In my dissertation, Knowing How to Feel: mapping affective epistemologies of ignorance through numbness, I examine the ways by which numbness contributes to harmful “epistemic resilience,” or the phenomenon whereby systems of meaning remain stable despite counter evidence or attempts to alter them (Dotson 2014). I am most importantly concerned...
We often criticize people for having beliefs that are not sufficiently supported by the total available evidence. We do this even if those beliefs are instrumental to satisfying their desires. This leads to a question: why should people care about following the evidence, especially when doing so is not instrumental...
This dissertation has two main aims. The first is to show that relying on the testimony of others is not as “epistemically special” as many epistemologists have made it out to be. More specifically, I argue that relying on someone’s testimony neither provides us with a non-evidential, epistemic reason to...
