


# City, Public Value, and Capitalism

New Urban Visions and Public Strategies

Edited by Hiroyuki Mori, Tomohiko Yoshida, and Ari-Veikko Anttiroiko





## **City, Public Value, and Capitalism**



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Strategies

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Ari-Veikko Anttiroiko

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# Contents

Forward — <i>Hiroyuki Mori, Tomohiko Yoshida, and Ari-Veikko Anttiroiko</i> .....	9
1. The Age of Urban Visions: From Global Cities to Civic Cities — <i>Hiroyuki Mori</i> .....	11
2. Public Value in the Late Modern City — <i>Hiroyuki Mori and Ari-Veikko Anttiroiko</i> .....	30
3. Smart City — <i>Tomoyuki Chikamoto and Toshiyuki Shimizu</i> .....	48
4. Practices of Japanese Local Cities Coping with Population Decline — <i>Kiyonobu Kaido, Keiro Hattori, Yasuyuki Fujii, Mihoko Matsuyuki, and Tomohiko Yoshida</i> .....	68
5. The Ecological City: With a Specific Focus on Participatory Biological Conservation — <i>Ryo Sakurai</i> .....	99
6. Building an Inclusive City — <i>Ari-Veikko Anttiroiko</i> .....	118
7. Restorative Cities as Regulatory Governance — <i>Veronica Taylor and Mary Ivec</i> .....	139

8. Policies That Trigger Gentrification in Kyoto City — <i>Tomohiko Yoshida</i> .....	159
9. Court Mediation as a Public Interest Platform: The Example of Maintenance Fee for Elders in Taiwan — <i>Shu-chin Grace Kuo</i> .....	185
10. Single-Mother Shared Housing as Space for Inclusion — <i>Lisa Kuzunishi</i> .....	199
11. Digital Transformations in Planning: An Australian Context — <i>Matthew Ng, Christopher Pettit, and Balamurugan Soundararaj</i> .....	221
12. Smart and Sustainable? Capitalism and City Futures in the Age of Crisis — <i>Kris Hartley</i> .....	239
13. Citizen-Centric Urban Governance — <i>Hiroyuki Mori, Tomohiko Yoshida, and Ari-Veikko Anttiroiko</i> .....	257
Bibliography .....	261
Editors .....	301
Contributors .....	303
Credits .....	305

# Forward

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This book, *City, Public Value, and Capitalism*, is one fruit of research conducted through the online policy platform of Meridian 180, headquartered at the Northwestern Roberta Buffett Institute for Global Affairs at Northwestern University.

Meridian 180 is an online system that was established in 2011 for the purpose of facilitating global research collaboration and disseminating policy proposals and research results in multiple languages—it currently has a worldwide membership of about 800 researchers and practitioners. An extensive archive of its activities can be found at the Meridian 180 web page (<https://meridianforums.northwestern.edu>). Its purpose is to tackle the pressing global challenges of our time and propose the policies necessary for an improved society by aggregating international knowledge through a multi-disciplinary, multi-cultural approach.

This book was edited under the auspices of the Asia-Japan Research Institute at Ritsumeikan University in partnership with the Northwestern Roberta Buffett Institute for Global Affairs. Ritsumeikan University is the first institution to have a Meridian 180 agreement with Northwestern University.

In 2019, Ritsumeikan University (through Meridian 180) hosted an online forum on the theme of "Smart & Shrinking Cities" and held discussions with members on the future of cities in the 21st century both face-to-face and online. This book focuses on important questions that emerged in these discussions and collects them in one volume. In this sense, this volume is none other than the result of policy research centered around Meridian 180.

The book is published using a new e-book system developed by the Northwestern Roberta Buffett Institute for Global Affairs and the Northwestern University Library. This digital publishing system can be applied in various ways online and is expected to spread rapidly in the future. It is a great honor to have this book published. As the editors, we would like to express our sincere gratitude to Northwestern University. If our book could contribute to the development of the new e-book system by the Northwestern Roberta Buffett Institute for Global Affairs and the Northwestern University Library, we would be more than happy.

# The Age of Urban Visions: From Global Cites to Civic Cities

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## CITIES AND THE CAPITALIST ECONOMY

Human beings have built and resided in cities since ancient times. Cities throughout history have been the “flower of civilization:” they have contained the cutting-edge social resources of their times and have been a driving force shaping the history of humankind.

Most cities were originally created based on political and religious powers around which various social and economic activities were carried out and, ultimately, around which urban societies developed. Cities with a clear identity as a “political city” and “religious city” can still be found all over the world.

In modern times, the market economy itself has become the driving force for the formation and development of cities, and “industrial cities” or “economic cities” are now more common than political or religious ones. In some cases, private industry grew spontaneously, and in others the politically-directed market economy exerted great power. Both types of city growth result from the logic of constant expansion tied to the development of capitalism. Capitalism is an economic system dominated by capital that aims for an eternal process of economic value accumulation that subordinates entrepreneurs and workers. Capitalism pursues constant economic growth for society as a whole, and cities have been the centers of capitalistic economic development. Cities today are developed by the power of this capitalistic economy and have become a base for capital accumulation; land use and public policy are geared toward the purpose of economic growth (Harvey, 1985).

On the other hand, the accumulation of economic resources in the space of the city has threatened the lives of residents in urban societies. Big companies and high-income earners occupy land that is in good condition and benefits from infrastructure and other social and economic benefits, driving workers to poorer residential areas and suburbs. These workers are forced to live in poor housing and endure bad traffic conditions. Over time, the absence of public health and pollution control eroded their lives and health. Even the supply of social resources such as decent housing and water have been so inadequate that cities were constantly afflicted with fear of infectious diseases and pollution. These issues emerged as a new category of social problems called urban problems. Urban problems emerge at every point in the history of the industrial city. While urban growth under capital accumulation was actively driven by the market economy, the urban policy created to deal with the social costs caused by it was poorly designed and implemented.

The appearance and development of industrial cities continued into the twentieth century. The shift of industrial structure from light industry (e.g., textiles) to heavy industry (e.g., petrochemicals) has led to the development of cities where environmentally destructive industries were concentrated. Environmental problems such as air and water pollution have been extremely damaging to biologically vulnerable populations,

such as the elderly and children, and the socially vulnerable, such as those with low incomes. Cities are densely populated and required the presence of social services, public facilities, and infrastructure for residents to be able to live a decent life together.

However, under market-led socio-economic systems, public policies focused on economic growth were prioritized. The municipalities did not actively adopt urban policies from a positive perspective to actively solve the difficulties of living for people, so social movements stepped in to solve urban problems. However, even after these movements, since people in weaker social positions tended to be the victims of urban problems, the enhancement of social services and pollution control measures were frequently neglected.

The growth of the city has also had a significant impact on the natural environment. Natural and agricultural lands in and around the city became the target of development due to their inferior economic value. When municipal power for city planning was weak, the city developed in a chaotic manner, taking on an ugly appearance. These development activities increased the administrative and financial burden on local governments and caused waste in public finance. The unplanned accumulation of business establishments and housing in central areas led to delays in the development of communal social conditions, leading to a shortage of public services such as schools, nurseries, water and sewage systems, and transportation. Residential areas built one after another in the suburbs were often equipped with the necessary infrastructure and social services from the beginning and enormous transportation investments were made to connect them to the central areas. Infrastructure development for disaster prevention also had to be improved in areas where the risk of disasters increased due to business-led land development in both the private and public sectors.

## **CITIES OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY— DEVELOPING INTO GLOBAL CITIES AND SUSTAINABLE CITIES**

Nevertheless, in the decades after World War II, progress in urbanization meant that some of the fruits of high economic growth could be directed to public policies. The three conditions that formed the post-war welfare society were the market economy, the nation state, and democracy, and all worked together. These conditions made it possible to balance urban economic growth and necessary urban policies in a relatively even manner because economic growth increased central governments' and municipalities' tax revenues and allowed them to direct their fiscal resources to the urban policies necessary for the improvement of citizens' lives. In short, within the post-war socioeconomic system, the market economy came under control.

However, cities still faced economic and social problems. Under capitalism, national and local governments had no choice but to adopt public policies premised on economic growth, in which effective urban policies still tended to constantly fall behind. Yet while the rise in respect toward basic human rights during this period advanced urban policy, the change was short-lived.

Welfare states suffered from low economic growth and budget deficits. As a response, so-called neoliberal policies emerged in a search for solutions in the 1980s. Neoliberal economic thought is market fundamentalism, which seeks to entrust the socioeconomic system to market mechanisms as much as possible. The social services and public works projects provided by the central and local governments up to that date were marketized and commodified. Public sector functions were privatized and outsourced to the private sector. Deregulation in the public sector was also carried out to promote this trend, and the natural and social environment of urban and rural areas changed considerably. In the public sector, a type of organizational management that imitated business companies, called new public management (Hood, 1991), was introduced, and citizens were treated as customers/objects rather than sovereigns/subjects. Citizens who did not pay a fair amount of tax

became bad customers of the public sector, and the safety net for vulnerable groups—who needed the government most—became fragile.

The psycho-cultural impact of the spread of neoliberalism led to a prevalence of extreme individualism and self-responsibility. Under the neoliberal philosophy, deregulation, privatization, and fiscal cutbacks have been promoted since the late 1980s, and the market economy has been separated from political administration and civil society and has taken on a superior position. Moreover, in concert with this, “world cities” or “global cities” such as New York, London, and Tokyo developed as new fields of urban research (Friedmann, 1986; Sassen, 1991). The industrial structure of cities has changed drastically, and with the progress of IT, a specialized field called the creative industry expanded significantly (Florida, 2002). The development of these new, growing industries have been a major source of economic growth in the twenty-first century, and, when coupled with the deregulation of the labor market, have widened the wealth and income gap (Sassen, 1991).

This gap has also sharpened social conflict in the city. The city center has been redeveloped to allow for new business activities and to serve the lifestyles of the wealthy. Global money, which has been constantly moving on an international scale, flowed into cities, and urban real estate became the target of global speculative investment. Gentrification expelled the citizens who lived in the city (Smith & Williams, 1986) and has come to be called “urban enclosure” (Hodkinson, 2012). As a result, disparities and conflicts have sharpened not only in the economy but also in living conditions among citizens. This change was the logical consequence of economic growth associated with the shrinking function of the public sector. The dominance of the city by the market economy—a constant characteristic of modern history—was advanced to its limit.

In addition, the future of the global environment was jeopardized by the expansion of human economic activity. International environmental problems such as global warming, ozone depletion, acid rain, and marine pollution have become common issues for all humankind.

In response to these realities, deliberative discussions on how a city could best operate have been ongoing since the 1990s. Various opinions on alternative city images include the effort of sustainable cities led by

Europeans (Expert Group on the Urban Environment 1996). This was an urban movement that responded to the environmental crisis and tried to transform the economic structure of the city into one that was environmentally friendly. This movement was strongly influenced by the idea of sustainable development, which was the philosophy promoted by the report *Our Common Future*, submitted in 1987 by the United Nations World Commission on Environment and Development. Sustainable development places the environment at the center of urban policy.

Unfortunately, the sustainable cities movement during the late twentieth century was based on the premise of maintaining economic growth and demanded that social costs—such as environmental destruction and resource waste—be internalized based on a fair distribution of environmental harm between present and future generations. Due to their economic priorities, sustainable cities had a relatively weak awareness of the other social issues that prevailed in the modern generation.

## **THE SPREAD OF SOCIO-PATHOLOGY AND VARIOUS RESPONSES IN CITIES**

In the late twentieth century, the world entered the era of neoliberalism in earnest as its influence intensified in cities. Economic globalization, which encouraged the free movement of capital, weakened national borders and caused nation-states to suffer from chronic fiscal pressure. It was the same in cities. This situation prompted a battle among states and cities to attract capital through deregulation and corporate financial support such as tax reductions and subsidies for private companies. At the same time, the role of the public sector was decentralized from the central government to local governments and the private sector.

This battle also meant that people faced lower wages and reduced social services. Inequality widened and poverty intensified, and discrimination against immigrants and certain racial groups increased. In the discussion sustainable cities, however, these conditions were moved to the background. How to deal with growing social conflict caused by

reductions to income and social-service disparities has become a major social issue in cities.

As one factor in globalization, cities around the world embraced tourism as an important economic strategy, which in turn caused new social issues. Underlying this trend is the fact that cities have tried to compensate for the shrinking population and economy by developing tourism demand. This is especially true in cities like Kyoto, where tourism resources are abundant while the outflow of working generation is large and birth rate is extremely low. Middle-class and wealthy people from all over the world were rushing to cities in each country as tourists, and hotels and accommodation facilities for tourists were built in order to absorb demand. Traditional commercial stores shifted their aim from residents to tourists. Land and housing prices skyrocketed, a significant portion of existing housing was transformed into facilities for tourists, and some residents were expelled. Chronic problems with infrastructure such as transportation congestion and poor waste treatment occurred, which worsened urban residents' daily lives and aggravated their dissatisfaction. Cities around the world began to seek ways to balance residents' lives with tourism.

In addition, many cities in developed countries began to shrink due to declining population and employment. The most typical situation is found in Japan, which is in the midst of the fastest population decline among all countries, with a population aging more rapidly than any in human history. In particular, Japan has a rigid immigration policy, severely restricting the acceptance of immigrants from abroad, so the population decline has been sharp (Hollander, 2018). Due to the declining population in Japan, the country's urban spaces have been compared a sponge, filling with holes as population density has decreased and the problem of vacant houses has become a national social issue. Declining population density negatively impacts administrative and financial efficiency. Many cities in Japan aimed to be compact cities that concentrate people in the city center based on the 2014 amendment of the Act on Special Measures Concerning Urban Renaissance.

A compact city approach like Japan's causes gentrification because it concentrates administrative and financial resources in the city center. By deregulating land use to encourage compact city formation, the compact city promotes the consolidation of public buildings such as schools and the construction of high-rise condominiums that can accommodate a large number of people. This approach also tends to damage the community and the built environment.

Sustainable cities aimed for environment-friendly urban development. The explosion of the Fukushima nuclear power plants caused by the Great East Japan Earthquake in March 2011 made the shift to renewable energy an international trend. The normalization of atypical weather has made it clear that climate change is an unavoidable problem, and the number of cities that control greenhouse gases and save energy as much as possible has expanded. Smart cities, which seek to be energy-efficient through IT, are one outcome of this idea. Smart cities are a form of city created by a new industrial structure and initiatives to actively utilize the latest information technology for urban development.

Major efforts have also been made to reduce dependence on the neoliberal free market economy and to create an urban economic structure that is as independent and circular as possible. The guiding idea of the market economy is that the best way to purchase goods and services is to "buy good things as cheaply as possible." Based on the theory of comparative advantage in economics, it is rational to actively purchase cheap and good products and services from outside the city, and conversely to sell products and services with comparative advantage in the city to the outside. However, the logic of comparative advantage presupposes normal and stable times. In the event of a disaster or other emergency, the socioeconomic structure that presupposes such a division of labor exposes vulnerabilities due to long supply chains.

Therefore, the movement to create a resilient urban economic structure has aimed to increase the economic circulation within the city and diversify its industrial structure in order to construct a community-based or social-solidary economy as promoted worldwide through the "buy local" and "slow food" movements. This represents a reemergence of

the idea that the existence of the community should be valued. In addition, it has begun to develop into “municipalism,” extending into a movement that enhances the economic, political, and administrative independence of a city as a whole (Baird, K.S. et al., 2019; Thomson, M. et al., 2020).

On the other hand, there are still strong movements to develop cities as tools for economic growth. For example, the World Bank seeks to create jobs and mitigate poverty by attracting and growing private firms and industries through the development of more competitive cities (World Bank, 2015). Cities lead the economy, and so pursuing cities' growth may not be a mistake. However, current cities with their urban problems have emerged as a result of tracking productivity and competitiveness. It is clear from the results of neoliberal urban policies that such competitive cities do not promise to solve the environmental issues and correct the widening disparities among populations. A city's economic growth should never be denied, but the sound development of a city cannot be directed by the sole value of growth supremacy as it used to be.

Moreover, many recent studies have shown that economic growth and rising incomes are not directly related to people's well-being. The presence or absence of relatives and friends, health, freedom, the environment, and so forth, do not have a strong correlation with income levels, and it has been reaffirmed that increasing these universal values is an important role of public policy (United Nations, 2020). Recent disasters and the COVID-19 pandemic clearly show that people's well-being is based, above all, on safety and freedom from fear. Cities are the most vulnerable to these emergencies, and the promotion of safe cities is emerging as a new policy agenda.

Such new findings provide hope even in the age of shrinking cities. Even if the population and economy shrink, the well-being of the citizens may increase if a high-quality city can be created. To that end, cities that have been developed under the dominance of the market economy must be returned into the hands of politics and society, and new urban policy initiatives must be developed. The diverse urban practices that have spread in the twenty-first century are opportunities to explore new policies.

## TOWARD A NEW CITY VISION

The situation outlined so far indicates that the present age is an era in which cities must develop into something new that is not strongly dependent on the single value of economic growth supremacy. The priority must be to develop cities so that people can jointly explore various forms of industry, society, culture, and environment and live happily together.

Notably, a city's values are diverse and its character will differ accordingly within a certain range of stances toward the public good. This means that we need to create a public discourse space within which people can articulate diverse public values and discuss and consider them carefully.

On the other hand, cities typically have less strong territorial and human ties than rural areas, so individuals are often isolated in them. This characteristic indicates that the operation of a public discourse space is challenging in cities. However, in the present age when neoliberalism has taken hold, regaining the public discourse space in a city is indispensable for creating a new future after a society long governed by market power and directed by the logic of economic efficiency has distorted the meritocracy and neutralized society's necessarily diverse public and moral discourses (Sandel, 2020). Since cities with economic supremacy are incompatible with the reality of a healthy society, people must carefully discuss issues based on their diverse public values, and develop a vision for a city that has appropriate systems for politics, economy, and civil society.

Such a vision is not created from a blank slate without a basis in reality. Because development processes repeatedly encounter various trials and errors, this will be reflected in the practices of cities.

As cities have developed along lines determined by economic systems, urban research has also become a central subject of social science. For example, Engels' book on urban problems in the 1870s is a classic analysis of urban problems under industrial capitalism (Engels, 2021). On the other hand, social sciences centered on economics have focused their analysis on atomized individuals and companies because they

pursued “scientificity.” Individuals and companies are mainly regarded as actors that make up the market, and a model has been built in which the socioeconomic system functions most efficiently when the government sector only responds appropriately to events that occur outside the market. The function of the civil society or community is neglected and viewed as an obstacle to an efficient socioeconomic system.

Karl Polanyi has positioned the market economy, government, and community as the main actors that make up the socioeconomic system, and therefore devised a more comprehensive and realistic model by integrating them (Polanyi, 1944). This framework was developed in economic anthropology and institutional economics and differs from orthodox neoclassical economics. In addition, Polanyi positions human beings as depending on the natural environment and ecosystems and living in institutionalized interactions with them. In that respect, his model depicts a holistic socioeconomic system.

Polanyi models the market economy as a system embedded in society, which he calls “modes of integration.” When applied to cities, such an integrated socioeconomic system is materialized in the most concrete sense. Because the market economy has grown unbalanced in relation to the government and communities, cities have become extremely large and have caused various social pathologies by disrupting proper social integration.

So far, governments have tried to compromise with the market economy, civil society, and the natural environment by curbing it with increasing public spending and enacting public regulations. However, neoliberal globalization has become extreme and put most municipalities under fiscal stress. As a result, the social integration model, by increasing the role of government, has reached its limit. However, many municipalities are promoting marketization, including commercialization in the public sphere, with the aim of maintaining urban society through short-term economic growth. This condition has led to further imbalances between the market economy and political and civil society, as well as increasing disparities and instability in urban societies.

Under these circumstances, Matthew Thomson and others argue for the application of Polanyi's model to a new model of urban governance (Thomson, M. et al., 2020). Polanyi attributed the functioning of the economy to provisioning for peoples' needs or livelihood, with the three elements of reciprocity, redistribution, and exchange weaving through mutual processes. Reciprocity means gifting and mutual aid, redistribution means the collection and distribution of economic resources by power, and exchange means the movement of goods in the market. Reciprocity and redistribution belong to non-market areas. Reciprocity is the economic function of community like the management of commons, and redistribution is mainly conducted under the jurisdiction of the government sector. The balance of these three elements varies by time and place and depends on broader social, cultural, political, and economic contexts. Currently, market exchange is the dominant process in cities. Thomson and others insist that modern municipalities should properly reintegrate Polanyi's three economic elements with urban economies using political, legal, and economic powers to create social justice and sustainable economic development. In that case, it is crucial to make full use of fiscal tools and public regulation, create public value, and revitalize the community beyond the logic of capital.

The dominant actors in Polanyi's three economic elements each have their own codes of conduct, as shown in Table 1.1. The codes of government and the market are widely understood in theory and practice. However, the code of conduct for a community may differ depending on the understanding of the basis of the community's existence. For example, if community is understood as a mere collection of individuals, as it is in mainstream social sciences, the idea of inclusiveness does not appear as part of its code of conduct. However, if companionship implied in reciprocity or mutual care is understood as a part of human nature that transcends individual profit and loss calculation and coercion, then "inclusiveness" is nothing but the original function of community. In this sense, the community code of conduct can be defined by inclusiveness. As the expansion of the market economy and the cutbacks by the government have caused the decline of urban society, the fate of the city in the future depends on how community can be activated through this function of inclusiveness.

**Table 1.1: Logics of community, government, and market**

	<b>Economic role</b>	<b>Code of conduct</b>
Community	Reciprocity	Inclusiveness
Government	Redistribution	Fairness
Market	Exchange	Efficiency

*Source: Author*

In order for a community to have strong inclusiveness, it needs to rely on a social philosophy (or communal value); some examples include autonomy, mutual respect, symbiosis, solidarity, self-esteem, empowerment, and democracy. The socioeconomic system that embodies these qualities holistically can be said to have public value. Community is an element of the nature of human society that has been passed down from the origin of human beings' group life, and is the most important viewpoint through which we can revive cities as a space where we live.

Municipalities should move toward becoming sustainable cities in the future by actively creating socioeconomic structures with this public value. For that purpose, it is crucial that the policy of community strengthening in the municipalities, which has been weakly grounded in theory and practice, is more fully developed.

Fig. 1.1 distributes public policy implemented by municipalities across four quadrants showing the success or failure of policies in terms of community and market effects. In mainstream social science (especially economics) so far, only market successes and failures have formed the basis of public policy. Public goods provision, redistribution, and economic stabilization have also been regarded as the role of public policy by the government, but none have been considered to have a direct relationship with the community. Therefore, for example, public assistance that has lacked a sense of community value sometimes caused emotional conflict between residents. Future urban policies must aim for the development of new cities by pursuing a model in which both the community and the market economy are encouraged to

develop (the area depicted in the first quadrant in Fig. 1.1). For example, urban industrial policies that utilize labor and economic resources within a city are put in the first quadrant area. This kind of policy will give the residents involved a strong awareness of their interdependence and strengthen social credibility and ties. This policy will also increase the community's trust in local governments and businesses.




Fig. 1.1: Quadrant of Policy Effects of Municipalities (Source: Adapted and modified from Bozeman, B. 2007)

Fostering such a strong sense of trust in civil society is also important for the efforts of smart cities, which will have to progress rapidly in the future. Collecting and utilizing data on people's behavior won't be possible without their willingness to trust in information management and utilization by governments and businesses. Smartening without such trust violates people's privacy and deprives them of their freedom. In this case, smart cities become surveillance societies based on data controlled by governments and businesses. Surveillance is never acceptable in a society based on modern democracy.

In this book, we will discuss new methods of urban governance derived from each field as a platform of community perspective including sustainability.

## BOOK STRUCTURE

This book sets out to explore the future of the city at the contemporary turning point in the neoliberal era from the viewpoint of public value. Public value is an obscure and dynamic idea, but that does not mean it is less important in science. Rather, it can be said that as a result of the spread of "scientific" economic activities and administrative policies in a narrow sense, the forms of community that underpin human existence have been weakened, leading to social, cultural, and environmental deterioration. Current public value should be based on the human rights of individuals and on restoring the nature of the community and environment. To help readers navigate the rest of the book, we have provided the following summary of the chapter contents.

Part I: The Age of City Regeneration (Chapters 1 and 2) gives an overview of the current situation at which the global market, led by neoliberalism, has arrived from the perspective of cities. The market has reconstructed the foundation of public value in its interest, yet it is indispensable for future city regeneration. Public value is essential for the establishment of a city based on community or civil society, which prioritizes the fellowship of its citizens. Public value is not a clear-cut idea, but it is very important to recognize that a constant orientation of citizens towards public value will promote a permanent movement for the creation of a good city and society.

Part II: New Urban Visions picks up typical directions for new urban development in the cities of the present based on the perspectives developed in Part I. Urban restructuring that employs rapidly advancing IT is an initiative that has obviously enabled the introduction of smart cities. Chapter 3 discusses the features of the smart city and suggests new directions to be taken for IT to be utilized in urban life.

Chapter 4 explores the situation surrounding shrinking cities in Japan and discusses measures for their revitalization based on the shared

conditions of cities in developed countries where the populations are also declining. The chapter suggests that, even if the city shrinks in size, this is not directly related to citizens' well-being and the city's livability. Rather, the autonomous policy capacity of the municipalities and citizens is crucial to determining how to create a livable city in the face of population decline.

Chapter 5 discusses the challenges of restoring and retaining the qualities of natural ecosystems that have deteriorated due to urbanization. From a purely economic perspective, it is desirable for cities to concentrate their economic and social resources on growing their economies as much as possible. From this perspective, natural ecosystems have long been treated as irrelevant to the market economy and evaluated only when valuable as "resources." Their intrinsic value has been treated as ancillary. In this chapter, new city efforts to restore them are discussed.

Chapter 6 explores urban practices that can positively impact various vulnerable or marginalized people and support their self-esteem and social reinstatement. Neoliberalism has created a significant number of vulnerable groups in cities around the world. Financial disparity and discrimination are based on a false meritocracy developed in the name of personal responsibility. However, human conscience and an innate community spirit prevents us from leaving such socially vulnerable people behind. Attempts are being made to walk hand-in-hand with them as citizens sharing the same city.

Chapter 7 discusses how to create an inclusive city that encourages participation by marginalized people. It can be said that this is important to the restoration of a true civil society, which is the key to true urban regeneration in the future. In this chapter, the best practices for and primary challenges of achieving this purpose are presented.

In the spirit of implementing the proposals in Chapter 7, the critical points for putting them into actual practice are specifically examined in Part III: Strategies for Inclusive City Making. Chapter 8 examines the reality of gentrification, which is a spatial expression of people's conflicts in cities, and discusses countermeasures. Gentrification is not a simple matter of people being segregated according to their income disparity,

but steadily unfolds through the effects of various economic and social factors such as tourism. This chapter discusses these factors from a comprehensive perspective.

Chapter 9 examines a practical strategy for regenerating the community. Community revitalization and strengthening includes a wide range of activities, from soft practices that directly restore people's connections to hard developments in built environments that naturally create networks of people. Without such integration, a community strategy cannot be fully functional.

Building on this point of view, Chapter 10 discusses the practical regeneration of the community centered around the development of a concrete architectural space conceived from the standpoint of the vulnerable. It is clear from the cases introduced in this chapter why the strategy for creating community from both software and hardware is important. This chapter shows that future community regeneration must be promoted by a strategy that integrates them both.

In Chapter 11, we discuss how to utilize IT, which will expand rapidly in the future, for urban planning that supports community regeneration and strengthening. This planning proposes the ideal state of smart cities from the perspective of community strategy, and this chapter explains how important IT is for the development of cities that serve a purpose beyond mere technological progress.

City visions and efforts in the above chapters encourage reflection on the state of the capitalist economy itself, which is the driving force behind the creation, development, and decline of cities. Part IV: Cities and Capitalism deals with this subject head-on. Chapter 12 argues that urban theories and policies that do not fully reflect the capitalist nature of the economy are ineffective in today's era of social change. It imagines a future city that incorporates all these points, the ideal form of which will vary depending on its location and conditions. Even within each country or region, cities make a difference depending on how they utilize their autonomy. With this premise in mind, we must develop the city as a spatial property common to all humankind.

Chapter 13, the book's conclusion, re-proposes the citizen-centric principle by placing public value, a topic that runs through this book, as the foundation of the future city and the basis of urban governance.

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# Public Value in the Late Modern City

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## INTRODUCTION

Cities are dense urban settlements that serve as the loci of consumption, commerce, power, and security (see Kotkin, 2005). They are as such more than just a group of people who settle down and interact in a given area. Cities as urban dissipative structures facilitate processes that are both local and relational. This is evident in how wars, economic booms, disruptive innovations, depressions, and the rise and fall of trade routes have shaped cities throughout history. At the highest level of abstraction this implies that each city as an instance of local choice evolves in a dialectic relationship with its societal and ultimately global contexts.

It goes without saying that people living in the same area is a necessary condition for the existence of a city, as is its physical environment. However, the social nature of the city becomes comprehensible only when we identify local instances of collective action, structures of human interaction, and the spatial organization of the local society. Regarding late modern cities in the developed world and their evolution both from industrial to postindustrial conditions and from local orientations to global connectedness, such an essence is usually associated with logistics (Cardenas et al., 2017), production (Henderson et al., 1995; Lobo et al., 2013; Helper et al., 2012), technological development (Castells & Hall, 1994), services (Jones et al., 2014), and collective consumption (Castells, 1977). A contextual perspective on such development has been articulated in the form of the world city hypothesis and global city theorizations (Friedmann, 1986; Sassen, 2001).

Regarding the recent developments that have reshaped these urban functions, dramatic changes took place in post-war decades, which witnessed economic expansion, Keynesian economic policy, the emergence of influential social movements, and the rise of the welfare state. Further changes took place in the 1990s due to the intertwining of globalization and an emergent information society, which appeared to be game changers in many respects. Keynesianism made way for neoliberal policies, the fall of the Berlin Wall epitomized the collapse of socialism, and the crisis of the welfare state prompted a search for alternative models for organizing the economy and society. For some time, it looked as if the Western liberal democracy and its underlying capitalist economic system had won the ideological war (Fukuyama, 1989).

A range of factors started to shake the global scene and increase tensions in the West during the 2000s. Namely, the triumph of neoliberal thinking seemed to have been accompanied by continuous economic crises, such as the dot-com bubble of 2000, the financial crisis of 2007, the late-2000s recession, and the EU sovereign debt crisis 2009, to name a few. Other features included the accelerated intensity of the impact of global economic forces, the financialization of the economy, and the emergence of the so-called “new economy.” This had both positive and negative implications. Globally, millions of people were lifted from

extreme poverty, especially after the opening of the economies of China and India in the late 1980s, but due to the consequent shift in production and services from developed to developing countries, unemployment and uncertainty increased in the West. In the urban world, the 1980s witnessed the emergence of neoliberal urbanism, which was expected to be the answer to the challenges posed by global competition. This was the time of the rise of urban entrepreneurialism (Harvey, 1989), in which local politicians, public managers and urban developers started to align the urban growth machine with the requirements of the global age (Anttiroiko et al., 2020).

The neoliberal city epitomizes this development (Hackworth, 2007; Pinson & Morel Journal, 2016; Storper, 2016). It emerged in the wake of the conservative and libertarian thinking in politics and society associated with economic liberalization and the promotion of free-market capitalism. Neoliberalism favors such policy measures and practices as dismantling trade barriers, privatization, competitive tendering, reductions in government spending, tax cuts, and consumer choice. In the management of cities, this led to the widespread adoption of the New Public Management (NPM) doctrine with its emphasis on marketization, managerialism, and customer choice (Hood, 1991; Knafo, 2020), on the one hand, and a competition-oriented development policy or urban entrepreneurialism, on the other (Harvey, 1989). The many faces of neoliberal urban policy are epitomized by such cities and city-states as New York, Chicago, Toronto, London, Frankfurt, São Paulo, Hong Kong, Singapore, and Shanghai.

Neoliberal thinking obviously reflects its liberal foundation, with roots in individual freedom. In urban life it has increased cost-awareness and competitiveness and contributed significantly to economic growth. However, it also has a negative effect that will be taken as the starting point of this chapter, namely in terms of social consequences. There are societal mechanisms that are supposed to bring about collective benefits from the full-fledged economic freedom of individuals. These include the “trickle-down” effect, “voting with one’s feet,” consumer choice, and the like. Yet, due to a variety of reasons, the aggregate impact of neoliberal policy seems to produce unintended consequences and side effects that cannot be ignored, especially when considered

from the point of view of collective welfare and the fundamental conditions of human relations and existence. One critical aspect of this development is the so-called “great decoupling” in which, despite productivity increases, a large segment of the population is excluded from the fruits of economic success (Brynjolfsson & McAfee, 2014). This is related to the polarizing tendencies of the new economy (Anttiroiko et al., 2020). A factor contributing to this is the gradual transition toward the greater role of value extraction in the economy (Mazzucato, 2018). Even if neoliberalism as such is not the only cause behind such problems in the economy, it appears to have contributed to increased inequality, urban poverty, economic exclusion, and deprivation. More importantly, neoliberal thinking provides insufficient tools for understanding the nature of the social consequences of global and national free-market policies, and is even less equipped to produce the means to tackle them. Taken to the level of urban governance, this implies that urban boosterism and streamlined competitiveness policies may not provide the answers to the fundamental problems faced by cities. It could be hypothesized that we need more balanced perspectives, reinterpretations, and refocusings in order to meet such daunting challenges.

In this chapter, we will address this issue by discussing alternative views of economic growth and their implications for urban policy and governance.

## **FROM GDP TO WELL-BEING**

The conventional idea of economic growth is based on the implicit premise of most of the classic theories of urban growth and development that population and economy are typical indicators of urban growth. Let us begin with population.

Population growth as a global phenomenon has become a threat to sustainability. It is unevenly spread across the globe and produces huge economic inequalities between individual countries and locations. Interestingly, many developed countries have actually reached a point where their population is shrinking which, accompanied by the problems

of a shrinking economy, has shifted the agenda from growth to shrinkage. For a long time, industrialization helped strategically well-positioned, advantageously located, and resourceful cities grow. There were undoubtedly declining areas too, but they were seen as exceptional, unlucky, or strategically incapable rather than as symptoms of a structural asymmetry. In the current situation many developed countries are entering a new phase in which the population is both aging and shrinking when migration is not considered. The challenge is that many countries are entering an era of shrinkage in all urban areas, as seen prominently in the case of Japan and a few other locations in Asia. While most Asian countries still experience stable economic growth, rapid aging and population decline are looming just around the corner and will eventually have an enormous societal impact, especially in the case of highly urbanized countries.

The previously discussed demographic trend has an equivalent in the economic life cycle as well. This is most relevant in urban economies, which have been very concerned with creating the preconditions for economic growth while treating citizens' well-being as a secondary matter. Approaches have been slightly more sensitive to context in political science and public administration, not to mention sociology and anthropology. However, it seems that irrespective of discipline, synthesizing views on the generative interplay of the economy and society have been rare. In addition, in most contributions the primary reference is still to urbanization, even if there is an obvious need to redirect the discussion to multi-dimensionality and the qualitative aspects of urban life. This becomes evident when discussing the conceptualization of urban decline, growth, and development.

Let us consider the following. When visiting a city, we sense its character, or as we may put it, its spirit or soul, which cannot be reduced to its population or economic scale or expansion. Rather, cities evince an important qualitative factor that resonates with something essentially human. Such qualitative aspects of the perception of cities give hope for shrinking cities. No matter how small the city is, it can focus on qualitative development. More importantly, this shift is not limited to shrinking cities, but reflects a need for a deeper reassessment of our perspective on urban development. In addition to an increased focus on

the qualitative aspects of development, there is a need to pay attention to the distribution of the benefits from these development efforts. Growth should be smart and inclusive in order to increase the well-being of all members of the community. A precondition for this is that local and national policies support such a holistic and inclusive view of urban development.

One indication of such a paradigm shift is increased interest in happiness as a core element of well-being. Especially since the early 2000s, academics have started to examine how economic indicators relate to people's sense of well-being (Easterlin, 2001; Frey & Stutzer, 2001) and how governments could use such data in a variety of policy areas to improve their citizens' quality of life (Bok, 2010). Important steps were taken in 2008 when Nicolas Sarkozy, former President of France, called on economists Joseph E. Stiglitz, Amartya Sen, and Jean-Paul Fitoussi to set up the Commission on the Measurement of Economic Performance and Social Progress. In 2010, the committee published a report titled *Mismeasuring Our Lives: Why GDP Doesn't Add Up*, which proposed three approaches to measure quality of life: (a) subjective well-being, i.e., understanding the determinants of quality of life at the individual level, (b) a capability approach for understanding the factors that expand life opportunities and options (health, education, income, etc.), and (c) fair allocations that reflect people's preferences regarding various aspects of the quality of life. Through these, the Commission advocated the importance of understanding the non-monetary aspects of quality of life, such as health, education, social ties, environment, and safety (Stiglitz et al., 2010).




