive as threatening, through counterinsurgency sweeps and greater regulation of disputes.

Second, assassination of a religious authority specifically, as identified by my dataset, decreases the proportion of respondents in a community that say non-state authorities resolve disputes, though just missing established levels of significance.[116] While individuals can seek dispute resolution from authorities beyond their community, and often do for larger disputes, the assassination of a religious authority in the community is associated with a slight narrowing of residents' options for dispute resolution.

In addition to the two significant associations between violence and dispute resolution, having a higher proportion of residents reporting *migration* is consistently significant across

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[114] Intercept = 0.223675 SE = 0.108118 p = 0.0467 *
[115] Intercept -0.28073   SE = 0.14454 p = 0.06096 .
[116] Intercept = -0.18633 SE = 0.09421 p = 0.05661 .

model specifications as decreasing nonstate control over dispute resolution[117] while increasing

state and co-regulation of disputes.[118] Disaggregating authorities further, migration increases the

role of local administrators and decreases the role of elders. This finding needs to be investigated

further but suggests that when a greater proportion of community members live outside the area,

this disrupts control of traditional authorities and reinforces state authority over disputes. More

than violence, it is out-migration that seems to be disrupting self-governance within Dagestan's

communities. This echoes previous research on community self-governance in China (Lu 2014),

though since migration does not have the same impact on infrastructure again highlights the need

to disaggregate governance across dimensions.

Violence and Social Order

Finally, turning to the relationship between violence and social order, I find that with one

exception there is no significant association between the proportion of respondents in a

community who said they experienced violence and who they said regulates social order. The

only exception is that in communities that experienced a counterinsurgency sweep, measured

according to my dataset, fewer respondents said that community members regulate social

order.[119] Social order has consistently been much less publicly regulated in Dagestan than in

Chechnya or Ingushetia. Attempts to do so and homogenize the population would likely lead to

strong backlash. The responses suggest that in communities that experienced a

counterinsurgency sweep, regulation of social order further decreased. Given that qualitative

evidence suggests these communities were often more religious and had stronger community

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[117] Intercept = -0.44309   SE = 0.14970   p = 0.00576 **
[118] Intercept = 0.28789   SE = 0.11798   p = 0.0204 *
[119] Intercept = -0.139289   SE= 0.061035   p = 0.02927 *

regulations on social order to start, counterinsurgency sweeps could have dislodged some of the social controls over individuals.

Conclusion

This chapter started by tracing the incorporation of informal elites, specifically clan leaders, into the state apparatus. Magomedov's decisions and political maneuvering stabilized the republic and likely prevented the outbreak of war. Nevertheless, the selective incorporation of authorities created a polycentric governance system where numerous actors within and beyond the state governed. Though previous studies suggest that authorities can cooperate to produce collective action and govern (Murtazashvili 2016), in Dagestan this instead often led to a lack of effective governance, particularly in the state's ability to provide goods and regulate disputes - the two dimensions where there is a fairly strong preference for state involvement. Non-state authorities and informal networks worked to substitute for state governance, best equipped historically to provide dispute resolution and regulate social order, but these domains remain fragmented into the present. Unlike its neighboring republics, when violence did break out in Dagestan, it was more localized, creating enclaves of insecurity rather than impacting the republic as a whole. Though violence dislodged specific individuals, it did not displace the overall governance institutions established in the 1990s. Zooming in on the villages where violence was concentrated, I find that the effects of violence are limited. Given that governance in Dagestan has historically been localized, this has persisted into the present, along with the commonly-encountered perception that the population is separate from the clans who control the republic-level institutions.

Long focused on understanding the impact of external war on state-building (Tilly 1990), the literature has recently shifted to understand the impact of internal conflict on state-building (Slater 2010) and the implications of other forms of violence. This chapter suggests that when governance institutions are particularly entrenched, local armed conflict may be not displace them. Particularly when studying meso and macro-level outcomes, scholars must be as attuned to the continuities that persist despite violence as they are to the way violence ruptures institutions and balance of power. In the case at hand, violence, specifically counterinsurgency sweeps, had greater impact on the dispute resolution than the material domains of governance like goods provision. Nevertheless, these shifts and the replacement of *individuals* were insufficient to overturn the polycentric governance *institutions.*

In the next chapter, I turn to Chechnya. Though the two republics looked very similar in the mid-1990s, after Chechnya's First War, I demonstrate that the Second Chechen War set the foundation for centralization of governance, setting it down a divergent trajectory from Dagestan.

Chapter 5: Chechnya: Divergent Pathways to Post-War Centralization

"The people are still there they haven't gone anywhere but in some ways it was easier to solve problems during the war than it is now - now there's only one authority and source of decision-making in the republic."- Interview with Chechen man in rural village, May 2017

"After fighting two brutal civil wars to keep and control its own Republic of Chechnya, the Russian state effectively gave its territory away to one man and his militia" (Marten 2012: 102).

The quotes above are representative of a prominent narrative about post-conflict Chechnya. According to it, two civil wars between the Chechen republic and central Russian state ushered in a period of unparalleled centralization under the guise of the head of the republic, Ramzan Kadyrov. Many residents point out this is a radical break with historical patterns of governance, which closely mirrored Dagestan and Ingushetia. As interviewees consistently reminded me, Chechens too historically had strong systems of self-governance. Is governance in Chechnya as centralized as the quote above suggests and to what extent did the two civil wars contribute to this centralization? More generally, what can be learned from the Chechen case about the repercussions of civil war for governance?

Civil War Literature

Scholars have long investigated the relationship between warfare and state-building. Responding to a shift in the international system where internal armed conflict is now the dominant type of warfare, they have refocused attention on studying the repercussions of civil war. Slater (2010) argued against an assumption that internal wars inherently weaken states, demonstrating that specific threats can instead result in state-building, increasing extraction specifically. Staniland (2012) and Driscoll (2015) map the ways in which civil war can restructure elite coalitions and political orders, remaking the state's institutions. Mukhopadhyay (2014), following Tilly (1985), traces how wartime coalition-building can further impact what

she terms "ruling infrastructure." Though focused specifically on actors within the state, these studies demonstrate that warfare can alter who governs and through which institutions. An expanding field of rebel (Arjona et al 2015; Arjona 2016) and armed actor governance (Kasfir et al 2017) shows that civil war not only impacts state institutions but governance more broadly. Even if civil war does not build Weberian states, it can restructure the exercise of authority, who governs civilians, and how. As Cammett (2014) argues in her study of post-war Lebanon, the governance institutions developed during war can reshape both whether state authorities can reclaim authority after conflict ends and civilians' access to services. Speaking to the larger literature on non-state governance, these studies begin to unsettle presumptions about a linear progression from "non-state" to "state" authority after conflict.

Though armed conflict has ability to restructure governance, due to the relatively peaceful nature of the overall Soviet disintegration, scholars examining post-Soviet state-building have emphasized elite make-up (Gryzmala-Busse and Jones-Luong 2002) and the configuration of alternatives to the state (McMann 2014) rather than armed conflict. Adopting a political economy perspective, for example, McMann (2005: 2) argues that, "because post-Soviet states continue to control a preponderance of resources relative to non-state entities, societal actors, including Islamic leaders and elders, have not taken over the state's role." The asymmetry between state and non-state authorities during the Soviet period left a legacy for how state institutions were reconstituted, pointing to institutional continuity in state dominance. Yet, if armed conflict alters the relationship between state and ostensibly non-state authorities, post-conflict governance may look much different than its historical counterparts. King (2001), a notable exception which explicitly analyzes the impact of conflict, notes the persistence of quasi-

states armed actors create during war into the post-conflict period. Though armed conflict may be a temporary disruption that allows for the persistence of pre-existing institutional arrangements (Murtazashvili 2016) as they did in Dagestan, it may leave lasting legacies.

Moving away from asking whether war makes the state, this chapter asks whether and how civil war can restructure governance. Specifically, it investigates whether the civil wars in Chechnya reconfigured the architecture of governance: who governs, over which domains, and where? We may expect Soviet institutions to be particularly sticky given their deep penetration of society, making it less likely that civil war would reconfigure governance. King (2001) finds that in Eurasia "the basic networks, relationships, and informal channels that arose during the course of the violence can replicate themselves in new, statelike institutions in the former conflict zones" (528). Heydemann (2018) similarly notes that in Libya, Syria, and Yemen, "the descent into civil war has been accompanied not by the breakdown of prewar, authoritarian, criminal, and predatory economic norms and practices, but by their redeployment to serve wartime requirements" (50). Evidence for the institutional persistence can also be found in studies of early modern state building (Spruyt 1994; Centeno 2002) and recent scholarship on rebel governance where rebels imitate or repurpose state institutions (Reno 2015; Sweet 2017). Pe-existing administrative structures and institutions can persist into armed conflict and be repurposed for state-building in the post-conflict period allowing for institutional continuity despite violence, as we see in the case of Dagestan in this dissertation.

Argument

Under what conditions, then, is civil war more likely to result in institutional ruptures and reconfigure governance? I argue this requires paying attention to the timing and repertoire of

violence. Compared to Dagestan, in Chechnya violence initially nearly coincided with institutional collapse and both wars occurred during the interregnum. The timing of the Chechen wars meant that the civil war occurred during a period of institutional uncertainty and renegotiation, leveling the playing-field and bargaining capacity of state and non-state authorities. Though the prewar institutions were robust, minimizing the likelihood that violence would significantly impact them, the wars occurred during a critical juncture where their grip was loosened, "allowing for agency or contingency to shape divergence from the past" (Soifer 2012: 1573). Given that during critical junctures even small events that may be insignificant during periods of institutional reproduction can play significant roles in redirecting institutional paths (Mahoney 2000: 536; Pierson 2004: 44), armed conflict that occurs during a critical juncture is particularly likely to reconfigure governance. Similar to Dagestan, state collapse allowed for the renegotiation of relationships within the state and with key actors beyond the state; however, in Chechnya, civil war drove this process, shaping the pattern of elite incorporation and in turn the architecture of governance. Yet, even during periods of massive upheaval, certain institutions may remain unaffected (Streeck and Thelen 2005: 8–9) or we may see institutional *re-equilibration* rather than change (Capoccia and Kelemen 2007: 350–351). Thus, key to understanding how civil war reconfigured governance in Chechnya is understanding which institutions it altered and which, despite massive and widespread violence, persisted.

I argue that civil war in Chechnya reconfigured governance by altering (1) civilian preference for governance, (2) collective action capacities and (3) the pattern of elite incorporation. Using process tracing and survey evidence, I show that the divergent patterns of

violence within the two wars pushed Chechnya in different directions, with the first war creating a period of disorder, while the second laid the foundation for post-war centralization.

A potential alternative explanation is that war is a consequence of institutional collapse, and thus its impact would simply be the impact of institutional collapse there are two problems with this approach. First, as mentioned, Soviet collapse was overwhelmingly peaceful such that it is inaccurate to reduce the civil wars to a reflection of institutional collapse. Second, institutional collapsed acted as a permissive condition, changing the underlying context and increasing the prospects for divergence (Soifer 2012: 1574), but did not produce all of the conditions that resulted in the centralization of governance in Chechnya. In other words, they were not sufficient to explain centralization, evident by the divergent outcomes in Dagestan and Ingushetia. These cases provide alternative accounts of what could have happened in Chechnya had it experienced state collapse without civil war. Though separating the impact of the civil wars and state collapse is particularly challenging in this case given their near simultaneous timing, civil war cannot be reduced to merely a component or reflection of broader institutional collapse. State collapse created the conditions in which governance could be reconfigured, but did not determine the divergent outcomes.

Analyzing the Chechen case is thus particularly useful for understanding whether civil wars that occurs amidst periods of institutional ambiguity is able to overturn previously entrenched institutions. This context more closely parallels Sendero Luminoso's conflict in Peru (Soifer and Vergera 2018), civil war in Iraq, or wars of decolonization, than the Democratic Republic of Congo, for example, where rebel and state alliances maintained pre-existing institutional arrangements despite war (Sweet 2018). Additionally, by comparing the two civil

wars, I seek to disaggregate how different repertoires of violence within civil war (Kalyvas 2006; Hoover Green 2011; Gutierrez Sanin and Wood 2018) can create divergent legacies.

I show that the First Chechen War, marked by indiscriminate and widespread violence and occuring during a period of institutional collapse, alienated civilians from the Russian state. However, the pattern of violence did not undermine the collective action of numerous informal authorities or create a joint vision for the post-war order, resulting in a period of disorder. The Second War, on the other hand, maintained the indiscriminate violence but also introduced selective targeting of informal authorities and direct violence in the form of counterinsurgency sweeps, as well as coercive policies like curfews. Together these experiences instilled a fear in civilians and disrupted the collective action capacity for resistance, setting the foundation for centralization. When republic state elites, therefore, sought to intervene in society across dimensions of governance, they encountered overwhelming compliance, as opposed to resistance they faced previously. The difference between these wars was not just the *level* of indiscriminate violence (Zhukov 2014) or the formation of collective identities after the war (Lazarev 2018) but the discrepancies in the *pattern of violence* (Gutierrez-Sanin and Wood 2017),[120] which caused shifts in the collective action capacities and elite coalitions.

Empirical evidence on the *impact* of different forms of violence is mixed; there are many more studies of the causes and most studies focus on indiscriminate violence. While some studies suggest that indiscriminate violence is counterproductive and pushes civilians to support the other armed group (Cocher et al 2015), others show that above a certain threshold indiscriminate violence will force civilians to cooperate, helping gain control (Zhukov 2014).

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[120] As Gutierezz-Sanin and Wood (2017: 26) summarize, the pattern of violence can be understood as "who did what to whom, and (to which we add) how and how often?"

This focuses on the military, but not the political implications of violence. This study demonstrates both that other forms of violence must be considered alongside indiscriminate violence, and that violence, even if achieving military goals like control and decreasing insurgent activity, also has political consequences which shape the post-conflict governance arrangements. The burgeoning recent literature on the long-term consequences of violence suggests that indiscriminate violence and repression has long-term costs (Lupu and Peisakhin 2017; Rozenas, Schutte, and Zhukov 2017). Few studies examine if those costs are relevant when the regime remains in power and can still credibly threaten violence. Wang (forthcoming), which examines the long-term impact of repression in China, finds that despite resulting in greater discontent, repression decreases contentious behavior. We can expect this to alter the bottom-up demands for governance and collective action capacity of non-state authorities to resist centralization efforts.

The sheer level and broad repertoire of violence in the Chechen wars may seem unique. Much of the recent civil war literature has instead focused on the ways in which armed groups try to win civilian loyalties and govern them to solve what Kalyvas (2006) terms the identification problem, which would allow armed groups to separate combatants from civilians. Under Kalyvas' logic, violence like widespread aerial bombardment evident in Chechnya appears counterproductive. However, armed groups greatly vary in the repertoire and overall levels of violence used against civilians (Hoover Green 2018). As Lyall (2015: 1) points out, "the past decade alone has witnessed extensive air campaigns against insurgents in Afghanistan, Gaza, Iraq, Pakistan, Yemen, Palestine, Russia, Somalia, Myanmar, Syria, Sudan, Mali, Nigeria,

Colombia, and Libya."[121] Cordon-and-search tactics, like those used in Chechnya, have not been

systematically studied to my knowledge, but are prevalent in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Palestine,

were historically used in Algeria, Kenya, and Indonesia, and are also used as counterinsurgency

tactics in states not at war like India. Large massacres and disappearances have been prevalent in

conflicts including Peru, Guatemala, El Salvador, Algeria, Sudan, Sri Lanka, Lebanon and Syria

and counterinsurgency can co-occur with mass killing (Valentino 2004: 82-84). The Chechen

wars, particularly the Second War as I will show, can be understood as part of a broader set of

conflicts where, instead of seeking to govern civilians and win their loyalties, armed actors use

subjugation and punitive measures to achieve control (Zhukov 2010), fitting into a set of cases

with broad repertoires of violence against civilians and high overall levels of violence.[122] Since

autocracies are more brutal counterinsurgents than democracies (Merom 2003), the case is more

likely to be representative of armed conflicts in authoritarian states. The case also speaks to a

broader argument that understanding post-war period requires attention to the wartime dynamics

(Berdal and Zaum 2013; Huang 2017; Cheng 2018).

This chapter aims to put civil war and its repercussions for governance into theoretical

and comparative perspective. I argue that civil war in Chechnya, specifically the combination of

widespread indiscriminate violence with selective targeting of the second war, led to the

centralization of governance across domains, though through different pathways. To demonstrate

this I begin by establishing what governance looked at after Soviet collapse; while this was a

transitional period, it helps set a baseline for what governance may look like in Chechnya had it

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[121] As Lyall (2015) goes on to point out we have very few studies on the impact of aerial bombardment in internal conflict. The studies that do exist focus mostly on its effectiveness as a military tactic (see. Coher et al 2015) rather than its effects on governance.

[122] There is, as Hoover Green (2018) argues and I will show, variation between the groups within a conflict as well.

not experienced violence. Next, I demonstrate the impact of the First Chechen War, showing that

indiscriminate violence alienated the population, setting the groundwork for the establishment of

non-state institutions, but was not sufficient for centralization. Then, I turn to the Second

Chechen War, showing that its broader repertoire of violence, specifically the introduction of

selective targeting and intrusive counterinsurgency sweeps, diminished state tolerance of non-

state governance and non-state authorities collective action capacity for resistance. This altered

both the state attempts at penetration of society and society's ability to resist, resulting in

renegotiation of elite relationships and centralization of governance.

Failed Attempts at Centralization: Reformulation of Non-state Governance and Establishment of Polycentric Governance

Of course I supported an independent Chechnya. But I imagined it so differently. - Oral history 16

In November 1991, Dzhokhar Dudayev declared Chechnya independent from Russia.

Despite minimal international recognition, he spent the next three years attempting to build an

autonomous state and increasingly sought to centralize power. The dissolution of the Soviet

Union, and the resulting retraction of pre-existing economic, political, and social institutions

served as a critical juncture in which structural constraints were relaxed, allowing for the re-

organization and re-configuration of authority, as in the other republics. The breakdown offered

new organizational possibilities to both state and non-state actors. A majority of the thirty-two

ethnically defined Russian regions issued declarations of sovereignty at that point (Bakke 2015:

81). Dudayev gradually increased attempts at centralization of authority, seeking to assert control

over elites within the state and incorporate or utilize those beyond its boundaries.

Cut off from federal funding and unable to access international aid, Dudayev utilized

symbols and the aspiration of a sovereign Chechnya to legitimate his authority. Deploying

symbolic power and establishing a normative basis for rule can be especially potent to develop

norms of behavior when the ability to provide public goods and apply coercive power is lacking.

By appealing to common historical experiences and memories of the Chechen population,

Dudayev was utilizing performativity—the repeated enactment of coded normative behaviors

producing a specific subject—as an elemental in the construction of state sovereignty (Weber

1998). Dudayev's strategies "extended attempts to provide public goods to incorporate the

production of political power through the adoption and manipulation of cultural symbols

(Mamilly 2015:78). Specifically, Dudayev made numerous appeals to the genocide of 1944,

constructing the Chechen state's identity in direct opposition to that of Russia. He framed

Chechen-Russian relations as consistently hostile across history, as evident in his 1993 decree:

> From the beginning of the armed invasion during tsar's Russia into the Northern
> Caucasus – more than three hundred years ago - Chechen land has been under colonial
> rule against the indigenous people, carried out through moral and physical destruction.
> Resistance by Chechen peoples, attempts to pursue freedom on their own land, have been
> ruthlessly suppressed. (31 August 1993 Presidential Decree #109).

Later that year, Dudayev issued a decree creating a Genocide Museum commemorating "victims

of the genocide of Russian (Soviet) imperialism against the Chechen peoples in the 18th-20th

centuries" (1 July 1993 Presidential Decree #80). This not only highlights the joint oppression,

but in doing so attempts to unite Chechens through a shared history, prioritizing their Chechen

identity over differences that may exist such as those based on teip (extended kinship) or

religious sect. It attempts to build a deep emotional resonance of nationalism, a template through

which he could then mobilize citizens to political action and create a collective project (Githens-

Mazer 2008). While the deportations were widely experienced, they were not openly discussed

and commemorated until this time period. Dudayev worked to create a "coherent narrative, or

collective frame of reference, that can generate popular support for the political order" he sought to construct (Mampilly 2015: 79). This was done by looking backward to draw on shared experiences.

While the symbolic framework Dudayev envisioned was initially sufficient to mobilize broad swaths of the population, his opposition sought greater autonomy within the Russian federation instead of Chechen sovereignty. Despite being more demographically homogeneous and territorially concentrated than ethnically-diverse neighboring Dagestan,[123] Chechen elites became increasingly divided, unable to establish a coherent set of state institutions to implement decisions or gain control over the entirety of its territory. Both camps sought greater local control over culture and religion, which had been suppressed under Soviet rule. Chechen historian and member of the inter-war administration, Mairbek Vatchagaev, suggests that Dudayev leaned heavily on the Qadiri tariqat, or Sufi brotherhood, while the Naqshbandi brotherhood, with notable exceptions like members of the brotherhood of Imam Tashu-Hadji and Ghazy-Hadji Zandaksky, composed large parts of the opposition with descendants of Deni Arsanov joining the opposition while descendants of Dokku Shaptukaev and Sheikh Solsa-Hadji Yandarov, most of whom live in the plains around Grozny, ignored Dudaev's government (Vatchagaev 2005 "Role of Sufism in the Chechen Resistance"). Though most of my interviewees were hesitant to categorize who supported which faction, given the commonplace splits within families, if pushed they suggested most of Dudayev's supporters were less educated and less successful under

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[123] Though the census data from this period are not entirely precise since Chechnya and Ingushetia were joined as a single republic, in the 1989 census, about 70 percent of the republic's inhabitants were Chechen or Ingush (Bakke 2014: 85). Zurcher (2007: 71) estimates that in 1991, about 84 percent of the population of Chechnya proper were ethnic Chechens.

Soviet rule. Though also divided by teip and Sufi brotherhood, the greatest source of division between Dudayev's supporters and opponents was ideological disagreement about the extent of autonomy they sought from Russia. Elite power struggles in Chechnya mirrored those in Dagestan.

Opposition within the state intensified, with Dudayev saying that Parliament was overstepping its powers and acting unconstitutionally (26 August 1992 Presidential Decree #119) and Parliament vetoing Dudayev's executive orders (18 February 1993 Executive Order #12). On April 21, 1993 supporters of Dudayev violently clashed with his anti-independence opposition on *Teotralinaya Ploshad,* Theatrical Square. The Committee of Alims, representing religious scholars, sided with the Parliament and the Constitutional Court in calling for new elections (Committee of Alims Statement 1 May 1993).

The inability to establish control increasingly drew religious authorities into power struggles. However, religious authorities operated autonomously from the state and the state system of dispute resolution remained secular. With restrictions on religious practice removed, there was a religious resurgence, evident in individuals traveling overseas to receive religious education, building mosques, and taking hajj. As a respondent in opposition to Dudayev described,

The religious factor was always really powerful to mobilize people - could be used to mobilize anything. One of the main things used to discredit the opposition to Dudayev was accusing people of being atheists but we had religious authorities on our side too - there were religious authorities on both sides but Dudayev's supporters tried to spread the opinion that we were people without God. But the people following them were those that were [Communist] party members yesterday and somehow became people of religion the next day. - Interview 61 2017. Dudayev was aware of religious figures' authority, suggesting that state leaders consult with

religious figures to prevent war (27 September 1992 Order #71). Yet, he also perceived them to

be a potential threat, issuing a decree to minimize and control intrusion by private actors and religious institutions in the court system (8 of January 1992, Presidential Decree #6) and establishing a National Committee for Islamic Religion, which was tasked with regulating religious institutions and creating a centralized institution to oversee the religious order (23rd of April 1992 Presidential Decree #79). Despite Dudayev's attempts at greater state regulation of dispute resolution and religious authorities broadly, these decrees, as his other orders, were largely ignored and authority remained fragmented as in the other republics.

Within a context of increasing polarization, the state not only unable to deliver basic goods and services but also proved unable to guarantee a minimum level of security. An individual working in the administration at the time described the local MVD, KGB, and legal system as paralyzed (Oral history 1). A mother of a police officer at the time described how Dudayev emptied the jails, making it nearly impossible for security officials to do their job (Oral history 19). Another respondent described the increase in criminality, saying she could not blame the young men who were joining the "bandits," because no one was receiving salaries (Oral history 12). With the legal framework for governance collapsed and state security officials unable to offer guarantees, custom and informal authorities became stronger. One woman offered an example: "Blood feuds really restrained the scumbags who wanted to take advantage of the time period. And people who understood what was happening very often sought to protect their neighbors from those who were trying to use their stronger positions" (Oral history 7). Dense social networks also helped prevent the republic from breaking out into full-blown war. A resident of a village in oppositional Urus-Martan described:

In almost every village, including [village name removed] there mobilized pro and anti-Dudayev groups. Conflicts were over appointments [to bureaucratic posts]. But,

Chechnya is a rather small place and want it or not, you are going to have family or connections on both sides. And the same thing happened at the top, around Dudayev there were close acquaintances for people that were pro and anti Dudayev….thus the split and opposition could only go so far because everyone understood if I raise my hand against the other side, someone I know is bound to have a sister that's married to someone there or something similar. - (Interview 61 2017).

Informal authorities and kinship networks provided informal assistance and networks helped contain disorder, increasing the salience and authority of non-state actors. Yet, they were insufficient to fill the role of the state. Informal authorities sought to guide dispute resolution and constrain violence. However, they were unable to regulate economic decision-making or provide public goods. As a result, most people - particularly those that were dependent on salaries rather than subsistence farming - were left trying to scrape by. This impacted the Russian portion of the population most because, as one respondent put it "They were particularly dependent on the state and all of a sudden there was no state. We at least had our family ties or a plot of land somewhere" (Oral history 9). Unlike other cases where a non-state network could be mobilized to provide social services like healthcare or infrastructure (Cammett 2014; Thachil 2014), the penetrative nature of Soviet institutions had prevented informal authorities from developing these resources.[124] Instead, communities collected money or food on an ad hoc basis to "pay" public workers like teachers, often providing payment in kind. Often this support was provided on a kinship as much as a territorial basis (MacLean 2010). As (Derlugian 1999: 36) suggests, and my interviews confirm, Dudayev undermined his own credibility by his "bombastic pronouncements, which were in sharp contrast with the stark reality of Chechen life." Promised that a Chechen leadership and independence would bring about prosperity, Chechens instead

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[124] This is not unique to the Soviet governance arrangement but as McMann (2014) points out was prevalent to some degree in welfare states broadly.

found themselves in worse poverty than before. As an opposition leader summarized, "central financing disappeared, of course, and the minimum money that there was from oil production all became split among criminals" (Oral history 1).

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Despite attempts, during three years of declared independence state elites proved unable to overcome fragmentation to create a coherent set of state institutions. Describing the period, respondents agreed that the new laws, executive orders, and decrees, like those mentioned above, were largely ignored. Governance was fragmented among numerous authorities within and beyond the state, as it was in the neighboring republics. Once the "euphoria" of independence, as many respondents describe the first few months, wore off, Dudayev's use of symbolic practices was insufficient to sustain civilians' loyalty in the context of the state's inability to regulate security or provide public goods. Summarizing governance at the time, a respondent stated, "The government was concerned with itself. Moscow had bigger problems than us. We survived how we could" (Oral history 1).

The aim of this section was to show how Chechen society initially responded to state collapse. Past experiences of collective repression proved to be an insufficient basis for governance. Instead of a coherent set of institutions put forth by new state elites or consistent ability of non-state authorities to substitute for state failure, Chechen elites became increasingly fragmented and their ability to effectively govern civilians declined. Offering slogans and mobilizing symbols of an independent Chechnya, elites could not themselves agree on a shared vision for the state and its governance framework. Despite increasing attempts at centralization, Dudayev faced stark opposition from both other state administrators and non-state authorities like The Committee of Alims. This demonstrates that there is nothing inherent to Chechnya that makes it prone to centralization of authority. Most importantly for this study, Chechnya's governance arrangements during the first years after Soviet collapse did not drastically differ from its neighboring republics. Despite becoming increasingly mono-ethnic, as the Russian population fled, the republic became increasingly disordered prior to the beginning of the First War. The outbreak of war with Russia represented an opportunity to reconfigure governance once again.

First War: Indiscriminate State Violence and Increased Cohesion

Numerous academics (Lieven 1998; Oliker 2001; Evangelista 2002; Tishkov 2004) and journalists (Politkovskaya 2002, 2007) provide accounts of the violence during the first war. Several notes are of particular importance to this study's focus on how violence impacted civilians.[125] First, violence by the Russian state was largely indiscriminate. My own interviews and those recorded at the time consistently discuss the shock and disbelief of watching Russia,

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[125] See Oliker (2001) for an account of the military tactics used by both sides, including attacks by Chechen rebels that occurred outside of territorial Chechnya like Budennovsk.

their own government, indiscriminately bomb civilians. To survive, neighbors spent days hiding together in whichever houses had basements. While recent scholarship has highlighted the potentially ordered nature of civil war territories where combatants attempt to establish institutions and at times provide goods to civilians (Kalyvas 2006; Arjona et al. 2015; Arjona 2016), respondents in Chechnya consistently emphasize the disorder of the war. This likely stems at least in part from the lack of consistent territorial control and undisciplined, poorly trained nature of the Russian army at the time, conditions that are predicted to result in disorder (Kalyvas 2006; Arjona 2016). As one respondent described, there were constant shifts in control (Oral history 5). Evidence suggests the use of indiscriminate violence was also a strategic decision stemming from "the desire to compensate for a lack of intelligence and firepower" since Russian soldiers assumed Chechens would fight against them (Zhukov 2014: 126). Several times, this included the massacres such as the infamous cases of Assinovskaya, Iarysh-Mardy, Bamut, or Samashki where 250 civilians[126] were killed and 68 others were taken to filtration camps. By the end of the war in addition to the major cities, roughly 27 villages[127] mostly in strategically important areas used by Chechen fighters to the West, were nearly completely destroyed. These events served as "moral shocks," (Jasper 1995) solidifying ties within Chechen society.[128]

The high level of indiscriminate violence and techniques used by the Russian state alienated civilians and led to a rally-around-the-flag effect around Dudayev's regime, increasing

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[126] Amnesty International 1996

[127] Calculated from the day by day description of the war in local Chechen magazine Dosh's 50th issue

[128] The war also caused broad disagreement within central Russia and the military. Oliker (2001), citing Mukhin and Yavorskiy (2009) writes that 540 generals, officers, and NCOs resigned rather than serve in the 1994–1996 Chechen war.

cohesion within Chechen society and shifting civilians' preferences for governance. Interviews consistently echoed what one respondent described: "it was like we were fighting China or America - all the tanks, airplanes, as if there was a whole army fighting them here. Of course, everyone here forgot about their own disagreements - willingly or not Russia united us" (Oral history 12). Moreover, interviewees also refer to combatants in the first war as mobilizing for self-defense, pushing back on the use of words like rebels or mujahedeen. Shatoy, Vedeno, and Nozha-Urt became centers of pro-independence mobilization because they were less integrated into the Soviet state, had mountainous terrain, and were home to key rebel commanders like Shamil Basayev. While pre-war networks in which the commanders were embedded structured the violent mobilization (Interview 74 2017; oral history 1), my interviews also consistently describe how most young men, regardless of pre-existing characteristics picked up arms believing they were "defending their homeland, their families, their republic" (Oral history 2). A half-Russian and half-Chechen woman similarly discussed that it was not just Chechens that supported Dudayev in the first war, but Russians living in Chechnya as well, given that the Russian government's violence was indiscriminate (Oral history 8). This is consistent with previous literature, which shows that airstrikes shift support away from the counterinsurgent while creating new grievances that fuel insurgent recruitment (Petersen 2001; Kalyvas 2006; Condra and Shapiro 2012). Even in areas previously opposed to Dudayev where Russian soldiers were initially welcomed, the violence alienated civilians from the Russian state. As one man summarized, "I stopped feeling like a citizen of the Russian state, though I am one. This feeling lingers to this day" (Oral history 5).

