Chapter 1: Despite the rapid growth of passive ownership over the past 30 years, there is no consensus on how or why passive ownership affects stock price informativeness. This paper provides a new answer to this question by examining how passive ownership changes investors' incentives to acquire information. I develop...
This dissertation consists of three essays that deal with problems of information acquisition and aggregation and the incentives to acquire such information. The first of the essays is titled The Timing of Complementary Innovations and studies the problem of an agent that acquires information about the viability of a project...
This dissertation comprises three essays in distinct areas of economic theory. The first chapter is co-authored with Gregorio Curello. We identify a new and pervasive dynamic agency problem: that of incentivising the prompt disclosure of productive information. To study it, we introduce a model in which a technological breakthrough occurs...
Conceptually, we can divide this dissertation into Chapter 1 which is in the tradition of information economics and comparative statics, and Chapters 2 to 4 which had all its genesis in the same project concerning identifying the value of product differentiation to consumers with minimal assumptions, and is therefore related...
Information policies are an effective way to alleviate information asymmetries, but the effectiveness of such policies depends critically on the underlying incentives people face. This dissertation is comprised of three papers that study the welfare effects of various information policies using game-theoretic models. The first paper analyzes how networks of...
In the first chapter, I present a theory of measurement of preference intensity and use this measure as a foundation for utilitarianism. To do this, I suppose each alternative is experienced over time. An individual has preferences over such experiences. I present axioms under which preferences are represented by an...
In this dissertation I examine issues related to uncertainty and robustness in game theory. In Chapter 1 a strategic setting is analyzed where players face Knightian uncertainty about the strategic choices of their opponents. That is, in contrast to the usual Bayesian framework and in line with experimental evidence, players...
This dissertation presents research on the game theory of political power, both between and within nations. It first revisits a classical distinction between three different types of power or influence: information, rewards and threats. By presenting a binary-action Principal-Agent problem which incorporates the essential ingredients of all three types of...
The fact that informational asymmetries impose a significant barrier in path of smooth functioning of markets has been well known in Economics since the 1970s. Communication and information exchange allow to mitigate these barriers to a certain extent. The existing Economic literature allows to get a good grasp of static...
Contest theory is an area of game theory that studies environments in which agents make sunk investments in order to get a prize. These investments could be money, effort, time, etc. Contest theory is used to study a wide range of applications, like political contests, research and development, advertisement campaigns,...