Fig. 2.1: The framework for measuring well-being and progress

In response to this, the OECD developed the Better Life Index (see <https://www.oecdbetterlifeindex.org/>), which lists 11 areas as indicators of personal well-being, grouped into two rather conventional main categories, “Quality of Life” and “Material Living Conditions” (see Fig. 2.1) (Llena-Nozal et al., 2019).

Although the indicators included in the “Quality of Life” category are not directly related to the economy, they are essential in determining and governing people's well-being. In addition, the OECD identified four categories of capital—natural, economic, human, and social—as the critical resources needed to sustain personal well-being. These are equivalent to such fundamental categories as nature, economy, individuals, and communities, which points to the contextual and holistic nature of human well-being.

The heightened interest in well-being and happiness provides a fresh view that challenges conventional conceptions of urban development. Most strikingly, it challenges the perception of economic growth as being the sole or the most important policy goal of city governments or as a privileged criterion for measuring success in urban development. Human and social factors thus have a vital role in the urban agenda, and

social sciences and urban studies have an important task in shedding light on them and integrating them with other aspects into a holistically understood development agenda.

## **POLICYMAKING FOR URBAN WELL-BEING**

A few decades after World War II, interest turned to the promotion of industrial development and amplified economic and population growth as a premise for such a policy. A crucial factor behind this development was the fact that major indicators on urban economic development had been primarily quantitative, which inherently directed attention to activities that were reflected in such indicators. Such a narrow approach tends to keep the urban development agenda instrumentalist and one-dimensional. This is noticeable in the case of the shrinking cities previously discussed, which have started to build their development agendas on novel premises as a reflection of changes in their internal and external environments. They have done so by understanding that shrinkage does not equal decline and recognizing that there are important qualitative aspects of development that should be taken into account. In this setting, the previously discussed role of well-being is critical, as it hints at what kinds of premises the new urban development paradigm can be built on, both as an element of endogenous growth and as a factor that has the potential to attract capital, expertise, creativity, and people to the city (cf. Anttiroiko, 2018).

Guimarães et al. (2016) examined in a multiple case study the push and pull factors that affect residents of shrinking cities in Portugal. According to them, the overall picture shows that, while economic conditions (job opportunities and good working conditions) are the most important factors (especially among the younger generation), social ties and place attachments significantly impact residents' decisions regarding migration. The study points out that stronger a sense of community and a city's identity increase the resilience of the city. It is worth mentioning that in some historical cities in Portugal, "beauty and heritage" was the most important pull factor affecting the decisions of residents. Furthermore, the influence of environmental factors such as "recreational and environmental amenities" was noticeable. Lastly, the

study revealed that the factors that contributed significantly to the well-being of residents varied between cities.

Hollander (2011) has shown that people's evaluation of neighborhood quality is almost the same regardless of whether the city is growing or shrinking. In fact, from the point of view of smart growth, depopulation may occasionally be considered a strength. Along these lines, van der Land and Doff (2010) stated that, in shrinking cities, the neighborhood and social ties are strengthened and the relationships of trust between the residents are reinforced, leading to strengthened self-efficacy and collective efficacy. This hints that there is parallel between the strengthening of independence at the individual level and increasing social capital at the community level, which together serve as a positive force in shrinking cities.

Based on the evidence and insights discussed so far, we may conclude that it will be important for cities to design policies that consciously promote community capital, strengthen independence, and encourage place attachment. Such an approach combines different spheres of community life, including the physical environment, relational social capital, and urban symbolism ultimately geared around the well-being of urban dwellers.

## **PUBLIC VALUE GOVERNANCE IN CITIES**

Discussions about how to assess and value economic growth vs. well-being in public policy are deeply rooted in the ideological landscape. Focus on economic growth, especially in the Western context, is associated with neoliberalism, whereas an emphasis of holistic and inclusive well-being leans towards progressive and collectivist ideologies. Rather than taking sides in this debate, our task is to point to the relevance of discussing the values on which urban public policies can be based. In fact, if we look at urban issues from an ideological point of view along the lines of a conventional liberal vs. conservative dichotomy, it reveals the need to determine on a case-by-case basis what combination of values best suits each respective urban community. In any case, there is a growing need to clarify the values on which urban

public policies should be anchored, which would benefit from broadening the perspective on urban development from a focus on mere monetary value (or economic growth) to a broader set of value categories, including well-being and happiness.

Capitalism is from the historical view a superior economic system in terms of organizing production and matching supply and demand. However, on the other side of the picture there are dysfunctional tendencies and socially polarizing outcomes that must be addressed in public policy. For example, Mazzucato (2018) has recognized that in modern capitalism, value-extraction is rewarded more generously than value-creation, even if the latter comprises the productive processes that essentially drive a healthy economy. She urges us to rethink capitalism, to redefine how to measure value in a society, and to rehabilitate the public sector as a key player in balancing such a development.

One of the most worrisome features of the global economy has been economic polarization. In advanced economies, top earners have experienced rapid income growth while the middle class shrinks and the lowest earners are left behind. This development is particularly striking in the United States (Bhatt et al., 2020; Brynjolfsson & McAfee, 2014). These kinds of changes have made traditional economic indicators, such as GDP, look problematic, if not obsolete. Polarization implies that the economic benefits of the increase in GDP are reaped primarily by the wealthiest segment of society, or rather, the transnational capitalist class. This urges us to reconsider the relevance of traditional economic indicators as the measure of success (Fox, 2012).

Measuring well-being, quality of life, or happiness has obvious challenges. Even if we use surrogate indicators and develop as many objective criteria as possible for determining such phenomena (e.g., aggregated holistic health data), the dilemma of subjective value and its methodological ramifications persists. A similar challenge to be faced is the multi-dimensionality of well-being, which makes this field conceptually fuzzy (see Stiglitz et al., 2010). This should not prevent us from seeking measures of a good life beyond quantitative indicators. Many attempts have already been made. For example, Skidelsky & Skidelsky (2013) proposed seven essentially irreplaceable values for

living a good life, namely health, security, respect, personality, harmony with nature, friendship, and leisure.

Another strand of thought that offers conceptual tools to deal with the challenge at hand is public value theory, which emerged in the 1990s (Moore, 1995). This discourse is of particular interest here because it shows how the concept of value is used in public administration, management, and policy. The original idea proposed by Moore (1995) was based on public managers' ability to create value in a society by using the means available to the government, such as service machinery, regulations, laws, resource allocation, and others. This is based on an idea that legitimizes the existence of government: government should be able to create value in a society in collaboration with a wide range of stakeholders from different sectors.

A watershed moment in this discourse becomes apparent when we consider what “public” actually refers to in this context, and what is the factual role of government in creating public value or ensuring that public interest is taken into account in all relevant aspects of community life. The minimum criteria for anything to be “public” are (a) collective or democratic decision-making, (b) community involvement in policy making, governance or management, and (c) public funding. So, for any activity to be deemed “public” in the given context it should fulfil these three criteria. When government is involved in creating public value, it is expected to base its actions both on collective values—e.g., fairness, equality, and social cohesion—as explicated in policy or legislative documents, and on the principles of good governance, including participation, effectiveness, responsiveness, transparency, and accountability. It is generally held that the impact of private-sector management doctrines and the New Public Management in particular have in fact diminished the “publicness” of public administration (Rugge, 2019).

The discussion of public value is rather government-centric and, to some extent, public-management-oriented. It is important to keep in mind that all individuals, organizations, and institutions create or at least have the potential to create public value irrespective of the degree of their publicness. This gave rise to new public governance, new public service,

network governance, and public value management approaches that brought values to the core of public governance and public-sector management. Especially, early developments surrounding public value management in the public sector became associated with networked governance methods that focus on the motivational side of stakeholder engagement, including loyalty, mutual respect, shared learning, and negotiated order (Stoker, 2006). This is seen as an approach built on values that go beyond efficiency, giving prominence to the application of democratic principles. Government serves as a collectively organized guarantor of the creation of public value, but it is worth emphasizing that the government does not have a monopoly on the agenda setting, public debate, and value-driven practices found in society because citizens, civic associations, and businesses have their stakes in such collective processes too (Bryson et al., 2014).

The public value perspective emphasizes the active role local civil society and the business community have in open discussions about the values and guiding principles applied both in the public sphere and in, partly, the private sphere in the community. This requires enabling community structures, such as open policy forums, deliberative mechanisms, and urban public spaces, as well as fostering a culture of openness and inclusion that encourages communicative action. It is important that, in addition to formal political institutions, there are informal arrangements, public spaces, cafeterias, parks, shopping districts, and other “third places” suitable for interaction and exchange of ideas (Habermas, 1991; Sandel, 1996; Oldenburg, 1989). We need to consider as well the use of digital technology, social media, and urban networks and platforms, many of which are locally embedded. A strategically critical mission is to integrate such civic discourses, forums, and platforms into the decision-making procedures of the city government in a dynamic and flexible manner. This integration requires a generative interplay between an unorganized discursive sphere and a democratically controlled decision sphere.

## FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE

There are already many cities all over the world that reflect an alternative view on growth and pay special attention to the well-being of citizens. There are zero-carbon communities that aim for hands-on sustainability, wellness cities with a focus on holistic health, slow cities (like the Cittaslow Movement) designed to improve quality of life, shelter cities that pay special attention to human rights, and others. It is worth noting that there are many ways of promoting well-being and quality of life. For example, as in the case of the shrinking cities previously discussed, they can adopt various strategies for responding to their contextual challenges, as depicted in Fig. 2.2.




Fig. 2.2: Shrinking Cities and their diverse policies

When discussing cities with progressive policies that broaden the view of urban development, this book will address such cases both theoretically and empirically. These include city-concepts such as smart, compact, shrinking, sustainable, restorative, and inclusive cities, each reflecting particular aspects of urban well-being. One of the main policy challenges faced by cities is to be able to take a holistic view of urban development and thus to be able to pinpoint the interrelatedness of the environment, people, technology, and economic development. The path towards

urban futures should be sustainable, democratic, smart, and inclusive, as these qualities are conducive to a genuinely citizen-centric approach to urban development that is able to contribute to the holistic health, well-being, and happiness of the citizenry.

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# Smart City

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## WHAT IS A “SMART CITY” ?

### ***Definitions and Trends of Smart Cities in the World***

The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) defines “Smart Cities” as “initiatives or approaches that effectively leverage digitalization to boost citizen’s well-being and deliver more efficient, sustainable and inclusive urban services and environments as part of a collaborative, multi-stakeholder process” (p.8). However, it also states, “The smart city concept is still in flux and subject to debate. Definitions of smart cities vary across OECD countries and institutions according to the geopolitical context and to the specific issues at hand.”(p.8)

In terms of global trends on smart cities, the G20 Global Smart Cities Alliance was established in 2019 with the World Economic Forum as its secretariat (G20 Global Smart Cities Alliance WEB site, 2019; The World Economic Forum, 2021). The alliance aims to develop international basic principles and guidelines for cities to use data and digital technologies. Thirty-six cities from around the world are participating as pioneer cities, and four cities from Japan are participating: Maebashi, Kaga, Hamamatsu, and Kakogawa (Fig. 3.1).



Fig. 3.1: Thirty-six Smart Cities in the world. Note that some of the initiatives of Pioneer Cities can be seen at the following website. [https://globalsmartcitiesalliance.org/?page\\_id=714](https://globalsmartcitiesalliance.org/?page_id=714)

There is also a report of survey results available on the benchmarking of building policies for ethical and responsible governance in smart city development. The standards used for benchmarking include "equity, inclusivity and social impact," "privacy and transparency," "Security and resilience," "Operational and financial sustainability," and "Openness and interoperability," and the results of a survey of 36 pioneer cities are presented.

## ***Definitions and Trends among Smart Cities in Japan***

According to the *Smart City Guidebook* (2021) published by the Cabinet Office of Japan's Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, the Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry (METI), and the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport, and Tourism (MLIT), smart cities can be defined as "sustainable cities or districts that continue to create new value by solving various problems faced by cities and districts through the provision of services that are close to each citizen, utilizing new technologies such as ICT and various types of data from the public and private sectors, and the advancement of management (planning, maintenance, management, operation, etc.) in various fields, and where Society 5.0 can be realized ahead of time." Smart cities as defined by the MLIT are classified and organized as shown in Table 3.1.

It should be noted as well that Society 5.0 is defined as "a human-centered society that achieves both economic development and solutions to social issues through a system that highly integrates cyberspace (virtual space) and physical space (real space)" (Cabinet Office, 2021) It refers to a new society following the hunting society (Society 1.0), agricultural society (Society 2.0), industrial society (Society 3.0), and information society (Society 4.0), and was first proposed as the future society that Japan should aim for in the Fifth Science and Technology Basic Plan.

As of August 2021, 184 projects are introduced on the Smart City Platform website. The main smart city-related projects promoted by the relevant ministries and agencies include: a) The Social implementation project for near-future technologies by the Cabinet Office; b) the Smart City Promotion Project for data utilization by the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications; c) the Regional New "MaaS" (Mobility as a Service) Creation and Promotion Project by the Ministry of Economy; Trade and Industry, d) the Project for the Promotion of New Mobility Services by the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism (MLIT); and e) the Smart City Model Project by the MLIT (see Table 3.2). The number of projects that include transportation as an issue is 158, and 143 projects include tourism and regional revitalization, indicating

that smart city initiatives in Japan are mainly focused on transportation issues (MaaS), tourism, and regional revitalization (Table 3.3).

**Table 3.1: *Classification of Smart Cities by the MLIT***

Category	Description
Accessibility	All citizens can move around comfortably with a focus on public transportation, improved convenience and transportation services through the use of automated driving, demand-responsive transportation, and MaaS.]
Nature	Urban space exists in harmony with water and greenery.
Energy	Realization of energy conservation at the building/block/district-level from both passive and active aspects. Utilization of renewable energy such as solar and wind power, promoting local production and consumption of energy that is secure even in emergencies.
Safety & Security	Developing disaster-resistant cities, fostering local communities, and securing emergency power generators, stockpiles, and evacuation sites in urban development. Remote management of health conditions using wearable terminals, promoting walking through the use of apps, monitoring rivers using water level sensors.
Recycle	Storage and utilization of rainwater, use of reclaimed water from wastewater treatment as non-potable water, waste management (3R, waste heat utilization, etc.).

## ***From Smart Cities to Super Cities***

In order to realize regional development in accordance the Super City concept, the Cabinet Office has invited applications for the designation of Super City-type National Strategic Special Zones, and a number of local governments have applied for this designation. While smart cities focus on demonstrations of one or more state-of-the-art technologies such as transportation and energy, super cities are future cities that will implement information technology as a basic social infrastructure.

## ***Smart Cities and Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)***

The SDGs are international goals to be achieved by 2030 as stated in the "2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development" adopted at the United

Nations Sustainable Development Summit 2015; they consist of 17 Goals and 169 Targets (United Nations, 2022).

Goal 11 of the SDGs reads: "Make cities and human settlements inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable," and indeed the realization of smart cities is deeply related to the achievement of Goal 11. However, the scope of the SDGs is broad, and smart cities are related to all 17 Goals, as well as to 81 targets (MLIT, 2018). The Keidanren (Japan Business Federation) also states that Society 5.0 will contribute significantly to the achievement of SDGs because it is a new growth model that combines problem solving and future innovations. Since smart cities are the places where Society 5.0 will be demonstrated, the realization and implementation of smart cities is essential to the achievement of the SDGs.


**Table 3.2: Number of Projects by Project Aim**

Project Name	Number of Projects
Social implementation project for near-future technologies	34
Smart City Promotion Project for data utilization	18
Regional New MaaS Creation Promotion Project	29
The Project for the Promotion of New Mobility Services	57
The Smart City Model Project	45
MLIT Smart Island Promotion Demonstration Survey	1
Total	184

**Table 3.3: Number of Smart City Projects in Japan by Issue Category (Multiple Answers Permitted)**

Classification of Issues	Number of Projects
Transportation and Mobility	158
Energy	22
Disaster Prevention	36

Classification of Issues	Number of Projects
Maintenance and Management of Infrastructure	38
Tourism and Regional Revitalization	143
Well-Being and Medical	48
Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishery	17
Environment	17
Safety, Security, and Surveillance	21
Logistics	31
Urban Planning and Development	18
Total Number of Projects	184



Created by the authors based on the *Smart City Guide Book*

Fig 3.2: Outline of the Smart City

## ENERGY MANAGEMENT IN THE SMART CITY


The biggest element that constitutes a smart city is the decision to avoid sustaining life in the city through the consumption of large amounts of fossil fuel by supplying the necessary power by renewable energy while reducing energy consumption. In other words, the energy supply and demand are managed between the consumer side and the power generation side.

## ***Zero and Net Energy Buildings***

Net Zero Energy Buildings (ZEB) and Net Zero Energy Houses (ZEH) are buildings or houses that aim to reduce the annual primary energy balance consumed while maintaining a comfortable indoor environment.

Since there are human activities in the building, energy consumption cannot be completely reduced to zero. Yet the total energy consumption is reduced through energy-saving processes which, when combined with renewable energy, lead to zero energy consumption.

The definition of ZEB / ZEH has been discussed and examined in various ways both in Japan and abroad. For example, in Japan, if an energy savings of 30% or more is achieved in a building, it is “ZEB Oriented.” If an energy savings of 50% or more has been achieved and it aims to use renewable energy it is “ZEB Ready.” Furthermore, it is classified as “Nearly ZEB” when it has achieved a reduction in energy consumption of 75% or more through energy saving processes and the use of renewable energy, and is at that point considered to represent a realization and popularization of the goals of the ZEB policy.



Created by the authors based on the "Summary of ZEB Roadmap Follow-up Committee" by the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry

Fig. 3.3: ZEB Roadmap (Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry "2018 ZEB Roadmap Follow-up Committee Summary")

## The Importance of Regional Power Sources

Until now, power systems have relied on demand control to shift to midnight power in order to stabilize nuclear power generation (base power) and power generation has been centrally controlled by the supply of large-scale power plants built according to power demand.


However, in the wake of the tightening of supply and demand following the Great East Japan Earthquake, it became apparent that it is important not only to strengthen conventional energy conservation but also to manage energy with an awareness of the balance between supply and demand. In addition, the introduction of renewable energy sources such as solar power and wind power is progressing, but the amount of power they generate depends on natural conditions such as the weather, and even in favorable conditions the area where the power trunk line is not as thick as necessary becomes the power generation limit. Therefore, generation needs to be stabilized on a regional basis by a control method other than a central power plant control system.

In addition, decentralized energy resources, including cogeneration methods like solar power and household fuel cells, along with storage batteries, electric vehicles, and “negawatts” (power saving), have been introduced to consumers on a wide scale.

For this reason, the conventional energy supply system that relies on large-scale power plants is being revised, and the construction of a mechanism for utilizing energy resources on the consumer-side of the electric power system is being promoted. Each of the decentralized energy resources available to buildings and homes are small, but they can be used to adjust the balance between the supply and demand of electricity by remote and integrated control using advanced energy management technology that utilizes the Internet of Things (IoT). This mechanism is called a virtual power plant (VPP). VPPs are expected to play an active role in future electric power systems, offering functions such as load leveling, absorption of excess supply of renewable energy, and providing supply in the event of power shortage. Moreover, not only in Japan, but also in areas where energy infrastructure is not well-developed or unstable, VPPs will lead to stable energy use on a regional basis without requiring large-scale infrastructure.

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### Toward the realization of VPP (virtual power plant) society



Each household has a power generation function, and the surplus is shared by the community.

### Implementation of disaster-resistant system and its expansion into Asia

Suppressing Large-scale  
Infrastructure



Independent Energy  
Infrastructure



Supplementing energy from both upstream and downstream of the grid, not only to large areas of the grid but also to small areas. Contributing to curbing large-scale infrastructure development in semi-off-grid areas overseas.

Fig. 3.4: Infrastructure development using VPP will strengthen the region and is expected to be utilized even in areas where infrastructure is not developed in Asia.

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## ***Safe, Secure, and Healthy Living***

A major feature of smart cities is the utilization of IoT to support an aging society. This is part of the reason that the IoT, in which all things are connected to the Internet, is being promoted to maintain a healthy standard of living. Through it, various things such as smartphones, smart speakers, personal computers, home appliances, and automobiles share information on the Internet and control other devices. A "sensor" that detects the environmental state of its surroundings is indispensable for realizing the full potential of IoT. In particular, the development of the Micro Electromechanical System (MEMS), which is a micron-level device that integrates sensors, actuators, electronic circuits, etc., and is constructed of miniaturized mechanical elements, seeks to provide this.

Even in homes, offices, factories, etc., MEMS senses the ever-changing environment, and various equipment such as air conditioning and lighting are linked to create a comfortable and energy-saving environment. MEMS can be incorporated into various equipment to create a safe, secure, comfortable, and convenient experience for inhabitants.

If the sensor is made sufficiently small, it becomes possible to sense the physiological levels and conditions of a person while wearing it. In this way, the activity and health status of the person can be easily confirmed. Additionally, using this information can lead to a more comfortable and healthy life.

The wristwatch-type wearable information terminal is equipped with a heart rate monitor and GPS in addition to a three-dimensional accelerometer that measures the amount of activity and calories burned. The life log (a "visualization" of the body) is recorded both throughout the day and during sleep. It is used for health management and measures the amount and intensity of sleep. Users can also measure the balance of their caloric intake by inputting meals and weight.

Due to the movement to improve the environmental performance of buildings (see, for example, the Leadership in Energy and Environmental

Design [LEED] of the US Green Building Council), interest in the health and working styles of people who spend time in buildings is changing (see also the WELL Building Standard of the International WELL Building Institute).

In my laboratory, while we acquire biometric information we are also exploring the relationship between subjective reports and physiological reactions that people feel, and we are also conducting research on working environment, working style, and productivity through Activity Based Working. I feel that human-centered design oriented toward human factors will become mainstream in the future.

## **WATER MANAGEMENT IN SMART CITIES**

Japan has about twice as much rainfall as the world average, and due to the effect of water resource development such as dams, it could be said that the frequency of drought is relatively low. On the other hand, looking at the world, it is expected that water shortages will be caused not only in areas that are physically prone to drought due to small rainfall, but also due to overuse through socioeconomic factors such as population growth and the concentration of populations in cities. In addition, the unequal spatial-temporal distribution of limited water resources in the world is worsening because of climate change. In areas where water shortages are serious, rainwater use and water reclamation/reuse are very important. It would be particularly useful in these cases to actively utilize treated wastewater or reclaimed water as non-potable water for commercial facilities and factories. In addition, by centrally managing the operation data of water purification facilities and sewage treatment facilities alongside the status of water demand using smart methods, it will be possible to operate each facility efficiently and improve the management efficiency of the entire region. This is what the smart city is aiming for from the viewpoints of water infrastructure and water operations.

In Japan, population decline has become a major issue when it comes to managing and utilizing water resources. In Japan, aging facilities related to infrastructure such as water supply and sewerage systems

constructed during the high-growth period have become a serious problem, and huge costs are required for their renewal. On the other hand, in recent years, water demand has been declining due to population decline and the advancement of water-saving methods, so it is necessary to rebuild facilities with downsizing in mind. In Japan, water supply and sewage systems are managed by local governments, but wide-ranging cooperation beyond the boundaries of municipalities and, in some cases, prefectures will be required.

### ***Wide-Area Water Supply in Smart Cities***

In Japan, water utilities that provide drinking water are, in principle, managed and operated by municipalities and are required to be financially independent with full cost recovery. The business situations of the water supply utilities are expected to become more severe due to the declining population and aging facilities and pipelines. It is important to strengthen the management base, improve the efficiency of office work, and secure the technical level of their operations by promoting various wide-ranging cooperation such as utilities integration, joint facilities development, and wide-area processing in office work. Therefore, it is necessary to consider strategic widening with an eye on the future. Coordination between prefectures is important in efforts to extend the area of operations beyond the traditional administrative areas of municipalities. Therefore, the Japanese Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications and the Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare are requesting that prefectures formulate a promotion plan for a wide area of water supply as stipulated by both the promotion policy for wide cooperation and the content of particular efforts. Now is the time to make the best use of existing facilities and to consider water supply systems that utilize wide-area operations such as connecting pipes, common water purification facilities, and distribution reservoirs in cooperation with related business operators.

This concept of wide-area water supply incorporates a diverse range of initiatives, including the sharing of operation departments (fee collection, maintenance, water quality management, training programs,

etc.). There is also a proposal aiming to unite operations within one water supply system for the entire prefecture.

On the other hand, gaps between water utilities in areas such as tariff levels, financial conditions, and facility levels are barriers to the promotion of wide-area water supply. Wide-area water supply in a broad sense includes not only utilities integration but also joint operation and joint management, and it will be necessary for stakeholders to cooperate based on what the utilities concerned can do together. In particular, material ordering and inventory management systems are relatively easy to combine, and it is expected that operating costs could be reduced by introducing and operating the same system in several regions. The introduction of the latest information technology related to water supply operation and management is also an important point. The following are possible examples: a) Improving inspection efficiency by introducing sensors into the pipeline network; b) high-quality short-term demand forecasting through machine learning, etc.; and c) prediction of raw water quality and operation/management of water purification facilities using weather forecasting.

## ***Smart Water Meters***

In recent years, the introduction of smart meters in the water supply field has attracted attention. It is expected that various improvements in the efficiency of water utilities could be achieved by installing smart meters that can offer improved efficiency in meter reading through the visualization of detailed data such as demand fluctuations, early leakage detection, improvement of user services, efficient pipeline network management, and efficient energy use through improved water operation, etc.

In addition, the improvement of user services could include monitoring for elderly people living alone, and it is possible to quickly detect abnormalities due to illness or injury of residents by monitoring the amount of water used. At present, the installation cost is a major problem, but many water utilities are conducting feasibility projects for smart meter introduction. Also, by collecting water data together with

electricity and gas data, it will be possible for authorities to integrate data related to public utilities.

## **SEWERAGE IN SMART CITIES**

### ***Utilizing Information Technology***

In Japan, the histories of water supply and sewerage systems differ slightly. Public sewerage systems were developed in each city from early on in the center of large cities, but there are many areas where prefectural governments have taken the lead in developing basin sewerage systems. Therefore, sewerage is a wide-area system compared to the water supply sector.

On the other hand, sewerage facilities are aging like water facilities. It could be possible to improve the efficiency of inspection work, prevent accidents through early repairs, and formulate a reconstruction plan by installing sensors and cameras in the sewer pipeline network and monitoring and collecting data. In addition, sewage sludge generated in the sewage treatment process has high potential as fuel and fertilizer. It is also possible to utilize sewage heat. By collaborating with water/biomass-related businesses and expanding the area of facility management, it would be possible to realize a more recycling-oriented and more energy-efficient city.

Also, one of the purposes of sewerage is to remove rainwater. In recent years, it could be said that the risk of inland water inundation is increasing because rainwater removal is not able to endure sudden torrential rain. It could be possible to disseminate risk information and reduce damage by controlling the water level in advance through the utilization of weather forecasts and water-level monitoring in pipelines and reservoirs.

### ***Rainwater and Reclaimed Water Use***

The rainwater collected from roofs is considered to have the highest quality among sources of surface water such as river water. Therefore, it

is relatively easy to treat and use rainwater onsite from the viewpoint of water treatment technology. In addition, rainwater use has the advantage of reducing the rainwater runoff. Furthermore, rainwater stored in a rainwater tank can be used as emergency water when the infrastructure is damaged in the event of a disaster. In the water treatment process, since it is assumed that the water treatment facilities may not be able to operate due to power supply interruptions, the installation of an independent energy system and rainwater system will also enhance disaster resilience.

As mentioned above, water reclamation/reuse is essential in areas where water resources are scarce. The water reclaimed through sewage treatment can be used as non-potable water for toilet flushing, cleaning, landscape irrigation, and industrial tasks. Throughout the world, reclaimed water is often used for agricultural purposes. Furthermore, reclaimed water is cooler in summer and warmer in winter compared to the outside temperature. A demonstration project for advanced combined use of reclaimed sewage water, which utilizes the temperature of reclaimed water as both a heat source and a supply for air conditioning, has also been implemented in Sakai City, Osaka Prefecture.




Fig. 3.6: Outline of the Water Smart City

## TOWARD THE REALIZATION OF SMART CITIES

Various pilot projects are underway and there are often many good practices among them. In particular, the BIM (building information model) is an effective tool that is being utilized. The sharing economy is also becoming more common, and platforms for these new systems are being formed. Furthermore, web and digital society are changing city planning itself (Douay, 2018). However, smart cities are composed of many elements and are not comprised only by IoT, transportation, buildings, energy, resources, etc. In addition, some places have unique

needs, such as cities and villages in the mountains, that differ greatly from country to country, and so there is no universal solution. It is important to have a blueprint that accounts for these in each city. Above all, the active cooperation of citizens is indispensable.

More information must be collected and analyzed regarding the implementation of smart cities. Since various devices are connected to the Internet and utilize the associated information, smart cities can be said to be a citizen-participant cities. Therefore, it is also necessary to develop information management rules on how to maximize the use of personal information and corporate information while respecting privacy and information security.

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# Practices of Japanese Local Cities Coping with Population Decline

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## INTRODUCTION

The population of Japan reached its peak in 2008 and has declined continuously since then. According to the Basic Resident Register, the

population of Japan declined by approximately 0.8% from 2014 to 2019. The main reason for this population decline is a natural decrease in population (hereafter referred to as “the natural decrease”). Even in the 1960s, some municipalities experienced population outflow. The main reason for this population outflow was migratory population loss (hereafter referred to as “net migration loss”). Therefore, population decline, which many municipalities in Japan have experienced in recent years, can be understood as a social phenomenon that differs from the decline seen in the past.

It is extremely difficult to prevent the natural decrease through urban and regional policies, as these policies can take more than 25 years to show their effects after being initiated. As the historical demographer Kitou (2011) pointed out, “population change takes quite a long time, similar to the turnaround of a huge tanker.” However, certain policies can prevent net migration loss to some extent. These policies are directly effective for mitigating population decline. Although the overall population of Japan has decreased, the population of several big cities has continuously increased at the same time. Therefore, a population shift from these big cities to other areas where the population has decreased is considered to be in conformity with national strategy.

In the global context, Mallach et al. (2017) organized the discussion on shrinking cities as a conceptual model organized around “conditions,” “scholarly discourses,” and “policy and action.” They concluded that it was important to identify the existence of conditions adequate to create the “political will” necessary to address the shrinking city’s problems. A key characteristic of the Mallach’s model is that it is oriented toward action. The authors recognized that the nature of the shrinking city problem needed to be redefined for purposes of action as a specific and narrow issue because policy is not always generic. Martinez-Fernandez (2016) defines three areas that are commonly needed to tackle the worldwide decline of population in Europe, Australia, Japan, and the U.S. in terms of policy processes like community resilience, urban regeneration strategies, and tackling the social effects of urban shrinkage. As was the case in these previous studies, the present authors also pay attention to the social aspects of population decline.

The present authors examined municipalities with a population below 500,000 that had enacted policies considered to be effective for preventing net migration loss (policies to decrease the number of people flowing out and increase the number of people flowing in), performed on-site investigations of specific policies and trends in the private sector, and summarized the investigation results. These cases address the six municipalities of Kanazawa (Ishikawa Prefecture), Hirosaki (Aomori Prefecture), Fukui (Fukui Prefecture), Onomichi (Hiroshima Prefecture), Nagato (Yamaguchi Prefecture), and Kamiyama (Tokushima Prefecture).

**Table 4.1: *Natural increase or decrease and net migration gain or loss of municipalities investigated from 2014 to 2019***

Prefecture name	Municipality name	Population (2019)	Population (2014)	Percent change	Natural increase or decrease	Net migration gain or loss	Contribution ratio of the net migration loss
Aomori Prefecture	Hirosaki City	172,031	180,370	-4.6%	-6,665	-3,175	0.32
Aomori Prefecture	Aomori City	284,531	298,416	-4.7%	-9,590	-6,671	0.41
Ishikawa Prefecture	Kanazawa City	453,654	452,144	0.3%	-2,937	4,812	2.57
Fukui Prefecture	Fukui City	264,356	267,978	-1.4%	-3,581	-685	0.16
Hiroshima Prefecture	Onomichi City	137,643	144,935	-5.0%	-7,011	-1,972	0.22
Yamaguchi Prefecture	Nagato City	34,305	37,384	-8.2%	-2,823	-902	0.24
Tokushima Prefecture	Kamiyama Town	5,319	6,128	-13.2%	-719	-263	0.27
Population between 200,000 and 500,000				0.1%	-243,723	269,898	10.31

Prefecture name	Municipality name	Population (2019)	Population (2014)	Percent change	Natural increase or decrease	Net migration gain or loss	Contribution ratio of the net migration loss
Same as above, excluding three metropolitan areas				-1.4%	-258,294	100,560	-0.64
Population between 80,000 and 200,000				-1.0%	-397,693	26,731	-0.09
Same as above, excluding three metropolitan areas				-2.3%	-325,777	-125,706	0.35
Population between 10,000 and 50,000				-4.9%	-684,438	-333,994	0.37
Population between below 10,000				-7.8%	-169,468	-88,811	0.42

Source: Created by the authors, etc. based on the Basic Resident Register

## STUDY BACKGROUND: POPULATION CHANGES IN MUNICIPALITIES IN TERMS OF “NET MIGRATION GAIN OR LOSS”

Table 4.1 shows the population changes, natural increases or decreases, and net migration gains or losses in municipalities investigated from

2014 to 2019, along with the averages of these figures according to the population category. The populations of municipalities with populations between 200,000 and 500,000 slightly increased (by 0.1%) from 2014 to 2019 because the net migration gain was slightly larger than the natural decrease. However, the total population of municipalities excluding three major metropolitan areas (Tokyo, Kanagawa, Chiba, and Saitama Prefectures in the Kanto area, Osaka, Hyogo, and Kyoto in the Kansai area, and Aichi Prefecture), decreased by 1.4%. This is because the natural decrease was approximately 2.5 times the net migration gain in these municipalities, although a natural increase was observed.

During the same period, the rate of population decline in municipalities with populations between 80,000 and 200,000 was 1%. The reason for this population decline is that the natural decrease was 14.9 times the net migration gain in these municipalities. The net migration loss was also observed in municipalities when the three metropolitan areas were excluded. However, the contribution ratio of the net migration loss to the population decline was approximately 35%. The rate of population decline among municipalities with populations between 10,000 and 50,000 was 4.9%, and the contribution ratio of the net migration loss to the population decline was 37%. The rate of population decline of municipalities with populations of <10,000 was 7.8%, and the contribution ratio of the net migration loss to the population decline was 42%. The population decline rate increased as the population decreased. Both the natural decrease as well as the net migration loss intensified as the population decreased. In what follows, the authors discuss the characteristics of core cities in local urban areas and peripheral small towns of the core cities. Kanazawa, Fukui, and Hirosaki are defined as the core cities (having populations between 200,000 and 500,000). Onomichi, Kamiyama, and Nagato are defined as peripheral small towns (having populations less than 200,000).




Fig. 4.1: Locations of the Selected Cases

## CORE CITIES IN THE LOCAL URBAN AREAS

### ***Kanazawa: Net Migration Gain as a Result of Gentrification***

Compared to municipalities in the same population category (between 200,000 and 500,000 in Table 4.1), excluding the three metropolitan areas, the population growth rate of Kanazawa was higher.

Furthermore, the net migration gain was larger than the natural decrease in Kanazawa.

Kanazawa is the capital of Ishikawa Prefecture, boasting a population slightly more than 450,000 in 2019. Kanazawa initially grew as a temple town around the Oyama-Gobo Temple and then flourished as the castle town of the Kaga Domain ruled by the Maeda family. As Kanazawa managed to escape strategic bombing during World War II and other great disasters, the streetscape of the Edo period (1603–1868) remains in place even in the modern era. The population of Kanazawa already exceeded 100,000 in the Edo period. During the late Edo period, Kanazawa developed as a large city alongside the three capitals of Edo (Edo is an old name of Tokyo at the present), Osaka, Kyoto, and Nagoya. After the Meiji Restoration (1868), as cities facing the Pacific Ocean began to rapidly develop, Kanazawa lagged behind Kobe and Yokohama. After World War II, Toyama and Komatsu (which are located in the vicinity of Kanazawa) developed due to the growth of the manufacturing and chemical industries. Although manufacturing companies such as Tsudakoma Corp. and I-O Data Device, Inc., are located in Kanazawa, many people there are generally engaged in commerce and tourism. Thus, Kanazawa has developed as a consumption-centered city.