In many villages, non-state and local authorities maintained their capacity to mobilize collective action and gained greater input in governance. Even in villages that were fragmented between support and opposition for Dudayev, non-state governance persisted, though the specific individuals in charge varied village-to-village. In a village within Urus-Martan, a respondent described how he and several others negotiated with Russian soldiers to maintain local control over security in their village:

By December, January, when Grozny was already surrounded, the fighting was moving to the mountains. There was a group of more educated people from [village name removed] - the director of the sovhoz was there, I was there - we went to Urus-Martan and were able to reach the [Russian] army through them. We negotiated that they won't bomb the village and everything will be calm. They said that as long as there would not be shooting at them [from the village] they agreed. So we organized a meeting at the village, gathered everyone, and set up posts with fires, 23 fires total around the village that were lit all night. The army knew that this marked off the village, the fires symbolized that we controlled the situation in the village. - Interview 63 2017.

While in this village, secular authorities handled the negotiation process, my interviewee went on to explain that in others elders or religious authorities were more involved. Other interviews suggested that Russian soldiers, often assuming that elders and imams were the holders of authority in Chechen villages, often insisted on talking to them. This was the case in Samashki in 1995, for example. The Russian military attacked the village in that case despite the negotiations, including the house of one of the elders. Video recordings from the period also show that non-state authorities role in establishing a symbolic order increased due to their oversight of funerals, organizing the erection of poles in the cemetery to honor martyrs killed during the war, and zikrs (Sufi ceremony). Religious authorities often brought village residents, mostly men, together to read the mavlid and sing mazamnash (traditional community choir), reviving religious rituals and increasingly making them a consistent part of everyday life. Given

the prevalence of funerals, religious authorities connection to the population at large and prominence in public life broadly increased during the war.

Despite this, and similar to the other republics under study, non-state authorities' role did not extend to provision or regulation of goods like healthcare, infrastructure, or education. Unlike evident in cases like Colombia (Arjona 2016), Lebanon (Cammett 2014), or Syria (Revkin forthcoming) where rebels and non-state authorities adopted broad governance projects, during the First Chechen War neither the state nor non-state authorities offered this. Asked about what authorities provided, a teacher described that her and her colleagues continued working without salaries and their attempts to ask for them were treated as "provocations." She went on to emphasize that regular civilians could not really impact either side's decision-making. (Oral history 3). Others described that there was constant theft and many lost their homes due to the bombing. Yet, respondents rarely emphasize the lack of goods provision in this period, which in comparison to the violence and lack of security, fell down the list of priorities. As one woman who lost her house stated, it would be a sin to talk about that when others lost their entire families (Oral history 3); this is a common sentiment among people I met - that they do not discuss their economic losses with other Chechens knowing that others' losses were irreplaceable.

Examining the impact of the First War, interviews, oral histories, and recordings suggest several patterns. First, the indiscriminate violence by the Russian army alienated the Chechen population, decreasing support for and trust in the Russian state by sending a message that Chechens were not equal citizens. Violence increased cohesion among Chechen civilians, uniting them against a common enemy and shifting civilian preferences for governance in favor of

Chechen leadership. Second, non-state authorities, specifically religious leaders and elders, played a prominent role in organizing communities' responses to violence. Given these authorities pre-existing connection to dispute resolution and social order, non-state control became more prominent in both, shifting who governed these dimensions more than it impacted goods provision. Traditional and religious authorities, as well as numerous armed commanders, remained beyond the purview of state control at war's end. Though Dudayev's regime gained support, governance remained fragmented across authorities rooted beyond the state.

Consequences of the First War: Disorder and Failed Attempts at Centralization

The First war formally ended on August 30, 1996, with the signing of the ceasefire known as the Khasavurt Peace Accord. For the next three years, Chechnya, or the Republic of Ichkeria as Dudayev renamed it, was formally independent. Given the gains in civilian support and increased authority of non-state actors, the end of war offered an opportunity to overcome pre-existing fragmentation. Newly empowered Chechen state elites utilized this opening, working to alter the state's institutional framework, penetrate spheres previously regulated by non-state actors, replace local elites with regime supporters, and establish a religious basis for state institutions. Yet, unlike in Dagestan where the selective incorporation of non-state authorities created polycentric governance, in Chechnya, power remained squarely in the hands of non-state authorities who were empowered by the First War. The inability to demobilize or incorporate wartime commanders led to further fragmentation within Chechnya; contestation over the state's institutions persisted. State elites found themselves facing significant opposition from non-state challengers resulting in the same struggles as before - an inability to gain control over the entirety of the territory, provide goods, and implement a cohesive set of dispute

resolutions or symbolic basis for the state. Presidential attempts to ameliorate commanders were at odds with civilian preferences, Parliament, and a substantial portion of informal authorities, creating an impasse. Unable to overcome the divergent preferences of civilians and commanders, and unable to demobilize wartime commanders who threatened the state, civilians in inter-war Chechnya lived under disorder.

The withdrawal of federal troops removed one source of threat. But it also left individuals that had opposed Dudayev unprotected. As one respondent explained, he initially felt betrayed by the Russian state when they started bombing civilians; he felt betrayed yet again when they left the republic to what he perceived to be purely criminal forces (Interview 79 2018). Another stated that he regretted supporting the Russians previously because, when they pulled out, they betrayed the local opposition, most of whom had to flee the republic thereafter as well (Oral history 16).

Empowered by the cease-fire, Dudayev began removing local leadership and appointing his supporters to positions throughout the republic. This often included the removal of trusted local administrators that had mobilized to protect their villages. Instead of helping centralize authority in the state, however, this decision removed individuals that helped maintain order in communities. With the state unable to provide security and local leaders removed, communities were left with gaps in authority, fostering criminality.

Dudayev's assassination in April 1996 escalated state attempts to restructure governance from the top-down, specifically the dispute resolution institutions and basis for social order. Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev, the Interim President, immediately began establishing institutions to differentiate Chechen from Russian identity and placate the battalion leaders that sought a

religious framework for the state. By August, he declared that shari'a law would regulate all marriage, spousal, and family affairs, utilizing TV and radio, the Justice Ministry, and the Mufti, Akhmad Kadyrov, to provide lessons on proper moral relations (28 August 1996 Presidential Decree #69). Over the next several months, Yandarbiyev made Arabic a mandatory subject in all schools "in order to create the essential basis for more informed and deep study of the Quran and Islam as sources of spirituality, righteousness and to free individuals and society from prejudice and ignorance," and made "essentials of Islam" a mandatory discipline, providing state funding for these initiatives (19 September 1996 Presidential Decree #119). They also sought to rename villages associated with the Russian revolution, Communist Party, Cossack villages (Muzaev 2010).

Yandarbiyev's reforms were an attempt to expand the state into spheres previously regulated by non-state authorities and change the basis of the respective institutions. The decrees re-imagined Chechnya's symbolic order, shifting it from one based on a shared history, as under Dudayev, to a religious order that was not similarly unifying. Though Chechnya was becoming increasingly religious, far from everyone wanted that to be the basis for state institutions. The top-down reforms of Chechen dispute resolution institutions along shari'ia law represented a radical break from both previous Soviet judicial institutions and Chechen customary practices. The reliance on Akhmad Kadyrov and local imams for the implementation of these initiatives also signaled the beginning of an alliance with religious authorities to justify and expand the power of the state. Many traditional and religious leaders, however, responded to state decrees with hesitation. While some authorities believed the population was not sufficiently familiar with shari'a (Lazarev 2018: 121-122) others wanted state institutions to remain secular, even if they

strongly supported Sufi Islamic practices (Oral histories 5, 8, 9). In this context, courts handled

everything from drinking alcohol and abuse of drugs to regulation of oil production and

journalistic practices (Interview 88 2018). Nevertheless, Chechen scholar Timur Muzaev reports

that nine out of ten cases had to do with labor disputes, causing the state to pass a decree

forbidding shari'a courts from handling them (Muzaev 2010). Despite state establishment of

shari'a district courts across the republic under the guise of the local administrator and imam and

establishment of a military guard to enforce the courts' decisions, enforcement varied widely. In

fact, the guard clashed with local militias repeatedly when they tried to enforce decisions

(Osmayev 2008: 132). One respondent described this fragmentation of authority:

If you kidnapped a bride that still had to be settled and you would still send your
respected people from both sides to deal with it. Mediations like this would still happen
with elders. Large conflicts like murder would still result in the gathering of relatives,
sometimes of armed relatives, but this was for larger conflicts that could result in blood
feuds. Some questions were also still decided through the administration - largely related
to provision of water, allocation of land, infrastructure, fixing roads - they had their own
niche that they were able to impact - for things like this people would go to the head of
the local administration. But there was also little financing and what could you do
without that - so there was a really narrow type of problem they could actually help with -
largely giving out land, for which they required money of course (Interview 81 2018).

As the quote suggests, this period of institutional transformation resulted in disordered blurring

of authorities, layering new institutions on top of previous ones without a clear or consistent

delineation of when which institutions were used and by whom, even if the republic operated

under shari'a law on paper. In prioritizing religious institutions for establishing order, state elites

imposed them atop pre-existing informal traditional institutions, further splintering the de facto

institutional framework.

Further, the state's inability to demobilize militias and establish a monopoly over

coercion exacerbated disorder. In the couple of years between the end of the first war in 1996

and the beginning of the second war in 1999, there was an estimated 160 armed groups in

Chechnya competing over resources from oil theft, arms smuggling, human trafficking, and

looting (Ware and Kisriev 2009: 143). This period also saw a rise in kidnappings, initially of

non-Chechen NGO workers and journalists. But as international actors stopped entering the

republic, kidnapping increasingly targeted locals as well. Commanders repeatedly clashed with

state security forces and attempted to assassinate state representatives. As one respondent stated,

"nothing, not teips could help you; but guns were useful" (Interview 59 2017). Another

respondent mentioned the extent to which this was a break from the pre-war period, describing

that while there may not have been a cohesive set of state institutions previously the type and

level of criminality peaked during the inter-war era (Oral history 17). Though the war had ended,

disorder had not. In fact, with the exception of bombing, descriptions of life are very similar to

those of the wartime period with statements like "when you're worried about trying to survive

you don't have time for politics" (Oral history 5) being commonplace. A young woman

described the interwar period as

two years of chaos. It was not safe, the law didn't work. Everyone kept shooting all the
time, Wahhabism spread. I can't say it was a peaceful time, war continued. There was no
firing, sweep-up operations, or fighting but it was a complete mess and everything was
extreme. Every second person was armed, did whatever he wanted, could do anything.[129]

Interviewees describe "bandit enclaves" with "little kings" - each commander maintained their

own army, establishing their own security posts and checks over cars that would enter their area.

Commanders, vying for power, organized mass demonstrations, created their own newspapers,

and formed political parties to mobilize gain civilian support; however, aside from giving

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[129] http://old.refugee.ru/last_to_know.pdf p 163

speeches and attending ceremonies like zikrs and funerals, they did little to provide goods or

services (Osmayev 2008: 32-48). Interviewees consistently commented that when healthcare or

education facilities operated it was in spite, not because, of commander or state leadership. In

mountain villages, like Bamut and Zoni, there were no operational schools and in others, like

Saiasan, Mahketi, and Dargo, there were no medical facilities (Abubakarov 1999). Many villages

went without access to gas or drinking water, causing mass migration from the mountains

(Muzaev 2010). The lack of stable goods provision further exacerbated criminality, resulting in

looting of factories and workshops, no consistent salaries or pensions - including for teachers,

doctors, and security services officials (Abubakarov 1999). As one historian summarized: "There

was no government. There was a system in which different armed forces existed with no

centralized command. They resolved their own personal problems and focused on providing for

their bosses. We were left to live off the land" (Oral history 12).

While some civilians utilized the new state religious institutions to establish order, many

pushed back on the criminality through the use informal levers like kinship. One respondent

from a village that previously had anti-Dudayev opposition described life in their village:

there was some balance and there were people who still had authority and were able to
push back against those that would make the claim that we fought and won and have
decision-making power now. But all the administrative positions, of course they put their
own people in those posts - but we knew those people and they didn't really allow
themselves anything that radical - most of the people were still local, most of the fighters
there were local. (Interview 78 2018)

Interviewees disagree about the effectiveness of informal mechanisms of establishing social

order with some believing that nothing but force worked, while others suggest that "even if you

are a bandit, you have a close relative that is married to someone so people still tried to settle

things through these internal relationships" (Interview 57 2017). Between the inability to

establish and enforce institutions consistently, high turnover of individuals in administrative

posts, and the removal of anyone believed to be in opposition to the new state elites, the interwar

period was characterized by disorder. The indiscriminate and widespread violence of the First

War alienated civilians from the Russian state but also empowered numerous non-state

authorities, who competed against each other and state centralization. While they did not offer an

alternative governance framework, this was sufficient to disrupt attempts at state-building and

create an environment of disorder for civilians who remained in Chechnya.

By February 1999, President Maskhadov, overwhelmingly elected for his Sufi beliefs and

pronouncements to maintain secular state institutions, gave into commanders' demands and

ordered parliament and the republic's religious leadership to draft a constitution fully based on

shari'a law. Civilian preferences, even when formally voiced, did not transfer into policies or

institutions they supported. Reminiscent of Dudayev's period, Maskhadov also found himself in

a confrontation with Parliament, which wanted to preserve the existing Constitution (Muzaev

2010). Imams and elders split on the religious basis of institutions, appealed to Maskhadov to

minimize commanders' influence in the state, evident in a public letter from the Imam of

Gudermes, Tsutsaev, and Head of the Elder Council of Gudermes, Ismailov (ibid). Despite this

resistance, Maskhadov pushed ahead with Yandarbiyev's reforms and proved incapable to

establish control over wartime commanders who made formal pronouncements of unity but

refused to demobilize. He appealed to commanders not to give in to provocations:

The struggle against our people did not end in war, it acquired other, insidious and vile
forms, the purpose of which is to bleed the Chechen people at any cost, to cut you off
from your people, to discredit the soldiers of Jihad (Groznenski Rabochi newspaper 1999
July 21-27).

But his appeals would remain unanswered. Prior to the Second War, Chechnya's institutions

remained highly fragmented and territory disordered. Though the territory became more

homogeneous, with an outflux of individuals who wanted to remain part of Russia (Interviews 21

2014; 84 2017), this demographic change was insufficient for centralization. As a local journalist

summarized,

there was no unification - each village looked a little different - in some places it was
pure criminality in others there were some that thought they really were fighting for an
independent Chechnya - many of these latter became disillusioned with what was going
on once they saw that it was just one Communist elite switched for another elite with a
larger appetite. (Interview 68 2018)

Violence in Second War: Expanding Repertoire, Direct Violence, and Selective Targeting

*"The First War was distinguished by its unexpected nature, it took us by surprise. The second
War was characterized by its unprecedented cruelty. Criminality unleashed, without discipline,
without understanding" (Oral history 2).*

"In trying to kill 200 bandits they killed 200,000 civilians" (Oral history 5)

Beyond increasing the intensity of indiscriminate violence (Lyall 2009; Zhukov 2014),

the entire pattern of violence (Gutierrez-Sanin and Wood 2017) changed in the Second War.

Russian forces continued to use indiscriminate artillery and air strikes, following it by sending in

ground forces. However, the Second War incorporated a broader repertoire that included more

direct (Balcells 2011) and extra-lethal (Fujii 2013) forms of violence, as well as selective

targeting of local administrators and non-state authorities. The involvement of Chechens in the

counterinsurgency also made violence more intimate and intertwined with civilians' daily lives.

Unlike Kalyvas' (2006) prediction territorial control did not decrease the use of violence.

Though Moscow came closer to achieving territorial control, this did not lead to civilian

collaboration, denunciations, or less violence. It was, nevertheless, sufficient to coercively incorporate informal authorities, achieving indirect and precarious centralization.

In August 1999, a group of Chechens led by Shamil Basayev crossed the border into neighboring Dagestan, a part of Russia. Following a series of terrorist attacks in Moscow and Volgodonsk that Russian officials blamed on Chechens, Russia re-declared war.[130] Russian forces began mass aerial bombardment of Nozha-Urtovsky, Bedenskiy, Shalinskiy, Gudermeskiy, and Shelkovskoi districts, as well as the cities Shali and Urus Martan, causing a flood of displaced residents into Grozny (Muzaev 2010). Though Maskhadov sought to conduct negotiations, both Russian politicians and Chechnya's commanders refused. After two months of heavy aerial bombardment, including of Grozny, and intense armed resistance, federal troops began a full-scale ground invasion in December. By February 2000, Russian troops captured the capital. Seizing the city, they established a full military presence, minimizing civilians' ability to flee the republic and locking them down with limited access to goods for several months. As fighting shifted to villages, particularly those in the West of the republic as rebels retreated to the mountains, Russia's tactics to retake control often included destroying large parts of the village, like in Komsomolskoe.

After a split between Chechnya's Mufti, Akhmad Kadyrov, and President Maskhadov, the federal government formally appointed Akhmad Kadyrov to administer governance in Chechnya on June 12th, 2000.[131] Ratelle and Souleimanov (2016: 1294) summarize Kadyrov's

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[130] The reason for the beginning of the war is controversial. Nineteen out of twenty-five individuals asked about it in different parts of the republic responded that they believe it was Moscow's fault and only one saying Chechens themselves provoked it with the invasion. Chechen commanders unequivocally denied a connection to the terrorist attacks.

[131] He technically did not become head of the republic until elections in 2003.

multiple roles as "a separatist commander, ardent opponent of Salafism, and Chechnya's grand mufti during the pre-war years." Kadyrov's shift provided religious authorities with greater institutional access[132] to Chechen state institutions and state elites in Moscow. Moscow found a way to overcome its monitoring and information problems. Additionally, with Kadyrov, and several other major commanders,[133] allying with Moscow and Chechen armed groups now fighting on both sides, fragmentation within Chechen society escalated. This marked the "Chechenization" of the conflict[134] and beginning of the counterinsurgency phase of the war, which lasted through 2009. When asked if there was anything that could provide security at that time, a man responded, "if I could hide fast enough, if I wasn't on the street at the wrong time, if I could run away quickly – this is what my life depended on" (Oral history 5). Though Moscow started sending money into Chechnya in 2000, restoring gas and electricity and helping schools operate more consistently, violence and coercion remained the central strategy for "establishing constitutional order," the phrase used by federal administrators.

Despite the tragedy of the first war, the majority of interviewees describe the second war as more brutal and featuring a broader repertoire of violence. My survey, which asked respondents to select which violent events occurred and when, confirms that all repertoires of violence were more prevalent in the Second War. As one woman summarized, "compared to the

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[132] See Gryzmala-Busse (2015) for an account of the impact of institutional access alters church's impact on policy-making.

[133] See Ratelle and Souleimanov (2016) for a detailed account of the militia factions within Chechnya during this period. Particularly important are the Yamadaev brothers (in charge of the 'East' battalion) and Said Kakiev (in charge of the 'West' Battalion), which operated as part of the Russian Ministry of Defense. Importantly, while some fighters switched willingly, federal troops threatened others directly or through family members.

[134] Dunlop (2012: 2) defines the policy as "empowerment of pro-Moscow Chechens headed up by representatives of the Kadyrov family." See Ratelle and Soulemanov (2016) for a review of scholarship on the policy; the authors define Chechenization as " a Russia-led policy aimed at destroying the insurgency in the once-breakaway republic through delegating significant military, economic, and political powers to the local authorities, effectively transforming an initially anti-Russian popular revolt into an internal Chechen affair."

second war, the first was child's play" (Interview 53 2017). Another stated, "When the bombing stopped, the counterinsurgency sweeps started" (Oral history 8). By March 2001, security services established checkpoints every two to three kilometers and enacted curfews (Osmayev 2008: 185). While in the first war a lot of people in Grozny were able to flee to their relatives in the villages, in the second war "young people would disappear at the checkpoints, they would pull people off the marshrutkas [buses]. Best case scenario, their disfigured bodies were dumped on the outskirts; in the worst case, they disappeared without a trace" (Interview 49 2016). The human rights organization Memorial, whose team documented violence during both Chechen Wars, identified 1,087 individuals kidnapped between 2004 and 2009.[135] A book created by a local organization, Chechen Mothers for Peace, identified 294 individuals whose location remained unknown when the book was written in 2014. Human rights groups estimate that up to five thousand individuals disappeared during the Second War (IHF 2006: 56). Interviewees who were teenagers during the Second War describe the trauma of Russian soldiers' searches at checkpoints on the way to school. Others who had family members disappear describe going to search for their bodies in the woods outside the village of Gikalo where troops often left them.

Violence also became more direct, structuring civilians' quotidian decisions and movements. In addition to federal forces bombing civilian zones like the infamous bombing of the main market in 1999, the introduction of checkpoints on the streets and counterinsurgency sweeps, which brought soldiers into civilians' homes, made it challenging for civilians to escape violence. Even during periods when they were not direct targets of violence, civilians remember constantly being interrogated and searched. Pervasive surveillance became an increasing part of

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[135] http://www.memo.ru/hr/hotpoints/caucas1/index.htm

counterinsurgency sweeps as more Chechens with local knowledge switched sides (Lyall 2010).

Usman Masaev, the Deputy Head of the Chechen Republic in 2002 described a

counterinsurgency sweep in his village where despite general's efforts several drunk soldiers

took an armoured personnel carrier to a neighboring town without permission and several did a

sweep of Masaev's house as he was talking to the generals (Novaya Gazeta "Billions of Rubles

Earmarked for Chechnya Spinning in Moscow" 2002). A man who was in his teens at the time

described that you could be "kidnapped, beaten, killed, buried for nothing at the time. Not for

nothing, for being a Chechen. The worst were the sweeps, which felt like an attempt to destroy

all the Chechen youth" (Oral history 5). Reflecting on the options available, particularly to young

men, during the time, Memorial wrote the choice was "either to serve the 'kadyrovtsy',

'kakievtsy', 'yamadaevtsy' or to 'disappear' without trace by 'unidentified men in camouflage'"

(Memorial 2005). Masaev similarly stated that "everyone today in Chechnya is between two

fires" (Novaya Gazeta 2002).

　　　After the incorporation of Chechen militias into the security apparatus, formally

accountable to the federal center but locally organized, Memorial documented that sweeps

became more targeted but disappearances continued and there was an increase in collective

punishments.[136] Collective punishment practices included threatening and kidnapping family

members of well-known commanders and *suspected* rebels, with victims ranging in age from

early teens to the elderly. It was not uncommon for kidnapped individuals to be tortured or found

dead. Though I never asked about collective punishment practices directly, several of my

interviews volunteered information about them. Most commonly, interviewees were discussing it

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[136] See https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/46963aff0.pdf for an English-language summary of the 2004-2005 reports.

as a state practice but they also mentioned several incidents in which rebels killed family members of those collaborating with the state. Thus, the Second War began with the indiscriminate bombing of the First War, but increasingly expanded the repertoire of violence, incorporating more direct techniques and more extra-lethal violence.

Furthermore, in addition to expanding the techniques and repertoire of violence, the Second War was characterized by selective targeting of local administrative officials and informal authorities by *both* the state and Chechen rebels. Despite the significance of this violence, it is one of the "silences" within Chechen society (Fuiji 2010) – a past individuals seem to prefer to forget, or at a minimum not discuss compared to the indiscriminate targeting by the Russian state.[137] With few exceptional cases, if local authorities did not *successfully* resist Chechen fighters from entering a village and prevent violence, the counterinsurgency forces - now composed of a mixture of federal and Chechen soldiers (Lyall 2009; 2010) - treated local and non-state authorities as supporting the rebels. One of the most famous cases was in Alhan-Kala, where federal troops allegedly killed Malika Umazheva. Umazheva was the only female administrator at the time and gained international attention for speaking out again federal counterinsurgency sweeps. The granddaughter of a respected elder described how her grandfather was arrested, when he was returned the soldiers told her to remember that they know where he is and can come back anytime (Interview 81 2018). Chechen rebels, on the other hand, perceived anyone associated with state institutions, police officers but also local village administrators, as cooperating with the federal forces (Interview 54 2017; Interview with 60 2017). Beginning in 2000, civilians started finding leaflets scattered around villages with lists of

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[137] It was not until my third trip that someone mentioned it, likely because it was representative of a violent fragmentation within Chechen society people in general prefer not to discuss.

individuals the shari'a courts supposedly found to be cooperating with Russians (Osmayev 2008:

237; 599).

Though statistics or systematic accounts for the full war are not available to my

knowledge, I compiled information from several local sources to understand the prevalence of

selective targeting. Local academic Abbaz Osmayev's documentation reveals that between 1999

and 2002, 230 MVD (local police) officers were reported killed; from 2001 through the first

quarter of 2002, nine imams were killed and one kidnapped; additionally, there were 53

assassination attempts on local administrators and their families (Osmayev 2008: 577). The

newspaper *Nezavisimaya Gozeta* identified 89 attacks resulting in deaths of at least one local

authority, including imams, elders, school directors, and local administrators, between 2000 and

August 2002 when the article was published. Though documented assassinations were fairly

spread out across Chechnya, they were particularly prominent in Urus-Martanovsky, Bedenski,

and Kurchaloiavsky districts. The latter - and the village Tsentaroi specifically, became the

stronghold of Kadyrov's administration. Most of these crimes remain unsolved. The attacks

persisted after the assassination of leaders on both sides – Akhmad Kadyrov in 2004 and Alsan

Maskhadov in 2005 – suggesting they became institutionalized as a practice. For example, the

human rights group Memorial, which gathered extensive testimonials during the wars in

Chechnya reported that in October 2005, unidentified armed men killed Khatsuev Umar, the

head of administration of the village Chechen-Aul; in August, a large group of Chechen armed

men similarly attacked the house of the head of local administration Shamkhan Beksultanov in

Roshni-Chu. According to the residents, the group captured one of Beksultanov's sons and

released him to tell his father to resign or be killed (Memorial 2005).[138] The report details several other incidents where Chechen rebels killed those accused of providing information or otherwise collaborating with Russian forces. A previous village administrator described the uncertainty and risk that he took on returning to his village after the community's elders asked him to step into that role, saying that everyone knew agreeing to serve in an administrative position at the time was putting yourself between the two sides (Interview 85 2018). Thus, in addition to the expansion of the techniques and repertoire of violence, the Second War introduced a pattern of selective targeting not prominent in the First War.

Thus, selective targeting during the Second War was not limited to Russian troops. Chechen rebels utilized it as well. Unlike in the First War, Chechen rebels - and most interviewees do not emphasize or suggest that Chechen fighters in the Second War were self-defense fighters like in the First - increasingly also targeted civilians such that violence against civilians was more two sided in the Second War with potentially important implications for post-conflict governance. However, across my original data and secondary sources I examined, even respondents that said Chechen rebels were indirectly responsible by putting civilians in harms way said they primarily blamed Russian troops for violence. Several stated that they believed Shamil Basayev was a Russian agent because "his actions were directed at destroying people" (Oral history 2), highlighting that for many civilians violence and the Russian state were inextricably linked. A 2003 study that drew on a representative survey and focus groups found that Chechens perceived the main threat to their safety and belongings to be federal forces (Haikin and Cherepkova 2003: 24-25). In hundreds of interviews in the ChechenArchive

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[138] http://old.memo.ru/hr/hotpoints/n-caucas/atmstr/eng/16.htm

conducted between 1995 and 2000 across Chechnya civilians consistently describe that they are "being destroyed" by the Russian state. My interviewees, conducted between 2014 and 2018, similarly emphasize the cruelty and violence of *federal troops* and consistently blame them for the conflict.

This section established the shift in the pattern of violence between the First and Second War, highlighting its expanded repertoire, more direct and extra-lethal techniques, as well as the escalation of selecting targeting by Russian and Chechen armed groups, with the latter increasingly split between those aligned with federal troops and fighting against them. To understand the impact of the violence, I asked respondents in my survey which forms of violence occurred in their communities. This initial question did not differentiate between the two wars but provides an overview of the pattern of violence by the end of the Second War.[139] Nevertheless, the survey responses demonstrate how widespread violence was and help understand the repertoire of violence.

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[139] Importantly the survey, since it was only conducted in Chechnya, does not include refugees that fled. Though some refugees came back, estimates from 2000 suggest that at that point roughly 200,000 individuals were either refugees or IDPs (Nichols 2000). Many of them, and those that fled afterwards, are likely excluded from this study.

Figure 24: Violence Experienced

Enumerators then asked the respondents follow-up questions about form of violence they selected, asking when it occurred, how frequently, and how it impacted them personally. The table below summarizes the percentage of respondents who selected each time period when asked when each type of violence occurred, with respondents able to select multiple time periods.

Table 5: And when did "the type of violence selected" occur to the best of your recall?

Type	First War	Second War
Crime	70.1	74

Bombing	72.3	78.8
Terrorism	61.2	77.6
Massacre	74.2	83.7
Sweep	9.6	89.8
Battle	72.4	84
Leader	43.6	61.4
Groups	40	86.7

The results demonstrate that all forms of violence were more prevalent in the Second War than the First, with particularly large changes in the prevalence of counterinsurgency sweeps, killings of influential local leaders, and violence between groups (ethnic, religious, or other).

When asked about the overall impact of violence since the collapse of the Soviet Union on their lives, the contrast with Dagestan is stark. Just over 25% of respondents stated it significantly impacted their life with only 8.4% saying not at all.

Figure 25: Overall Impact of Violence

Understanding the impact of the two wars, and the Second War specifically, requires differentiating between the "wartime" and "post-war" time periods. Yet, as in many other cases there was not a clean break between the war and post-conflict period (Berdal and Zaum 2013; Huang 2017; Lake 2017; Cheng 2018) and many of the key individuals from the war transitioned into roles in the post-conflict state (Mukhopadhyay 2014; Driscoll 2015).[140] Further, as with the other cases under study, the "post-conflict" period is characterized by a decrease but not elimination of violence, making the delineation of a clear end of war more challenging.

Though the federal government formally lifted the counterinsurgency regime in Chechnya in 2009, Moscow announced the end of the "active phase" of the conflict in 2001, bombing decreased in the early 2000s, and daily armed clashes decreased by the mid-2000s.[141] When I asked my interviewees when the war ended their answers either reflect local violence or micro-level individual experiences of violence. For example, one interviewee, whose village was bombed but relatively spared from counterinsurgency sweeps, said the situation was relatively stable by 2000, which he associated with the school re-opening (Interview 72 2017). Another said it was not until 2006 when she was able to walk through Grozny safely at noon (Oral history 17). Most answers were between 2003, when Akhmad Kadyrov became head of the Republic, and 2009. However, several respondents, the whereabouts of whose family members remain unknown, said the war will continue for them until they can bury their family members' bodies.

I address this challenge by focusing on post-conflict governance in contemporary Chechnya, but with attention to *when* and *how* the governance trajectory under study -

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[140] This is not a rare outcome, evident by the expanding literature focused on rebel-to-party transitions (Lyons 2016; Zaks working paper).

[141] Marten (2012) chapter 5 provides a detailed account of the transition from federal to local control over the security organs and legalization of the informal militias.

centralization - began to take hold and how it was institutionalized. The survey evidence allows me to understand the overall associations between violence and governance but does not allow me to differentiate between the impact of violence in the First vis-a-vis Second Wars. To overcome this challenge and help capture the timing of different changes, I rely upon the interviews, oral histories, recorded accounts from the wartime periods, and secondary literature. This helps capture the *process* of centralization rather than treating it as a static outcome.

Post-Conflict Governance: Direct and Indirect Centralization

Compared to the First War, the Second War set the conditions for centralization of governance in the Chechen state. Centralization occurred in three ways. First, centralization occurred *directly* through state dominance of material dimensions, crowding out non-state authorities' capacity to provide goods and leaving civilians with limited options for self-governance. Second, centralization in dispute resolution occurred predominantly *indirectly* through state control over and regulation of non-state authorities. Though religious authorities and elders remain the dominant authorities in dispute resolution, due to the removal of *autonomous* non-state authorities, civilians are left with a narrowed set of options to regulate disputes beyond state-regulated and state-approved institutions. Importantly, religious authorities and respected elders remain dominant actors in dispute resolution - this has not changed. What shifted is the extent of their autonomy vis-a-vis state authorities. Finally, more than in the other cases at hand, state elites seek to regulate social order, and do so through the incorporation of previously non-state institutions. Decisions civilians previously made within their family are now increasingly publicly-regulated. As discussed, state authorities sought to make similar changes earlier, particularly during the interwar period when Yandarbiyev sought to centralize power and

instill a religious order for governance. However, he encountered fierce resistance which contemporary republic elites in Chechnya have not faced. Thus, examining contemporary post-conflict governance in Chechnya reveals alternative pathways to centralization, forged through distinct relationships between state and ostensibly non-state authorities.

Re-examining the architecture of governance established in the outcomes chapter, we see strong state penetration of the material dimensions - and a greater role for republic elites in Chechnya than in neighboring republics - while religious authorities and elders are significantly more prominent in dispute resolution, and a range of authorities regulate social order. Unlike in Dagestan, I do not attempt to aggregate the domains into state-nonstate categories, since, as established in the outcomes chapter, these labels obfuscate more than they reveal in Chechnya.[142]

Figure 26: Republic Governance Regime

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
[142] I provide a table with the mean and standard deviation across communities in the chapter appendix

Existing studies have focused on the impact of counterinsurgency tactics on rebel violence (Lyall 2009; 2010; Toft and Zhukov 2015; Souleimanov and Siroky 2016) and on the spread of the conflict to neighboring regions (O'Loughlin et al 2011; Zhukov 2012; Ware 2013). In this sense, the impact of violence in the second war has been heavily researched. Further, Sokiryanskaya (2009), Ratelle (2014), and Souleimanov (2015) have documented how the counterinsurgency tactics influenced civilians' daily lives and Lazarev (2018) demonstrated how exposure to violence impacted civilian preferences for legal institutions. Building on this detailed case literature, I examine how the heterogeneous impact of violence in Chechnya contributed to centralization. As the table in the appendix demonstrates and I discuss below, violence had minimal impact on goods provision but significantly impacted dispute resolution and social order. Counterinsurgency sweeps, bombing, and battles were most commonly associated with changes in governance.

I examine each of the three theorized mechanisms in turn: civilian preferences, collective action capacities, and the pattern of informal and local authority integration. First, I look at civilian preferences, demonstrating that they diverge across dimensions of governance. Second, I examine how civil war shaped the collective action capacity of non-state authorities vis-a-vis state elites. Finally, I turn to the pattern of integration, tracing how the relationship between state and ostensibly non-state authorities shifted such that authority now rests in Chechen state elites in contrast to the inter-war period. I conclude this section by drawing the connection across these three interconnected mechanisms to show how they jointly shape governance.

Civilian Preferences

Understanding governance requires understanding how civilians choose between the options available to them. The First War resulted in significant alienation of Chechen civilians from the Russian state. Interviews consistently reveal that the Second War further undermined Russian legitimacy, solidifying civilian perceptions that they were subjects to be controlled and regulated, not citizens with rights within the Russian state. As one woman described, "prior to 1999, I considered myself in the opposition [to Dudayev]. I had never been a supporter of Dudayev or Maskhadov, I thought all of this was a crazy idea and that nothing would come of it. But as of 1999, I no longer consider myself Russian" (Oral history 7). The persistent inaction of state officials further cemented the perception that Chechen civilians could not expect fairness or equality within the Russian state, as exemplified by this statement from a village administrator:

People call us a region of Russia, but it's nothing of the kind! If a Chechen is killed, nothing happens. No court, no procurators. And no help. We don't care who we are a part of – Russia, India, America! We just want to live on this little plot of land. We're not asking to be rich, to build ourselves mansions. We need very little – to walk to the forest, feed ourselves from it, like before, tend to our vegetable gardens, our cattle….and all the while the only certainty is that people are very really being killed." IHF 2006: 70.

One man, asked to describe how civilians felt by the end of the war stated: "the best referendum was just looking on the roads and seeing all the people fleeing. If you just get a recording of the roads to Dagestan or Ingushetia filled with people, that should tell you all you need to know" (Interview 87 2018). Another respondent highlighted the cruel irony of the situation – after describing a fire where five people were burned alive and another individual lost his legs and was not allowed to be transported to the hospital because the soldiers had orders not to let anyone through, the woman said, "and this was the behavior of the people that came here to establish constitutional order" (Interview 76 2018). I consistently encountered this sentiment. A woman from a mountain district stated: "We can be bombed, killed, and our children as well.

What is the point of talking about average people when even politicians, writers, composers said

that our kids can be destroyed because they will grow up to enact revenge" (Oral history 12).

Summarizing the impact of the Second War on Chechen society, another woman described her

feeling of helplessness:

I believe this second war broke people more. I cannot say I had any hopes in 2003,
everything kind of atrophied. The only thing I wanted was for the war to end, for stability
and for me to be able to return home. Every time some awful event would destroy any
hope so until the last moment I had a hard time believing that there would really be
peace. Very often I just wanted to leave this country and go somewhere because I was
completely disillusioned with the government, with everyone (Interview 18 2014).

These accounts, from villages across Chechnya, consistently demonstrate an overall alienation

from the federal government. This had been a persistent and increasingly common sentiment

since the First War.

However, compared to the First War, civilians did not necessarily support Chechen

leadership either. One woman summarized: "Everyone was tired of the war. We did not know

who to root for or who to trust because we did not want the Russians to stay in Chechnya, but we

did not want them to leave because it turned out that life under our own was not better" (Oral

history 19). In fact, a majority of the oral histories reveal that civilians did not trust the new

regime under Kadyrov, at least initially, for switching sides and aligning with the Russian state.

They saw a hypocrisy since the individual "offering them an end to war was the same one calling

for gazavat just a few years earlier" (Oral history 5). Some went on to say that they

simultaneously understood this was likely the only path to peace. Therefore, substantial

alienation from the federal center did not transfer to support for Chechen leadership. It is not

immediately apparent who civilians perceived to be the dominant authorities or which

institutions they preferred. Moreover, it does not reveal if there are any differences across domains of governance. To understand this, I turn to the survey data.

First, civilians were asked a battery of four questions to understand their broad perception of different authorities. Specifically, the questions asked who in the community is the most accessible, most trustworthy, most fair, and whose decisions are most likely to be obeyed.[143]

Figure 27: Authority Characteristics

Two matters are evident: first, there is variation in who respondents selected across questions that represent different elements of authority, and, second, central administrators are almost never selected. The wars did not dismantle trust in religious authorities or elders in Chechnya, perceptions of their fairness, or their obedience. Moreover, republic authorities, receiving less

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[143] The order of the questions was randomized.

than 2% in both of the other republics, are selected by just over 10.2% of the population as the most trustworthy and 10.5% as the most obeyed.

Next, I utilize hierarchical models to see if there is an association between violence - measured by respondents' selection of violent events in their community - and their perceptions of different authorities. I control for mobility,[144] religiosity,[145] and gender.[146] The results reveal that, with the exception of violence between identity groups, violence either made no difference or is associated with a less positive perception of local and republic level administrators. Specifically, counterinsurgency sweeps are associated with a decrease in respondents selecting local and republic administrators as the most trustworthy or fair. Massacres are associated with a decrease in respondents selecting local administrators as the most likely to be obeyed, trustworthy, or fair. Crime and having a local authority killed in the community were also associated with decreased trust in republic and local administrators respectively.

Importantly, given the targeting of local officials and change in republic elites during the 2000s, particularly after 2005 when Ramzan Kadyrov became head of the republic, local and republic administrators are no longer the same individuals who held these positions prior to the Second War. Nevertheless, civilians who selected their communities as having experienced violence of any type were less likely to say that local and republic level administrators are the most likely to be obeyed, trusted, or fairest in their communities. This provides support for

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[144] This comes from a survey question, which asked respondents if anyone in their household lives in a different village or city more than 30 days out of the year. It accounts for the likelihood that individuals' mobility changes their exposure to different authorities and embeddedness in local community networks (Lu 2014).
[145] This comes from a survey question as to whether the respondent selected religion as their primary identity. We may expect more religious individuals to more commonly select religious authorities.
[146] This comes from enumerator identification of respondents' gender. Lazarev (2018) found that gender significantly impacted preferences for legal institutions in Chechnya.

Hypothesis 1, which predicted that when the state is blamed for the conflict, as the interviews consistently demonstrate was the case in Chechnya, state administrators are likely to have a particularly challenging time regaining authority due to changes in civilian perceptions and lack of trust.

The more negative perceptions of state administrators is paralleled by more positive perceptions of elders and religious authorities, as well as community members with the exception respondents that identified bombing in their community. Sweeps, massacres, and crime are all associated with increased trust of elders. Massacres are similarly associated with an increase in perceived obedience of elders and community members while sweeps are associated with perceived increase in fairness of religious authorities. This highlights the central role elders and religious authorities, as well as community networks, continue to play in Chechen society, despite their linkages to the state. Civilians generally continue to perceive them as trustworthy, fair, and obeyed. Civilians that identify their communities as having experienced violence are more likely to perceive these authorities positively.

This confirms that experiencing violence pushed civilians away from the state, alienating them not just from the federal center but also from republic and local administrators who are now appointed in a top-down manner, instead of being accountable to local communities as before.

Do civilians' perceptions differ across dimensions of governance? I asked respondents who they would turn to if they have a problem with infrastructure to understand their preference for goods provision. Respondents were allowed to list multiple options if they were used jointly.

Table 6: If you have an infrastructure problem in your community, who do you usually go to?

Central administrators	0.3
Republic administrators	13.6

Local administrators	74.4
Religious authorities	0.8
Elders	1.0
Community members	27.8
Businessmen	0.3

There is almost no difference between the percentage of respondents that selected local administrators for this question and the percentage who, when asked who makes decisions about infrastructure in their community, selected local administrators (74.6%). Community members and republic administrators also feature prominently, the latter more so than in Dagestan. Moreover, there are minimal differences between respondents who stated their communities experienced violence and those who did not, with the exception of massacres and crime, which was associated with respondents that were significantly less likely to select local administrators.[147] Counterinsurgency sweeps, on the other hand, are associated with a decrease in respondents reporting they turn to community members to resolve problems with infrastructure. This shows there were some shifts within civilian preferences for goods provision but, nevertheless, local administrators were consistently the main authorities respondents selected across all groups.

To assess the impact of violence on civilian preferences for dispute resolution, the survey asked respondents which legal order *should* be followed in situations where Russian law, shari'a, and adat contradict. Importantly this assess civilian preferences for dispute resolution institutions rather than authorities, but still helps understand what type of governance system civilians

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[147] Impact of crime on selecting local administrators: Coefficient = -0.13089 SE= 0.04510 p= 0.00386 **
Impact of crime on selecting local administrators: Coefficient = -0.11176 SE= 0.04825 p= 0.0209 *

prefer.[148] Though there was a high non-response rate for this question (23.54%),[149] highlighting

the sensitivity of the question. Shari'a dominates among those that answered the question,

selected by 53.9% of respondents, followed by Russian law, selected by 36.4% of respondents,

and finally, adat, selected by 9.6% of respondents. The preference for shari'a *over* Russian law,

demonstrates that society has not only become more religious but that there is a strong demand in

society for religious basis for dispute resolution institutions. The costs to ignoring this demand

are likely high. The preferences fall far short of a consensus, however. That a significant portion

of the population still prefers a separation between religion and politics in dispute resolution

presents a clear challenge to any cohesive system of dispute resolution. This fragmentation is

echoed in civilians' actual behaviors, with 24.2% of respondents saying they would never go to

an imam, 24.7% saying they would never go to an elder, and 30.9% saying they would never go

to the police for assistance with a dispute.

Violence - specifically counterinsurgency sweeps - are associated with a significant and

substantial decrease in support for shari'a[150] and increasing support for adat.[151] Only 32.3% of

respondents who identify counterinsurgency sweeps in their communities stated that they prefer

shari'a for dispute resolution compared to 51.5% of respondents that did not identify

counterinsurgency sweeps in their communities. Community exposure to a counterinsurgency

sweep shifted preferences for adat from 4.3% to 13.6%. Though sweeps are also associated with

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[148] Lazarev (2018) extensively discusses civilian preferences for dispute resolution institutions.

[149] The non-responses are likely to be due to the sensitivity of the question. However, which answer is most sensitive is not clear. On the one hand, selecting shari'a over Russian law signals a disagreement with the formal legal system. Yet, given the prevalence of religion in Chechen society and republic administrator's support for shari'a, there may be social desirability for the respondent demonstrate they are religious.

[150] Coefficient = -0.187940 SE = 0.050375 p = 0.000217 ***

[151] Coefficient = 0.100140   SE = 0.033188 p= 0.00273 **

increased preferences for Russian law (from 21.2% to 36.6%) the change is not statistically significant. Given that counterinsurgency sweeps are the driver of this change, it likely stems from the Second War. Counterinsurgency sweeps did not lead to greater support for the federal legal system but did decrease support for rebels' vision of the state, pushing civilians to their pre-existing traditional modes of dispute resolution. This echoes the logic commonly encountered in interviews that even though society became increasingly religious, violence during the Second War increasingly alienated civilians from both the Russian state and rebels.

Comparing the impact of violence on dispute resolution vis-a-vis goods provision provides support for Hypothesis 1a, which stated that the impact of violence on civilian perceptions is likely to be uneven, with less impact on the material dimensions of governance. There is a more cohesive set of preferences for goods provision, which Chechens continue to perceive as the responsibility of state authorities, reflecting a continuity of Soviet practices. Given that stable alternatives for goods provision did not develop during state collapse or wartime, this continuity makes logical sense. Preferences for dispute resolution, on the other hand, are fragmented and, compared to Dudayev's period shifted towards shari'a. This change is not simply a reflection of increased religiosity in post-Soviet society broadly, evident in the comparison with Dagestan where only 30.0% of respondents selected shari'a. Instead, it likely reflects alienation from the Russian state due to the wars and greater role religious authorities came to play during state collapse and wars in Chechnya specifically. Further, as many interviewees suggested and one respondent succinctly described, the wars prevented elders from passing "conservative values and traditions, which were usually passed from generation to

generation and which stabilized society" to the youth (Oral history 1). Nevertheless,

counterinsurgency sweeps limited this shift in civilian preferences.

Though the survey did not assess preferences about the social order, interviews

consistently demonstrate a strong sense that there has been a degradation of Chechen values and

culture and a persistent desire to rehabilitate and restore them. The generational split is evident

here as well with older interviewees often focusing more on restoration of pre-existing values

whereas the younger interviewees more commonly reference Chechen traditions with a religious

component. Nevertheless, consistently across interviews, individuals emphasize the importance

of maintaining Chechen "culture, roots and language" (Oral history 5), but disagree as to whether

this is the government's role. An older interviewee reflected on the greater republic elite

intrusion into what he perceived to be private matters: "We don't have a culture anymore – we

used to but we don't. Maybe those that are beyond the borders of the republic have managed to

maintain it but not here - the most awful thing for any Chechen is to be ridiculed and humiliated

and pushed down as we are now" (Interview 84 2018). Another felt things are not so black and

white - he supported the government's decree to forbid bridal kidnapping but strongly opposed

regulations over dress (Interview 64 2018). Several of my interviewees who were more religious

stated they appreciated state support for religion because they felt they could wear their more

conservative clothing without concern, though a small number also mentioned that they did not

appreciate that they could not wear other clothing that state policy has come to associate with

Wahhabism (Interview 77 2018; Interview 80 2018). This demonstrates that civilian preferences

are quite varied but respond to very specific policies, not social order broadly. The two wars

created a strong and consistent desire for unification in Chechen values and traditions; however, there is not a unified vision as to who should enforce it and how this should look.

Collective Action Capacity

Civilian preferences alone are insufficient to explain institutional trajectories, particularly if civilians are unable or unwilling to act on their preferences. While small goods or disputes can be resolved without collective action,[152] most organization of self-governance or demand-making on state authorities requires joint efforts. I argue that armed conflict can impact collective action, and in turn governance, by impacting (1) the presence of skilled leaders (Pearlman 2011; Finkel 2015) and (2) the cohesion of community networks (Thachil 2015; Arjona 2016; Kaplan 2017). Communities lacking these characteristics should be less likely to organize self-governance, demand governance from state authorities, or resist state attempts at centralization.

The response to the First War demonstrated that the widespread, indiscriminate violence initially strengthened the capacity of non-state authorities - both armed and nonviolent, and increased the cohesion of communities who overcame disagreements prevalent during Dudayev's rule when faced with Russian violence. This prevented centralization of authority in the interwar period, blocking state administrators attempts to gain control of the territory or enforce decrees. The Second War entailed a broader repertoire of indiscriminate violence, alongside more direct techniques and selective targeting that penetrated civilian daily lives, resulting in both the removal of key leaders and decreased trust and cohesion within Chechen society, counteracting the gains in capacity to organize collective action from the First War.

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[152] Murtazashvili (2016) provides a theoretical framework to understand why different levels of collective action are necessary for different goods.

Coming into the Second War, informal authorities and village administrators sought to reassert their authority and utilize tactics they used in the First War to protect their villages and organize governance. Following two particularly brutal sweeps in Starayi Atagi and Sernovodsk, General Lieutenant Moltenskiy issued Order #80 that the village head, among other officials, had to sign off after troops conducted a sweep that they were given a list of detained and do not have complaints as to how it proceeded (Memorial 27 March 2002).[153] Interviews consistently state that in practice, with few exceptions, troops purposefully scheduled counterinsurgency sweeps when the village head was gone or coerced administrators into signing, such that de facto, local administrators could not effectively minimize violence' and their influence waned. Even where villages effectively prevented Chechen rebels from entering the village, this did not help avoid counterinsurgency sweeps and aerial shelling (Oral history 9). Further, federal troops continued utilizing large-scale massacres, such as in Novoe Aldi and Komsomolskoe. A man from Urus-Martan who helped organize civilian self-defense patrols said they were effective but Russian forces did everything to demobilize them (Oral history 4). As the Second War drew on, selective targeting removed local leaders who could work with both sides and diminished the effectiveness of non-state and local authorities that remained, undermining collective action. The four individuals I met with who served as heads of villages during the 2000s described that even though they retained their communities' respect they felt increasing helplessness and frustration from their inability to influence decision-making, protect their communities, or provide them with public goods.[154] In a 2008 interview Vakhit Akaev, founder of the modern Islamic school in

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[153] The body of the order can be found at: http://old.memo.ru/hr/hotpoints/n-caucas/misc/ordertext.htm

[154] I do not want to minimize the important work of local administrators in this period. Several were very proud of their ability to protect their village at points, organize mutual assistance within the village, and help their residents

Chechnya and Head of the Department of theory and practice of social work of the Chechen

State University, when asked about the limited number of religious actors with authority beyond

their village or district, stated "in the first years of this decade [after Maskhadov's rule], dozens

of imams and mullahs from traditional Islam died at the hands of extremists. That is, the

religious elite of Chechen society was destroyed. Therefore, today the authoritative

representatives of the clergy throughout the Republic can be counted on the fingers of one hand"

("Vakhit Akayev: In Chechnya, Islam is a factor that cements society" 2008 Islam.ru).

Early in the second war, communities tried to organize despite losses of key leaders due

to assassinations and limitations placed on those who remained. Their riskiest form of collective

action civilians organized were protests calling for the release of someone security forces

detained. Demonstrations commonly followed counterinsurgency sweeps, sometimes bringing

the bodies of those killed out to demand justice (Osmayev 2008: 318-320). Several times

civilians blocked the main highways, such as the August 1st 2001 demonstration where nearly

400 people blocked the Rostov-Baku road; federal troops responded with gunfire (ibid. 293).

Increasingly, troops dispersed demonstrations with violence and without an answer to the

demands.

In addition to removing leaders capable of organizing collective action effectively, the

Second War fragmented Chechen society, decreasing trust and cohesion. Though some

communities and networks maintained an ability to organize collective action internally, the

Second War widened the fractures that began to appear in the interwar period. While there was

disagreement within all of the republics in the North Caucasus about the post-Soviet institutional

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get compensation when federal elites began the policy. Despite these occasional and important victories, they
expressed a high degree of frustration with the limitations imposed on them.

design, the wars in Chechnya exacerbated and politicized these divisions. Numerous

interviewees emphasized that reciprocal assistance which allowed Chechens to survive crises

previously decreased. One young man specifically pointed to the massive fences residents

installed when their rebuilt their homes, saying this is a reflection of people's broader attempts to

block themselves off from the rest of society (Interview 69 2018). One sixty-year-old

summarized:

There is a growing disdain not only for the elderly, but also between young people
themselves. I'm not talking about the whole nation, of course. Part of her. But that part of
the people which adhered to former customs and traditions are not able to influence
anything because to do this, they need power. It used to be that the opinion of the village
was enough to "burn the earth under someone's feet" if he committed any offense. Now
Kadyrov thoroughly took up morality. What happens – I don't know. (Oral history 9)

His statement highlights several key points. First, the degradation of pre-existing leadership

hierarchy. Interviewees had different interpretations as to whether this is positive or negative,

some commenting that this provides greater individual freedom while others, often older, reflect

that while cities can be rebuilt, traditions cannot. Nevertheless, there is consistent agreement that

neither traditions nor elders have the authority they previously had and their enforcement

capacity has diminished, though not disappeared. Another interviewee highlighted a similar

disrupture of the hierarchy within the state, saying that not a single person who was in

administration during the Soviet era is in power now,[155] emphasizing not just the turnover but the

lack of members of the older generation who used to be the core of decision-making (Oral

history 14). Second, the statement highlights that the split in Chechen society is not solely

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[155] See https://www.bbc.com/russian/features-44576739#anchor1 for a detailed account of who holds which
positions in Chechnya and their ties to the head of the republic, Ramzan Kadyrov.

generational but prevalent within youth. Finally, the statement points to increased penetration and regulation of social order by republic state elites.

To understand the potential for collective action in Chechnya more systematically I turn to several questions from the survey. First, I examine the extent of cohesion by assessing respondents' trust. The survey reveals that present-day Chechnya has the highest rate of distrust among the three republics, with 70.6% of survey respondents in Chechnya stating that one needs to be careful when interacting with others.[156] This suggests that overcoming republic-wide collective action problems and banding together, as society did during the First War, is now likely to be challenging. While the First War united Chechen society against a common enemy, the Second War was characterized by increasing violence between Chechens, fragmenting social cohesion and removing capable leaders, as predicted by Hypothesis 2a.

The survey also asked individuals about their primary identity, which literature has identified as an explanation for how individuals can overcome collective action problems (Habyarimana et al. 2007; Singh 2010; Murtazashvili 2016). Since Chechnya is mono-ethnic, Chechen identity has potential to serve as a source of cohesion, as Dudayev sought to make it when he was President. Yet, only 12.08% of respondents selected ethnicity as their primary identity. Instead, 48.16% of respondents selected religion, pointing to a transformation of the social fabric of society, a point commonly referenced in interviews. In contemporary Chechnya, it is likely now easier to organize collective action based on a joint religious identity rather than ethnicity. These mechanisms provide insight into present-day challenges of organizing collective action developed through two wars.

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[156] 53.5% of respondents in Ingushetia and 67.8% in Dagestan selected this option. Thus, Chechnya, despite being ethnically homogeneous, has higher rates of distrust than Dagestan.

Assessing actual behaviors is also useful to understand collective action. To do this I asked individuals about their participation in religious, kinship, and mutual assistance networks, as well as participation in community service events like *belhi*.[157] Though these are sometimes also mobilized by the state, interviews suggest that most commonly participation is incentivized by community expectations. The responses, presented in the table below, show that individuals are actually highly engaged in their community networks, particularly through financial assistance to each other, community service, and religious participation.[158] Less prevalent are extended kinship gatherings, echoing interviewees' comments that teips have minimal impact.

Table 7: Forms of Collective Action (Chechnya)

	Have Done	*Might Do*	*Would never do*
Financial assistance	75.15	21.08	3.76
Community service	69.62	20.63	9.75
Attend religious gatherings	52.41	35.67	11.92
Attend kinship gatherings	29.89	43.91	26.21

Further, 28.22% of respondents said their community meets once or more a week, more than twice the percent in Dagestan and Ingushetia. Collective action has not fully dissipated. However, it appears to have become inconsistent and the networks within which it is organized narrowed.

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[157] See Reeves (2018) on how community service is mobilized and role it plays in state-building in Central Asia.

[158] Religious attendance is largely limited to males. When broken up by gender, 71.3% of males said they attend religious gatherings, compared to 35.1% of women.

Together the information on collective action provides a complicated picture. Interviews and survey data show there is a high level of distrust in society broadly. Unlike the First War, the Second War decreased cohesion in the republic. Further, interviews describe that the Second War removed key leaders and disrupted existing hierarchies. As the war progressed, elders' imams', and local administrators' role and ability to minimize violence or impact decision-making increasingly narrowed. Yet, the data also demonstrates that individuals remain involved in their religious and community networks, suggesting potential for collective action has not withered. Further, religion has become the primary identity for a significant part of Chechens, demonstrating that while society has fragmented religion has appeared as a potential common identity, which could be mobilized for collective action. Understanding the governance trajectory, therefore, requires understanding religious authorities' role in contemporary Chechen society. While the First War strengthened non-state authorities influence and increased cohesion in communities, the Second War diminished, though not destroyed, it.

Pattern of Integration

Examining civilian preferences and collective action capacity helps understand whether society can mobilize bottom-up demands. However, it is also necessary to examine the pattern of integration - the relationship of local and informal elites to the state - to assess the range of alternatives civilians have (McMann 2014; Kruks-Wisner 2018). The pattern of integration also helps understand whose rules are enforced and where authority rests, not just on paper, but on the ground. Where non-state authorities maintain not just the capacity to mobilize collective action but their autonomy, they can serve as a powerful counterbalance to state authorities (Migdal 2001; Boone 2003). Yet, where ostensibly non-state and state authorities are fused, this

relationship can crowd out or bypass civilian involvement (Gryzmala-Busse 2015), limiting the governance options available to civilians. The sections on civilian preferences and collective action both demonstrate that, in addition to local and republic administrators, a significant portion of the population continues to have strong ties to religious authorities, and slightly less so elders, making both of these ostensibly informal authorities - and their relationship to the state - particularly relevant for understanding governance in Chechnya. In this section, I demonstrate that through the Second War into the post-conflict period, autonomy of elders, imams, and local administrators increasingly shrank as republic elites integrated all three into a state hierarchy.

Given that elders and imams consistently had less ties to extraction or goods production, the reconfiguration of their relationship to the state had less impact on material dimensions of governance. Religious authorities and elders may serve as intermediaries to the state but rarely provide goods directly. Republic state elites expanded their control over these domains directly, prioritizing the Eastern part of the republic where their power base was centered for goods provision, without having to negotiate or overcome resistance from non-state authorities. In villages associated with rebels who refused to disarm, goods provision came slower. Through the mid-2000s, as one resident explained, civilians survived as they could with the help coming in the form of building materials occasionally provided by the Danish Refugee Council and assistance from relatives who left the republic (Interview 19 2014). *Grozenskiy Rabochi,* the only independent newspaper operating in the republic at the time, consistently published articles in the early and mid-2000s highlighting civilians' economic struggles, such as the December 18th 2003 article "How to Survive Amidst Destruction and Unemployment." According to the local administrator of Leninsky District in Grozny, only 13 of the pre-existing 22 schools were

operational by 2003, mostly due to the efforts of local parents and teachers (*Grozenskiy Rabochi* 6 Dec 2003). However, with major economic assistance from Moscow and an informal policy where all state employees, businessmen, and individuals receiving compensation from Moscow had to contribute a percent of their pay to the Akhmad Kadyrov Fund (Interview 37 2015; Oral history 1),[159] Chechen republic elites regained a monopoly over extraction and began consistently providing public goods. My interviewee who was involved with the reconstruction process at the time justified the informal extraction practices by stating that it was impossible to rebuild the republic otherwise (Interview 43 2015). Few deny these practices, either saying they prefer not to talk about the way reconstruction was funded or "that the only way to do it at the time was through a harsh, centralized hierarchy" (Oral history 1).[160] Many of my interviewees simultaneously commented that the best achievement of the last two decades is the republic's reconstruction and that there are constant statements and signs to remind them where to direct their gratitude.