Although the population of Kanazawa decreased immediately after the Meiji Restoration, it has gradually increased since then. However, the population growth rate of Kanazawa was not very high compared with that of other local central cities. The population of Kanazawa exceeded 450,000 in 1995 and has remained largely stagnant since then. The population of Kanazawa in 2019 was 453,654. During nine recent years (2010–2019), the natural decrease was approximately 1% and the net migration gain was approximately 2%. Therefore, the net migration gain tended to compensate for the natural decrease. In Kanazawa before 1995, the natural increase tended to compensate for the net migration loss. After 2008, the net migration gain was larger than the natural decrease. After 2012, the natural decrease was larger than the net migration gain. Thus, the population dynamics of Kanazawa changed markedly after 2010.

The Hokuriku Shinkansen, a high-speed bullet train railway line, has facilitated the net migration gain. Kanazawa Station on the Hokuriku Shinkansen line opened in March 2015. According to a report by the Development Bank of Japan, the economic ripple effect of the Hokuriku Shinkansen on Ishikawa Prefecture was approximately 67.8 billion yen, which was markedly larger than what was predicted before the opening of the station (12.4 billion yen). Due to this economic impact, issues of gentrification have arisen in the urban district. Following the opening of Kanazawa Station on the Hokuriku Shinkansen line, increases in the home values in Kanazawa have been much larger than those of other cities in Japan, and the numbers of new offices and stores have increased. This marked increase in tourism demand has also prompted hotel-related investments.

These trends have led to the conservation of many traditional town houses (wooden buildings built before 1950) in Kanazawa through the establishment of new regulations. Although townhouses in Kanazawa are valuable urban resources, people in Kanazawa tend to avoid such houses because they are said to be “old, dark, and cold.” With the widespread demolition of these townhouses in Kanazawa, their numbers have decreased. As a policy to promote the use of townhouses in response to the needs of a new era while simultaneously conserving the structures, Kanazawa established the “regulations on promoting the conservation and utilization of Kanazawa town houses” in 2013 before the opening of Kanazawa Station on the Hokuriku Shinkansen line. Approximately 6,100 townhouses existed in Kanazawa when the regulations were established; however, 550 were lost within five years. Thus, the demolition of townhouses has continued in Kanazawa. Fortunately, there are several cases where the conservation and utilization of townhouses that can be considered model cases. Examples include Yaoyoroz Honpo, a multipurpose store opened in March 2015, HATCHI Kanazawa, a hotel opened in March 2016, and KUMU, a multipurpose hotel opened in August 2017. Following these pioneer cases, townhouses have been renovated into residences, restaurants, cafes, stores, galleries, studios, and guest houses. Thus, a new twist on old charm has been generated in the central urban area of Kanazawa.

Among the 35 prefectural capitals, excluding ordinance-designated cities, the population increased in only 11 from 2010 to 2019 (excluding Matsue, which merged cities, towns, and villages). Of these 11 cities, a natural increase was observed only in six. In contrast, a net migration gain was observed in 25 cities. In Kanazawa, the net migration gain has compensated for the natural decrease, and its population has been maintained. However, this compensation results in gentrification. Therefore, a policy to positively conserve urban resources, such as townhouses, is required. Although Kanazawa belongs to the group of cities exhibiting a net migration gain in the era of depopulation, Kanazawa highlights the need for an urban policy that generates subtle solutions to thorny problems.

### ***Fukui: Repair of Old Buildings and Young Business Persons***

The rate of population decline of Fukui is similar to that of municipalities in the same population category (between 200,000 and 500,000), excluding the three metropolitan areas. Although municipalities in this population category exhibit a net migration gain on average, Fukui has shown a net migration loss. However, the number of people counted in the net migration loss is small, being much smaller than the losses incurred by cities on the Sea of Japan side of the country, such as Aomori, Akita, and Nagaoka, although the number of people counted as part of the net migration loss of Fukui is larger than that of cities in three prefectures in the Hokuriku region (Fukui, Ishikawa, and Toyama Prefectures).

Fukui is the capital of Fukui Prefecture. The population of Fukui is slightly more than 260,000 in 2019. Fukui developed as the castle town of the Echizen Domain ruled by Katsuie Shibata, a military commander in the age of civil strife. In the Edo period, Fukui became the central city of the Echizen Province, which yielded 680,000 koku of rice (1 koku  $\approx$  140–150 kg). From the Meiji period (1868–1912), Fukui flourished as one of Japan's foremost textile cities. However, it suffered from strategic bombing during World War II, and the Fukui Earthquake occurred in 1948. Thus, Fukui was severely damaged. Since then, Fukui has

performed reconstruction projects and been renewed like a phoenix. From 1971 to 1974, Fukui merged with the surrounding towns and villages, causing the area of Fukui to increase from 33 km<sup>2</sup> to 339 km<sup>2</sup>. The population of Fukui also increased from 77,000 to 230,000, reaching its peak in 1995 and then beginning to decrease. In 2006, Fukui merged with the surrounding towns and villages again, causing its area to increase further. The population of Fukui significantly increased but then tended to decrease again, although the decrease was insignificant. The population of Fukui decreased by approximately 1% over nine years (2010–2019), decreasing by 0.1%–0.3% every year except for 2013. Although the natural decrease in these nine years was approximately 2%, the net migration gain in the same period was approximately 1%. Because the net migration gain partially compensated for the natural decrease, the population decline of Fukui tended to be eased to some extent.

Due to the two above-mentioned events (strategic bombing during World War II and the Fukui Earthquake in 1948), Fukui was heavily reconstructed. However, the road toward reconstruction taken by Fukui differed from that taken by many other cities that were also recovering from war damage. Based on the firmly-held city planning ideas of Tasaburo Kumagai, the Mayor of Fukui at that time, Fukui placed emphasis on the construction of road networks. As a result, the urban structure of Fukui was able to keep up with the subsequent progress of motorization to a certain extent.

However, by executing the above-mentioned city planning, the automobile dependency of Fukui increased; the number of owner-driven cars per household in Fukui Prefecture came to be the largest in Japan, suburbanization progressed, and consequently, the central district of Fukui began to deteriorate. In the 2000 census, the move-in ratio of population from 1995 to 2000 of Matsuoka Town (Eiheiji Town at present), which was adjacent to Fukui City, was the highest (8.1%) in Fukui Prefecture. The move-in ratio of the town previously known as Shimizu Town, which was merged into Fukui City, was 4.7%. Thus, the move-in ratios of municipalities in the suburbs of Fukui were high, highlighting the remarkable population outflow to the suburbs of Fukui in the late 1990s. As a result, the central district of Fukui deteriorated,

the number of residents decreased, and vacant stores and parcels of land began to appear in the central district of Fukui.

To address these issues, Fukui has adopted policies to both encourage people to live in the central district and to attract customers. The placement of Fukui Station on the Hokuriku Shinkansen line, which will open in 2023, has facilitated these policies, and areas surrounding Fukui Station have already been redeveloped. In 2016, Happiring, a 21-story compound building, opened at the east exit of Fukui Station. In this building, the lower floors are used for commercial complexes, including a multipurpose hall and a planetarium, while higher floors are reserved for residences. Happiring is the highest building in Fukui Prefecture. On the east side of Happiring, a 27-story building is under construction. This building will house a large number of residences as well as commercial facilities, including a hotel. The number of people living in the central district of Fukui is thus predicted to increase in the future.

In addition to the above-mentioned large-scale developments, attempts to improve the charm of the central district have been implemented, including the adoption of a town-planning-like approach that promotes the repair of old buildings. For example, the floor space of wooden buildings over 60 years old accounts for 77% of the total floor space of buildings in a 0.8 ha area adjacent to Shinsakae Shopping Mall near Fukui Station (Fukui City as of 2013). Because the condition of this area is excellent, the implementation of an urban redevelopment project through an exchange of property rights system similar to that used in nearby areas, has been considered many times. However, no large-scale redevelopment project has yet been put into place because the ownership of property rights is extremely complicated. In cooperation with Harada Laboratory at the University of Fukui, Fukui investigated the intentions of property owners in the area in 2013. Based on the investigation results, a social experiment was performed. Consequently, a square called Shinsakae Terrace, in which wooden decks were laid on an outdoor parking lot, was installed. This square has been used for various events, leading to the development of a space in which a variety of people and organizations gather and interact with each other. A survey of visitors performed in 2015 revealed that approximately 90% of visitors felt that “the impression of the central area has improved for the

better” and the number of vacant stores in the area adjacent to Shinsakae Shopping Mall began to decrease in 2015 (Fukui City, 2018). Despite the presence of many old buildings in this area, we could find several young businesspeople who rented old vacant stores when we visited the site. Although the net migration gain is extremely small according to statistical analyses at present, the number of people from Fukui moving to cities in other prefectures is expected to decrease thanks to the implementation of urban regeneration projects for the central district of Fukui in the form of structural measures such as constructing new buildings, as well as non-structural measures such as renting out old stores.

### ***Hirosaki: As a Case of City Center Residence***

Compared to municipalities in the same population category (between 80,000 and 200,000), excluding the three metropolitan areas, the rate of population decline in Hirosaki was higher. The contribution ratio of the net migration loss to the population decline was also higher than the average. Compared to municipalities in three prefectures in the northern part of the Tohoku region on the Sea of Japan side of the country (Aomori, Akita, and Yamagata Prefectures), the rate of population decline of Hirosaki was the lowest, and the contribution ratio of the net migration loss to the population decline was the second-lowest, barely surpassed by Sakata. It is worth noting that the rate of population decline in Aomori was higher than that in Hirosaki and the contribution ratio of net migration loss to the population decline of Aomori was higher than that of Hirosaki. Aomori is the prefectural capital of Aomori Prefecture, and the population of Aomori (more than 200,000) is much larger than that of Hirosaki. The reasons why the rate of population decline of Hirosaki was lower than that of Aomori are examined below.

As mentioned above, compared to municipalities in the same population category (between 80,000 and 200,000), the population decline rate and contribution ratio of net migration loss of Hirosaki were higher. For this reason, it may not be appropriate to include Hirosaki as a case to be evaluated in this study, yet the population decline rate and the

contribution ratio of the net migration loss in Hirosaki were relatively good for a city in the northern part of the Tohoku region on the Sea of Japan side, where the population decline has generally been quite rapid. Notably, the population decline in Hirosaki was smaller than that in Aomori. The correlation coefficient between the total population of 99 municipalities in three prefectures in the northern part of the Tohoku region on the Sea of Japan side and the population growth rate from 2010 to 2019 was 0.44. This value suggests that the population decline rate increased as the population decreased. However, the population decline rates of Aomori and Hirosaki in the same period were 6.5% and 6.4%, respectively. Furthermore, the net migration losses of Aomori and Hirosaki were 2.9% and 1.8%, respectively. Therefore, Hirosaki showed a greater ability to maintain its population level than Aomori even though the population of Hirosaki is approximately 60% that of Aomori. The reasons for the above-mentioned differences were examined on the assumption that differences in the urban policies between the two cities were involved.

We searched newspaper databases using “Aomori” and “compact city” as keywords and we found the first mention of the “compact city concept” advocated by Seizo Sasaki, the Mayor of Aomori in 1997. According to the article, Mayor Sasaki proposed the compact city concept in his 21<sup>st</sup> Century Creation Plan (1995), which was the new long-term master plan. This plan states that urban functions should be concentrated in areas surrounding Aomori Station and that the utilization of areas in front of the station is to be set aside for private initiatives. The Auga Building, which is located in front of Aomori Station and was constructed in the First-Class Urban Redevelopment Project and opened in 2001, became a symbol of this plan. The number of visitors temporarily exceeded six million per year, so the Auga Building sprang into fame as a successful case of the compact city concept. However, as reported in a newspaper article on a major portal site by Shouji (2016), Namioka Town was merged into Aomori City, Sasaki was rejected in the mayoral election, and many tenants moved out of the Auga Building. Before January 2018, Aomori City Hall was already using four floors (first to fourth floors) of the Auga Building for its functions, a situation that continues in the present. Therefore, Aomori City Hall took responsibility for the worsening of the management of the Auga Building. Aomori City

Hall and local shopping streets are now looking toward a better future while returning to the concept of “city planning to allow people to live comfortably while considering job creation” (Shouji, 2016). From the perspective of business administration, Aomori has sufficient experience in the plan-do-check-act cycle, also known as the Shewhart Cycle. Therefore, Aomori can be considered the “pioneer of the compact city.”

When we searched academic papers using “Aomori” and “compact city” as keywords in Japanese, we found a study by Kaido (2001) in J-STAGE, the largest database of academic papers in Japan. This study performed a correlation analysis between population density and accessibility to local community facilities using 49 cities in Japan to investigate the “paradox of the compact city,” which arose in Europe and America. The “paradox” in this case refers to a phenomenon in which a negative effects occur in a compact city due to overcrowding and congestion when its population density increases, resulting in a city becoming more inconvenient to navigate and live in as the city becomes more compact. Kaido (2001) concluded that although population density was correlated with market orientation indices such as traffic networks and convenience store availability, it was not correlated with parks and meeting places. Therefore, a location policy for these public facilities was considered important. Along with Kanazawa, Fukui, and Akita, Aomori is considered to be a city of the Hokuriku and Tohoku regions, where dwelling house sizes are large and accessibility to public transportation facilities is considered acceptable. From this viewpoint, Aomori can be understood to be on the way back to embracing a “location policy for public facilities” (Kaido, 2001, p. 426) following its painful experience with the private project surrounding the Auga Building as handled by Aomori.

Hirosaki was the castle town of the Hirosaki Domain, the popular name of which is the Tsugaru Domain. The urban structure of Hirosaki has accepted “historical constraints” as discussed by Yokoo (1987). In 1896, during the second half of the Meiji period, the garrison of an army division that had jurisdiction over the northern part of the Tohoku region was located in Hirosaki. Since then, urbanization has made considerable progress. After World War II, the urban district of Hirosaki expanded, centering on the castle town and garrison. Core urban

facilities, such as schools and hospitals, were built in places that had previously been used for military sites. The city area expanded at this point due to boundary changes. The main population growth spurt had already occurred between 1930 and 1945. The location of military sites is known to have markedly affected the urbanization process at that time (Yokoo, 1987). Along with old towns on the outskirts of the town located in the northwest part of Hirosaki, the educational, medical, and welfare facilities located in the southeast part of Hirosaki are considered to have played a key role in the promotion of urbanization after World War II.

Aomori was established as a port town of the Hirosaki Domain. However, Hirosaki conspicuously exhibits the characteristics of a castle town or political center due to the history described above. In the past, Hirosaki was called Naka Tsugaru (central Tsugaru), Aomori was called Higashi Tsugaru (east Tsugaru), and Kuroishi was called Minami Tsugaru (south Tsugaru). The history of Hirosaki shows that Hirosaki sits at the center of the Tsugaru region, which is why a national university and national medical institution are located in Hirosaki.

When we searched academic papers using “Hirosaki” and “compact city” as keywords, similar to our process for Aomori, the oldest paper found was a study entitled “City Center Residence” published by Kitahara in 2003. Since then, Kitahara has published many studies on city center residences, repeatedly asserting that “the compact city cannot be simply realized by a policy to encourage people to move from detached houses in suburban residential areas to apartment houses in the central district” (Kitahara, 2012, p. 23). Kitahara is the first person to assert that the so-called compact city cannot be simply achieved through redevelopment projects in the central district and the relocation of dwellings from suburban residential areas. The conclusion that “the sustainability of a suburban residential area can only be examined based on the existence of an idea that the area should be mainly managed by its residents, and this examination will result in the realization of a true compact city” is particularly suggestive (p. 23).

One of the characteristics of the Location Normalization Plan of Hirosaki established in 2017 is the placement of a “fresh food store,” the area of which is between 1,000 and 10,000 m<sup>2</sup>, in each central district of an

urban function induction area. The idea of a “city center residence” is clearly reflected in this plan. Hirosaki has put forth the idea of a “compact city + public transportation network + smart city.” Therefore, the proposal of the compact city of Hirosaki is not stronger than that of Aomori. However, Hirosaki has developed several facilities that will play a key role in solving the issue of shrinking cities. The Hirosaki City Machinaka Information Center is a symbolic facility and its location at the midpoint between the previous Hirosaki Castle site and the previous garrison of the army division is important. In the urbanization process of Hirosaki, the location of this center has connected these two cores. Hirosaki Station opened in 1927, and Chuo Hirosaki Station opened in 1952 located between these two historical cores that function as the third and fourth urban cores, respectively. Thus, these four cores form a well-balanced urban infrastructure.

As mentioned above, marked differences exist in the urbanization processes of Aomori and Hirosaki, despite similarities in population declines and economic trends between the areas. Regarding countermeasures against shrinking cities and the effects of such measures, Aomori and Hirosaki show markedly different characteristics. These differences may be the reasons for the difference in the net migration loss between the two cities.

## **PERIPHERAL SMALL TOWNS OF THE CORE CITIES**

### ***Onomichi: Migration by DIY Renovation***

The rate of population decline in Onomichi was higher (-5.0%) than that of municipalities in the same population category (between 80,000 and 200,000), excluding the three metropolitan areas (-2.3%). However, the contribution ratio of the net migration loss was lower than that of the natural decrease. Therefore, Onomichi has successfully kept people in the city and encouraged new residents to move into the city to a certain extent, although the population has decreased overall.

Onomichi faces the Seto Inland Sea, and its population is slightly less than 140,000. In the Edo period, because goods-carrying merchant ships stopped at a port in Onomichi, it was the most prosperous city with a commercial port in the Seto Inland Sea. From the 1980s to the 1990s, many movies were set in Onomichi, and the city became associated with several famous writers. Onomichi attracted the attention of many tourists as a city with ties to movies and literature. Recently, Onomichi has become known as a city with many hills and sloping landscapes, and consequently many cyclists have visited the Setouchi Shimanami-Kaido Expressway. Onomichi has thus become a major tourist destination in Hiroshima Prefecture. However, the population of Onomichi has shown a decreasing trend, with the population of the previous Onomichi area before its merger continuously decreasing after its peak in 1975.

In the nine-year study period (2010–2019), although the natural decrease was approximately 7%, the net migration loss was only approximately 1%. In 2016, Onomichi experienced a net migration gain, although it only amounted to 39 people. The net migration loss has continued, but the contribution ratio of the net migration loss has remained low. According to the 2015 census, the number of intra-prefectural migrants into Onomichi was smaller than that out of Onomichi by 964 (a net migration loss). However, the number of inter-prefectural migrants from other prefectures was larger than that of other prefectures by 232 (a net migration gain). In Fukuyama, which is adjacent to Onomichi, with a population of 465,000, the number of intra-prefectural migrants into Fukuyama was larger than that out of Fukuyama by 1195 (a net migration gain). However, the number of inter-prefectural migrants from other prefectures was smaller than that of other prefectures by 904 (a net migration loss). Thus, Onomichi contrasts markedly with Fukuyama. In the micro-level inter-regional competition, the number of intra-prefectural migrants of Onomichi (-964) was much worse than those of Fukuyama (-623), Hiroshima (-295), Higashihiroshima (51), and Mihara (30). However, according to the macro-level inter-regional competition from the perspective of population change, Onomichi's performance is acceptable. In particular, the difference between the number of inter-prefectural migrants from the three metropolitan areas and the number of inter-prefectural migrants to these areas was +109 in 2010 and +114 in 2015. Therefore,

unique population movements can be observed in Onomichi. The difference between the number of inter-prefectural migrants from areas aside from the three metropolitan areas and the number of inter-prefectural migrants to these areas was +311 in 2010 and +118 in 2015.

Regarding the reason for Onomichi's unique population movements, town planning that utilizes its unusual historical and geographical characteristics can be cited, in addition to its above-mentioned strong competitiveness as a tourist destination. Onomichi is located on the graded land of the Onomichi Three Mountains. At present, this graded land, known as Yamate, is a tourist spot where only temples and shrines existed in the past. From the late Meiji period to the early Showa period (1926–1989), business tycoons began to build villas called *saen* ("tea garden" in English). Since then, various types of buildings of different ages, including Western-style buildings, Japanese-style inns, and tenement houses, have been built in this area. As a result, a unique landscape peculiar to the graded land has emerged. Because Onomichi avoided strategic bombing during World War II, many 40- to 100-year-old buildings still exist in Onomichi. However, because many old buildings do not satisfy the legal obligations of road abutment, these buildings cannot be rebuilt. Because of the graded land, vehicles cannot enter this area. As a result, the renovation cost in this area is approximately three times that of flat land. Therefore, many buildings have been abandoned and left vacant. Neither the owners of these buildings nor Onomichi City Hall can do anything about this.

Recently, a non-profit organization (NPO) called the Onomichi Akiya Saisei Project (the Onomichi Vacant House Renovation Project, known as Aki-P) has engaged in active operations centering on this Yamate area. Aki-P began to renovate vacant houses in the Yamate area and approximately 20 vacant houses have now been renovated. In 2009, Onomichi entrusted Aki-P with a vacant house bank. In the eight years that followed, the bank matched approximately 80 vacant houses with new users. Consequently, the number of migrants in the Yamate area has increased. Furthermore, bakeries, cafes, and pottery forges have been opened. As a result, the Yamate area has become more attractive than ever before not only for residents, but also for tourists. Many immigrants are married couples in their 20s and 30s. Young people have

migrated into the Yamate area, where the aging of the population has progressed, vacant old buildings have been repaired, and consequently, a new community has been created.

The renovation costs for vacant houses in the Yamate area are extremely high if contractors renovate these houses, as these houses are located on graded land that hampers vehicle access. However, many people have migrated to the Yamate area because they can live in individualistic and historical houses at extremely low costs, and they can perform repairs on these houses while renting them. Therefore, the majority of these immigrants renovate vacant houses by themselves (through do it yourself [DIY] renovation). Aki-P also supports these migrants. People who have already migrated and young people working at local drinking spots voluntarily help carry out household goods and garbage left in vacant houses, carry in renovation materials, and invite new migrants to move into the Yamate area. Aki-P supports migrants in various ways. For example, it holds events, such as workshops, in which migrants can learn professional skills from craftsmen, and flea markets in which household goods left in vacant house are sold. Aki-P also provides grants for repairing old houses in Onomichi to migrants.

The vacant house bank became more convenient after Aki-P took over its operation because it is open even on weekends. However, to obtain information on registered vacant houses, people must physically visit Onomichi. In many vacant house banks in other municipalities, anyone can obtain information on registered vacant houses through the internet. However, through Aki-P, the vacant house bank only introduces registered vacant houses to people who can patiently search their favorite vacant houses by themselves. Such patience is indispensable for people intending to live in Onomichi, with its many slopes and alleys. The DIY method of renovating vacant houses takes a lot of time and effort as well. Living in a place with many slopes is inconvenient, necessitating quite a bit of patience and an ability to enjoy such challenges. Aki-P provides a framework in which people can patiently perform DIY renovations while enjoying the challenge of life in an otherwise inconvenient location with the support of neighbors.

The majority of areas in which the population is declining are inconvenient places to live. To revitalize an area with a population decline, people who can acclimatize their lives to the unique conditions of the area or who truly *want* to live in the area should be selected, instead of a policy which accepts all comers. Aki-P has created a framework to encourage and support the lives of people who can adapt their lives to the unique conditions of Onomichi to immigrate.

### ***Nagato: Master Plan with Private Sectors***

The rate of population decline of Nagato was slightly higher (-5.0%) than that of municipalities in the same population category (between 10,000 and 50,000) (-4.9%). However, the contribution ratio of the net migration loss was lower than that of the natural decrease. Therefore, Nagato has successfully kept people in the city and encouraged people to move into the city from outside to a certain extent even though the population has decreased overall.

Nagato is located in the northern part of Yamaguchi Prefecture facing the Sea of Japan, and its population was 32,700 as of January 2020. Because Nagato lies outside of basic national traffic networks, no manufacturing industry has developed in the area. Even now, the fishing, agricultural, and stock-raising industries, their associated food processing industry, and the tourist industry are the main industries in Nagato. The population of Nagato reached its peak in 1955 (66,112) and has since continuously decreased.

Amid this state of gradual decline, Kurao Ohnishi, the former Mayor of Nagato, took office as mayor in 2011. Once instated, Ohnishi enacted a policy to increase the number of visitors, which he hoped would create jobs and stem the outflow of young people. Since then, Nagato has pursued a concept of town development that makes use of Nagato's advantages. In 2018, the road station "Senzakitchen" was opened (The words Senzaki Port and Kitchen are combined). This road station provides fresh fish and shellfish that have been harvested at Senzaki Port as well as barbecued chicken, a local specialty. This road station has successfully attracted tourists, the number of which has been larger than predicted. Furthermore, Nagato attempted to revitalize Nagato

Yumoto Onsen, a hot springs resort in Yamaguchi Prefecture located in the southern part of Nagato. Nagato Yumoto Onsen is a time-honored hot springs resort that opened in the Muromachi period (1336–1568). In 1983, 390,000 people visited the resort. However, the number of visitors decreased to 180,000 in 2014, less than half of that at its peak. In the same year, Shirokiya Grand Hotel became bankrupt despite boasting 150 years of history and being dubbed the “hot spring of the Lord of the Mori Domain.” The massive site of the abandoned hotel provided a powerful image of decline in the form of a deteriorated hot springs resort.

In an effort to improve this situation, Ohnishi decided to purchase the land and the hotel and to dismantle the building at public expense. Ohnishi then invited Hoshino Resort, Inc., to renovate the hotel facilities. In response to the invitation, Hoshino Resort proposed a master plan through which the future of the entire area, including the hotel site, could be shared by all parties concerned; this master plan was indispensable for future organization and investment. After the renovation process began, Nagato developed this master plan together with Hoshino, which proposed the plan while the administration carried out public investment based on the plan. This was an unprecedented project. Ohnishi, the Mayor of Nagato at that time, might have had a sense of crisis about the situation of Nagato Yumoto Onsen. His sense of crisis resulted in the subtitle of the master plan: “paying attention to existing resources, and local resources led Nagato Yumoto Onsen to be revitalized (renovation of the hot-spring resort by local treasures and powers)”(Nagato City, 2016, p.9). All of the parties concerned commonly understood that “this tourism town must be revitalized without compromise (Matsuoka, H., interview, March 9, 2020).” Under these circumstances, Hoshino Resort decided to invest in the unused space generated by the bankruptcy of the hotel.

In addition to creating the master plan, Nagato formed a team to promote the master plan, composed of qualified local individuals like proprietors, experts, and administrative officers. Thus, the master plan was promoted in the form of a private initiative. The promotion team commonly understood that “in the age of population decline and financial difficulties, town activation led by administrative investment

without the involvement of the private sector, as in the age of economic growth, will fail, and the next generation will inherit debts” (Matsuoka, H., interview, March 9, 2020). This means that rather than seeing the revitalization efforts for Nagato Yumoto Onsen led by the local government and uninvolved citizens, local well-wishers should participate in the project as a “private business entity with a strong will to bear risks.” Due to the promotion team’s enthusiastic appeal, the previously public-operated bath was privatized. Ohnishi’s approach produced a positive result. In 2018, the number of tourists visiting Nagato reached a record high. On March 12, 2020, KAI Nagato, a new hotel was opened by Hoshino Resort on the site of the previous Shirokiya Grand Hotel, and on March 18 of the same year, Onto—a public bath reconstructed by local young businesspeople—was opened. Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, KAI Nagato and Onto failed to make brilliant debuts. However, because all the parties concerned carried out their responsibilities with conviction, the local hot springs resort industry has gotten back on a path toward revitalization even while the population has continuously decreased and many businesses have disappeared.

Regarding the population decline in Nagato over this nine year period (2010–2019), the natural decrease was 11%, and the net migration loss was 3%. However, the number of people counted in the net migration loss has tended to decrease over the past five years. At the time of graduating from junior and senior high schools, some students want to leave Nagato to receive a good education. Therefore, during the graduation season, the number of people moving out is larger than that of people moving in. However, the number of people 25–29 and 30–34 years old moving in was larger than that of people moving out. This tendency has continued in recent years. Therefore, although some students move out of Nagato for better education opportunities, there are still young people who want to live in Nagato. When the results of the above-mentioned policy in Nagato are fully realized, the net migration loss will be reduced further.

## ***Kamiyama: Promotion of Satellite Offices***

The rate of population decline in Kamiyama was much higher (-13.2%) than the average among municipalities in the same population category (below 10,000) (-7.8%). However, the contribution ratio of the net migration loss was lower than that of the natural decrease. The main reason for the population decline in Kamiyama was the natural decrease. Although the net migration loss is larger than the net migration gain, the difference has been kept small.

Kamiyama in Tokushima Prefecture is a small town with a population of slightly more than 5,100. It is surrounded by mountains and filled with lush greenery but is only 30-40 minutes away from Tokushima City and one hour away from Tokushima Airport by car. Thus, Kamiyama is located in a convenient place.

The population of Kamiyama exceeded 20,000 in 1955. However, the population has continuously decreased year over year, rendering Kamiyama a so-called “depopulated town.” Recently, Kamiyama has been receiving attention as a successful example of regional revitalization due to a minor influx of migrants. Although the number of people counted as part of the net migration gain was 27 in 2011, persistent net migration loss has been observed since 2010, except for in 2011. However, more than 100 people have moved into Kamiyama every year, and young people in their 20s and 30s have accounted for approximately 50% of these new residents (51% in five-year period from 2013 to 2017). Approximately 100 people have moved into Kamiyama, with a population of around 5,000, and roughly 50% of the migrants are in their 20s and 30s. In addition, some 15 information technology (IT), design, and film-related companies have satellite offices located in the town, so Kamiyama cannot be said to be a depopulated town anymore in spite of the significant decrease of population after 1955.

Kamiyama was an exemplary depopulated town in the past, but in 1991, an International Exchange Committee was founded in the town after an old American blue-eyed doll of the type given to Japan to symbolize Japan-U.S. Friendship before World War II was found in the town. This Committee resulted in the establishment of an NPO called Green Valley.

Green Valley has mainly been engaged in actions called Kamiyama projects, which invite people and companies to Kamiyama from outside. Green Valley considers that Kamiyama should aim at “creative depopulation” to change the outcome of depopulation instead of seeking a population increase. In other words, they suggest that Kamiyama should invite young people and creative human resources from outside, restore population composition, and raise the value of Kamiyama as a business area where various ways of working are possible. Consequently, Kamiyama could become a well-balanced and sustainable area without relying only on agriculture and forestry.

An artist-in-residence program that started in 1999 was the first project in Kamiyama to invite migrants. By providing accommodations and ateliers as paid services for domestic and foreign artists, the town encouraged artists to live there. Subsequently, three projects in Kamiyama launched. In the work-in-residence program, bistros, cafes, bakeries, pizzerias, shoe shops, delicatessens, and guest houses have been opened in vacant houses on shopping streets in recent years. The difference in utilization between the above-mentioned vacant houses and those located in ordinary shopping districts is that the work-in-residence program does not simply provide vacant houses for those who want to buy houses, but appoints and invites workers and entrepreneurs necessary for the future of the town. Thus, this program helps design the town. A project related to satellite offices has emphasized the extension of invitations to IT, design, and film related companies, which do not need to be picky when selecting worksites. This project has facilitated the renovation of old private houses to provide an attractive workplace environment accompanied by an older appearance and a modern interior space for young people. As part of a project of the Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare, the Kamiyama School was opened to provide supporting training for job seekers for six months. Approximately 50% of trainees who finished the program have since immigrated into the Kamiyama Town.

As mentioned above, when artists, entrepreneurs, creators working in satellite offices, and persons who manage shops in Kamiyama migrated into Kamiyama, a new influx of people was generated and new services were created. When restaurants use agricultural products from local

farmers, the economic benefits circulate within a specific area. This is Kamiyama's regional revitalization strategy. At present, Kamiyama is planning to open a technical college using the creative human resources in the town. Therefore, a further new influx of people is expected to be generated.

Kamiyama's efforts to invite creative human resources into the town are considered to be based on a cultural tradition of accepting the arrival of new people from outside the town, excellent accessibility from Tokushima Airport and Tokushima City, and the execution of projects by an NPO instead of the local administration. It took 13 years from a doll being sent back to the United States in 1991 to the establishment of the NPO. The people engaged in this activity shared their successful experiences little by little and expanded their fields of activity during this period of 13 years. Administrative projects must typically achieve a certain result within a short period of time, so successful experiences cannot be accumulated. If a project is performed by a private organization, however, the project can be continued for a long time. This is the reason for Kamiyama's success. Kamiyama established standards for human resources and for what stores would be invited to put down roots in the town, instead of accepting all comers, and designed the town based on these standards. As a result, Kamiyama has attracted creative human resources for a long period of time.

## **CONCLUSION**

Given that policies for helping municipalities often aim to help cope with population decline, this study focused on attempts that successfully reduced the contribution ratio of the net migration loss instead of the natural decrease by presenting the results of on-site investigations of six large and small municipalities. The natural decrease is difficult to eliminate within a short period of time. The above-mentioned municipalities were considered to have succeeded in their attempts to mitigate the population decline. While there were some municipalities whose policy results could not be extracted from rough statistical data, by analyzing the statistical figures in detail, the results of the policies could be clearly demonstrated.

When Kanazawa's trend changed from a natural increase to a natural decrease, its net migration trend changed from a loss to a gain. As a result, Kanazawa's population successfully increased. While making full use of the opening of Kanazawa Station on the Hokuriku Shinkansen line, Kanazawa continues to cope with issues of gentrification and the conservation of traditional town houses, which require subtle solutions. By implementing urban regeneration projects through structural as well as non-structural measures and reducing the number of people counted as the net migration loss, Fukui has eased the damage of population decline caused by the natural decrease. Although the population of Aomori is larger than that of Hirosaki, the contribution ratio of the net migration loss of Aomori is larger than that of Hirosaki, probably because the idea of a "city center residence," which is a bottom-up approach instead of a top-down approach, functions effectively. Regarding Onomichi, although the number of people constituting the net migration loss is not very small, the number of intra-prefectural migrants was negative and the number of inter-prefectural migrants was positive. Thus, unique population dynamics were observed. This is considered to be the result of the NPO Onomichi Akiya Saisei Project functioning effectively. Regarding Nagato, the number of people counted as part of the net migration loss has decreased in recent years while the number of people between 25 and 34 years old who moved into Nagato has been larger than that who moved out of Nagato. This is thought to be due to the success of the drastic regional revitalization policy. By establishing the artist-in-residence program and renting satellite offices, Kamiyama has successfully brought in more than 100 young people every year, more than half of whom are in their 20s and 30s.

By analyzing the demographics of the six above-mentioned municipalities in detail, it was revealed that a population decline, which damages the sustainability of a region, can be avoided or eased by adopting policies that make full use of regional characteristics and pay attention to the net migration loss. For example, see young migrants compensated for the net migration loss in Nagato and inter-prefectural in-flow compensated for intra-prefectural out-flow in Onomichi. In this context, this chapter can conclude that the private sectors' initiatives and bottom-up approaches are common values for avoiding rapid

population decline in these shrinking cities. The process based on bottom-up and private initiatives may be a kind of prescription for providing public value.

**Table 4.2: Summary**

Municipalities	Population (2019)	Policy characteristics	Comparison of cities in the same population category	Characteristics of the net migration gain or loss
Hirosaki City	284,531	The idea of a “city center residence,” which is a bottom-up approach instead of a top-down approach. Differences in the historical urban policy between Hirosaki and Aomori.	Although the population decline rate and the contribution ratio of the net migration loss were higher than the averages, Hirosaki has done relatively well for a city in the northern part of the Tohoku region on the Sea of Japan side.	Although the rate of population decline in Hirosaki was similar to that of Aomori, the contribution ratio of the net migration loss of Hirosaki was lower than that of Aomori.
Kanazawa City	453,654	Conservation of historical town houses and attempts to cope with gentrification following the opening of Kanazawa Station on the Hokuriku Shinkansen line.	The population of Kanazawa has increased.	In 2008, the net migration loss changed to a net migration gain and the net migration gain sufficiently compensated for the natural decrease, which tended to increase.
Fukui City	264,356	Urban regeneration projects in the	The rate of population decline in Fukui	The net migration gain compensated for the gentle

Municipalities	Population (2019)	Policy characteristics	Comparison of cities in the same population category	Characteristics of the net migration gain or loss
		form of structural as well as non-structural measures.	is similar to the national average but better than that in Aomori, Akita, and Nagaoka, which are located on the Sea of Japan side.	natural decrease, so the population decline was eased.
Onomichi City	137,643	Attractive town development through bottom-up-type countermeasures against vacant houses.	Although the population decline rate was higher than the national average, the net migration loss was small.	The number of intra-prefectural migrants was negative, but the number of inter-prefectural migrants was positive.
Nagato City	34,305	Drastic regional revitalization policy through public and private cooperation, such as the entrustment of a private company with the creation of a master plan.	Although the population decline rate was higher than the national average, the net migration loss was small.	Recently, although the contribution ratio of the net migration loss has tended to decrease, and the population has continuously decreased, Nagato has successfully kept people in the city and encouraged people to move into the city from outside to a certain extent.
Kamiyama Town	5,319	Adoption of a policy to proactively invite people from outside.	Although the population decline rate was higher than the national average, the net	More than 100 people have moved into Kamiyama every year, and young people in their 20s and 30s

Municipalities	Population (2019)	Policy characteristics	Comparison of cities in the same population category	Characteristics of the net migration gain or loss
			migration loss was small.	account for approximately 50% of this.