One of the first priorities of the newly powerful republic elites was to centralize authority within the state. Memorial's interviews with the heads of numerous village administrations across the republic during the 2005 Parliamentary elections included consistent complaints that they ran for office because they believed they could improve the situation for their community but realized their repeated efforts have minimum impact and that gradually the republic administration was replacing them. Summarizing the political order by the mid-2000s, one previous politician who was in opposition to Dudayev stated: "authority today does not rest on

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[159] This interview was with a state official who helped implement this policy. It remains a widely acknowledged fact in Chechnya.

[160] These assertions also come from individuals who critique republic elites' other policies suggesting these statements are not simply made out of fear.

the population, it rests on Kurchaloi, Nosha-Urt, and Gudermes...while almost not a single person from Urus-Martan, Achoi Martan, or Shatoi are represented" (Oral history 14). By 2018, Kadyrov installed individuals who were family members, friends, or often those who served with him or his father in the early 2000s, throughout the administration, security services, demonstrating a history of loyalty. A BBC report found that out of 158 administrators, 30% were relatives of the head of the republic, 23% were co-villagers and another 12% were friends and their relatives (BBC "Chechnya of Thrones: who governs the republic and how" 2018). One of my interviewees, who was a village head for five years in the 2000s prior to being replaced, described how civilians consistently approached him for assistance with compensation and rebuilding but he felt helpless to assist because republic authorities did not support him (Interview 73 2018). Republic administrators increasingly started assigning those perceived as loyal to them throughout the republic. Increasingly through the Second War and into the post-conflict period, local administrators lost autonomous influence over governance decisions as republic elites build a vertical hierarchy *within* the state.

Republic elites increasingly expanded their authority beyond state institutions as well, melding state authority with that of elders and religious figures. In 2000, Akhmad Kadyrov told Anna Politvsakaya that he envisioned Chechnya having a similar relationship with religious authorities as in Dagestan and Ingushetia, with sufficient religious infrastructure to fill the population's needs but with a secular basis for state institutions ("The Average Person Does Not Need Freedom" 2000 Islam.RF). However, increasingly republic elites relied on informal authorities to re-establish order and began to perceive *autonomous* non-state organization as a threat.

Both Yandarbiyev and Maskhadov sought to reconfigure state institutions - specifically dispute resolution and social order - to incorporate both Islamic norms and religious authorities. As numerous executive decrees from the 1990s demonstrate, Yandarbiyev and Maskhadov sought to control these domains by, for example, controlling appointments to shari'a courts (Executive Decree #140-r 6 Dec 1998; #33, 28 Jan 1999) and using them to change family affairs and divorce institutions (Executive Decree #97 28 Aug 1996). They also both encountered fierce resistance both within and beyond the state, as discussed above. Yet, Russian troops and Chechen rebels killed key authorities capable of organizing resistance while the widespread violence created both a fear and exhaustion among the population. Many of the newly appointed imams were from Ramzan Kadyrov's Kunta-Hadji Sufi brotherhood, further minimizing the public or political influence of Naqshbandi tariqat (Vahit Akayev 2008) and installing members of the brotherhood in the government, the muftiat, mosques, and medreses (Vatchigaev 2014: 6).

Due to the split in Chechen society during the Second War, the number of conflicts - and blood feuds specifically - increased, furthering the likelihood of additional violence. Under the oversight of republic elites, religious authorities took a prominent role in regulating these, and other disputes. In the early 2000s, Hamzat Hadji Salamov, the imam of Grozny's main mosque, began working to create a network of respected authorities in every village to conduct masliat (a ceremony of reconciliation in blood feuds), as well as resolve property disputes in divorce proceedings, conflicts between creditors and insolvent debtors, and disagreements within families (Grozenski Rabochi 26 Sept 2003). State authorities increasingly began to control previously autonomous spaces for dispute resolution. In a 2008 interview, Salamov himself

described how state administrators altered the role of traditional authorities when asked about the

council of elders:

if you mean the Councils of elders that operate under the administrations of each district
of the Republic. Often they exist on paper, so to speak, "for show", and are controlled by
local authorities. For this reason, people do not want to involve in the resolution of
conflicts those who will report then "on the work done", that is, will make public the
details of the conflict situation. (17 January 2008 "Head of Chechen elders Hamzat
Salamov: 'masliat' means reconciliation" Islam.RF)[161]

At that point in time, Salamov stated that his work continued without "having to report the

details of the conflict publicly"[162] (ibid.)

Yet, republic elites believed that it was necessary to establish a "Single concept for

spiritual and moral education and development of the younger generation republic of Chechnya"

evident in Ramzan Kadyrov's February 14, 2013 order with the aforementioned name. The first

sentence of the order justifies the need for state regulation due to the "destruction of the Russian

statehood through the demoralization of society, decompose its traditional principles" by

international terrorists in the 1990s, placing responsibility for restoring "patriotism, religious

values, and Vainah adats (traditional values)" on state administrators at all levels. The order

directly linked the perceived threat created by the wars to the need of state regulation of religious

affairs, and in turn both dispute resolution and symbolic order.

Similar to Yandarbiyev's decrees, its language presents a top-down program of

"educating," "forming," and "developing the next generation" that would have respect for

Chechen values as a Russian citizen. This tension comes up several times in the order,

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[161] https://www.minavtodor-chr.ru/edinaja-koncepcija-duhovno-nravstvennogo-vospitanija-i-razvitija-podrastajushhego-pokolenija-chechenskoj-respubliki/
[162] He also pointed out that women more consistently preferred the disputes settled under shari'a while men preferred adat since women had greater rights under the former institutions.

simultaneously emphasizing that Chechnya is a secular government that follows the Russian constitution and respects freedom of religion but also details the content and normative basis of a child's upbringing. This includes spelling out which values should be promoted in the family, how a family's structure should look, that families should pass down stories of famous sheiks, which artists and writers should be used to "teach the spiritual values of Chechens." Moreover, the order not only insists that "Young people need to be educated on the values of traditional religion" but that "it is important to use the authority of religious authorities in prevention anti-social behavior, extremism and terrorism." At other points, the order explicitly state that "public authorities need to use their [religious organizations'] potential in spiritual and moral education and development of the younger generation." The order states that, "Misinterpretation of norms poses a great danger to society, traditions, and customs. As a result, it is necessary for contemporary society and especially its younger generation needs not only knowledge of national ethics, but also how to comply with them." The order proceeds to lay out the variety of institutions, from media to cultural organizations, law enforcement, sports organizations, and religious authorities that have to assist in implementing this vision of Chechen society and conduct joint seminars on prevent of extremism. It also explicitly gives responsibility to the DUM of Chechnya for ensuring " realization of legal rights and protection for freedom of religion and the spread of Islam." These are all indicators of extensive fusion between religion and national identity (Gryzmala-Busse 2015: 27-28), in this case being mobilized and instrumentalized by republic-level state elites.

Unlike previous republic leaders, interviews and fieldwork observations demonstrate the current administration effectively enforces this shared vision. The fusion between religion and

the state is both physically evident with state sponsorship of religious infrastructure like

mosques, are regularly conducted jointly with local administrators and imams. Reflecting on the

aforementioned order in 2018, Rustan Abazov, the Director of the Department for Relations with

Religious and Public Organizations, stated the "strong point of the document is that it was

created by Ramzan Kadyrov and he personally controls its implementation" (02 August 2019

Grozny Inform) highlighting the oversight by republic elites, and the head of the republic

himself, in regulating dispute resolution and social order. This is a strong contrast with both

Ingushetia and Dagestan. Further, unlike in other republics, the Mufti of Chechnya Salaf-Hadji

Mizhiev holds the title of "Advisor to the Head of the Republic," demonstrating the tight

linkages between religious and state authorities. Even looking at the Instagram of the DUM,

which in Chechnya is used to report on most events organized by different administrators,

religious authorities' work is consistently presented as "implementing the orders of the Head of

the Republic." In the last several years, this has included going into schools to conduct seminars

against extremism, which does not drastically differ from other republics, but also working to

prevent divorces and reunite families, encourage payment for social services, effectively forbid

alcohol, and organize competitions about the role of "Akhmat-Haji Kadyrov in the formation of

peace and prosperity of the Chechen Republic" (DUM Instagram post May 11 2019).

Even before the order officially passed, in 2010, Ramzan Kadyrov relied on religious

authorities to enforce his decrees, such as forbidding bridal kidnapping. After Ramzan Kadyrov

forbid the practices, Chechnya's Mufti Sultan Mirzaev issued a statement that bridal kidnapping

is against shari'a and all imams and Chechen TV stations similarly started issuing declarations

against the practice (28 October 2010 "Chechnya: abduction of brides moving to the past?"

IslamRF). The fusion was not limited to private family affairs. Beginning in 2009, imams started reading lists of drivers that broke traffic laws or were found driving under the influence (11 May 2009 "In the mosques of Chechnya will announce the names of traffic violators" IslamRF), helping state administrators enforce laws which were being ignored.

While religious authorities pursue some of these policies in neighboring republics, two key things are different in Chechnya. First, in Chechnya republic elites enmeshed religious authorities and elders within the state, effectively incorporating ostensibly non-state authorities into the state hierarchy, shifting the architecture of governance. While in Dagestan and Ingushetia, the incorporation of previously non-state authorities did not severely diminish their autonomy, in Chechnya this process effectively made most ostensibly non-state authorities state agents. This allows state elites to channel religious authorities' connections for state purposes, helping ensure compliance and providing an additional tool for regulating society alongside the coercive and patronage policies for which Chechen elites are well known.

Second, the overwhelming emphasis on a single vision for dispute resolution and social order - as determined by state republic elites and implemented by religious authorities and elders - limits options for civilians. The vision espoused by Chechen elites effectively made religion a national security issue, elevating Sufism to a central component of Chechen state identity while equating Salafism with the potential for violence that could jeopardize a hard-won political stability. Civilians were left to strike a delicate balance between following state "recommendations" such as wearing a head-covering without exhibiting characteristics associated with Salafism, such as the wrong beard length or wrong head-covering style. This policy became overtly evident in the 2016 attempt to ban Salafism and equate it with terrorism,

something Chechnya's coercive apparatus has done in practice since the Second War.[163] In

incorporating religion authorities, Chechen republic elites simultaneously laid out the acceptable

parameters within which civilians can practice religion, resolve disputes, and organize their lives.

This broadened the state's reach into civilians' daily lives.

In Chechnya, more than in the other cases at hand, governance was reconfigured through

a renegotiation of relationships between state and ostensibly informal authorities. The previous

section suggested that Chechen society has become increasingly religious, leaving the potential

that religious authorities could serve as an important check on power as they did under Dudayev

and continue to provide in neighboring republics. Further, until the beginning of the Second War,

local administrators similarly served as vital actors in regulating disputes, helping establish

security, and lobby for goods provision. However, following the election of Akhmad Kadyrov as

Head of the Republic, and increasingly under Ramzan Kadyrov, state and religious authority has

blurred. Many of the decrees Yandarbiyev issued but was unable to enact, current state

authorities have been able to push through, altering the basis for state institutions and penetration

previously non-state and private realms. As one historian summarized, Ramzan Kadyrov has

been able to execute the vision of the politicians that came before him (Oral history 12). Another

young man said, "Dudayev, Maskhadov just talked. Ramzan gets it done" (Oral history 13). Key

to this centralization process has been state control over religious authorities, elders, and local

administrators. As a result, civilians experience the state not only in their attempts to find

employment and at security checkpoints but also in mosques and at community meetings, in their

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[163] See https://www.rferl.org/a/caucasus-report-grozny-fatwa-controversy/27987472.html for details.

decisions of how to dress and whether to remain married. Through the integration of "non-state" authorities, republic elites have changed the face of the state in Chechnya.

To confirm the diminished capacity of informal authorities to serve as a check on state power, the survey asked respondents who they would turn to if they have a conflict with the head of their village. For context, in Ingushetia, which until 1992 was joined with Chechnya and had similar relations between state and non-state authorities, 21.9% of respondents said they would approach an imam or elder; in Dagestan, 11.2% selected that option. In Chechnya, only 7.2% of respondents suggested they would seek help from an imam or elder. Chechen respondents were also less likely to say they would protest, write a letter to a newspaper, or reach out to contacts who could influence the situation. Religious authorities and elders are no longer perceived as effective sources of resistance to state administrators or policies, even if they remain respected, trusted, and obeyed by civilians.

Pulling the three sections - civilian preferences, collective action capacity, and the pattern of incorporation - together demonstrates that the two wars in Chechnya, and the Second War specifically, drastically reconfigured governance, particularly dispute resolution and social order institutions. Out of the three governance domains under study, goods provision in Chechnya most closely resembles its Soviet-era counterpart. Though the logic through which goods are distributed is more personalized, state elites again monopolize economic decision-making, serving as the main target of civilian demand-making and crowding out space for rival goods provision. In contrast, religious authorities, and less so elders, are now the daily face of dispute resolution and social order institutions. Preferences over who *should* control these have shifted in favor of religious authorities and Islamic institutions but remain diverse. However, the Second

War created the conditions for republic elites to replace local administrators and achieve centralization indirectly. By fragmenting Chechen society, removing and incorporating ostensibly non-state authorities, republic state elites have limited the alternatives available to civilians and diminished their capacity to mobilize resistance to state centralization. Through the regulation of ostensibly non-state authorities, republic state elites found indirect mechanisms to enforce state policies and establish a "shared vision" for Chechnya.

Perceiving deviation from state-regulated institutions as a threat to their power, republic elites in Chechnya more than in the other republics utilize a top-down system of control that permeates throughout the republic's territory. State attempts at penetration parallel the territorially widespread distribution of violence during Chechnya's wars. One observable implication of both the geographic distribution of violence and the top-down governance policies is that there may be less spatial variation in governance in Chechnya than in the other republics. The differences in civilians' preferences may have been overshadowed by the widespread violence that impacted broad swaths of the population and centralization efforts. This possibility is evident in one young man's proud declaration that his district was the last to put up a picture of Akhmad and Ramzan Kadyrov; though reached after a longer struggle, his village is now stamped with the same symbols as the government's centers of power Gudermes and Tsenaroi (renamed Akhmad-Urt in 2019). Nevertheless, existing work emphasizes the localized nature of violence and governance (Kalyvas 2006; Arjona 2015; 2016), suggesting that even in a centralized system like Chechnya's there may be community-level differences.

Village-Level Variation in Governance

Prior to looking at the relationship between violence and governance, I plot the proportion of individuals in each community who said state or non-state authorities regulate infrastructure, dispute resolution, and social order. The plots below aggregate state control (local, republic, and state central authorities) on the left and *ostensibly* non-state control (religious authorities, elders, community members) on the right.

Figure 28: Variation in Governance by Community

Plot 1: Proportion Choosing State (L) and "Nonstate" (R) Authorities As Infrastructure Providers by Community

Plots 2: Proportion Choosing State (L) and "Nonstate" (R) Authorities As Regulating Dispute Resolution by Community

Plots 3: Proportion Choosing State (L) and Nonstate (R) Authorities As Regulating Social Order by Community

Immediately the contrast between state control over goods provision vis-a-vis dispute resolution and social order is apparent, with significantly greater state control in the former domain. Yet, remembering that the actors classified as non-state in the other cases are under state control in Chechnya highlights the reliance of the state on ostensibly non-state authorities across communities. I explore the extent to which experiences of violence help us understand this community-level variation next.

I measure violence within communities through two methods. First, I use the data compiled by Zhukov from Memorial's databases which I combined with data on assassinations, as before, dichotomously coding communities 1 if they did experience that form of violence and 0 if they did not. Second, to aggregate the individual survey responses to community level measure of violence, I code the proportion of respondents in the community who stated their community experienced that form of violence. This avoids false precision and arbitrarily selecting a threshold, instead capturing that community members may disagree about whether a violent event occurred depending on their memories and exposure to it. I similarly use the

proportion of respondents in the community to code the outcomes, using, for example, the proportion of respondents that said state authorities regulate infrastructure in their community.

I use migration, measured as the proportion of respondents who stated that someone in their household lives in a different village or city more than 30 days a year, and religiosity, measured as the proportion of respondents in the village who selected religion as their primary identity, as controls. Unlike Dagestan, contemporary Chechnya is overwhelmingly monoethnic so I do not control for ethnicity. Importantly, unlike in the process tracing I do not differentiate between the timing of violence in this analysis. However, breaking the analysis down by types of violence helps differentiate between the two wars to some extent since both interviews and survey responses showed that counterinsurgency sweeps, targeting of leaders, and violence between groups were much more prevalent in the Second War such that there is a correlation between the type and timing of violence.

There are concerns that communities were targeted for reasons that are not random. While these concerns cannot be fully mitigated and I do not have an experiment or instrumental variable, existing research suggests that communities were targeted somewhat randomly (Lyall 2009), because of their distance from the main highway (Zhukov 2009), or because of the individual characteristics of Russian generals (Lazarev 2018). These factors may be related to, but are not determinative of governance. Interviews suggest factors like pre-existing collective action capacity and civilian support, which I argue are key to understanding governance, do not explain community's exposure to violence.

Violence and Goods Provision

According to my theory and the republic-wide data, violence should not have a significant impact on goods provision because this has historically consistently been provided by the state, structuring civilian expectations, and because I expect violence to impact this dimension less. As discussed in the theory chapter, civilians are likely to accept goods like infrastructure from whomever is able to provide them. The averages above demonstrated that goods provision remains consistently regulated by state authorities directly across communities. In fact, I find that the *only* form of violence that is associated with any significant impact on infrastructure provision are massacres, which are associated with a decrease in republic authorities' role.[164] Violence did not radically shift communities' ability to organize infrastructructure provision on their own or significantly shift the state's involvement. Across communities, state administrators remain the prominent providers of goods like roads and schools.

My visits to villages across Chechnya suggest that there is a bit of variation in the extent of reconstruction. Though the center of the republic has been rebuilt entirely, a few miles away signs of war remain. Further, villages like Komsomolskoe still have numerous buildings that are only partially standing and Bamut, which was completely destroyed during the wars remained flattened when I visited in 2017. Yet, republic elites have utilized federal funding and funding they informally collect throughout the republic to rebuild significant portions of Chechnya, including villages where massacres occurred, often with large ceremonies where republic leaders can demonstrate their effectiveness.

Violence and Dispute Resolution

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[164] Coefficient: -0.41464 SE= 0.17520 p = 0.0219 *

As established above, the two wars alienated civilians from the state but also reconfigured the state's relationship with religious authorities such state elites now utilize shari'a and religious authorities carry out state decrees. Religious authorities and elders are particularly relevant to understanding dispute resolution, a domain in which they consistently played an important role even during the Soviet era. Is there a relationship between the proportion of respondents within a community who reported violence and who governs or have republic-level centralization efforts overcome these spatial differences?

Unlike goods provision, where violence had a minimal impact, the survey results suggest significant differences between communities where a higher proportion of respondents reported violence and those with lower proportions. Consistently community-level violence is associated with a decrease in the role of state administrators and increased role of "non-state" religious authorities, elders, and community members broadly. The results show that counterinsurgency sweeps had the most consistent impact on who governs, pointing to the Second War specifically in increasing "non-state" authority over dispute resolution,[165] while decreasing the role of local administrators.[166] Crime[167] and violence between groups[168] is similarly associated with a decreased role for state administrators broadly while increasing the role of elders.[169] These findings demonstrate that violence, particularly direct violence by the state, undermined direct state control over dispute resolution. Communities where a higher proportion of respondents reported violence - specifically from the Second War - were more likely to identify actors other

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[165] Coefficient = 0.29594 SE= 0.11614 p = 0.0139 *
[166] Coefficient = -0.27270 SE= 0.11166 p = 0.0182 *
[167] Coefficient = -0.34527 SE= 0.12756 p = 0.00927 **
[168] Coefficient = -1.08040   SE= 0.36962 p = 0.005195 **
[169] Coefficient = 0.82948 SE = 0.25279   p = 0.001887 **

than state administrators as regulating disputes. This also demonstrates that communities that experienced violence are able to resolve disputes without state administrators. Nevertheless, as with the other findings it is necessary to keep in mind the relationship between state and "non-state" authorities to interpret the results. Therefore, in these areas the state's ability to control ostensibly non-state authorities is that much more important to regulating disputes.

Violence and Social Order

Similar to its reconfiguration of dispute resolution, violence had a consistent impact on social order such that communities where a higher portion of respondents reported violence were less likely to report state administrators' regulate social order and more likely to report its regulation by "non-state" authorities. While many interviews suggested that the pre-existing social order and traditional hierarchies have broken down in Chechnya, the survey evidence shows that ostensibly non-state authorities are more likely to regulate social order in communities that experienced violence. Specifically, a higher proportion of respondents reporting counterinsurgency sweeps,[170] bombing,[171] and massacres[172] in their community are all associated with respondents reporting less state control over social order. The results are not completely consistent with a shift to non-state control when we disaggregate by actor, since sweeps[173] and bombing[174] are also associated with a decrease community control. However, with these couple of exceptions, nearly all forms of violence are associated with less state and greater non-state control over social order. Similar to dispute resolution, this demonstrates that

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[170] Coefficient = -0.19281   SE = 0.07654   p = 0.015 *
[171] Coefficient = -0.32686   SE = 0.08254   p = 0.000238 ***
[172] Coefficient = -0.21508   SE = 0.09881   p = 0.03424 *
[173] Coefficient = -0.42907   SE = 0.09055   p = 1.82e-05 ***
[174] Coefficient = -0.29257   SE = 0.11999   p = 0.018351 *

communities that experienced violence did not lose control over social order. Religious authorities, elders, and community members continue to regulate dress, speech, and behavior in the in the community and are more involved in communities that experienced almost all forms of violence. State elites' regulation of this domain, thus, hinges on their control over "non-state" authorities, particularly in communities that had violence where their influence has persisted.

Conclusion

This chapter opened with a quote that represents a commonly encountered belief about Chechnya - that Ramzan Kadyrov determines everything in the republic. The account above demonstrated the paradox of governance in Chechnya. On the one hand, governance is significantly more centralized than in neighboring Caucasus republics despite similar structural and historical antecedents. On the other hand, as this chapter demonstrated, centralization is heavily dependent on state incorporation of ostensibly non-state authorities, specifically religious actors and to a lesser degree elders.

Tracing the shift in the relationships, this chapter showed that widespread, indiscriminate violence of the First War was insufficient to centralize governance, instead leading to a period of disorder. The Second War, on the other hand, characterized by more direct and extra-lethal violence, as well as selective targeting by both federal troops and Chechen rebels, diminished sources of resistance. This allowed republic-level state elites not only to penetrate society directly but to utilize non-state authorities' authority to restructure dispute resolution and social order. While republic elites' heightened sense of threat perception has pushed them to provide infrastructure and goods more broadly than in the neighboring republics, it has also limited the alternatives of governance available to civilians. Interview and survey data demonstrate that

religious authorities, elders, and kinship networks are capable of resolving disputes and establishing norms of social order without state intervention for significant portions of the population, though less likely to satisfy demands for material goods. Unlike Dagestan, where residents seek greater state involvement, therefore, in Chechnya civilians face the opposite problem of maintaining spaces without state interference.

In the next chapter, I turn to Ingushetia. Given that the two republics were part of a single administrative-territorial unit until 1992, comparing their governance trajectories offers a particularly useful counterfactual.

Chapter 6: Ingushetia: Collective Violence and Mediated Governance

The Ingush people have survived as a group due to adats. We survived the deportation in the 40s and we survived the ethnic cleansing in 1992. - Interview 1 2016.

I was part of the government youth organization but all they would do is hold roundtables to show that they are doing something but there was no action. So I left and we created a parallel and independent organization but one that is actually doing the work. The same thing happened with the Council of Elders. -Interview 3 2016.

The republic of Ingushetia lies just West of Chechnya. Until 1992, the two were part of the same federal administrative unit, Checheno-Ingushetia. When Chechnya moved toward independence in 1991, Ingush leaders organized a referendum where a reported 92.5% of Ingush voters selected to stay part of the Russian federation (Serdalo 8 Sept 1992). On June 4th 1992, the Russian federal government formally established the Republic of Ingushetia. According to an activist who helped organize the referendum, a big part of the decision to separate from Chechnya was the recognition that if Ingushetia split from Russia it would forgo territorial claims to Prigorodny district (Interview 34 2018). In 1944, when Stalin deported the Ingush population, the Soviet state abolished Checheno-Ingush and annexed the fertile strip of land on the West bank of the Terek River to North-Ossetia. When Soviet elites allowed the Ingush population to return in 1957, Prigorodny district remained part of North Ossetia. Ingush leaders wrote letters seeking its return and organized a mass protests in Grozny in 1973 after which most

of the protest leaders were arrested. As Toft (2003) pointed out, for ethnic groups territory and identity are often intertwined such that territory becomes perceived as indivisible and the attachment to it different than to other land. This was particularly true in Ingushetia where Prigorodny was not only viewed as a homeland but constituted nearly a third of the republic's territory historically. The Ingush as a group, therefore, historically have both a material and symbolic attachment to Prigorodny district. Their demands for the districts' return persisted from 1957 despite repression.

The lack of clarity around the rules of the game at Soviet collapse and inability of central elites to enforce its decisions, created a classic security dilemma (Rothchild 2001). The same year the Russian state recognized the Republic of Ingushetia, an intense, though brief, clash broke out in Prigorodny district between North Ossetians and Ingush residents in the district. As a result, the majority of the Ingush population in Prigorodny district fled from North Ossetia to newly-established Ingushetia. Twenty-seven years later the conflict remains a key source of contention with organizations like "Opora Ingushetia" founded to address the "rehabilitation of the Ingush peoples" (Interview 33 2018). Did the ethnic cleansing, a form of collective targeting, impact governance within Ingushetia and if so, how?

I argue that collective violence increased preferences for self-governance, particularly in domains linked to Ingush identity like dispute resolution and social order. Additionally, collective violence increased intra-group cohesion and ties to informal authorities, specifically elders and religious actors. To reconstruct state institutions and gain control, state administrators had to negotiate with and work through informal authorities, setting the foundation for a mediated governance trajectory in Ingushetia. Central state authorities' attempts to recentralize

governance and spillover violence from Chechnya both challenged the governance arrangement, introducing fragmentation into Ingush society and politicizing religious cleavages. Though these shocks disturbed the mediated governance arrangement, they were insufficient to displace autonomous non-state authorities who maintained strong linkages throughout society.

Collective Violence Literature

Collective targeting is "violence or threatened violence against members of a group because of membership in that group (Steele 2017: 24).[175] As Steele (2017) describes, ethnicity is often the basis for such targeting and can result when an armed group seeks to expel civilians. The Center for Systemic Peace conservatively estimates that three million people died from ethnic violence between 1990 and 2013. Most research on collective violence focuses *intergroup* interactions and causes of violence between groups (Horowitz 1985; Doyle and Sambanis 2000; Varshney 2002; Hartzell and Hoddie 2003; Lijphart 2004; Balcells, Daniels, Escriba-Folch 2016). The mechanisms discussed, however, also have implications for understanding *intragroup* dynamics as scholars demonstrate collective violence can reshape displacement patterns and demographics (Steele 2017) as well as identification with a group (Tilly 1978; Kaufman 2006; Shayo and Zussman 2011; Dyrstad 2012; Sambanis and Shayo 2013; Shesterina 2016). As Gould (1995:15) wrote, reflecting on how conflict alters the salience of identity cleavages, "social conflict between collective actors who are defined in terms of this partition will heighten the salience and plausibility of the partition itself. The intensification of the boundary's cognitive

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[175] Steele (2017: 33) makes a distinction between collective and communal violence, with the latter perpetrated by community members who do not remain organized thereafter. Given that most accounts describe the involvement of paramilitary groups and pursuit of the expulsion of a particular group from a territory, I classify this as a case of collective violence but the argument that follows should not change if we categorize it as communal violence instead. See Lange (2017) for a review on definitions of ethnicity specifically.

significance for individuals will, in other words, align social relations so that the boundary becomes even more real." Conflict that centers a specific identity cleavage can, therefore, make it more salient, promoting identification with and loyalty to that identity group instead of other potentially cross-cutting identities.

Literature on territorial conflicts specifically has relatedly found that territorial conflicts are more likely to politicize ethnic cleavages (Bulutgil 2016), are harder to resolve and often create lasting rivalries as leaders construct symbolic narratives that make the territory more indivisible (Goddard 2006; Goddard, Pressman and Hassner 2008). While the cleavage may not always be ethnicity and I expect the process to operate similarly where collective violence targets a religious or political group, I focus on ethnicity because that was the relevant cleavage in this case.

The conflict between Ingushetia and North Ossetia led to two ethnically homogeneous and segregated republics, making the literature on governing ethnically-divided societies less relevant for understanding governance *within* the republics.[176] Though segregation such as this worsens *intergroup* trust and increases threat perception (Balcells, Daniels and Escriba-Folch 2016), it is not rare. This literature reveals several mechanisms that are relevant for understanding how collective violence can impact post-conflict governance broadly. As Lange (2017: 8) summarizes, "at the heart of ethnicity is a focus on community: An ethnic framework is based on communal categories, an ethnic structure provides the mechanical foundations for community, and an ethnic consciousness makes people value community." This suggests that targeting based on collective identity can trigger greater identification with one's community and

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[176] This created a separation between the two groups, which Kaufmann (1998) advocated may be necessary to decrease violence in sectarian conflicts.

obligations to that community, which cause members to both protect the group and better enforce

obligations through sanctions (ibid 12). Previous studies similarly suggest that collective

targeting can trigger strong ingroup identification and polarization of identities (Wood 2008;

Sambanis and Shayo 2013) and that shared understandings of history and identity can help define

the groups' interests (Viterna 2013; Wood 2003; Shesterina 2016). Empirically assessing the

impact of ethnically-organized violence, Dyrstad (2012: 829) finds that in post-conflict Kosovo

"ethno-nationalism is so dominant that there is hardly any [individual-level] variance to explain."

Shesterina (2016), on the other hand, finds that even within an ethnically-organized conflict in

Abkhazia, there was variation in whether individuals perceived the threat collectively.

Argument

Building on the literature above, I argue that collective targeting has the potential to

heighten the salience of the group's identity and create a joint perception of threat. Where

collective violence prompts concerns over the groups' survival, I expect it to increase

preferences for self-rule in policies related to the group's identity. For example, when collective

violence targets an ethnic group, members can prioritize what Bakke (2015) terms "cultural

policy autonomy," increasing demands for greater control over language, the content of

education, and social order to ensure the group is preserved. There is also likely to be greater

emphasis placed on symbols such as street names, anthems, rituals, honorific positions, and sites

associated with the group's identity (Horowitz 1985: 216-217). Where the group's identity

overlaps with particular dispute resolution practices, such as religious or traditional institutions,

self-governance over dispute resolution may become a priority as well. This is not to suggest that

the group will not also have specific preferences regarding goods production, particularly if there

are regional inequalities,[177] but that these may less impacted by collective violence than social order and dispute resolution, which become politically activated as salient concerns after collective violence.[178]

In addition to altering preferences, collective violence can increase the targeted groups' collective action capacity, particularly when it results in the community's segregation. Under conditions when collective violence geographically brings the group together, in turn creating denser social networks (Toft 2003), it can combine with increased identification with the group to lower the barriers to collective action. As Bakke (2015: 17-18) suggests, elites and civilians are more likely to mobilize around ethnicity when a larger share of the region's population shares the ethnicity. Scholars have previously discussed how proximity can be mobilized for violent collective action against an outgroup (Bhavnani et al 2014; Balcells, Daniels and Escriba-Folch 2016). I focus on how it can be channeled for nonviolent actions like self-governance here instead. In addition to proximity, a heightened sense of community obligations and norms of participation (Tsai 2007; Lange 2017) developed through the joint trauma can incentivize people to participate, fostering collective action.

Preferences for self-governance and stronger collective action capacity should help communities organize self-governance. Even though single communities are often unable to provide many important public goods (Murtazashvili 2016), leaders able to coordinate across communities can help achieve broader collective action. Additionally, community leaders, if they maintain trust and engender obedience, can also organize negotiations or resistance to state

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[177] See Bakke (2015) on how revenue can alter minority group preferences over fiscal autonomy and chances of secessionist conflict.

[178] In cases where collective targeting happens due to class, expectations would be flipped.

efforts at restructuring governance (Mukhopadhyay 2014), making them more accountable to local communities and non-state authorities.

In the next section, I trace the development of mediated governance (Menkhaus 2007) in Ingushetia. Since here, as in Chechnya, armed conflict coincided with state collapse, I show that it had a greater impact on governance than in Dagestan and strengthened non-state governance, unlike in Chechnya. Given the shared history of institutional development in Ingushetia and Chechnya, Ingushetia also reveals a possible alternative governance trajectory to Chechnya.

Response to Collapse: Establishment of the Republic of Ingushetia

When the Soviet Union collapsed, Ingushetia was pretty much a large village - now we have three. -Interview 13 2016.

At Soviet collapse, the Ingush population was dispersed between present-day Chechnya, Ingushetia, and North Ossetia. Despite ties created by the same ethnicity and previous trauma of Soviet deportations, fragmentation emerged as it did in the other republics. According to interviews, families from the same teip most commonly lived in the same village or city but the ethnic group was dispersed. Meeting with a small business owner in Nazran, who used to live in Grozny prior to the First Chechen War, I inquired about differences between Ingush who lived in the three territories. He described minimal variation, but said people still refer to residents as "Groznenskiy" or "Prigorodny," and that since they lived in more urbanized areas they did often have a higher degree of education and were used to living among other ethnic groups (Interview 6 2016). The divisions my interviewee perceived came to the forefront early in the organization of the Congress of the Ingush People in 1989. Two organizations emerged: the People's Council of Ingushetia and Niskho. The former, led by Beksultan Sejnaroev, was comprised of the intellectual elite, mainly residents of Grozny or Vladikavkaz, who were academics, economists,

writers, and lawyers, and most of whom were communist party members. Niskho, led by school teacher, poet and dissident Issa Kodzoev, was based in Ingushetia and had the support of the rural Ingush population (Sokirianskaya 2009: 252-253). Despite being relatively homogeneous in terms of ethnicity, there were ideological divisions, in addition to those based on teip and vird (Sufi brotherhood) which structured mobilization and decision-making.

The main concerns for both organizations, and Ingush at large, was resolving the question of Prigorodny district. With this in mind, Ingush leaders sought to "fix the historic injustice that had been enacted against Ingushetia," as one of my interviewees involved with organizing the referendum explained (Interview 29 2017). An Ingush resident leaving in Grozny at the time stated that most Ingush wanted to stay in the Russian federation because there was a hope to return Prigorodny, the "heart of Ingushetia," as he described (Interview 9 2016). The Ingush joined representatives of three other deported groups in the North Caucasian, the Karachais, Balkars, and Chechens, to form the Association of Repressed Peoples to exert pressure on the authorities at the regional and federal level. The Association played a major role in the passage of the April 1991 Law on the Rehabilitation of Repressed Peoples. Article 3 of the law acknowledged that the deportations were illegal and allowed for the return of the deported groups "according to their will, to places of traditional residence in the territory of the RSFSR" while simultaneously stating that the during "rehabilitation of repressed peoples, the rights and legitimate interests of citizens currently living in the territories of repressed peoples should not be infringed."[179] The law provided no guidance as to how this should proceed or be enforced, setting the stage for contestation. It was sufficient to give the Ingush hope that there was finally a

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[179] The full text of the law in Russian is available at: http://ivo.garant.ru/#/document/10200365/paragraph/7:0.

political opening for them to return to the pre-deportation boundaries. Ingush interviewees consistently discuss their demands for the return of Prigorodny to be legally-founded on this law. Thereafter, each district where Ingush lived formed its own informal council with deputies to help organize the referendum on Ingushetia's split from Chechnya and establishment of a standalone republic within the Russian federation (Interview 29 2017).

Tensions in Prigorodny district escalated. Niskho's newspaper, Daimokh, published stories about the destruction of Ingush cemeteries, calling for Ossetian elders and informal leaders to take a stand and help return the Ingush their lands prior to Stalin's 1944 genocide (Daimokh 23 October 1990). The Ingush individuals I met with who had lived in Prigorodny district during the Soviet era described challenges receiving registration to move back and facing economic discrimination[180] but not violence. Beginning in 1991, deputies from the three main districts making up contemporary Ingushetia - Malgobek, Sunzha, and Nazran - issued statements asking the federal government to provide security assistance to Ingush living in Prigorodny district (Serdalo 26 Feb 1991). In March 1991 Boris Yeltsin visited Ingushetia and called for all action possible to prevent violent ethnic conflict. Several respondents said at the time, his visit was perceived as a sign of support for the Ingush (Interview 14 2016; Interview 28 2017). However, during that same visit he reportedly told residents of Ahki-Urt that there would be no transfer of land (Zurabov 2011). On June 4, 1992 the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation adopted a law Establishing the Ingush Republic, part of the Russian Federation, though the republic's borders were undetermined. Clashes between Ingush and North Ossetians began in Prigorodny district that same year, resulting in the organization of local militias.

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[180] For example, in 1982, the official registration of Ingush in Prigorodny was severely restricted, denying new residents housing and employment (Hill 1995: 38).

The brief time span under which Ingushetia existed separately from Chechnya prior to the escalation of the conflict into collective violence, possess challenges to accurately assessing who governed during this period and how. Nevertheless, there appears to have been a fairly clear division in governance with formally-elected officials determining the republic's new institutional arrangements while elders and religious authorities served as advisors or coordinators to gather civilian input. Informal authorities remained, as they had under Soviet rule, key in deciding what were considered "private affairs," like bridal kidnapping, divorces, and blood feuds.

The individuals I interviewed who were involved in organizing the referendum and political decision-making at the time suggested it paralleled the Soviet period. When I asked respondents about everyday decision-making, they consistently stated that even during Soviet times there were individuals knowledgeable about Islam and teip elders who had a very high level of authority and helped resolve disputes. As one respondent stated, even if teips did not formally meet, everyone associated individuals with their teips so it structured the way individuals behaved (Interview 16 2017). This was less applicable to those living and working in Grozny and Prigorodny district, but applied as well since information spread quickly and all Ingush were connected through rituals like weddings and funerals (ibid.) For example, if there was a bride kidnapping where a young woman was taken without prior consultation with the family and elders had to gather to determine the course of action regardless of where they lived (Interview 20 2017). In extreme situations this led to the gathering of up to a thousand co-villagers and distant relatives (Albogachieva 2010: 9). Elders and mullahs strictly regulated the process, helping coordinate whether the blood feud would be forgiven or carried out and whether

the family was allowed to remain in the village or asked to leave (ibid). Local newspaper articles

similarly suggest that informal authorities helped coordinate decision-making. Summarizing their

roles, Ingush ethnographer Makka Albogachieva (2010: 16) wrote,

Any person who commits an immoral act will be ostracized. If the family supports him,
then they will suffer the same lot. People will not communicate with them and even when
they die, only close relatives will attend their funeral such that it will occur without
appropriate rites or the participation of disciples, relatives, and friends.

Civilians relied on informal authorities to resolve disputes and appealed to them as mediators to

formally recognized delegates. For example, the residents and religious authorities of the village

Barsuki wrote an open letter to the district delegate Murad Bekov, published in the government

newspaper Serdalo. The letter stated that the residents organized a meeting with the presence of

religious authorities to address security concerns that had arisen in the village and asked Bekov

to act within his duties in helping establish order (Serdalo 17 March 1992). This suggests

informal authorities like elders and religious authorities were not heavily involved in republic-

level political decisions but served an important role in helping organize and voice civilians'

demands.

Economically, the territory that became contemporary Ingushetia was the least developed

part of Checheno-Ingushetia and few if any changes occurred that first year. With the exception

of three factories, the territory was overwhelmingly agricultural. As the director of one of the

factories explained, his factory was the largest but employed less than 2000 individuals; most of

the residents that resided in the territory of contemporary Ingushetia traveled to Grozny or to

North Ossetia for work; he estimated that roughly 50% of the residents lacked formal

employment (Interview 31 2018). As Sokirianskaia (2009: 258) summarizes and my

interviewees confirm, Ingushetia "had underdeveloped industry, social infrastructure, and

transport, it had no higher educational establishment, no hotels, no railway station, no airport or cinema or stadium." Many of my interviewees discussed that they had no gas or piped drinking water at the time of the split. Though all the territories experienced economic challenges at Soviet collapse, Ingushetia was the worst off.

Thus, the brief period prior to the active phase of the conflict generally paralleled the other republics, seeing a negotiation between Soviet and newly emerging elites through formal institutions, and a simultaneous opening for previously informal authorities to operate publicly. Two slight but important differences mattered for governance. First, given the small size of the population - under 200,000 (Bakke 2015: 119), ties within Ingush communities were likely tighter than amongst Chechens and Dagestani residents. However, as mentioned disagreements and fragmentation within the Ingush population existed. Additionally, roughly 18% of Ingushetia's population were Russian and another 6% Chechen such that the republic was not homogeneous (Zurcher 2007: 28). Second, given the republic's economic underdevelopment, goods provision was initially lower, even within the three republics that were the least economically developed within Russia (ibid). Though land conflicts were prevalent across the republics, including between Ingushetia and Chechnya, the conflict between Ingushetia and North Ossetia led to the first large-scale violence in post-Soviet Russia.

Collective Violence: Ethnic Cleansing

Despite the gradual escalation of tensions, organized collective violence in Prigorodny district only lasted a few days. The details regarding how the conflict started, the extent of the planning, and terminology are contested on both sides. The death of an Ingush schoolgirl in the village of Yuzhnyy after being struck by an armored personnel carrier, interpreted by Ingush as

careless or intentional supposedly ignited the conflict (O'Loughlin et al 2008: 650) though

violence broke out earlier in the year when North Ossetian authorities killed 27 Ingush protesters

and imposed an 18-month state of emergency in the Prigorodny district (Hill 1995: 38). As a

result, Ingush residents decided to organize armed patrol units within Ingush settlements (Cornell

2005: 247). On October 30th, 1991, large-scale violence broke out between armed Ingush and

Ossetian in the villages of Kurtat, Dachnoye, Oktyabrskoye, and Kambileyevskoye within

Prigorodny district (O'Loughlin et al 2008: 650). As information about the fighting spread, more

armed men from both Ingushetia and South Ossetia came to Prigorodny district (Sokirianskaia

2009: 254). Both sides accuse the other of organized aggression and frame their own actions as

necessary self-defense. As fighting and hostage-taking escalated, Russian troops brought into the

region sought to separate the populations. While the intentions are contested, Russian troops

effectively expelled the majority of the Ingush who had lived in Prigorodny district into

Ingushetia. The peak of the fighting ended by November 4th, but occasional skirmishes occurred.

Exact numbers of casualties or displaced are difficult to obtain since not all of the Ingush living

in Prigorodny district were formally registered. However, Human Rights Watch estimates that

the fighting left 583 dead, 939 injured and 261 missing (HRW 2012: 17). An estimated 3,000

homes - mostly Ingush - were destroyed. The majority of the homes were in predominantly

Ingush settlements like Dachnoye, Kartsa, and Kurtat as well as mixed towns like Chermen,

Tarskoye, and the city of Vladikavkaz (O'Loughlin et al 2008: 651). In addition to those killed

and the destruction of property, an estimated 60,000 Ingush residents were expelled from the

district between 1991 and 1993 (Hill 1995: 40). These numbers must be read with the

consideration that in 1989, there were less than 200,000 individuals of Ingush ethnicity registered in the Russian census (Zurcher 2007: 28).

Niskho's newspaper Daimokh covered the events as "North Ossetian extremism" and "planned provocation" that was coordinated with North Ossetian state administrations (Daimokh April 1993 #37) and the Ingush government newspaper Serdalo wrote that North Ossetians "repeatedly provoked the Ingush" (Serdalo 5 Nov 1992). Serdalo published reports that the North Ossetian government had extensively planned the attacks and worked with assistance from Russian MVD troops to "carry out the genocide," stating that the Ingush people's repeated pleas for assistance from Moscow went unheard (ibid.) This helped solidify a narrative that the conflict was not merely a result of a lack of capacity to control rogue civilians but the result of a purposeful government policy. The federal administrations' decision to leave Prigorodny district under the jurisdiction of North Ossetia, nominally under that of the Provisional Administration, solidified the Ingush perception that Russians sided with the Ossetians.

Amidst the fighting statements described that the "*Ingush peoples* are living through one of their most tragic periods" (emphasis mine) and that "Ingush boys are fighting for their land, their streets, and their homes...giving their everything to achieve justice for the Ingush peoples" (Serdalo 3 Nov 1992). Both statements are phrased to highlight the collective nature of the threat and tragedy. After the fighting ended, the newspapers published detailed narrative accounts of the violence from Prigorodny's expelled Ingush residents and the family members of those killed. In published interviews, Ingush administrators emphasized that because the republic was just being formed and did not have its own radio or TV station, Ossetian politicians were able to turn public opinion against the Ingush by spreading false information (Serdalo 3 November

1992). Even nearly three decades after the conflict, interviewees reflected that the Ingush nation is very small such that every life is essential not just for its own value but for preserving the group.

The events were presented and interpreted as an attempt to destroy the Ingush nation. This interpretation is exemplified Fedor Bokov's *This is Fascism*, which numerous interviewees advised me read in order to understand the conflict; one gave it to me as a gift. Writing in 2008, Fedor Bokov, previously an Assistant Professor at Checheno-Ingush University and one of the leading politicians in Ingushetia in the 1990s, included a section titled, "Only facts," where he laid out testimony about North Ossetian doctors stealing Ingush victims' organs and saying they will ensure not one Ingush leaves their hospital (22-27). One of my interviewees who lost a child during the fighting described in tears how her Ossetian neighbors suddenly showed up with weapons as they marked the houses where Ingush lived for destruction (Interview 15 2017). The several interviewees I talked to in North Ossetia, including an academic and state employee, emphasized the planned and organized violence of Ingush militias. Describing the organization of the fighting, O'Loughlin et al (2008: 649) write, "The fighting in Prigorodny thus pitted a range of North Ossetian and Russian forces—police officers from the North Ossetian Ministry of Internal Affairs, members of the Ossetian National Guard, North and South Ossetian militias, and federal OMON special police—against these irregular Ingush militias." Though the conflict broke out over divergent interpretations of the Law on Rehabilitation and incompatible land claims to Prigorodny district, by its end, the violence exacerbated ethnic tensions and resulted in perceptions that Russia was no longer helping return Ingush lands but once again prosecuting the Ingush unjustly.

As previous studies have shown, ethnic conflict is not always be perceived collectively (Shesterina 2016). However, in Ingushetia, civilian and politician statements consistently discussed and framed it as such, emphasizing the need to preserve the Ingush population and identity. Civilian accounts of the conflict, published in Serdalo and circulated through the republic, stated that "individuals involved in rampant arrests of Ingush individuals knew their addresses and places of work. Without advance preparation involving extensive time and a lot of people, such acts could not have been as successful" (Serdalo 28 Nov 1992). Such statements emphasized that the violence was not a spontaneous act but part of an ongoing effort to target Ingush residents. Narratives linked violence with the 1944 deportations, evident in residents' statements such as: "from the time of the deportation in 1944 my family had put everything into this house, dreaming that one day we would be able to move back to our homeland and live happily. We thought we had finally made it back" (Serdalo 28 Nov 1992). The conflict was interpreted and presented as a collective threat to the entire Ingush ethnicity, not just the individuals that were directly impacted or even their families. Moreover, though the peak of active violence lasted less than a week, the conflict remains unresolved for years. The lack of a resolution allowed violence to flare up again and the threat to be consistently mobilized as a reminder of the need for internal cohesion.[181] Given that the armed conflict was understood and presented as a collective violence, in the next section, I examine its implications for Ingushetia's governance trajectory. Though scholars have focused on Ingushetia as a case that "avoided war"

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[181] For example, despite the numerous economic challenges, at the 1996 Ingush National People's Congress, most delegates named the return of forcefully displaced from Prigorodny district as one of the top concerns, demonstrating the persistence of the perceived threat (Serdalo 21 September 1996).

(Derlugian 1999; Zurcher 2007), the collective violence had a profound impact on the newly forming republic, setting it down a trajectory of mediated governance that revived non-state leadership hierarchies and institutions.

Legacy of Collective Violence: Establishing Mediated Governance

Tough economic situation, many unresolved social questions, the challenges of refugees and expelled migrants - there is no way this could not impact every Vainakh family. (Serdalo 12 September 1995)

While previous Soviet repression fostered attachment to a joint Ingush identity, the collective violence between Ingushetia and North Ossetia forced the Ingush to concentrate in Ingushetia and intensified perception of a collective threat to the ethnic group. In doing so, the conflict increased the density of networks and salience of joint ethnic identity, helping override potential divisions based on teip or Sufi brotherhoods and increase the potential for joint collective action. Establishing institutions that would secure and maintain Ingush identity became a top priority. While staying within the Russian federation was necessary to ensure economic viability and the possibility of Prigorodny district's return, Ingush civilians prioritized self-governance in dispute resolution and social order through informal institutions.

Since collective violence coincided with the reconstitution of state institutions, the conflict incentivized state administrators to work with non-state authorities, delegating governance functions to them. Whereas in Chechnya state administrators came to view autonomous non-state authorities as a threat, in Ingushetia they were necessary bargaining partners. These early decisions set the republic down a trajectory of mediated governance, as often occurs when there are strong non-state authorities during periods of state collapse (Menkhaus 2007; Hagmann and Peclard 2010).

When state administrators sought to centralize governance and redeploy their administrative authority in the early 2000s, they had to face non-state authorities with broad linkages throughout society. In contrast to Chechnya, where governance resulted through domination and co-optation of non-state authorities, in Ingushetia, it was negotiated through non-state authorities who maintained autonomy, particularly in domains where they were governed historically. Though the actors involved in governance are, therefore, similar to the other republics, the relationship between them, governance options available to civilians, and counters of the state differ. In the next section, I trace how the mediated governance trajectory developed immediately after the conflict with North Ossetia.

Proximate Impact of Collective Violence on Governance

With the republic's new-found independence, the administrative apparatus in Ingushetia formed from scratch. President Aushev regularly rotated Ministers and lower-level personnel, drawing on individuals across teips for the state's apparatus. Unlike Dagestan, where personnel were drawn into the state due to their clan ties and Chechnya, where the post-conflict state-building process similarly over-represented those loyal to Kadyrov, clan politics were less prevalent in Ingushetia. Sokirianskaya (2009: 285) classified the make-up of elites under Aushev and found that while Aushev's teip was slightly over-represented, the administration had a broad mixture of teips represented. Elders and religious authorities, whose roles I discuss further below, negotiated and worked with state authorities. Through the late 1990s, informal authorities maintained their autonomy from the state, organizing collectively to establish norms of dispute resolution and social order.

Goods Provision

When the peak of violence ended in 1992, civilians in Ingushetia were in a fairly similar position to those in the other republics, attempting to maintain basic access to public goods, resolve an increasing number of disputes, and navigate the shifting institutions regulating social order. As in the other republics, the retraction of state institutions created a particularly stark gap in goods provision where the state historically dominated and there were few readily accessible alternatives available. Though state administrators regulated goods provision, as in the other republics, the level in Ingushetia was the lowest of the three republics. Ingushetia was the less economically developed territory of Chechen-Ingushetia, mirroring the rural areas of the other two republics. The influx of displaced Ingush from North Ossetia put a strain on already scarce economic resources, mostly coming from Moscow. In 1993, 97% of Ingushetia's budget came from Russian federal government subsidies (Hill 1995: iii). In 1995, the Russian government declared Ingushetia a "free economic zone," providing the republic added funding allocated for socioeconomic development (Sokirianskaia 2009: 260-261). State administrators repeatedly complained, as they did in other republics, that they only received a portion of the designated funding.

For its first years as a republic, state administrators worked to improve the level of goods provision but could not keep up with civilians' demands and expectations. The free economic helped bring funds in to the budget, such that by 1995 the output of the republican industry increased by 9.7% (Serdalo June 4 1996). The economy was not in as dire a predicament as neighboring Chechnya. Yet, that same year, the state newspaper, which had an incentive to present the situation in the best possible light, wrote that the two middle schools in the city of Karabulak operated significantly over capacity; most of the city's roads, including those

connecting to the main federal Baku-Rostov highway, remained unpaved (Serdalo 14 December 1995). In Ordzhonikidze, residents faced consistent electricity outages and lacked adequate drinking water (Serdalo 8 August 1995). Even in the capital, schools lacked the necessary infrastructure and class sizes ranged upwards of 40-45 students, according to district administrators (Serdalo 31 October 1995). The situation in healthcare was even more dire with financing for construction of needed medical facilities lacking or inconsistent (Serdalo 9 April 1996) and a severe shortage of qualified medical professionals, resulting in outbreaks of tuberculosis (Serdalo 31 October 1995). State administrators consistently failed to deliver basic public goods expected and demanded by the population.

State administrators prioritized basic public goods like roads and schools but non-state authorities were not entirely absent from goods provision, focusing their efforts on construction of religious infrastructure as in the other republics. In the early 1990s, foreign donors from Jordan and Saudi Arabia funded the construction of several mosques as well as an Islamic University (Seradalo 27 June 1995; 27 August 1996; 21 May 1996). However, most mosques and madrassas in the republic were funded by businessmen and attendees (Interview 2 2016). For example, businessmen Ahmed Dzeitov funded Nazran's central mosque while Magomet Malsagov, another local businessman, funded several smaller mosques in the republic (Serdalo 27 August 1996). On rare occasions, such as the opening of the central mosque in Nazran, republic administrators provided one-time assistance (ibid).

Building the republic's infrastructure during the economic collapse and with limited resources proved a slow process. A delegation of responsibilities developed with non-state authorities and civilians funding religious institutions while the state sought to provide roads,

schools, and other "secular" infrastructure. As one respondent pointed out, though there have

been a couple of cases where villages gather money to pave a road or build a sports complex,

"people don't want to invest in what the government should provide" (Interview 2 2016).

Residents had come to expect the state to provide certain goods and were not ready to let it shirk

its responsibilities.

State administrators explained the republic's economic challenges by pointing to the

territory's underdevelopment during the Soviet era and insufficient federal funding but also by

consistently linking it to the influx of an estimated 150,000 displaced Ingush from North Ossetia,

(Serdalo July 11 1995; Serdalo 31 October 1995). Moreover, Ingush politicians repeatedly stated

that North Ossetian politicians were misallocating funds in Prigorodny to Ossetian residents

instead of using them for Ingush citizens of Ossetia whose homes were destroyed (ibid). Ingush

republic elites sought to transfer some of the funds to Ingushetia, where the displaced residents

lived with family members or in temporary housing. Indeed, expelled Ingush from Prigorodny

faced particular difficulties in obtaining services or goods. When they sought assistance with

services within Ingushetia, residents reported that they were told they are legally considered

residents of their villages in North Ossetia; when they attempted to do so, they were told they are

not formally registered in North Ossetia, leaving them without adequate goods or services

(Interview 21 2017; Interview 22 2018). Though almost every Ingush family I talked to had

taken in those displaced from Prigorodny - and most who had experienced displacement stated

they stayed with family or distant relatives - not all were able to do this and not all were able to

do it for years. Informal support and kinship networks were insufficient to provide adequate

goods for the extended period of time and massive influx of people. With another wave of

displaced persons from Chechnya in 1999,[182] neither state administrators nor informal networks could adequately provide public goods and keep up with demands.

Therefore, though collective violence did not significantly shift Ingush preferences for goods provision it did strain the capacity to effectively provide goods, a problem across Russia and particularly severe in the North Caucasus. Had the number of displaced individuals been smaller and Ingushetia not been flooded with another round of displaced from Chechnya shortly thereafter, informal networks may have proved more adequately equipped to assist. Yet, they were overwhelmed and state resources strained. Non-state authorities worked collectively and individually to build the religious infrastructure in the republic, as they did in the neighboring republics as well. A delegation of responsibilities with state administrators responsible for the same goods they had been responsible for under Soviet rule - schools, roads, electricity, gas - while non-state authorities worked to create a religious infrastructure. These dynamics did not significantly differ from neighboring republics at the time.

Dispute Resolution

Though collective violence did not significantly shift who governs as it relates to goods provision, it had a profound impact on dispute resolution, impacting both civilian preferences and the relationship between state and non-state authorities. Ingushetia's formal legal institutions, set out in the republic's 1994 Constitution, did not initially recognize traditional institutions or authorities.[183] Nevertheless, the republic's residents and state administrators

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[182] In September 1999, President Ruslan Aushev defied a federal order to close the border between Chechnya and Ingushetia and let almost 300,000 Chechens flee into Ingushetia (HRW 2012:12).

[183] The Constitution placed Ingush republic laws over Russian federal laws, stating the latter apply as long as they do not contradict the former (statute 6) but established a separation between religion and the state (statute 11) and stated that state-provided education is secular (statute 30). As in the other republics, state collapsed weakened the formal legal system, exacerbated in Ingushetia by the need to create local courts from scratch. Through his presidency, Aushev repeatedly criticized the corruption of courts, contradictions and weak enforcement of court rulings, and

consistently relied on elders, religious authorities, and kinship networks in dispute resolution, emphasizing the need to maintain Ingush practices and identity.

Though the 1994 Ingush Constitution set no formal role for either elders or religious authorities, from the republic's founding they actively participated in village meetings and dispute regulation. As my interviewees described, they typically began by working through family members, then turning to elders and the local imam if necessary. State authorities were consistently described as a mechanism of last resort. At the 1994 Meeting of the Muslims of Ingushetia, attendees voted to create the Muftiat of Ingushetia and elected its representatives, with the aim of reviving Islam (Serdalo 23 July 1996). All mosques and madrassas within Ingushetia, as well as the two Islamic Universities formally fell under the Muftiat's oversight. Beginning that year, the Council of Alims met monthly to rule on "spiritual" disputes, addressing roughly 800 between 1994 and 1996 according to the Muftiat's coordinator Magomet Dzangiev (ibid.)

By 1995, President Aushev delegated partial responsibility for dispute resolution to informal organizations, seeking to strengthen their capacity. Aushev formally recognized "conciliatory commissions," transferred responsibility for regulating blood feuds to them and placed them under the oversight of the Muftiat (Patiev 2007: 307). Blood feuds were one of the most common causes for violence in Ingush society at the time and teip elders, who had historically assumed responsibility for their regulation, were increasingly struggling to effectively control them (Serdalo 5 December 1997). The commissions, consisting of elders,

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inadequate coordination between different courts and security services (Serdalo 17 April 1999; 8 July 2000). In 1997, after Aushev's order, over 300 policemen were fired (Serdalo 14 April 1997). While adat (customary law) and shari'a do not have formal enforcement mechanisms, Ingushetia's formal legal institutions were not more effectively enforced.

religious authorities, and respected people from villages throughout the republic, sought to strengthen informal authorities' enforcement capacities (Albogachieva 2010: 17). Families maintained access to alternatives for settling blood feuds, having the option to go to respected individuals who were not part of the commission or courts as well (ibid.)

Even when courts effectively served their role and an individual was formally punished, Ingush residents maintained a strong preference for relying on informal dispute resolution mechanisms to settle blood feuds. Reflecting on the prevalence and importance of involving non-state authorities in the resolution of blood feuds and resolving them collectively, one elder I interviewed stated, "Blood feuds were and always will be. My cousin was killed in 1979. Thirty-seven years the feud has lasted. The person went to prison, served his time but the blood feud remained. Finally we have decided to resolve it at a wedding this week, to conduct masliat. This will serve as an example to others" (Interview 5 2016). Resolution of blood feuds and similar large-scale disputes was inherently a collective process involving families, elders, and increasingly religious authorities, since blood feuds have implications for the entire teip. For example, families that have a blood feud between them are not allowed to marry (Albogachieva and Babich: 2010). In fact, all informal mechanisms of dispute resolution relied on collective action since the implementation of elders' or imams' decisions relied on expectations of collective punishment if the individual did not comply. This was significantly easier to accomplish with Ingush residing within the republic and interacting daily than when they were spread across the three republics.

State reliance on informal authorities for dispute resolution was not limited to Aushev. Security officials, including federal troops stationed in Ingushetia, explicitly discussed that they

viewed elders and religious authorities as key actors in ensuring the republic's stability. For example, in Nesterevskoi where federal border security forces were stationed, the village imam, elders, and the head of the village administration, Ahmed Aushev, jointly coordinated a meeting with the federal security forces to establish norms of behavior and prevent escalation of disputes (Serdalo 10 October 1995).

In seeking to re-impower non-state authorities, state administrators reinforced norms of self-governance through horizontal linkages. in his 1996 address to the Ingush National Congress, Aushev emphasized that crime is not just a problem of the individuals committing it, but of their families and those allowing it to occur in their villages (Serdalo 21 September 1996) In doing so, he called on both family members and co-villagers to collectively regulate disputes and crime with "the methods developed over centuries to influence those that are on the wrong path" (ibid.) In his speech, Aushev called on community councils to lead in dispute resolution, with a primary role for parents and family members, with referrals of only the most serious crimes to police (ibid.) Instead of perceiving non-state authorities and self-governance as a threat, Aushev actively encouraged its use. Security officials had similar views, as evident in a public letter written by the head of the Nazran police force where he wrote that elders must take a larger responsibility over what their family members are doing to control crime (Serdalo 27 September 1997). Though the reiterated emphasis on strengthening informal mechanisms of dispute resolution also highlights that they were not entirely effective, state officials consistently saw the best chance for resolving disputes not in formal institutions but in informal mechanisms.