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# The Ecological City: With a Specific Focus on Participatory Biological Conservation

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## THE MEANING OF BIODIVERSITY CONSERVATION IN AND AROUND CITIES

In order to ensure the continued well-being and longevity of human life on Earth, it is imperative and critical that the environmental issues that the world faces today be resolved. International societies have formulated and declared common goals for people to work toward to promote the creation of a sustainable society. A notable example of such goals is the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) announced by the

United Nations General Assembly in 2015. The importance of conserving biodiversity is mentioned in several of the SDGs, such as Goal 14 (“Conserve and sustainably use the oceans, seas and marine resources for sustainable development”) and Goal 15 (“Protect, restore and promote sustainable use of terrestrial ecosystems, sustainably manage forests, combat desertification, and halt and reverse land degradation and halt biodiversity loss”) (United Nations 2021).

Researchers caution that planet Earth currently faces its sixth mass extinction period, as they estimate that an average of 40,000 species disappear every year (Miller & Spoolman, 2016). The difference between the current phase of mass extinction and the previous ones (including the one that occurred 65 million years ago when dinosaurs went extinct), is that the current extinction is caused by one species, human beings. Wildlife habitats have been destroyed by environmental degradation, and their populations have declined due to overexploitation by humans. Biodiversity provides various indispensable services to humans, which can be categorized into those with direct value (e.g., the use of nature’s bounty for food, fuel, and medicines) and indirect value (e.g., recreational and educational). Biodiversity also plays an important role in providing ecosystem services such as climate control and nutrient cycling, and the loss of biodiversity directly threatens the sustainability of human beings’ lifestyles (Primack & Kabori, 2008).

Biodiversity is not only found in remote forests or wildernesses far from cities, but also exists and flourishes in and around cities. In fact, numerous species live in and around cities and other human settlements worldwide (Oke et al., 2021). For example, a study conducted in home gardens in England revealed that more than 8,000 insect species thrive within them, accounting for about a third of all insect species in the country (Owen, 2010). Studies in Japan revealed that many wildlife species (except the endangered and threatened ones) have habitats in Satoyama (Sato means village and Yama means mountains in Japanese) and in areas in and around human settlements, including paddy and agricultural fields, streams, and village forests (Ministry of the Environment, 2001). As recognized in international societies and conferences—such as the tenth meeting of the Conference of the Parties (COP10)—cities play an important role in restoring and

conserving nature and contribute to the conservation of global biodiversity (Oke et al., 2021). It is for this reason that conserving biodiversity in and around cities and restoring natural expanses in residential areas have become an integral part of the process for mitigating the global biodiversity crisis confronting us today.

Ecological cities are broadly meant to promote the sustainable development of urban space (Chen et al., 2020), which entails various approaches from monitoring soil and water quality, to building green roofs, to optimizing transport structures in cities (Van et al., 2019; Oke et al., 2021). In this chapter, biodiversity conservation is used as a case study to understand how the creation of ecological cities might be achieved through a participatory process.

## **CASE STUDY FOR CONSERVING AND RESTORING BIODIVERSITY IN RESIDENTIAL AREAS**

Protecting nature in residential areas and restoring greenery in cities not only conserves biodiversity but also positively impacts people's quality of life. Having greenery around their houses positively impacts the psychological health and well-being of residents (Campbell and Wiesen, 2009; Tan et al., 2017), and losing the cover of vegetation decreases their overall life satisfaction (Youngentob and Hostetler, 2005). In addition, creating greenery or protecting nature can enhance the participatory skills and governance of the people involved if it is conducted through a bottom-up and participatory process (Hill, 2008). Under these premises, there have been various participatory nature restoration or conservation programs implemented in and around cities worldwide.

One such project, in which the author was involved, was a participatory greening project implemented in Ushikubo Nishi District of Tsuzuki Ward in Yokohama City, Japan. Located about 30 km west of the Tokyo metropolitan area, Yokohama City is the second most populous city in the country with around 3.7 million residents (City of Yokohama, 2014). Due to the rapid development of the city in the 1950s and an increase in population, the city lost large expanses of its natural areas (Yokohama

Environmental Planning Bureau, 2013). To conserve and restore greenery, the city prepared and implemented a Green Community Development Project in which revenues from a “green tax” (taxes paid by city residents to conserve nature) were utilized. Through this project, the city facilitates community-based management and encourages residents to take the initiative to conserve and restore greenery in their neighborhoods by providing 90% of the necessary funding while the remaining 10% is paid by the districts. Ushikubo Nishi District, with 4,354 residents in 1,559 households, was used for this project and was designated one of 14 model districts in 2012; it received funding from Yokohama City for five years.

Restoring greenery and managing nature in and around residential areas cannot be done sustainably or effectively if the residents do not support or participate in such projects (Krasny et al., 2014). If the residents do not understand or appreciate the value of nature in their residential areas, they could be instrumental in its destruction in the process of the city’s further development; moreover, it is difficult for outsiders (e.g., other city residents, government officials, and researchers) to continually visit the area and manage such projects on behalf of the local residents. For these reasons, a community-based project is preferable to a top-down project. There are many examples of projects that fail to receive support and participation from the residents because project managers ignore the interests and motivations of the residents when trying to reach their goals (Hill, 2008).

To understand residents’ needs, concerns, and other general perceptions related to greening projects and utilize this information to improve the effectiveness of such programs, the author conducted social studies in Ushikubo Nishi District. The first step of the research was to interview members of the district committee, the “Association of Flowers and Greening.” Ushikubo Nishi District was chosen as the research site since the campus of Tokyo City University is located within the area. Furthermore, this was the only place among 14 model districts where the project was prepared and organized in collaboration with the residents and the university. Therefore, the Association of Flowers and Greening, whose primary role was to design and implement the

greening project, consisted of committees comprised by residents and university faculty and graduate students.

Interviews were conducted with the seven resident committees (out of ten) and three university committees (out of six) who confirmed their ability to participate. The interviews aimed to reveal and evaluate the committees' perceptions and expectations from the project. While the details of the results of this interview are published in Sakurai et al. (2015a), some key findings will be explained here. Regarding their expectations of the project, three resident committees mentioned that they hoped to see “more flowers and greenery” in the district, while two university committees mentioned that they expected residents would “increase their interest toward wildlife” through the project. When asked how to best achieve the goals of the greening project, two resident committees mentioned that “motivation by residents” and “interaction and communication among residents” were important, and one university and two resident committees mentioned that “outreach to residents regarding the project” would be important.

The results of a data mining analysis also revealed differences in the language used by the resident and university committees in the interviews (Table 5.1). Resident committees used words like “flower,” “kids,” and “beautiful” more often, while university committees used words like “wildlife” and “know” more frequently. The results of these interviews were later shared with committee members, which gave them the opportunity to realize the differences in perception between resident and university committees and address how to overcome such differences and collaborate more effectively (Sakurai et al., 2015a).

***Table 5.1: Words frequently Mentioned by Members of “Association of Flowers and Greening” Committee in Ushikubo Nishi District (Source: revised from Sakurai et al., 2015a)***

**Resident Committee**

Ranking	Words	Jaccard	Frequencies	Words appeared per individual
1	Flower	0.073	57	8.1
2	Enter	0.064	48	6.9
3	District	0.055	41	5.9
4	Age	0.046	36	5.1
5	Make	0.043	34	4.9
6	Plant	0.040	31	4.4
7	Kids	0.039	31	4.4
8	Beautiful	0.034	29	4.1
9	Association	0.030	23	3.3
10	New	0.028	21	3.0

### University Committee

Ranking	Words	Jaccard	Frequencies	Words appeared per individual
1	Wildlife	0.139	31	10.3
2	Greenery	0.135	42	14.0
3	Think	0.134	46	6.6
4	People	0.128	39	13.0
5	Plan	0.112	25	8.3
6	University	0.109	26	8.7
7	Know	0.102	21	7.0
8	Greening	0.083	20	6.7
9	Many	0.081	16	5.3
10	Have	0.080	16	5.3

Therefore, in order to implement participatory greening projects, citizens' demands and perceptions need to be considered. A survey was conducted among the residents of Ushikubo Nishi District (a total of 810 households registered in the district's residents' association) to

understand what kind of activities were expected or desired by the residents. Two questionnaires were distributed to each household so that two family members could answer them: one who was interested in greening/planting and another who was not. After distribution of the survey in August 2013, 544 questionnaires from 274 households were returned. (The details of the results of this survey are published in Sakurai et al., 2015b and 2016.)

Based on a multiple regression analysis, the results revealed that the strongest factors affecting residents' willingness to participate in "creating community greenery or biotopes" and "planting along streets" were their perceptions of whether the "greening project will enhance social interaction among residents" (Table 5.2). This had a stronger effect on resident motivation than the question of whether residents enjoyed taking care of greenery. Similarly, structural equation modeling was conducted using the same data to determine the factors that affect residents' willingness to participate in greening activities. The results revealed that, in addition to residents' willingness to improve aesthetic beauty by planting flowers and greenery, their level of interaction with neighbors affected their willingness to join in the activities (Fig. 5.1).

**Table 5.2: Multiple Regression Analysis with Greening Activities as Dependent Variables and Socio-Demographic and Cognitive Factors as Independent Variables.**  
**[B=standardized coefficient] (Source: Sakurai et al., 2015b)**

Creating community gardens or biotopes	B	p	VIF	R2	Adjusted R2
A greening project will enhance social interactions among residents	0.245	0.001	1.351	0.256	0.241
Residents should collaborate in maintaining the natural environment of the district	0.223	0.003	1.527	0.256	0.241
I take care of greenery in a garden and/or around my house	-0.202	0.006	1.434	0.256	0.241

<b>Creating community gardens or biotopes</b>	<b>B</b>	<b>p</b>	<b>VIF</b>	<b>R2</b>	<b>Adjusted R2</b>
I enjoy taking care of greenery	0.258	0.001	1.592	0.256	0.241

<b>Planting along streets</b>	<b>B</b>	<b>p</b>	<b>VIF</b>	<b>R2</b>	<b>Adjusted R2</b>
A greening project will enhance social interactions among residents	0.248	<0.001	1.374	0.355	0.336
I enjoy taking care of greenery	0.206	0.004	1.553	0.355	0.336
Taking care of greenery is troublesome	-0.166	0.009	1.226	0.355	0.336
Residents should collaborate in maintaining the natural environment of the district	0.219	0.002	1.534	0.355	0.336
I know the Green Community Development Project	-0.163	0.007	1.115	0.355	0.336
There are plenty of flowers in the district	-0.117	0.044	1.035	0.355	0.336




Fig 5.1: Result of structural equation modeling [ $n=398$ ,  $X^2=189.368$ ,  $p<0.001$ ,  $GFI=0.93$ ,  $AGFI=0.89$ ,  $RMSEA=0.08$ ; all values are at standardized coefficient ( $p<0.01$ ) Source: revised from Sakurai et al. 2016

These analyses reveal that residents felt that the greening of residential areas was important from the perspective of enhancing community interaction. While increasing greenery and restoring nature in and around human settlements would increase the biodiversity level of the region, residents in Ushikubo Nishi District saw the project as a potentially critical opportunity to implement participatory community development. This implies that it is important for the government, researchers, and stakeholders to consider the social dimensions of creating ecological cities if they are to make such projects effective and sustainable. Since factors such as the relationship between government and researchers, government policies, and residents' perceptions of nature could be different in different countries and cultures, public interest and motivation to participate in such conservation or greening projects should be examined and understood clearly to effectively design outreach and recruit residents to participate in such activities not only in Japan but all over the world. The level of interaction and trust

relationships among residents constitute “social capital,” which is defined as trusting relationships among members of a community and is comprised by social connections and shared social norms (p. 174). Understanding and improving the social capital of the community would be a key factor in enabling sustainable and effective nature conservation/restoration in urban areas.

## **CITIZEN SCIENCE AND THE CITY NATURE CHALLENGE**

This section introduces an international citizen science project called the City Nature Challenge (CNC). Citizen science, defined as the engagement of the public in a scientific project (Dickinson and Bonney, 2012; Kobori et al., 2016), has been recognized as an indispensable approach for fostering nature conservation. Citizen science advances research and science because, with the help of citizens, researchers can obtain international data within a short amount of time; data that are often impossible for most researchers to collect because of limitations in time and manpower. In addition, information on threatened species and their statuses—obtained by citizen science projects—could affect and improve policies and decision-making regarding conservation. Citizen science projects have educational effects as well, since citizens can gain a) skills to identify species and b) knowledge related to the natural environment and species by participating in various activities.

CNC is an international event in which residents observe wildlife species in and around their neighborhoods and submit photos and audio records via a mobile app. The event takes place annually from the end of April to the beginning of May. In the first half of this period, the “Observation Period,” participants submit their observations, and in the second half, the “Identification Period,” experts identify the species submitted by participants. CNC started in 2016 when the Natural History Museum of Los Angeles County and the California Academy of Sciences in San Francisco implemented an event where citizens in those cities came together to observe their surrounding natural environment. Year on year, the number of participants and observation sites increased, and in 2018, more than 17,000 people from 68 cities worldwide participated,

observing 8,600 species in 441,000 observations (CNC 2021). In 2021, 53,000 participants from 419 cities in 44 countries observed 31,000 species (Fig. 5.2).




Fig. 5.2. Citizens Participating in CNC and Observing Wildlife in Tokyo in 2021 Photo taken by the author

Collecting this data creates environmental education opportunities for city dwellers while providing valuable research data to identify the current biodiversity conditions in each city. It also provides the necessary data and incentives through which stakeholders are able to implement conservation and/or restoration projects. Some previous studies showed that participating in such activities not only enhanced participants' understanding and awareness of biodiversity, but also changed their behaviors (e.g., some citizens joined invasive plant removal projects and/or talked to others about invasive species after participating in citizen science activities; Jordan et al., 2011). Furthermore, the spread of COVID-19 had limited effects on restraining people from observing nature because the number of participating people and cities increased even during the pandemic in 2020 and 2021.

CNCs provide opportunities for citizens to not only understand the natural environs of the city, but also to think about how nature can be

conserved near human settlements. Such opportunities also provide citizens with the opportunity to connect with the nature that surrounds them (Oke et al., 2021). The survey of participants in 2021 revealed that people tried to avoid crowds but still went outside to record species (Kishimoto and Kobori, 2020), demonstrating that people remained eager to connect with nature.

While the significance of citizen science projects in terms of enhancing education, conservation, and science has been pointed out by many scholars (Bonney et al., 2015; Kobori et al., 2016). If policy makers hope to implement effective and sustainable projects, it is important to understand what motivates residents to participate in such activities. However, few studies have been conducted to understand participants' perceptions and reactions to these international citizen science events. The author conducted a survey of CNC participants worldwide to reveal their cognitive responses to the activities in 2018. Details of the findings of this survey are published in Sakurai et al., 2022. Among the 361 responses that were received in this survey, 145 respondents had participated in events in the US, 113 in Japan, 34 in the UK, and 28 in Malaysia. Other respondents represented eight other countries, while some others did not specify the countries that they represented.

When asked about what they enjoyed the most, Japanese participants (mostly from Tokyo) mentioned connecting with nature (Fig. 5.3). While nobody in Japan mentioned saving the environment as an enjoyable factor, a fair number of global city participants raised it.




Fig. 5.3. Results of open-ended questions on what the participants enjoyed most in the activities. (Japan:  $n=113$ , World cities:  $n=239$ )

A stepwise regression analysis was conducted on American and Japanese responses to understand the factors that affect their intention to participate in similar citizen science activities in the future. The results revealed that in both countries, participants having the chance to learn about wildlife in their local areas affected their willingness to participate in future events ( $p<0.05$ ) (Sakurai et al., 2022). In other words, the more the participants learned about wildlife in their neighborhoods, the more likely they were to join future events in both the US and Japan.

Program managers could incorporate such information when tailoring their messages for participant recruitment and enhance participants' satisfaction during the activities. For example, explaining how such citizen science activities could contribute to conserving the natural environment (e.g., by providing important information on threatened species) before and during the events could raise the participants' satisfaction levels. Managers could also ensure that the participants have enough time to connect with nature (especially in countries like Japan where many people's motivation for participation is to connect with nature) and that they learn about the wildlife in their areas, which could increase future and repeat participation. Citizen science projects would play an important role in creating ecological cities if both nature conservation authorities and the public are involved in such activities.

## ***Sense of Place as a Potential Key Factor in Building Ecologically and Socially Vibrant Cities***

This chapter shows how a participatory greening project and a worldwide citizen science project are potentially useful for creating ecological cities. While the goal of both projects is to create ecological cities by effectively conserving and restoring nature in and around cities, both cases reveal how residents value their connection to their surrounding social and natural environments. Such public attachment to a specific place or the way people confer meaning to a certain place is called “sense of place” (Stedman, 2002; Ardoin, 2014). This specific place includes both social and biological spaces, as well as both their social and cultural facets. The sense of a place is established through the actual experience of people being in that area (Krasny, 2020). The most important implication of a sense of place is that the more attachment people feel to the area, the more likely they are to take action to protect and conserve that specific area (Jorgensen & Stedman, 2001; Krasny, 2020).

The first example of participatory greening projects suggests how people’s sense of place, which is determined by how much time they spend in the place and interacting with their neighbors, enhances their willingness to join greening events. The CNC citizen science project increased participants’ connections to their natural environment, and their learning about neighborhood wildlife encouraged them to participate in future events. By developing relationships with the natural environment existing around their neighborhoods, they became more aware of and cautious about such places. These factors seemed to enhance their attachment to places, including both biological and social environments. Studying people’s sense of place in more detail and providing more concrete data on this concept could reveal more about the indissoluble link between the social and the natural environments.

If planners only look at the ecological aspects and concentrate on restoring nature and increasing diversity while ignoring residents’ perceptions and concerns, such projects will not be effective or sustainable. Similarly, we cannot create a sustainable city if we are only

concerned about the social aspects, ignore the species that live around the city, and destroy nature. To create cities that are not only ecologically friendly but also socially vibrant with active interaction both among residents and between residents and their natural surroundings, it is important to understand residents' sense of place and how such place attachments can be nurtured in cities.

## ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

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# Building an Inclusive City

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## INTRODUCTION

Living in a society implies that we are conditioned by various kinds of situational, traditional, and institutional in/out or on/off “relays” that determine our social statuses and relations with other people, groups, and organizations. Such social relays serve both exclusionary and inclusionary purposes. The uses of these mechanisms have evolved over time, with the major transformation taking place in the transition from the customs and hierarchical rules of tribal, agrarian, and imperial societies to the complex institutional matrix of durable institutions in functionally differentiated late modern societies. In this latter context, practically all exclusionary practices have been exposed to ideology critique and moral evaluation. Many activities that used to be seen to reflect a legitimate group-based exclusion are today condemned as prejudicial practices or discrimination. In short, it is widely agreed that developed countries have become more open, inclusive, and democratic

than what they were in pre-modern times (Pinker, 2018). Inclusiveness is, indeed, a critical element of social development, and, as concluded by Estivill (2003), the transition towards an inclusive society has become a prevailing trend throughout the world. That said, developed countries may not be as inclusive as commonly believed. This urges us to take a closer look at exclusion and consider possible opportunities to make improvements in terms of social, political, and economic inclusion.

This article discusses the localization of the inclusion agenda and asks: on what kind of framework should urban communities in the developed world build their inclusion policies? This chapter is based on a realist, domain-specific universalism, which is reflected in an emphasis on common humanity and harmony among people living in an urban community. In addition, this discussion is oriented toward improving people's chances to participate in value creation to benefit themselves as well as the surrounding community, which is an under-researched topic in urban and community research (Murie & Musterd, 2004; Short, 2021) as well as in other branches and subfields of social sciences (Allman, 2013; Mascareño & Carvajal, 2015; Silver, 2015). This implies a shift in concern from social to economic inclusion or, in other words, from entitlement to value creation. Such an approach is expected to catalyze economic inclusion and lead to the improvement of quality of life among all segments and sectors of the community.

## REMARKS ON EXCLUSION

Discussion about inclusion can begin with a discussion of *exclusion* because inclusion is supposed to intervene in a social setting in which some unnecessary, unjustified, or immoral exclusionary mechanisms are in place (Anttiroiko & de Jong, 2020). It is necessary to point out that exclusion, despite its negative connotation, has been and still is a natural and even necessary feature of social life. Exclusionary rules or actions define boundaries between "us" and "them" when governing social interaction, determining people's positions in local decision making, controlling borders, proving ownership of a property, organizing family life, and keeping communities safe (Allman, 2013). Let us consider such instances as *identities* based on kinship, marriage or citizenship, *activities*

such as business transaction, military service, or a football game, or *organizations* such as hospital, school, or convenience store, which all exclude and include people in one way or another—based on assent, submission, birth, payment, special requirement, role-playing, and so forth—vis-à-vis the given social spaces, institutions, and activities even in open and democratic societies (e.g., Rawal, 2008; Estivill, 2003; Espino, 2015).

However, there are instances in which exclusion is not based on a legitimate function or tradition but appears to be unnecessary, unfair, harmful, unjustified, or immoral. This is the essence of exclusion that is referred to in the global inclusion agenda. For example, the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs states that “social exclusion describes a state in which individuals are unable to participate fully in economic, social, political and cultural life, as well as the process leading to and sustaining such a state” (UN DESA, 2016). This statement refers to societal conditions in which some people are unjustly prevented from participating in mainstream society.

Even if both justified forms and subjective views of exclusion relativize the inclusion agenda, it is ultimately based on observations on the existence of the forms of exclusion that reflect sexism, racism, religious discrimination, classism, ageism, discrimination against obese people, or ableism in working life, the subtle acts of unjustified exclusion in everyday life, or complex processes relating to unemployment, attainment gaps, or problems with substance abuse, which eventually exclude people from mainstream society. Even if society *per se* is hardly the sole reason behind individual hardships in an open and democratic society, there is an ethically grounded obligation to develop inclusive structures and practices that are conducive to enhancing quality of life in the population at large.

## **THE EMERGENCE AND MAINSTREAMING OF THE GLOBAL INCLUSION AGENDA**

Social inclusion as it is commonly understood today evolved through small steps during the development of civilizations rooted in the

European cultural heritage and the Enlightenment in particular (Zafirovski, 2011; Pinker, 2018; McCloskey, 2019). While the eighteenth-century Enlightenment itself was rather Eurocentric in many respects and can be seen to reflect white supremacy to a degree (Freter, 2018), it nevertheless enriched the ideas of individual freedom and equality and challenged the conventional justifications for colonialism (see Carey & Festa, 2009; Kohn & Reddy, 2017). Even if nation-building processes of the modern era contained some inherent exclusionary elements, radical shifts pushed development towards inclusion especially after the revolutions of 1848, as evidenced by demands for more citizen participation and greater freedom of the press, the lifting of restrictions on political assembly, the improvements in working conditions and the respect for labor rights, the introduction of national social insurance schemes, and the introduction of women's universal suffrage and their right to stand for election (Anttiroiko & de Jong, 2020).

The first half of the 20th century witnessed a gradual weakening of colonialism, the rise of communism and fascism, and the eruption of two world wars. World War II was a watershed in the ideological landscape, marked by a considerable weakening of conservative ethnocentrism due to its war-related legitimization crises, while at the other side of the ideological spectrum the rise of Soviet-led Eastern Bloc, radical countercultures, social movements, left-wing politics, and the building of the welfare state increased the prominence of collectivist thinking. A left-leaning cultural semi-revolution in the late 1960s evoked a persuasive identity struggle reminiscent of the century-old Marxist idea of class struggle, which legitimized attacks against market economies, institutions, authorities, and belief systems that were the building blocks of modern societies (Anttiroiko, 2019). Such fundamental ideological and structural elements of Western civilization were seen to represent the interests of the white supremacist capitalist elite, and thus to serve inherently exclusionary functions built for safeguarding its material interests. Radical movements directed attention to marginalized people's ability to participate effectively in economic, social, political, and cultural life—this effectively stretched the scope of the concept of exclusion to cover practically any kind of subjective alienation and distance from mainstream society (Duffy, 1995). This view has been

instrumental in the gradual mainstreaming of the progressive inclusion agenda.

Western democracies began to address social and economic exclusion on a larger scale during the 1980s and 1990s. One of the starting points for the institutional promotion of social integration and inclusivity was the World Summit for Social Development held in Copenhagen in 1995. This idea gained significant ideological and institutional support from international organizations, such as the OECD, the IMF, and the World Bank, and regional organizations, the most influential among them being the European Union (Sen, 2000; Rawal, 2008). They contributed to the creation of high-level inclusion agenda, which indirectly affected the integration of inclusion into national and local policy agendas (Estivill, 2003). Similar developments are evident in the mainstreaming of DEI (Diversity, Equity, Inclusion) in the corporate world and in the wide range of inclusion-oriented activities conducted by civil society organizations at different institutional levels.

## FROM PARTICULARISM TO HOLISTIC INCLUSION

As mentioned earlier, a critical historical turn took place after the World War II due to the retreat of ethnocentrism and nationalism as a reaction to their association with the absurd violence of the two world wars (cf. Furedi, 2017). The subsequent moral confusion that emerged created a fertile breeding ground for radicalism and progressivism that in the 1960s boosted the wave of movements fighting against drastic injustices and demanding equal opportunity, especially for women, workers, racial minorities, and the poor (Haidt, 2017; Lukianoff & Haidt, 2018).

The turn from the demands for *equality of opportunity* in the 1960s to the *entitlement thinking* of the 1990s and the following decades depicts a dramatic change in identity politics. The radicalized identity politics started to essentialize identity, rendering its relationship with inclusion somewhat problematic (cf. Moran, 2020). Mainstream politics were challenged by two camps of essentialist identity politics in particular, those of *right-wing populism*, which represents ethnocentric, reactionary,

localist, and revanchist responses to global solidarity, “uncontrolled” migration, and a democratic deficit, and *left-wing identitarianism*, which is associated with a heterogeneous group of radical, anarchist, and progressive forces with particularistic agendas, while at the same time being united against their arch-enemy, portrayed as a white supremacist heteronormative capitalist patriarchy (on identity politics, see Heyes, 2020; Furedi, 2019).

Various identity groups play a positive role in public policy by pinpointing the forms of exclusion in society based on their experiences and their views of historical, structural, and/or cultural aspects of exclusion (Hornung et al., 2019). However, problems arise when *identity politics* radicalizes and becomes openly divisive, antagonistic, essentialist, and particularistic. Such “common enemy politics” relies as a rule on misconstrued epistemology and social ontology (Furedi, 2019; Flanagan, 2021; McWhorter, 2021; Valdary, 2021; Lukianoff & Haidt, 2018). It attributes *a priori* practically all barriers to need satisfaction as well as all observed socio-economic disparities to structural discrimination, which builds a shaky epistemic ground for inclusion (see, e.g., Sowell, 2019; McWhorter, 2021). On top of this, the salience of identities in politics tend to increase their manipulation for political gains (Bleich & Morgan, 2019). Therefore, understanding the role of identities in local policymaking calls for unbiased, empirically grounded policy research and analysis—and ultimately de-essentialization of identity categories—as the epistemic precondition for a sound policy (on empirical analysis of social exclusion, see e.g. Good Gingrich & Lightman, 2015; Loktieva, 2016). This is particularly important because inclusion policy hardly ever addresses only disadvantaged groups but involves also other actors in the given asymmetric or discriminatory setting. This highlights the role of *relationality*, which entails, due to its implicit boundary conditions, situational ambiguities, and changing subject positions, that inclusion must be seen ultimately partial by necessity (cf. Dobusch, 2021). The articulation of this through three main categories—identities, disparities, and policies—and four schematic action categories is illustrated in Fig. 6.1.




Fig. 6.1. Identity groups and evidence-based inclusion policy.

It is noteworthy that inclusion programs and trainings tend to increase divisiveness and even inject toxicity in workplaces, as claimed by Chloé Valdary (2019), which may be the case with local communities as well. The message to city governments is that they should refrain from becoming handling centers for sectional interests and particularistic policy demands (Anttiroiko & de Jong, 2020). Another problem with essentialist identity positions among separate groups is their tendency to feed a *victim mentality* (Bar-Tal et al., 2009), which in turn fuels antagonism and leads to the articulation of social problems in the way that makes them look unsolvable.

There is a risk that raw emotions overtake politics and, further, that victimhood anchors emotional guidance to resentment and hatred rather than to compassion and forgiveness (cf. Valdary, 2019). Emotional dimensions play a role (especially at an individual level) in laying a moral foundation for an inclusive city—most notably in the context of a multicultural and racially divided society (see Monroe et al., 2000; Taylor, 2006). It has its pitfalls too, however, as pointed out above. Heightened emotion may exacerbate political polarization and even lead to a politics of demonization (see Lukianoff & Haidt, 2018).

A true policy challenge lies in understanding how the problems identified with exclusion should be articulated and addressed at the institutional level within the local policymaking process. At this level, local government should show *place-based leadership* as a balancing and unifying force that acknowledges equivocality, democratic dialogue, a search for common ground, the importance of a shared common vision, and strategic actions that reflect the compassionate “common humanity politics” (cf. Hambleton, 2015; Anttiroiko & de Jong, 2020; Lukianoff & Haidt, 2018). Open and democratic local institutions contribute to the *local political culture of inclusion*, which is a critical piece of the puzzle, as variations in local political culture explain to some extent the differences in the patterns of relationships between identity variables and political outcomes (Deleon & Naff, 2004).

## A FRAMEWORK FOR URBAN INCLUSION

Pathological forms of exclusion have historical precedents in dynastic elitism, caste systems, apartheid systems, and legal discrimination against ethnic minorities. Such cases represent the systemic and institutional exclusion of certain groups from the mainstream society. Modern Western societies have abolished such systems altogether, even though some existing disparities can be assumed to persist as a reflection of the injustices and discriminatory practices of the past. Developed countries enacted laws during the post-war decades to make discrimination illegal, which is a significant step forward. Moreover, many public and private institutions have included inclusion in their operational principles, values, or brand attributes. Consequently, in advanced democratic societies the major problem is not large-scale discriminatory behavior as such but the culture that may underpin some subtle exclusionary elements or produce cognitive biases that lead to the underutilization of people’s capacities. The message to local governments is clear: they should put structures in place to support, enable, integrate, and empower those who are not able to participate fully in mainstream society.

Hilary Silver (2015, pp. 2-3) emphasizes that social inclusion has two sides: inclusion in *social interaction* and inclusion in *institutional*

*environments* that open access to participation in various spheres of social life. According to her, social inclusion is “a multi-dimensional, relational process of increasing opportunities for social participation, enhancing capabilities to fulfill normatively prescribed social roles, broadening social ties of respect and recognition, and at the collective level, enhancing social bonds, cohesion, integration, or solidarity.” The UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs emphasizes similar elements in its definition, even if its emphasis is explicitly on participation of disadvantaged groups: “social inclusion is defined as the process of improving the terms of participation in society for people who are disadvantaged on the basis of age, sex, disability, race, ethnicity, origin, religion, or economic or other status, through enhanced opportunities, access to resources, voice and respect for rights.” (UN DESA, 2016).

Inclusion is in essence an intervention into an extremely complex societal setting comprised by interrelated factors. The building of an inclusive city is a holistic endeavor that cannot be managed by the city government alone. A move towards an inclusive city is possible only if the institutional stakeholders and community members in different roles internalize the idea of inclusion and practice it in their everyday lives. This means that actions should be taken to implement inclusivity in underlying cultures, social structures, and institutional practices. It is important to seek common denominators of inclusion, which are the building blocks of the vision of the city, inclusive policy design, and inclusion-oriented local leadership (e.g., Hambleton, 2015). If the political leaders and public managers adopt an inclusive, empowering, and democratic *leadership style*, it promotes inclusion throughout the municipal organization and extends an influence through numerous actors and various channels into the local community, eventually reshaping *local culture*.

A precondition for successful holistic interventions is to approach inclusion as a *multi-layered phenomenon*. Regarding physically disadvantaged groups, Schleien et al. (2003, p. 8) state that the concept of inclusion may be best viewed as a continuum that includes three levels of acceptance:

1. *Physical integration*. At this level an individual's right to access is recognized.
2. *Functional inclusion*. This refers to an individual's ability to function successfully within a given environment.
3. *Social inclusion*. This refers to person's ability to gain social acceptance and/or participate in positive interactions with friends and peers during recreation, hobbies, and other leisure activities.

In the case of marginalized identity groups, measures designed for them may include the following categories of policy intervention: (a) anti-oppression psychotherapy and counselling; (b) improving motivation, awareness, self-esteem, and opportunity enhancement; (c) capacity-building and the provision of support services to create preconditions for functional capacity and individual or collective performance; (d) incentivization and nudging that fosters inclusive mindsets and behavior changes; (e) barrier removal and institutional finetuning to guarantee equal access, fairness, and equality of opportunity across the institutional landscape; (f) group-specific inclusion programs or affirmative actions designed under carefully scrutinized case-specific conditions; and (g) supporting participation in value-creation processes and entrepreneurship (cf. Anttiroiko & de Jong, 2020).

The key elements of inclusive city policymaking are illustrated in Fig. 6.2.




Fig. 6.2. Key elements of inclusive city policy. Modified from Anttiroiko & de Jong, 2020, p. 67

## PROMOTING VALUE CREATION THROUGH INCLUSION

One of the aims of this chapter is to highlight the need to focus on economic integration, which may facilitate holistic inclusion in a more constructive way than what we might call the “victim-centered” and “rights-based” approaches. While a *victim-centered approach* is a must in traumatic and criminal processes, and *rights-based approach* has its place in addressing grave human rights violations, they are not

conducive when coaching people in strengthening their human capacity, contributing to co-creation within a local association, becoming a member of local cooperative, or starting a small business. Such processes require a *value creation approach*, which in a democratic society urges us to redirect attention from human rights to people’s ability to use their competencies and resources to generate something of value that is sold to a customer base, offered as publicly subsidized service, or provided for free to those in need. It is an effective way of integrating people into society through a simultaneous promotion of awareness, identity-building, capacity-building, relational capital, empowerment, and material reward. Following this logic, the classic models and typologies of citizen participation can be changed into a model of value creation, as illustrated in Fig. 6.3.



Fig. 6.3. The ladder of stakeholder value creation. Modified from Anttiroiko & de Jong, 2020, p. 84.

Practically all holistic inclusion schemes attend to people's stakes, contributions, and other aspects of value creation. For example, O'Brian's (1989) five accomplishments that support valued experience and build community competence include the following: growing in relationships, contributing, making choices, having the dignity of valued social roles, and sharing ordinary places and activities. This list is based on a thorough understanding of the needs of disabled people, and the consideration of how human service programs should be designed to contribute to this target group's lives. "Contributing" points to the need to allocate resources to assist people with disabilities in discovering and expressing their gifts and capacities. Everyone has some capacity to contribute to their local community, and when society is able to utilize such a capacity it can integrate people in a meaningful way and eventually provide them with a source of greater self-control, happiness, and meaning (cf. Cheung et al., 2014; Ward & King, 2017; Deci & Ryan, 2000).

The construction of an inclusive city must have a foundation in the local institutional and cultural setting. Therefore, the precondition for building an inclusive city is poverty alleviation, inclusive infrastructures, and the provision of a supportive institutional framework. When targeted initiatives for supporting, enabling, integrating, and empowering people are introduced with the support of physical, institutional, and social infrastructures, they have better chances to bring about sustainable results. Finally, the strategic actions that support urban value creation can be grouped into three core areas: (a) access to skills and employment; (b) entrepreneurship and access to finance; and (c) access to services that enhance economic opportunities (EBRD, 2017). These three points form the operational core of the support for local value creation, and this core can be extended to a broader set of grassroots-level value enhancement practices that harness diverse capitals and potentials from people and communities for the purposes of value creation. Ultimately, inclusive policy should create an environment that is conducive to entrepreneurship (Acs & Stough, 2008) and to the creation of an inclusive capitalism (de Jong, 2021)—this is illustrated in Fig. 6.4.




Fig. 6.4. Three aspects of economic inclusion: skills, finance, and services. Adapted from Anttiroiko & de Jong, 2020, p. 71

The above model is a conceptual scheme that highlights the most vital elements of urban economic inclusion policy. Specific actions depend on the situation and features of each community, which may vary from cities operating within a welfare-society framework, to those affected by municipalism or progressive movements, to ones that are undergoing profound industrial restructuring (Anttiroiko & de Jong, 2020). Approaches that exemplify citizen-centric economic inclusion include self-employment and working-class entrepreneurialism (Birelma, 2019), microbusiness, family business, and home-based business (Houston & Reuschke, 2017), popular economy (Gago, 2018), social and solidarity economy (Mendell, 2014), and a range of special forms of entrepreneurship, such as senior, youth, academic, women, LGBTQ+, social, green, minority, ethnic, indigenous, immigrant, informal, prison, and disability entrepreneurship (Cooney, 2021; Cederberg & Villares-Varela, 2019). All of these incorporate entrepreneurship into various domains of community life in their own ways. Such approaches serve as bridges between social and economic spheres of urban life and form an important supplementary side of urban economic inclusion.

## CONCLUSION

Building an inclusive city is a surprisingly complicated process, demanding thorough conceptualization of the theoretical premises of such an endeavor, the anticipation of trade-offs between different groups demanding inclusion, and a recognition of the challenges of creating unity and harmony at the local level. The above discussion points out that exclusion and inclusion are complex, multi-dimensional, and relational phenomena that call for smart policy responses. First, in such a sensitive and knotty area as exclusion/inclusion, epistemic accuracy and sophistication are a necessary precondition for sound policy. Second, as inclusion as a phenomenon is complex, so too must the policy be complex; as such, one useful simplifying scheme would be to divide actions into four categories—i.e., supporting, enabling, integrating, and empowering—each responding to a particular form of exclusion. Lastly, rather than antagonism and divisiveness, policies should reflect holism, unity, and compassion in order to create a genuinely constructive and inclusive atmosphere.

This chapter has argued for the critical role of economic inclusion, as it is supposed to serve as a catalyst for holistic integration due to its natural tendency to inspire, empower, and bring together city dwellers and other local stakeholders. The aim of this policy is the creation of an inclusive city that is not only open, democratic, and fair but also entrepreneurial and economically thriving. Such a city would aim to promote the idea of a shared prosperity, which by cultivating co-creation and other ensuing processes would contribute to the pursuit of meaningfulness and happiness in the lives of city dwellers.

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# Restorative Cities as Regulatory Governance

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## INTRODUCTION: THE RESTORATIVE CITY

The restorative city has multiple meanings. In the world of urban design it points to ideas about building the physical city in ways that promote mental health and well-being (e.g., Roe & McCay, 2021; Masoudinejad & Hartig, 2020; Cahn & Segal, 2016). In this chapter, we use “restorative city” to mean an idea, a philosophy with a set of practices, and a social movement advanced through relationship building, in which participants seek to reshape the lived experience of a city for its residents as they interact with government, other institutions, and each other as

community members. Of course, urban design and urban governance can (and do) intersect in ways that are “restorative,” but our focus in this chapter is on the regulatory effects of restorative practices (rather than physical environments) on individual and group behaviors and city governance.

Cities that are adopting a restorative philosophy are doing so in order to create communities in which “restorative justice” is a shared value. Most restorative cities began with a program or project grounded in restorative justice, and then build this project out to city-wide scale through one or more policy portfolios. Restorative justice is a concept drawn from the field of criminology that prioritizes social cohesion and reintegration of offenders over punitive sanctions, particularly imprisonment. We explore this definition in more detail below.

The restorative city idea has applications beyond the criminal justice system, with potential applications in schools, workplaces, homes, and communities. In this broader sense, a city grounded in restorative justice norms is one in which people are more intentionally focused on their relationships with one other and with—and within—institutions. Relational flourishing and minimizing relational harm are central to a restorative city, as community and government actors build social and cultural resiliency, and continually work to create a safer, empowered, accountable and happier society through increased social capital and more cohesive and healthy communities. Addressing harms, including historical wrongs, is an important feature of “becoming” a restorative city. In Canberra, the city site that we discuss in more detail below, addressing the relationships of harm that Traditional Owners and local Indigenous communities—particularly local Ngannawal Elders—have experienced has indicated that the voices of our First Nations peoples must guide restorative efforts.

This sounds like an appealing vision for any city, but the question that we ask in this chapter is what experience to date tells us about the conditions a restorative city requires to germinate and flourish. In other words, what is required to make the practice match the rhetoric and move beyond “regulatory ritualism” (Braithwaite, Makkai, & Braithwaite, 2007), or the risk that political actors will simply invoke “restorative”

values as a way of improving the image of a city and its governance without transforming its institutions or service delivery?

We approach this chapter as “insider-outsiders.” Taylor is the former Director of the Regulatory Institutions Network (now School of Regulation and Global Governance) at the Australian National University, established by her colleagues, John and Valerie Braithwaite. John Braithwaite is recognized internationally as a leading theorist of restorative justice and is an empirical scholar who has tested the practices flowing from that idea both domestically and internationally (Braithwaite, 2002). Ivec is a social worker whose career includes non-government and government sectors. Her policy development role in social welfare led to research collaboration with Valerie Braithwaite, a leading thinker on responsive regulation (e.g. Braithwaite, 2007). Ivec convened the Canberra Restorative Community<sup>1</sup> for six years as a grassroots network of over 500 members with an interest in restorative approaches to Canberra’s social problems. The restorative community network is made up of individuals: Ngunnawal Traditional Owners and Indigenous Elders, those with backgrounds in, or currently involved with, civil society activism or non-profit organisations, academics, retired and current public servants, and a range of practitioners across legal, health, education, justice, social welfare domains. Together, the network has charted the policy course for many of the elements necessary to make Canberra a restorative city and community.<sup>2</sup>

## FROM RESTORATIVE JUSTICE TO RESTORATIVE CITIES

The “restorative” quality of a restorative city does not have a universally agreed-upon definition but has its roots in the concept of restorative justice, which is a relational theory about how to build “community capital” (Braithwaite, 1989). The essence of relational justice is its focus on repairing relationships after conflict or harm, whether at the individual or the group level. The key idea is that healing the relationship between a marginalized person or group and a community is the basis for reintegration. This marginalization could be socio-economic, or it could involve ethnic enclaves; it could describe the situation of First

Nations people, or it could relate to people in contact with any stage of the criminal justice system.

Restorative justice emerged as a critique of conventional modes of dispensing justice, particularly criminal justice, and the socially disintegrative effect of adversarial and punitive processes. Conventional criminal justice processes that emphasize retribution did not seem particularly responsive to an individual's circumstances—particularly those of young or first offenders—or to admit the possibility of diverting people from pathways to prison. By focusing exclusively on the offender and the offender's crime against the state, conventional criminal justice paid little or no attention to the victim—the person or community affected by the harmful behavior. A key idea in restorative culture is establishing prevention and intervention procedures at an early stage—at the community level for situations of unrest or conflict (Mannozi, 2019, p. 289)—rather than simply relying on the state to provide remedies after the harm has occurred.

The “restorative” character of restorative justice relocates the offender into human relationships with family and community as well as with those affected by the harm. It seeks to reduce the likelihood of recidivism by the offender, as well as recognizing the importance of making good the harm experienced by victims. The hope of restorative justice is that it will influence offenders in ways that help them avoid re-offending, but regardless of whether this actually happens, it seeks ways to recognize and repair the social relationships impacted by their behavior. It seeks to heal.

A paradigmatic “practice” in a restorative justice system is conferencing: the consensual, facilitated conversation between offender and victim, often joined by other supporting or affected participants. This may take place in addition to, or in place of, any stage in the criminal justice procedure. A criminal justice setting is by no means the only space in which restorative practices are used. Today, this style of facilitated conference is used in a wide range of remedial processes in workplaces and within large institutions:

*Restorative practices aim to strengthen relationships, increase effective communication skills, and repair harm and inappropriate behaviour in*

*settings including education, workplaces, the local community and the sporting field. (Anderson & Ross, 2018, p.5)*

“Circle time” is also a prominent restorative practice where students, co-workers, or other groups of people come together in a circle to talk to each other and develop relationships (Anderson & Ross, 2018, p. 6).

One domain where a restorative approach has worked well in Canberra is in the Circle Sentencing Court,<sup>3</sup> part of the Magistrates Court (court of first instance). Galambany means “We all, including you” in the Ngunnawal language spoken by local traditional owners of the land in the Canberra region. The purpose of the Galambany Court is to provide effective and restorative processes to Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander defendants through community involvement in sentencing. The Magistrate sits alongside panel members and Elders who are invited by the Magistrate to contribute to the sentencing process.<sup>4</sup> A cost-benefit analysis found that a circle sentencing process helps persons appearing before the Court better maintain employment; improves the health of offenders and their families; improves educational opportunities; reduces the risks of homelessness; helps to reduce violence against women and reduce the number of children in care and protection. Overall the approach was an effective use of resources, with significant benefit to the local community. The Galambany Court also plays an important role in enhancing relationships between the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander community and the Canberra criminal justice system.

A fairly common domain for the application of restorative practices in other cities is in the delivery of child welfare and social services. A family group conference, for example, is a space in which family members can talk together about problems and issues faced by the family, and develop plans and solutions that will allow them to move forward. State agencies or child welfare organizations are represented in these conferences, but the ideal is that the family members involved have agency in formulating a parenting plan or narrowing the issues in dispute to find a way forward that will work in their particular context.<sup>5</sup>

What restorative practices like these have in common is a desire to go beyond the limitations of the fairly blunt instruments of state

intervention and an explicit preference for democratic, rather than hierarchical or oppressive practices.

## ***Restorative, Responsive, Inclusive, Accountable***

When we translate restorative justice as a feature of city governance, it takes on qualities that clearly intersect with theories of responsive regulation (e.g., Braithwaite, 2002). In many of the restorative city manifestos, “restorative” also means respectful, fair, and democratic processes that shape service delivery. Or as Straker puts it,

*The development toward the new paradigm of a restorative city would suggest a rejection of the existing patriarchal paradigm of city governance and existing patterns of engagement of individuals, groups and communities (Straker, 2019, p. 325)*

Conceptually, this would seem to intersect with the idea of the “inclusive city” narrated by Anttiroiko in this volume, but the “restorative city” is one in which government is *an* actor, not *the* actor, and where government is called upon to change its behaviors, not simply to exhort other actors to do so. It also points to the qualities and behaviors we seek in state and non-state professional actors as they help to meet the relational needs of individuals and communities. A restorative community calls upon each member to reflect upon and enact an intentional, relational way of being. The concept of “ubuntu”, or “I am through you,” provides a deeper sense of the essence of the restorative city. How all these elements are designed and operate varies with the host environment. We discuss some of these variations below.

## **RESTORATIVE CITIES WORLDWIDE**

There is no single definition of, or international standard for, what constitutes a “restorative city” (Straker, 2019, p. 325). Those cities that wish to define themselves as “restorative” do so by self-nominating, as in the case of Hull, a city in the north of England that was the first mover in 2010. This, then, is a relatively new movement, but it has inspired

similar efforts and announcements by cities in various parts of the world, including:

- ◆ Australia: Canberra<sup>6</sup>, Newcastle<sup>7</sup>
- ◆ New Zealand: Whanganui
- ◆ United Kingdom: Hull, Leeds, Brighton, Bristol
- ◆ United States: Oakland (California)
- ◆ Europe: Leuven (Belgium); Como, Tempio Pausiana, and Lecco (Italy); Wroclaw (Poland); Tirana (Albania)

These cities are also part of one or more transnational networks,<sup>8</sup> along with various local networks and epistemic communities comprised of researchers, community activists, and practitioners that are nested within, and continuously draw upon, their wider communities. As new restorative cities emerge, they generate an informal set of design characteristics and features against which aspiring restorative cities can assess themselves (e.g., Newcastle Law School, n.d.).

What we also notice in this list is that these tend to be mid-size, provincial cities—even Canberra, which is a national capital, is actually a medium-sized semi-rural city of 400,000. They also tend to be cities facing one or more economic and social challenges, often triggered by industrial decline. But being in crisis is not a necessary precondition for becoming a restorative city. What seems to be more important is

*the sensitivity of the individuals working in strategic sectors to start-up restorative city projects: they could be school managers, university lecturers, representatives from the social services and from the non-profit sector and magistrates. Much depends on the ability of these individuals to meet and dialogue* (Mannozi, 2019, p. 289).

The catalyst is often a call to action for a new way of thinking about and addressing social harms, which in turn builds social capital and cohesion. Newcastle in Australia, which is an aspiring restorative city, describes its challenges this way:

*The city of Newcastle in New South Wales has faced significant challenges in the last two decades due to the erosion of traditional industry and employment opportunities. Across the city there is now growing evidence of much needed urban renewal . . . some residents, including young families, continue to be disadvantaged by a lack of suitable employment opportunities, and education, housing, child welfare, and criminal justice systems that do not adequately address harms and hardships, with the potential to exclude these residents from a variety of opportunities open to others. Social, cultural and economic renewal could be furthered by Newcastle becoming a restorative city. (Anderson & Ross, 2018, p. 1).*

Mannozi (2019) suggests that there are nine essential elements, or steps, for those who wish to establish a restorative city:

1. Identify the key values of restorative justice to detect the main inspiration behind the interventions to be implemented;
2. Be aware of the linguistic challenge, which implies the need to promote and encourage the ability to use, where necessary, a restorative language (which is careful, welcoming, nonjudgmental, and cooperative) in the various contexts where they intend to intervene;
3. Know the best practices already in use elsewhere that implement a restorative approach;
4. Raise awareness in the community of the meaning, the potential, and the limits of restorative justice;
5. Enter into agreements and memoranda of intent with institutions and organizations operating within the territory;
6. Identify gatekeepers capable of intercepting conflict and understanding its extent;
7. Be able to create practical roots for the restorative management of conflict;
8. Understand the need to rely on adequately trained, qualified mediators and facilitators;

9. Take the opportunity to scientifically supervise the project in synergy with institutions and universities. (p. 290)

In practice, as Straker (2019) points out, no single city has followed all of these steps. The way in which each city defines itself as “restorative” and what kinds of policies and programs they prioritize is different in each case.

Whanganui, New Zealand has a particularly well-articulated definition of what a “restorative city” looks like when viewed through the experience of its residents:

A Restorative City is where the population:

- ◆ Enjoy a safe, calm environment
- ◆ Value relationships based on equal respect, concern, care, and dignity
- ◆ Enjoy a positive cultural identity
- ◆ Understand both the negative and positive impacts of our behaviour
- ◆ Take responsibility for our actions and repair harm we may have caused others
- ◆ Have our voices heard and are tolerant of differing views

A Restorative City can be measured by:

- ◆ Reduced child abuse, domestic violence, and other criminal activities
- ◆ Reduced absenteeism / stand downs and increased academic achievement in schools
- ◆ Reduced absenteeism / bullying and sabotage in workplaces and increased productivity
- ◆ Increased satisfaction when interacting with government and non-government agencies
- ◆ Increased feelings of safety in homes and walking the streets

◆ Increased sense of community belonging<sup>9</sup>

However, this is not a universal definition. Some cities focus on addressing conflict and crime; this may involve interventions with young people, initiatives to address antisocial behavior, or work to reduce community polarization and hate crime. Others may focus on reducing tensions that lead to intergroup conflicts and building opportunities for dialogue and tolerance. In some cities, the emphasis will be on changing city service delivery. Many restorative city projects focus on children and young people:

*the goal is to ensure that, by the time these young people grow up and move into leadership positions within the cities, restorative practices have become second nature* (Anderson & Ross, 2018, p. 2).

More recently, some cities have also focused on redressing historical institutional abuses of children and vulnerable people in the wake of waves of disclosures in Australia, the United Kingdom, the United States, Canada, and Europe that have uncovered decades of abusive behavior in church-run and charitable institutions.<sup>10</sup> These restorative processes and schemes of redress can operate across multiple national and sub-national levels and within networks of institutions. Restorative approaches have been important in these cases because the time limitation periods for making civil or criminal claims against the perpetrators of harm have often expired, either because the victims are elderly or dead or because gathering evidence for adversarial proceedings is impractical, impossible, or would further harm the victims (e.g., Vernon, 2018).

In the case of Whanganui, the intention was to “dispel the idea . . . that the restorative approach was only applied when there is conflict or harm done” (Straker, 2019, p. 326). Leuven, on the other hand, adopted the restorative city project explicitly to deal with conflict (Straker, 2019, p. 327). It is worth noting that many other cities worldwide adopt policies or practices that would align with the Whanganui model; alternatively, they may consciously design restorative practices for dealing with one or more types of social policy challenge without necessarily declaring themselves to be a “restorative city.” Halifax, Nova Scotia is one such example.<sup>11</sup> Extensive use of restorative approaches by key institutions

including Restorative Boards of Inquiry as an alternative to traditional Boards of Inquiry are now well established in the Province (e.g. Human Rights Commission,<sup>12</sup> Nova Scotia Government<sup>13</sup>). Braithwaite et al (2019) and Tito-Wheatland (2018) provide further analysis of restorative networks in other jurisdictions not mentioned in this chapter. These networks are at the core of the restorative city model.

As Straker points out, while the malleability of the “restorative city” concept is a strength, it can quite quickly become an operational challenge when the declaration bumps up against the pragmatic need to show what the values mean: “how restorative approaches fit within existing contexts and what impact that existing context will have on its development” (Straker, 2019, p. 327).

This becomes important when, as is inevitable, restorative projects are evaluated, quantitatively and qualitatively—and, crucially, when there are failures or unintended consequences. The answer to those effects cannot simply be that restorative practice are intrinsically good or ideal simply because they exist (Straker, 2019, p. 329, citing Wonshé, 2004)

## **WHAT MAKES A CITY “RESTORATIVE”? POLICY INTERVENTION EXAMPLES FROM CANBERRA**

In early 2015, the Australian Capital Territory (ACT) Legislative Assembly committed to Canberra becoming a restorative city.<sup>14</sup> The idea of “becoming” is important, because most restorative practitioners put a significant emphasis on the quality of processes, rather than technocratic measurement of “outcomes.” The government endorsement of the restorative city concept was built on a previous decade of work, including a pilot project, the institutionalization of the idea of restorative justice, and the formation of a wide-ranging consortium of interests that supported the idea.

The initial empirical research projects were carried out as a partnership between the Regulatory Institutions Network at the Australian National University and the ACT government, its justice portfolio, police, and prison administration. The Re-Integration and Shaming Experiments

(RISE) carried out in Canberra were based on earlier work devised by John Braithwaite and his collaborators in the nearby country town of Wagga Wagga. Those experiments showed that restorative practices that engaged with offenders and victims delivered positive results for both while also reducing the likelihood of offenders reoffending.

Based on the successful pilot program, the ACT government adopted restorative justice as a policy approach within its Justice portfolio. It established a Restorative Justice Unit,<sup>15</sup> which operates under the *Crimes (Restorative Justice) Act 2004* (ACT) and provides young offenders with the opportunity to engage in restorative justice conferences. By 2016, the program was expanded to allow for participation by adult offenders in restorative justice conferences. The conferencing itself resulted in payments of financial compensation by offenders to victims and also for the undertaking of a significant amount of work by young offenders to benefit their victims and the broader community. (Anderson & Ross, 2018, p. 3).

An important build-out of the Restorative Justice Unit was the addition of an indigenous guidance partner to increase indigenous participation in conferencing. The more recent iteration of this has been the Warrumbul (“Youth”) Circle Sentencing Court<sup>16</sup> for young Indigenous offenders aged 10 to 17 years, which entails meetings between a magistrate and Indigenous community elders to develop a rehabilitation plan as an alternative to a criminal justice process. This application of restorative justice is particularly important in the ACT, where approximately a quarter of the people serving sentences at the Alexander McConachie Centre (the ACT jail) are indigenous even though Indigenous Australians make up just 2% of the national population.

From those beginnings in the modification of criminal justice processes in Canberra, restorative approaches have expanded to Indigenous Circle sentencing, the Gallambany Court, and to family and intimate partner and sexual violence (Phase 3)<sup>17</sup>. The new University of Canberra hospital has become a sister hospital to Whanganui, New Zealand, with both working to develop a restorative healthcare model based on Indigenous and Maori leadership.<sup>18</sup> An important new development is the announcement that the ACT government will establish its own specialist

coronial service (ABC News 2021) based on a restorative coronial reform process.<sup>19</sup> It might seem unusual that a Territory that is functionally the equivalent of a State would not have a Coroner's Office, but for many years the ACT rotated the role of coroner amongst nine sitting magistrates. That had the effect of constraining the ability of magistrates to acquire the specialized skills needed for a coronial inquiry. Long delays in performing inquests are highly distressing for the family and friends of the deceased, particularly in cases where the deceased was an Indigenous person. Australian judicial institutions have a shameful history of both causing the deaths of Indigenous people in police custody, and of covering up investigations into such deaths, so there is a deeply-felt and legitimate distrust of these institutions in some communities. The restorative hope for the new coronial service is that it will increase respect for bereaved families and communities and deliver more privacy and responsiveness when deaths requiring inquests are investigated.

## CONDITIONS AND CHALLENGES FOR RESTORATIVE CITIES

The restorative city aims to displace the prevailing ideology of retribution and punishment for social harms and to simultaneously change institutional culture and practices. But as Burford (2018) observes, it is not easy to change urban, school, or welfare microsystems from within by challenging inveterate standard practices. We see those challenges in even the most committed and apparently successful examples of restorative city policy. So, for example, when we quiz our annual cohort of regulators from the ACT who are undertaking a course in the *Policy and Practice of Regulation* at the Australian National University, we ask them whether they are aware that Canberra is a restorative city. This cohort of regulators is drawn from outside the Justice portfolio of the government, and their answers, unfailingly, are "no".

What this "casual empiricism" tells us is both that the restorative city label and the ideals that underpin it may have been institutionalized in the Territory's justice system—exemplified by the Restorative Justice

Unit discussed above—and that it may have very little traction in the non-justice regulatory operations of government and among the stakeholders, community groups, and individuals impacted by them. This is notwithstanding the fact that the ACT Government has dedicated staff within the Justice and Safety Directorate who are responsible for developing a cross-portfolio understanding of restorative approaches. The Canberra Restorative Community itself includes citizens who are committed public servants working in that same government.

What that points toward, of course, is one of Teubner's "regulatory trilemma" problems: the risk of regulatory incoherence (Teubner, 1983). In this case a government, through its agencies and in its interactions with community co-regulators, proclaims itself to be restorative in some of its operations but is clearly not in others. Of course, this begs the question of just how restorative a government needs to be in order to produce a genuinely restorative city. The second challenge, which is common to all transformative policy ideas, is that they can be hostage to the present, particularly the availability of a political champion. In the case of Canberra, a succession of Attorneys-General have been supportive of restorative approaches, due to the deep roots which took hold as a result of the work in the 1990s under John Braithwaite. Currently, the Justice portfolio is held by a politically progressive Minister who also led the Greens Party, a long-time junior coalition partner to the Australian Labor Party, which has held government in the ACT since 2001. Canberra, as a capital city, has an unusual demographic that is both more educated and wealthier than the average Australian city and has supported progressive governments for more than two decades. As the next federal election approaches in 2022, a bipartisan approach is being built by the network members described in this chapter, with the current Opposition indicating strong support for restorative approaches in child protection and other areas. All these efforts have been made with the explicit intention of avoiding the restorative city being a "one person show." We see this sometimes in school environments with a school principal who may be a restorative champion: once they leave, so too does the restorative ethos. So when key individuals rotate out of office or retire, there is an open question about how appealing the restorative city concept would be to their successors.

In an era of populism, there is always the risk that any prospective government will campaign on a “hard on crime” platform or invoke social divisions as a way of appealing to the electorate’s baser instincts. What this suggests is that a restorative city needs to institutionalize its practices and values as a way of protecting them from political oscillation.

A third challenge lies in sustaining the coalition of intermediaries that nurture relationships with and among individuals and community groups so that they can maintain a steady pressure on the government to respond to legitimate requests to adopt restorative practices. This is a kind of civic-minded volunteerism that is increasingly rare in post-industrial societies. In Straker’s overview of six restorative city case studies (2019), he identifies the common elements in a restorative city “start-up” as a community of interest or a community of practice:

*A group or groups of professionals, agencies, and practitioners coming together to respond to a perceived need within their communities [and] all working in communities where restorative justice was already established to some degree (Straker, 2019, p. 326).*

Having an “already established” form of restorative justice itself implies shared literacy in the concept, some form of pilot, and then the integration of the idea into one or more public processes. This suggests access to relevant ideas and the availability of like-minded people in a network willing to test them in practice. It is not surprising, then, that where restorative communities of interest or communities of practice have flourished, they have done so with help from established institutions from which they can borrow both ideas and resources. This has certainly been the case in Canberra, where the Canberra Restorative Community (facilitated initially by Mary Ivec and since 2021 convened by colleagues at the University of Canberra) has borrowed resources and institutional continuity from the city’s two universities.

## CONCLUSION

The restorative city is a recent experiment in reconceptualizing relationships between a city government and residents, between social

institutions and residents, and among residents themselves. It seeks to redefine the way in which major institutions in a city should deliver services and contribute to the well-being and resilience of their residents. Because there are no agreed-upon definitions or features of a restorative city and because restorative cities themselves define their missions differently, it is difficult to assert with confidence that being “restorative” matters in ways that are measurable. It also opens up the risk of a kind of “regulatory ritualism,” where politicians become enthused by the idea of a restorative city as a way of either improving their political credentials or spruiking (explain) an imagined future state of a city that is currently experiencing economic and social dislocation. In Australian English, when someone “spruiks” a product or a project in public, they extol its virtues like an old-style carnival salesman who does not quite believe the inflated claims he is making—politicians of all types tend to be masters of this.

On the other hand, the restorative justice concept and the practices from which the restorative city idea draws have been extensively studied and empirically assessed. This work tends to show, on balance, that restorative practices are successful in preventing reoffence and recidivism. More importantly, however, restorative practices are also shown to repair important social relationships and to attend to the needs of victims and those affected by harmful acts.

This insight is important at a time when we observe an ever-widening scope of harmful behaviour in schools, sporting contexts, workplaces, shops, institutions, natural environments, and digital spaces. Harms that are not immediately or easily dealt with through criminal procedures, such as bullying, intimidation, racial slurs, vandalism and property damage, petty theft, cruelty to animals, pollution, and destruction of natural habitats are all corrosive to community well-being, but they stem from perpetrators who are disconnected from community norms and values that prioritize tolerance, cohesion and well-being. What restorative practices offer at an individual level—and more importantly, in an aggregated way—is the opportunity to correct that misalignment and reconnect people in ways that are more likely to support and encourage positive behaviors. That, by itself, should be of enough value

to recommend serious consideration of the potential of a restorative city approach.

1. Mary Ivec acknowledges with grateful thanks here colleague and friend Fiona Tito Wheatland, who agreed to join her as they embarked on the Restorative City journey in 2014 on our visit to Whanganui, New Zealand at the invitation of the then Chief Social Worker, NZ, Paul Nixon.
2. See: <http://www.canberrarestorativecommunity.space/restorative-justice>
3. <https://www.courts.act.gov.au/magistrates/about-the-courts/areas-in-the-act-magistrates-court/galambany-court>
4. *ibid*
5. In Canberra, the restorative city that we discuss below, political pressure is building to allow family conferences and for the family to lead on the decisions made in a parenting plan as a matter of right. This is in part a response to the high rates at which Indigenous children are separated from their families in state-led welfare interventions. See: <https://www.canberratimes.com.au/story/6849461/family-conferences-would-be-legal-entitlement-under-canberra-liberals-plan/> Retrieved 19 October 2021
6. See <http://www.canberrarestorativecommunity.space/>
7. See <https://www.researchgate.net/project/Newcastle-as-a-Restorative-City-Justice-Community-Education-and-Health>
8. See, for example, the European Forum for Restorative Justice ([euforumrj.org](http://euforumrj.org)) Working Group on Restorative Cities; and the International Institute for Restorative Practices (IIRP) ([iirp.edu](http://iirp.edu))
9. See <https://restorativepracticeswhanganui.co.nz/the-restorative-city/>
10. For an illustrative list see: <https://caranua.ie/useful-resources/international-inquiries-into-institutional-abuse/> Retrieved 19 October 2021
11. <https://www.dal.ca/news/2020/06/10/dalhousie-officially-launches-first-ever-international-restorati.html> and <https://novascotia.ca/news/release/?id=20210414002>
12. <https://humanrights.novascotia.ca/resolving-disputes/about-process/restorative-approaches>
13. <https://novascotia.ca/just/RJ/>

14. See, e.g., <https://the-riotact.com/canberra-a-restorative-city/198949>
15. See: <https://justice.act.gov.au/justice-programs-and-initiatives/restorative-justice>
16. See: <https://www.courts.act.gov.au/magistrates/about-the-courts/areas-in-the-act-magistrates-court/warrumbul-circle-sentencing-court>
17. <https://justice.act.gov.au/justice-programs-and-initiatives/restorative-justice>
18. See [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8WnJfLB4cfg&list=PLFcZjYDP\\_3PgXoZss2gk67PH3k9vrUORY&index=1&t=2s](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8WnJfLB4cfg&list=PLFcZjYDP_3PgXoZss2gk67PH3k9vrUORY&index=1&t=2s)
19. Rhian Williams, a member of the Canberra Restorative Community, has developed papers to explain and support a restorative coronial reform process describing the key elements of restorative approaches. These can be found at <http://www.rhianwilliams.com.au/>

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# Policies That Trigger Gentrification in Kyoto City

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## INTRODUCTION: DISCUSSING GENTRIFICATION

Gentrification occurs when the dilapidation of the inner area located around the city's center reverses through a process of public and/or private sector construction and urban redevelopment that forces existing residents to move out. High-income residents then move in, and consequently, the average income of people living in the inner area increases. Fujitsuka (2017) systematically introduced gentrification to Japan's academic communities, drawing on examples in large cities in the United Kingdom and the United States since the 1980s and various examples in other Western countries. Gentrification developed as follows: first, in the second half of the 1970s, gentrification in Western

countries began due to the tendency of people to return to the downtown area because of long commutes. Second, historical buildings began to be regenerated in the 1980s. Third, gentrification took place in conjunction with the forced eviction of people in low income brackets, elderly people, and people in racial and ethnic minority groups. In short, then, gentrification was characterized by the return of people from the city's suburbs to the inner area, the regeneration of historical buildings, and the forced displacement of minority groups. Thus, according to Fujitsuka's theory, gentrification can be theoretically explained by temporal changes in the existing built-up areas, the accumulation of historical buildings, and the trend of lower-income people moving out of the inner area. However, some studies on gentrification depend on statistical indicators and observation periods.

Scholars have identified gentrification—observed in cities in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia in the 1970s due to the appearance of white-collar workers engaged in technical and managerial occupations—as a new problem within capitalist society. Therefore, differences in gentrification among these three countries meant inquiring into the ideal state of capitalism (Smith & Williams, 1986). For example, in the United States, those in the low income bracket mainly live in private rental houses; in the United Kingdom, low-income earners live in publicly operated housing; and in Australia, most can relatively easily acquire their own homes. Therefore, the processes of gentrification differed among these three countries as a matter of course. In particular, because the displacement pressure exerted on existing residents by administrative authorities and real estate agencies was extremely fierce during the gentrifying process in large cities in the United States, the movement against urban redevelopment intensified there and existing residents' attitudes toward gentrification also raised their awareness about local politics. Indeed, in the United States, the movement against gentrification led the Presidential Committee in 1976 to enact of the Housing and Community Development Act of 1978 (Smith & Williams, 1986). Because gentrification attracted attention as a remarkable social phenomenon, scholars like Smith & Williams (1986), for example, mainly used simple indicators for geographical analysis, such as the ratio of rented houses, the ratio of white people, and the ratio of people in low income brackets.

Fujitsuka (2017) produced an overview of trends in studies on gentrification and described a range of theoretical approaches. One study applied institutionalism to investigate the redevelopment of inner areas by administrative authorities that resulted in the soaring prices of houses in the 1980s. Another study examined whether gentrification followed a reverse to the filtering process—in which people in higher income brackets moved out of inner areas, resulting in an increase in the number of people in lower income brackets—from a social stratification perspective. One study analyzed gentrification in the field of economics from the perspective that house rents tend to increase as the land's potential value increases. In another study on gentrification, increasing numbers of residents, such as single mothers, artists, and people in sexual minorities, were defined as people in the new middle class. In Fujitsuka's study, which studied Kyoto City as the case, the ratio of "workers engaged in specialized and technical jobs" living in Kyoto City was calculated based on the occupational classification in the population census of each old school district (p. 29). The workers were defined as gentrifiers, and the districts experiencing gentrification were defined as those in which the ratio of the gentrifiers was high. Fujitsuka (2017) pointed out that an investigation of the temporal trend of gentrification was important even if it was examined over a short period.

Dinga et al. (2016) also analyzed gentrification in detail from the perspective of change over time. Based on the long-term census in each statistical tract in the U.S. city of Philadelphia over 33 years from 1980 to 2013 (along with address data contained in the Consumer Credit Panel from 2002 to 2014), they analyzed the actual movement of households and linked the statistics to the data. Dinga et al. determined the median house prices, house rents, and the ratio of university graduates in each neighborhood district. When the obtained medians for specific districts were higher than the medians in the entire city, the neighborhood was defined as a "gentrifying district." When the obtained medians were lower, the neighborhood was defined as a "nongentrifying district" or "nongentrifiable district." Subsequently, the probabilities of people moving into and out of these districts were obtained. Dinga et al. identified 128 districts as nongentrifying districts, 56 districts as gentrifying districts, and 181 districts as nongentrifiable districts.

Using Auckland, New Zealand as a case, Liu et al. (2019) compared and examined the methods of identifying gentrification. They compared fluctuations in building and land values between two points in time (from the perspective of reinvestment in housing) using statistics on building and land values. They used statistical indicators (social aspects), such as management, legal management, professional population, median annual income, non-homeownership rate, and ethnic composition, as variables for the classification of districts. They also examined two clustering methods, k-means clustering and boundary-value analysis. Meltzer and Ghorbani (2017) examined income fluctuations, calculated the average income of people living in each census tract in the population censuses in 2000 and 2008, obtained the difference in the average income between 2000 and 2008, and defined “gentrifying” and “substantially gentrifying” based on the size of the difference. Similarly, McKinnish et al. (2010) used individual data obtained in the population censuses at two points in time (1990 and 2000) and calculated the incomes of households living in each census tract using the first quintile.

As mentioned above, to identify the location of a gentrification district in geography, social attributes such as occupations, the number of university graduates, and ethnic composition must be classified in addition to economic attributes such as income, house prices, and land prices.

## **WHICH AREAS ARE GENTRIFYING IN KYOTO?**

This chapter examines the case of Kyoto City, which is an internationally known tourist destination. The total number of guests staying in Kyoto City annually is 13.17 million, 3.8 million of which are foreign guests. Kyoto City is the most famous tourist city in Japan and well-known as a historical city. In particular, the present author first considered how both the prosperity derived from tourism and the execution of city planning policies (including the New Urban Landscape Ordinances enforced in 2007) meant to maintain historicity impacted the advance of gentrification in Kyoto City. Next, I explored how the Hotel Business Act revised in 2016 affected the locations of hotels, inns, and lodging

houses, with attention to the movements of these facilities around 2016. Specifically, I analyzed data on population and land prices because many previous studies used statistical indicators related to social and economic attributes for the geographical definition of gentrification. Because the latest population census was conducted in 2015, and a rapid change in residential population was unlikely, we analyzed fluctuations in population by age group from 2005 to 2015. We also analyzed the percentage changes in land prices during two four year periods: 2005 to 2009 and 2014 to 2018.