By the end of the 1990s, state administrators formally recognized informal authorities and institutions of dispute resolution in an attempt to create a single cohesive system of dispute

resolution. These were not attempts to create an Islamic state, as they were in Chechnya and the

Kadar zone of Dagestan, but decisions to integrate existing informal practices within the state's

legal framework. In 1998, Aushev legalized polygamy and legalized village shari'a courts

(Albogachieva 2010: 141). The courts had the right to hear property and inheritance cases, cases

of defamation, and divorce cases (Babich 2005: 64), representing a narrower jurisdiction than

Chechnya's interwar shari'a court. Additionally, the court's decisions were only enacted if both

parties agreed to the venue, instead of relying on elders of Russian courts, for example. In 1999,

Aushev made the court the republic's official legal body. The Council of the Alims elected the

qadi every five years, with the ability to extend the current qadi's term (Albogachieva 2010: 141-

142). In Ingushetia, the court operated for two years, during which issued written rulings and

handled nearly a thousand cases, before the republic's next President changed it back to a

consultative body (Babich 2005: 64), a decision I discuss further below.

Aushev also issued a decree which explicitly stated that the opinion of local elders and

imams should be considered when appointing local administrators (Serdalo 2 June 1998).[184] This

presented a divergent vision from Chechnya and Dagestan's governance systems at the time,

providing both greater autonomy and input for non-state authorities. Asked about the relationship

of state administrators to religious authorities, the Provost of the Islamic University Islam Ash

Shaaf'i[185] and Advisor to Aushev on Religious Affairs said he meets with the President as

necessary but there is a great deal of autonomy to the institution (Serdalo 29 April 1995). Aushev

echoed the separation in a 1999 interview with Anna Politovsakaya, stating that the state has to

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[184] Sokirianskaya (2009: 275-281) argues that teips, nevertheless, were not cohesively mobilized for elections.
[185] The institute was open from 1992 to 1997. In the early 2000s, the Institute was renamed the Institute for the Study of Islamic Culture and Religion.

do everything to work with religious authorities but that religion has to be separated from the state as much as possible (Politovskaya 1999).

The most prominent dispute, nevertheless, was not within Ingushetia but with neighboring North Ossetia, where informal authorities and Ingush institutions did not have sway. The lack of enforcement of the 1991 Law on Rehabilitation, the numerous decrees issued thereafter by the Russian government, and agreements between Ingush and North Ossetian state officials who began negotiating directly in 1995, further diminished Ingush trust in the state's legal institutions and its capacity to implement its decisions. As Ruslan Buzurtanov, the head of The Center for the Rights of the Repressed, stated, "there is a big debt owed to those who fought for the laws' creation...it is the laws themselves that have become the greatest challenge. Unfortunately, the state has no cohesive program for their implementation" (Serdalo 26 September 1995). My interviewees similarly stressed that the Russian state failed to honor their constitutionally provided rights, decreasing their trust in the legal system. In June 1995, after a handful of residents started moving back to the village of Kurat, several were murdered. Aushev urged patience and restraint in "the face of provocation for the sake of our nation" (Serdalo 27 June 1995).

By 1996, forcefully expelled Ingush were legally allowed to return to 8 villages in Prigorodny district, but very few did so, fearing for their security (Serdalo 21 September 1996). Within the state administration, and under Aushev specifically, residents encountered a policy of restraint that focused on ensuring they did not reignite an active and armed phase of the conflict. While most Ingush supported this approach,[186] they also lost faith in formal legal system. Yet,

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[186] Not all supported Aushev's approach, which focused on addressing the outcomes of the conflict, instead seeking more decisive action to return Ingush residents to their villages and in some cases seeking to reclaim Prigorodny

since informal modes of influence, like blood feuds do not transfer to those who do not recognize the practice like Ossetians (Albogachieva 2010), civilians had to rely on formal mechanisms to address what many perceived as the biggest dispute impacting their lives.

Therefore, with the exception of the persistent conflict with North Ossetia where residents had to rely on formal mechanisms of dispute resolution, residents of Ingushetia generally preferred to resolve disputes through informal institutions. Family and community networks particularly played a prominent role, one encouraged by state officials. Administrators initially outsourced disputes to informal authorities and increasingly sought to create space for them, and informal dispute resolution institutions, within the state's legal framework. While the architecture governing dispute resolution was more consistent than in Dagestan, which had a patchwork with different villages operating under different institutions, in Ingushetia this was achieved without crowding out alternative options of dispute resolution as in Chechnya. Unlike in Chechnya where state administrators sought to bring non-state authorities under their control, in Ingushetia, administrators sought to empower informal authorities and regulate a category of disputes through them. While informal authorities' autonomy closely paralleled the system in Dagestan, non-state authorities also had significantly more influence in Ingushetia, actively sought for their input and empowered to make decisions.

Social Order

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district for Ingushetia (Interview 29 2018). They openly voiced their demands for an alternative approach to the dispute, which became increasingly public after several murders of Ingush residents in 1997. For example, in June, twenty-three Ingush activists and leading figures, including the Mufti, head of the Council of Elders, head of the Women's Ingush Council, and the head of several local branches of major parties published a letter criticizing the lack of decisive action on the conflict (Serdalo 6 June 1997). Several months later, another group, which again included Mufti Albogachiev, issued a statement appealing to "traditions of the mountains," and evoking the "legacy of Stalinism, which hurt both Ingush and Ossetians," seeking the "return of Ingush lands" (Serdalo 26 August 1997). Aushev's call for patience contributed to a 33% reduction of voters' support to Aushev in the 1997 elections (Sokirianskaya 2009: 271).

Alongside the emphasis placed on establishing Ingush dispute resolution institutions, a similar priority was placed on maintaining and reviving a social order in line with Ingush traditions. In practice, this meant prioritizing and promoting Ingush language development, traditionally outlined norms of behavior and interaction, and physical symbols of Ingush culture. Had the collective violence targeted a different side of the groups' identity, such as its religious basis, the priority may have been placed on creating a different basis for the social order. Non-state authorities and networks took a lead on reviving Ingush traditions; state elites initially took a secondary role.

During the early years of the republic's formation, civilians, informal authorities, and state administrators emphasized the need to prioritize the revitalization of Ingush culture, traditions, and values to undergird the republic's social order. For example, the 1996 Law on Government Languages, established both Russian and Ingush as state languages, raising the priority of the latter. One thread consistently evident in politicians' statements and interviews is that Ingush should be in charge of their own "ethnic politics," rather than leaving it in the hands of federal administrators who had previously enforced policies that did not take into account local traditions and culture (e.g. Serdalo 6 April 1999). As with dispute resolution, primary responsibility for social order fell on families, elders, and religious authorities, who emphasized cohesion and maintaining Ingush traditions as the basis for social order. This delegation of responsibility created stricter guidelines for social interactions and behaviors, dress, and educational institutions than in Dagestan, but with greater flexibility than in neighboring Chechnya.

By the late 1990s, teip meetings became a regular forum to discuss questions that could impact the entire group, including symbolic projects like reconstruction of the teip's historic tower complex in the mountains (Interview 17 2017). Though state elites supported these efforts, they repeatedly emphasized that the primary responsibility to "revive Vainakh cultural and spiritual values" fell on families, elders, and religious authorities (Serdalo 2 April 1996). Beginning in 1999, the state newspaper Serdalo started publishing the names, pictures, and addresses of individuals responsible for kidnapping for example, with the explicit goal of putting societal pressure on families to ensure no one in their teip was involved in such criminality.[187]

In his presidential address to the Ingush National Congress in 1996, Aushev stated, "we can halt the construction of roads, factories, businesses, all of it, but not ideology… we all need to work on the creation of ideological institutions that include spirituality and morals rooted in national traditions, etiquette, in keeping with basic human values. There is important work being done to address historic injustices and restore forgotten names...only after the creation of a joint ideology and values can we talk about material institutions" (ibid.) Despite economic challenges and lack of basic public goods like healthcare facilities, schools, and electricity, state administrators emphasized the need for investment in objects deemed of cultural significance. In 1995, the Ingush state created a committee dedicated to preserving Ingush sculptures allocating funds for their restoration and providing security for sculptures and statues deemed of cultural significance (Serdalo 25 April 1995). As one of the architects involved with it described, the Ingush lost most of their historical statues and sculptures that were in both Grozny and

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[187] Most of the individuals identified in the newspaper were residents of Chechnya but several of the articles pointed out that the groups were receiving assistance by residents of Ingushetia.

Vladikavkaz and were starting anue, making it essential that they preserve what was left within the republic's territory (Serdalo 3 October 1995).

The conflict put a strain on traditional institutions but also highlighted their importance in residents' eyes. As the advisor to Ruslan Aushev pointed out, "the nation was put in an extreme situation. There is a constant fear for one's own future but also the future of one's family, the problems created by the hundreds of deaths and disappearances from the events in Oct-Nov 1992 and the undeclared war in Chechnya" (Serdalo 12 September 1995). In the context of the perceived threat, many residents sought to reclaim their Ingush identity, giving their children historically Ingush names like Hava, Aset, Magomed-Basir compared to names commonly given in the Soviet era like Roza and Ahmed (ibid.) Aushev repeatedly stated that the development and success of the republic depended on maintaining Ingush traditions and norms and operating cohesively as a nation (e.g Serdalo 21 September 1996). Just as the 1994 Constitution elevated Ingush law, it placed Ingush language on equal footing with Russian as the state language and made language development a high government priority (statute 13).

In reinforcing traditional order, state elites also strengthened society's hierarchy. For example, in his 1996 address to the Ingush National Congress, Aushev discussed the increase in drug use, stating that it was particularly unbecoming for Ingush women. Listing off the women's names, he stated "they all have husbands, brothers, fathers, children. What are they teaching the next generation? Why are their relatives, their elders not stopping their illegal actions" (Serdalo 21 September 1996). Actions liked drug-use were perceived as threats to the traditionally established norms of behavior but also to women's place in society, which authorities argued had to be reclaimed to re-establish social order.

While state administrators emphasized a joint vision based on Ingush traditions, beginning with the mid-1990s, a demand for religious institutions also developed in society, particularly among the younger generation. At their 1995 meeting, the Organization for Ingush Youth passed a resolution seeking the introduction of Arabic and Islamic values at all Ingush schools, demonstrating a strong demand for a religiously based social order alongside traditional Ingush institutions. In 1995, the government newspaper Serdalo started publishing a regular column about the Foundations of Islam to provide consistent information across the republic and by 1996 the two Islamic Universities in Ingushetia could not keep up with applicants (Serdalo 21 May 1996). At that point, according to the Assistant to the Minister for Education, schools' curriculum was focused on replacing the communist ideology with reasserting Ingush traditions and culture - "that which had been forgotten," suggesting that early on the priority for state administrators was on Ingush traditional institutions not religious ones (Serdalo 25 April 1995). By the end of the 1990s, state administrators introduced Arabic and Foundations of Islam into school curriculum as the Organization for Ingush Youth requested; however, this decision was also driven by spillover violence from Chechnya and the perceived threat to local, Sufi religious beliefs, which I discuss in the next section.

Through the 1990s, Ingush adat and local interpretations of shari'a intermixed to regulate behavior and rituals like weddings and funerals. The Muftiat determined kalim though it also varies based on which Sufi brotherhood the families belong to. There are disagreements between adat and shari'a as to what happens with the kalim upon divorce, as well as what happens to the children. According to adat, children stay with the fathers' family while according to shari'a they stay with the mother until the age of seven when they decide who to live with (Albogaevicha

2017: 199). Sufi brotherhoods also regulated practices around funerals, including visitation rights, donations in honor of the passed, and ceremonies like zikr which are performed thereafter. These traditions helped reinforce community networks, as not only those who knew the individual came to pay their respects and contribute financially to the family. These norms reinforced social cohesion and community solidarity, as well as the authority of elders and religious leaders, though by the end of the 1990s there were disagreement about whether norms around funerals and weddings should follow adat or should adapt to be in line with Islam.

Parts of the shifts in social order echoed state initiatives in Chechnya, with a similar emphasis on restoring and maintaining "traditional" and "local" institutions vis-a-vis foreign influences. Nevertheless, there are several important differences. First, though state administrators approved and formalized curriculum changes in Ingushetia, they resulted from a bottom-up process and were driven by an autonomous religious establishment not by state administrators. Second, with the exception of the time period under Murat Zyazikov (2002-2008) which I address below, they were not implemented with the same coercive logic as the decrees in Chechnya.

Though the authorities involved in governance in Ingushetia parallel the other two republics, the manner in which the early governance trajectory developed differed. In Ingushetia, the pattern of informal integration more closely mirrored Dagestan than Chechnya, with informal authorities maintaining a high degree of autonomy from the state. However, due to the conflict with North Ossetia, which led to the prioritization of Ingush identity, greater emphasis was placed on self-governance over dispute resolution and social order in Ingushetia with greater involvement of non-state authorities. Moreover, while in Dagestan, capacity for collective action

was focused on narrower communities, ties across Ingushetia allowed for greater cohesion and

more effective bargaining with state authorities. During the decade after the conflict, Ingushetia

was governed under a mediated arrangement, prompted by the collective violence in 1992 at the

republic's founding.

Challenges to Mediated Governance: Spillover from Chechnya's Wars and State Efforts at Centralization

The Chechen wars impacted Ingushetia, not just due to the influx of displaced persons

but by introducing new divisions into the republic, politicizing religion, and escalating coercive

tactics that challenged the pre-existing mediated governance arrangement. The disorder and

criminality of interwar Chechnya spilled over to neighboring Ingushetia. Though Ingushetia had

the lowest crime rates of the three republics under study in the 1990s, by 1997 kidnapping,

commonplace in Chechnya at the time, started to happen in Ingushetia as well. That year, MVD

reported 44 incidents and the numbers continued to climb into the 2000s (Serdalo 15 November

1997). However, while in Chechnya the state response was a securitization of Islam, the initial

approach in Ingushetia was less intrusive and less coercive, maintaining the mediated

governance trajectory. When Ingush state elites did try to instill similar policies to Chechnya in

the 2000s, non-state authorities pushed back more effectively than in Chechnya, preventing

centralization.

Aushev's initial approach was to regulate religion more closely, which had implications

for all three governance domains. These decisions were not purely driven by top-down policies,

but also responded to demands collectively organized by the National Congress of Ingushetia's

Muslims in which the Muftiat played a leading role. First, the Congress called for the closure of

several schools which were receiving foreign financing, "which have already brought much harm

to the neighboring republics, which are potentially harmful to maintaining the best characteristics of our nation, our traditions, and can jeopardize the cohesion within our republic" (Serdalo 5 August 1998). In declining further financing, state administrators limited external influence but also options for goods provision. This was not from a lack of need; nearly a decade after the republic's formation, in a 2000 speech, President Aushev set one of the annual goals as providing piped water throughout the entire republic, including in the new capital, Magas (Serdalo 24 August 2000) demonstrating that the economic situation in the republic remained problematic. However, given that foreign funding was mostly targeted at religious infrastructure, the direct impact on broader public goods provision was likely limited. It did mean that residents, however, had to further split their scarce economic resources to entirely fund religious infrastructure locally. Ensuring the stability of local beliefs, traditions, and order trumped purely economic considerations.

While limiting reliance on foreign economic funding, the 1998 Congress' resolution simultaneously called for introducing Islamic education, stating that it was necessary in the face of the threat posed by "foreign influences" to revitalize "traditional" Islam practiced in Ingushetia (Serdalo 5 August 1998). This had implications for both dispute resolution and social order. First, the resolution introduced a class on the Foundations of Islam in schools across Ingushetia for grades 5-11, as well as Arabic classes (Serdalo 7 August 1998). Both sets of classes would be taught by graduates of Nazran's Islamic University who were required to first receive a certificate from Ingushetia's Muftiat (Akieva 2014: 333). In 1997, the republic's Assistant Advisor to the President on Religious Affairs began conducting seminars discussing the difference between Sufism and Wahhabism in schools and publishing articles for the

population more broadly (Serdalo 4 September 1997). The Muftiat also created a program based

on the Shaafi mashab and advised the heads of the Islamic Universities and imams of local

mosques to conduct discussions regarding Wahhabism and "its negative tendencies" (Serdalo 22

February 1997). In justifying these decisions, the Congress appealed to the need to maintain a

distinctly Ingush identity, emphasizing traditional religious practices (Serdalo 5 August 1998).

The demand to maintain Ingush traditions also spilled over into the legal system. By

1999, state administrators made formal allowances for informal mechanisms of dispute

resolution, juxtaposing the two. Statute 9 of the Ingush Law on Regulating Legal Questions and

Combating Criminality allowed the President to pardon or decrease the sentence of individuals

charged with crimes that were allowed under traditional law, such as blood feuds and bridal

kidnapping.

These policies were similar to those passed in Dagestan at the time, increasing regulation

by both religious authorities and state administrators. However, in Dagestan, laws also banned

Salafism. Residents in Ingushetia retained the ability to go to Salafi mosques, despite state

disapproval. State administrators perceived non-Sufi Islam, what they referred to as Wahhabism,

as a threat as they did throughout the North Caucasus' republics. However, instead of bringing

elders and imams under state control, Aushev adopted an approach of consultation with informal

authorities. In 1998, he explicitly issued an order that local imams and elders should be consulted

in the appointment of local administrators (Serdalo 2 June 1998). The state's approach and

reforms signaled support and alignment with Sufism and the Muftiat, but did not crowd out

alternatives for civilians as they did in Chechnya, and to a lesser degree, Dagestan. Nevertheless,

as religion and politics became more intertwined, new cracks emerged in what was previously a cohesive narrative around a collective Ingush identity.

Attempts at Centralization and "Chechenization"

In 2002, Murat Zyazikov replaced Aushev as President, a decision allegedly made due to Aushev's criticism of the war in Chechnya.[188] Zyazikov's approach closely mirrored Kadyrov's in Chechnya, relying on repression and coercion rather than mediation and reliance on non-state institutions or authorities. In a 2002 interview, he stated that while his own views on Ingush traditions did not differ from Aushev's he did not see the need to formalize them or incorporate them into state practices (Serdalo 18 July 2002). One of his first acts was dissolving the forming shari'a courts created under Aushev, which he described as wasting state funds, shifting them back to non-state mechanisms for consultation (ibid). Asked about a potential backlash, Zyazikov stated he was not concerned because he has Putin's backing (ibid.) Though Zyazikov continued to meet with elders and representatives of the Muftiat (Serdalo 13 January 2004), interviewees suggest the meetings were not an attempt to consult or gather information but to implement state decrees through informal authorities (Interview 17 2017; Interview 18 2017). This exemplified a shift in state policy, with accountability and decision-making shifting toward the center rather than to the local population, as in the other republics.

In addition to shifting the relationship with non-state institutions, Zyazikov adopted coercive tactics that human rights organizations and scholars described as the "Chechenization of Ingushetia (Memorial 2005; Evangelista, 2004; Sakwa 2011). In 2002, Zyazikov began

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[188] Aushev provided his assessment of the counterinsurgency strategy in Serdalo's 6 November 1999 issue, criticizing the heavy-handed use of force, which he stated, based on his experience fighting in Afghanistan was insufficient to rule. This contrasted with Zyazkov's statements that Putin understood the Caucasus better than almost anyone (Serdalo 18 July 2002)

counterinsurgency operations within the IDP camps in Ingushetia, resulting in human rights abuses and disappearances mirroring those in Chechnya itself (Memorial 2005). The following year, violence in Ingushetia increased with 52 documented abductions; 38 were residents of Chechnya, 12 were residents of Ingushetia, and 2 were citizens of Armenia (ibid). In 2004, Ingush and Chechen fighters set up their own security checkpoints in the republic, where they checked documents and shot passing security personnel, as well as attacked the Interior Ministry, the FSB, and police headquarters. Over 90 people, mostly security personnel, were killed and rebels seized weapons from security forces (Francois-Ratelle 2013:130). This strategy created a major backlash and destabilized the republic, causing a surge in attacks against police and a portion of Ingush residents to join Chechnya's rebels under the Ingush Jamaat (Francois-Ratelle 2013:129-135). My interviewees remember Zyazikov's rule as categorized by an inability to go outside after dark and a high level of insecurity, echoing statements of interviewees in Dagestan's Makhachkala and Khasavyurt.

When conflicts and criminality increased with the influx of criminality from Chechnya, challenging existing mechanisms of dispute resolution, Ingush residents sought to strengthen informal mechanisms of dispute resolution rather than dismantling them. In addition to existing conciliation commissions previously discussed, some villages also created "teip courts," which consisted of a small number of elected members of the teip - often including someone knowledgeable of Islam and a representative of the younger generation as well as elders - to settle disputes, enforce norms of behavior, and provide funding collected from all members to any families harmed in a dispute (Serdalo 4 November 2000).

As the population became more religious, increasingly the resolution of disputes and reconciliation after blood feuds process happened after Friday prayer with members of both extended families in attendance and appeals to the importance of forgiveness in Islam rather than merely Ingush traditions (Albogachieva 2010; Albogachieva and Babich: 2010). My interviewees stated that by the 2000s, people started going directly to the local imam if they could not resolve a problem within the family instead of going to elders first (Interview 18 2017; Interview 19 2017). During the 1990s, teips gathered for all serious questions but now they mostly gather to discuss bridal kidnapping, disputes between teips, and blood feuds; if there is a problem that cannot be resolved within the teip, they turn to the imam, followed by shari'a courts (Interview 19 2017). Though teips' influence decreased, it shifted to religious authorities.

The spillover violence from Chechnya and state violence under Zyazikov paralleled the counterinsurgency approach used across the North Caucasus republics and pushed Ingushetia toward securitization of governance. The violence dynamics mirrored Dagestan at the end of the 2000s, with attacks on security personnel and attempted assassinations on "traditional" religious authorities escalating (Memorial 2007). Memorial (2007) summarized the cycle of violence:

The militants professing radical Islamism have been committing attacks against the clergy, who, in their view, are collaborating with the authorities and with the special security services. When the "siloviks" have to investigate crimes, they, in the first place, "work through" the lists of "non-traditional" Muslims who are perceived as suspicious by definition. Representatives of this group primarily become victims of illegal actions on the part of the special security services, law enforcement agencies and the military.

Violence continued to escalate through the late 2000s, causing Moscow to replace Zyazikov with Unus-Bek Evkurov, an Ingush Colonel who had fought on the Russian side in Chechnya. The violence left a significant mark. Asked about what forms of violence occurred in their village or

neighborhood in my survey, 52.58% of respondents said there has been a counterinsurgency

sweep in their village. The overall results are evident below:

Figure 29: Violence Experienced

Asked about the extent to which violence in the post-Soviet period impacted their life

overall, most respondents selected that violence had an impact. In fact, individuals' assessment

of how violence impacted their lives closely echo the results from Chechnya.

Figure 30: Overall Impact of Violence

Evkurov adopted a more mediated approach that echoed Aushev, decreasing coercive tactics and providing more autonomous space for non-state organizations and authorities. Though Evkurov tried to utilize non-state authorities to legitimate his rule creating a Council of Elders in 2009 for example, he also allowed parallel independent organizations to exist as he was unable to shut down the autonomous council of elders. In practice, this often resulted in a formal and informal organization operating simultaneously.

Despite the shift to more coercive practices in the 2000s, important differences in governance persisted, rooted in the initial governance trajectories of the republics in the 1990s. State elites were unable to achieve centralization, as they had in Chechnya, due to the persistent strength of non-armed non-state authorities in Ingushetia who maintained their autonomy and capacity to mobilize wide spans of the population for resistance to state penetration. For example, on September 19 and 20th 2007, federal security forces abducted two Ingush residents, leading to mass riots in Nazran. Hundreds demonstrated and blocked intersections in Nazran,

demanding the civilians' return and calling for an investigation into security practices. Only after learning that the two abducted men were released did the crowd disperse (Memorial 2007). In 2010, a similar situation resulted in protests by villagers from Plievo. As one elder phrased it, "through weddings and funerals we maintain our spider web of relations" (Interview 5 2016). Though state administrators tried to sometimes use non-state authorities to pressure civilians, such as when they sent elders from Plievo to ask protests to go home,[189] collective action persisted. Strong horizontal networks, and persistence of non-state authorities who could mobilize them not just for self-governance but also for resistance, prevented state domination, maintaining Ingushetia's mediated governance trajectory.

In the next section of this chapter, I test this argument that spillover violence from Chechnya was insufficient to shift the mediated governance trajectory established due to collective violence, focusing on the three mechanisms at hand - civilian preferences, collective action capacity, and pattern of integration - and their outcomes for the three dimensions of governance - goods provision, dispute resolution, and social order.

Long-Term Impact of Collective Violence

Re-examining the current architecture of governance established in the outcomes chapter, I assess *who* controls *which domains.* This allows for the possibility that governance is uneven across domains and that violence may have heterogeneous effects. The figure below summarizes survey responses to the question, "who controls the following domains in your community?" Given that actors in Ingushetia are autonomous from each other, we can interpret the answers directly.

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[189] https://ingushetiya-ru.livejournal.com/775077.html Accessed 19 July 2019.

Figure 31: Republic Governance Regime

As in the other republics, state administrators dominate the material dimensions of governance while non-state authorities are more prevalent in dispute resolution and social order. State collapse and conflict did not fully overturn the shared history of the three republics and the history of state penetration from the Soviet era. Looking closer, Ingushetia falls in between Dagestan and Chechnya in terms of who governs. The role of republic authorities is prominent in the material dimensions of governance, closer to Chechnya but there is still a slight presence of non-state authorities in security and more so in infrastructure, as in Dagestan. Breaking down the non-state authorities, family members, elders, religious authorities, and local administrators play a prominent role in dispute resolution, and social order is heavily controlled by family members, with a presence of other authorities.

While this provides information about each authority fully broken down, it was important to understand if state and non-state actors compete or co-produce governance across these domains. To do this, I look if respondents selected only state actors, only non-state actors, both, or said that no one regulates this domain. The responses are below.[190]

Figure 32: Republic Governance Aggregated by Group

State and non-state authorities co-regulate dispute resolution and education most commonly, though 16.53% of respondents also stated that they jointly produce infrastructure. Moreover, non-state authorities dominate dispute resolution, more so than in the other cases, and are prevalent in education and social order, highlighting the persistence of non-state authorities in governance. This echoes interviews and observations that attempts at centralization have not

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[190] I provide a table in the Appendix with the mean proportion of respondents who selected each of the authority types as well as the standard deviation across communities in the chapter appendix.

displaced non-state authorities. As in Dagestan, there are greater demands for the state to effectively provide goods, but civilians continue to rely on non-state authorities for non-material dimensions of governance.

To more systematically understand the causes of mediated governance in Ingushetia, I examine each of the three theorized mechanisms in turn: civilian preferences, collective action capacities, and the pattern of informal and local authority integration. First, I look at civilian preferences, demonstrating that they diverge across dimensions of governance in a similar manner to the other republics. Second, I examine how collective violence shaped the collective action capacity of non-state authorities vis-a-vis state elites. Finally, I turn to the pattern of integration. I conclude this section by drawing the connection across these three interconnected mechanisms to show how they jointly shape governance.

Civilian Preferences

Understanding governance requires understanding how civilians choose between the alternatives before them. Interviews echoed Dagestan in terms of goods provision, with residents desiring greater and more effective state involvement, but mirrored Chechnya, with a preference for utilizing non-state mechanisms of dispute resolution. There is not the same alienation from the Russian in Ingushetia as there is in Chechnya where the state was directly responsible for the violence, but there are persistent feelings that state authorities cannot be trusted to enact laws and decisions. Moreover, the selection of non-state authorities seems to stem less from alienation from the state than from a preference to maintain Ingush traditions and culture. To understand residents' perceptions of different authorities and how they select which authorities to turn to, the survey asked a battery of four questions. Specifically, the questions asked who in the community

is the most accessible, most trustworthy, most fair, and whose decisions are most likely to be obeyed.[191]

Figure 33: Authority Characteristics

The results reveal that non-state authorities are consistently the most accessible, trusted, perceived to be fair, and obeyed. Though interviewees suggested that elders have lost their authority, 42.47% of respondents selected them as the most obeyed in their community, nearly tied with religious authorities who were selected by 42.45% of respondents. Given that neither elders nor religious authorities have formal enforcement mechanisms and rely on social pressure and voluntary compliance, a high degree of obedience is necessary for collective action broadly, and informal dispute institutions and social order specifically.

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[191] The order of the questions was randomized.

Next, I utilize hierarchical models to see if there is an association between violence and their perceptions of different authorities. I control for mobility,[192] religiosity,[193] and gender.[194] To focus on the impact of the collective violence rather than the spillover violence from Chechnya that came thereafter, I focus on respondents' answer as to whether they lost a close family member as a result of the conflict in Prigorodny district. The results show that losing a close family member decreased trust in local authorities,[195] though it did not have significantly alter perception of fairness or obedience or assessments of other authorities. The results provide mixed evidence for Hypothesis 1, which suggested that the state should have a harder time regaining authority if it is responsible for the violence. One potential explanation is that Russian troops were involved in the violence and displacement and the federal government is blamed for not resolving the conflict, which may decrease trust in it even though it was not the main actor responsible for collective violence.

Do civilians' perceptions differ across dimensions of governance? I asked respondents who they would turn to if they have a problem with infrastructure to understand their preferences for goods provision. Respondents were allowed to list multiple options if they were used conjointly.

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[192] This comes from a survey question, which asked respondents if anyone in their household lives in a different village or city more than 30 days out of the year. It accounts for the likelihood that individuals' mobility changes their exposure to different authorities and embeddedness in local community networks (Lu 2014).

[193] This comes from a survey question as to whether the respondent selected religion as their primary identity. We may expect more religious individuals to more commonly select religious authorities.

[194] This comes from enumerator identification of respondents' gender.

[195] Coefficient = -0.07081 SE = 0.02879 p = 0.01447 *

Table 8: If you have an infrastructure problem in your community, who do you usually go to?

Central administrators	2.0
Republic administrators	31.7
Local administrators	79.5
Religious authorities	0.8
Elders	0.5
Community members	34.3
Businessmen	5.0

The responses show that while most Ingush turn to the state for goods provision, community members play a role as well. The results slightly differ from the responses to who provides infrastructure in the community, where 68.58% of respondents selected local authorities. Respondents who reported losing a family member from the conflict were less likely to say they go to local administrators.[196] Similar to Chechnya and Dagestan, there are some shifts in who civilians turn to for goods provision but state authorities are consistently the dominant actors responsible for goods provision. Conflict did not displace civilians' perception that the state is responsible for this domain.