In Japan, to record the standards for land transaction prices in cities, the national government has determined standard points in each city and published the land prices based on the standard points as of January 1 each year. The national government has provided the official land prices of 632 standard points in Kyoto Prefecture in a time series on its portal site so that point data storing these official land prices can be used through the Geographic Information System (GIS). Most of the 632 standard points are residential areas. However, offices and dwelling houses combined with shops are included in some standard points. The left and right graphs in Fig. 8.1 show the increase in official land prices from 2005 to 2009 and 2014 to 2018, respectively, as obtained by interpolation estimation using inverse distance weighing (IDW). The increases in official land prices were obtained by dividing the difference in land prices at two points in time by the older land price. For example: (the increase rate of land price from 2005 to 2009) =  $[(\text{land price in 2009}) - (\text{land price in 2005})]/(\text{land price in 2005})$ . In Fig. 8.1, zones in which land prices have increased are expressed in four groups ranging from 20% to 35% at 5% intervals. Zones with an increase rate below 20% and zones in which land prices decreased are not shown Fig. 8.1. In zones with the highest increase rate, land prices increased by more than 35% during four years. The temporal changes in land prices were observed at 242 points in Kyoto City during four years from 2005 to 2009. The highest increase rate was 68.7% and the greatest decrease rate was -17.4%. From 2014 to 2018, land prices were collected from 273 points. The highest increase rate was 112.0% and the highest decrease rate was -10.3%. The difference between the highest increase rate and the highest decrease rate was larger in the second half of the four year periods. Therefore, economic conditions were excellent in the second

half. In the first half of 2014–2018, although economic conditions were still affected by the global economic downturn precipitated by the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy in September 2008, land prices of the central districts in Kyoto City increased.




Fig. 8.1: Increase Ratio of Land Price of Kyoto in Two Periods (IDW). Left: 2005–2009 Right: 2014–2018. Made by National Land Data Download Service

As shown on the left in Fig. 8.1, remarkable increases in land prices were observed in the central business district (CBD) consisting largely of four blocks surrounded by the three north-south streets of Kawaramachi-dori, Karasuma-dori, and Horikawa-dori, and the three east-west streets of Oike-dori, Shijo-dori, and Gojo-dori. Because these four blocks look like “田” in the Japanese language, this district is called “田の字(tanoji).”

The right graph in Fig. 8.1 shows the changes in land prices from 2014 to 2018 using the same colors as those used on the left. In Kyoto City, three wards—Kamigyo, Nakagyo, and Shimogyo—are located in the downtown area from the north to the south, and Higashiyama Ward is

located to the east of Nakagyo Ward and Shimogyo Ward. As shown in the right graph, zones with increasing land prices widely expanded in the eastern parts of Nakagyo Ward and Shimogyo Ward and in the northern part of Higashiyama Ward. From 2005 to 2009, zones with land prices continuously increasing widely expanded to surround the CBD, in which land prices had increased remarkably. Therefore, a hypothesis can be made that gentrification began from the CBD and expanded at the CBD's eastern, northern, and southern sides, thus surrounding the CBD.

Fig. 8.2 shows three dot density maps obtained by ArcGIS using census tract data from the population census. The dot density maps indicate fluctuations in population by age group in each census tract in the period from 2005 to 2015, which differs from the periods in Fig. 8.1. The left graph shows increases in population below 14 years of age. The middle graph shows increases in populations from 15 to 64 years of age. The right graph shows decreases in population above 65 years of age. The differences in ages between the youngest and oldest age groups are 15 years and 50 years in the right and middle graphs, respectively. In the right graph, the difference in age between the youngest and oldest age groups may be 20 years when average life expectancy is considered. Although the three graphs are quite difficult to compare—because one dot represents three, nine, and three people in the left, middle, and right graphs, respectively—these graphs may in fact be compared productively with one another. Polygons expressed by light gray lines in the background of each graph indicate the shape of each census tract. In addition, because data on census tracts with a small number of residents were concealed and unified, consistency between two points in time was difficult to achieve. Therefore, an analysis of these census tracts was omitted. Because concealment and unification are often used for data on hilly and mountainous areas, large errors are unlikely to have occurred in this study's analysis of urban areas.

Notably, the population below 14 years of age increased in the eastern part of Nakagyo Ward and the population between 15 and 64 years of age increased in the eastern part of Nakagyo Ward and the northern part of Shimogyo Ward. In the three wards, although people living in the downtown area experienced the global economic downturn precipitated by the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy in September 2008, the land prices

increased and the populations among those of productive ages and their children also increased.

The right graph shows decreases in population above 65 years of age in the form of real numbers. Unlike the left and middle graphs, negative absolute values are expressed by dots in the right graph. Therefore, these values are expressed in blue instead of red in the left and middle graphs. As shown in the right graph, the population decreased remarkably in the eastern part of Shimogyo Ward. When increases in population in the left and middle graphs and decreases in population in the right graph are considered simultaneously, increases in population in areas at the center of Kyoto City, such as the eastern part of Nakagyo Ward and the northeastern part of Shimogyo Ward, together with a decrease in elderly people in areas surrounding the downtown area, have largely changed Kyoto City's population composition. In other words, gentrifiers in the period from 2005 to 2015 were young people at productive ages newly migrating into areas at the center of Kyoto City, while elderly people were displaced both voluntarily or forcibly. As mentioned below, the number of elderly people decreased significantly in the eastern part of Shimogyo Ward and the western part of Higashiyama Ward while the number of lodging houses rapidly increased. Housing vacancies due to a decrease in the number of elderly was considered to result in an increase in the number of lodging houses.

For Kyoto City, the "inner areas" that became a popular topic after the 1970s in the fields of geography and city planning are located in the northwestern and southern parts of Kyoto City, some distance away from the CBD. The Higashikujo area in Minmi Ward (with a large Korean population) and the Nishijin area in Kamigyo Ward (where small- and medium-sized factories that produce traditional Nishijin brocade are located) have been considered to be typical inner areas (Nakamura & Taji, 2020). An established theory is that gentrification generally occurs in the inner areas (Fujitsuka, 2017). Since the 2000s, inner areas have not been subject to increases in land prices and number of employees. Thus, gentrification might occur in the CBD or its neighborhood area instead of inner areas.




Fig. 8.2: Population Change of Kyoto from 2005 to 2015 by Age Groups. Left: Increase of Age 14 or Younger (Decrease excluded. 1 dot=3 persons). Middle: Increase of Age 15 to 64 (Decrease excluded. 1 dot=9 persons). Right: Decrease of Age 65 or Older (Increase excluded. 1 dot=3 persons). Made by Population Census (2005–2015)

## CITY PLANNING TO PROMOTE THE FIRST WAVE OF GENTRIFICATION

This chapter describes the process of gentrification in Kyoto City after the 2000s. To this end, it is necessary to examine the institutional framework of height control districts as a factor in city planning.

In Japan, the Building Standards Law and the City Planning Act restrict building height. In Kyoto City, the Building Standards Law in 1950 restricted building height in residential areas to 20 m and those in the other areas to 31 m. Based on the City Planning Act enforced in 1968, municipalities started imposing various restrictions. The City Planning Act designated use districts that restricted the purpose of land use and height control districts that restricted building height. A zoning system was also established for “areas and districts” to ensure reasonable land use by classifying land within city planning areas and imposing certain restrictions on buildings and structures. In Kyoto City, height control districts were designated in 1973 based on the City Planning Act. In 1996, the areas of aesthetic and scenic districts were expanded and the

maximum building height in areas at the foot of a mountain and areas facing certain arterial roads was reduced from 20 m to 15 m.

In 2003, in the interest of tightening the height regulations of buildings in the above-mentioned CBD from the perspective of landscape improvement, areas which have 31 m regulation were divided between two types of regulations. The maximum height regulation of buildings remained 31 m after the revision in both areas, while the maximum heights of buildings along the boundary line with adjacent land lots and along front roads were reduced. Nevertheless, the revision of 2003 is thought to be a comparatively smaller change than the revision that took place in 2007.

Under these circumstances, restrictions on building height were revised in September 2007—the largest revision in recent years. This revision, a so-called “downzoning,” was carried out to reduce the maximum building height in almost all old city areas, more than 30% of residential areas at the foot of a mountain, areas facing certain arterial roads, areas in the western part of Kyoto City, and industrial areas in the southern part of Kyoto City. In particular, traditional urban houses called “Kyo-machiya” accumulated in a four-block area in the CBD. The Gion festival is held in this area, the history of which stretches over more than 1,000 years, and it was registered as a UNESCO Intangible Cultural Heritage practice in 2009. In the Gion festival, decorated floats called yamahoko (wooden landmarks) are displayed on roads in towns and are paraded one after another.

The buildings' maximum height was reduced from 31 m to 15 m in certain districts, including the area in and around which the yamahoko floats are displayed and paraded. In Shijo-dori and Oike-dori, which are north-end and central streets in the CBD, regulations on signboards were strengthened. Regulations on distant landscapes were added to restrictions on building height to protect mountain ranges that can be seen from river terraces, parks, and temple gardens. In particular, regulations on distant landscapes were applied to areas on the east side of the Kamo River in Kyoto City to prevent impeding the view of Nyoigatake Mountain because the Daimonji-yaki (Mountain Bonfire) has

been performed there for years. These regulations on building heights are similar to the Fuseau Regulation in Paris, established in 1977.

Fig. 8.3 shows the changes in the maximum building height in meters before and after Kyoto City's enactment of the new Landscape Ordinance in 2007. The new Landscape Ordinance raised and reduced the maximum building height in different areas. The areas with diagonal lines and cross-hatched lines are designated as those with weaker regulation in height control. Buildings in these areas can be built with the same or higher height than before. Downzoning was carried out in areas shown in gray and black. In these areas, existing buildings that exceeded the maximum building height outlined in the new Landscape Ordinance were ranked as existing non-conformed buildings. In the future, new buildings in these areas must conform to the new Landscape Ordinance. Remarkable downzoning was observed in the CBD, the shape of which is close to a square. In this area, the new Landscape Ordinance reduced the maximum building height from 31 m to 15 m. In the black area at the east side of the CBD, which includes Yasaka Shrine (the location for the main ceremony of the Gion festival), the maximum building height was reduced from 31 m to 12 m. In the large gray areas that seem to surround the CBD, the maximum building height was generally reduced from 20 m to 15 m.

Downzoning could not be ignored as part of the gentrification process because the effect of downzoning on property prices was significant. In Fig. 8.1, areas with land prices that had markedly increased were exactly the same as those with severe downzoning. Because the supply of high-rise buildings was highly restricted, the supply-demand balance among high-rise buildings tightened, and consequently, land prices increased. The CBD at the eastern side of three wards in the downtown area became an exclusive residential district, promoting high-rise luxury condominium construction instead of the rebuilding of detached houses. In the CBD, people of productive ages became gentrifiers and drove an increase in the population. In other words, reinforcing regulations on height control districts in city planning brought "the first wave of gentrification" to Kyoto City: land prices in the CBD increased and people of productive ages (and their families) migrated into the CBD. It is important to describe "the first wave" because "the second

wave” of gentrification subsequently occurred in Kyoto City. In the second wave of gentrification, the number of lodging houses increased. Therefore, the second wave of gentrification was considered to be driven by tourism.




Fig. 8.3: Change of Maximum Height Regulation of City Planning in Kyoto City before and after 2007 based on Enactment of New Landscape Ordinance. Made by the City Planning Maps before and after 2007 by the Author

## TOURISM AND THE SECOND WAVE OF GENTRIFICATION

The Regulatory Reform Implementation Plan, which was approved in a Cabinet meeting of the Third Abe Cabinet on June 30, 2015, states: “Regarding vacation rental services utilizing ordinary dwelling houses, summer houses, and so on, the lodgers of which are raised through the Internet, concerned government ministries shall examine the actual situation of the services from 2015, including competitive conditions with inns and hotels, from a very wide perspective, and shall obtain a conclusion in 2016.” In 2016, the Japan Tourism Agency (Commissioner Shigeto Kubo) and the Ministry of Health, Labor, and Welfare (Minister Yasuhisa Shiozaki) jointly examined these services, reviewing lodging house standards for structure, equipment, and furnishings. In April 2016, the Hotel Business Act was revised and the standards relaxed: before the revision, the gross floor area of guest rooms was to uniformly exceed 33 m<sup>2</sup>; after the revision, the gross floor area per person was changed to 3.3 m<sup>2</sup> per lodger when the total number of guests is ten or smaller. Before the revision, the Hotel Business Act stated that each lodging house was obliged to install a reception desk. After the revision, the act stated that it is desirable for each lodging house to install a reception desk. Thus, the requirement to install a reception desk was relaxed.

Under the above-mentioned circumstances, Airbnb—a vacation rental site and available in Japan beginning in 2014—increased the number of registered facilities. In 2017, unauthorized vacation rental sites increased in many places in Japan. Vacation rental sites were criticized because some sites were inspected without warning by the Fair Trade Commission in November 2017. Around 10 vacation rental sites existed as of November 2017, and the competition among these sites to secure lodgers likely intensified in preparation for the 2020 Tokyo Olympics (2017, November 17) *The Nikkei, Evening Edition*, p.13. Subsequently, the Private Lodging Business Act (Home-Sharing Business Act) was enforced in the beginning of June 2018.

Kyoto City was significantly affected by the Cabinet’s decision. Fig. 8.4 shows the changes in the cumulative number of private lodging

operators approved based on changes to the Hotel Business Act. The number of lodging houses has markedly increased since 2016 and reached its peak in 2019 before the COVID-19 pandemic. Indeed, the number of lodging houses in 2019 was approximately three times that of 2015.

In data on Kyoto, lodging houses are classified as accommodation facilities, as shown in Fig. 8.4. Kyoto City surveyed the number of inns to determine the number of unique accommodation structures called Kyo-machiya. According to Article 2, Paragraph 1 of the Ordinance on the Preservation and Utilization of Historical Buildings in Kyoto City, a Kyo-machiya is a traditional wooden townhouse that was already built when the Building Standards Law in 1950 was enacted. The Kyo-machiya has a traditional structure, morphology, and design generated in response to urban life. A typical Kyo-machiya has a tiled roof, the slope of which faces a road, and an entrance parallel to the ridge of the roof. It is a detached or terraced house with fewer than three stories, a beaten floor, and a street courtyard. Thus, several detailed features define these structures. In Fig. 8.4 these structures, referred to as “machiya” in the Hotel Business Act, are separated from other types of lodging houses, hotels consisting of medium- and high-rise buildings, and Japanese-style inns, all of which are combined.




Fig. 8.4: Increase in Permitted Businesses by the “Hotel Business Act” in Kyoto City 2014–2020 (Unit: Number of Business). Kyoto City as of July 2021.

Fig. 8.5 shows the results of a questionnaire survey asking tourists visiting Kyoto City about their accommodation facilities in the form of a square graph. In this figure, the vertical axis represents the ratios of accommodation facilities and the horizontal axis represents tourists' home countries and regions. On the horizontal axis, the width of each country or region corresponds to the percentage of the total number of tourists that visit from the particular country or region. The survey was conducted at the same time on the same day of the week in each of February, May, August, and November in 2019. In the survey, 1732 foreign tourists were randomly selected and then interviewed. The number of tourists from the countries and regions described in the graph accounted for 92.7% of the total number of tourists. Tourists from other countries and regions, making up 7.3% of the total number of tourists, are omitted from this graph.

As shown in Fig. 8.5, the numbers of tourists staying in hotels, inns, and lodging houses were totaled according to their accommodation facilities. The number of tourists staying at friends and relatives' houses, machiya, guest houses, and pilgrims' lodgings were also totaled. Many lodging houses might be apartments and condominiums, and many friends and relatives' houses might be private houses. Because inns, machiya, guest houses, and pilgrims' lodgings are Japanese-style accommodation facilities, the countries and regions with higher percentages of the numbers of tourists staying at these facilities are arranged from the left to the right in this figure. However, since some tourists might have confused inns with machiya, it may be necessary to combine these two types of facilities. The highest percentage of foreign tourists intending to stay in Japanese-style facilities came from Taiwan, followed by South Korea, North America, Hong Kong, Europe, Oceania, China, and Southeast Asia, in that order. Many tourists from Europe intended to stay in hotels, yet the largest number of tourists staying at machiya, guest houses, and pilgrims' lodgings came from Europe. Many Chinese tourists stayed at lodging houses as guests and they can be regarded as the major users in terms of the total number. Tourists with small budgets might intend to stay at lodging houses and tourists with large budgets might intend to stay at hotels, even if their individual lifestyles differ. Thus, economic background might help to determine tourists' intentions.




Fig. 8.5: Lodging Choice organized by Selected Countries, consisting of 92.7% to the Total Number of Foreign Tourists in Kyoto City (multiple answers allowed).

Fig. 8.6 shows a distribution chart of lodging houses registered after 2008, as permitted by the Hotel Business Act, obtained from the list of facilities as of January 2021. Kyoto City has occasionally published this list. In this figure, three wards in the downtown area and Higashiyama Ward are magnified. Fig. 8.6 excludes hotels and inns but includes 2,998 lodging houses registered and on the list. Since addresses in Kyoto City are expressed in a complicated manner (for example, north or south is attached to the name of a street), block names and house numbers, excluding the complicated expressions, were converted into latitudes and longitudes using the CSV Address Matching Service provided by the University of Tokyo. Subsequently, lodging houses were plotted using

ArcGIS's function for adding XY data. When address matching was performed, some towns with detailed house numbers could not be searched. Therefore, some errors occurred. In the other towns, house numbers could be searched. When several addresses were registered for one lodging house, the first address was used for the search. As a whole, house numbers could be searched for 2,660 lodging houses, block names could be searched for 255 lodging houses, and house numbers or block names of remaining lodging houses were unknown. The locations of the unknown lodging houses were amended by visual inspection. When the confidence level of the uniqueness of data matching was confirmed, 2,942 lodging houses could be correctly searched. However, 56 lodging houses had multiple block names and their locations were also amended by visual inspection.

In Fig. 8.6, lodging houses that have been newly permitted since 2017 are shown in blue, those permitted before 2011 are shown in red, and those permitted between 2012 and 2014 are shown in orange. As this figure highlights, the number of lodging houses permitted in recent years increased in areas just outside the CBD where downzoning had been carried out. These areas were located on the CBD's eastern and southern sides and the southern side of Kyoto Station. In other words, the increase in the number of lodging houses indicates that many areas used for private housing located outside the CBD were converted to areas used for lodging facilities. Importantly, the reason for this conversion is the decrease in the number of elderly people, as shown in the right graph in Fig. 8.2. While the operators of hotel businesses are carefully avoiding increases in land prices due to downzoning—which occurred in areas at the eastern side of Nakagyo Ward and the northern side of Shimogyo Ward—elderly peoples' homes have been targeted, and residential areas have been changed into “lodging house towns.”

Under the Hotel Business Act, one operator registers one facility. Therefore, the effect of building a large-scale hotel with a large number of guest rooms differs greatly from the effect of building a lodging house with a small number of guest rooms. Based on Kyoto City Tourism Association's (2020) estimation, as of January 2021, the number of lodging houses in Kyoto City slightly increased from the list's number. Currently, the number of lodging houses in Kyoto City is 3,337 and the

number of guest rooms is 17,228. Therefore, the average number of guest rooms per lodging house is 5.2. Currently, the number of hotels and inns in Kyoto City is 656, and the number of guest rooms in these is 36,243. Therefore, the average number of guest rooms per hotel or inn is 55.2. Although the number of hotels and inns is only one-fifth that of lodging houses, the number of guest rooms per hotel or inn is approximately 10 times that of guest rooms per lodging house.

Because the number of lodging houses is approximately five times that of hotels and inns, the effect of lodging houses on the architectural landscape is markedly larger than that of hotels and inns because lodging houses are widely distributed geographically. The psychological effect of lodging houses on people moving on roads near these facilities is also markedly larger than that of hotels and inns because these people more often encounter lodging houses.




Fig. 8.6: Distribution of Lodging Houses registered after 2008, Focused on Selected Wards of Kyoto City. Source: The author, created from the List of Registered Business in Kyoto City and Address Matching Service by CSIS, University of Tokyo.

## CONCLUSION

From the beginning of the 2000s to 2021, Kyoto City experienced two waves of gentrification as a tourist center and historical city. Despite the 2008 global economic downturn, the first wave of gentrification led to increases in land prices in the CBD. The structural change in the relative population balance due to increases in the numbers of people at productive ages and their children also occurred in the CBD and its surrounding districts. The CBD, in which land prices had increased, was almost the same as a zone in which the maximum height of buildings was severely restricted by Kyoto City's city planning authority in September 2007 to solve the long-term landscape conservation problem. Downzoning through reducing the maximum height of buildings triggered increases in land prices and generated a wave of gentrification. Furthermore, the CBD in Kyoto City not only had a business function but also a cultural function because of the Gion festival. Since additional values produced by the traditional event combined with downzoning to tighten the supply-demand balance in the real estate market, property values in the downtown area rapidly increased. As a result, richer young families and their children slowly and steadily migrated to the downtown area, partly because the high density condominiums were comparatively affordable.

The second wave of gentrification was prompted by the rapid increase in the number of lodging houses after the revision of the Hotel Business Act in April 2016. The Japanese government foresaw the expansion of online reservation sites such as Airbnb, which advocate a sharing economy, and actually abolished the standards for the structure, equipment, or furnishings in lodging houses, removing the requirements for those houses with less than ten lodgers to possess a minimum gross floor area of 33 m<sup>2</sup> for guest rooms and install a reception desk. This change meant that many small-scale detached houses and condominiums were converted into lodging houses called vacation rentals. At that time, municipalities—which urgently needed to take measures to utilize vacant houses because the ratio of the number of vacant houses to the total number of houses was as high as 14%—had to yield to the strong pressure to develop lodging houses. As a result, these municipalities have continuously permitted an

unprecedented number of lodging houses. The convenience of intercity travel and the excellent accessibility of its famous tourist spots led to a remarkable increase in the number of lodging houses in areas on the CBD's eastern and southern sides (the inner areas). In these areas, which had an aging population and conspicuous vacant houses, private houses that elderly people had lived in became vacation rentals with a Japanese-style façade and stylish curtains, and foreign tourists walked on nearby streets while noisily pulling suitcases. Such scenery has penetrated the daily lives of people living in nearby areas. It can be said that Airbnb kicked the elderly out of the inner areas of Kyoto. The area that saw the largest increase in lodging houses is the same area where the number of people aged above 65 years has decreased the most. Fig. 8.7 shows the above-mentioned structural changes in Kyoto City.




Fig. 8.7: Waves of Gentrification

Since 2017, vacationers illegally dumping garbage and the generation of unfamiliar noises have become serious problems, leading to an inquiry that resulted in most vacation rentals remaining permitted while various measures were enacted to regulate them. The newly enforced in 2018 Private Lodging Business Act (Home-Sharing Business Act) tightened the requirements for installing a reception desk. An office near the rental meant to manage vacation rental users' manners and conduct became a condition for permission. In particular, because the number of potential

vacant houses was large in Higashiyama Ward and Shimogyo Ward, which had an increasingly aging population, regulations on vacation rentals have been tightened. In the second wave of gentrification, approximately 3,000 dwelling houses were converted into lodging houses. If two people were assumed to originally live in one dwelling house, the dwelling houses where 6,000 people had lived were converted into lodging houses. Moreover, the number of lodging houses registered after 2008 was 445 in Shimogyo Ward and was 199 in Higashiyama Ward. The number of people aged above 65 years decreased after 2005 by 1,566 in Shimogyo Ward and 745 in Higashiyama Ward. Overall, the number of lodging houses increased in these two wards by 644 and the number of people aged above 65 years decreased in these two wards by 2,311. Therefore, one out of two dwelling houses vacated by people above 65 years of age was converted into a lodging house.

An increase in the number of accommodation facilities does not directly result in an increase in the residential population. However, if vacant houses are used as lodging houses, the conversion of dwelling houses into lodging houses cannot be negatively evaluated in general. One interpretation of the situation is that when the number of lodging houses increases, a new flow of people is generated, and consequently the area is better utilized. From this perspective, the conversion of dwelling houses into lodging houses cannot be said to be typical gentrification.

Due to landscape policies adopted by municipalities and the government's relaxation of regulations, the direction of contemporary capitalism changes a city's structure. In Kyoto City, the gentrification caused by the immigration of young families into the CBD and the outflow of elderly people from the inner area has become a kind of displacement. We agree that the preservation of landscapes and the revitalization of regional economy could be understood as public values. We ask, however: did the government deeply consider the rapid change in urban structure caused by the immigration of young families and the emigration of elderly people? The authorities cannot ignore the provision of sufficient welfare facilities because this can also be considered as a public value.

Since April 2020, five waves of the novel coronavirus in Japan have impacted the society and economy, and the effects of these five waves on the urban structure is still unknown. However, we must also firmly grasp the meaning of the two waves of gentrification. Based on this understanding, we can then carefully observe the effect of the COVID-19 calamity on gentrification in the future.

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# Court Mediation as a Public Interest Platform: The Example of Maintenance Fee for Elders in Taiwan

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## **INTRODUCTION: ELDER CARE AS PUBLIC INTEREST IN COURT-ORDERED MEDIATION**

When the public interest relates to social issues such as economic development, social hierarchy, or generational injustice, community planning demands that the common good-oriented city model be redesigned. However, the role and function of the judiciary, including local courts, is often neglected. This chapter conducts an ethnography of court-ordered mediation to examine how the process serves the public

interest, particularly in the case of disputing elders' maintenance fees. The social context of this case demonstrates how the judiciary serves the public interest, particularly through financial support to the elderly, also known as elders' maintenance fees. Traditionally, both in the domain of family law and in societal practice, it is the adult children's obligation to support their elder parents' daily living expenses. However, the emphasis on individualism, the distortion of the nuclear family, the burnout of the middle-aged generation, and other contemporary trends have contributed to a situation in which elder parents cannot be financially supported by their adult children. Even worse, elders' social care costs have become a long-term critical issue within the domain of the family. Eventually, elder care expenses could not be solved by the family alone. Therefore, the elder financial support system eventually became the core of the broader public interest and a vital tool for maintaining the well-being of society.

As the individual case of elders' living expenses has become a concern of the common good and has been taken care of under the principle of public interest, elder care costs have been disputed between elder parents and their adult children in family court. The first stage of the dispute process is court-ordered mediation. This chapter examines the mediation process, as led by the family court, in an indictment case filed by older parents against their adult children for living expenses. The court employed its judicial power to mobilize social workers and psychological consultation resources and then reported outcomes to social welfare agencies to sustain the elder care network when the family financial and care functions failed.

Court-ordered mediation functioned in this case as a community service platform. In Taiwan's family law area, elder care costs—characterized as maintenance fees by previous indictments and legal scholars—have been traditionally considered a private matter. However, this chapter discusses how elder care costs have transitioned from the household sphere into the domain of public interest. The aim of the chapter is to demonstrate this transition through case analysis, with an emphasis on how contemporary society has driven the transition of elder care from private to public interest. Under these conditions, the judiciary branch—

specifically court-order family mediation—has become an effective platform for community strategy.

## **WHY HAS COURT-ORDERED MANDATORY MEDIATION BECOME A COMMUNITY SERVICE PLATFORM?**

The mediation system in Taiwan involves parallel township mediation and court-ordered mediation.<sup>1</sup> Township mediation entails enlisting prominent local figures (e.g., elders of a well-established family in the village, people with significant knowledge and experience, or people with higher socioeconomic status) to serve as mediators that help local people address small-scale disputes such as minor traffic accidents, low-intensity labor disputes, or domestic controversies. The concept of township mediation is intended to foster a sense of community. Parties involved are encouraged to use local and community resources to solve small-scale disputes and avoid the need to go to court, with its attendant formality and strict legal procedures. However, traditional township mediation has been affected by rapid social and economic transitions. The influence of such transitions on mediation is described by Jung Shaw-Wu, a Taiwanese anthropologist, in “Culture, Law, and Strategy: Settlement Processes of a District Mediation Committee.” Jung (2007) contends that the local culture, local factional affiliations, and socioeconomic status, both relative and absolute, of the parties and mediators constitute weak points in the authority of township mediation. In contemporary society, it has become difficult to identify the most credible family in the village in the same way it had been in the past. Similarly, it has become difficult to select experts with a certain degree of professional knowledge and mediation skills to negotiate between the disputing parties. Other concerns are whether the parties will trust the “local elites” chosen to serve as their mediators and whether the selected mediator will attempt to achieve a truly fair outcome or simply an expedient solution to resolve the issue (Jung, 2007, pp. 57-104, ). Furthermore, the increasing atomization and restructuring of society undermines rootedness in one’s locality, and disputing parties can easily obtain extensive information online.

Consequently, for younger generations that are more internet savvy and tend to move for job opportunities, township mediation may not be a compelling option. In other words, traditional township mediation seems to have lost the moral and cultural authority on which the legitimacy of its decisions depends. In this context, court-ordered mediation is becoming increasingly important.

In light of how the mediation paradigm has shifted and continues to shift from the township to the court-ordered model, I intentionally selected family dispute mediation as my field and I have worked on this since 2008. I discovered that parties involved in family disputes have a relatively high level of confidence in court-led mediation. In "The Counseling Function of Family Court and Family Dispute Resolution," Kuo (2016) analyzed contemporary court functions and determined that courts of first instance, particularly family courts, have increasingly functioned as service providers rather than performing the more conventional roles of hearing and weighing evidence and handing down verdicts (Kuo, 2016, pp. 345-403, ). Courts, for instance, increasingly provide various resources such as education classes for divorcing parents who are in post-divorce family situations, occupational counseling, and self-help legal aid for parties involved in disputes, with the aid taking the form of actual resources that can serve to enhance their knowledge of and confidence in future negotiations. Thus, service-oriented court-ordered mediation by family courts is in keeping with the trend toward courts offering multiple services. This paper presents an analysis of how court mediation functions as a community service platform; a dispute between an older father and his adult children over who should pay the living expenses of the former is examined as a case study below. This study takes place in an urban context; courts in urban areas are in a more privileged position to recruit relatively experienced professionals to serve as the court-mediators when compared to courts in rural areas. This does not mean that people living in rural areas follow so-call traditional values and enjoy reciprocity and happiness with three generations living together. My fieldwork experience indicates that courts in rural area are not able to obtain adequate human resources to build up the type of service-oriented court-ordered mediation. Therefore, in this chapter, I only focus on the cases happening in courts that are located in urban areas.

## **A FATHER AND HIS CHILDREN FAILING TO FULFILL THEIR ROLES: AN EMPIRICAL CASE AND ANALYSIS**

The living expenses of older adults include medical expenditures for chronic diseases, which are paid via the National Health Insurance system (National Health Insurance Annual Report 2019, p. 10) or their national pension.<sup>2</sup> This policy demonstrates that providing for the living expenses of older adults is in the public interest. However, in accordance with the traditional cultural concept of fulfilling one's duty of filial piety to one's elderly parents, Taiwan's Civil Code specifies that adult children have an obligation to provide for the care of their parents.<sup>3</sup> To balance the interests of parents and their children, Taiwan's Civil Code also provides that if a parent failed to fulfill their parental duty when their child was a minor, then said child—after reaching adulthood—may petition the court. The child may ask to be exempted from their duty or to have it reduced after the court comprehensively reviews the moral, cultural, financial, and psychological conditions of both the elderly parents and their adult children in family cases.<sup>4</sup>

Through my own court-ordered mediation practice, I have come to understand the actual conditions of contemporary Taiwanese society, wherein non-traditional families constitute an increasingly large proportion of families. Given the range of contemporary circumstances, not all older adults are in marriage relationships, and for those who were married and do have adult children, they may not be able to live with their adult children for care as they age or receive further living assistance from their adult children (Kuo, 2017). Therefore, providing for the living expenses of older adults, including medical expenses but excluding various personal expenses, is seen as a public interest matter. Because family dynamics have shifted, the traditional nuclear family model is no longer adequate to the needs of older adults. Consequently, from the traditional point of view, adult children should pay for their elder parents' living expenses to express their affection to the parents, as well as to demonstrate that the filial duty has been well fulfilled. However, this is supplemented by the government in the name of the public good. To provide substantive societal context and to explain the

transformation of elder care costs into a part of the public interest, I examine how court mediation has been extended to become a community service platform, with special attention given to the maintenance fee provision of the Taiwan Civil Code in the real case of Mr. A.

### ***The Case of Mr. A***

Mr. A was 68 years old, married and divorced twice, lived alone, received a monthly old-age pension of NT\$4,000, and participated in the social relief welfare-to-work program operated by the local government, for which he received NT\$15,000 per month. Even with the program income, he struggled to make a living, and then the local government terminated the program after only two years because of insufficient financial support and the number of people needing the subsidy. Additional misfortune befell Mr. A when he was involved in a traffic accident and suffered a bone fracture. After the accident, which compounded his problems with chronic diabetes and hypertension, he developed osteomyelitis, his prognosis was poor. His ability to live independently gradually declined, and he eventually moved into a long-term care institution administered by the Social Affairs Bureau of the local government; at that point, he received a low-income subsidy of NT\$8,000 per month. However, the cost to live in the institution was NT\$20,000 per month. On behalf of Mr. A, the Social Affairs Bureau prepaid one year of the cost of residing in the long-term care facility. The local government then determined that the payment should be borne by Mr. A's three children, B, C, and D, and requested the court to order the three children to reimburse these prepaid expenses.<sup>5</sup>

Before they could commence litigation, the court ordered Mr. A and his three children to try mediation under court supervision. After more than a year of mediation and the submission of complete accountings of the property and finances of both the father and the children, no satisfactory resolution had been achieved. The adult child B argued that the father, Mr. A, had been married to B's mother for only one year. After Mr. A and B's mother divorced, B had been taken care of by his grandmother, who was the mother of Mr. A. Mr. A was not an active

participant in B's childhood, and Mr. A paid neither B's education nor living expenses. As an adult, B was working as a laborer and only earned approximately NT\$30,000 monthly; moreover, he had to pay alimony to his ex-wife. B contended that he already was financially against the wall and could not afford to cover the expenses of Mr. A.

The other two adult children were daughters C and D. They were born during Mr. A's second marriage. C and D both noted that Mr. A was sentenced to jail after 3 years of marriage to their mother. Then, Mr. A divorced C and D's mother, who raised the two girls alone. C and D claimed that they had no strong bond with Mr. A as their father. In addition, D's son had a rare disease, which financially burdened D. Thus, D could not afford to bear the expenses of Mr. A.<sup>6</sup> The court determined that in the case of B, although Mr. A did not personally take care of B, he had entrusted B to A's mother. This act was deemed sufficient to fulfill the parental duty of care for B. As for the children from the second marriage, Mr. A had raised the two daughters for at least 3 years, which was also deemed sufficient to establish that A had discharged his parental duty, and thus, C and D were responsible for executing theirs. Therefore, the court ordered that B, C, and D reimburse the maintenance fee prepaid by the local government. The court weighed B, C, and D's financial abilities and decided that B, C, and D should pay NT\$2,000, NT\$8,000, and NT\$2,000 per month, respectively. B, C, and D are highly likely to resist paying and to appeal the decision. Mr. A, however, may petition the high court procedure to enforce the judgment against children B, C, and D.

In this case, the filial duty of adult children was measured in monetary terms: as a biological father: how many years did Mr. A pay for each child so that the child should be obligated to pay the father back upon reaching adulthood? In this context, the nuclear family was reduced to being understood solely as a financial support unit rather than as something more robust and richer and that includes reciprocal love, respect, and active engagement in family activities. In such a case, what does filial duty mean for elderly parents and their adult children, particularly regarding the responsibility of paying for living expenses? Court proceedings focus only on the financial aspect but have nothing to contribute to creating or honoring an aging plan that accounts for the

situations of elderly parents and adult children alike. A mediation process focused on helping Mr. A and his children develop a mutually agreeable future plan would have likely yielded a superior outcome. Additionally, during the mediation, a court-assigned mediator may have introduced more public financing alternatives available from the local government and community, which may have eased the burdens of A, B, C, and D. Because such a process was not engaged, the case will likely be fought bitterly through litigation.

## **FAMILY COURT MEDIATION AS A SERVICE PLATFORM**

In 2000, Taiwan's Judicial Yuan enacted a policy to use mediation flexibly to solve family disputes, having realized that litigation is not always appropriate for solving domestic problems. Family court, unlike other courts, prioritizes helping families resolve disputes without litigation, and hence, family courts provide expert help to families to facilitate communication and negotiation. Judge Peng Nan-Yuan, in a law review article, explains how psychological counseling can be beneficial for parties engaged in mediation, often leading them to greater understanding of the dispute and eventual resolution (Peng 2008, p. 40). Further, Judge Hsieh Ching-Hui indicated that, under current practices, "the court shall provide a mechanism for interested parties to" work through negative emotions holding back dispute resolution, and further recommend "consulting techniques or psychosomatic treatment methods frequently used by social workers, such as empathizing, active listening, or medical diagnosis, [that] are adopted to help interested parties recover to a relatively stable psychological state for them to face and undergo legal proceedings" (Hsieh, 2005, p. 13-15). Meanwhile, I proposed "quasi-consultation" as a lens through which to interpret the function of family courts (Kuo, 2016). For more than two decades, Taiwan's Judicial Yuan has employed the "quasi-consultation" mode of dispute resolution, which has been integrated into court-ordered mediation. This paradigm has been predominant in family matter resolution in Taiwan.