The ability to provide goods has improved but remains strained and unable to keep up with residents' demands. When I met with teachers throughout five villages in Ingushetia between 2016 and 2018, they consistently stated that schools continue to struggle to fill demand, partially due to the high birth rate. Similarly, most of my interviewees seek healthcare for anything other than minor issues outside the republic. Businessmen I met with complained that continuous electricity outages disrupted their ability to operate, confirming that the regular

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[196] Coefficient =-0.09136   SE = 0.04505 p = 0.0433 *

outages I experienced when conducting fieldwork were not an irregularity. Despite significant advancements, the lower-level of economic development initially evident in Ingushetia at the republic's founding persists into the present and fails to meet civilians demands.

To assess the impact of violence on civilian preferences for dispute resolution, the survey asked respondents which legal order *should* be followed in situations where Russian law, shari'a, and adat contradict. Importantly this assesses civilian preferences for dispute resolution institutions rather than authorities, but still helps understand what type of governance system civilians prefer. To assess the impact of violence on civilian preferences for dispute resolution, the survey asked respondents which legal order *should* be followed in situations where Russian law, shari'a, and adat contradict. Importantly this assesses civilian preferences for dispute resolution institutions rather than authorities, but still helps understand what type of governance system civilians prefer. The non-response rate for this question (11.46%) is lower than in the other republics, suggesting the question is not perceived to be as sensitive in Ingushetia. Shari'a dominates among those that answered the question, selected by 76.9% of respondents, followed by Russian law, selected by 16.4% of respondents, and finally, adat, selected by 6.7% of respondents. The preference for shari'a *over* Russian law, demonstrates that society has not only become more religious but that there is a strong demand in society for religiously basis for dispute resolution institutions. More than in the other republics, this demand approaches a consensus and is not associated with respondents' reported experiences of violence. The low level of preference for adat shows that it has been replaced by shari'a, echoing interviewees who stated that most elders now rely on shari'a instead of adat as well. This supports the argument

that the conflict resulted in stronger preferences for Ingush institutions, though there has been a clear shift over time in the emphasis on the religious institutions over pure adat.

The shift toward a more religious basis for dispute resolution introduced divisions in Ingushetia, as it had in the other republics. A resident of Nasik-Kurt, where Hamzat Chumakov is the main imam, stated that though thousands come from all over the republic and beyond it to hear the imam's message on Fridays, there are divisions within the village (Interview 18 2017). The mosque is just one example of the fragmentation around Islam within Ingushetia, with disagreements between the imam and the official Muftiat, as well as between both and President Evkurov. As one well-respected member of the Salafi community explained to me, there are now around 15 mosques that operate outside the Muftiat's control; though neither the Muftiat nor the state wants competition and pressures the imams, they are allowed to continue operating (Interview 19 2017). Though there is a general preference for Islamic dispute resolution institutions, there are splits in the strands of Islam individuals prefer.

Comparing the impact of violence on dispute resolution vis-a-vis goods provision provides in Ingushetia does not provide support for Hypothesis 1a, which stated that the impact of violence on civilian perceptions is likely to be uneven, with less impact on the material dimensions of governance. There is a fairly cohesive set of preferences for both goods provision and dispute resolution, which is not significantly impacted by experiences of violence. However, the preferences reflect a clear split across dimensions of governance, with a desire for goods provision by the state but preferences for shari'a over state dispute resolution mechanisms, in line with the argument that collective violence led to prioritization for Ingush dispute resolution mechanisms.

Though the survey does not address social order preferences specifically, interviews consistently suggest that there remains a preference for what is perceived to be traditionally Ingush dress, culture and modes of behavior, though respondents have mixed views about whether the state should support them and how Islamic practices should be incorporated. Older respondents generally stated they want greater prioritization and investment in Ingush culture and traditions (Interview 14 2016; Interview 20 2017). As one interviewee put it, "everything begins with culture" (Interview 20 2017). Younger interviewees, on the other hand, though similarly wanting to live in under Ingush institutions seemed to appreciate more freedom and the ability to more freely practice religion (Interview 23 2018; Interview 24 2018). There are now religious splits within the same teip and sometimes within the same family, despite a fairly consistent preference for an Ingush interpretation of Islamic social institutions. Despite the disagreements, there preference is strongly for local control and decision-making over social order.

Collective Action Capacity

Civilian preferences alone are insufficient to explain institutional trajectories, particularly if civilians are unable or unwilling to act on their preferences. While small goods or disputes can be resolved without collective action, most organization of self-governance or demand-making on state authorities requires joint efforts. I argue that armed conflict can impact collective action, and in turn governance, by impacting (1) the presence of skilled leaders (Pearlman 2011; Finkel 2015) and (2) the cohesion of community networks (Thachil 2015; Arjona 2016; Kaplan 2017). Collective violence should increased the cohesion and linkages across Ingushetia, increasingly

the capacity to organize self-governance, demand governance from state authorities, or resist

state attempts at centralization, supporting a mediated governance framework.

The authority characteristics results suggest that elders and religious authorities remain

prevalent in organizing collective action as they are most trusted and obeyed authorities. Though

interviewees suggest that elders' role has become more symbolic, the 2018 protests around the

land conflict with Chechnya suggest otherwise. In response to the initial decision of republic

administrators to transfer nearly 10% of Ingushetia's land to Chechnya, several teips issued

statements condemning republic authorities and expelling them from the respective teips, such as

the Sultigov teip, which expelled Marifa and Magomed Sultigov for supporting the land transfer.

The Ingush Committee for National Unity and the autonomous Committee of Ingush Teips under

Malsag Uzhahov, who had been elected as the leader, and a well-respected elder Ahmed Barhoev

helped organize the protests. Though not all of the protest leaders were informal authorities, such

as Bagaudin Hatuyev, who is a lawyer and head of the Committee for Youth Organizations, the

protests revealed the strength of leaders capable of mobilizing collective action. In the summer

of 2019, thirty of the peaceful protest organizers were arrested, leaving the future potential for

such collective organization unclear. Thus far, Murad Doskiev replaced Uzhahov as the leader,

suggesting there are sufficient networks to maintain leadership and organization. Ingushetia had

the greatest ability of leaders to mobilize republic-wide collective action, bringing together

religious authorities, elders, leaders from the younger generations, and female activists like

Izabella Evloeva and Zarifa Sautieva who helped cover the events.

To understand the potential for collective action in Ingushetia more systematically and

beyond the protests, I turn to several questions from the survey. First, I examine the extent of

cohesion by assessing respondents' trust. The survey reveals that present-day Ingushetia has the highest rate of trust among the three republics, with 46.10% of survey respondents stating that most people could be trusted. This suggests that while there are challenges to overcoming republic-wide collective action problems and banding together, there is a degree of trust that fosters such collective action. While there is not a direct point of comparison from before the conflict to test Hypothesis 2c, that collective violence fosters social cohesion and increases collective action, the fact that Ingushetia has the highest degree of trust across the republics provides evidence that is consistent with that hypothesis.

The survey also asked individuals about their primary identity, which literature has identified as an explanation for how individuals can overcome collective action problems (Habyarimana et al. 2007; Singh 2010; Murtazashvili 2016). Since Ingushetia is mono-ethnic, Ingush identity has potential to serve as a source of cohesion. Yet, only 10.67% of respondents selected ethnicity as their primary identity. Instead, 35% selected family and another 30.83% selected religion as the identities that play the greatest role in their lives, pointing to a number of identities that are relevant to people's lives beyond ethnicity. The ability to organize collective action likely depends on being able to mobilize these cross-cutting identities instead of drawing purely on a single one, a possibility particularly since family does not contradict ethnicity but represents a more narrow identification.

Assessing actual behaviors is also useful to understand collective action. To do this I asked individuals about their participation in religious, kinship, and mutual assistance networks, as well as participation in community service events like *belhi*.[197] Community service events are

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[197] See Reeves (2018) on how community service is mobilized and role it plays in state-building in Central Asia.

less commonly mobilized by the state than in Chechnya, most commonly incentivized by community expectations. The responses, presented in the table below, show that individuals remain highly engaged in their community networks, particularly through financial assistance to each other, community service, and religious participation.[198] Kinship gatherings are slightly less prevalent but still occur, more commonly than in the other republics as well.

Table 9: Forms of Collective Action

	Have Done	*Might Do*	*Would never do*
Financial assistance	77.96	15.46	6.58
Community service	60.56	25.25	14.19
Attend religious gatherings	50.33	29.80	19.87
Attend kinship gatherings	43.14	37.85	19.01

Both the survey results, interviews, and participation observations suggest that while collective action capacity may not be as strong as it was historically, it persists and there are networks and organizations that are used to organize collectively. Kinship networks, specifically, appear to be the strongest in Ingushetia compared to the other republics. Religious networks, when the focus is on men's attendance, are also the most prevalent in Ingushetia. The survey shows that other spaces for collective action, such as charitable organizations, women's groups, and political parties, are also more common in Ingushetia.

Pattern of Integration

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[198] Religious attendance is largely limited to males. When broken up by gender, 85.4% of males said they attend religious gatherings, compared to 15.2% of women. This is the highest male attendance in any of the republics.

Given the broad ties religious authorities and elders maintain to the population, and their ability to organize collective action, it is necessary to understand their relationship to state administrators, and the relationships within the state, to understand to what ends collective action is channeled. As suggested in the description of the protests, in Ingushetia, non-state authorities have remained truly autonomous from the state, organizing self-governance, negotiating with state authorities but also mobilizing resistance to state efforts to reconfigure governance.

Despite several attempts by the state to mobilize non-state authorities to implement state decisions, such as the creation of the Council of Elders under Evkurov in 2009, non-state authorities resisted the efforts to incorporate them into the state. As the introductory quote describes, this often resulted in the creation of parallel organizations such that there was a Council of Elders under the President and an autonomous organization. These attempts at centralization have not limited governance alternatives for civilians, evident in the fact that 20.43% of respondents stated they would seek assistance from an elder or imam if they had a conflict with the village administrator. In January 2016, when the conflict between the Muftiat and Evkurov came to peak, the Mufti's teip, Hamhoevi, gathered over a hundred of its members to determine the preferred course of action, critiquing the administration's effectiveness and its attempts to interfere in the religious sphere in ways forbidden by the Constitution. Other teips, like the Dalgievi, had similar meetings, often with the presence of a local imam and tamada.[199] Though these were organized around a specific conflict, teip gatherings have a broader purpose. One of my interviewees described how the Teip Council is organized:

At the bottom are gatherings that occur in each neighborhood or village where one or two delegates are chosen from each location. Each teip in each location has their own set of

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[199] There is one tamada in each settlement who is responsible for carrying out rituals like weddings and funerals, as well as mavlid, which is the settlement of disputes (Albogachieva 2014: 76).

delegates such that there may be several sets in one village. These delegates meet regularly or as needed. These meetings involve hundreds, sometimes thousands of people. The delegates have chairmen, who in some large settlements form a council of the chairmen. These councils select a few people as representatives to the Republic Council of a particular teip. Up to a certain level in this structure the processes go without formal rules, relying on informal norms. The representatives of the teips periodically meet at the Teip Council, which has a formal management structure including a president, secretaries, audit commission and discusses relevant social issues. The Chairman of the Council of a single teip automatically serves as the delegate to the Teip Council, where more than 100 people meet and also elect a Chairman, deputies, etc. (personal correspondence October 2019)

The Council's structure ensures it is embedded in communities throughout the republic with several levels of accountability. The imams are now often appointed by the Muftiat, this generally happens in consultation with the community. Both sets of authorities remain autonomous from the state. Though Evkurov tried to dissolve both the Muftiat and Teip council, neither order was effectively implemented. The Muftiat is again operational, with the last round of elections occurring in July 2019 and the Teip Council, though having lost its formal organizational status, continues to operate with minimal changes (Interview 34 2019). Informal authorities, repeatedly tested, remain autonomous from the state.

Pulling the three sections - civilian preferences, collective action capacity, and the pattern of incorporation - together demonstrates that governance in Ingushetia most closely allows civilians to enact their governance preferences out of the three republics, with the greatest discrepancy in goods provision. Despite the progress made in terms of goods production, especially considering the low level at which the republic started, state administrators continue to be unable to fill civilians' needs. Non-state authorities fill the gap where they can, as in Dagestan, but are limited both by their expectations of the state's responsibilities and resources.

Non-state actors have slowly pushed beyond their Soviet-era boundaries. As the republic became more religious through the late 1990s and into the 2000s, Islam also came to play a more prominent role economically, particularly in structuring the work of charitable funds. Religiously rooted charities like Tesham, which was founded in 1998, have flourished in Ingushetia with a heavy focus on distributing food, clothing, and economic assistance around Islamic holidays. The organizations operate autonomously from the state and provide an important source of need-based economic assistance. However, the Soviet-era delineation of responsibilities continues to structure where non-state authorities are willing to contribute resources and organization. As one of my interviewees, a small business owner and administrator at one of the republic's charitable organizations, explained, people in the republic are much more likely to donate for religious causes rather than goods they perceive to be the duty of the state, reiterating the split that began in the 1990s (Interview 26 2018). Other interviews echoed this sentiment. When I asked on human rights worker if he ever saw groups raise money for construction of schools, for example, he laughed and asked why they would do that given that this was the state's responsibility. Therefore, though residents have gradually obtained greater resources and increased their capacity to collectively contribute to goods provision, their perceptions of authorities responsibilities continues to structure their behavior.

Preferences for dispute resolution and social order strongly favor non-state institutions and authorities, on the other hand. In Ingushetia, unlike Chechnya, non-state authorities remain relatively autonomous and are given the space to create rules and institutions outside state control, though there have been efforts to minimize contradictions. In 2010, the National Conference of Ingush Muslims gathered with roughly 400 delegates, featuring representatives of

each village, the Muftiat, and President Evkurov, to discuss urgent questions regarding blood

feuds, bridal kidnapping, and broadly Islam within the Russian federation. The price of the

kalim, the amount given to a bride, was raised at the conference not just to keep up with inflation

but as an attempt to minimize divorces (Albogachieva 2010: 484-485). Another key question was

bridal kidnapping, allowed under adat but banned under shari'a. By 2013, the attendees of the

Conference on Ingushetia's Muslims voted to ban bridal kidnapping, with local mosques issuing

fines up to 200,000 rubles (Albogaevicha 2017: 188-189). The reason given was that the

tradition contradicted both shari'a and Russian law, suggesting less emphasis on maintaining

Ingush traditions than early in the 1990s (ibid.) Several young men and women I interviewed

said this ruling decreased, but did not fully stop, the practice demonstrating its persistence. In

cases where bridal kidnapping does occur, a combination of family members, religious

authorities, and elders are all involved in negotiating the outcome, most commonly without the

involvement of state administrators (Interview 36 2018).[200] The authority of non-state actors in

dispute resolution persists. The counterinsurgency sweeps that became widespread after the

Second Chechen War only increased their strength in dispute resolution.[201]

       When I met with an assistant to the Qadi of Ingushetia in 2018, he described the process

through which they settle disputes in detail. He stated that the courts aimed to provide a decision

within three days, which the local imam was then responsible for enforcing. The assistant

described that if the person refuses to implement the decision or does not show repeatedly after

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[200] The interests of the "bride" are theoretically represented by her sister or mother, who are assumed to know the woman's intentions (Albogaevicha 2017: 188-189).

[201] Sweeps are associated with an increase in religious authorities' role in dispute resolution (coefficient = 0.34778 SE = 0.05286 p = 2.37e-10 ***), increase in elders role in dispute resolution(coefficient = 0.22056 SE = 0.05422 p =6.20e-05 ***), and decrease in local administrators role in dispute resolution (coefficient = -0.21445 SE = 0.04935 p = 1.9e-05 ***).

being called in to the court, the imam announces it at Friday prayer to place public pressure on the individual. In cases where the family supports the individual's decision not to comply than the punishment spreads to the whole family such that others will not attend their funerals or weddings. If they publicly condemn the actions then they are not held accountable. For the most serious offenses, the person can be kicked out of the village. However, the most common offenses they considered were questions about business, loans, selling of alcohol, divorces, and land disputes that did not involve the state. (Interview 32 2018). The enforcement of their decisions, as with elders, therefore relied upon informal sanctions. The shifting landscape of dispute resolution suggests residents in Ingushetia are still negotiating which mode of dispute resolution and social order norms should regulate decision-making and behavior in the republic. State interference into social order remains minimal, similar to Dagestan and authority of elders has decreased compared to the 1990s but not diminished. Though there is less obedience of informal authorities compared to the past, they still have more authority than state administrators. As one interviewee who practices Salafism stated, "you can discuss religion, you can grow your beard, wear your clothing" (Interview 19 2017). He went on, "Under Aushev you were pressured if you did not agree with the Muftiat, under Zyazikov - he did not control the situation, no one did; under Evkurov we gained freedom, you can be a Sufi, a Salafi, you can see that there is less coercion and interference."

While the strength of non-state authorities has allowed them to effectively negotiate with, and limit centralization efforts of state administrators, informal institutions and regulations also place constraints on residents, particularly women. One young woman summarized, "women are more independent now but we still live in a patriarchal society" (Interview 24 2018). Another

woman, head of an NGO, described there was an influx of women's NGOs as a result of the wars, allowing for more interaction between men and women in nontraditional roles and greater spaces for women's participation in society (Interview 4 2016). Women's NGOs have created a coalition to support each other (ibid.) However, she went on to describe that they have run into criticism, a comment echoed by other women. Describing the impact of dispute resolution institutions on women, several women commented that most women will not seek divorces because adat leaves the kids with the husband. When I met with a group of young women, all under the age of thirty, in 2017 to discuss dispute resolution, they stated that their husbands typically voice issues of concern to the family after Friday prayer, an arena to which women have limited access.

The horizontal institutions of control impact social order and women's place in society as well. Though most of the women I met with stated they feel as though they have greater freedom now, able to work in most organizations, their stories also pointed to a persistence in family's control. For example, one female journalist described how her husband received phone calls after she published a critical piece telling him to reign her in (Interview 24 2018). Whereas families are used to put pressure on people to make specific decisions broadly, the fact that the call went to her husband is telling. Following the commentary around the 2018-2019 protests and arrests, though the several women involved received overwhelming support, there were also numerous comments about how the women should not have been involved in the first place. Those defending their presence most commonly commented that women would not have to protest if men did their jobs, not because on the basis of women's equality. Informal institutions, authorities, and networks continue to place limits on women's behavior and public role.

Overall, civilian preferences in Ingushetia most closely mirror Chechnya, while the collective action capacity and pattern of integration more closely resemble Dagestan. Collective violence increased social cohesion and density of networks, key for mobilizing collective action. Since policies resulting from collective violence initially prioritized maintaining Ingush dispute resolution and social order institutions, non-state authorities regulating these spaces maintained their capacity to mobilize autonomous collective action into the present. Governance in Ingushetia continues to be marked by the persistent influence of informal politics in the realms that non-state authorities have historically occupied; because of the delegation of governance functions, this rarely leads to competition with the state.

Village-Level Variation in Governance

Given that Ingushetia is the smallest republic of the three under study and that individuals impacted by violence are not concentrated in a specific area within Ingushetia, there may be few village level differences in governance. Ingushetia has eighteen settlements that have more than five thousand people, fourteen of which were sampled in the survey. Given how small most villages are, most people travel between them and into the cities daily, such that there is a high degree of regular interaction between residents of different villages. Existing studies suggest that this should increase demands on the state while weakening informal governance (Lu 2014; Kruks-Wisner 2018). I control for migration, as well as religiosity, as in the other republics to examine the village-level variation in governance.

Prior to looking at the relationship between violence and governance, I plot the outcomes for the proportion of individuals in each community that said state authorities regulate infrastructure, dispute resolution, and social order respectively, to see the extent of variation

across communities. The plots are below with an index of state control (local, republic, and state central authorities) on the left and non-state control (religious authorities, elders, community members) on the right.

Figure 34: Variation in Governance by Community

Plot 1: Proportion Choosing State (L) and Nonstate (R) Authorities As Infrastructure Providers by Community

Plots 2: Proportion Choosing State (L) and Nonstate (R) Authorities As Regulating Dispute Resolution by Community

Plots 3: Proportion Choosing State (L) and Nonstate (R) Authorities As Regulating Social Order by Community

The plots confirm that there is a delegation of governance responsibilities not just at the republic level, but in most villages, such that state administrators control goods provision while non-state authorities regulate disputes and social order. Though there were only 14 locations surveyed, in most communities state administrators - local or republic - play a minimal role in dispute and social order while non-state authorities are rarely involved in goods provision. Within most communities, civilians encounter the state as a goods provider - though a subpar one - while experiencing non-state authorities less as distributors and more as regulators and representatives.

The results show that across communities, infrastructure is fairly dominated by state authorities, while social order remains regulated mostly by non-state authorities and dispute resolution exhibits variation but is mostly either regulated by non-state authorities or by both non-state and state authorities. The greatest variation between communities is in state authorities' involvement in infrastructure and non-state authorities regulation of disputes and social order. I explore the extent to which experiences of violence help us understand this community-level variation next. I focus on the proportion of respondents who stated that they had a close family member killed as a result of the violence in Prigorodny district as a proxy for the violence rather than the latter spill-over violence to analyze the impact of collective violence.

Violence and Goods Provision

At the community level, there is no significant association between the proportion of respondents who said they lost a family member as a result of collective violence and who governs. This is in line with the theory that collective violence did not have a significant impact on goods provision and is likely at least partially caused by the fact that displaced individuals

from Prigorodny were spread out throughout the entire republic, such that their economic impact would not be concentrated on a specific area in the republic.

Violence and Dispute Resolution

The proportion of respondents in a community that reported having lost a family member as a result of collective violence is positively associated with community regulation of disputes[202] and negatively associated with dispute resolution by the state.[203] This confirms the republic-wide results that experiencing collective violence resulted in a desire to preserve informal, Ingush mechanisms of dispute resolution. The community differences, nevertheless, reveal that even if there was an overall republic-wide shift, communities with a greater proportion of people who lost a family member are particularly likely to rely on informal mechanisms, even within the broader overall tendency. Though violence was not perpetuated by the state, its association with the inability to protect Ingush residents or allow for their return seems to have impacted civilians reliance on the state for dispute resolution nevertheless.

Violence and Social Order

With the exception of a decrease in regulation by religious authorities there is no association between the proportion of respondents in a community that lost a family member and who regulates social order. While this contradicts expectations that collective violence is particularly likely to impact social order (Hypothesis 1a), it also leaves open the possibility that the changes occurred at the republic level, overshadowing local variation.

Conclusion

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[202] Coefficient = 0.4075   SE = 0.1446   p = 0.01822 *
[203] Coefficient = -0.25192 SE = 0.10770 p = 0.0414 *

Though all of the cases exhibit differences across dimensions of governance, they are most prevalent in Ingushetia with the state reclaiming responsibility for goods provision while non-state governance institutions and authorities are dominate dispute resolution and regulation of social order. This delegation of governance functions has been consistently negotiated, and renegotiated between state and non-state authorities. While the former control economic resources, they are forced to contend with the greater obedience and trust in elders and religious authorities. This chapter argued that collective violence in Prigorodny district set the republic down this mediated governance trajectory, preventing fragmentation to the extent visible in Dagestan despite similarities in violence in the 2000s, and also preventing centralization as evident in Chechnya. Collective violence increased cohesion and prioritization of Ingush traditions and institutions, specifically those regulating disputes and social order. Given the prevalence of elders and religious authorities in these governance domains historically, they have not taken on new functions but been able to regulate these domains publically, as compared to the Soviet era. Governance in Ingushetia has been reconfigured with greater space for informal authorities than prior to state collapse and conflict. While this is true across the republics, in Ingushetia, informal authorities both remain autonomous, unlike Chechnya, and influential, more so than in Dagestan. Though scholars have warned that "power imbalances may be so strong that talking of 'negotiation' overstretches the actual meaning of the term" (Hagmann and Peclard 2011: 16), in Ingushetia state elites dominate material resources but allow non-state authorities autonomy and power, such that the term is both appropriate and reflects the range of alternatives civilians have in governance.

Chapter 7: Conclusion
Heterogeneous Impact of Armed Conflict: Continuity and Divergence

This dissertation presented a framework to that seeks to update Tilly's perennial question of whether war makes the state, instead asking, whether and how armed conflict reshapes sub-national governance. Bringing together literature on different forms of armed conflict and violence, non-state governance, and state-building, it sets an agenda for studying post-conflict governance that asks (1) who governs, (2) over which dimensions, and (3) where? Tracing the impact of different patterns of violence during and after state collapse, this dissertation argued that armed conflict can impact governance through three interrelated mechanisms. First, it suggested that armed conflict can reshape civilian preferences for governance, impacting the bottom-up demands made on authorities. Second, it showed that violence can impact the ability to mobilize those demands by altering community's collective action capacity. Lastly, it demonstrated that armed conflict can impact elite's pattern of integration, shaping the political order undergirding governance and alternatives available to civilians. By reshaping these three mechanisms, armed conflict can recast long-standing governance trajectories, as it did in Dagestan, Chechnya, and Ingushetia, producing a polycentric, centralized, and mediated system of sub-national governance.

Takeaways from the Cases

This dissertation showed that the impact of armed conflict is heterogeneous across domains of governance. Across the cases under study, conflict had a greater impact on dispute resolution and social order than on extraction and goods provision, which most closely resembles its Soviet era counterpart. Looking across the three republics, residents continue to hold state authorities responsible for goods provision, a long-standing expectation forged through living

under a welfare state for decades. Additionally, given that the Soviet state historically exerted significant economic control, non-state authorities and civilians faced the greatest challenge in the economic realm when state institutions collapsed in the 1990s. When they did organize collectively, it was still mostly to provide goods not deemed the state's responsibility such as religious infrastructure. By the early 2000s, state administrators regained relative control over the distributive arms of the state. Though sub-national variation exists, it is at the margins.

Armed conflict had a greater impact on dispute resolution and social order. In Chechnya, widespread indiscriminate violence alienated the population, increasing preferences for non-state modes of dispute resolution and prioritization of maintaining Chechen symbols and social order. Unlike in Ingushetia, these changes have been enacted in a top-down manner under state oversight. The Second War, by incorporating selective targeting and direct, extra-lethal violence on top of pre-existing indiscriminate tactics, disrupted informal networks and removed leaders capable of mobilizing resistance to state centralization. As a result, republic elites in Chechnya not only directly regulate the economic domains of governance, but through indirect control over ostensibly informal authorities, regulate dispute resolution and social order. As the case chapter detailed, residents still find places of self-governance beyond the purview of state authorities, but state presence increasingly penetrates spaces and domains previously deemed private.

In Ingushetia, collective violence led to a similar prioritization of Ingush dispute resolution and social order institutions. However, unlike in Chechnya, this increased social trust and ties across the republic, empowering non-state authorities rather than state institutions. Though my argument predicted less alienation from the state in Ingushetia, since the armed conflict was not with the state but with a neighboring republic, many interviewees seem to hold

the state responsible for not protecting Ingush residents and not resolving the conflict since, resulting in alienation from the state nevertheless. This distinction needs to be further explored but demonstrates the complex processes involved in blame attribution for violence, suggesting that an actor does not need to commit the violence to be blamed for it.

In Dagestan, because violence broke out after the institutionalization of elite bargains and was more localized and fragmented than in the other two cases, it did not significantly alter the overall governance trajectory. This has meant that authority remains concentrated at the local village level, where self-governance with input from numerous authorities dominates. Clan networks that continue to control state institutions are separate from the majority of Dagestan's residents. Unlike Chechnya, it is the lack of state penetration and lack of coordination between the fragmented authority networks has left gaps in several governance domains, most strikingly goods provision, creating desire for greater state input. To some extent civilians are crowded out of the governance arrangements in both Chechnya and Dagestan. In Chechnya, the state and ostensibly non-state are so intertwined that there are few alternatives; in Dagestan, on the other hand, the fragmentation of authority with minimal collaboration has meant residents have a broad range of alternatives but many of whom shirk their perceived responsibilities.

Ingushetia offers a promising alternative where state and non-state authorities seem to engage and negotiate - not just on paper as in the formally sanctioned Councils of Elders - but in a way that provides civilians with actual input. However, during the last months of this dissertation the Ingush state has offered an important reminder that all of these are, nevertheless, authoritarian modes of governance in a system that continues to rely heavily on coercion. A powerful non-state movement organized in Ingushetia around the land conflict with Chechnya in

the fall of 2018. What initially united the republic, bringing tens of thousands onto the streets, mobilizing religious authorities and elders to pressure the state to resolve the dispute through established legal channels, was met with mass arrests in the last few months. To some extent, it has been yet another attempt to reimpose the Chechen model of governance on its neighboring republics. Nevertheless, this dissertation has shown the level and scope of violence it took to centralize governance in Chechnya to create its unsteady nested system. While it achieved compliance, I show that it also alienated the population and the system's enactment relies on numerous layers of authority each filling its role - Moscow continuing to provide funding while religious authorities are willing to enact the state's decrees. The long-term stability of such a system is precarious.

Scope Conditions: Legacy of Leviathan and State Collapse

What components of post-conflict governance can be generalized and which processes may be unique to the North Caucasus? Given the emphasis on power distribution and bargaining between state and ostensibly non-state authorities, three conditions seem particularly relevant. The first condition is the history of totalitarian and bureaucratic Soviet Union rule. The second is the rapid collapse of those same institutions. Finally, unlike many current cases of post-conflict reconstruction, the international organizations and foreign states played a relatively small direct role.[204]

1. History of totalitarian bureaucratic rule

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[204] I discussed the places where the international community was involved in the cases, such as Saudi Arabia's aid and the role of transnational combatants during the Chechen conflict itself. However, the North Caucasus did not have foreign peacekeepers like the DRC or external state-building efforts like Afghanistan and Iraq. For a review of the role of the international community in post-conflict contexts see Berdal and Zaum (2013).

A history of totalitarian rule set the antecedent conditions for governance. The Soviet state historically had asymmetric control over coercion and capital (Tilly 2005). After decades of living under a socialism, citizens developed expectations of what states should provide and the extent to which informal institutions were necessary to access these resources (Heathershaw and Schatz 2018: 11-14). As Heathershaw and Scatz (2018: 13) summarize, "the citizen-subjects of postsocialist space know Leviathan." For scholars of other regions this may echo 1950s statism, where the state assumed a dominant role in production and economic development, but without the 1970s neoliberal transformations brought on by international institutions in other regions. This likely had two implications. From the elite perspective, since state institutions and practices crowded out space for informal authorities, non-state authorities did not have established histories and practices of governing, particularly in spheres that required an autonomous material resource base. Within the healthcare sphere, for example, non-state welfare providers only emerged during the 1990s after decades of virtually complete state monopolization of social provision (Cook 2007). Communist regimes early on absorbed or closed down private and market-based social service (Inglot 2008). Even in the absence of a formal ban, entrepreneurs had little incentive to produce goods and services that the government was already providing (McMann 2015: 23).