In the “2008 Family Dispute Mediation (Conciliation) Practical Operation Manual” of the Taichung District Court, for example, a novel procedure called the “mediation double screening mechanism” is described. In this procedure, Judicial Associate Officers (JAO 司法事務官) screen cases in the first stage. Subsequently, the JAOs assign cases to suitable mediators depending on the formality examination, characteristics of the dispute, and the professional competency of the mediator pool. In the “formality examination” screening process, the JAOs are able to illuminate those cases that are not able to be solved by the mediation process. Among the mediator pool, available mediators all have different specialties. The family dispute mediators screened, trained, and employed by the court can perform consulting functions to help interested parties solve their disputes. Therefore, before the date of mediation, according to the mediation double screening mechanism, the JAO undertakes a formality review and a mediator is assigned who then communicates with the interested parties, informs them about the mediation process, and works to increase the interested parties' willingness to attend the mediation. After implementation of the “mediation double screening mechanism,” the success rate of mediation increased to 59% in 2008 and the attendance by interested parties on the date of mediation reached 69%. In the family dispute resolution process, mandatory mediation enables the interested parties to gradually clarify their situations with the assistance of court-provided resources and independently develop or jointly negotiate suitable, concrete, and feasible solutions (Yang et al. 2013; Yang et al., 2007).

As the family court mediation system was established and developed rapidly, the judges' burden from handling these tremendously complicated litigations were effectively reduced. Therefore, in the Labor Incident Act that took effect in 2018, the importance of mediation is highly emphasized. In fact, in the current judicial system in Taiwan, particularly at the district court level, mediation is a mandatory process that is supervised by local courts. The courts recruit suitable mediators for various cases, mostly local professionals such as lawyers, social workers, or psychologists. The courts also provide seminars, study groups, and workshops in different fields to help professionals learn from each other. Therefore, this continuous upgrading of the quality of mediators has eventually produced a new model of the judiciary at the

local level and has made an impact in the local community, particularly in the area of family law disputes. The more experienced mediators and local courts have created a platform for people who need help with their dysfunctional families. In fact, when the two disputing parties enter the process of court-ordered mediation, the courts can invite municipal resources to help the parties and their relatives negotiate their own satisfactory resolutions.

## **COURT-ORDERED MEDIATION AND ITS PUBLIC VALUE**

After reviewing the history of court-ordered mediation in Taiwan in the last two decades, I would like to point out that at least in the area of family disputes, court-ordered mediation is successful and effective because disputing parties are convinced of the authority of the judiciary and thus are confident in the resources—psychologists and social workers—provided by the courts to help resolve their disputes. On the other hand, mediation is by nature less formal and therefore is highly appropriate for family disputes. For example, elder care in these instances typically involves decades of emotional blackmail and financial shortage or unfair arrangements within the family. Such disputes have made significant impacts not only on a few family members, but also they produce negative influences on subsequent generations and their ongoing family lives. Therefore, the well-established court-ordered mediation mechanism has played a role in successfully addressing the demands of individual cases while also realizing the public value of reducing the relational harm of acrimonious family litigation.

It is particularly notable that all the participants, including the JAO, the court-assigned mediator, and the disputing parties, work to reach a settlement through teamwork. The disputing parties learn key skills, namely negotiation and communication, allowing them to better establish and pursue their future life plans by clearly expressing their intentions. The JAO, the court-assigned mediator, and the professional helpers who participate in the mediation process hone their abilities through their intensive participation in dispute resolution, emerging

better prepared to mediate future disputes and assist elderly individuals, thus forming a type of safety net.

When the topic of elder care costs is related to court-ordered mediation and becomes an important public value for reimagining the well-being of the community, I suggest a reconsideration and reactivation of the role of court-ordered mediation. First, I contend that when discussing the contributions of communities or professional groups to urban renewal that involves the public interest, changes in the role and function of district courts should not be neglected. The relatively younger generation in local courts could try to be more flexible rather than resorting to litigation when they are confronted by cases that oppose public interest to traditional family values. They must play a more active role rather than one merely limited to using authorities solving the individual chaos under the umbrellas of the nuclear family or so-called traditional Chinese filial responsibility.

Second, little prior attention has been paid to the fact that family courts are becoming more service-oriented compared to earlier stages of court-ordered mediation. Thus, court-ordered mediation provides services that introduce financial and psychological support resources to interested parties. Winning or losing cases is not the key point. Helping the disputing parties establish a new order in their lives is the goal. Such a new order may pertain to the establishment of a more autonomous, non-biological “chosen” family for individuals who receive varied financial and emotional support from different life stages.

Third, by analyzing the case of Mr. A in the process of court mediation, I suggest that courts should thoroughly review cases in advance of mediation, and carefully assign the appropriate mediator whose professional knowledge can be correctly applied to the case. Meanwhile, when the assigned mediators supervised by the court are able to help interested parties clarify problems, they can also introduce the disputing parties to community resources. When these methods are used during the process of mediation, every participant—including the JAO, mediator, and disputing parties—can better understand the limitations of the law. Ultimately, the court system has its restrictions. The court, the black letter of the law, and court-ordered mediation mechanisms can

only realize their professional authority successfully if they engage varied resources to form a platform for redesigning the new city. Nevertheless, pursuing personal happiness and further seeking the common good of the community require a deeper comprehension and cooperation among various professional fields. To achieve the goal of the chosen family as the part a wider community strategy, one cannot rely solely on one approach or a limited area of professionals. In this regard, the judiciary can play an active role at the local level in particular. To maintain court-ordered mediation as a public resource platform, and to achieve the goal of making this mechanism provide public value, a focus that extends beyond solving individual cases will be a concrete step toward the community strategy.

1. See the Township and County-Administered City Mediation Act (English version). <https://law.moj.gov.tw/ENG/LawClass/LawAll.aspx?pcode=I0020003>
2. In 2019, of the total medical expenses of outpatients and inpatients (including emergency clinics) in Taiwan, the expenses of people aged 65 years or older accounted for 38.4%, the highest among all age groups.
3. Taiwan Civil Code Article 1115: “In case there are several persons bound to furnish maintenance, the order in which they are to perform such obligation is as follows: (1) Younger lineal relatives by blood; (2) Elder lineal relatives by blood; (3) Head of the house; (4) Brothers and sisters; (5) Members of the house; (6) Daughter-in-law and son-in-law; (7) Parents of either the husband or the wife. Among the elder lineal relatives by blood or younger lineal relatives by blood, the person nearest in degree of relationship will be the first. If there are several persons bound to furnish maintenance and of the same degree of relationship, such obligation shall be borne by them according to their respective economic ability.”
4. Taiwan Civil Code Article 1118-1: “If it would be grossly inequitable for a person to be liable for maintenance, he may ask the Court to mitigate such an obligation when the person who is entitled to maintenance has committed one of the following acts: (1) If the person entitled to maintenance has intentionally maltreated, insulted or committed severe misconduct, physically and spiritually, against the person liable for maintenance, his/her spouse, or a close relative of the person liable for maintenance. (2) Without justifiable reason, the person entitled to maintenance did not fulfill his/her obligation to the person liable for maintenance. The provisions of subsection (1) and (2) do

not apply to persons entitled to maintenance who are lineal descendants by blood of the person liable for maintenance.”

5. This case was adapted from the Taiwan Kaohsiung Juvenile and Family Court decision Jia-sheng-zi No. 62 in 2020, district court decision *Jia-qin-sheng-zi* No. 242 in 2017, Taiwan Taipei District Court decision *Jia-qin-sheng-zi* No. 242 in 2017, and Taiwan Taipei District Court *Jia-qin-sheng-zi* No. 4 in 2017.
6. In 2021, the minimum monthly living expenses per person in Taiwan was NT\$13,288. The minimum living expense is determined by competent authorities of the central government and special municipalities and is set as 60% of the median of disposable income per capita in the recent year as announced by Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics, Executive Yuan. The minimum living expense is reviewed and adjusted according to the living standards of different regions annually to protect the basic economic security of the disadvantaged. The adjustment of the minimum living expense is relevant to the rights of the disadvantaged. Thresholds for other social welfare subsidies, such as living allowances for middle- or low-income senior citizens, living subsidies for people with disabilities, support for disadvantaged children and youth, and support to families in hardship are adjusted according to the minimum living expense, which profoundly affected public finance. For more, see the Department of Social Assistance and Social Work, Ministry of Health and Welfare: <https://dep.mohw.gov.tw/dosaasw/cp-530-56282-103.html> (last viewed on October 2, 2021).

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# Single-Mother Shared Housing as Space for Inclusion

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## WOMEN IN POVERTY AND REDUCED MARRIAGE RATES

The phrase “women in poverty” has gained increasing attention as a term referring to unmarried women among the working poor.

In 2011, the National Institute of Population and Social Security Research (IPSS) released shocking data showing that effectively one in three unmarried women living alone is living in poverty. Consequently, special reports on women’s poverty frequently surfaced in the media. Women in this position are at the bottom of the social ladder, working multiple low-

wage jobs with little time to sleep and having to cut down on utilities and food costs. Many women across social classes appear to feel a kinship with them, based on the powerful response to an NHK program (Nippon Hoso Kyokai; Japan Broadcasting Corporation) on the subject from 2014. In 2017, the Yokohama City Council for the Promotion of Gender Equality released the results of a full-scale survey of situations faced by these women, leading to, among other things, discussions specifically geared toward producing a better understand of the factors that produce women's poverty, as well as providing methods for support.

However, women have always had to deal with poverty. The statistics indicate that women's employment rates have increased in the last thirty years, and the M-curve that shows Japanese women's labor force participation rate is flattening due to the rising rate of women working all their lives. Why, then, is the issue of women in poverty coming to the fore only now? One major factor in this new attention is the increase in unmarried and divorced women. That is, the "safety net" of marriage, previously a lifetime guarantee for women, is no longer functioning as advertised, which exposes women's poverty.

Single-mother households have conspicuously high poverty rates even relative to the number of women in poverty in general. According to the 2019 Comprehensive Survey of Living Conditions, the poverty rate for single parents was 48.1%; about half of all single-parent households were in poverty.

According to a 2017 survey by the Ministry of Health, Labour, and Welfare (MHLW), the employment rate among single mother households in Japan is 81.8%, high even in comparison with other countries, and many single mothers are unstably employed. Therefore, the mean earned income of single-mother households is two million yen; even with welfare payments included, it remains extremely low at 2.43 million yen. Estimates within the same survey find a total of 1.23 million single-mother households, of which 80% are the result of divorce. As lifestyles have become diversified, society has come to accept that leaving a marriage and taking the children is one possible choice that women can make when living their lives. It is a very welcome

development that women are now able to choose their own paths in life without being caged by concerns about appearances or outdated customs. However, single-mother households in Japan face the reality that, in return for this freedom of choice, they are now forced to accept the risk of poverty.

## **SINGLE-MOTHER HOUSEHOLDS AND HOUSING LOSS**

Decreasing marriage rates are also impacting the area of housing. In the earlier era of homogeneous life courses, people formed so-called “standard” families and worked to own homes, climbing the housing ladder as a single unit. The owners of those houses were, almost without exception, the men/husbands, whereas the women/wives had only to buy into the system called marriage to acquire stable housing. However, with the shelter guarantee system called marriage now collapsing, a sharply increasing number of women are forced to obtain housing through their own efforts. In Japan, with its insufficient supply of public housing, residential quality directly reflects payment capacity. Consequently, the housing available to women in poverty is by definition low quality.

Single-mother households are often characterized by the loss of housing following a divorce. There are various reasons why this occurs. When moving out of a family-owned house, divorced women may give reasons like “it was in my husband’s name” and “I was worried about staying in a house where the loan wasn’t paid off,” whereas for housing rented during marriage, the reason might be “moving to a place with cheaper rent.” Furthermore, many women also leave their homes due to issues such as domestic violence (DV) or debts (Kuzunishi, 2017).

At a time of pronounced financial instability in the aftermath of a divorce, finding a new place to live and moving there with small children in tow can be immensely difficult. In many cases, women find that having left their homes, they have nowhere else to go and have to wander the streets.

Even if they apply to real estate agents to find private-sector rented housing, they are likely to be unwelcome to landlords because of their unstable income. The MHLW survey of 2017 mentioned above found that while over 70% of single mothers had been employed when the mother was married, only 30% of them had been full-time company employees. From the perspective of real estate, housewives and part-time pink-collar workers are inevitably high-risk with regard to rent arrears. Some are able to move in with parents or relatives, but not everyone has this option. There are a significant number of women and children exposed to the risk of housing loss at a level that is impossible to quantify.

## **INSUFFICIENT PUBLIC HOUSING SUPPORT**

Welfare exists as a system to support households struggling with poverty and facing housing loss; however, only 11.2% of all single-mother households receive welfare support (MHLW, 2017). Clearly, this number is absurdly low in comparison with their high poverty rates. Therefore, it is easy to conclude that many households cannot or do not receive welfare even though they are qualified for it. Moreover, the media have also reported on the dismissive treatment meted out at welfare consultations. Additionally, according to Yoshitake (2019, p. 171), “there is a tendency to not seek welfare among single-mother households ‘close to independence,’ those where the mother is relatively well-educated, employed, in reasonable health, with strong self-discipline, and inclined to value ‘independence and self-help.’” According to Yoshitake (2019), a tendency toward strong self-discipline is a mechanism which involves highly valuing “independence and self-help” and refusing to receive welfare. This refers to the perception or attitude that hard work will make hopes and dreams come true. This background factor may be significantly influenced by the social stigma against welfare recipients.

Meanwhile, facilities available to mothers and children with no place to go include maternal and child living support facilities. After World War II, when war widows were prevalent, these facilities functioned as important housing options for mothers and children—there were approximately 600 throughout Japan. However, facility residents

numbers decreased as time passed; as of a 2018 survey, there were only 222 facilities extant (MHLW, 2020). Reasons noted for the decline in usage include a mismatch with modern clients' needs (curfews and other rules), dislike of the implications of the "facility" name, and so on.

Finally, public housing exists as a housing support option for single-mother households. Public housing was established as a measure to combat the postwar housing shortage and, in particular, to guarantee housing for those with low incomes, through the 1951 Act on Public Housing. However, there are merely 1.92 million public housing units throughout the country, that is, about 3.6% of the entire housing stock, which leads to supply issues. Further, housing estates with vacant units tend to cluster in inconvenient suburban areas, causing serious problems with uneven geographical distribution. In addition, an issue particular to single-mother households is the lag between applications for public housing and the preferred entrance period, which creates timing issues that prevent entry. While some municipalities accept applications during divorce disputes, applicants are required to cancel their applications if their divorces are not complete by the time of entry (excluding urgent situations such as DV). In particular, the poverty of "pre-single mothers" (pre-divorce single mothers) has been identified in recent years. Forced to live as single-mother households for all intents and purposes, a significant number of households are barred from any and all public support for single-mother households because their divorces are incomplete. Not all dissolutions of marriage go smoothly, and it is not unusual for divorce to be preceded by a long period of separation. Notwithstanding the severe housing needs that arise during this gray area between marriage and divorce, the worst problem here is that there are no housing policies offering support.

## **THE EMERGENCE OF SINGLE-MOTHER SHARED HOUSING**

One potential way to fill these gaps in the system is single-mother shared housing (SMSH). Remarkably, these programs are nearly all corporate, that is, established by real estate agencies. Conventionally, low-income single-mother households have been excluded from the

housing market. However, in recent years, to address the worsening issue of vacant houses, more agencies are supplying housing to single mothers.

Having experienced severe housing shortages due to war damage, Japan promoted a housing supply system based on three pillars—the Government Housing Loan Corporation, public housing, and Housing Corporation semi-public housing—with housing units exceeding the number of households by 1968. Thereafter, large-scale housing construction (mainly by private-sector developers) continued as well. From 2008 onward, the population began to decrease as society aged, and the birthrate fell; thus, more houses became vacant. In 2018, there were 8.46 million vacant houses, approximately 13.6% of the total housing units, the highest percentage since WWII (MLIT, 2019).

As noted above, renting to economically unstable single-mothers carries with it the risk of payment arrears and potential damage to the operating company. However, the dilemma is that if companies follow conventional practices by targeting only those with stable incomes, they will not fill their vacant units. From the late 2000s onward, then, the strata of society with low incomes, including the single-mother households previously excluded from the housing market, were more likely to be included in accordance with risk mitigation frameworks. SMSH can be understood as one aspect of this movement.

As of September 2021, there are 40 shared houses for single-mother households in Japan. Many of them do not require the down payments or guarantors typical of ordinary rental housing, and some permit entry to unemployed people following pre-entry discussions. However, almost all are based on short- and fixed-term rental contracts, whereas those admitting unemployed people take risk-avoidance measures such as advance rent payment or savings confirmation (Kuzunishi, 2018a).

Shared housing refers, essentially, to multiple unrelated households sharing the same residential unit. Ninety percent of existing SMSH involves sharing bathrooms; there are just a few newly built units with separate bathrooms for each household. The rent ranges from 25,000 to 150,000 yen, which notably covers a wide range not limited to low-income families (Kuzunishi, 2018b).

Independence for single mothers is characteristically delayed and hampered by the following four issues: (a) housing is difficult to find without employment; (b) jobs are difficult to find without a fixed address; (c) jobs are difficult to find without childcare; and (d) childcare is difficult to obtain without an employment certificate, which requires a job.

To resolve these issues within SMSH, some houses offer childcare, provide employment opportunities or places to work, and generally provide all-in-one support for mother-and-child independence.

However, housing projects targeting those with low incomes make minimal profit and are often closed or repurposed. Issues said to arise within SMSH include rent arrears, conflicts between residents, child neglect, and so on, with a wide range of care required including welfare services, medicine, and overall health (e.g., DV, poverty, disability, and mental illness) services. However, many of the businesses involved lack knowledge of the welfare system when they begin the project, which makes providing suitable support difficult.

To find smooth resolutions for the problems common to these businesses around the country, a Nonprofit Organization (NPO) called the National Single Parent Residential Support Council (NSPRSC) was founded in 2019. As well as providing system information and advice to its members, the Council also operates a dedicated portal site for SMSH and provides other support for appropriate operations.

## **THE NEEDS OF SINGLE-MOTHER SHARED HOUSING**

What are the needs of single-mother households taken on by SMSH? Here, let us examine the trends in SMSH needs based on inquiry data obtained from Mother Support, the aforementioned portal site operated by the NSPRSC.

Mother Support was founded as an individual endeavor by Satoshi Akiyama in 2015 and passed on to the NSPRSC from 2019 onward. Access to the site steadily rose from 2017 through 2020, with a sharp

increase beginning in April 2020 when a state of emergency was declared due to the coronavirus pandemic (Fig. 10.1).

This paper analyzes the 229 requests for on-site support made from April 1, 2020 through March 31, 2021 (Fig. 10.2). From April 2020 onward, new inquiry items intended to facilitate the smooth matching of the person making an inquiry with businesses included questions on (a) marital status, (b) employment status, (c) desired entrance period, (d) age of mother, (e) number and gender of children, and (f) current address and desired house location. These categories were established to reflect requests from NPO members.




Fig. 10.1: Access numbers from 2017 through 2020.




Fig. 10.2: Inquiries by month in FY2020.

Nearly half of the mothers making inquiries were in their thirties (48.6%), with 30% in their twenties, and 20% in their forties. Regarding their marital status, the highest percentage (37.8%) were separated, 9.2% were married, and 47.0% of the inquiries were pre-single mothers who were not yet divorced, which amounts to almost half (Fig. 10.3). The most common employment status provided was informal employment (35.4%), followed by unemployed (34%) (Fig. 10.4). With regard to the number of accompanying children, those with one child were the most common at over 70% (Fig. 10.5). In addition, the range of children's ages included 109 children aged 1–3 (39.6%) and 70 aged 4–6 (25.5%), with children below school age, including pregnancies, totaling 73.8% of the total (Fig. 10.6).

By gender, excluding 31 unclear items, girls comprised 51.3% of the total (140) and boys 48.7% (133). A rundown of the trends suggests that SMSH clients tend to be just or not yet divorced, unstably employed, and to have one child below school age. The number, age, and gender of the children involved is extremely important information for the operators. Each household is given one room, but households with multiple children may be permitted to live together depending on the children's ages.




Fig. 10.3: Marital status of people making inquiries. Note: n-229.

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


Fig. 10.4: Employment status of people making inquiries. Note: n-229.

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


Fig. 10.5: Number of children. Note: n-229 (excludes 14 unclear items).

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


Fig. 10.6: Ages of children. Note: n-229 (excludes 22 unclear items).




Fig. 10.7: Desired entry point. Note: n-229 (excludes 68 unclear items).

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


Fig. 10.8: Desired area. Note: n-229 (excludes 18 unclear items).

Some operators also decide whether to admit mothers with older boys based on the opinions of the other residents. Therefore, this kind of advance information is also effective in facilitating rapid matching.

Further, when asked how soon help was needed, 38.5% of those surveyed responded “within one month,” and 37.3% responded “within three months,” indicating that almost 80% were urgently in need of housing. Interviews with operators reveal that there are several cases where divorce and moving are planned to coincide with a child’s entrance into school or where plans for divorce hinge on the promise of

housing (Kuzunishi, 2018a). This likely accounts for answers such as “six months or more” or “undecided.”

Finally, we researched how women selected locations. According to Kuzunishi (2006), single when mothers select residential locations outside of the prefecture, they tend to rely on parents or other close relatives, hoping for child-raising support; when moving within cities or similar short distances, they tend to prioritize children’s school districts.

Research on location selection with regard to SMSH includes Kuzunishi and Okazaki (2018), who analyzed the results of interviews with 15 would-be residents of a house in Shinjuku Ward, Tokyo. Of the interview targets—who were mainly pre-single mothers with small children—only a very few could depend on support from relatives. Many of them had come to Tokyo for college, found employment, married, and continued to live in the capital area. Reasons for not returning to their parents’ homes included “worse employment conditions in the provinces” and the desire to avoid “lower educational levels” in relation to factors such as supplementary tutoring or “cram” schools and extracurricular activities. Reasons given by women in the provinces included “looking for good employment conditions” in addition to “wanting a shared house with furniture, etc., where a down payment is not contracted, so moving isn’t too difficult.”

As for the results of the present survey, Fig. 10.8 shows that half the respondents hoped to move out of the prefecture. Of the 135 people hoping to leave the prefecture, 54 (40%) wanted to move to a neighboring prefecture. Out of all respondents, 40% hoped to remain in the same prefecture, and 7.9% in the same city or ward as their current residence.

While over half the respondents selected houses outside their prefectures, 40% of those selected the neighboring prefecture, suggesting an overall trend of wanting to move within as close a range as possible to their current residence.

## COMMUNITY-CREATED SHARED HOUSING

SMSH is operated by for-profit companies and is heavily biased toward filling vacant units because management success relies on high occupancy rates. Therefore, the conditions for entry are not stringent and mainly depend on the capacity to pay the rent, which is the central point that such companies focus on. Naturally, the rules for occupancy and so on are explained upon entry, but there may not be enough of a common ground between residents and operators, which can lead to problems thereafter.

Currently, SMSH tends to attract two often opposing groups: those needing communal living (oriented toward living with someone) and those needing a guaranteed place to live (nowhere else to go). Therefore, residents frequently clash over lifestyles and mutual assistance. Is it possible, then, to share living principles and satisfy the various desires of the residents as well as the operators? For example, *ideau* (a single-mother shared house in Osaka made from a remodeled *nagaya* tenement) has successfully created a housing community by preemptively cultivating a specific SMSH community via social media. It took two years for *ideau* to open: during that period, they enhanced members' mutual understanding through events and workshops before providing the actual housing after deciding on the occupants at the final stage.

Given the normal practice of using vacant houses and opening them based on practical aspects (securing the housing, deciding on the occupants, and creating a community), *ideau*'s reversed order of operations is highly interesting. The benefits of this method are that, with occupants selected in advance, vacancies are no longer a point of concern and management goals are easy to meet. Furthermore, because rules and communal living principles shared in advance, post-entry problems are less likely to arise. Meanwhile, disadvantages include the time required to launch the operation as well as the minimal profits; however, this is likely to be a very effective method for NPOs starting up an operation based on welfare or community-building principles.

<b>Location</b>	<b>12 minutes on foot from Osaka Metro Kire-Uriwari Station</b>
Units	five households (pets accepted)
Rent	70,000 yen (including internet and water)
Other	If unemployed upon entry, rent is reduced to 40,000 yen for up to two months until employment is secured

***Table 10.1: Overview of ideau***

## **MULTIGENERATIONAL HOUSING BEYOND THE CONCEPT OF ONE FAMILY PER HOUSE**

Kuzunishi (2021) conducted a survey on the actual situation of multi-family shared houses. Glendale Jiyugaoka, located in Tokyo's Jiyugaoka district, is a multigenerational shared house which opened in 2019. As of April 2021, its residents included two single-mother households, one single woman, one international student, and four older people (aged 95, 94, 93, and 71).

Ito Keiko, CEO of the managing company, Happiness Lands Inc., created this house using existing stock: "we need an environment where older people can live in their own way, in a context as close to their own home as possible" (Kuzunishi, 2021, p. 77).

There are also group homes specifically meant for older people in Japan, but as the residents age over time, it becomes difficult for them to support one another. The company examined the potential benefits of establishing diverse households that include but are not limited to older people. Opinions from older people on the concept of multigenerational housing are best exemplified by that of one respondent who said that "young people nearby bring energy, but it would burden them to have them taking care of us all the time" (Kuzunishi, 2021, p. 78). By developing policy based on interviews of this kind, they arrived at a framework in which the older people cover costs while the young people are as involved as possible in house management in exchange for low rents. Finally, they took two adjoining houses and made one into a residential home for older people and the other into a shared house for

younger people. Costs for the older people include entrance fees ranging from zero to three million yen (repaid over five years) and monthly rents in three possible plans determined by the entrance fee amount (218,000 yen, 278,000 yen, or 360,000 yen). Shared house rents vary according to room size from 50,000 to 109,000 yen, which is considered very reasonable given that its location is only 12 minutes from Jiyugaoka on foot.

International students are able to live rent-free in return for doing part-time work cleaning and preparing meals. Shared house residents can be entitled to dinner on weeknights for an additional 26,000 yen. Before the coronavirus pandemic, residents would gather in the dining room to eat together. Residents would also hold birthday parties, as well as other events such as Christmas and New Year's. Unfortunately, the coronavirus caused active interaction to be minimized; even so, many residents seem to find it helpful to have others nearby.

For instance, one resident had started working from home due to workplace policy but found it difficult to make progress when their small child was making noise. Another resident noticed the issue and offered to look after the child, allowing for the worst difficulties to be overcome. A different resident lived in the shared house and performed house work services, using the extra time to study for promotion exam and achieve financial independence.

In a little less than two years since Glendale's opening, one of the older residents has already passed away; he was able to enjoy a full life within the house until the end. Ito, the CEO, received heartfelt thanks from the deceased resident's family and said that she felt convinced that "we can make more out of the potential for living with someone, not with family, yet not alone" (Kuzunishi, 2021, p. 78).

**Table 10.2: Overview of Glendale Jiyugaoka**

Location	12 minutes on foot from Toyoko Line Jiyugaoka Station
Units	five households (pets accepted)
Rent	50,000 to 109,000 yen (including Internet and water)

Location	12 minutes on foot from Toyoko Line Jiyugaoka Station
Other	Weeknight dinner service available for 26,000 yen.

## SINGLE-MOTHER SHARED HOUSING AS A SPACE FOR INCLUSION

According to NPO members, consultations with single mothers involve serious matters such as “I have nowhere to go if I leave,” “I’m staying temporarily in a hotel/with friends,” “I need to get away from my violent husband right now,” “my child is disabled, can we still move in?,” “can I still move in if I’m on welfare?,” “can I still move in if my child is in high school or older?,” and so on (Kuzunishi & Murosaki, 2016, p. 195). Further, various issues after entry have arisen, including mothers with mental illness, which can cause difficulties with cohabitation. If measures are taken too late and the problems worsen, the operators face further issues and profitability falls.

Since 2019, the NPO National Single Parent Residential Support Cooperative has comprehensively increased its operator information network. Common issues have also become clear on a chronological axis, from establishment through entrance support and during residence. Interaction among operators and accumulated case studies are provided as feedback for operators and made use of in operations.

In the last few years, some operators have collaborated with local companies and raised funds via donations to provide free meals and shelter or to create food banks. In addition, free cram schools have been established in some cases to ensure that children have a place to be. These initiatives are innovative in their focus on supporting not only residents but also local households with children and older people.

As seen above, the role of SMSH is not only to provide shelter simply as a physical residence space but also to create knowledge and know-how on working within the gaps in the system, eventually confronting issues faced by residents at the level of residential and regional welfare by establishing a network that opens up housing to communities within the framework of the commons.

SMSH doesn't have a massive housing demand and is regarded as a minor factor in the local housing market. However, it is an urban space for inclusion that can accept various social classes such as ethnic minorities, sexual minorities, single mothers, and members of low-income groups. Such a space enhances the markets' resilience and improves the vitality of the urban economy. This is to say that, while the market for these spaces is small, their impact on society is enormous. In this context, SMSH is an indispensable player in the housing market with a significant public value in urban spaces.

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# Digital Transformations in Planning: An Australian Context

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## INTRODUCTION

Australian cities face numerous housing challenges, the most prominent of which is the housing shortage faced by the country over the past three decades (Yates and Wulff, 2005). Indeed, up to 2009, it was estimated that approximately 180,000 additional dwellings were needed

to meet housing demand (NHSC, 2010). However, to date, this gap has since continued to widen (Phillips and Joseph, 2017; Pawson, 2020). Today, the disparity between housing supply and demand has become a highly topical subject. It has been credited as the root cause of the housing stress<sup>1</sup> experienced by many Australians (Rahman and Harding, 2014). Most recently, the Australian Institute of Health and Welfare (2021) estimated that, in 2018, approximately 17% of Australians spent over 30% of their gross annual incomes on housing costs, with a more concerning 5.5% of the population spending more than half of their incomes on housing. This figure had risen year-on-year since 1994, when 13.8% of Australians were considered to be under housing stress (see Fig. 11.1; AIHW, 2021).




Fig. 11.1: Housing Stress in Australia between 1994 and 2018. Figure adapted from ABS, 2019

This is an issue that has become particularly pressing when considered in terms of demographic characteristics and geography. Not surprisingly, it was noted that lower-income households disproportionately feel housing stress; in more urban regions, close to 48% of low-income households were considered to be under some financial stress concerning housing costs (ABS, 2019; AIHW, 2021). Having been poorly addressed, these issues have continued to contribute to numerous urban challenges. In many Australian cities today, issues such as homelessness, housing affordability, and increasingly disparate

intergenerational home-ownership rates have become the most tangible symptoms of the housing crisis (Yates and Bradbury, 2010; Parsell and Marston, 2012; Wood et al., 2015; Wilkins & Lass 2018). Moreover, coupled with their persistence over time, these issues have made achieving urban equity amongst the country's most vulnerable demographic groups all the more difficult.

However, despite these longstanding consequences, housing delivery in Australia remains hindered by a multiplicity of unresolved factors. These include land supply issues, zoning and development restrictions, lengthy planning processes, and a lack of coordination between the development bodies overseeing infrastructure and housing delivery (Gurran and Bramley, 2017; Phillips and Joseph, 2017; Murray, 2020). Pawson et al. (2021) add that, whilst increasing capacity for home building is undoubtedly crucial, housing policies addressing it need to be more carefully considered to ensure the consistency of housing delivery and its accessibility across all demographic groups both financially and geographically.

If we consider these issues more tangentially, it can be argued that the facilitation of better housing delivery is crucially lacking in the critical exchange of data and information surrounding the housing stock at present. Indeed, for housing development processes in Australia to be more efficient and transparent, critical pathways to improved data management, visualization, and analysis of housing stock need to be considered (Pettit et al., 2017). This is a gap that has not been fully addressed yet and which has contributed detrimentally to housing delivery in the country. In fact, up to more recent years, aspects of data management and analytical communication had been relatively overlooked. This has since changed, with an increase in the digitization of planning data and the proliferation of analytical tools that seek to create more data-driven and responsive urban services (Barns, 2018).

These linkages between digitization and housing are explored more deeply in this chapter with respect to housing data as a critical resource in the digital transformation of planning in Australia. Opportunities that accompany this shifting paradigm are discussed with a view toward potentially shifting planning practice through the introduction of a

singular housing database for Australia. In this context, we detail how citizen-centered approaches in this ongoing transformation may facilitate more granular communication around current housing development conditions, greater community engagement and ownership, and the democratization of planning technology and data that enable greater community participation. Furthermore, it we show how such a platform may facilitate the essential exchange of knowledge that precedes development and delivery.

## **BACKGROUND**

In 2020, the Planning Institute of Australia released a statement on the guiding principles for the future of digital planning systems. It was noted in the report that, whilst there had been a marked proliferation of tech- and data-driven planning assistance tools, there were reformations of Australia's underlying digital data infrastructure that also needed to be considered (PIA, 2020). Indeed, it has since become clear that, given the increasing digitization across all domains of planning and development, strategic decisions need to be made in both data administration and operationalization. These are pressing requirements that shed light on the central role that national governments must play in this ongoing transformation (Dunleavy and Margetts, 2015) which, ultimately, will shape the future models of Australia's data governance. Considering this, Pettit, Lieske, and Jamal (2017) posited that approaches to the development of data management systems and downstream analytical tools needs to be more collaborative. They put forward the notion that government agencies (as data providers) and external agents (as the developers of these necessary toolkits) both require mutual support in identifying and addressing a city's national development priorities.

This integral step was also noted by Barns (2018, p. 5), who suggests that, whilst a more cooperative dynamic was essential, national government also needed more tactical direction in their "curation and management of data assets to support strategic [planning] priorities." In this vein, there is a growing call for the government to foster a more enabling environment in the co-design and co-development of digital

platforms in Australia. As such, policies that underpin this movement need to be aligned across all sectors (Barns et al., 2017). In this process, there may be more opportunities for individuals, institutions, and commercial entities to aid with and co-create data-driven approaches and formulate solutions that can meet the remit of future development planning goals. Goldsmith and Crawford (2014) and Barns (2018) maintain that this will require current data custodians to recognize the value of open public data, prioritize their access, and work towards their standardization; this, in turn, may dramatically boost innovation in a way that has not yet been realized in Australia.

Globally, the digital transformation of planning and city data has in fact now become almost commonplace. In cities around the world, access to key information on the city has burgeoned in the form of city dashboards. For example, in the United Kingdom's London CityDashboard, climate sensors and real-time public transport and traffic data are integrated into a single interface (De Lange, 2018; Li et al., 2020; Young et al., 2021). Additionally, in San Diego, the PerformSD dashboard summarizes key metrics on public service performance, crime, transportation, and other important socioeconomic data obtained from numerous public service departments that pertains to the progress and improvements of numerous policy indicators (City of San Diego, 2021). In Australia, similar work on city dashboards has also been undertaken (e.g., the Sydney City Dashboard by the University of New South Wales) to offer citizens a single point of access to similar data (Pettit et al., 2017). These examples provide their citizens ready visualizations of key city information; this provision allows citizens to make informed decisions about engaging with their environment, and these choices can ultimately be quantified in their feedback (Reponen, 2017).

However, as pointed out by Kitchen et al. (2016), caution should be observed given the level of abstraction that accompanies the representation of city data and given the choice of what data is presented. Further, it has also been suggested by Mattern (2013) and Barns (2018) that these initiatives provide citizens only superficial access to data. Instead, separately, they suggested that more value could perhaps be gained should citizens or other development agents be allowed access to government data, in addition to being given choices

about its utilization (Kitchin and McArdle, 2016). Platforms that offer these services, colloquially named data stores, place less emphasis on the moderation and selective communication of data, leaning instead towards open or paid access to a larger gamut of data formats to all user types (Barns, 2018). These platforms are aligned with the “Government as a Platform” digital strategy, where the delivery of data is completed through shared registers and APIs. Yet at the same time, their downstream use remains undetermined (ref. Fig. 11.2; O’Reilly, 2011; Al-Ani, 2017). The objective here can be loosely articulated as to make available the widest diversity of data at the largest volume to the highest number of people. This is reflected in their “one-to-many structure”, wherein numerous distinct applications can be derived from the same datasets (Pope, 2019).




Fig. 11.2: A possible schema of use for data stores in Australia.