This contrasts with regions that have a long history of non-state governance. In Lebanon, for example, the state's historically limited role in provision of services meant that religious communities initiated or further developed their own social welfare programs (Cammett 2014: 140). Similarly in Afghanistan, Mukhopadhyay (2014: 6-7) describes that "warlords have been intimately involved in the state-making business from its conception" and religious and tribal

elites served as power-brokers. The Soviet state, on the other hand, killed many of the most influential non-state authorities in the North Caucasus and crowded out space for others. While it does not mean a clear boundary developed between state and non-state, as work by Grzymala-Busse and Jones Luong (2002) makes clear, there was a powerful set of state institutions that penetrated the peripheries. Thus, in the cases at hand, non-state authorities were likely more restricted in their ability to govern than in cases where non-state actors had greater space for organizing historically.

From the civilian perspective, Soviet institutions established expectations about citizen and authorities' obligations and the logic according to which each perform. These expectations did not disappear with the retreat of the state, continuing to shape the targets of citizen demand-making and their practices of engagement.[205] Whereas armed conflict may introduce international actors or rebels that can provide resources, there is a higher barrier to their mobilization than in spaces where they operated previously and civilians expectations take time to change. Where previous institutions did not so thoroughly penetrate society, norms may be less persistent and governance, easier to reconfigure.

2. Conflict amidst state collapse

The second pertinent scope condition is that two of the conflicts under study - Chechnya and Ingushetia - occurred during the collapse of relatively bureaucratic state institutions, increasing uncertainty and contingency. Helene Thibault refers to this period as creating an "ideological and material deliquescence" (2018: 14). Conflict that occurs during the collapse of state institutions cannot be seen as the continuation of politics by other means, as Clausewitz

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[205] Reevers (2018) for example, documents how state elites in Kyrgyzstan continued to utilize norms of the "ashar state" to elicit citizen support and participation after Soviet collapse.

suggested, likely creating greater ruptures in governance and disruptions to prewar practices than conflict that occurs outside of state collapse. State retreat pushed societies in the North Caucasus from an extreme of state domination to the other extreme of disorder.

Far from all civil wars occur during the state collapse, as evident by the expanding literature that shows that far from creating situations of disorder, institutions may continue to structure civilian life through conflict (Sweet 2017). In fact, armed actors can organize by repurposing and maintaining state institutions instead of disrupting them (Heydemann 2017; Sweet 2017). Even when the central government's power is contested, creating multiple, competing orders, such as during periods of conflict, pre-existing institutions can leave enduring legacies. When conflicts occur under relative institutional continuity, the state is more likely to limit the range of non-state actions by continuing to structure the space in which non-state actors organize (Reno 2011).

Since state institutions were severely and suddenly weakened in the cases examined, simultaneously losing coercive capacity, undergoing economic shock and losing legitimacy, non-state actors likely had greater agency and bargaining capacity.[206] That reconfiguration of governance then occurs during a critical juncture suggests that institutional constraints are more relaxed than they would otherwise be, allowing for abrupt change instead of gradual transformation (Streeck and Thelen 2005). As the Dagestan chapter suggests, armed conflict is also less likely to have an impact when it does not coincide with institutional ruptures.

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[206] Derluguian (2004) and Zürcher (2007) provide two of the best accounts of Soviet collapse in the Caucasus specifically. Bunce (1993) and Chapter 4 in Jones Luong (2002) have extensive discussions of the broader impact of transitions from state socialism.

This condition pushes the relationship between state and non-state actors in the opposite direction of the first scope condition. State collapse can be expected to make the power struggle between state and non-state actors more balanced than in cases where state institutions endure into the conflict, strong or weak. Since conflict broke out in Dagestan later than in Chechnya and Ingushetia there variation on this condition, allowing for an examination of its impact.[207] Overall, the cases may more closely resemble conflicts that occur during periods of institutional change such as the armed conflicts in Peru and Iraq, as well in the successor states to the Former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, than in a persistently weak state like the DRC or in an otherwise strong state like Sri Lanka. The processes may also be more similar to other periods of institutional change like decolonization or modern-day rapid withdrawal of an external power.

3. Role of international community

Finally, unlike cases where foreign powers or international organizations are involved in post-conflict reconstruction, external actors played a minimal role in negotiating peace, building post-conflict institutions, or providing resources. While the international community and the US played a large role in reconstituting Russian institutions, this did not transfer to the sub-national dynamics. In fact, after September 11th, the US accepted Russia's framing of the North Caucasus as part of the war on terror, allowing the Russian state to address the conflicts internally with relatively little international involvement. Thus, the post-conflict governance landscape is less fragmented with less third-party assistance than in conflicts like Syria or Somalia.[208]

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[207] Since violence in Dagestan is much more fragmented and localized, identifying a clear start or end date is much harder.

[208] Driscoll (2015) thoroughly documents the impact foreign influence can have on post-war state-building.

Despite the specifics of the cases at hand, I believe the approach is useful to understand post-conflict governance dynamics more broadly by providing a framework for studying societies emerging from conflict. By providing an emphasis on unpacking the interactions between civilians, informal authorities and state elites, it offers a framework to trace the way in which conflict does and does not impact governance. Moreover, while studies of governance focus, and even explicitly limit their scope, to areas of "limited statehood," this project provides more general insights into the processes of rebuilding authority after the collapse of previously entrenched regimes. The reconstruction of governance in the North Caucasus shows, for example, how highly bureaucratized authoritarian regimes can give way to new strategies of governance that rely much more extensively on informal societally-based authority structures to monitor and regulate citizens. Since these post-collapse modes of governance relies more extensively on informal and indirect means of rule, my work also locates the heretofore hidden mechanisms of control and the different points at which individuals and communities are able to insulate and assert their own distinct interests. This highlights the asymmetric power state elites have in an authoritarian regime while also paying attention to the agency of religious, customary, and business authorities as well as non-elite civilians. Drawing out the implications of the complex relationships forged between state and ostensibly non-state authorities, this dissertation has sought to center the perspective of civilians, asking what alternatives of governance are available to them, how they navigate this architecture of governance, and with what implications.

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Dissertation Appendix:

Chapter 1: Alternative Explanations and Scope Conditions

<u>**Alternative Explanations**</u>:

  To my knowledge, there are no alternative theories for post-conflict governance specifically, though the literature on legacies of violence, post-conflict state-building, institutional change, and non-state governance provides alternative accounts and assumptions for parts of the argument. In many ways, the basis for my project is the argument that current accounts are unable to explain the full extent of variation since they only look at part of the process; this makes them less wrong than incomplete. In the next chapter, I present the North Caucasus cases. Their selection of helps to account for many structural and historical alternative explanations like colonial legacies, geography, and socioeconomic development and need for capital. I address what I believe are the strongest alternative or complementary explanations below.

1. **Variation Across Governance Dimensions versus Governance**

  The first test for the argument is to establish variation in governance, which underlies my assumption that governance must be studied as a disaggregated process rather than a cohesive package of practices. An alternative argument would instead show that state and non-state governance strategies do not significantly vary across dimensions and territory given the cases' historical and structural similarities and the high economies of scope of governance (Tilly 1992; Alesina and Spolaore 1997). This would suggest that conflict is not sufficient to overcome long-standing historical trajectories of governance or structural characteristics like political geography (Herbst 2000), concentration of economic units (Soifer 2015) and modes of production and

extraction (Bates 1981). Instead, according to these theories, state collapse was a temporary juncture and governance institutions were reconstructed in the same manner as before. This would challenge assumptions I make about elite and civilian agency and the lasting legacies of conflict dynamics for governance. I argue and empirically show these are complementary explanations that impact governance but are insufficient to explain the full degree of variation I identify.

a. At the other extreme, governance may be a result of actor's strategic calculations and historic and structural constraints may not constrain civilian perceptions and actors' capabilities. This features most prominently in the literature emphasizing international actors' ability to transform post-conflict institutions (Chesterman 2005) but also extends to works centering the agency and strategic calculations of domestic actors (Hellman et al 2000). Since I argue that pre-existing experiences with governance and conflict dynamics constrain the range of possible choices, who has a seat at the decision-making table, and civilian preferences, arguments that solely focus on actors' agency and strategic calculations would also counter mine. Instead, I expect the state to have a stronger role in goods provision than in dispute resolution given institutional configuration of the Soviet state. Evidence to the contrary would suggest actors have more agency than I expect and would support a more pure bargaining account of governance.

2. Immediate Capacity versus Impact of Prior Interaction with Authority

Individuals may be more concerned about actors' capacity at a given point in time, forgoing previous behaviors, if that actor is able to provide goods, services, and order. This explanation foregrounds actors' ability to supply governance. For example, Bakke et al. (2014) suggest that "internal legitimacy in de facto states born out of violent struggles depends on

whether they are able to provide their inhabitants with democratic participation, economic goods, and security" (593). This assumes that individuals' demands and behaviors are not impacted by the shadow of the past, such as their experiences in conflict, but focused on actors' capacity in the present. If this alternative explanation is correct - that civilian demands reflect authorities' capacities at a given point in time - there should not be significant differences in preferences for governance based on their exposure to different patterns of conflict – this should simply be a reflection of actors' capabilities.

I argue that governance capacity matters because it impacts which actors can provide governance in which domains. However, institutional supply does not mean the institutions are utilized (Gryzmala-Busse 2007; Gans-Morse 2017). Thus, there may be situations where elites provide resources but, particularly if there are alternatives available, civilians do not utilize them. For example, the state may have a police force to control security but individuals may rely on civil patrols and vigilantism instead (Bateson 2013). Thus, I argue that theories purely based on actors capacity to provide governance are insufficient to explaining outcomes.

3. Exposure to Violence or Exposure to Types of Violence

Another possibility is that, in line with existing micro-level literature, exposure to violence impacts who individuals turn to for governance, regardless of the type of violence or perceptions about the actor responsible. Bauer et al (2016) find little systematic differences in outcomes across the type of violence experienced in their meta analysis of recent literature. According to this result, it does not matter if individuals are exposed to a bombing campaign or a counterinsurgency sweep - both have the same impact on their preferences and behavior. I can account for this by treating exposure to violence as a binary variable instead of specifying it

according to sub-types and seeing if the predicted probabilities of appealing to specific actors significantly change. However, if there is in fact variation between types of violence such that the treatment takes on more than two values, existing frameworks that treat violence dichotomously ignore its heterogeneous treatment effects.

In addition to alternative demand-side pathways to governance, there may be alternative explanations for the supply-side, or state elites' desire and capacity to subsume alternate sources of authority and goods provision, that are not related to the conflict.

4. Impact of Economic Structure and Revenue Imperative

Boone's (2003) theory presents the strongest alternative to the supply-side logic of my argument. My theory closely draws on Boone's argument that community collective action shapes peripheral elites' bargaining capacity vis-a-vis the state and central elites' strategies to control the periphery. Yet, likely because her scope is limited to agrarian societies, Boone argues that modes of surplus appropriation shaped state strategies toward informal authorities and thus, the governance arrangements that resulted. All three sub-national territories in this dissertation are economically dependent on the center for economic transfers and subsidies, which according to Boone's theory makes them "allies" who want to cooperate with the center. A similar logic should be at play within the republics, where local village authorities depend on the republic's capital for their budgets. However, this does not align with the empirical variation in the cases, where informal authorities' relationship to the state varies from outright resistance to ambivalence to incorporation. Moreover, it does not explain the center's strategies to deal with local elites; according to Boone, since none are cash-crop regions, the center should adopt a strategy of non-incorporation consistently, which does not match with the dynamics on the

ground. Thus, though Boone's theory comes the closest to explaining local variation in governance, it falls short in explaining the differences across the republics and across dimensions of governance.

Similarly focused on supply-side factors, state elites may shift their governance strategies based on their revenue imperative (Slater 2010). Yet, as stated earlier all three republics rely on subsidies from Moscow for revenue, suggesting that they should all have minimal incentives to extract or provide goods.

5. Role of Geography and Ideas

An alternative account places ideas at the center of why political elites opt for different responses to the same opportunities (Soifer 2015: 20): "urban primacy - the extent to which a country is dominated demographically and economically by a single urban center - affects the emergence of state-building projects through its effect on which ideas about development take hold." Success in state-building then depends on whether bureaucrats were prominent members of the local community (22). Yet again, the republics develop within a similar ideological vision for the Russian state and power is similarly delegated to local elites.

6. Ethnic Composition

Finally, governance may be driven by structural factors like ethnic composition, which may negatively impact provision of public goods (Banerjee, Iyer, & Somanathan, 2005: 639). Though typically applied to research on social welfare and infrastructure, this logic may apply more broadly. This would suggest that at the polity level, Dagestan has the lowest level of governance while Ingushetia and Chechnya should exhibit comparable and higher levels goods provision driven by their monoethnic composition. I argue that while ethnic composition may

hinder collective action it is insufficient to explain governance patterns, which are impacted by community structure more broadly including factors like religion, kinship structures and, importantly, actors' strategic choices. Moreover, particularly during critical junctures when state elites may seek to incorporate or assimilate groups into the state, ethnic heterogeneity, and fragmentation more broadly, may result in broader goods provision as elites seek to broaden their support base and integrate previously hostile actors into the state or selectively accommodate their demands for autonomy (Singh 2011; Singh and Hou 2016). Thus, explanations based on ethnic heterogeneity have disjointed predictions and, I suggest, are insufficient in explaining local governance patterns.

Chapter 2 Appendix: Research Methods and Fieldwork

Explanation	Literature	Predictions	Evidence in Current Cases	Fails to Explain
Historical Legacies (colonial or precolonial institutions)	Soifer (2015); Mahoney (2003; 2010); Kurtz (2013); Wilfhart (2018)	Similar patterns of state-building	Joint rule under Soviet Union and Russia	Divergent trajectories
Methods of formal administration	Soifer (2015)	Similar patterns of state-building	Same legal status and extent of formal delegation of authority for decision-making; part of North Caucasus Federal District	Divergent trajectories
Political Geography	Herbst (2000); Soifer (2015)	Ingushetia should have highest level of state-building and Dagestan, lowest	Comparable mountainous terrain on Russia's periphery; Dagestan largest territory and most dispersed population	Ingushetia does not exhibit the greatest degree of state penetration and Dagestan has the greatest in some dimensions
Need for capital / revenue imperative	Tilly (1975; 1992); Slater (2010); Saylor (2014)	Chechnya, with highest level of violence, should have highest need for capital and degree of demand for state-building (though no commodity	All rely on federal subsidies over local extraction[209]; similar socioeconomic conditions with high unemployment and poverty	Divergent trajectories

[209] There is some variation in capacity to extract discussed in the next chapter and the cases but not enough to predict the divergent governance trajectories

		boom)		
Resource curse	Karl (1997); Kandley (2018); Jung (2018);	Resources hinder state-building	Chechnya historical producer of oil but not since the 1990s; all rely on federal subsidies	Divergent trajectories
External threats	Tilly (1992); Centeno (2002)	State-building in Ingushetia (threat from Ossetia) and potentially some in Dagestan due to threat from Chechnya but given lower level of conflicts, should be more destructive to institutions	None of the cases had an international threat though ethnic conflict between Ingushetia-Ossetia can be viewed as "out-group threat" and group of rebels invaded Dagestan from Chechnya	As the original theory, fails to explain all the cases. As a relaxed version, fails to explain low goods provision and extraction in Ingushetia and Dagestan
Internal Threats	Slater (2010)	Chechnya had the strongest internal threat so should have highest level of state-building	This is a complementary explanation that explains part of the outcome	Variation within the cases; lower direct state control over dispute resolution in Chechnya
Citizen Demands	Evans, Huben and Stephens (2018)	Dagestan has the highest level of citizen demands and should have highest level of state-building, followed by Ingushetia	Complementary explanation but not just level of demand-making that matters but its organization and target	Pattern of goods provision & infrastructure is nearly opposite to what is predicted by theory
International Order	Gerschenkron (1962); Fukuyama	Similar patterns of state-building	Post-Soviet breakdown	Divergent trajectories

	(2004); Jackson and Rosberg (1982)			
Ties to the West	Levitsky and Way (2010)	Similar nondemocratic modes of governing	All of the governance arrangements discussed are undemocratic and all the cases have weak ties to the West	Divergent modes of governance

Despite the similarities, which make the republics comparable, there are several potentially relevant differences. First, within Chechen-Ingush Autonomous republic, most of the administrative and economic institutions were located in the modern-day Chechen side.[210] This meant that at independence in 1992, Ingush society was faced with creating much of the republic's bureaucratic apparatus and infrastructure from scratch. Thus, in this case we can expect to see a more balanced initial power distribution between state and non-state elites. Additionally, given the republic's lag in physical infrastructure and economic development, this dimension may both lag behind the other two republics and receive greater priority in Ingushetia.

Second, while Ingushetia and Chechnya have become largely mono-ethnic since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Dagestan has always been and remains incredibly ethnically heterogeneous. Though much of the homogenization is a result of state collapse and the conflicts in the 1990s themselves, and is in turn captured as part of the change in community social structures, the social networks in Dagestan were more localized and fragmented to start. Thus,

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[210] Interviewees in Ingushetia were quick to highlight that there were three factories in Ingushetia during the Soviet period, which provided most of the residents' jobs but most of the republic was agricultural land.

for example, the killing of a village imam was less likely to impact the republic as a whole compared to Chechnya and Ingushetia where networks were denser between villages. However, as the empirics of the cases demonstrate ethnic linkages are not determinative; inter-war Chechnya, though mono-ethnic was sufficiently fragmented to mirror Dagestan. Moreover, there have been cases of cross-clan and cross-ethnic cooperation in Dagestan, such as the Northern Alliance movement formed in 2005, as well as inter-clan conflicts. Thus, while Dagestan's ethnic heterogeneity may make centralization more challenging it is not determinative of its governance trajectory.

Finally, there is variation in previous state repression. While the Soviet government deported the entire Ingush and Chechen population in 1944, in Dagestan the state resettled many highland groups to the plains and into previous Chechen land. The variation in the scale of deportations created a collective trauma against the state in Ingushetia and Chechnya which is not as broadly shared in Dagestan. I measure and discuss this more extensively in the case chapters.

Chapter 2: Survey Descriptive Characteristics

Age Breakdown

Gender Breakdown

Ethnic Breakdown by Republic

Dagestan:

Chechnya

Ingushetia

Marital Status

Never married	Married	Engaged	Divorced	Widowed	Refuse to answer
20.12	63.27	2.62	5.73	7.77	0.49

Education Breakdown

No education	Elementary education	High school graduate	Associate's degree / technical degree	College degree	Professional/graduate degree	Refuse to answer
3.40	5.86	41.74	5.80	39.93	2.95	0.32

Employment Breakdown

Disabled	3.21
Employed Full Time	27.41
Employed Part Time	8.07
Home-Maker	11.95
Pensioner	13.90
Self-Employed	9.62
Student	10.43
Unemployed	12.24
Other	2.69
Refuse to answer	0.49

Household Size

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	More than 10	Refuse to answer
3.44	8.88	17.76	24.94	20.72	11.39	6.50	2.93	1.48	0.55	0.58	0.84

Chapter 3 Appendix

The top five authorities and all those that received more than 5% in one of the republics are included in the tables while all relevant authorities are included in the respective figures.

Public Goods 1: Responsibility for roads

	Dagestan	Chechnya	Ingushetia
Community members	21.90%	8.34%	18.18%
Local Government	66.61%	46.34%	46.32%
Republic Government	11.40%	33.56%	20.35%
Central Government	6.06%	1.60%	2.60%
Businessmen	6.79%	1.53%	14.50%

Public Goods 2: Responsibility for schools

	Dagestan	Chechnya	Ingushetia
Community members	56.43%	17.97%	39.44%
Local Government	35.31%	47.27%	40.14%
Republic Government	8.57%	20.36%	27.15%
Central Government	2.65%	1.11%	4.41%
Businessmen	2.55%	0.42%	3.02%

Public Goods 3: Responsibility for mosques

	Dagestan	Chechnya	Ingushetia
Community members	66.06%	20.95%	45.72%
Religious Authorities	35.97%	11.93%	17.54%
Local Government	8.39%	40.46%	10.86%
Republic Government	0.58%	31.26%	2.92%
Charitable organizations/ humanitarian funds	16.20%	4.17%	12.73%

| Businessmen | 31.44% | 3.24% | 38.83% |

Dispute Resolution 1: Responsibility for dispute resolution:

	Dagestan	**Chechnya**	**Ingushetia**
Family members	19.38%	7.58%	17.24%
Community members	24.82%	10.05%	10.89%
Elders	24.46%	54.43%	56.75%
Religious Authorities	31.69%	68.74%	68.29%
Local administrators	49.86%	41.65%	28.29%
Republic administrators	7.01%	8.94%	12.85%
No one	6.87%	0.60%	3.25%

Dispute Resolution 2: What to do when legal orders contradict:

	Dagestan	**Chechnya**	**Ingushetia**
Russian law	48.78%	28.88%	14.47%
Adat	7.87%	6.81%	5.85%
Shari'a	23.89%	38.59%	68.13%
Refuse to answer	19.46%	25.72%	11.54%

Symbolic Governance 1: Responsibility for social order (dress, social interactions)

	Dagestan	**Chechnya**	**Ingushetia**
Family members	56.65%	65.33%	63.90%
Community members	12.59%	15.67%	5.85%
Elders	5.22%	14.14%	8.94%
Religious Authorities	11.30%	28.20%	15.61%
Local administrators	9.51%	17.12%	18.70%
Republic administrators	0.64%	9.11%	5.04%

No one	24.32%	7.07%	11.38%

Symbolic Governance 2: Responsibility for monuments and street names

	Dagestan	**Chechnya**	**Ingushetia**
Local administrators	78.09%	52.53%	66.94%
Republic administrators	23.03%	59.67%	46.81%
Central government	8.93%	7.14%	6.55%
Community members	8.33%	7.32%	5.40%
No one	6.75%	1.21%	7.53%
Elders	2.32%	5.31%	2.62%

Chapter 4 Appendix Dagestan

		GOVERNANCE DIMENSION BY ACTOR														
		Infrastructure					Dispute Resolution					Social Order				
		Republic	Local Am	Communit	Rel Auth	Elders	Republic	Local Amin	Community	Rel Auth	Elders	Republic	Local Amin	Community	Rel Auth	Elders
No Violence	Coeff	-0.116	0.094	-0.122	0.011	0.001	-0.037	-0.039	0.104	-0.071	-0.004	-0.015	-0.020	0.057	-0.064	-0.028
survey	S.E.	0.043	0.051	0.040	0.006	0.006	0.030	0.059	0.051	0.060	0.050	0.009	0.024	0.039	0.041	0.023
Crime	Coeff	0.040	-0.033	0.053	-0.006	-0.005	0.048	-0.016	-0.184	0.019	-0.013	0.017	0.023	-0.006	0.074	0.027
survey	S.E.	0.045	0.050	0.036	0.007	0.007	0.031	0.054	0.046	0.055	0.044	0.011	0.028	0.035	0.037	0.023
Sweeps	Coeff	0.085	-0.015	-0.023	-0.005	0.003	0.010	0.082	0.008	0.027	-0.067	0.015	0.016	-0.049	-0.087	-0.001
survey	S.E.	0.047	0.055	0.042	0.007	0.006	0.031	0.062	0.053	0.063	0.052	0.009	0.023	0.041	0.043	0.024
Sweeps	Coeff	0.064	-0.065	-0.028	-0.012	-0.003	0.060	-0.062	-0.009	-0.139	0.013	0.005	0.019	-0.128	-0.062	-0.028
dataset	S.E.	0.055	0.071	0.075	5.492e-03	0.006	0.031	0.098	0.089	0.089	0.097	0.010	0.023	0.064	0.075	0.030
ReligAssassination	Coeff	0.042	-0.062	-0.073	0.004	-0.006	0.048	0.036	0.010	-0.095	-0.137	0.006	0.010	-0.026	0.016	0.009
dataset	S.E.	0.059	0.076	0.082	0.007	0.005	0.031	0.107	0.021	0.101	0.104	0.009	0.021	0.074	0.083	0.032
ImpactOverallSign	Coeff	0.169	0.097	-0.025	0.001	-0.001	-0.025	0.054	0.054	0.016	-0.048	0.016	0.082	-0.015	-0.039	-0.038
survey	S.E.	0.081	0.090	0.065	0.013	0.013	0.054	0.098	0.084	0.099	0.081	0.023	0.055	0.067	0.083	0.047

Dagestan Table 2: Governance by Dimension
Below I include the mean and standard deviation for the proportion of respondents who selected state and non-state authorities for each of the outcomes, and those who selected both state and non-state authorities. The mean shows the average proportion of respondents that chose a state or non-state authority as regulating the governance dimension, while the standard deviation shows how dispersed the proportion is across communities.

	Infrastructure		
	State	Non-State	Both
Mean	0.74	0.06	0.15
StDev	0.25	0.08	0.19

	Dispute Resolution		
	State	Non-State	Both
Mean	0.21	0.40	0.30
StDev	0.15	0.24	0.19

	Social Order		
	State	Non-State	Both
Mean	0.08	0.67	0.02
StDev	0.15	0.26	0.04

Chapter 5 Appendix: Chechnya

		Infrastructure					Dispute Resolution					Social Order				
		Republic	Local Amin	Community	Rel Auth	Elders	Republic	Local Amin	Community	Rel Auth	Elders	Republic	Local Amin	Community	Rel Auth	Elders
No Violence	Coeff	-0.083	-0.135	-0.159	-0.001	-0.004	-0.090	-0.259	-0.180	-0.155	-0.025	0.015	0.162	-0.280	0.033	-0.010
survey	S.E.	0.132	0.107	0.074	0.012	0.021	0.076	0.133	0.080	0.119	0.134	0.061	0.099	0.097	0.125	0.102
Crime	Coeff	-0.038	-0.062	0.046	-0.002	-0.007	0.026	-0.025	0.107	-0.043	0.041	-0.013	0.012	0.025	-0.008	0.096
survey	S.E.	0.052	0.042	0.029	0.005	0.008	0.030	0.052	0.031	0.047	0.053	0.023	0.039	0.037	0.049	0.040
Sweeps	Coeff	-0.068	-0.025	-0.002	-0.003	-0.004	0.039	0.153	0.021	0.064	-0.005	-0.029	-0.064	-0.080	-0.149	0.000
survey	S.E.	0.051	0.041	0.028	0.004	0.006	0.029	0.051	0.031	0.045	0.051	0.023	0.038	0.037	0.048	0.038
Sweeps	Coeff	-0.172	0.043	0.020	-0.002	0.008	-0.042	-0.028	0.020	0.026	0.052	-0.026	0.017	0.003	0.128	0.109
dataset	S.E.	0.095	0.073	0.042	0.006	0.006	0.048	0.091	0.048	0.076	0.083	0.041	0.062	0.092	0.088	0.054
ReligAssassina	Coeff	-0.074	0.118	-0.025	-0.006	0.001	-0.073	0.019	-0.030	0.048	0.150	-0.064	-0.098	0.030	0.007	-0.040
dataset	S.E.	0.143	0.104	0.059	0.008	0.007	0.069	0.131	0.066	0.109	0.11503	0.058	0.087	0.137	0.132	0.078
Bombing	Coeff	-0.047	-0.110	0.020	0.002	-0.004	-0.014	0.084	-0.067	-0.064	-0.157	-0.015	0.016	-0.091	-0.149	-0.162
survey	S.E.	0.047	0.038	0.027	0.004	0.007	0.027	0.047	0.029	0.043	0.048	0.021	0.036	0.034	0.044	0.036
Battle	Coeff	-0.011	0.021	0.008	-0.003	0.007	-0.045	-0.115	0.000	0.104	0.149	-0.008	-0.027	-0.076	0.087	0.095
survey	S.E.	0.046	0.037	0.026	0.004	0.007	0.026	0.046	0.028	0.041	0.046	0.021	0.035	0.033	0.043	0.035
Massacre	Coeff	-0.053	-0.024	0.024	-0.003	0.001	-0.002	-0.067	0.035	0.026	0.133	0.011	-0.030	-0.003	-0.083	0.027
survey	S.E.	0.055	0.045	0.031	0.005	0.008	0.032	0.056	0.034	0.050	0.056	0.025	0.042	0.041	0.052	0.043
ImpactOverallSI	Coeff	0.018	-0.075	0.053	-0.003	0.002	-0.038	-0.015	0.040	-0.041	0.011	-0.023	0.031	0.020	-0.060	0.085
survey	S.E.	0.043	0.036	0.025	0.005	0.007	0.024	0.044	0.029	0.039	0.044	0.023	0.033	0.032	0.041	0.034

GOVERNANCE DIMENSION BY ACTOR

Chechnya Table 2: Governance by Dimension

Below I include the mean and standard deviation for the proportion of respondents across communities who selected state and ostensibly non-state authorities for each of the outcomes, and those who selected both sets of authorities. The mean shows the average proportion of respondents in a community that chose a state or non-state authority as regulating the governance dimension, while the standard deviation shows how dispersed the proportion was across communities. Important to remember in these interpretations is that ostensibly non-state authorities in Chechnya are most commonly carrying out state decrees such that the state - non-state distinction provides more insight into whether state control is direct or indirect rather than providing evidence of alternative institutions as in the other chapters.

	Infrastructure		
	State	Ostensibly Non-State	Both
Mean	0.87	0.04	0.06
StDev	0.17	0.07	0.10

	Dispute Resolution		
	State	Ostensibly Non-State	Both
Mean	0.15	0.52	0.31
StDev	0.14	0.26	0.22

	Social Order		
	State	Ostensibly Non-State	Both
Mean	0.13	0.69	0.11
StDev	0.18	0.28	0.16

Chapter 6 Appendix: Ingushetia

   To understand how much variation there is within the roles authorities take on in communities, I calculate the mean and standard deviation for the proportion of respondents across communities who selected state and non-state authorities for each of the outcomes, as well as the proportion of community members who selected both state and non-state authorities. The mean shows the average proportion of respondents in a community that chose a state or non-state authority as regulating the governance dimension, while the standard deviation shows how dispersed the proportion was across communities.

	Infrastructure		
	State	Non-State	Both
Mean	0.72	0.04	0.19
StDev	0.20	0.04	0.14

	Dispute Resolution		
	State	Non-State	Both
Mean	0.06	0.57	0.34
StDev	0.07	0.25	0.25

	Social Order		
	State	Non-State	Both
Mean	0.09	0.68	0.06
StDev	0.14	0.22	0.07