Considering this, data stores need to be designed around the needs of the user given the far-reaching impacts that alterations or modifications can have on services and the analytical models that depend on it. However, there presently also remain numerous challenges to making data stores operational both in Australia and globally. As indicated by Lopez et al. (2012) in their development of QuerioCity—an integrated database of city data—critical structural, functional, and semantic considerations must be made to make the integration of existing datasets possible. They stress that urban data is often highly disparate and exists in multiple formats and structures. Consequently, datasets ingested into data stores need to be restructured, linked, and made relational to meet the primary objective of creating a single comprehensive data ecosystem (Pan et al., 2016; Schieferdecker, 2016).

This includes the creation of a common semantic structure across dataset properties that allows rapid queries to be made by users, instead of a manual “mapping” of attributes within these large datasets (Schieferdecker, 2016).

Critically, this remains a difficult task as it may be unrealistic at present for many data custodians to adopt a single schema. These challenges appear to be ubiquitous and are also applicable to Australia (O’Reilly, 2011; Al-Ani, 2017; Gil-Garcia and Henman, 2019). Here, key city data are also held by a diverse set of custodians in an even more varied range of formats. For example, Geoscape Australia, the national provider of location data, offers numerous data products that include key building attributes (e.g., building footprints, materials, height, area), land parcel data (e.g., land ownership, zoning codes, valuation information), and geocoded address files; however, these exist as separate datasets that need to be queried individually. The resulting datasets include numerous data forms (CSV, GeoJSON, JSON, ESRI shapefiles, etc.) that will also need to be made relational. Utilizing these datasets and ensuring their interoperability requires significant time costs for processing and restructuring.

Specific housing datasets in Australia are also highly disparate and disjointed. There is often little information on the housing stock available to the general public; and, where data is available, they are fragmented or available only on an aggregated scale. Furthermore, these datasets are only made fully available through a paid subscription, which adds an additional barrier to both research and the development of downstream tools. Furthermore, should these datasets be utilized in tandem with other relevant datasets from other major providers such as the Australia Bureau of Statistics or the Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Group, subsequent analyses may become less granular given the varying levels of data aggregation. As a result, there are numerous bureaucratic and procedural barriers facing researchers and policymakers alike if they desire to implement evidence-based planning and downstream analytical modelling in the country.

# AN INTEGRATED AUSTRALIAN HOUSING DATA PLATFORM

The challenges mentioned above distill only a minute part of the multidimensional challenges researchers and policymakers face in obtaining and operationalizing available housing data in Australia. These challenges often manifest themselves tangibly in the coordination between developmental and institutional agents, which invariably leads to disruption and delay in activities related to housing delivery. Further, given the current pace of growth and urbanization in the country, there is mounting pressure on resource allocation and planning capacities for much-needed housing delivery. These are issues that the national government has recognized, and with smart infrastructure and planning policies now introduced (e.g., New South Wales [NSW] Smart Infrastructure Policy and Smart Places Strategy), active calls for technology-focused, citizen-centered approaches are now being made (Brown, 2012; Pettit et al., 2017). Moreover, since its introduction, the NSW Government's smart city development policies have stimulated many discussions on rethinking how the country's planning and development systems and processes can be enhanced (Pettit et al., 2015; Yigitcanlar, 2020). Despite this, however, a more systematic and coordinated means to facilitate these vital exchanges has yet to be developed or adopted.

Nevertheless, opportunities to address these issues do exist with particular respect to the nation's ongoing pursuit of the digital transformation of its planning system. Here, there is potential not only to remedy Australia's need for a coordinated system of data management and exchange, but there are also actionable avenues to create more efficient, transparent, and responsive systems than those that already exist today. In particular, it is believed that tangible change can be affected by the consolidation of the diverse existing housing datasets, the maintenance of their relevance and validity, and the prioritization of data accessibility for all stakeholders, including the general public. These activities are integral in promoting several required downstream activities concerning Australia's housing data: first, they facilitate the standardization of common built-environment

data, sources, and processes to allow data integration and interoperability between multiple platforms and applications; second, they allow for more rapid large-scale data exchanges to be made from a single platform without the need for lengthy pre-processing steps. By reducing the impact of these initial impediments, the development of such a data governance system would inevitably be valuable in promoting and expediting innovation and development in terms of policymaking and other high-value technological advancements.




Fig. 11.3: Conceptualization of the Australian Housing Data Analytics Platform, its functionality, users, and services.

These are the opportunities and challenges recognized by the University of New South Wales City Futures Research Centre in their ongoing development of a novel Australian Housing Data Analytics Platform (AHDAP). AHDAP seeks to address Australia's housing data disparity by creating a consolidated and harmonized housing data governance model. In its current stage of development, AHDAP is a federated data platform capable of large-scale ingestion, standardization, and management of all digital data on housing and the built environment in the country. This includes the integration of the many existing and varied datasets held by individual custodians across the nation. For the

first time in Australia, the platform connects numerous critical private and public institutions in academia, industry, and government who also recognize the concerted effort required to deliver and implement such a novel data governance model in the country.

AHDAP is able to overcome the current shortfalls of data management in Australia through several essential tracks. First, by harmonizing the large mass of housing data in accordance with global management standards (Kresse and Fadaie, 2013), rapid, multiscale, and multidimensional analysis and simulations can be implemented using previously disjointed datasets to evaluate and substantiate future development scenarios more holistically. Moreover, this addresses present redundancies for policymakers and researchers by commissioning surveys to repeatedly collect the same data used downstream. As a result, significant time and opportunity costs associated with such activities are effectively minimized with a single trusted repository. The breadth of data and the ease with which it can be rapidly obtained and analyzed using AHDAP are central to accelerating policy evaluation and development delivery; however, more importantly, they are crucial to better understanding the linkages between housing, communities, and underlying land use dynamics. Indeed, for policy and research in Australia to be relevant, they must be supported by data that allows for timely and dynamic interventions at the correct locations and spatial scales.

Second, with its planned suite of analytical and decision support toolkits, the development of AHDAP holds significant potential for improving the interrogation of current and future housing development scenarios. In particular, the integration of the proven and validated RAISE and WhatIf? toolkits that preceded AHDAP creates an extensive capacity to hypothesize and simulate possible development futures with regard to land and property value changes, infrastructure allocation, and real-time development decision support (Pettit et al., 2015, 2020). These are critical insights that are often inadequately addressed in reviews of the complex land supply, demand, and allocation issues that have contributed to the country's current housing delivery situation. The advancement of these indispensable tools creates opportunities to develop and elevate current metrics to account for these issues, and to communicate and visualize more effectively the impact of planning and development choices with

respect to aspects such as mobility, accessibility, well-being, and diversity, which are fundamental dimensions of the lived experience of Australians. These outputs are made accessible by AHDAP to essential development stakeholders and agents, as well as to the general public, where such data can inform and empower citizens through the insights gained from such spatial intelligence.




Fig. 11.4: The newly launched Colouring Sydney Platform, as part of the Colouring Cities Research Programme, as novel tool for collecting voluntary geographic information and increasing public participation.

Finally, with the integration of Colouring Australia—a collaboration with the Alan Turing Institute’s Colouring Cities Research Programme—AHDAP can leverage new public engagement methodologies and data collection approaches. The Colouring Australia tool was born from the acknowledgement that obtaining accurate and granular building-level attributes is not typically feasible given that it is an onerous exercise. As such, Colouring Australia is positioned as a novel citizen science platform that is able to rapidly collect and disseminate voluntarily provided geographical information on Australia’s building stock. Indeed, amidst the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, digital engagement has become further legitimized and its role in enabling better outreach to

more traditionally excluded audiences has been proven. Diversity and inclusion are central themes in its design and development; this can be seen in its focus on the “local” with data collection and inputs open to almost all demographic groups. As such, it allows local communities to both contribute voluntary geographical information and validate data within their local environment in a way that does not require extensive digital training.

These benefits of this are multifold; primarily, in light of aspirations to encourage participatory policy and solution formulation for local urban challenges, the empowerment and data ownership gained from this engagement are important to increasing support for and trust in Australia's planning processes. In a similar vein, community engagement and data collection through this citizen science space offer a more novel approach to enhancing data granularity and accuracy, which will ultimately be used to improve the current data offering in AHDAP and elevate the accuracy of its corresponding toolkits. Further, as part of the Colouring Cities Research Programme,<sup>2</sup> the platform is approached in highly collaborative ways with both global and local research institutions, which allows for significant knowledge exchange in terms of both policy and operationalization. This also includes peer-reviewed work on data analytics and machine learning models to ensure the development and deployment of rigorous toolkits for all cities. Ultimately, there is vast potential for a singular housing data platform such as AHDAP to herald a new shift in the way communities, public stakeholders, and development agents in Australia engage with technology and data throughout the entire planning and development process.

## CONCLUSIONS

In this chapter, we have discussed the changing landscape of planning and development in Australia. First, we have indicated how critical data is as a commodity for policy makers and other development agents when it comes to creating more value and driving innovation in tech- and data-driven services and applications. In this respect, we have highlighted how widening access to data for these key user groups may

aid in identifying key areas of improvements and development, particularly in the realm of Australia's housing delivery. With this in mind, we have introduced the Australian Housing Data Analytics Platform, which is a digital platform in its infancy. The platform is able to support urban researchers, policy makers, and industry by providing access to a comprehensive array of data and decision-support tools that assist in addressing the challenges facing the Australian housing market, including housing supply, affordability, and stress. The platform endeavors to follow the PlanTech principles developed by the Australian Planning Institute, including the directive that digital planning infrastructure should be public infrastructure built with open technology. In this chapter, we have also outlined one of the key digital components comprising AHDAP, Colouring Australia. This open-source digital platform provides a means for democratizing access and contributions to knowledge of the city through a crowdsourcing approach. This platform conceives of data as a public good and enables citizens to access information and analytics in a way that is not currently possible in the country. The next steps in the development of AHDAP are to improve the accessibility of a wider range of digital housing assets across Australia which in themselves provide public value by supporting evidenced-based decision making and improved planning of our cities.

1. Housing stress is identified in households that spend over 30% of gross income on housing costs ABS, 2019.
2. Current (2021) partners include The American University of Beirut (Lebanon), The University of Bahrain and Bahrain Authority for Culture and Antiquities (Bahrain), The University of New South Wales (Australia), University College London and the Alan Turing Institute (London), The National Technical University of Athens (Greece), and The Leibniz Institute for Ecological Urban and Regional Development (Germany).

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# Smart and Sustainable? Capitalism and City Futures in the Age of Crisis

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## INTRODUCTION

*"Technocratic systems and policy design logics emerge from social and value-laden settings; neither materializes from a mythical purity of logic but is fashioned in politically and epistemically contested environments."*  
(Hartley, 2020, p. 237).

Because a city is inseparable from its economic context, its analysis must be positioned in relation to the current and future forms of capitalism that define it. Examining the commonly deployed "sustainable" and

“smart” narratives of city visioning, this chapter argues that the seemingly revolutionary tone of such narratives belies the fact that they represent no meaningful departure from capitalist logic and are thus likely to perpetuate existing policy problems. Market fundamentalism, even when obscured or blunted by these seemingly progressive narratives, replicates existing power structures while making the by-products and failures of status-quo capitalism politically palatable—even in the face of growing economic inequality and existential threats like climate change, pandemics, and human exploitation.

The term “sustainable” is often conceived in a broad sense, encompassing not only environment and energy but also softer factors like social inclusion and disaster resilience. The term “smart” is also becoming similarly broad and vague, moving beyond its original focus on technology to encompass the way governments claim to conceptualize and approach policy problems. Emerging narratives around the future of cities suggest that these concepts are related and play similar roles as discursive frames. For example, the ASEAN Smart Cities Framework combines both in its vision for inclusive urban growth: “a smart city is also equivalent to a ‘smart sustainable city’, promoting economic and social development alongside environmental protection through effective mechanisms to meet the current and future challenges of its people, while leaving no one behind” (MFA, 2018).

The current language around both concepts appears to signify a shift in narrative focus from growth and capital accumulation to social equity and wellbeing. This shift leverages a variety of emergent ideas and properties such as the creation of new “public values” in policy practice. However, despite efforts to reframe legacy concepts (ostensibly for political purposes), there exists an underlying capitalist logic that reflects a longstanding faith in the primacy of the market, including the idea that market efficiency can deliver economic growth and the public goods needed to achieve loftier goals like social inclusion. This chapter’s critical provocation is that the concepts of “sustainable,” “smart,” and their variants are imbued with a capitalist logic that reproduces itself even amidst a profound loss of credibility borne of anomalous data (Kuhn, 2012 [1962]) and increasingly wicked and intractable crises (Head, 2019).

One example of capitalist logic in policy action is the corporate power that informs discourses around sustainability and smartness. The innovative capacity of the private sector enjoys an increasing degree of credibility in producing market-based solutions to policy problems. For example, pilot projects like Sidewalk Toronto promote a totalizing technocratic vision that goes beyond the once specific and ring-fenced parameters of discrete smart cities technologies. This “city in a box” approach, valorized in utopian claims about smartness, masquerades as an integrated solution to urban problems while, at its core, advancing private development interests; more colloquially, the smart city idiom can be seen as a land grab. Sustainable and smart may thus be used by corporate actors as branding schemes for projects that rely on the privatization and financialization of public space. In this way, the logic of capitalism has been embedded in narrative-based policy revisioning from its inception, enjoying the credibility of “common-sense” efficiency but perpetuating pathologies that work against the notion of public goods.

Given these limitations, how can the scholarly discussion about sustainability and smartness be reshaped? There is a need for more critical approaches such as those taken by Datta and Odendaal (2019) and Kuecker and Hartley (2020), not only within the academy but also in practitioner circles. At the same time, efforts to redefine and reshape these narratives are already occurring on multiple fronts, including political critiques of the neoliberal and market-fundamentalist logic underlying the sustainability and smart movements. Adding further nuance to these critiques, this chapter goes beyond arguments about the corporate capture of policy agendas to discuss how narratives themselves become institutionally embedded. This discussion seeks to deepen understandings about the mechanics by which particular narratives maintain their hegemonic position within a broader policy discourse—one that shrewdly presents itself as progressive, adaptable, and politically responsive even as its claims are undermined by inconvenient realities. This chapter further argues that the perpetuation of staid capitalist logic within these seemingly revolutionary policy narratives reflects, in part, the underlying influence of policy-instrumental rationalism—the view that complex problems can be reduced to observable elements and solved with policy interventions

that are appropriately targeted, designed, and calibrated (Hartley & Kuecker, 2021). The remainder of this chapter discusses the institutionalization of governance reform narratives and how the promotion of sustainable and smart as reconstituted iterations of “good governance” serves capitalist ideals.

## **DOUBLING DOWN: THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF GOVERNANCE NARRATIVES**

When exploring how narratives like sustainable and smart have become institutionalized in global policy discourse, it is helpful to consider the historical evolution of public administrative practice and the effect of political realities on how good governance is conceived of at any given time. The concept of a politics-administration divide, mainstreamed into policy scholarship over a century ago, gave rise to professionalization and managerialization in the public sector and thus created space for the emergence of efficiency and optimization as governance virtues. The promotion of an instrumental-rationalist policy epistemic and its expression in the good governance narrative enjoyed substantial institutional backing in the post-WWII Bretton Woods era (Anders, 2005; Stiglitz, 2000). Amidst the fallout of the war, countries were eager to establish a global economic system that would ensure practical interdependence and thereby forestall geopolitical instability. While some of the principles on which the Bretton Woods system was based, including the backing of the United States dollar with gold, have since been abandoned, the ideas and institutions (including the World Bank and International Monetary Fund) that emerged from that formative era endure today and remain highly influential in how the global economic system and associated policy efforts operate. The evolution of these ideas and their influence on governance practice since WWII illustrates how narratives like sustainability and smartness protect a long-running ideological commitment to capitalism that adapts to circumstantial imperatives while maintaining epistemic coherence.

In the wake of WWII, fiscal commitments and development aid were mobilized to assist rebuilding efforts, while in the United States the wartime production apparatus was reconfigured for peacetime. The 1950s and 1960s were a period of high economic growth across the Western world and elsewhere, supporting substantial tax-funded public investment in development projects (e.g., poverty alleviation, infrastructure, and research capacity; see Eisinger, 1988 and Devine, 1985). However, this well-resourced machine of government intervention and its deepening relationship with the private sector encountered turbulence amidst a confluence of factors. Emerging in the late 1960s, these factors included economic challenges (e.g., oil price fluctuations) and, primarily in some Western countries (where many scholarly ideas about governance were originating), socio-political contention arising from unresolved racial injustices. The post-war Anglo (American, British, and Commonwealth) model of government intervention faced substantial political pushback as fiscal and social crises arose and the legitimacy of government institutions was challenged. From this backlash and the accompanying crisis of trust in institutions (Dalton, 2005) emerged criticisms about the size and role of government.

These critiques were accompanied by seismic shifts in normative views about the public sector, with the concept of New Public Management (NPM) emerging as a prescriptive vision for reform. The NPM era saw substantial reforms in governance (Christensen & Lægreid, 1999; Hood, 1995), enabled by a global institutional architecture that embraced the capitalist principles of privatization and marketization in the same way that the principles of systemic economic interconnectedness arising from the Bretton Woods agreements had been embraced decades prior. Gaining pace in the UK, New Zealand, and the United States, among other countries, NPM reforms had the advertised effect of fiscally disciplining government interventions.

Despite the advertised virtues of NPM, critics argued that the adoption of associated reforms had the effect of “gutting” or “hollowing-out” state capacity (Clifton, 2014; Christensen & Lægreid, 2002)—particularly with respect to programs like social support, education, and infrastructure. While such reforms, in various manifestations across

countries, continue to be promoted decades later in political discourses about government waste and inefficiency, many scholars and practitioners have pushed for the reassertion of the state in public affairs. For example, scholarship has proposed so-called ‘post-NPM’ models (Christensen, 2012) including new public governance (Osborne, 2006) and new public service (Denhardt and Denhardt, 2015); these alternatives underscore the role of the state while recognizing the value of multi-sectoral models for public service delivery. If the ideological pendulum had swung towards government intervention in the post-WWII era, and towards a pro-market model in the NPM era, the post-NPM pendulum settled somewhere in the middle—recognizing capacities not only in the public and private sectors but also in the “third sector” (e.g., community groups and non-government organizations).

Considering the state of NPM and post-NPM in the third decade of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, ideas about government appear to be shaped increasingly by manifold and convergent systemic crises including climate change (which gained mainstream policy recognition only in the past two decades), threats to national and personal safety and security with both local and global dimensions, the fragility of the global economic system (as illustrated by the 2008 global financial crisis), and the COVID-19 pandemic. These crises highlighted global economic, political, and social interconnectedness and the influence of geopolitics on efforts to address systemic crises (Watson et al., 2020). Responses included global policy initiatives and frameworks like the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), New Urban Agenda, Addis Ababa Action Agenda, Paris Agreement, and Sendai Framework. Amidst these crises, however, there remains no consensus about the efficacy of NPM versus that of post-NPM, and neither “camp” appears to have conclusively captured the political or policy discourse.

Each of these political-ideological movements claims to have an exclusive claim to good governance, illustrating how the concept can be an empty signifier while still serving as a flexible and adaptable political tool. The contents of the concept—however non-substantive they may be—have been robustly explored and need no review here; the dynamics by which good governance deepens its influence invite novel critical reflection. The conduits for spreading ideas about good

governance, as previously mentioned, include the global institutional constellation of aid organizations and the numerous governance indices that have proliferated since the early 2000s (Erkkilä, 2016; Gisselquist, 2014). At the same time, it is pertinent to consider how narratives like good governance continue to find new pathways for influence and what these processes reveal about power dynamics and the political economy of sustainability and smartness.

Good governance is a concept that was not promoted simply through institutional coercion (e.g., tied or conditional aid; see Svensson, 2003) but through the implicit consensus of a narrative built around plausible if nebulous ideas that ultimately became seen as common-sense government. This narrative ossification can be observed not only in the concept of good governance but also in other largely unassailable concepts like capitalism and democracy. For all their virtues and faults, these concepts are practically incapable of being criticized or rethought at the mainstream level—least of all in politically or economically liberal (free) settings—and the consequent narrative hegemony bounds how society re-thinks legacy ideas and incorporates alternative ones. Colloquially, the house can be torn down only with the tools used to assemble it; alternative epistemics and understandings have no terminological analogue with the dominant paradigm, and they are thus so mismatched with reality that they are dismissed as effete and irrelevant. An example is how so-called “alternative knowledges” (e.g., folk, local, or indigenous understandings about society and “nature”) are marginalized by the heavily technocratic view of climate change resilience, as illustrated by the SDG project and its hundreds of progress indicators (Hartley, 2020; Kuecker, 2018).

New trends in global governance harbor the legacy of this hegemonic thinking, branching in various disciplinary directions while carrying a common underlying (capitalist) theme. For example, the global urban collaboration movement stresses knowledge exchange among cities, with networks addressing domain-specific policy issues like urban sustainability, migration, technological “modernization,” and governance practice (Kosovac et al., 2021; Leitner et al., 2018; Acuto et al., 2017). This network model has a deep history originating with city “twinning” and city diplomacy (Acuto et al., 2021), and this strategy has

matured in both theory and practice to the extent that it now stands as a powerful policymaking template connecting global and local governance (including, for example, SDG “localization;” Hartley, 2020). Members of such networks in the formative epoch were cities that had the resources to participate—what the literature and casual understandings now consider “global” cities. These cities are seen to be policy leaders on issues like urban sustainability and socio-political issues; examples are New York City, London, Los Angeles, Paris, Singapore, and other “Alpha” world cities (as classified by the Globalization and World Cities Research Network). At the same time, the opportunity to participate in networks has been extended to cities that enjoy less global visibility, including smaller cities in wealthy countries and “megacities” in lower-income countries. The latter may seek opportunities for knowledge exchange to address policy issues relevant to their context, including rapid urbanization, informal housing, forced migration, and threats to the built and natural environments resulting from climate change. The global urban network model also represents an opportunity for urban governments to circumvent political pushback at the national government level and pursue policy visions that they consider appropriate for their own localities.

Despite the apparent advantages of such networks as venues for the exchange of good governance ideas, it is appropriate to apply a critical perspective when examining the underlying power dynamics of collaboration and knowledge transfer—including market fundamentalism’s influence on how policy problems are defined and addressed. While such networks can provide useful conduits for the seemingly innocuous practice of policy transfer, diffusion, and learning (for discussions of these concepts, see Hadjiisky et al., [2017], Marsh and Sharman [2009], Stone [2001], and Dolowitz & Marsh [2000]), they can also serve as institutional mechanisms for framing and promoting particular narratives and thereby generate the coercive effect of normalizing policies across member cities. As such, it is prudent to consider how seemingly novel institutional arrangements like global urban networks can in some ways reflect the same power dynamics that the Bretton Woods institutions did in promoting post-war global economic integration. In the case of urban networks, a narrative about “good urban governance” congeals around the concept of sustainability,

smartness, and other policy issues prioritized by the SDGs; the ideals of the incumbent global policy project are thus institutionalized in the urban agenda from inception (as opposed to being identified and addressed endogenously according to circumstantial or contextual need). SDG localization is becoming more deeply institutionalized through progress indicators like the “SDG tracker” and through the embrace of voluntary local reviews (VLRs; see Oosterhof, 2018). When interpreted as a socio-political system, the global narrative on sustainability is—as it would be for almost any policy issue—buttressed by the power of self-imposed conformity resembling Foucault’s governmentality: the pressure felt by city network members to comply with apparent consensus or mainstream narratives.

The prospects and risks of narrative hegemony are apparent in an era when governments of all scales must confront the local impacts of global crises. Cases of “economic miracles” like the so-called Asian Tigers (South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore) evince the crucial role of the state in providing infrastructure and facilitating coordination in ways that catalyze structural economic transformation. Pro-market and anti-state narratives appear to ignore this history but nevertheless enjoy deep embeddedness in the underlying logic of good governance as measured by the most common global indices. Countries whose governance systems reflect some compromise between pro-market and pro-state extremes are less legible to the common metrics of good governance; indeed, these systems may be seen as messy and “prismatic” (Riggs, 1964) hybrids that, absent conformity to known models, appear to survive by sheer force of political and administrative will—or by dumb luck. The absolutist discourse of market fundamentalism holds little of the nuance needed to understand such situations. In the policy sciences literature, this disfunction has been metaphorized various ways and resembles an inherently disordered system that maintains coherence and effectiveness despite rationalist expectations to the contrary (Hartley and Howlett, 2021). These dynamics are crucial for understanding how capitalist logic lurks even in seemingly novel policy movements like sustainability and smartness. The final section of this chapter presents a more detailed discussion about how sustainability and smartness have been metricized and their

governance managerialized—trends reflecting the aforementioned phenomenon of narrative hegemony.

## **METRICIZING URBAN GOVERNANCE: THE SUSTAINABILITY AND SMARTNESS PERSPECTIVES**

The pursuit of the SDGs has become managerialized through the introduction of over 200 indicators that practicalize the 17 goals. This effort enforces a type of soft accountability upheld through performance measurement, particularly as indicator data is used to compare and rank progress. The institutionalization of indicators in the SDG progress evaluation system also serves as a normalizing mechanism that directs the attention of governments towards a common set of problem conceptualizations and policy interventions. Further, policy efforts to pursue the SDGs are no longer the domain only of national governments; cities are increasingly using the SDGs as a guiding vision for their urban plans. Such localization efforts, often publicized through VLRs, can range from general references about the SDGs at one end of the spectrum to specific incorporation of monitoring targets at the other. A universal and standardized SDG localization monitoring strategy like that which exists for national-level governments could facilitate comparison and nudge city governments towards integrated adoption of all SDGs. Nevertheless, there are practical constraints to widespread adoption, such as limited resources, political pushback, and bureaucratic concerns about centralized control. Furthermore, the unique contexts of individual cities call for the flexible interpretation of SDG strategies around a variety of disparate conditions and capabilities. Indeed, the term “localization” itself implies a degree of context-based adjustment that focuses on the needs of smaller-scale jurisdictions.

One example of a progress monitoring initiative is the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA) online registry, meant to be a platform for sharing good practices, success stories, and lessons learned regarding SDG implementation at the national and local levels. The program is supported by a database of over 400 cases and has a target

audience that includes member states and stakeholders. The searchable resource contains cases from around the world focused on the local scale and addressing all SDGs. Examples are social and affordable housing in Bahrain (addressing the SDG for sustainable cities and communities), implementing the Sendai Framework at the local level in European Union countries (SDGs focusing on poverty, climate action, and life below water), institutionalizing community participation in urban service delivery through “design, digital, and dialogue” in Helsinki (SDGs for sustainable communities and peace, justice, and strong institutions), organic farming in a Turkish village (SDGs for gender equality, responsible consumption and production, and life on land), and New York City’s VLR (all SDGs). Examples of sharing initiatives are the “tools” and “discuss and engage” functions of the “Localizing the SDGs” platform, a joint effort by the UN Development Programme (UNDP), the UN Human Settlements Programme (UN Habitat), and the UN Global Taskforce of Local and Regional Governments.

Regarding the institutionalized sharing of best practices, New York City’s “Global Vision | Urban Action” program, managed through the Mayor’s Office for International Affairs, is implemented through site visits, panel discussions, and UN events to highlight lessons about SDG localization. It also embraces the VLR process as an opportunity to align urban policies with SDGs and communicate progress in a language meaningful to city governments embarking on similar efforts. According to a Brookings Institution report, “integrating the SDGs into the city-to-city networks in which they participate will, by sharing best practices and innovations, help to leverage needed capabilities. It will also provide a platform for elevating their voice in debates about the SDGs” (Pipa, 2019). In this way, SDG localization is seen as another opportunity to deepen coordination and knowledge-sharing, further embedding (or privileging) the perspectives and experiences of “leader” cities and producing a normalizing effect on the naming and framing of policy issues. Evidence indicates, however, that the topical focus (as largely aligned with individual SDGs) of urban networks varies. For example, a study by Tjandradewi and Marcotullio (2009) finds that, among Asian cities participating in such networks, urban leaders felt that issues pertaining to environment, health, education, and infrastructure were

more applicable to urban policy than were issues pertaining to gender empowerment, poverty, housing, finance, and economic development.

The power of narrative in establishing a global policy agenda with local implications can be seen not only in the sustainability project but also in the smartness project. In an era when technology is permeating nearly every facet of society, including governance, the commercial interests and agendas of corporate actors are making an increasingly consequential footprint in daily life and state-society relations.

Developers of smart city technologies, as profit-driven actors at their core, increasingly must balance commercial motives with softer narratives about public value, sustainability, and city futures. In this way, they have a substantial role in determining the urban policy agenda. From a more abstract perspective, urban policy as a technocratic exercise remains beholden to a capitalist logic that has in many ways been the cause of urban policy problems like socio-economic inequality and climate change. Indeed, technological solutions as profit endeavors seek ways to address the problems that capitalism itself has caused; this circularity constitutes an iron cage of ideology that may prevent policymakers from asking deeper questions about endemic policy problems.

In examining urban policy problems, a principal question is: who defines the problem and sets the agenda? In an ideal democratic setting, the agenda-setting stage of the policy process is participatory, negotiated, and discursive. However, the market-fundamentalist logic that has animated neoliberal reform agendas validates a supply-side approach to problem-definition in which the smart solutions on offer dictate which problems are identified and how they are specified. In short, smart city technologies have been promoted as solutions to artfully constructed policy problems—those that appear to rely on gathering more data and digitizing or automating urban service delivery systems. This application of smart cities perpetuates a narrow approach to problem definition that drills down on already “knowable” aspects of problems while discounting complexity in problem determinants that elude metricization and rationalization (including social and political dynamics). Narratives about policy problems focus more on what smart cities can immediately solve than on what undergirds policy failures, and

in this way such narratives lure policymakers into thinking about problems in the same ways, only even more quickly and cheaply as technology allows; the novelty lies in the method rather than in the perspective or epistemic. As such, the future of cities could be defined by how capitalist logic is redefined (or otherwise), including towards more participatory and discursive frames of governance that interrogate the foundations of systemic problems rather than relying quixotically on identifying technologically sophisticated ways that the impacts of such problems can be alleviated.

## CONCLUSION

Efforts to understand how sustainability and smartness narratives present themselves as novel while perpetuating legacy ways of thinking about policy problems invite a critical view of how governance is normatively imagined. The origins of the good governance movement hold some insights into how narratives about the primacy of constructs like capitalism (including market fundamentalism) become entrenched, morph into ideas that serve momentary political values (e.g., smart), and preserve their longstanding epistemic orientations. An assessment of this process prompts the question: “smart and sustainable *for what?*” One answer is that cities are cast by entrenched economic interests as needing sustainable and smart policies to stabilize social, political, and environmental conditions for the furtherance of the capitalist project. The credibility of this policy project is maintained through the power and privilege of an elite expert or knowledge class—not only government technocrats but also consultants, academics, and public intellectuals. According to Kuecker and Hartley (2020), “the technocrat’s ability to produce knowledge becomes a gesture through which power guides discourse about normative goals . . . this convergence of policy, technocracy, and planning points to teachable optics” (p. 521). These optics invite further critical scrutiny about capitalism as an ideological force underlying the narrative frames that shape city futures.

This chapter has critically assessed the process by which narratives about smart and sustainable governance become institutionalized and assume positions of discursive privilege. In closing, it is pertinent to note

that the exclusion of alternative epistemologies that attends this privilege is obscured by perfunctory and often patronizing overtures to participation. Kuecker and Hartley (2021) state that “the paradox of the development project was that the implementation of participatory programs required it to transform subjects into a particular version of empowered agents to serve the narrative of inclusion, but only after they had internalized long-running messages about their own inferiority and dependency” (p. 14). The discursive hegemon of instrumental rationalism, in its various branded iterations, brooks no dissent and replicates itself in both hard (institutional) and soft (rhetorical) ways; as such, it does violence to stores of knowledge and consciousness that are centuries or millennia in the making (including so-called folk or local wisdom that is often found in indigenous communities). Capitalist logic is the principal economic leitmotif within the narrative iterations of good governance and blends with instrumental rationalism to valorize a myopic market-based solutionism that never meets a problem it deems too complex. This chapter has extended this argument to explore the institutionalization of governance reform narratives and to examine how the capitalist project of good governance has reconstituted itself in the sustainable and smart movements. Efforts to re-think how capitalism shapes urban futures cannot afford to overlook more than a century of embedded economic interests and their profound influence on how society understands policy challenges.

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# Citizen-Centric Urban Governance

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## CURRENT CAPITALISM AND CITY

Due to the market economy that has emerged under capitalism, the city has continuously developed as a space that forms the core of modern civilization. State-of-the-art technology has been developed and implemented through urban socio-economics, and has consistently had a major impact on people's behavior and minds.

Modern cities have expanded through the ever-increasing power of capital, which strengthens the infrastructure and services of the public

sector that underpins it while damaging the natural environment and ecosystems in the name of social development. Due to increasing fiscal stress on the public sector and a growing awareness of the need for environmental protection, the conventional urbanization model is no longer considered valid. Moreover, even within cities, the extreme widening of income inequality has caused serious discrimination based on spatial, cultural, and psychological distinctions between people. In response to the powerlessness of citizens in today's cities, this book discusses from various angles methods that might place control in the hands of the citizens.

As society and the environment fall into crisis, discussions based on the premises of low-growth and degrowth economies are flourishing. This shows that regaining various public values that can supersede the singular value of economic growth is of crucial importance to our future development. A response to this issue is urgently required in the economic center of the “city” where diverse people and industries are gathered.

## **TOWARDS CITIZEN-CENTRIC URBAN GOVERNANCE**

In this book, we propose that both the community or civil society should play an important role in future city development, and the functions of the public sector must also respond accordingly. At this time, it is important to introduce changes to those municipalities that directly control the cities. Consequently, the policies of regional and central governments must adapt to these new criteria. This is also in line with the principle of subsidiarity advocated by the European Charter of Local Self-Government, which was adopted in 1985 (Councils of Europe, 1985). This has become a more significant reform direction now that municipalities are under fiscal stress.

The fundamental difference between the public sector (ie., national, regional, and local governments) and the private sector (which includes communities and businesses) is that the former has political and administrative power. Widely disseminated terms like public-private

partnership or public-private co-production only superficially describe the public and private sectors as just different actors. However, the public sector has the power to subdue the private sector, and it is a mistake to discuss both on the same level. This means that, even if we say how important it is to revitalize the community and local businesses, we may end up with nothing if we do not also commit to reforming the public sector. So how should the public sector, especially municipalities, change in the future?

First, if the political administration takes a pride in their city, they should consider how it should be developed and discuss their plans with the public. Part II of this book discussed the typical types of city, and each administration must correctly determine their vision for the city as described in these chapters.

Second, the universally accepted principles for the implementation of these strategies focus on laying the foundations for strengthening the community through utilizing smart technology. This can be the most important weapon to mitigate the harmful effects of the capitalist economy under which current cities exist.

Third, municipalities must promote self-reform geared toward adopting these urban policies. Until now, municipalities have been dominated by paternalistic welfare policies based on power. Public assistance for vulnerable groups is a typical example: it was a matter of course within the constraints of the times, and it is necessary to continue this policy in the future. However, such urban policies do not create community awareness. In order to strengthen the inclusiveness of the community, cities in the future will need to make major changes in urban policy from both soft and hard perspectives, as mentioned in Part III.

Fourth, the establishment of deliberative democracy can appropriately check and correct the power of municipalities. One important function of democracy is to collect a wide range of valuable information. To that end, abuse of municipal power should be constantly monitored and restrained. Otherwise, opportunities to gather information from the public so as to allow for the flow of information and the disclosure of the necessary municipal messaging would be missed. In order for the power of the municipality to function properly, it is essential to promote checks

and balances through parliamentary and public participation in the development of the municipality and the city. "Power corrupts" is a truth about human society that transcends time and society, but today this fact needs to be strongly recognized by municipalities: it is the key to innovation in the future of municipalities and the city itself.

Fifth, we must ensure constant civic learning to develop deliberative democracy in cities. As British politician James Bryce said, we need to seriously reaffirm that the best school of democracy, and the best guarantee for its success, is the practice of local self-government (Bryce 1921). Arguments throughout this book take this claim seriously. The more familiar we are with things that directly impact our lives, the harder we can work on them ourselves, and the easier it will be to exert the energy to do it. The management and consolidation of neighboring schools is of greater daily concern for individuals than the issues of the national school system. In this sense, the axiom that "all politics is local" is true, and such a stage presents the best opportunity to strengthen deliberation by the citizens. Municipal governments must actively provide such a place for citizens' learning and involvement.

It is no exaggeration to say that the future of humankind will be shaped by promoting the correct vision of the city through these new urban governance systems. When truly self-sustaining cities are realized, the era of urbanization driven by the unsustainable, exploitative, and alienating capitalist economy will be over, and a new society will begin.

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